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https://doi.org/10.1177/08912432241230557
GENDER & SOCIETY, Vol 38 No. 2, April, 2024 216 –243
DOI: 10.1177/08912432241230557
© 2024 by The Author(s)
Article reuse guidelines: sagepub.com/journals-permissions
“I AM A FEMINIST, BUT . . .”
Practicing Quiet Feminism in the Era of
Everyday Backlash in South Korea
GOWOON JUNG
Kyung Hee University, South Korea
MINYOUNG MOON
Clemson University, USA
In this study, we investigate the practice of feminism among young South Korean women
in the era of backlash. Drawing on interviews with 40 female college students in South
Korea, we found that most of the participants self-identify as feminists who engage in
feminist activities primarily in private offline settings on their college campuses. To under-
stand this phenomenon of quiet feminism, which contradicts the global trend of post-
feminist attitudes and online feminism, we link the students’ offline practice of everyday
feminism with what we term everyday backlash. Our findings reveal that these young
women have encountered widespread antifeminist sentiments in both online and offline
everyday contexts since the rapid popularization of feminism in South Korea in the late
2010s. We argue that this pervasive everyday backlash not only motivates the students to
create safe spaces within their college campuses but also discourages them from publicly
disclosing their feminist identities. Through this research, we contribute to the literature
on contemporary feminist practice and its relationship with backlash by offering a
nuanced understanding of the local context in South Korea.
Keywords: everyday feminism; backlash; identity; misogyny; South Korea
During the mid to late 2010s, as digital feminism gained momentum
and the #MeToo movement became widespread worldwide, a simi-
lar yet distinct feminist movement emerged in South Korea (hereafter
AUTHORS’ NOTE: We thank the anonymous reviewers for their helpful feedback. This
work was supported by the Ministry of Education of the Republic of Korea and the
National Research Foundation of Korea (NRF-2020S1A5A8046428) and Kyung Hee
University (20220709). Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to
Gowoon Jung, Assistant Professor, Department of Sociology, Kyung Hee University, 26,
Kyungheedae-ro, Dongdaemun-gu, Seoul 02447, South Korea; e-mail: gjung@khu.ac.kr.
1230557GASXXX10.1177/08912432241230557GENDER & SOCIETY / MonthJung and Moon / QUIET FEMINISM IN THE ERA OF BACKLASH
research-article2024
Jung and Moon / QUIET FEMINISM IN THE ERA OF BACKLASH 217
Korea). While state feminism had been led by professional activists and
had become institutionalized in the process (S.-K. Kim and Kim 2011),
young women who had no connection with the older, established women’s
movement in Korea actively utilized digital platforms to form online and
offline alliances under the banner of feminism (Jang 2016; J. S. Kim
2021). Starting with the #iamafeminist Twitter activism (J. S. Kim 2017),
they created websites to mock men in response to online misogyny (Jang
2016), engaged in “sticky activism”1 to commemorate victims of misogy-
nic violence against women (J. S. Kim 2021), and orchestrated the largest
demonstration in the history of the women’s movement by denouncing
the illegal filming of women’s bodies (Moon 2022). These events and
activists have prompted gender scholars in Korea to theorize this as a
“feminism reboot” (Sohn 2017) or the popularization of feminism (B.-M.
Kim 2018; J. S. Kim 2021; Seo and Choi 2020). With feminism gaining
increasing visibility and mention in society, antifeminist discourse has
also surged, particularly among young men (J. S. Kim 2021; J. Kim 2023;
T. Kim and Yuk 2022). This surge has contributed to heightened gender
conflict in Korean society to the extent that it became a major topic in the
2022 presidential election2 (H. J. Kim and Lee 2022).
In this study, we examine how young women in Korea, who have
immersed themselves in the recently popularized feminism, practice
feminism within a social context where antifeminist sentiments have
become more prevalent than ever. We situate our investigation in the
transnational literature about the relationship between backlash and femi-
nism. The increased visibility of feminism in the form of popular femi-
nism within digital society triggered a strong reactionary response of
popular misogyny (Banet-Weiser 2018). Digital feminists, who played a
significant role in popularizing feminism in Korea, have also experienced
pervasive misogyny over the past decade (J. S. Kim 2021). However, little
is known about how antifeminist backlash impacts the everyday practice
of feminism among individual women. Previous studies have focused
primarily on the reaction of women’s movements or institutions to
antifeminist backlash, rather than examining the private sphere and the
everyday actions of individual feminists (e.g., see Colpitts 2020; Cullen
2021; Sanders and Jenkins 2022).
