No full-text available
To read the full-text of this research,
you can request a copy directly from the authors.
Liberal fatalism, COVID 19 and the politics of impossibility
This article examines how public inquiries come into being through a detailed analysis of the pre-inquiry phase of the UK COVID-19 Inquiry. We focus on two key points of contestation—around the timing of the inquiry and its terms of reference—and suggest that what is at stake during the pre-stage of an inquiry is its ontological and epistemological orientation. Our analysis traces the emergence of two distinct positions during this phase: a grassroots position (conceiving of the inquiry as a response to the experience of collective grief) and an official position (conceiving of the inquiry as a means of learning lessons). Particular attention is given to the latter position and what it reveals about the rhetorical function of transparency in confirming a political commitment to institutional accountability, at the same time as working towards a particular conception of the inquiry as a practical task, expansive in remit, and future oriented.
This short article represents a contribution to the debate on the motion “Social science is explanation, or it is nothing.” While in the format of parliamentary debating the contribution would fall on the side of the opposition, I will not be arguing against explanation as such. The work of explaining is in no way oppositional to or mutually exclusive with critique. Instead, my contribution will revolve around two arguments: one is that both critique and explanation exhibit characteristics we commonly attribute to science; the other is that reserving the label of science for explanation draws a boundary around social sciences in ways that exclude many of the interesting things it does. Some of the examples include the sociological analysis of governmental approaches to the COVID‐19 pandemic, or critical analysis of concepts such as “cancel culture” or “terrorism.” The conclusion is that explanation and critique are mutually supporting elements of science, and that combined they give us insights we cannot glean from either alone.
Structural Injustice has become a hugely important concept in the field of political theory with the work of Iris Marion Young central to debates on what it is, what motivates it and how it should be addressed. In this article, I focus on a particular thread in Young’s account of structural injustice which I argue is all too often overlooked - the untraceability of structural injustice. This is not only a constant theme in Young’s account of structural injustice, it is, in fact, a defining feature. By ‘untraceable’, Young means that structural injustice is distinct from other sorts of injustices for which there is a traceable agent at fault – these sorts of faut-based injustices fall under what Young calls the ‘liability model of injustice’. For the purposes of exploring the concept of structural injustice, I follow the logic of the claim that structural injustice is untraceable to see where it takes us in conversation with Young’s critics. I conclude that Young’s account is not only defensible with some clarification and development but vital politically. That said, I also find Young’s account of political responsibility for structural injustice wanting and accordingly I propose a way of understanding what I see as a dynamic transition from structural to fault-based injustices which I argue Young’s more ‘static’ account fails to accommodate. This is important, I suggest, for thinking about the ways in which responsibility for different forms of injustice operate and change.
Contemporary Political Theory (2023). https://doi.org/10.1057/s41296-023-00634-4
In early 2020, COVID-19 exposed differences in public health laboratory systems’ testing abilities. Focusing on Germany, the USA and the UK between 1900 and 2020, this article argues that studying the distinct evolution of laboratory infrastructures is critical to understanding the history of infection control and the limits of template-based reforms in global health. While each analysed laboratory infrastructure was shaped by a unique national context, neoliberal visions of lean public services and declining resources led to significant reform pressure from the 1970s. The US Center of Disease Control’s model of epidemic intelligence provided an attractive template to integrate resources and focus planning on preparedness scenarios. It also helped justify cuts to local laboratory infrastructures. Effects were uneven: in the USA and the UK, improved integration failed to compensate for local laboratory cuts and loss of autonomy. By contrast, Germany’s subsidiary principle allowed for limited federal integration while leaving local services mostly intact.
