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Two Years After the Coup in Myanmar
Abstract
This month marks the second anniversary of the military coup in Myanmar. This brief
provides a general overview of the political situation in Myanmar two years after the
military coup. Assessing India's approach, the brief argues that India’s
engagement with Myanmar’s ethnic and opposition forces to restore stability
and democratic rule would better serve its long-term economic and political
interests.
www.asianconfluence.org
AsCon Brief 08
Sai Latt
7 February, 2023
1
Two Years After the Coup in Myanmar
Introduction
On 1 February 2023, Myanmar’s military regime announced the extension of nationwide state of
emergency for another six months.i It was on this day two years ago that the military staged a coup
and captured power from a democratically elected government. The junta’s latest move has been
to buy more time to continue its oppression against the pro-democracy movement. A day after
extending the state of emergency the junta imposed martial law in 37 townships across the country,ii
clearly indicating its determination to crush the armed resistance movement.
On January 10 and 11 this year, the Myanmar military launched aerial attacks against Chin National
Front’s Headquarters, Camp Victoria, on the Indian-Myanmar border. The airstrikes killed five
Chin fighters and injured several civilians.2
iii There were reports of the Myanmar Air Force using
Indian airspace for this attack and that two bombs landed on the Indian side of the border,iv raising
questions about India’s role in the Myanmar’s ongoing political crisis. This brief provides a general
overview of the political situation in Myanmar two years after the military coup and argues that
India’s engagement with Myanmar’s ethnic and opposition forces to restore stability and
democratic rule would better serve its long-term economic and political interests.
Factors Behind the Coup
The Myanmar military, which has ruled the country since the 1960s, has no plan to withdraw from
politics. During the last two decades, the military has protected its political dominance with the
2008 Constitution, giving it control over key state apparatuses.v Between 2012 and 2020, however,
it felt threatened by peace negotiations with ethnic groups and the rise of the National League for
Democracy (NLD). On the peace negotiations, the military concluded that the 2015 Nationwide
Ceasefire Agreement forced the military to concede too much to ethnic groups (e.g., a commitment
to federalism, holding dialogue on equal footing and monitoring military activities).vi
The NLD’s landslide victories in the 2015 and 2020vii elections led the military to believe that the
NLD government would pursue actions in its second term that would erode the military's grip
on power. The military feared the NLD government would compromise its economic
monopolyviii and go ahead with amendments to the 2008 Constitution to side-line the military in
politics, a major agenda of the NLD party. In addition, Senior Gen. Min Aung Hlaing wanted to
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be the president, partly to stoke his ego and partly to secure presidential immunity for war crimes
including the Rohingya genocide.ix When the NLD’s electoral victory in 2020 denied him a path
to the presidency, Min Aung Hlaing staged a coup, alleging vast (and unproven) electoral fraud on
the part of the NLD.x
The Rise of People’s Movement Against the Coup
When the military seized power in 2021, it did not seem to have anticipated the massive public
backlash. Claiming that it was merely assuming temporary care of state power, the junta's aims are
to side-line Aung San Suu Kyi from politics, disable the NLD as a political force, clamp down on
public protests in towns and cities and contain ethnic armed groups in remote areas before
convening another election under its watch. When the military brutally suppressed non-violent
rallies by killing and arresting en masse, thousands of students and young people decided to join
the armed resistance movement against the junta.