Recognizing that different forms of backlash can influence feminist
actions in various ways (Mansbridge and Shames 2008), we explore
how the so-called everyday backlash, relevant to contemporary Korean
society, influences the daily practices of feminism among young women.
On the basis of interviews with 40 female college students in Korea, we
218 GENDER & SOCIETY / April 2024
discovered that these students engage in what we term quiet feminism.
We define quiet feminism as an agentic, everyday feminist practice per-
formed by self-identified feminists who maintain a low profile in shel-
tered environments under unreceptive social contexts toward feminism.
While most of our participants willingly adopt the label of feminist, they
are cautious about openly expressing their feminist identity, including in
digital spaces. Despite practicing everyday feminism in their daily lives,
their feminist actions take place primarily in private offline settings—
contrary to the prevalence of digital activism among young feminists
noted by some scholars in Western contexts (Banet-Weiser 2018; Mendes,
Ringrose, and Keller 2019; Pruchniewska 2019). We argue that this prac-
tice of quiet feminism is a response to the pervasive everyday backlash
that women encounter in their online and offline routines and surround-
ings. While quiet feminism represents a form of discreet action rather
than overt collective resistance, signifying a state of abeyance in the
feminist movement, we also argue that it helps construct a steadfast
feminist identity for emerging feminists, suggesting a pool of potential
recruits and constituents for the future rebound of the feminist movement
after abeyance. Through this research, we aim to contribute to the litera-
ture on contemporary feminist practice and backlash by providing a
nuanced understanding of the local context in Korea.
DIVERSE FORMS OF FEMINISM AND
ANTIFEMINIST BACKLASH
Amid persistent claims of feminism’s demise and the rise of the post-
feminist era (Butler 2013; McRobbie 2004), gender scholars contend that
feminism has not disappeared but has assumed diverse forms (Crossley
2017; Reger 2012). In the examination of young Western college students,
researchers have observed distinct patterns in the perspectives, identifica-
tion, and practices of young women concerning feminism. The “I am not
a feminist, but” literature illustrates how young women reject feminist
identification to avoid the negative stigma associated with feminism while
advocating core gender equality principles (Aronson 2003; Dyer and
Hurd 2018; Williams and Wittig 1997). Recent scholarship has also
emphasized that young women engage in everyday feminism, which dif-
fers from the collective action of the second-wave feminist movement,
aiming to challenge everyday sexism in their lives (Crossley 2017;
Schuster 2017). Furthermore, an increasing number of women are
Jung and Moon / QUIET FEMINISM IN THE ERA OF BACKLASH 219
becoming involved in digital feminism, especially as they navigate hyper-
networked societies (Keller 2012; Mendes, Ringrose, and Keller 2019;
Pruchniewska 2019).
Contemporary feminism in Korea has developed a unique local form
while mirroring the broader global feminist trend. In the 1980s–2000s,
professional feminist organizations, particularly the Korean Women’s
Associations United, focused on gender mainstreaming policies, resulting
in significant achievements such as new legislation addressing sexual and
domestic violence (S.-K. Kim and Kim 2011). However, this movement
struggled to significantly alter the cultural perception of feminism and
expand its influence among the broader public (M. J. Kim 2020).
Meanwhile, young feminists who connected through college networks
forged a new brand of feminism in the 1990s and 2000s, concentrating on
everyday gender politics. To drive cultural change, they organized events
such as menstrual festivals, published feminist magazines and newspapers,
and utilized online platforms to promote feminist identities (Jeong 2015).
Despite their efforts, their influence remained primarily within campus-
based activism within a limited network of feminists (Jeong 2015).
The most recent wave of feminism, emerging in the mid-2010s, aligns
with global digital feminism. Young women, particularly digital natives,
became increasingly aware of issues related to misogyny, sexual vio-
lence, and crimes against women in Korea. They used digital platforms
such as Twitter and women-only communities to disseminate feminist
ideas and engage in both online and offline activism against online
misogyny and digital sex crimes (Jang 2016; J. S. Kim 2021). Their con-
tributions to raising awareness of gender inequality to the forefront of
social discussions have been widely acknowledged, with many scholars
attributing this to the popularization of feminism in Korea (B.-M. Kim
2018; J. S. Kim 2021; Seo and Choi 2020). However, they have also
encountered challenges, including a lack of connection to or rejection of
existing women’s movement organizations, as well as the potential for
radicalization akin to trans-exclusionary radical feminism (TERF; B.-M.