The article addresses Giorgio Agamben’s critical commentary on the global governance of the Covid-19 pandemic as a paradigm of his political thought. While Agamben’s comments have been criticized as exaggerated and conspiratorial, they arise from the conceptual constellation that he has developed starting from the first volume of his Homo Sacer series. At the centre of this constellation is the relation between the concepts of sovereign power and bare life, whose articulation in the figure of homo sacer Agamben traces from the Antiquity to the present. We shall demonstrate that any such articulation is impossible due to the belonging of these concepts to different planes, respectively empirical and transcendental, which Agamben brings together in a problematic fashion. His account of the sovereign state of exception collapses a plurality of empirical states of exception into a zone of indistinction between different exceptional states and the normal state and then elevates this very indistinction to the transcendental condition of intelligibility of politics as such. Conversely, the notion of bare life, originally posited as the transcendental condition of possibility of positive forms of life, is recast as an empirical figure, whose sole form is the absence of form. We conclude that this problematic articulation should be abandoned for a theory that rather highlights the non-relation between sovereign power and bare life, which conditions the possibility of resistance and transformation that remains obscure in Agamben’s thought.
In this contribution, I present emergent analysis of a preoccupation with managing COVID-19 through border control, among non-Governmental public health actors and commentators. Through a reading of statements, tweets, and interviews from the ‘Independent Sage’ group – individually and collectively – I show how the language of border control, and of maintaining immunity within the national boundaries of the UK, has been a notable theme in the group’s analysis. To theorize this emphasis, I draw comparison with the phenomenon of ‘green nationalism’, in which the urgency of climate action has been turned to overtly nationalistic ends; I sketch the outlines of what I call ‘viral nationalism,’ a political ecology that understands the pandemic as an event occurring differentially between nation states, and thus sees pandemic management as, inter alia, a work of involuntary detention at securitized borders. I conclude with some general remarks on the relationship between public health, immunity, and national feeling in the UK.
Social theory is developing in response to the coronavirus (COVID) crisis. Fundamental questions about social justice in the relationship of individuals to society are raised by Delanty in his review of political philosophy, including Agamben, Foucault and Žižek. However, the focus on the libertarian critique of authoritarianism is not enough. The social democratic critique of neoliberalism lies at the centre of the contesting responses to the COVID crisis. A social democratic perspective on public health, democracy and state action is contrasted with the anti-statists of left and right. This is addressed in debates on the relationship between science and governance, the place of crisis in theories of change and the conceptualisation of alternative forms of social formation. The crisis initiated by the pandemic, cascading through society, from health to economy, to polity and into violence, includes a contestation between social democratic and neoliberal visions of alternative forms of society.
Brazil’s governance of the COVID-19 pandemic has been described as nothing short of tragic by several commentators. President Jair Bolsonaro’s dangerous brew of neoliberal authoritarianism, science denialism and ableism has plunged this country into catastrophe. In this article we argue that this form (or lack) of public health governance can best be described as governance without (central) government. We begin with an overview of public health governance in the country before introducing the main theoretical concepts that guide our analysis, namely the notions of ‘government by exception’ and ‘strategic ignorance’. Finally, we sketch the main features of this emerging form of (non)governance of COVID-19. We highlight the new forms of solidarity and mutual aid that have emerged in favelas and Indigenous communities, which have stepped in to fill the void left by a limited federal presence. The article concludes by reflecting on what this collapse of public health reveals about the limitations of democratic governance in the age of Bolsonaro.
The article offers a critique of the prevailing understanding of the relationship between neoliberalism and classic nineteenth-century liberalism in contemporary international political economy (IPE) and offers a redefinition inspired by Polanyi and Gramsci. Within critical IPE studies, a consensus has emerged that neoliberalism cannot be reduced to a simple attempt to roll back the economy and let loose free-market forces. However, this insight relies on contrasting neoliberalism with a classic liberalism, that is, a simple attempt to implement just this naïve laissez-faire ideology. In contrast, this article argues that nineteenth-century liberalism is also characterised by an active use of state and legislative power. Through a historical study of two cases from nineteenth-century Britain, Poor Law reform and the Gold Standard, the paper will argue that state action played a central role even during the heyday of laissez-faire liberalism. With a starting point in Polanyi’s dictum that ‘laissez-faire was planned’, this reinvestigation will point towards a need to develop a more nuanced understanding of the distinctions between economic theory, ideology, and practical policy, as well as pointing towards a general reinterpretation of the role of the state in liberal economic ideology.