Source: Media Monitor Collective, January 2023 (Limited Circulation)
Looking at the evolution of anti-coup activity since February 2021, what is significant about
the people’s resistance against the coup and the military’s State Administration Council (SAC)
is the nature of the movement, in particular, the rapid transformation of political culture. Some
points to note are:
Two Years After the Coup in Myanmar
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Beyond NLD Politics: The anti-coup movement initially started with an aim to restore the NLD
government. Within a few weeks, leaders of the movement were convinced that the movement
should broaden its scope to encompass eradicating authoritarianism and military dictatorship in
Myanmar.xi Unlike the pro-democracy movement that developed after the 1988 uprising, the
current movement is not centred around the NLD but calls for a systemic change (ideological,
political, socio-economic and institutional reforms) that the NLD government failed to advance
during its tenure before the coup.xii
•Greater Inter-Ethnic Solidarity: Closely linked to ending dictatorship in Myanmar is the
need to end all forms of discrimination. Witnessing the security forces’ brutality in their
neighbourhoods such as killing children, pregnant women and students, the majority ethnic
Bamar have gained a greater realization and understanding of the decades-long suffering of
ethnic minority groups – including the Rohingya – at the hands of the Myanmar military.xiii
Because of this, and unlike before, the anti-coup movement actively calls for federalism – a
key political objective that ethnic groups have been fighting for. Some elements of the
resistance have even apologized to ethnic Rohingya and other minority communities who
have suffered from Bamar rulers’ oppression.xiv Moreover, as witnessed in the Federal
Democratic Charter drafted by opposition forces, the movement seeks to end discrimination
based on gender and sexual orientation.xv Likewise, the people are now raising questions
against corrupt and military-supporting monks. In the past, Buddhist monks were
untouchable even when inciting violence or collaborating with the military. After
witnessing some senior monks’ support of the 2021 coup – in particular, a senior monk’s
alleged suggestion to shoot people in the head,xvi and another’s justification of killing and
his public support of Min Aung Hlaing in the name of protecting Buddhism – Bamar
Buddhist citizens have started to contest the unquestionable authority of the Buddhist
clergy.xvii This is a hugely significant transformation for such a conservative country as
Myanmar. Of course, not everything is rosy, but the point is that there has been rapid
transformation toward a more progressive political culture (at least for now) despite on-
going pro-military Buddhist nationalist mobilization against the democratic movement.
•The Young Leaders and Followers: Demographically speaking, the vast majority of those
leading the anti-coup movement and their followers are in their twenties and thirties.xviii On
the one hand, fewer members of this generation have prior experience of the military’s
brutality before the coup. Thus, they are not fearful of the military unlike previous
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generations. On the other hand, their exposure to democracy, better education and a
more open Myanmar society during the last ten years has given them inspiration to
fight for a better future. Now, they are angry that their chance to catch up with the
world (even with their Asian neighbours) has been stolen by the military and that the
generals are allowing capable young people, the future of the nation, to be killed or
arrested and abused by police and soldiers who are no better than criminal thugs. When
anger and the void of fear meet the ideology of heroism, young people are willing to
join the armed resistance movement and die for the cause. The newly emerged opposition
armed groups, known as the People’s Defense Forces (PDFs) and Local Defense
Forces (LDFs) include many hundreds of educated and skilled young people. This
helps explain why they have been able to produce their own weapons and artillery in less
than two years and how they have inflicted serious losses on the military regime forces.
•Fighting in the Heartland: Armed conflicts in Myanmar during the last seven
decades have largely been confined to borderland regions where ethnic minorities are
concentrated. Since the coup, the resistance movement has spread to the Myanmar
heartland (Sagaing and Magway Regions) as well as in major cities and towns. In short,
the conflict has spread across the country, including in ethnic Bamar regions that
remained largely untouched by armed conflicts suffered by others ethnic minority
groups. It is in this heartland that most of the brutal killings and arson attacks are
happening in the current conflict.
Military Violence and Airstrikes
It is estimated that resistance forces have neutralized more than 22,800 Myanmar soldiers on the
battlefield.xix Furthermore, while exact statistics are hard to collect, it is generally understood
that between 7,000 to 13,000 Myanmar soldiers and police have defected to ethnic
resistance organizations and PDF/LDFsxx and the junta is having difficulty recruiting
new soldiers. Meanwhile, ethnic and PDF/LDF forces have successfully disrupted the Myanmar
army's logistics, communications and supply lines in many places. Losing manpower and ground
advantages while operating in larger combat areas compared to past conflicts, airstrikes – long
part of the military’s counterinsurgency strategy – have intensified since the coup, becoming a
signature of the Myanmar junta’s brutality.