Kim 2018; M. J. Kim 2020).
With the increasing feminist activism online, antifeminist backlash has
become widespread throughout online spaces as well. Such backlash is
not entirely new and has existed since the birth of feminism. In Western
societies, antifeminist backlash emerged as a response to the successful
second-wave feminist movement of the 1970s, taking the form of cultural
backlash, masculism, and antifeminist counter movements (Blais and
Dupuis-Déri 2022; Faludi 2009; Mansbridge and Shames 2008). Japan, in
220 GENDER & SOCIETY / April 2024
its pursuit of feminist policies, experienced antifeminist backlash due to
state feminism’s increasing influence (Kano 2011). Concurrently, neo-
liberal and postfeminist discourses have gained dominance, giving rise
to antifeminist sentiments among young men influenced by growing
conservatism (J. Kim 2023). This political and social environment has
spurred the migration of antifeminist backlash to the digital realm, creat-
ing a manosphere—a space where digital communities propagate misogy-
nist views and reject inclusive masculinity (Han and Yin 2023). Bratich
and Banet-Weiser (2019) describe how, in networked digital communities,
some young men who are disillusioned with neoliberal society blame
women and feminism for their sexual disappointments, resorting to bash-
ing women. A similar dissemination of antifeminist backlash is seen in
East Asian countries, with China demonizing feminists as deviant women
and betrayers of the nation (Huang 2023).
In line with global trends, antifeminist discourse in Korea has evolved,
influenced by the success of state feminism and the rise of a neoliberal,
digitally advanced society. Korea’s mandatory military conscription sys-
tem for young men has added a unique dimension to the growing antifem-
inist sentiment. For instance, in 1999, the women’s movement successfully
challenged the constitutionality of compensation policies for military
service, claiming discrimination against female workers. This led to a
surge in antagonism toward feminists, with critics accusing them of
demanding rights without fulfilling their duties (Choo 2020). The intro-
duction of gender mainstreaming policies and the establishment of the
Ministry of Gender Equality in 2001 further fueled sentiments against
state feminism and women’s movements, as they were seen to be impos-
ing reverse discrimination on men (B.-M. Kim 2018). As younger genera-
tions of men adopted postfeminist beliefs in Korea’s hyper-competitive,
neoliberal society, they began to view women’s rights groups, especially
those advocating for political quotas and affirmative action, as promoting
female supremacy (G. Jung 2021). In addition, the Korean manosphere,
known as Ilbe, has become a breeding ground for misogynistic discus-
sions, openly ridiculing Korean women since the mid-2010s. In response
to the rise of online misogyny and digital sex crimes, digital feminist
groups emerged as counter-activism groups. Some of these groups
adopted controversial tactics, advocating for female supremacy, and
employing trolling strategies (Koo 2020). This extremist digital feminism
also contributed to justifying antifeminist sentiment further by portraying
Korean feminism as a distorted and unsupported version promoting
female supremacy (B.-M. Kim 2018).
Jung and Moon / QUIET FEMINISM IN THE ERA OF BACKLASH 221
Antifeminism is a global phenomenon with a unique historical trajec-
tory in Korea. However, existing research has focused predominantly on
how antifeminist backlash emerges in response to feminist advancements.
Specifically, studies on backlash have emphasized its emergence as a
reaction to feminist movements, rather than exploring how individual
feminists respond to such backlash (Colpitts 2020; Cullen 2021; Sanders
and Jenkins 2022). For example, Cullen (2021) examined resonant frames
with which to counter opposition from right-wing populists within the
European Union. Colpitts (2020) investigated the impact of antifeminism
on Canadian universities’ handling of campus sexual violence, revealing
that campus antifeminism affects institutional policy-making processes,
resulting in the adoption of depoliticized language in anti-sexual violence
policies to avoid criticism from antifeminists. While recent scholarship
has explored how women combat online harassment and misogyny
through digital technology, these actions often take place within collective
online spaces (Ging and Siapera 2019). Thus, the impact of antifeminism
in private spheres, particularly how individual feminists respond to
antifeminist backlash, has received limited attention in existing research
(for the exception, see Blais and Dupuis-Déri 2022).