We locate Arendt’s and Shklar’s writings within what Katznelson has identified as an attempt to create a new language for politics after the cataclysm of the twentieth century, and Greif has called the new ‘maieutic’ discourse of ‘re-enlightenment’ in the ‘age of the crisis of man’. More specifically, we compare and contrast two related, but in many ways also differing, ways of thinking about totalitarianism and its legal repercussions. To this end, we examine two sets of studies: Arendt’s The origins of totalitarianism and Eichmann in Jerusalem: A report on the banality of evil and Shklar’s After utopia: The decline of political faith and Legalism: An essay on law, morals, and politics. While The origins of totalitarianism and After utopia discussed totalitarian ideology and its consequences for modern political thought, the Eichmann report and Legalism dealt with the question of whether and how justice is possible after the extreme experience of totalitarianism. We argue that the maieutic impulse led Arendt and Shklar to find distinct routes to address a common concern. Our paper ends with a discussion of some of the surplus meaning that was generated by the different maieutic performances of the two thinkers.
This article explores the continuities in alcohol policy over the past decade under both Labour and Coalition governments. It is argued that these continuities reflect a neoliberal mentality of government whereby market mechanisms are maintained even when the outcomes produced are deemed undesirable. Policies to address these outcomes have focused on the individual citizen, conceived of as a potentially rational decision-maker. If exhortations to behave in the desired fashion do not reap results then measures are targeted at specific individuals or groups of individuals considered flawed consumers. The continuity is examined in light of recent commentary that has identified a trend in policymaking reflecting a loss of confidence in individual rationality and market outcomes, described variously as post-liberalism or neocommunitarianism. It is suggested that the stability of the broader underlying structures of thought that circumscribe contemporary policy discussions should not be underestimated.
This chapter describes the emergence of " global health security " as a strategic framework designed to prepare for and respond to the threat of catastrophic disease.
As agenda-setting theory moves toward its 50th anniversary, its productivity in the past and at present augurs a highly promising future. In this essay, the original theorists trace the development of agenda setting and identify seven distinct facets. They explore three of the seven facets—need for orientation, network agenda setting, and agendamelding—in greater detail because those are particularly active arenas of contemporary research. Grounded in more than 40 years of productive collaboration among the authors, this inaugural Deutschmann Scholars Essay offers numerous new ideas about recent trends in and future directions for agenda-setting theory and research. The three authors are all recipients of AEJMC's Paul J. Deutschmann Award for Excellence in Research recognizing a career of scholarly achievement. The Deutschmann scholars observed that this may well be the most original article they have ever written together.
In this article, we discuss the increasing interdependence of societies, focusing specifically on issues of systemic instability and fragility generated by the new and unprecedented level of connectedness and complexity resulting from globalization. We define the global system as a set of tightly coupled interactions that allow for the continued flow of information, capital, goods, services, and people. Using the general concepts of globality, complexity, networks, and the nature of risk, we analyze case studies of trade, finance, infrastructure, climate change, and public health to develop empirical support for the concept of global systemic risk. We seek to identify and describe the sources and nature of such risks and methods of thinking about risks that may inform future academic research and policy-making decisions.
There is a takeover movement fast gaining influence in development economics, a movement that demands that predictions about development outcomes be based on randomized controlled trials. The problem it takes up—of using evidence of efficacy from good studies to predict whether a policy will be effective if we implement it—is a general one, and affects us all. My discussion is the result of a long struggle to develop the right concepts to deal with the problem of warranting effectiveness predictions. Whether I have it right or not, these are questions of vast social importance that philosophers of science can, and should, help answer.