The targets are not just armed resistance forces but also civilian locations including schools and
medical facilities. Our research team has noted 685 airstrike incidents across the country between
Two Years After the Coup in Myanmar
5
February 2021 and January 11 this year. In addition to airstrikes, junta forces have repeatedly and
systematically burned down houses, and entire villages in some places, as a way to suppress the
opposition movement and their supporters. Two years after the coup, almost 49,000
houses have been burnt down and 6,417 civilians have been killed.xxi
Political Exits
Looking at possible exit strategies, the most important question is: What will resolve the
current crisis? Dialogue does not seem to be an immediate option. On the one hand, opposition
groups aim to topple the coup leaders and their regime through a combination of military
pressure, the establishment of public administration in opposition-controlled territories
and international pressure. They have made significant gains (territory, losses inflicted on the
military, etc.) since 2021. Moreover, the people feel bitter about the junta’s use of extreme
violence. Every time the junta commits an atrocity, people are more willing to fight than
negotiate. A popular motto which translates as “no negotiation for the blood debt” encapsulates
this sentiment.
On the other hand, the generals never negotiate in good faith and see negotiation as a sign of
weakness. Recalling the track record of the past ten years of peace negotiations, even when
the military agreed to negotiate, the process was not meant to reach mutually acceptable
agreement, but rather it was about forcing the other party to submit. That is the reason peace
negotiations with ethnic groups during the last ten years failed miserably.
Although the junta’s recent extension of state of emergency has put in doubt the junta’s own plan
of holding a sham election in August 2023, the military will try to convene election using the
old playbook that aims to have a military-backed party win in the election and co-opt other pro-
military parties (or individual politicians – including ethnic ones) to form a government. It will
seek moral support from Buddhist nationalist monks to legitimate its actions. Meanwhile, it is
trying to contain as many ethnic armed groups as possible and obtain agreement from these
groups to pre-empt any attempt to disrupt the election or extend their support to the PDF. Once
the government is formed, the military may amend the 2008 Constitution nominally as
a way to normalize the administration.xxii
However, the election is not the solution for the crisis. Nor is it a viable exit for junta leadership,
particularly Min Aung Hlaing. It will cause more troubles instead. First, the military–having
hijacked power from an elected government–has no legitimacy to convene another election. And
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yet, to make this election possible, the junta will unleash more violence against the opposition
movement and also force people to participate in the election where they can. Second, the election
itself, let alone the result, will not be accepted by the opposition forces that would disrupt the
elections. Third, even if the new government is formed after the election as planned, young
resistance fighters will not stop fighting. Neither will ethnic resistance groups until their relative
autonomy under a federal arrangement is guaranteed. Fourth, as mentioned earlier, the current
movement is not centred around the NLD anymore. Even if the NLD or the opposition government
National Unity Government deviate from the current strategy of armed resistance (and non-
negotiation), armed resistance groups are likely to continue fighting.
Because of these reasons, the election will drag the country further into a protracted conflict with
ever-rising human and economic costs. The questions that political stakeholders need to answer
are: (a) how to strengthen the resistance movement; (b) what can reasonably be done between
now and the future election; (c) who will act, take the lead, or intervene; and (d) how the
international community can help.
Global and Regional Communities
In this messy political context, the role of the international community has been problematic.
Despite the US’s new Burma Act within its National Defense Authorization Act and other
Western countries' selected economic sanctions against the SAC, the world seems to be sitting on
the fence. Even as Western capitals express concerns and UN envoys urge for cessation of
the SAC’s violence, diplomatic missions and UN agencies in Myanmar have been busy
travelling to Nay Pyi Taw to renew relationships with the military–––all in the name of
humanitarian assistance. While hypocritically assuring that such engagement does not confer
legitimacy and recognition, they signal that the international community is not fully against the
coup or the junta’s violence, with many countries looking to normalise relations with the junta.
Russia and China have given diplomatic and military support to the Myanmar military regimes for
decades. Min Aung Hlaing has visited Russia at least three times in two years, including a
meeting with President Putin in September last year and recently the SAC has relied more on
Russia than China for military support–––especially for fighter jets, helicopters and air
defence.xxiii Min Aung Hlaing’s affinity with Russia since the coup, however, seems to be at
odds with decision-makers in Beijing.xxiv
Two Years After the Coup in Myanmar
7
ASEAN’s intervention has not worked so far despite support from the competing major powers
including the US, China, India and Japan. As Indonesia assumes ASEAN chairmanship for 2023,
it has started formulating strategies and approaches to try and revive ASEAN’s Five Point
Consensus and its implementation. How far it can go, depends on how much it engages with ethnic
communities and Myanmar’s opposition forces, as well as how much political support it garners
from individual ASEAN countries and the wider world.