EVERYDAY BACKLASH AND
QUIET FEMINISM
To address this gap in the literature, we examine how young college
women practice feminism in their daily lives amid a growing antifeminist
backlash in Korean society. In our research, we use the term everyday
backlash to characterize the backlash we observe in the everyday envi-
ronments of our participants, both online and offline, where they are
deeply involved. As young college students, they face antifeminist back-
lash in multiple settings, including popular online portals and digital
communities for college students that they visit daily, as well as in the
classroom, university clubs, and social establishments. We show that this
phenomenon of everyday backlash is prevalent in online spaces due to
the unique digital culture in Korea and reflects widely expressed antifem-
inist sentiments, both directly and indirectly, within everyday offline
contexts. We argue that the young women in our study adopt what we call
quiet feminism in response to such everyday backlash.
We define everyday backlash as a common form of antifeminist back-
lash found on popular online portals and digital communities. We call it
222 GENDER & SOCIETY / April 2024
everyday backlash due to its ubiquitous presence in digital spaces.
Recently, antifeminist views have spread on major Korean portals and
digital communities, extending beyond the manosphere. For example,
the derogatory term for women, kimchi-nyeo,3 originating from the
manosphere, is now widely used among Korean online users (J. S. Kim
2018). This dissemination is closely linked to widespread Internet and
social media usage in Korea, which surpasses other developed nations in
Internet, smartphone, and social media use, particularly for discussing
political and social issues (Pew Research Center 2022). Furthermore, a
small number of major portals, such as Naver, are primary channels for
accessing news and expressing opinions through anonymous comments,
facilitating the rapid spread of hate speech (M. Y. Choi et al. 2022).4
Recent studies report increasing gender-based hate speech on Naver,
Korea’s largest portal (M. Y. Choi et al. 2022). In a 2021 survey, 71 per-
cent of respondents reported encountering hate speech in Internet portal
comments, with women (80.4 percent) and feminists (76.8 percent) as the
primary targets (National Human Rights Commission of Korea 2021).
These figures reveal the widespread presence of gender-based hate
speech in Korean society, particularly targeting feminist women on a
daily basis, leading us to label it as everyday backlash.
Everyday backlash extends beyond digital spaces, manifesting in eve-
ryday interactions within offline spaces where feminists engage in their
daily routines. Widespread online backlash impacts offline settings, where
feminists invariably encounter antifeminist sentiments and explicit or
implicit attacks during their everyday lives. For instance, the online back-
lash leading to the abolition of the General Female Student Council in
major Korean universities during the late 2010s exemplifies how digital
actions result in tangible consequences in offline campus environments
(Cheong and Lee 2020). The discourse surrounding this abolition was
sparked by the student portal site Everytime, which influenced student
opinions on the matter (M. H. Kim 2020). The argument for dismantling
the General Female Student Council echoed the widely circulated antifem-
inist discourses in Korea, contending that women are no longer a minority
and that allocating student council fees exclusively to a women’s council
constitutes reverse discrimination (Cheong and Lee 2020). Beyond uni-
versities, young women attempting to practice feminism report instances
of “cultural policing,” such as being silenced by negative reactions from
friends during discussions about feminism in their daily lives (T. Kim and
Yuk 2022). Our interview participants also recount overt antagonistic
attacks when the topic of feminism arises in university classes, club
Jung and Moon / QUIET FEMINISM IN THE ERA OF BACKLASH 223
activities, and social gatherings with peers. Thus, in Korea, antifeminist
backlash takes the form of ubiquitous everyday backlash, where mano-
sphere discourse spreads to and permeates popular online portals and is
recognized, acknowledged, and accepted offline as well.
In this specific social context, young women engage in quiet femi-
nism5 as a response to everyday backlash. Quiet feminism is an agentic,
everyday feminist practice that takes place in sheltered environments
when unreceptive social contexts push emerging feminists to maintain a
low profile. This manifestation of quiet feminism reflects the complex
interplay between one’s feminist identity, agentic mind, and discreet
actions in response to an unwelcoming environment for feminism. Those
practicing quiet feminism typically identify as feminists, distinguishing
themselves from situational feminists, who adopt a feminist identity only
in situations where they perceive gender inequality in postfeminist envi-
ronments (Crossley 2010). In our study, those engaged in quiet feminism
maintain a more steadfast and consistent feminist identity, even in the
face of antifeminist sentiments, while participating in relatively protected
environments.
