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A Thumb on the Scale Alberta Government Interference in Public-Sector Bargaining

Authors:

Abstract

This report examines the ways governments, and specifically the Government of Alberta, interfere in public-sector collective bargaining through both legislative measures and non-legislative actions. It also explores how this growing interference may impact the 2024 bargaining round in Alberta.
Jason Foster, Bob Barnetson, and Susan Cake
This report was published by Parkland Institute.
February 2024 © All rights reserved.
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ISBN: 978-1-894949-92-7
A Thumb on the Scale
Alberta Government Interference in
Public-Sector Bargaining
Acknowledgements
About the Authors
About Parkland Institute
List of Tables
Executive Summary
Introduction
Part 1: Government Interference in Public-Sector Bargaining in Canada
1.1 Permanent Exceptionalism
1.2 Government Interference and the Charter
1.3 Government Responses to Charter Decisions
1.4 Moving to Mandates
1.5 Non-Legislative Interference
1.6 A Game of Cat and Mouse
Part 2: Government Interference in Public-Sector Bargaining in Alberta
2.1 Legislative Interventions in Collective Bargaining
2.2 Increasing Public-Sector Bargaining Coordination
2.3 The 2017 Bargaining Round and Aftermath
2.4 The 2020 Bargaining Round
Nature of Government Involvement
Scope of Government Mandate
Role of Mediation
Role of COVID-19
2.5 Eects of Government Intervention on Bargaining
The Eect of Secret Mandates
Eect of PBCO Involvement
Eect of the UCP Political Agenda
Conclusion
Prospects for the 2024 Round
References
Parkland Institute • February 2024
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CONTENTS
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33
Jason Foster is the director of Parkland Institute and an associate professor
of human resources and labour relations at Athabasca University. Jason is
the author of Gigs, Hustles, & Temps (2023) and Defying Expectations: e
Case of UFCW Local 401 (2018), as well as co-author of Health and Safety
in Canadian Workplaces (2016). His research interests include workplace
injury, union renewal, labour and employment policy, and migrant workers
in Canada. He is committed to sharing research to as broad an audience as
possible, so that it might contribute to policy change and making peoples
lives better.
Bob Barnetson is a professor of labour relations at Athabasca University.
He is the author of Health and Safety in Canadian Workplaces (with Jason
Foster), Political Economy of Workplace Injury in Canada, and Canada’s
Labour Market Training System.
Dr. Susan Cake is an assistant professor in human resources and labour
relations. Susan has been with Athabasca University since 2020. Prior
to joining AU, Susan was a worker advocate specializing in the areas of
Occupational Health and Safety, Workers’ Compensation Systems, and
pensions. Susans current research interests include union relevance and
renewal, care work, and early learning and child care. Susan is the current
chair of Child Care Now Alberta and a board member of Child Care Now.
e authors are grateful to the sta at Parkland Institute for their work
in helping make this report happen. ey also thank the participants in
the study for their time and candour. Parkland Institute is appreciative of
the nancial support for this report by the Alberta Union of Provincial
Employees.
Acknowledgements
About the Authors
A Thumb on the Scale: Alberta Government Interference in Public-Sector Bargaining
ii
About Parkland Institute
List of Tables
Parkland Institute is an Alberta research network that examines public
policy issues. Based in the Faculty of Arts at the University of Alberta, it
includes members from most of Alberta’s academic institutions as well as
other organizations involved in public policy research. Parkland Institute was
founded in 1996 and its mandate is to:
conduct research on economic, social, cultural and political issues facing
Albertans and Canadians
publish research and provide informed comment on current policy issues
to the media and the public
sponsor conferences and public forums on issues facing Albertans
bring together academic and non-academic communities
All Parkland Institute reports are academically peer reviewed to ensure the
integrity and accuracy of the research.
For more information, visit www.parklandinstitute.ca
Table 1: Interventions and Work Stoppages by Decade
Table 2: Interventions before and aer Health Services and SFL
Table 3: Frequency of Intervention by Type, 2000-2022
Table 4: Interventions by Type and Period, 2000-2022
Table 5: Government of Alberta Legislative Interventions
Parkland Institute • February 2024
iii
1
A Thumb on the Scale: Alberta Government Interference in Public-Sector Bargaining
In 2024, about 200,000 Alberta public-sector workers will be negotiating
new contracts. is report examines the ways governments, and specically
the Government of Alberta, interfere in public-sector collective bargaining
through both legislative measures and non-legislative actions. It also explores
how this growing interference may impact the 2024 bargaining round in
Alberta.
For decades, governments have intervened in public-sector bargaining.
Legislation restricting public-sector workers’ right to strike, ending labour
disruptions, limiting the scope of negotiations, and imposing contract
provisions has been common across jurisdictions and political party lines. In
recent years, the Supreme Court of Canada, in a series of decisions, extended
the Charter of Rights and Freedoms’ protection to collective bargaining
and striking. In theory, these decisions reduce the governments’ ability to
interfere with public-sector bargaining. In practice, however, the impact of
these decisions has been both complex and limited.
e rst part of the report examines the history of government interference
with public-sector bargaining in Canada. Our analysis of government
legislation nds that the rate of government interference in Canada has
increased markedly since 2000, despite Supreme Court decisions seemingly
restricting the scope for such intervention. Surprisingly, the rate of
interventions has almost tripled during that period.
Further, the analysis shows strategic adaptations by governments in response
to the Supreme Court’s decisions Health Services and Support – Facilities
Subsector Bargaining Assn v. B.C. (colloquially called Health Services) and
Saskatchewan Federation of Labour v. Saskatchewan (colloquially called SFL),
such as altering the type and form of legislative interference they employ. For
example, one new approach is using broad bargaining mandates with which
public-sector employers must comply, marking a departure from legislating
specic contract provisions (a common form of intervention pre-Health
Services).
Governments have increasingly formalized and made more sophisticated
their non-legislative interference as well. Non-legislative interference consists
of formal and informal actions taken outside of legislation designed to
inuence outcomes at bargaining tables and can include placing pressure on
employers, becoming directly involved in bargaining, or threatening unions.
e evidence suggests that governments across Canada have been
playing a game of cat and mouse with working people and their unions.
Specically, governments are (mostly) complying with Canadas evolving
labour rights but they are doing so in the most minimal ways possible to
Legislation
restricting public-
sector workers
right to strike,
ending labour
disruptions,
limiting the scope
of negotiations,
and imposing
contract provisions
has been common
across jurisdictions
and political party
lines.
Executive Summary
2
Parkland Institute • February 2024
protect governments’ ability to achieve their political and scal goals. ey
are also adopting new legislative and non-legislative tools to enhance the
eectiveness of their interference.
e second part of the report examines the recent history of the Alberta
governments involvement in public-sector bargaining. Alberta has actively
intervened in public-sector labour relations, passing 16 pieces of legislation
restricting public-sector bargaining rights since the early 1980s. In recent
years, Alberta has used both legislative interventions and enhanced non-
legislative tools to inuence public-sector bargaining. is shi could have
important impacts on the upcoming 2024 bargaining round.
In 2019, the government passed the Public Sector Employers Act (PSEA)
which, among other things, authorizes the Minister of Finance to issue secret
and binding bargaining directives to all public-sector employers, excluding
municipalities and private post-secondary institutions. e introduction of
the “secret mandate” — a set of directives given to employers that cannot be
shared with unions or publicized in any way — was a rst in Canada.
Non-legislatively, the government has focused on enhancing the role of the
Provincial Bargaining and Compensation Oce (PBCO, formerly called
the Public Bargaining Coordination Oce). Created in 2015 and tasked
with supporting “the government’s interests as an employer and funder,” the
PBCO is responsible for ensuring government mandates are implemented
at over 250 public-sector bargaining tables. e PBCO was rst active in
bargaining during the 2017 round (under the NDP), with its involvement
expanded in the 2020 round.
e report provides an in-depth analysis of the 2020 bargaining round based
on interviews with union negotiators and a government ocial. It was not
possible to interview employer negotiators as they continue to be subject to
the condentiality provisions of the PSEA.
is report also nds that the secret mandates bogged down negotiations
and made the need for mediation more likely. e involvement of the
PBCO added an element of professionalism to government interventions
in the 2020 round, but its overall impact served to entrench and solidify
government interference, leading to further strain in the bargaining
relationship between employers and unions. Further, the PBCO’s
unwillingness to fully acknowledge its role as gatekeeper sowed distrust
between the union negotiators and the government as a whole.
is report further nds that the 2020 round continued a decade-long trend
of intensied government involvement in public-sector collective bargaining
in Alberta, marked by the introduction of secret mandates and the active
management of the bargaining process across the public sector by the
PBCO. Coupling this trajectory with the United Conservative Party’s (UCP)
3
A Thumb on the Scale: Alberta Government Interference in Public-Sector Bargaining
political agenda and confrontational approach to workers and unions led to
an unprecedented degree of intervention, both legislatively and informally.
e signicance of this nding is two-fold. First, government interference is
becoming more eective due to its enhanced legislative and non-legislative
tools. Second, the introduction of secret mandates is a novel development
in the ongoing evolution of government interference, one that is likely to be
replicated elsewhere.
