Life and Mind: The Common Tetradic Structure of Organism and Consciousness - a Phenomenological Approach

Abstract

The question of the holistic structure of an organism is a recurring theme in the philosophy of biology and has been increasingly discussed again in recent years. Organisms have recently been described as complex systems that autonomously create, maintain and reproduce themselves while constantly interacting with their environment. Key focal points include their autopoiesis, autonomy, agency and teleological structure. This perspective marks a significant advancement from the 20th-century viewpoint, which predominantly saw organisms as genetically programmed, randomly generated and blindly selected survival-machines. However, crucial questions about the shape and development of organisms still lack answers. Shape and development are deeply interconnected and seem to require a holistic approach. Here, I will briefly outline a phenomenological perspective which could provide a framework for seeking answers to these fundamental questions. In particular, I propose a common four-fold phenomenal structure of the developing organism and the cognising consciousness, which makes it possible to observe the agential and teleological structure of the organism "from within". This fourfold structure also describes the molecular level and thus provides a general organismic concept. It furthermore corresponds to the four Aristotelian "causes" (conditions).

Full text

LIFE AND MIND: THE COMMON TETRADIC STRUCTURE OF ORGANISM AND
CONSCIOUSNESS – A PHENOMENOLOGICAL APPROACH
https://www.dialecticalsystems.eu/contributions/life-and-mind-the-common-tetradic-structure-of-organism-
and-consciousness-a-phenomenological-approach/
Christoph Hueck
1
The question of the holistic structure of an organism is a recurring theme in the philosophy of biology and has
been increasingly discussed again in recent years.
2
Organisms have recently been described as complex
systems
3
that autonomously create, maintain and reproduce themselves
4
while constantly interacting with their
environment. Key focal points include their autopoiesis
5
, autonomy
6
, agency
7
and teleological structure
8
. This
perspective marks a significant advancement from the 20th-century viewpoint, which predominantly saw
organisms as genetically programmed, randomly generated and blindly selected survival-machines. However,
crucial questions about the shape and development of organisms still lack answers. Shape and development are
deeply interconnected and seem to require a holistic approach. Here, I will briefly outline a phenomenological
perspective which could provide a framework for seeking answers to these fundamental questions.
I. The Structure of the Organism
The origin of every organism and each of its organs can be traced to an ancestor or a precursor form. An
organism’s specific structure is enabled and constrained by what has been generated by its predecessors or
previous stages of development. At the same time, every stage of an organism’s development carries the
potential for its future developmental goals. A seed, for example, has the effective potential to develop into a
flowering plant. The activities and changes that take place inside the seed happen for the sake of its future
development, and this principle applies at the morphological, cellular, biochemical, molecular, and genetic
levels. All processes are directed towards supporting the life and survival of the organism or species as a whole.
It’s also important to keep in mind that an organism always develops as a specific type or species which remains
constant throughout its development. A rose is always a “rose”, whether it exists as a seed, a shoot, a flowering
plant, or a rose hip. Throughout its development, there is an underlying constancy. Biologically, this constancy is
the species of the organism; epistemologically, it is its type or concept. Finally, an organism is dependent on its
environment. While the species remains unchanged over time, the environment always only influences the
organism in its current physical state.
A living organism can therefore be described by four distinct but interacting aspects, as illustrated in Fig. 1. (In
fact, it is arguably impossible to think of an organism by leaving any one of these aspects out). When the
developmental stages shown in Fig. 1a are merged, a fourfold structure is obtained (Fig. 1b). It’s horizontal
dimension, encompassing descent and goal-directedness, represents organic life across time. The two
horizontal arrows signify an interpenetrating process: both influences are active throughout the organism’s
development, life, and reproduction. The vertical dimension illustrates the organism’s autonomous agency in
relation to its environment.
9
Different organisms exhibit varying degrees of autonomy
10
(compare, e.g. jellyfish
and mammals). Consequently, the two vertical arrows don’t interpenetrate but oppose each other. This tetradic
1
Independent researcher. Akanthos Academy, Stuttgart. hueck@akanthos-akademie.de
2
Mossio (2024).
3
Gilbert und Sarkar (2000); Bizzarri et al. (2013).
4
Nicholson (2014).
5
Weber und Varela (2002).
6
Moreno und Mossio (2015); Fulda (2023).
7
Desmond und Huneman ; Virenque und Mossio (2023).
8
Steigerwald (2006); Walsh (2006); Walsh (2015); Gambarotto und Nahas (2022); Rosslenbroich (2023).
9
Jacques Monod, although being an influential advocate of genetic determinism, nevertheless described this autonomous agency of an
organism in very clear words: “[An organisms] structure demonstrates a clear and unrestricted self-determination that includes a quasi-total
‘freedom’ from external conditions and forces. External conditions can certainly hinder the development of the living object, but not direct
it; they cannot impose their organization on it.” Monod (1975), S. 28 (transl. CH).
10
Rosslenbroich (2014).