Although they self-identify as feminists, quiet feminists prefer covert
actions in their daily lives, even in digital spaces. They do so because they
are acutely aware of the widespread antifeminist backlash in both online
and offline environments, prompting them to exercise caution in publicly
expressing their feminist identity. Their actions are not solely a matter of
individual choice driven by consumerism or individualistic pleasure (see
Crossley 2010) but rather an inevitable response to cultural forms of
oppression and policing. As a result, quiet feminism typically unfolds in
sheltered environments. H.-Y. Kim’s (2022) research also reveals that
young Korean feminists actively seek meeting places with like-minded
individuals, which serve as shelters for feminists in a hostile environment
for feminism. In this sense, quiet feminism is not synonymous with
implicit feminism (Giffort 2011). Giffort (2011) argued that volunteer
activists in the Girls’ Rock Camp in the United States do not explicitly
label their feminist actions as feminist but implicitly implement feminist-
driven activities for the empowerment of girls, concerned about how the
legitimacy of their actions will appear to parents and funders in a politi-
cally postfeminist environment. While implicit feminism highlights such
strategic choices of feminist organizations to avoid a feminist label for
the legitimacy of their feminist activities, quiet feminism emphasizes its
practice in sheltered environments.
224 GENDER & SOCIETY / April 2024
Quiet feminism also signifies a continuation of everyday feminist prac-
tices. The term everyday feminism originated from third-wave feminism
to describe feminists’ political actions to challenge ordinary and habitual
forms of sexism and misogyny embedded in their daily lives (Schuster
2017). Hence, quiet feminism falls within the category of everyday femi-
nism, as feminist actions take place within individuals’ daily lives rather
than adopting highly organized collective activities.6 Moreover, we con-
sider this practice of quiet feminism as the process of constructing a
feminist identity within the constraints of a given environment, rather than
being a form of resistance to political oppression, as seen in everyday
forms of resistance (Scott 1989) or quiet politics (M. Jung 2022). Our
research participants do not perceive their actions as a component of con-
tentious politics; instead, they view them as a means of quietly studying,
absorbing knowledge, epistemology, language, and logic, and solidifying
their feminist identity.
DATA AND METHODS
In this study, we utilized 40 qualitative, in-depth interviews as part of
a broader project investigating young Koreans’ perceptions of gender
equality, feminist identification, and participation in feminist move-
ments. The first author conducted these interviews on Zoom from June
through October 2020, in adherence to social distancing rules following
the COVID-19 outbreak.7 We employed snowball sampling to recruit
participants through key informants, including women students and uni-
versity faculty members who introduced other young women interested
in feminism. After the initial interviews, we expanded our participant
pool through informal networks and participant referrals.
The interview questions covered participants’ (1) personal background,
(2) perception of gender equality in Korean society, (3) feminist identifica-
tion, (4) views on feminism, and (5) positions on various feminist move-
ments (e.g., #MeToo, Megalia, the 2018 Women’s March). Participants
were assured of anonymity and confidentiality, and pseudonyms were
used. To efficiently recruit women students interested in the topic, the first
author leveraged her academic position. During interviews, a sympathetic
and politically neutral approach was employed to prevent potential
negative reactions. To address the power imbalance between students
and a professor, students who were not personally acquainted and less
likely to enroll in the author’s course or engage in future interactions
Jung and Moon / QUIET FEMINISM IN THE ERA OF BACKLASH 225
were intentionally selected. The author’s affiliation with Korean univer-
sity campuses was beneficial in understanding the apolitical climate on
campus and the reluctance of young students to discuss feminist topics,
given the sensitivity and divergent perspectives associated with feminism.
At the time of our interviews, all the participants were college students
attending a university in the Seoul metropolitan area. For our analysis, we
categorized the participants into three groups based on their feminist self-
identification: 22 feminists, nine fence sitters, and nine nonfeminists.8 The
majority of women students identifying as feminists practiced feminism
individually through activities such as reading books and discussing gen-
der issues with friends and family. Six students actively participated in
women’s movements. We defined fence sitters as individuals who are not
confident in identifying themselves as feminists but believe they are pro-
gressing toward becoming feminists. Finally, nonfeminists claim no inter-
est in or attachment to feminism. In this study, we extensively drew on the
narratives of the 31 students who identified as feminists or as fence sitters
in the murky process of becoming feminists.