As Alberta heads into another round of public-sector bargaining in 2024,
government intervention is expected to persist and evolve. Indeed, the
recent introduction of Bill 5, which amends the Public Sector Employers Act
allowing for the creation of bodies to facilitate employer coordination of
bargaining across sectors, is evidence of that continued evolution.
It is also expected that the government will impose mandates designed
to minimize public-sector wage increases and to standardize agreements
across sectors. e report concludes by oering several options for how
public-sector workers and their unions can respond to growing government
interference, both at the bargaining table and through increased political
pressure.
The introduction
of secret mandates
is a novel
development
in the ongoing
evolution of
government
interference, one
that is likely to
be replicated
elsewhere.
4
Parkland Institute • February 2024
Introduction
In Canadas labour relations system, workers, through their unions, and
employers are expected to negotiate in good faith to achieve a mutually
acceptable collective agreement. In the private sector, the role of the
government is normally limited to setting some rules regarding the
bargaining process. is reects the belief that the content of a collective
agreement is best worked out between the union and the employer. While in
recent years governments have enacted legislation making it more dicult to
organize unions in the private sector, they have largely remained hands-o
on private-sector bargaining.
ings are more complicated in the public sector. In addition to setting the
rules and acting as a referee, the government is also one of the parties at the
bargaining table — the employer (or primary funder of the employer). For
decades, governments in Canada have taken advantage of this dual role to
place their thumb on the scale, tilting the bargaining process in their favour.
As a result, public-sector workers have enjoyed fewer and weaker labour
rights than workers in the private sector.
Until recently, the only restriction on government interference in public-
sector bargaining was what voters would tolerate. Governments (of all party
stripes) periodically passed legislation restricting public-sector workers’ right
to strike, ending labour disruptions, limiting what could be negotiated at
the table, and imposing contract provisions. Governments have also non-
legislatively interfered with bargaining processes to achieve political and
economic goals.
In recent years, in a series of decisions, the Supreme Court of Canada
extended the Charter of Rights and Freedoms’ protection to collective
bargaining and striking. In theory, these decisions reduce the governments’
ability to interfere with public-sector bargaining. In practice, however, the
impact of these decisions has been both complex and limited.
is report begins by examining the past 20 years of government legislative
interventions in public-sector bargaining. It analyzes how, and how oen,
governments have interfered with bargaining in the wake of the key Supreme
Court decisions colloquially called Health Services and SFL. Subsequently,
this report explores the impact of Albertas 2019 Public Sector Employers Act
(PSEA), which imposed secret bargaining mandates, to reveal how mandates
and other non-legislative interventions shaped the bargaining process and
outcomes during the 2020 round of public-sector negotiations. e report
concludes with a discussion of how the strategies of the 2020 round might
play out in the upcoming 2024 round of public-sector bargaining in Alberta.
5
A Thumb on the Scale: Alberta Government Interference in Public-Sector Bargaining
PART 1 Government Interference in Public-
Sector Bargaining in Canada
In Canadas contemporary labour relations system, unions and employers
periodically negotiate the terms and conditions of employment for workers
in a bargaining unit. If a union and an employer are unable to agree on the
content of the collective agreement, labour law allows workers to strike
(i.e., withdraw their labour) and employers to lockout (i.e., prevent workers
from working) to apply economic pressure on each other. For private-sector
workers, this arrangement has existed since the mid-1940s (Heron 1996).
Most public-sector workers — those employed by governments and the
various agencies and organizations of government — did not gain access
to collective bargaining until the late 1960s.1 Governments were reluctant
to extend bargaining rights to their own employees, and only did so aer
signicant agitation by public-sector workers. Even then, governments
placed limits on what could be negotiated and dramatically curtailed the
right to strike, normally by substituting binding arbitration for strike/
lockout.
For example, in Alberta, few public-sector workers could legally strike until
2016. at year, the then New Democratic government extended the right to
strike to most public-sector workers to comply with a Supreme Court ruling
(Saskatchewan Federation of Labour v. Saskatchewan). Today, police and
reghters in the province continue to be prohibited from striking. In the
Labour Relations Code, the government also requires public-sector workers
to maintain a minimum level of “essential services” during a work stoppage
to avoid endangering the life, health, safety, or security of the public. ese
essential-service restrictions particularly impact health-care workers.
Governments justify restrictions on public-sector bargaining and work
stoppages as necessary to ensure public access to important services
(Chaykowski 2016). In eect, the collective-bargaining rights of public-sector
workers are deemed less important than the public interest. Public-sector
workers and labour scholars have long argued that these legislated limits
also tilt the playing eld further in the governments’ favour and advance
their interests as employers (Weiler 1986; Swimmer and Bartkiw 2003; Rose
2016). In practice, whenever public-sector strikes do occur, both the union
and the employer are careful to ensure that the health and safety of the public
are not aected by ensuring enough workers remain on the job (e.g., stang
emergency rooms) or performing specic functions when needed (e.g.,
delivering pension cheques).
Most public-
sector workers —
those employed
by governments
and the various
agencies and
organizations of
government — did
not gain access
to collective
bargaining until
the late 1960s.
1 Some public-sector workers at the
municipal level and in public utilities have
been unionized since the early 1900s.
6
Parkland Institute • February 2024
1.1 Permanent Exceptionalism
In addition to establishing a more restrictive bargaining system for public-
sector workers, governments also regularly enact legislation to prevent or
end public-sector strikes. Governments shape the outcome of negotiations
by restricting negotiable topics, imposing contract terms, and/or establishing
bargaining mandates. is interference in collective bargaining is intended
to limit the bargaining power of public-sector workers and, thus, their ability
to secure better wages and working conditions.
e frequency of such interference led scholars Leo Panitch and Donald
Swartz to describe this pattern of government behaviour as one of
“permanent exceptionalism” (Panitch and Swartz 2003). By the 1980s,
governments legislatively interfering in public-sector collective bargaining
had become a well-established (i.e., permanent) and central feature of
public-sector labour relations. e use of these tools was justied as
temporary, emergency-related, and necessary to protect the public interest
(i.e., exceptional). e irony of governments consistently and repeatedly
resorting to so-called exceptional measures was not lost on Panitch and
Swartz:
In so far as the terminology of emergency and crisis can be
made elastic enough to cover a whole era rather than specic
events, months or even years, measures presented as temporary
can come to characterize an entire historical period.
(1984, 152)
Permanent exceptionalism has become a dening feature of public-sector
labour relations in Canada. Table 1 demonstrates that legislative interference
has increased at an escalating rate over the past seven decades. While the
absolute number of interventions has declined recently (likely due to fewer
work stoppages), the rate of intervention has increased tenfold. ere were
ve interventions between 2020 and 2022. is data was excluded from
this analysis because COVID-19 delayed collective bargaining and work
stoppages and thereby rendered data from this period noncomparable.
This interference
in collective
bargaining is
intended to limit
the bargaining
power of public-
sector workers
and, thus, their
ability to secure
better wages
and working
conditions.
7
A Thumb on the Scale: Alberta Government Interference in Public-Sector Bargaining
Legal
Interventions Annual Average
Interventions Annual Average
Work Stoppages Rate of Intervention per
Work Stoppage
1950s 3 0.3 209 0.0014
1960s 13 1.3 437 0.0030
1970s 41 4.1 877 0.0047
1980s 49 4.9 754 0.0065
1990s 25 2.5 394 0.0063
2000s 41 4.1 258 0.0159
2010s 34 3.4 184 0.0185
Table 1: Interventions and Work Stoppages by Decade
Source: Statistics Canada 2022; Panitch and Swartz 2003; and authors’ calculations.
e most likely explanation for the increased rate of interventions is that,
from a government perspective, these interventions are eective in achieving
their goals (Smith 2020). Although the courts will occasionally overturn such
legislated interventions, this normally occurs years aer the government
has reaped the benets of them. Further, governments rarely face political
consequences for interfering in collective bargaining, and sometimes
receive a public opinion bump for prioritizing the interests of those who
are potentially aected by job action, such as students, parents, patients,
consumers, and taxpayers (Swimmer and Bartkiw 2003; Evans et al. 2023).
ere are, however, exceptions to this pattern, such as the erce response
to the Ontario governments 2022 eort to pre-empt a strike of 55,000
educational workers (Alphonso 2022). is unusual response may have
been sparked more by the government’s decision to invoke the Charter of
Rights and Freedoms’ notwithstanding clause than by its attempt to pre-empt
a strike. Despite this recent exception, the overall pattern of success has
encouraged governments to continue routinely interfering in public-sector
collective bargaining (Rose 2016).
1.2 Government Interference and the Charter
For most of the last 70 years, governments have faced no legal impediment
to interfering with public-sector labour relations. Early Charter decisions in
the 1980s did not protect collective bargaining or striking from legislative
interference. is jurisprudence emboldened governments to interfere.
Beginning in the 2000s, the Supreme Court’s view of labour rights evolved
incrementally (Fudge 2006). In 2007, the Supreme Court issued a decision
(colloquially called Health Services aer the name of the union that led the
challenge) that asserted that “freedom of association protects the capacity of
Although the
courts will
occasionally
overturn such
legislated
interventions,
this normally
occurs years after
the government
has reaped the
benets of them.