Drawing on narrative interviews with psychiatrists and health analysts in Britain, the article provides an analysis of debates over the safety of SSRI antidepressants such as Prozac and Seroxat. The focus of the article is on what I describe, drawing on Foucault, Nietzsche, Niklas Luhmann and Michael Power, as a 'will to ignorance' within regulatory bureaucracies which works to circumvent a regulator's ability to carry out its explicit aims and goals. After a description of the regulatory processes that have influenced the efforts of patients and practitioners to reach conclusions on the risks and benefits of antidepressants, I conclude by suggesting that the article's analysis of the regulation of SSRIs carries theoretical insights for the study of regulation and bureaucracy in general.
The financial crisis of 2007–8 was experienced and reflected upon as a crisis of knowledge, the perennial question being why nobody accurately understood the risks that were being taken within the financial sector. In the wake of the crisis, there have been demands that rational economic knowledge be extended further and more vigorously, to prevent such ignorance being possible in future. At the same time, there have been demands for a new, softer rationalism, which factors in the possibility of errors and systemic complexities. What neither approach recognizes is that ignorance is not simply the absence of rational economic knowledge, but is a productive force in itself, something that is actively nurtured and exploited, both by neo-liberal theorists such as Hayek and by expert actors who have been implicated in the financial crisis. We explore how ignorance has been alternately an albatross, a commodity and an institutional alibi to financial actors and the scholars who study them.
Ignorance and knowledge are often thought of as opposite phenomena. Knowledge is seen as a source of power, and ignorance as a barrier to consolidating authority in political and corporate arenas. This article disputes this, exploring the ways that ignorance serves as a productive asset, helping individuals and institutions to command resources, deny liability in the aftermath of crises, and to assert expertise in the face of unpredictable outcomes. Through a focus on the Food and Drug Administration's licensing of Ketek, an antibiotic drug manufactured by Sanofi-Aventis and linked to liver failure, I suggest that in drug regulation, different actors, from physicians to regulators to manufacturers, often battle over who can attest to the least knowledge of the efficacy and safety of different drugs - a finding that raises new insights about the value of ignorance as an organizational resource.
During the past two decades, the radical right has reemerged as an electoral force in Western Europe, as well as in other stable democracies such as Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. Aside from discussing the ideology of this party family and how it relates to older forms of right-wing radicalism and extremism, such as fascism, this review deals with the question of how the emergence of radical right-wing parties can be explained and why such parties have been considerably more successful among voters in some countries than in others. Possible explanations are grouped into two parts: The first consists of so-called demand-centered explanations, that is, explanations that focus on changing preferences, beliefs, and attitudes among voters. The second consists of so-called supply-side explanations, that is, explanations that focus on political opportunity structures and party organizational factors.
The recent proliferation of scholarship on collective action frames and framing processes in relation to social movements indicates that framing processes have come to be regarded, alongside resource mobilization and political opportunity processes, as a central dynamic in understanding the character and course of social movements. This review examines the analytic utility of the framing literature for understanding social movement dynamics. We first review how collective action frames have been conceptualized, including their characteristic and variable features. We then examine the literature related to framing dynamics and processes. Next we review the literature regarding various contextual factors that constrain and facilitate framing processes. We conclude with an elaboration of the consequences of framing processes for other movement processes and outcomes. We seek throughout to provide clarification of the linkages between framing concepts/processes and other conceptual and theoretical formulations relevant to social movements, such as schemas and ideology.
Given the growing prominence of nudge economics both within and beyond the academy, it is a timely moment to reassess the philosophical and political arguments that sit at its core, and in particular what Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein call libertarian paternalism. The first half of this paper provides a detailed account of the main features of this form of paternalism, before moving, in the second half, to a critical evaluation of the nudge agenda that questions, among other things, the gendered basis of paternalistic governance; the idea of ‘nudging for good’; and the political values that underpin nudge. The final section of this paper builds on the existing work of John McMahon by asking whether libertarian paternalism should be understood as a new, hybrid form of neoliberalism, or, rather, as a post-neoliberal form of governance that has emerged out of, and flourished in, the post-crisis situation.