We conducted abductive analysis, aiming to find the most likely expla-
nations for our observations by making inferences based on the available
evidence while considering the context and background knowledge
(Tavory and Timmermans 2014). Through a reiterative process of review-
ing the literature and comparing the evidence with existing theories, we
proposed the most reasonable explanations given the available informa-
tion. In terms of the analytical steps, we initially reviewed the interview
transcripts and conducted open coding to identify recurring themes within
the interview questions related to feminist identification, feminist prac-
tice, and people’s reactions to the participants’ feminist identity and
actions. Second, we identified key consequences and causes, exploring
the underlying social forces at play. Our aim was to elucidate the unique
ways in which these women identified as feminists, engaged in feminist
activities, and experienced antifeminist backlash. Third, after uncovering
the mechanisms shaping the everyday feminism of young female college
students, we extensively researched the literature on everyday feminism
and antifeminist backlash against women’s movements. This search
aimed to identify the most plausible explanations for the Korean case,
which exhibits distinct characteristics from other cases. In addition, we
frequently navigated between the interview data and the broader literature
on everyday feminism and backlash to determine the most appropriate
explanations that could characterize the Korean context.9
226 GENDER & SOCIETY / April 2024
QUIET FEMINISM: NAVIGATING FEMINISM IN
THE FACE OF EVERYDAY BACKLASH
Whereas young women are often portrayed as negating their feminist
identities in the postfeminist environment (Crossley 2010), some
openly claim their feminist identity and engage in everyday feminist
actions on online platforms (Banet-Weiser 2018; Keller 2012; Mendes,
Ringrose, and Keller 2019; Pruchniewska 2019). In contrast, most
Korean students in our study acknowledged their feminist identity but
hesitated to openly disclose it, both online and offline. They practiced
everyday feminism covertly within the campus environment. This dis-
creet form of feminism—quiet feminism—stemmed from their appre-
hension of prevalent antifeminist sentiments and backlash in their
everyday surroundings. Despite their “quiet” approach, these young
women college students continued to practice everyday feminism by
creating safe spaces on their college campuses and constructing their
feminist identities in their daily lives.
“I’m a Feminist, But . . .”: Quiet Feminism Among
Self-Identified Feminists
Most of the interview participants in our study answered “yes” when
asked if they considered themselves feminists, but their responses were
often followed by “but” statements. Many mentioned they identified as
feminists but did not participate in organized feminist protests or publicly
disclose their feminist identity. Some were uncertain about meeting the
criteria for being a feminist due to their limited direct involvement or
inadequate knowledge of the feminist movement.10 Nevertheless, most
participants viewed themselves as feminists because they had undergone
an ideological transformation and engaged in minor activities driven by
their feminist consciousness. The following interview account illustrates
our participants’ understanding of feminism and feminist identification.
Jinjoo Yang shared,
I feel like being a feminist is a major part of my identity. Since the begin-
ning of this year, I made a commitment to contribute more by getting
involved [in feminist actions] and being mindful of how I present myself to
others . . . but they are not like huge actions. I just thought it would be nice
to see people around me changing their perceptions [regarding gender], so
I’ve been consciously making an effort to talk more about gender issues
with my friends.
Jung and Moon / QUIET FEMINISM IN THE ERA OF BACKLASH 227
Jinjoo Yang illustrated her intellectual commitment to feminism by
discussing gender-related issues with her friends daily. Many participants
expressed the same view that anyone interested in gender equality could
be considered a feminist, regardless of their involvement in social move-
ment activism. This perspective aligns with the reasoning of third-wave
feminists who prioritize enacting feminist principles in their daily lives,
fulfilling the feminist slogan “the personal is political,” over collectively
mobilized activism (Schuster 2017). However, despite their willingness to
embrace feminist identification, our participants hesitated to publicly
express their feminist identities. For example, Ahyoung Kim stated,
I personally think that anyone who is interested in gender issues and
believes in gender equality is a feminist, but in our society, because the
term “feminism” is used differently, like sarcastically, and there is some
kind of social pressure [against feminism], I find it difficult to introduce
myself as a feminist in public settings.