8
Parkland Institute • February 2024
members of labour unions to engage in collective bargaining on workplace
issues” and indicated the Charter protected the process of bargaining from
substantial interference (Health Services and Support – Facilities Subsector
Bargaining Assn v. British Columbia at para 2). is decision established that
a meaningful process of bargaining was an aspect of freedom of association.2
In 2015, the Supreme Court issued a second decision (colloquially called
Saskatchewan Federation of Labour or SFL) that extended protection from
substantial interference to striking.3 SFL asserted that restricting strike
action substantially interferes with the right to a meaningful process
of collective bargaining. Justice Abella noted that labour relations are
characterized by deep inequalities that render workers vulnerable and that:
a meaningful process of collective bargaining requires
the ability of employees to participate in the collective
withdrawal of services for the purpose of pursuing the terms
and conditions of their employment through a collective
agreement. … In this case, the suppression of the right to
strike amounts to a substantial interference with the right
to a meaningful process of collective bargaining. (SFL v.
Saskatchewan, para 75)
Legal scholars have suggested these decisions represent modest gains for
workers. Being free from substantial interference is a narrow right. is
narrowness allows governments to cra legislation that both complies with
the Charter and still interferes in labour relations in impactful ways (Dunn
2015; Etherington 2016; Braley-Rattai 2018). Nevertheless, unions have
had some recent success challenging government interference, as seen in a
series of court victories for unions in B.C. (B.C. Teachers Federation v. B.C.),
Nova Scotia (N.S. Teachers Union v. Nova Scotia), Ontario (OPSEU et al. v.
Ontario, Ontario English Catholic Teachers’ Association v. Ontario; ATU Local
113 v. HMQRO), and in the federal jurisdiction (Canadian Union of Postal
Workers v. Canada).
e remedies awarded in these cases have sometimes been signicant. e
British Columbia Teachers’ Federation estimated its 2016 court victory
in a case involving legislation that removed class sizes from collective
agreements would force the government to invest $250 to $300 million per
year into the education budget to implement the decision (Hyslop 2016).
e overturning of Ontario’s Bill 124 in 2022 meant the province has had
to provide health-care workers backpay of almost $1 billion so far, with the
nal amount potentially being $2.7 billion or more (D’Mello 2023). Despite
these successes, unions face uncertain outcomes and remedies in the legal
system, as well as multi-year delays in resolution, which may limit the utility
of Charter challenges and unions’ interest in relying on them.
Unions face
uncertain
outcomes and
remedies in the
legal system, as
well as multi-
year delays in
resolution.
2 The court case arose out of legislation
passed by the government of B.C. in
2002 (Health and Social Services Delivery
Improvement Act) which unilaterally
altered existing collective agreements,
prohibited bargaining over key workplace
issues, and provided exibility to
health-care employees to alter working
conditions regardless of the language in
collective agreements. The Supreme Court
ruled free and fair collective bargaining
was a crucial aspect of the freedom of
association under the Charter and thus
the legislation was unconstitutional for
undermining bargaining processes.
3 The case arose out of legislation passed
by the government of Saskatchewan in
2008 (Public Service Essential Services
Act) which declared most public sector
workers “essential” and therefore
prohibited from striking. The Supreme
Court ruled the legislation to be too
sweeping and afforded the employer too
much power to determine “essential”
work. By doing so, the Court extended
Charter protection to the right to strike as
a part of the freedom of association.
9
A Thumb on the Scale: Alberta Government Interference in Public-Sector Bargaining
1.3 Government Responses to Charter Decisions
An analysis conducted by the authors of this report suggests that, rather than
curtailing government interference with public-sector collective bargaining,
recent Charter decisions have seen governments increase their rate of
interference and experiment with new ways to interfere.
Table 2 sets out the rate of government intervention between 2000 and
2019.4 is data is broken into three periods, the boundaries of which
are the key Charter decisions (Health Services in 2007 and SFL in 2015).
As in the previous table, data from 2020 to 2022 is excluded because it is
noncomparable.
Table 2: Interventions Before and After Health Services and SFL
Source: Statistics Canada 2022; Panitch and Swartz 2003; and authors’ calculations.
Period Number of
Interventions Annual Average Annual Average
Stoppages Rate of Interference
2000-2007 34 4.3 280 0.0152
2008-2015 27 3.4 188 0.0180
2016-2019 14 3.5 170 0.0206
e number of interventions and the number of work stoppages declined
signicantly in each time period. e rate of government interference,
however, increased by 36% across the three periods. It is puzzling to see
the rate of government interference rising at the same time as the Supreme
Court was narrowing the legal space in which interference can occur.
One explanation for this pattern is that governments have used the clarity
provided by Health Services and SFL to tailor their interventions, thereby
lowering the legal risk of interfering in public-sector collective bargaining.
is explanation gains strength by examining patterns in the kinds of
legislative interventions used during these periods. ere are ve categories
of legislation:
Back-to-Work (BTW): Legislation designed to terminate a strike/
lockout or pre-empt a looming work stoppage and impose an
alternative dispute resolution mechanism or a specic outcome.
Essential Services (ES): Legislation designed to identify workers
performing “essential services” and restricting their right to strike.
Legislated Contract Provision (LCP): Legislation imposing contract
provisions outside the context of a specic bargaining process and/or
establishing legislated ceilings for contract provisions.
Right-to-Strike (RTS): Legislation restricting the right to strike and/or
strike activities (e.g., picketing limitations).
4 For methodological details, see Foster,
Barnetson, and Cake 2023.
10
Parkland Institute • February 2024
Union Governance (UG): Legislation imposing rules aecting internal
union governance, including requiring that unions seek member
permission to collect or expend dues for certain activities and
mandated nancial reporting requirements beyond what is contained
in a unions constitution or other governing documents.
Table 3 presents the frequency of each type of intervention. By far, the most
preferred type of interference is BTW legislation, comprising half of all
interventions, followed next by LCP with one-quarter of interventions. e
prominence of these two types of interference may reect that they address
specic political problems or goals (i.e., ending a strike and/or determining
specic contract language). e other types of interference aect the
underlying legal architecture of labour relations (i.e., they persist over time),
which would lower their frequency.
Table 3: Frequency of Intervention by Type, 2000-2022
Table 4: Interventions by Type and Period, 2000-2022
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Intervention Type Frequency (%)
Back-to-Work 40 (50.0%)
Legislated Contract Provisions 20 (25.0%)
Essential Services 9 (11.3%)
Right-to-Strike 9 (11.3%)
Union Governance 2 (2.5%)
Table 4 breaks down the types of intervention by the period in which it was
enacted. For this analysis, we did include COVID-era legislation as the focus
of attention is the frequency of each type of intervention, rather than the rate.
Intervention Type Pre-Health Services
(2000-2007) Post-Health Services
(2008-2015) Post-SFL
(2016-2022)
Back-to-Work 18 (52.9%) 13 (48.1%) 9 (47.4%)
Legislated Contract
Provisions 10 (29.4%) 4 (14.8%) 6 (31.6%)
Essential Services 2 (5.8%) 5 (18.5%) 2 (10.5%)
Right-to-Strike 4 (11.8%) 4 (14.8%) 1 (5.3%)
Union Governance 0 (0%) 1 (3.7%) 1 (5.3%)
11
A Thumb on the Scale: Alberta Government Interference in Public-Sector Bargaining
Table 3: Frequency of Intervention by Type, 2000-2022
Source: Authors’ calculations.
e overall trend in Table 4 is that, when governments desire to intervene
in public-sector collective bargaining, they prefer to do it via carefully
created episodic interventions.5 e proportion of BTW legislation remained
constant over all three periods. is likely reects the fact that specic BTW
legislation is required for each dispute, making its eect more time-limited.
Further, while SFL oers some protection to workers facing BTW legislation,
the protection it extends is narrow enough to permit governments to write
BTW legislation that complies with the Charter if they include meaningful
alternatives for resolving the dispute (i.e., binding arbitration).
In contrast, the proportion and number of legislated contract provision
interventions declined by approximately half following Health Services. is
decline may reect governments needing time to consider the implications
of Health Services for future legislated contract provisions. Aer SFL, the
number of legislated contract provision interventions remained roughly
stable, but its proportion of all interventions more than doubled.
ere was a signicant increase in the number of persistent interventions
(i.e., essential services, right-to-strike, and union governance) following
Health Services and then a dramatic tapering o following SFL (most of these
occurring in Alberta). is pattern may reect governments’ adjustments to
the legal architecture of public-sector labour relations in response to the bar
on “substantial interference” with collective bargaining and the fact that we
have now entered a period of relative stability in the legal architecture.
1.4 Moving to Mandates
Before Health Services and SFL, legislation interfering with bargaining would
oen impose specic contract provisions. Of the 10 instances of legislated
contract provisions between 2000 and 2007 (pre-Health Services), nine
either imposed specic contract provisions or unilaterally altered existing
agreements. In Health Services, the Supreme Court found this practice to be
unconstitutional and governments instead began adapting their approach to
dictating bargaining outcomes.