India and the Myanmar Crisis
Myanmar people are convinced that the Indian government has been training Myanmar Air Force
pilots, selling arms and jet fuel and collaborating with different SAC ministries. There have
been official exchanges between New Delhi and Nay Pyi Taw.xxv According to analysts,
these engagements serve to accelerate India-Myanmar cooperation in the context of India’s
Act East Policy and in particular secure large infrastructure projects in Myanmar such as the
Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project and India-Myanmar-Thailand highway project.xxvi
Source: Media Monitor Collective, February 2023 (Limited Circulation)
Such collaboration may have made sense two years ago, but the coup has changed everything. India
needs to consider the following:
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oMaking Enemies with the People: The people of Myanmar feel bitter about the
militaryxxvii and thus, collaboration with it might result in India being seen as their
adversary. With India’s Myanmar-based infrastructural projects located in conflict-
affected territories, security risks are of immediate concerns to the very realization of
these projects – let alone their long-term economic viability.
oStability and Predictability: For the success of the Act East Policy, India needs
stability and predictability in its partner countries (as well as in its Northeast region
bordering Myanmar). The junta and its use of force as the only means to deal with
political issues, causes more chaos and uncertainty.
oWar Crimes vs. “Mother of Democracy”: Politically, India’s collaboration with a
Myanmar junta that has committed a number of war crimes against its own people
makes a mockery to India’s claim to be the “mother of democracy”.
oChina: Beijing would not sit idly while India seeks to accelerate bilateral deals with
the Myanmar military, especially when China has relative influence over certain
ethnic groups and opposition forces as far as its regional geo-strategic influence is
concerned.
In short, India’s current approach to engage with the junta and ignore Myanmar’s democratic anti-
coup opposition movements is not helping the resolution of the crisis in Myanmar. It will only taint
India’s international reputation as the largest democracy that adheres to the values of freedom and
human rights, which are likely to outweigh actual strategic gains–––regionally and globally.
Conclusion
It is in India’s long-term interest to engage with ethnic groups and opposition actors so that the
Indian decision-makers can better navigate the complex conflict contexts and the web of different
relationships and deadlocks in Myanmar. It is crucial to engage these actors not only because they
are political stakeholders that can shape armed conflicts but also because Indian development
projects and transportation links are located in or pass through their territories. It is also
important to engage with these groups (and other regional powers) towards finding a resolution
to the crisis in Myanmar.
Two Years After the Coup in Myanmar
9
Similarly, Indian think tanks and foreign policy actors should engage with Myanmar think tanks,
activists, civil society organizations and human rights groups to enhance understanding of the
challenges, priorities and dilemmas. This would also foster people-to-people relations and help
avoid creating a new enemy with the people of Myanmar in the region. Most importantly,
interaction between pro-democracy think tanks and policy institutes will help generate more
nuanced and thought-through policy and strategic approaches. Developing such approaches will
serve both countries’ democratic interests while ensuring India’s long-term interests in
neighbouring Myanmar and from tarnishing its global image for collaborating with a Myanmar
junta that has been accused of crimes against humanity.
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i “Myanmar extends state of emergency, likely pushing back polls”, February 1, 2023, Nikkei Asia,
https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Myanmar-Crisis/Myanmar-extends-state-of-emergency-likely-pushing-back-polls
ii
“Martial Law Imposed on 37 Myanmar Townships, Including Resistance Strongholds”, The Irrawaddy, February
3, 2023, https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/martial-law-imposed-on-37-myanmar-townships-including-
resistance-strongholds.html
iii
Personal communication with Chin Human Rights Organization, January 11 and 17, 2023.