The COVID-19 pandemic posed challenges for healthcare systems and political leaders across the globe. In this case study of Brazil, we argue that leadership failings at the highest level contributed to Brazil’s relatively high and escalating death rates during 2020. Drawing on an analysis of a large amount of textual documentation drawn from media reports, we emphasise the role and consequences of President Jair Bolsonaro’s political discourse and prioritisation of the economy. We focus on the first wave that swept across the globe between January and late June of 2020, arguing that Bolsonaro underplayed the seriousness of the epidemic, leveraged misinformation as a political strategy, promoted pseudoscience, and undermined the Ministry of Health. He also confronted subnational governments for adopting lockdown measures – a move that enabled him to blame regional governors for the short-term economic costs of COVID-19 related restrictions. We suggest that his denialist approach to climate change paved the way for his subsequent denialism of the seriousness of COVID-19 and for his undermining of social distancing, mask-wearing and other preventative responses supported by science. These sobering findings highlight the role that national leaders can play in undermining scientific approaches to both public health and the environment.
This article examines a frequent assumption of sociological accounts of knowledge: the idea that knowledge acts. The performativity of knowledge claims is here analysed through the prism of ‘sociological excuses’: the idea that sociological explanations can act as ‘excuses’ for otherwise unacceptable behaviour. The article builds on Austin’s distinction between illocutionary and perlocutionary effects to discuss the relationship between sociological explanation, sociological justification and sociological critique. It argues that understanding how (and if) sociological explanations can act requires paying attention to social and political conditions of performativity and their transformation in late liberalism.
A global catastrophic risk is one with the potential to wreak death and destruction on a global scale. In human history, wars and plagues have done so on more than one occasion, and misguided ideologies and totalitarian regimes have darkened an entire era or a region. Advances in technology are adding dangers of a new kind. It could happen again. In Global Catastrophic Risks 25 leading experts look at the gravest risks facing humanity in the 21st century, including asteroid impacts, gamma-ray bursts, Earth-based natural catastrophes, nuclear war, terrorism, global warming, biological weapons, totalitarianism, advanced nanotechnology, general artificial intelligence, and social collapse. The book also addresses over-arching issues - policy responses and methods for predicting and managing catastrophes. This is invaluable reading for anyone interested in the big issues of our time; for students focusing on science, society, technology, and public policy; and for academics, policy-makers, and professionals working in these acutely important fields.
This article offers a critical account of efforts to engage people with the issue of antimicrobial resistance (AMR). It analyses how public health workers encourage what they understand as responsible antibiotic use or antibiotic stewardship, and how their efforts are shaped by different theories of ‘behaviour’ or social action. Discourse analysis of all major UK campaigns and their evaluations over the last two decades reveals how different versions of the citizen jostle for attention in a public health that draws on sociology, psychology, and increasingly behavioural economics. Rejecting an explanation which focuses solely on the appeal of emotion in new forms of governance, I deploy theories of expert and lay ignorance to show how public health is pushed towards new approaches as it struggles with an apparently recalcitrant public in the case of AMR. Here ignorance is both problematic and productive, prompting a shift to campaigns based on unreflective action, that are accompanied by decisions to work with potential misunderstandings about antibiotics and their effects. I suggest the term ‘shrug’ as a provocative counterpart to the ‘nudge’ of behavioural economics, drawing attention to the ways in which behavioural interventions may be linked to strategic retreats from engagement, when policy makers feel unable to affect or predict the understanding and views of non-experts. The article thus contributes to sociological and political critique of narrow forms of behavioural thinking and their effects on relations between governments and their citizens.
Critical accounts over the past years have focused on neoliberalism as a subject of knowledge; there has been a recently growing interest in neoliberalism as an object of knowledge. This article considers the theoretical, epistemological and political implications of the relationship between neoliberalism as an epistemic subject and neoliberalism as an epistemic object. It argues that the ‘gnossification’ of neoliberalism – framing it an epistemic project, and deriving implications for political engagement from this – avoids engaging with numerous ambiguous elements of the production of knowledge. Drawing on Bourdieu’s concept of the ‘scholastic fallacy’ and Boltanski and Chiapello’s work in sociology of critique, the article lays out a framework for the study of the relationship between epistemic, moral, and political elements of critique of neoliberalism, including the conditions of its own production in contemporary academic contexts.