Among the six instances of legislated contract provision interventions
between 2016 and 2022 (post-SFL), only two imposed specic contract
provisions. In three instances, governments mandated broader bargaining
outcomes (e.g., stipulating a maximum amount for wage increases) but still
allowed the parties to bargain settlements overall. One other government
intervention unilaterally altered previously negotiated dates and processes
for wage re-openers. is pattern suggests that governments have shied
their approach to legislating contracts since Health Services, moving away
from imposing settlements and focusing on creating the conditions that help
them obtain their desired settlements instead.6
Governments
have shifted
their approach
to legislating
contracts since
Health Services,
moving away
from imposing
settlements
and focusing
on creating the
conditions that
help them obtain
their desired
settlements
instead.
5 For details of this analysis, see Foster,
Barnetson and Cake 2023.
6 This approach is consistent with the
Supreme Court’s Meredith decision and
a series of lower court decisions in 2016
upholding the same piece of legislation
(the Federal Expenditure Restraint Act)
which the Supreme Court refused to hear,
that found government-imposed wage
settlements could be constitutional if
carefully constructed.
12
Parkland Institute • February 2024
Unions have challenged ve of the six post-SFL interventions to legislate
contract provisions in the courts. Two have been overturned — Nova Scotias
Bill 75, which imposed wage settlements on teachers, and Ontario’s Bill 124,
which capped wage increases for hundreds of thousands of public-sector
workers. One, however, has been upheld: Manitobas Bill 28, which set a
two-year wage freeze followed by mandates for wage maximums. Two, Nova
Scotia’s Bill 148 and Alberta’s Bill 9, remain unresolved at the time of writing.
e sixth, Alberta’s Bill 21, has not yet been challenged in court.
1.5 Non-Legislative Interference
Governments also have other tools available to interfere with public-
sector bargaining beyond legislation. Governments can interfere directly
or indirectly at public-sector bargaining tables, and our analysis nds that
governments have, in fact, increased their non-legislative involvement in
bargaining.
When the government is the employer (e.g., of the core civil service),
government decision-makers provide mandates directly to their bargaining
team and the government directly approves any resulting agreement. is is
similar to the dynamic in private-sector negotiations. By contrast, when the
government is a key funder of an organization, but the direct employer is a
notionally independent agency, board, or commission (e.g., school boards,
health authorities, and crown corporations), the government must act
indirectly to achieve its bargaining goals (Ross and Savage 2013).
In the 1990s, governments oen attempted to indirectly interfere in
bargaining through legislative mechanisms, such as narrowing the scope of
issues subject to negotiation and changing the rules surrounding collective
bargaining (Reshef 2007; Swimmer and Bartkiw 2003). Beginning in the
early 2000s, governments started to more actively communicate their desired
outcome and attempt to compel agencies, boards, and commissions (ABCs)
to comply (ompson and Slinn 2013). Over time, these eorts have grown
more sophisticated and formalized. is shi can be seen most clearly in
teacher bargaining in many provinces, including Alberta, BC, and Ontario
(Reshef 2007; Rose 2003; Sweetman and Slinn 2012), but eventually it
extended to other sectors.
Today, Canada has a patchwork of approaches to government involvement
in bargaining. Some provinces, such as Quebec and Newfoundland, have
centralized bargaining with the government at the table (Peters 2014). Other
provinces, particularly in Atlantic Canada, centrally bargain some issues
while leaving local tables to negotiate local matters. Ontario has a complex
mixture of centralized and decentralized structures (Chaykowski and
Hickey 2012). Some jurisdictions have formalized a centralized process for
Governments can
interfere directly
or indirectly at
public-sector
bargaining
tables, and our
analysis nds
that governments
have, in fact,
increased their
non-legislative
involvement in
bargaining.
13
A Thumb on the Scale: Alberta Government Interference in Public-Sector Bargaining
issuing mandates. For instance, since 2013, the Federal Treasury Board has
a veto over tentative agreements with all agencies and Crown Corporations
(Treasury Board of Canada 2008; Clark Wilson LLP 2013). Saskatchewan
also has a standing cabinet committee to oversee bargaining matters
(Institute for Research on Public Policy 2006).
e most developed model of centralized bargaining is found in British
Columbia. Since 1993, the Public Sector Employers’ Council (PSEC) has
coordinated “labour relations, total compensation planning, and human
resource management across the broader public sector.” (Government of
B.C. 2023a) In practice, the PSEC establishes a monetary mandate and
contract term for all public-sector employers. Other government priorities,
such as service-delivery improvements, are sometimes added to the
mandate, which is publicly announced at the commencement of bargaining
(Government of B.C. 2023b). Alberta has also had a bargaining coordination
oce since 2014, which will be discussed in more detail in Part 2.
1.6 A Game of Cat and Mouse
Overall, the data suggests expanding Charter protections has not reduced
the rate of government interference in public-sector collective bargaining.
In fact, the rate of interference has increased, to a level almost triple that
of the 1990s. Governments have, however, slightly altered their approach
to interference. Back-to-work legislation remains the most common form
of interference, likely because it promptly resolves the immediate issue
of a work stoppage. ere is signicant political upside for back-to-work
legislation for governments in the short term (Swimmer and Bartkiw
2003), and any legal or nancial ramications are normally borne by future
governments, as court challenges get resolved years later.
Other forms of intervention have shied over time, suggesting governments
were looking for ways to achieve their political goals (e.g., monetary
restraint, no labour disruption, and weakened unions) without running
afoul of the courts. When Health Services made imposing contract
provisions more problematic, governments temporarily moved away from
that strategy, turning to methods of restricting workers’ right to strike.
When SFL ruled those actions were possibly unconstitutional, governments
returned to a modied form of legislating contract provisions, issuing
mandates and ceilings rather than specic outcomes.
e evidence suggests governments across Canada have been playing a
game of cat and mouse with working people and their unions. Specically,
governments are (mostly) complying with Canada’s evolving labour rights
but they are doing so in the most minimal ways possible to preserve their
ability to achieve their political goals.
Expanding Charter
protections has
not reduced the
rate of government
interference in
public-sector
collective
bargaining. In
fact, the rate of
interference has
increased, to a
level almost triple
that of the 1990s.
14
Parkland Institute • February 2024
PART 2 Government Interference in Public-
Sector Bargaining in Alberta
2.1 Legislative Interventions in Collective Bargaining
Alberta’s boom-and-bust economy makes public-sector nance unstable
and results in periodic calls for public-sector austerity. Since the early 1980s,
Alberta has enacted 16 pieces of legislation (or issued orders authorized by
legislation) intended to restrict bargaining rights, primarily targeting public-
sector workers (refer to Table 5).
Table 5: Government of Alberta Legislative Interventions
Year Legislation Purpose
1982 Health Services Continuation Act Ended a province-wide nurses strike.
1983 Labour Statutes Amendment Act Eliminated the right to strike for health-care workers
and reghters.
1987 Construction Industry Collective
Bargaining Act Restricted bargaining rights for construction workers.
1990 Livestock Industry Diversication Act Removed the right to unionize for workers in the
livestock industry.
2001 Labour Relations Act Temporarily suspended the right to strike for
Edmonton municipal employees and paramedics.
2002 Labour Relations Act Temporarily suspended the right to strike for teachers
in 22 school districts.
2002 Education Services Settlement Act Ended a strike by teachers and restricted negotiable
matters.
2003 Labour Relations (Regional Health
Authorities Restructuring) Act Removed the right to strike for nurse practitioners
and other health-care workers; restricted negotiable
matters.
2008 Labour Relations Amendment Act Removed the right to strike for paramedics.
2013 Public Services Salary Restraint Act Threatened to impose a four-year agreement if
agreement not settled by deadline.
2013 Public Sector Continuation Act Further restricted public-sector workers’ rights by
expanding the denition of “strike activity.
2016 An Act to Implement a Supreme Court
Ruling Governing Essential Services Granted all public-sector workers except police and
reghters the right to strike while imposing onerous
essential-service conditions.
2019 Public Sector Wage Arbitration
Deferral Act Unilaterally changed binding contracts by delaying
wage re-opener deadlines.
2019 Public Sector Employers Act Provided minister power to impose secret, binding
negotiation mandates on all public-sector employers.
15
A Thumb on the Scale: Alberta Government Interference in Public-Sector Bargaining
Source: Compiled by authors.
2020 Restoring Balance in Alberta’s
Workplaces Act Required union member opt-in for collection of non-
core dues; established restrictions on the right to
picket and secondary picketing.
2023 Public Sector Employers Amendment
Act Expanded secret mandates to non-unionized public-
sector workers and provided for the creation of
employer committees and employer associations to
coordinate bargaining and other human resources
matters across employers.
Between 2000 and 2022, Alberta laws made up 13.5% (11) of all legislative
interventions in Canada, with three of those occurring early in the United
Conservative Party’s (UCP) rst term. is level of intervention is notable,
given that Alberta has the lowest unionization rate in Canada and very low
levels of strikes and lockouts.
Over the past decade, Alberta’s government involvement in public-sector
collective bargaining has evolved, both legislatively and non-legislatively.