structure symbolizes an organic whole as a dynamic interplay between descent, goal-directedness, autonomous
agency, and environmental adaptation.
II. The Molecular Level
The tetradic structure also applies to the molecular level of the
organism. The “livestream” from the past is represented by
inheritance of DNA, whose structure copies the organism’s past
into the present, so to speak. DNA itself (the supposedly
“controlling” genes) is an entirely passive structure. Any activity
and developmental potential is realized through the catalytic
action of proteins. By lowering the activation energy, catalysis
enables biochemical conversions that would otherwise take
centuries or longer. Just as the achievements of the past remain
present in the organism through the structure of its genes, its
future potential is “drawn” into the present through the
function of catalytic proteins.
And just as the species or type “superordinately” determines
the course of development of the organism as a whole, gene
and protein activities are regulated by the whole organism
according to its requirements in respective developmental and
physiological states. And finally, as physical substances, DNA,
RNA and proteins etc. correspond to the present physical
structure and substance of the organism (whereas in relation to
the past and future, DNA and proteins must be thought of
functionally rather than substantially).
The tetradic structure therefore describes the organism not only on the macroscopic but also on the molecular
level (Fig. 2). The structure can also be applied to metabolism and to all other cellular, organic and organismic
processes and thus “permeates” all levels of the organic, as it were. In fact, it can be argued that this structure
hovers implicitly in the background of any biological knowledge relating to an organism. It can therefore be
seen as the concept of the living organism, the bio-logos.
Fig. 2: Tetradic structure of molecular-genetic components
and functions of the organism.
Fig. 1a: Phenomenological depiction of the
factors which constitute a developing organ-
ism.
Fig. 1b: The tetradic structure of the organism.

III. Structure of Consciousness
Interestingly, the tetradic structure also describes the structure of
consciousness, if it is described in a phenomenological first-person
perspective (Fig. 3). When I look at the bud of a rose, I add to the
present sensory impressions the images of its past stages through
memory, and I also anticipate – perhaps not very conscious, but
nevertheless recognizable – its future development. I summarize
these impressions, memories and anticipations in the concept
“rose”. And this does not only apply to the cognition of an organism,
but to the structure of (healthy) consciousness in general: In every
waking moment I have sensory impressions, memories of the past,
subtle anticipations of the future and find myself in a constant state
of “apperception” of the “I”
11
.
The structure of consciousness appears to correspond to the
structure of the living organism. Consciousness can therefore be
seen as an inner experience of organic life. To be conscious means to
experience life from within.
12
IV. Gestalt-Perception
An organism cannot be seen as a present phenomenon only,
because it integrates its past and future, and consciousness cannot
be limited to the present moment, but must be seen as a “time
field” in which past and future are integrated through memory and
anticipation.
13
Interestingly, time-integration is also relevant for
shape perception. Traditionally, shape-perception is considered to
require the merging of percepts and concepts. However, Viktor von
Weizsäcker demonstrated that the perception of shapes also
involves a subtle temporal process.
14
In an experiment, he showed
test subjects individual points that lit up one after the other at
different positions on a screen. If these points together formed a
circle (or another simple and concise figure) this “circle” could be
“seen” by the test subjects, although it was “not at all founded in
the stimulus”
15
. This is only possible because the test subjects
remembered the positions of the previously shown points and expected the following ones. von Weizsäcker
called these phenomena the “anamnesis” and “prolepsis” of gestalt perception, respectively (corresponding to
retention and protention in Husserl’s analysis of musical perceptions).
The tetradic structure therefore also describes the perception of a gestalt. In Fig. 4 one can observe the
interaction of the four components in a self-experiment. The holistic concept of an "elephant" does not entirely
fit with the detailed individual perceptions which are linked by memory and anticipation: I do not see what I
expect to see according to what I think I should see and what I actually saw. Due to the lack of fit, the four
components are pulled apart here, so to speak, which would otherwise coincide in a flash and thus go
unnoticed.
These observations show that in biological cognition we are not only dealing with living organisms “out there”
and (similarly structured) cognition “in here”, but that the organic gestalt itself (and thus also its changes during
development) can only be understood as such if the (time-integrating) interplay of “outside” and “inside”, of
nature and mind is taken into account.
11
Kant (1926).
12
Recently, some scholars have argued that both the cognizing subject and the organismal object could be treated as organized living
systems. The investigation of the properties of living organization would therefore simultaneously be an investigation of the subject of
biological knowledge and vice versa. Cf. Mensch ; van de Vijver und Haeck . This corresponds to the notion of “continuity without identity
between life and mind” as recently advocated by Gambarotto und Nahas (2023). These authors explicitly claim that “the structure of
natural life is the same as the structure of mind” (p. 769).
13
Cf. Husserl (1928).
14
Weizsäcker (1942).
15
Ebd., S. 50.
Fig. 4: Self-experimental demonstration of the
interaction of concept, perceptions, memory and
anticipation in gestalt-perception.
Fig. 3: Tetradic structure of the conscious mind.