iv
“In Mizoram, voices grow against Centre’s silence on Myanmar ‘bombing’”, Scroll.in, January 14, 2023, https://
scroll.in/article/1041842/in-mizoram-voices-grow-against-centres-silence-on-myanmar-bombing. [Mizo civil
society groups complaint to New Delhi that the Myanmar junta violated Indian airspace for this attack, but the
Indian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MEA) denied violation of airspace. [See Mizo CSO statement,
https://twitter.com/ChinHumanRights/status/1616110520012263424/photo/1; See MEA spokesperson’s
statement, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/myanmarese-militarys-air-operation-near-
border-with-india-new-delhi-takes-up-matter/articleshow/97146003.cms]
v
The Constitution allows the military to control the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Border
and Security Affairs and the National Defense and Security Council. It also allows the military twenty-five percent
of seats in parliament. The military as an institution is free from any civilian operational and financial oversight, as
are its business interests.
vi
Various personal communications with ethnic peace negotiators (2018-2021).
vii
The NLD won 396 out of 476 seats. The military backed Union Solidarity and Development Party won only 33
seats. The remaining 47 seats went to other parties, https://www.irrawaddy.com/elections/myanmars-2020-general-
election-results-numbers.html
viii
Personal communication with Myanmar activists and analysts (June 2021).
ix
“Myanmar Junta Chief Met Ex-President and Former Dictator: What Did They Discuss?”, The Irrawaddy,
September 1, 2022, https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/myanmar-junta-chief-met-ex-president-and-former-
dictator-what-did-they-discuss.html
x
“Myanmar election commission find fraud everywhere”, The Bangkok Post, July 10, 2021,
https://www.bangkokpost.com/world/2146643/myanmar-election-commission-finds-fraud-everywhere
xi
For example, see General Strike Committee Statement 1/2021 (dated 20 February 2021), https://
www.facebook.com/GeneralStrikeCommittee/photos/121045310021947
xii
Various personal communication with activists (2021-2022).
xiii
“Myanmar’s ethnic Bamar majority seeks amends with Rohingya after they, too, face military violence,” The Global
and Mail, September 29, 2021, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/world/article-myanmars-ethnic-bamar-majority-
seeks-amends-with-rohingya-after-they/
Endnotes:
Two Years After the Coup in Myanmar
11
xiv
AsCON Brief 08
Ibid.
xv
See full text of the Federal Democracy Chapter, NUCC (National Unity Coordination Committee), https://nucc-
federal.org/federal-democracy-charter/
xvi
“ ”
The Irrawaddy
, July 18, 2022,
https://burma.irrawaddy.com/opinion/viewpoint/2022/07/18/253249.html
xvii
Swe Win, “The fall of Sitagu was a success of the Spring Revolution”, Myanmar Now, January 5, 2023,
https://myanmar-now.org/mm/news/13663
xviii
For example, individuals such as Esther Ze Naw (Female), Ei Thinzar Maung (Female), Dr Tayza San, Khun Bedu,
Maung Saung Ka and Bo Nagar are known for the mass movement against the coup. Likewise, celebrities such as
Paing Phyo Thu (Female) and Daung are among the many other who deserve recognition.
xix
Based on data collected by my research team on armed conflicts, coup & violence and civilian impacts.
xx
Various personal communication with activists and representatives who were former Myanmar soldiers (November
2022).
xxi
Based on data collected by my research team on armed conflicts, coup & violence and civilian impacts.
xxii
Various personal communication with ethnic leaders and resistance movement members (July 2022 – January
2023).
xxiii
Narayanan Ganesan, “Russian arms and influence in Myanmar” East Asia Forum, November 5, 2022,
https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2022/11/05/russian-arms-and-influence-in-myanmar/
xxiv
“Did China deliver a snub to Myanmar’s military regime?” Aljazeera, January 11, 2023,
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/1/11/beijing-delivers-subtle-snub-to-myanmars-military-regime
xxv
“Indian Foreign Secretary Visits Myanmar Junta Leaders as Ties Deepen”, The Irrawaddy, November 23, 2023,
https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/the-world-myanmar/indian-foreign-secretary-visits-myanmar-junta-leaders-as-ties-
deepen.html
xxvi
Personal Communications, November-December 2022.
xxvii Tun Myint, “How the Coup Shattered the Image of Myanmar’s Military”, The Diplomat, April 21, 2022,
https://thediplomat.com/2022/04/how-the-coup-shattered-the-image-of-myanmars-military/
Disclaimer: The views expressed above and the information available including graphics and
images are those of the author/s and can therefore in no way be taken to reflect the position of
Asian Confluence.
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