Notable legislative changes include the 2016 enactment of An Act to
Implement a Supreme Court Ruling Governing Essential Services and the 2020
introduction of the Restoring Balance in Alberta’s Workplaces Act (commonly
referred to as Bill 32).
e 2016 legislation, a response to the SFL decision, extended the right to
strike to all public-sector workers (except reghters and police) but also
required “essential” public services to remain available during strikes or
lockouts. Employers and unions were required to negotiate essential service
agreements (ESAs) outlining how these services would continue during
a labour dispute before initiating mediation in the process of collective
bargaining (a legal precursor to strikes/lockouts). Many have argued these
ESAs served as an additional barrier to legal strike/lockout as they provided
a secondary negotiating table where delaying tactics could be employed
(Barnetson 2019).
Bill 32 placed signicant restrictions on picketing during labour disputes.
ese restrictions included prohibiting workers from “obstructing or
impeding” anyone wishing to cross a picket line and requiring unions
to obtain permission from the labour relations board before engaging in
secondary picketing (i.e., at locations other than the workplace). While these
provisions do not impact bargaining directly, they are aimed at reducing the
eectiveness of striking, which weakens unions’ bargaining power.7
7 Readers interested in a fuller discussion
of the implications of Bill 32 are invited to
read the Parkland Institute report Tipping
the Balance: Bill 32, The Charter and
the Americanization of Alberta’s Labour
Relations System.
16
Parkland Institute • February 2024
2.2 Increasing Public-Sector Bargaining Coordination
Over the past 20 years, Alberta governments have also worked, albeit
unevenly, to concentrate contract expiry dates. At present, all of Albertas
major public-sector collective agreements expire within months of one
another. Labour relations practitioners refer to the resulting clusters
of negotiations as “rounds” of bargaining. e most recent rounds of
bargaining began in 2017 and 2020 while the next round begins in 2024.
One common outcome of this kind of clustered bargaining is a pattern of
similar settlements, which governments see as advantageous (Traxler, Brandl,
and Glassner 2008). Economic conditions and relative bargaining power
determine for whom the creation of patterns is most advantageous (Roche
and Gormley 2017). Unions can increase their bargaining power in clustered
bargaining by coordinating bargaining eorts across tables.
A series of interviews we conducted with union ocials and a government
ocial conrms that Albertas government has long had an interest in what
happens in public-sector bargaining, in particular at the so-called “big
six” tables.8 ese tables negotiate agreements in education, health care,
and the core public service, thus encompassing the majority of public-
sector workers. For decades, union-side negotiators would refer to the
provincial government as the “ghost at the table.” One longtime union ocial
indicated that everyone involved in public-sector bargaining knew that
the government “were never actually there but they were the ones making
the decision.” is control from afar oen rankled union-side negotiators
because the real decision-maker was not at the table.
is perception was conrmed by the government ocial we interviewed.
“rough most of the [Progressive Conservative] years, it was more of
an ad hoc sort of approach until about the last two years before the end
of their government [in 2015].” e relevant provincial department (e.g.,
the Department of Health in the case of health care) would engage with
the employers, but there was little communication or planning between
departments. According to the government ocial,
the minister or the deputy minister involved would swoop
in at the end [of bargaining], to not only direct the deals but
potentially even cut the deals. Oen, they would swoop in with,
we called it, the wheelbarrow of cash [to settle the agreement].
ere is little evidence that the government had much involvement or took
much interest in the approximately 250 smaller tables involving agencies,
boards, and commissions. An even more hands-o approach was taken
with municipalities, which are legally autonomous entities. Instead, the
government mostly relied on the persuasive power of the patterns set at the
big tables to inuence outcomes at the smaller tables.
8 All quotations in this section come from
author interviews with labour relations
practitioners. This includes a government
ofcial with direct knowledge of the
2017 and 2020 bargaining rounds and
nine senior union ofcials engaged in
the 2020 round of negotiations (many
of whom have participated in many
rounds over the years). The unions that
employ the union ofcials interviewed
represent the majority of public-sector
workers across every major domain of
the public sector. The identities of these
interviewees have been anonymized.
These interviews were supplemented
by the authors’ direct knowledge and
experience of public-sector bargaining in
Alberta due to past and current roles as
labour relations practitioners, senior-
level government ofcials, and/or lead
negotiators during the 2020 and other
rounds of bargaining. Employer-side
negotiators were not interviewed as they
continue to be required under the PSEA to
hold condential all information related
to government-imposed mandates, and
thus would not be able to shed light on its
impacts on the bargaining process.
17
A Thumb on the Scale: Alberta Government Interference in Public-Sector Bargaining
is approach shied in 2012, under Progressive Conservative Premier
Alison Redford’s leadership. Redford established a secretariat (called the
Public Sector Resource Committee) to discuss possible coordination of
public-sector bargaining. is body discussed ways the government could
engage in bargaining dierently but was disbanded without any action taken
following Redfords resignation in 2014.
In 2015, Redford’s successor, Jim Prentice, created the Public Sector Working
Group, which seconded ocials from dierent departments with bargaining
experience to establish a plan to coordinate bargaining across the public
sector. e 2015 mandate of the Working Group read:
e Public Sector Working Group is responsible for dening
a disciplined, collaborative, long-term approach to public
sector bargaining that achieves fair settlements for public
sector employees that are consistent with the government’s
scal goals. e group makes accurate, objective market data
available to bargaining teams in a timely fashion, including
the costs of proposals and promotes labour stability and the
protection of public services. (Government of Alberta 2016, 12)
In 2016, the newly elected New Democratic Party government under
Rachel Notley altered the mandate of the Working Group to emphasize
coordination of bargaining:
e Public Sector Working Group supports governments
interests, as employer and funder, with respect to public-sector
labour relations. e group prepares mandates, supports cross-
sectorial coordination in bargaining and otherwise strengthens
the government’s overall strategic capacity with respect to
negotiations, compensation research, and other strategic labour
relations matters. (Government of Alberta 2017, 12)
e name of the working group was also changed to the Public Bargaining
Coordination Oce (PBCO) to reect its more permanent role in
negotiations. In 2022, the name was once again changed to the Provincial
Bargaining and Compensation Oce. Today, the function of the PBCO is
laid out very clearly on the government website. It is worth citing it in full:
e Provincial Bargaining and Compensation Oce (PBCO)
supports the governments interests, as an employer and funder,
with respect to public-sector bargaining. PBCO provides
support and advice to the government and its employer
partners to ensure bargaining outcomes align with the
governments’ scal, economic and public policy priorities.
18
Parkland Institute • February 2024
Core functions and services include:
bargaining directives and negotiations for unionized sta
oversight and administration of non-union and out-
of-scope compensation for applicable public sector
agencies under the Reforms of Agencies, Boards and
Commissions Compensation Act (RABCCA) and
regulations
applied economic labour analysis
compensation research and data analytics
strategic negotiation planning and arbitration support
labour relations advice to internal and external partners
Bargaining directives cover all public sectors including health,
post-secondary education, K-12 education, and Agencies,
Boards and Commissions (ABCs). PBCO also provides support
for negotiations with the Alberta Medical Association and
compensation for provincial judges, justices of the peace and
resident physicians. (Government of Alberta 2023b)
In essence, the PBCO represents the “government’s interests as employer and
funder” and ensures all public-sector settlements “align” with government
“scal, economic and public policy priorities.” In 2022-23, the PBCO budget
was $3 million and it employed 14 sta. (Government of Alberta 2023a)
2.3 The 2017 Bargaining Round and Aftermath
e 2017 round of negotiations was the rst with active PBCO involvement.
A representative of the PBCO was present at each of the big six tables.
eir primary role was to be a conduit between specic employer-side
bargaining committees and the government. e PBCO representative
ensured employers adhered to the government’s scal mandate and managed
employer requests to vary non-monetary aspects of the mandate.
e PBCO was not physically present at the smaller tables. It did, however,
consult with those employers on mandate-related issues. e 2017
government mandate centred on a two-year wage freeze, with employers
being directed to oer any necessary improvements to non-monetary
language (including layo protection) to achieve this. e option of a third-
year wage re-opener was also considered a possibility. e government
largely achieved its scal mandate in this round of bargaining.
Following the 2019 election, the Jason Kenney-led UCP government
implemented several initiatives designed to further increase the government’s
inuence over bargaining. First, Bill 9, e Public Sector Wage Arbitration
Deferral Act, unilaterally delayed wage re-openers which had been negotiated
19
A Thumb on the Scale: Alberta Government Interference in Public-Sector Bargaining
in 24 collective agreements aecting approximately 180,000 workers
(Government of Alberta 2019). ese agreements had established a deadline
of June 30, 2019, for a negotiated agreement on the wage settlement for
the last year of the agreements. Any unresolved negotiations would move
to binding arbitration. Bill 9 delayed the deadline to October 31. While
largely a procedural maneuver, Bill 9 signalled that the UCP was prepared
to alter collective agreements through legislation to achieve its political
goals. Unions were ultimately unsuccessful in seeking an injunction against
the legislation, and the subsequent passage of time made any further legal
challenges moot.(Bellefontaine 2019)
Later in 2019, through the omnibus Bill 21, the government enacted the
Public Sector Employers Act (PSEA). e PSEA authorized the Minister
of Finance to issue secret and binding bargaining directives to all public-
sector employers except municipalities and private post-secondary
institutions. e PSEA was a response to a PBCO review of the 2017 round
of negotiations, wherein the PBCO found that many employers at the small
tables, particularly school boards, failed to comply with the government’s
bargaining direction at the time. According to the civil servant interviewed,
e [PBCO] recommendations were basically saying we need
to put a little bit more teeth [into mandates]. … e decision
was that directives would have a bit of authority or weight, …
giving it the he of a ministerial directive.
e PSEA combined with the UCP’s decision to push forward with an
austerity agenda early in its term were an early signal that the 2020 round
of bargaining would be dicult. e government’s rhetoric going into the
round suggested they would be looking for signicant rollbacks.