V. The Reality of the Organic
In summary, one can say that the structure of the organism
corresponds with the structure of consciousness and also with the
structure of perception of its gestalt. These correspondences
facilitate the argument that the question of organic form and its
development can (only) be answered if the cognizing consciousness
is taken into account. This could be a resolution of the teleological
dilemma, as expressed so clearly in Kant's “Critique of Judgment”.
Kant had to describe the organism in teleological terms as a
“natural purpose”, but he could not naturalize purpose because he
projected his empiricist and mechanical concept of the inorganic to
the whole of nature.
16
A phenomenological analysis, however,
indicates that organic nature must be treated differently in the first
place. A living organism cannot be understood under the premise of
the dead. Its development in the counter-current of descent and
goal-directedness and its constant, autonomous species with its
changing and environmentally adapted appearance belong to
organic nature like particularity and mechanical causality to dead
matter. For the organic, only nature and mind together result in
what we experience as the reality of a living organism.
VI. Outlook: Aristotelian Causes and “Souls” as Potentially Heuristic Tools
The phenomenologically derived tetradic structure of the organism also reflects Aristotle’s four “causes”:
Descent corresponds to the so-called causa efficiens (“how did it come into existence?”), purposefulness to the
c. finalis (“what is its purpose?”).
17
The species or type corresponds to the c. formalis (“what gives it its form or
identity?”) and the physical appearance to the c. materialis (“what is it made of?”). Some authors have argued
that the connection or even the identity between the causae efficiens, formalis and finalis is the Aristotelian
principle of life, the “soul”.
18
However, Aristotle distinguishes between a nutritive (“vegetable”), an animal, and
a rational soul. This distinction, in fact, could help to bridge the explanatory gap between life and mind
19
by
characterizing the different “souls” (e.g. ways in which the three causes interact) by different degrees of
consciousness (Fig. 5). This can only be sketched out here: Physical substance has no consciousness. Descent (c.
efficiens) can also not be described as conscious, but as a kind of remembered “habit” of the organism in
adaptation to changing environmental conditions.
20
Goal-directedness (c. finalis) is to be regarded as a
fundamental characteristic of all organisms, but it becomes an increasingly conscious striving for anticipated
satisfaction as the level of organization in animals increases. Actual, free agency is only achieved in humans as
the spontaneity of rational consciousness. This in turn means that the analysis of the four faculties described
for human consciousness: rational spontaneity, conscious anticipation, habitual memory and sensual
perception, would enable the description and exploration of the essence of the organism “from within” and
bridge the gap between life and mind.
16
McLaughlin (1990).
17
As Fernando Moya wrote: “The introduction of the final cause in the study of living entities is not a response to a vitalist conception, but
rather to the need to study the logos in the development of each living organism: a logos that, operating through efficient causes, should
explain the regularity of the outcome in embryological development. This logos is what distinguishes living from non-living entities.” Moya
(2000), S. 331.
18
Christopher Frey: “An organism’s soul is the principle, cause, and end of a single, articulate activity of living and each of an organism’s vital
bodily movements are aspects or partial manifestations of this unitary, natural activity.” Frey (2022). And Lucas John Mix wrote: “Biological
explanations are special, though, because they integrate the four causes in a unique way. In living things, the formal, efficient, and final
causes are the same. The essence of an organism is its purpose, and both are inseparable from how it came about. In other words, a living
thing can be defined through understanding its source (similar parents) and end (similar children). Aristotle used souls as a kind of
explanation unique to living things, where formal, efficient, and final causes coincide.” Mix (2018), S. 49. And Dalia Nassar wrote: “Like
Aristotle’s conception of final cause, [Kant’s conception of natural purpose] approximates the notion of formal cause. A formal cause
concerns the design or structure of an object. … The structure of a living being … is realized through the purpose (self-construction; self-
maintenance), and the purpose is realized in and through the structure. … In the case of internally purposive beings, the purpose is nothing
other than the maintenance of the structure. The final cause … is the ongoing realization of the formal cause.” Nassar (2022), S. 41.
19
Gambarotto ; Gambarotto und Nahas (2023).
20
Ebd., p. 775.
Fig. 5: The Aristotelian “souls” in the tetradic
structure of the organism.

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