Is capitalism inherently predatory? Must there be winners and losers? Is public interest outdated and free-riding rational? Is consumer choice the same as self-determination? Must bargainers abandon the no-harm principle? Prisoners of Reason recalls that classical liberal capitalism exalted the no-harm principle. Although imperfect and exclusionary, modern liberalism recognized individual human dignity alongside individuals’ responsibility to respect others. Neoliberalism, by contrast, views life as a ceaseless struggle. Agents vie for scarce resources in antagonistic competition in which every individual seeks dominance. This political theory is codified in noncooperative game theory; the neoliberal citizen and consumer is the strategic rational actor. Rational choice justifies ends irrespective of means. Money becomes the medium of all value. Solidarity and good will are invalidated. Relationships are conducted on a quid pro quo basis. However, agents can freely opt out of this cynical race to the bottom by embracing a more expansive range of coherent action.
Of the division of labour (From book I, chapter 1) The greatest improvement in the productive powers of labour, and the greater part of the skill, dexterity, and judgment with which it is any where directed, or applied, seem to have been the effects of the division of labour. The effects of the division of labour, in the general business of society, will be more easily understood by considering in what manner it operates in some particular manufactures. It is commonly supposed to be carried furthest in some very trifling ones; not perhaps that it really is carried further in them than in others of more importance: but in those trifling manufactures which are destined to supply the small wants of but a small number of people, the whole number of workmen must necessarily be small; and those employed in every different branch of the work can often be collected into the same workhouse and placed at once under the view of the spectator. In those great manufactures, on the contrary, which are destined to supply the great wants of the great body of the people, every different branch of the work employs so great a number of workmen that it is impossible to collect them all into the same workhouse. We can seldom see more, at one time, than those employed in one single branch.
Every reader who opens a new book takes a certain chance. For until he has read the book he cannot know whether it is at all worth reading. It is, therefore, no more than fair that an author should tell him right at the beginning what the book is about, and why it was written, even though this is not easy to do.
This book gives an extended argument for epistemic authority from the implications of reflective self-consciousness. Epistemic authority is compatible with autonomy, but epistemic self-reliance is incoherent. The book argues that epistemic and emotional self-trust are rational and inescapable, that consistent self-trust commits us to trust in others, and that among those we are committed to trusting are some whom we ought to treat as epistemic authorities, modelled on the well-known principles of authority of Joseph Raz. Some of these authorities can be in the moral and religious domains. The book investigates the way the problem of disagreement between communities or between the self and others is a conflict within self-trust, and argue against communal self-reliance on the same grounds as the book uses in arguing against individual self-reliance. The book explains how any change in belief is justified-by the conscientious judgment that the change will survive future conscientious self-reflection. The book concludes with an account of autonomy.
Recent public health policy has emphasized the promotion of behavioural change and the achievement of healthy lifestyles as central to tackling deeply ingrained health inequalities in the UK and beyond. These approaches contrast with more upstream structural strategies that aim to address material determinants of health. A current exemplar of the behaviourist approach is the use of social marketing as a methodology in public health. Social marketing is posited as a strategy for creating social good' through importing the methods of commercial marketing into health and social policy in a range of settings, in this instance, public health. In contrast to the traditional public health goals of serving society and improving the wellbeing of populations, those of social marketing, as with other recent strategies in health and social policy, start with the management of behaviours and lifestyles, responsibility for which is placed with the individual. It is argued that this reflects a broader behavioural turn' in public health methodologies that increasingly obviate the significance of social and relational determinants of health. Qualitative data collected with a sample of public health professionals (n = 17) are discussed to examine the adoption of these new methodologies in a specific locality in the UK. The wider implications of these practices for public health strategies both nationally and internationally are considered.