2.4 The 2020 Bargaining Round
Bargaining in the 2020 round was scheduled to start just as COVID-19
began spreading across the world in March. Due to the immediate crisis of
responding to the emerging pandemic, bargaining at most tables was delayed
until the summer and fall. When bargaining did resume, it was done in the
context of COVID restrictions, with most negotiations taking place virtually.
e bargaining mandates issued to public-sector employers for the 2020
bargaining round are unknown because disclosure, even aer the fact,
remains illegal under the PSEA. It is possible to infer the wage aspect of the
original mandates from the 2020 opening oers, which consistently asked
for wage rollbacks in the rst year ranging between three and 11 percent,
followed by three years of zero increases. is opening position is consistent
with one of the recommendations of a government nancial review
panel released in the months before bargaining to reduce public-sector
Bill 9 signalled
that the UCP
was prepared to
alter collective
agreements
through legislation
to achieve its
political goals.
20
Parkland Institute • February 2024
compensation across the board (MacKinnon 2019). Ultimately, all the major
agreements settled on modest wage increases of 3.25% to 4.25% over either
three or four years, with most of the money back-end loaded. is outcome
suggests the government mandate shied during negotiations. Whether the
mandates extended beyond the wage package is a point of debate that will be
discussed further below.
Nature of Government Involvement
Government involvement in the 2020 round of bargaining varied based on
the sector and number of workers involved. For the big six tables, the PBCO
had a representative at the table throughout bargaining, just like in 2017.
All respondents of our interviews reported that, at least before mediation,
the PBCO representative remained silent during bargaining sessions with
the union. e silence of the PBCO representatives did not, however, mean
they were not exerting authority. Indeed, the PBCO was actively managing
developments at the table. According to one union ocial, “It was very clear
that the people at the table did not have the authority to negotiate certain
things.” e PBCO was, at times, also actively shaping employer proposals.
e government would say to [the employer], okay, this is your
proposal today and their negotiator would have like an hour
sometimes to read and digest it and then have to give it to us.
Sometimes it was clear that [they] had just got this and [they]
didn’t even understand what was in it.
All respondents agreed that no deal could be settled without approval from
the PBCO at least on matters related to the government mandate.
At the smaller tables, PBCO representatives were not physically present
during negotiations but did provide direction and ensure employer
compliance with the mandate. ings were dierent in the municipal
sector. ere was no direct or active involvement of the PBCO at tables with
municipal employers, but eorts were made to include the largest cities in
coordination. e civil servant indicated:
We had, three or four times a year, a committee where we
would bring in representatives from each of the six sectors of
the public sector to just to talk about issues and updates. We
would invite a representative of Edmonton and Calgary to
come to some of those meetings … We are just talking about
coordination and recognizing the municipalities are a player
and they have a role.
21
A Thumb on the Scale: Alberta Government Interference in Public-Sector Bargaining
Union ocials in the municipal sector believe the government mandates
shaped employer demands because of municipal reliance on provincial
funding and the close political ties between the UCP and some city
councillors.
Scope of Government Mandate
Union ocials were uncertain of the scope and content of their employers
mandates or how the mandates may have shied during bargaining. e
similarity of initial opening oers suggested to them, however, that the initial
monetary mandate was a wage rollback followed by several years of zero
increases.
ere was, however, less agreement among union ocials about how
detailed the mandates were or whether they included direction on non-
wage items. Some respondents believed the 2020 mandate was focused on
the total monetary value and le the employer to handle other matters. One
respondent suggested that the mandate was monetary, but with an additional
nudge.
I think what happened this round was that the government gave
them specic instructions on overall compensation and on term
and I think what also happened, though, is the government
said, in terms of management rights and operational stu, you
propose whatever you want and we promise we will back you.
If correct, this would mean the government encouraged employers to add
additional items to create a de facto “broadened mandate.
Other union ocials believed the mandate went beyond setting a monetary
value and delved into a wide range of issues, citing two lines of evidence to
support this view. First, employers unexpectedly rejected small, cost-neutral
amendments to proposals that had no material or nancial impact on the
employer but would advance a union objective (e.g., workplace equity).
Oen, the employer stated the amendment “looked too dierent” from other
agreements. is suggested that there was an actor in the background with
the desire to standardize the content of agreements and the power to compel
compliance. Second, employer representatives tabled proposals in which
neither party had previously expressed interest. Union ocials said these
proposals “[came] out of the blue” and their content sometimes seemed more
in line with policy positions taken by provincial political gures rather than
employer or worker interests. is was the experience of the authors as well.
One union ocial hypothesized that these expanded mandates were about
standardizing language across agreements in a single sector.
22
Parkland Institute • February 2024
It’s not just about getting a nancial mandate, but it’s also about
pushing things down. So when [some] people have benets
or language thats better than other people in the sector, it’s
very clear that there’s an attempt through the government to
push those individual language clauses down and to try to
make an even pattern. We saw this over and over with how
the employers were talking at the table of specically targeting
single benets or single classications of employees to try to…
push their wages or benets down.
Based on these interviews, the authors tentatively conclude that, at the big
six tables where the PBCO was present, there was less need for a formal
“mandate” about non-monetary items because the PBCO representatives,
who were in regular contact with political decision-makers, could
intervene directly to aect the outcome. In contrast, at tables without
PBCO representatives present, which oen entailed multiple bargaining
relationships aecting similar kinds of workers, the mandates were expanded
to address the governments sectoral concerns across employers.
Role of Mediation
Every major agreement, and most smaller agreements, reached an impasse
during bargaining, with settlement occurring during mediation. All union
ocials reported that there was basically no movement at the table until
mediation began. is is suggestive of when (temporally speaking) mandates
shied. One respondent conjectured that the looming entry of a third party
led employers to reconsider their positions.
[T]hey went from complete insanity to where we normally are
at the beginning of bargaining… where they had one or two
rollbacks. ey withdrew all of the crazy stu. … Because I
think they didn’t want to hear what [the mediator] would say,
which is ‘you are crazy’.
Aer the rst few large tables settled, negotiators at other tables developed
an approximate sense of the shi in the monetary mandate and, at some
of the tables, the employer presented revised wage oers reecting the
larger settlements. Nevertheless, employers did not remove many other
concessionary proposals before mediation.
At mediation, the content of the mandates was communicated more
explicitly. At many tables, the mediator communicated, directly or
indirectly, that certain items were subject to the mandate. At tables with
PBCO representation, it was the PBCO representative who communicated
the mandate. According to one union ocial, “In mediation, [the PBCO
At the big six
tables where
the PBCO was
present, there was
less need for a
formal ‘mandate’
about non-
monetary items
because the PBCO
representatives,
who were in
regular contact
with political
decision-makers,
could intervene
directly to affect
the outcome.
23
A Thumb on the Scale: Alberta Government Interference in Public-Sector Bargaining
representative] was actually way more candid about it. … [ey] made it
very clear what was there under [the direction of] the Minister of Finance.
Mediation also revealed the extent of government engagement in the
process. Mediators found dierent ways to communicate that on monetary
items the government was in control.
When we got into mediation, [the mediator] said to me ‘why
don’t we do this at two dierent tables? So, why don’t we
have one table where we talk about the operational stu and
a second table where we talk about money and I won’t even
bother inviting [the employer] to that table…. It’ll just be you
and me and [PBCO representative], you and your bargaining
t ea m’.
e union ocial indicated the mediator proposed this arrangement
because, when it came to monetary matters, the employer has “no say in the
matter at all, they have no input.
One union ocial reported that the mediation process included phone calls
with the head of the PBCO, who had a direct line to the relevant ministers.
Another union ocial, who was at one of the smaller tables, reported being
present as the mediator made a phone call to “a mystery man” to seek
approval for a proposal. While this respondent could not identify the person
whom the mediator phoned, the nature of the conversation convinced
the respondent that the “mystery man” was not someone from their
organization. ese examples suggest that the PBCO sta appear to have
been actively engaged in directing the nal settlements at most bargaining
tables, even during mediation.
Role of COVID-19
e COVID-19 pandemic aected the outcomes of the 2020 round by
altering both the process and the broader political context, so much so that
it compelled the government to walk back its original mandate. e start
of negotiations was delayed by six to 12 months and took place virtually.
Virtual bargaining slowed down the process and required negotiators to
adopt new strategies and tactics (Foster 2023). e destabilizing nature of
COVID-19 had three main eects on bargaining.
Public opinion regarding public-sector workers — particularly
teachers and health-care workers — became quite positive due to their
hard work in dangerous conditions. Trying to force wage rollbacks
and other concessions on these “heroes” was politically untenable and
likely contributed to the eventual shi in the government mandate.
24
Parkland Institute • February 2024
e delay in the negotiations pushed public conict (e.g., strikes and
lockouts) too close to the 2023 election. Governments typically seek
to do unpopular things early in a mandate (König and Wenzelburger
2017). With some negotiations pushing into late 2021, the political
risks of a confrontation with public-sector unions may have
made government leaders nervous. is hesitancy may have been
heightened by internal leadership challenges facing then-Premier
Jason Kenney, challenges that ultimately forced his resignation in mid-
2022.
Rebounding oil prices in 2021 added substantial revenue to the
governments coers. is fundamentally changed the economic
context in which bargaining was taking place and undermined the
governments argument for public-sector austerity.
One union ocial put it this way:
ey were running out of time and they were running out of
credibility to leverage with the public, especially in light of
COVID and particularly [for certain sectors such as health
care]. ose workers were seen as heroes by the public and
yet the employers are demonizing them. … [Also] I think the
government realized that they were getting into not the red
zone but the orange zone in terms of their mandate and they
weren’t going to be able to pull this one o and it would have
led to probably strikes leading up to an election. … I think they
lost the appetite for that ght.
2.5 Effects of Government Intervention on Bargaining
Previous research has established that ongoing government intervention
in bargaining “can gradually transform the process of collective bargaining
and with it the union-employer bargaining relationship” (Reshef 2007,
691). Specically, it damages the relationships between the union and the
employer by increasing conict at the table and reducing trust between the
parties (Rose 2016; Swimmer and Bartkiw 2003; Sweetman and Slinn 2012).
An open question is how the specic forms of interference in the 2020 round
shaped the process and outcomes.
The Effect of Secret Mandates
Legislatively prohibiting employers from sharing the content of the
governments mandate with union negotiators was new in 2020. While
negotiators rarely share the full extent of their mandate, the PSEA curtailed
the ability of employer-side negotiators to reveal elements of their mandate
While negotiators
rarely share the
full extent of their
mandate, the
PSEA curtailed
the ability of
employer-side
negotiators to
reveal elements of
their mandate to
advance bargaining
or achieve a
strategic goal.
25
A Thumb on the Scale: Alberta Government Interference in Public-Sector Bargaining
to advance bargaining or achieve a strategic goal. For union negotiators,
secret mandates also made it dicult to ascertain which proposals were
coming from the employer — and therefore were more malleable — and
which were coming from the government. Union ocials indicated that
they were compelled to “guess the mandate” during negotiations (because
knowing the source of a proposal would shape the unions response) and this
dynamic both slowed bargaining and put workers at a disadvantage.
When union negotiators directly asked employers what the mandate was,
employers refused to disclose their mandate, with some denying they were
acting under a mandate altogether. As bargaining proceeded, employer
negotiators did nd ways to indicate that they had to seek government
approval. “ey made it very clear that they have principals that they had
to, you know, check in with and that they get their marching orders from,
said one union ocial. Employer negotiators also found ways to signal
when a proposal came from the government without directly divulging
that information. For example, when an employer tabled a proposal that it
knew the union would dislike, the negotiator would nd a way to distance
themselves from the proposal.
ey did say several times ‘as directed by the government’.
… Particularly when they [tabled a specic concessionary
proposal] they wanted us to know, please don’t shoot the
messenger, this is directed by the government.
Union ocials believed that, by the end of bargaining, they understood
the monetary mandate. ey remained uncertain about what other aspects
of negotiations were bound by government directives. Some believed that
PBCO had vetted almost every aspect of their agreements, while others
thought only key issues were subject to oversight. Indeed, dierent tables
may have been subjected to dierent levels of PBCO oversight. Most
respondents agreed that not having knowledge of where directives were
coming from undermined their ability to build a strong bargaining strategy
and respond appropriately, which was possibly one of the intended eects of
the secret mandates.
e secrecy forced upon employers bogged down negotiations and made
the need for mediation more likely. Mediation (eventually) attenuated
much of the impact of the secrecy because mediators, tasked with nding a
resolution, were more open with the unions about at least some aspects of
the mandate. e openness of mediators may also reect their awareness
that secret mandates in fact can slow bargaining and delay resolutions. It is
unclear the degree to which the government was involved in the decision to
disclose portions of the mandate during mediation.
Most respondents
agreed that not
having knowledge
of where directives
were coming
from undermined
their ability to
build a strong
bargaining strategy
and respond
appropriately,
which was possibly
one of the
intended effects
of the secret
mandates.
26
Parkland Institute • February 2024
Effect of PBCO Involvement
e PBCO extending its involvement to all negotiation tables was also new.
Its decision to sit at the big six tables could have streamlined bargaining, as
the so-called “ghost at the table” had nally taken a corporeal — although
silent — form. e eect of PBCO’s presence was, however, reduced by the
decision to have the PBCO representative remain silent and by the secrecy
surrounding the mandates. As a result, union negotiators remained unable to
negotiate directly with the true decision-maker.
e PBCO’s decision to lurk in the background at smaller and decentralized
tables was more problematic. Union representatives at the smaller tables
were also unable to negotiate directly with the true decision-maker.
Additionally, matters that, in the past, had been seen as local/institutional
concerns (and thus not of interest to the provincial government) were now
being treated as part of the government mandate. e loss of employer
autonomy and the perception that the PBCO was insuciently familiar
with the specic local context of the workplace stymied negotiations and
undermined trust at the table. One local-level negotiator compared 2020 to
the 2017 round.
At [small employer tables], last time we were done in two days,
everything settled. [is time] they had like nothing signed o
even [aer months of bargaining]. Even though there are fewer
things on the table than before, its actually harder now.
is increased diculty was attributed to the involvement of the PBCO.
While the PBCO involvement in bargaining added an element of
professionalism to government interventions during the 2020 round, its
overall impact served to entrench and solidify government interference,
leading to a further weakening of the bargaining relationship between
employers and unions. Further, its unwillingness to fully acknowledge its
role as gatekeeper sowed distrust between the union negotiators and the
government as a whole.
Effect of the UCP Political Agenda
In the lead-up to the 2020 bargaining, the UCP’s tone was combative and
designed to pit public-sector workers against workers in other sectors. e
government argued that public-sector workers were the highest paid in the
country and rollbacks were needed because the province could no longer
aord such high wages. For example, then-Finance Minister Travis Toews
stated:
e mandate presented to the union reects the provinces
current economic and scal reality, … e government is
While the PBCO
involvement in
bargaining added
an element of
professionalism
to government
interventions
during the 2020
round, its overall
impact served
to entrench
and solidify
government
interference.
27
A Thumb on the Scale: Alberta Government Interference in Public-Sector Bargaining
Government
political agendas
inuencing
dynamics at
bargaining tables
are nothing new.
The growing
power of the PBCO
to enforce that
agenda simply
makes government
interference more
effective.
asking unionized public service employees to be part of the
solution, as we face the worst economic crisis in nearly a
century. is is a fair and reasonable oer. e union’s in-going
proposal is asking for a ve per cent raise, while thousands of
Albertans working in the private sector have already taken pay
cuts (Quoted in Bellefontaine 2020).
In the rst year of its mandate, the UCP embarked on a signicant plan
to contain spending, including in public-sector wages. At the same time,
the government passed multiple pieces of legislation aimed at weakening
employment protections and curtailing union power. is anti-union
animus shaped the dynamics at bargaining tables. As one union ocial put
it:
Look, every round is dierent. A lot of it comes down to
what the [goals] of the government of the day is, how nasty
that agenda is, versus not. … is particular government was
inherently nasty because they don’t like unions.
Union ocials believed that the aggressive rollbacks that employers
demanded in their opening oers reected the government’s broader
political strategy at the time. ey also believed the lack of bargaining
progress until mediation reected the government’s desire to be seen by the
public as acting tough on public-sector unions and “reining in” spending. It
was only the impact of COVID and a brightening scal situation that led to
the mandates shiing in mediation.
Government political agendas inuencing dynamics at bargaining tables
are nothing new. e growing power of the PBCO to enforce that agenda
simply makes government interference more eective. Ad hoc interventions
implemented by individual ministers have given way to highly structured,
coordinated, and disciplined institutional eorts.
28
Parkland Institute • February 2024
Conclusion
ere is no question the 2020 round of bargaining was dicult for all
parties and was made more challenging with the upheaval of the COVID-19
pandemic. If looked at in the context of both Alberta’s history of government
involvement in bargaining and the broader evolution of government
interference across Canada, the 2020 round can be seen as a continuation
of the trend toward growing sophistication in how governments approach
public-sector bargaining. Specically, governments are carefully recalibrating
their legislative interventions to hopefully avoid constitutional issues.
In Alberta, the introduction of secret mandates and the active management
of bargaining by the PBCO in the 2020 round is a continuation of a decade-
long intensication of government involvement. Coupling this trajectory
with the UCP’s political agenda and their confrontational approach to
workers and unions led to an unprecedented degree of intervention, both
legislatively and informally, in the 2020 bargaining round. e signicance of
this nding is two-fold.