Behaviour change is increasingly central to policy and politics. The exemplar of nudge, and its relationship to behavioural economics and psychology, is outlined. Nudge's claim to libertarian paternalism is evaluated in the context of the neoliberal state. A sociological critique of behavioural economic assumptions enables a still wider account of shifting state–citizen relations. Foucauldian analyses of such relations, as well as deliberative 'think' perspectives, are assessed. A more explicitly political, social-democratic model of the behaviour change state is advocated. This would be more attuned to the socioeconomic context of behaviour, and also be prepared to defend citizens against ubiquitous attempts to shape their subjectivity.
In the following essay, reference is made to the ambivalent position of non-knowledge between ensuring the production of scientific knowledge and risky decision-making. It will also be shown that this ambivalence is the result of system-internal operations and not of external facts, on which "incomplete constructivism" essentially depends. Finally, it is shown that the concept of risk marks the interface where modern society oscillates between experience (cognition) and action (risk) and that even this state is due to its own operations and not to an overall insight into some better option. Basically, the argument of this article demonstrates fundamental modes of framing uncertainty in modern society. /// L'auteur se penche sur la place ambivalente du non-savoir entre la production de connaissances scientifiques et la prise de décision à risque. Il montre que cette ambivalence est le résultat d'opérations propres au système et non pas de facteurs externes -- d'un "constructivisme inachevé". Il conclut que la notion de risque caractérise cette interface où la société moderne oscille entre l'expérience (cognition) et l'action (risque); et que cette situation est le produit de fonctionnements internes plutôt que d'une perception ou d'une représentation d'ensemble d'options meilleures. En bref, le présent article relève des modes d'appréhension de l'incertitude dans la société d'aujourd'hui.
Interpretive policy analysis entails the application to studies of public policies of approaches building on ontological and epistemological presuppositions deriving from interpretive philosophies. Its central characteristic is its focus on meaning. Interpretive policy analyses are, then, situation‐specific, rather than entailing general laws or universal principles. They commonly focus on the language used in policy debates, as well as on other human artifacts that convey policy and organizational meanings, such as people's acts and whatever objects they might use in those acts. Interpretive policy analysis is an alternative to survey research, cost‐benefit analysis, and other such approaches.
To what extent do the results of randomized controlled trials inform our predictions about the effectiveness of potential policy interventions? This crucial question is often overlooked in discussions about evidence-based policy. The view I defend is that the arguments that lead from the claim that a program works somewhere to a prediction about the effectiveness of this program as it will be implemented here rests on many premises, most of which cannot be justified by the results of randomized controlled trials. Randomized controlled trials only provide indirect evidence for effectiveness, and we need much more than just randomized- controlled-trial results to make reliable predictions.
This book argues that catastrophe is a particular way of governing future events – such as terrorism, climate change or pandemics – which we cannot predict but which may strike suddenly, without warning, and cause irreversible damage. At a time where catastrophe increasingly functions as a signifier of our future, imaginaries of pending doom have fostered new modes of anticipatory knowledge and redeployed existing ones. Although it shares many similarities with crises, disasters, risks and other disruptive incidents, this book claims that catastrophes also bring out the very limits of knowledge and management. The politics of catastrophe is turned towards an unknown future, which must be imagined and inhabited in order to be made palpable, knowable and actionable. Politics of Catastrophe critically assesses the effects of these new practices of knowing and governing catastrophes to come and challenges the reader to think about the possibility of an alternative politics of catastrophe. This book will be of interest to students of critical security studies, risk theory, political theory and International Relations in general.
This paper reviews the case for libertarian paternalism presented by Thaler and Sunstein in Nudge. Thaler and Sunstein argue that individuals' preferences are often incoherent, making paternalism is unavoidable; however, paternalistic interventions should 'nudge' individuals without restricting their choices, and should nudge them towards what they would have chosen had they not been subject to specific limitations of rationality. I argue that the latter criterion provides inadequate guidance to nudgers. It is inescapably normative, and so allows nudgers' conceptions of well-being to override those of nudgees. Even if nudgees' rationality were unbounded, their revealed preferences might still be incoherent.