First, the combination of new legislative tools enhancing the government
ability to interfere in bargaining and the increasingly active role taken by
the PBCO meant government interference was more eective than in the
past. e eectiveness of past ad hoc interventions by government ministers
or the premier was highly dependent upon the capacity of these actors.
e creation of a structured, professional body of civil servants tasked with
securing government mandates dramatically increased the eectiveness
of government intervention. In both the 2017 and the 2020 rounds of
bargaining, the government managed to achieve its goals of a pattern
settlement. External factors beyond the government’s control were the key
limiting factor.
Second, while the imposition of secret mandates had only a mixed eect on
the 2020 round of bargaining, the secrecy can be seen as Albertas unique
contribution to the ongoing evolution of governments’ eorts to interfere
with public-sector bargaining while abiding by the evolving jurisprudence.
To this end, it is likely we will see other jurisdictions in Canada employ
secret mandates as one of their strategies for legislatively interfering with
public-sector bargaining.
While the
imposition of
secret mandates
had only a
mixed effect on
the 2020 round
of bargaining,
the secrecy
can be seen as
Alberta’s unique
contribution to the
ongoing evolution
of governments’
efforts to interfere
with public-
sector bargaining
while abiding
by the evolving
jurisprudence.
29
A Thumb on the Scale: Alberta Government Interference in Public-Sector Bargaining
Prospects for the 2024 Round
Collective agreements covering approximately 200,000 public-sector
workers will expire in 2024. Given the long-term trajectory of public-
sector bargaining in Alberta, it is expected that the provincial government
will again interfere with the process. is will likely include using secret
mandates to restrict employer discretion at the table and enforcing them
via the PBCO. A PBCO representative will probably be present at the big
six tables, although how actively they will participate is unknown. PBCO
representatives will also likely monitor and inuence negotiations at the
hundreds of smaller tables, even if resource constraints prevent them from
attending.
What will be in the secret mandates? e upcoming round of negotiations
once again begins early in the recently re-elected UCP’s mandate.
Traditionally, this is the political window when governments attempt to
complete those parts of their agenda that they expect to be unpopular
with the public. is may include renewed calls for reductions in public-
sector compensation. Given the provinces healthy scal balance sheet
and stubbornly high ination, wage rollbacks may be dicult to justify.
Alternatively, an oer of small (or no) wage increases may be bundled with
other forms of reductions, such as lay-os, privatization, and increased
employer exibility. Some of these reductions may take place outside the
bargaining process, but would nonetheless impact negotiations.
ere may also be a continuation of eorts to standardize agreements
across sectors or move to a one-size-ts-all model. Such a requirement may
mean that provisions in specic collective agreements that are dierent and
perhaps responsive to local issues are refused or removed at the negotiating
tables. Such a mandate may assist employers in reversing gains previously
made by stronger bargaining units over time. It may also prevent employers
from responding to local needs.
ere is little evidence to suggest that the aggressive, anti-union tone taken
by the UCP will dier from 2020. Pre-COVID, the UCP government adopted
strong language using anti-union rhetoric and accusing public-sector
workers of being overpaid and unreasonable in their demands. COVID-19
muted the eectiveness of this rhetoric at justifying rollbacks. e 2023 UCP
caucus is likely to be equally or more inclined to adopt a similar strategy,
especially at the beginning of negotiations, and Albertans should expect a
confrontational tone early in the 2024 round.
In the fall of 2023, the government passed Bill 5: Public Sector Employers
Amendment Act. is bill expands the scope of secret mandates (and thus
the role of the PBCO) to include non-unionized public-sector employees
and implements new penalties against employers who breach the mandates.
The upcoming
round of
negotiations once
again begins early
in the recently
re-elected
UCP’s mandate.
Traditionally, this
is the political
window when
governments
attempt to
complete those
parts of their
agenda that they
expect to be
unpopular with the
public.
30
Parkland Institute • February 2024
It also authorizes the minister to create employer committees which bring
together multiple employers to “coordinate collective bargaining” (s.3.3(3)
(b)) and employer associations, set up as corporations, to coordinate in
broader matters of human resources (including non-union employees).
e government has not provided information about the purpose of
these bodies. At the time of writing, it is also unclear whether any will
be established in time for the 2024 bargaining round. If they do move
ahead with associations, that action will mark a new level of government
interference at bargaining tables across the sector. e move toward multi-
employer bargaining committees and associations indicates a desire on the
part of the UCP to further coordinate bargaining across employers, likely
on a sectoral basis (e.g., post-secondary employer association). Sectoral
coordination could streamline the implementation of government secret
mandates and facilitate the harmonization of agreements within a sector. For
unions (which generally bargain individually), it would mean bargaining
with not just one employer and the government, but with a coordinated
cluster of employers and the government.
Sectoral bargaining has potential risks and rewards for public-sector
workers. ere are recent examples in other provinces where unions, faced
with sectoral or centralized bargaining, developed a coordinated strategy
that maximized their bargaining power. In 2021, 22,000 New Brunswick
public-sector workers across 11 union locals won signicant pay increases
aer a 16-day strike in the face of a provincially imposed austerity agenda.
In the fall of 2023, a coalition of Quebec public-sector unions representing
420,000 workers built a common front against the provincial government.
e coalition staged a series of multi-day strikes through the fall and in
early 2024 signed an agreement with signicant improvements to wages and
working conditions.
At a minimum, any move toward sectoral employer associations will require
increased sectoral cooperation and coordination among Alberta public-
sector unions. Unions will need to remain watchful in the early stages
of 2024 bargaining for signs that these new committees and associations
are being established for this round and also remain open to increased
coordination and cooperation across unions and sectors.
ere are several strategies that public-sector workers and their unions can
consider as they prepare for bargaining in 2024. Unions can adjust their
bargaining strategies at the table to counter the governments interference,
including:
As a condition of bargaining, demand greater transparency from
employers regarding the scope and content of government mandates.
Understanding what aspects of the employer position are imposed and
There are recent
examples in other
provinces where
unions, faced
with sectoral
or centralized
bargaining,
developed a
coordinated
strategy that
maximized their
bargaining power.
31
A Thumb on the Scale: Alberta Government Interference in Public-Sector Bargaining
what are at the discretion of the employer should be a prerequisite to
bargaining.
Increase coordination between unions and across segments of the
sector to share information and maximize pressure on the government
to nd fair settlements across the sector.
Turn the tables on the government’s desire for a pattern settlement
on wages by publicly articulating a joint union position on wage
expectations.
Demand a more upfront role by the PBCO, given their centrality to
negotiations. Demand that the PBCO actively participate at the table
as the government representative.
Unions, or potentially the labour movement as a whole, may also wish
to legally challenge whether the PSEA’s secret mandates are a violation of
workersCharter-protected freedom of association because they substantively
interfere with collective bargaining. e narrow nature of associational rights
established in Health Services may mean secret mandates are permissible in
whole or to certain degrees. Despite this, the potential to limit or bar this
tactic may make such a challenge worthwhile. Not challenging this tactic is a
de facto acceptance of it by unions. Further, while a Charter challenge would
not be resolved prior to the 2024 round of bargaining, unions could seek
an interim injunction, which might limit the government’s use of this tactic
until the challenge was decided.
Unions can reduce the eectiveness of the secret mandates by educating
their members about the existence and deleterious eects of the mandates.
ey can also encourage members to place pressure on UCP Members of the
Legislative Assembly (and their donors) to respect free collective bargaining.
e public may also be convinced to engage in pressure tactics. Most
members of the public have experienced unfair bargaining situations, such
as negotiating a car purchase only to have “the manager in the back” veto
the agreement. A carefully craed communications campaign highlighting
how fundamentally unfair the government’s negotiating tactics and goals are
to teachers, nurses, and other public-sector workers may attach signicant
political costs to this bargaining strategy.
Furthering this tactic, unions may consider concrete ways to make the UCP
bargaining strategy politically costly, such as pushing negotiations closer to
provincial elections, although this would need to be balanced with keeping
the membership engaged over a prolonged period. e farther bargaining
goes into the governments term, the more likely ongoing ssures in the UCP
will manifest and the more reluctant the government may become to force a
showdown.
32
Parkland Institute • February 2024
Finally, unions will benet from a well-organized and mobilized union
membership that is prepared to take action to achieve their goals at the
table. is increases the unions bargaining power, which weakens the
employer’s position. Ultimately, a governments mandate is only as strong as
the determination of the politicians imposing it. If public-sector workers are
not prepared to accept an unfair deal and are willing to take action to protect
their rights, this may shi the political calculus within the UCP enough to
change its mandate.
Action can take many forms, including informal expressions of displeasure
through information pickets, rallies, and other steps protected by the
freedom of expression. It can also take the form of legal job action. e legal
constraints around job action may require the labour movement to explore
creative alternatives beyond formal government-sanctioned work stoppages.
No one can predict the outcomes of the 2024 round. e trend in Alberta
suggests public-sector workers and their unions should prepare for the
government to interfere with bargaining to a degree never before seen
in Alberta. e response of public-sector workers and their unions will
play a signicant role in determining whether this strategy of intensifying
interference will continue in the future.
Public-sector
workers and their
unions should
prepare for the
government to
interfere with
bargaining to
a degree never
before seen in
Alberta.
33
A Thumb on the Scale: Alberta Government Interference in Public-Sector Bargaining
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