Like Ahyoung, most of our participants avoid openly disclosing their
feminist identity despite their self-identification. We consider this choice
of being “quiet” about their authentic identity to be vastly different from
situational feminism (Crossley 2010). According to Crossley (2010),
some young women redefine feminism based on their needs and situa-
tions, switching to feminist values only when they encounter apparent
sexist situations but generally believing they can navigate life without
practicing feminism. Rather than being influenced by such postfeminist
beliefs, our participants’ intent for practicing “quiet” feminism is heavily
related to the hostile environment against feminism that they face, which
we discuss further in the following section. Quiet feminism also differs
from implicit feminism (Giffort 2011). Whereas implicit feminism refers
to feminist activists’ strategic decision to avoid a feminist label to attract
a broader audience and increase the legitimacy of their feminist actions,
“quiet” feminists are more concerned about overt antifeminist sentiments
prevalent in Korea—everyday backlash.
Everyday Backlash and Quiet Feminism in Sheltered
Environments
Our participants’ avoidance of public disclosure of their feminist iden-
tity is reflected in the ways in which they stayed away from feminist
actions in online spaces and shifted their practice of feminism to private
offline settings, particularly in small circles of friends established as safe
228 GENDER & SOCIETY / April 2024
havens in their college campuses. In other words, the students created safe
spaces for themselves to freely explore, discuss, and practice feminism.
To our surprise, most participants did not choose digital sites or online
communities as such safe havens. As discussed earlier, many students
preferred to talking to their close friends about various gender issues in
private conversations, rather than actively participating in feminist actions
open to the public. Moreover, some students exerted deliberate effort to
join a feminist study group or a club that aligned with their feminist iden-
tity. Ari Min shared,
Depending on where I am, I act differently when it comes to expressing my
views on feminism. In my [social studies] club, “New Ideas,” I freely talk
about it, but I keep my mouth shut in my soccer club because it’s not wel-
come there. . . . I stay quiet around my [public administration] department
friends, but I’m quite vocal at “New Ideas” because the people there share
a similar mindset, and I feel understood. . . . In my soccer club, most mem-
bers are men, and even women there aren’t interested in feminism. So, if I
bring up feminism there, I might be seen as an annoying person, so I usu-
ally stayed quiet and I eventually stopped going there.
Ari mentioned that she gradually moved away from a campus soccer
club to her social studies club because she was more comfortable in the
latter and it enlightened her on various gender issues. Similarly, other
students voluntarily organized self-study groups to read books and discuss
feminism with their close friends and joined university clubs where many
female students could feel safe, strengthen their knowledge, and gain
moral support. Hayoon Choi said,
When several girls are sitting around in my club room, we casually talk
about feminism. In the new debate club that I joined recently, I also realized
that there were quite a few feminists. So, whenever we start a conversation,
our topics naturally switch to that [gender-related] direction.
Such collective spaces and activities on campus serve as hubs and shel-
ters for students to conceal themselves from the harsh environment
against feminism to amass power and move forward. These narratives
support what T. Kim and Yuk (2022) find in their research on young
feminists’ experiences living in a conservative region in Korea. Like our
participants, the informants in their study eagerly looked for gatherings of
like-minded feminists as their “survival” strategy in the antagonistic envi-
ronment against feminism.
Jung and Moon / QUIET FEMINISM IN THE ERA OF BACKLASH 229
Our participants’ shift to private settings, particularly within small cir-
cles of friends established as safe havens in their college campus, was
influenced primarily by two aspects of everyday backlash. First, our data
suggest that young college students’ quiet feminism is a response to the
ubiquity of everyday backlash in online spaces in Korea. Many students
refrained from engaging in any feminist activities online due to the notice-
able antifeminist backlash prevalent on online platforms, portal sites, and
communities. The following statement from Sorim Yoo illustrates the
prevalence of antifeminist backlash in online spaces, including popular
sites for college students.
Seeing comments responding to gender-related posts on social media
proves my point [of the widespread negative perception of feminism]. In
my school’s digital community, like Everytime, so many misogynistic com-
ments have been posted. A couple of years ago, when a female celebrity
supported a campaign called “Girls Can Do Anything,” I remember people
on Everytime ridiculed her a lot. It is like when we talk about women’s
empowerment, people just can’t take it. Personally, when I was sharing lots
of posts about the Nth Room case on social media,11 saying anyone who
watches those videos is an accomplice, I found that some of my male
friends unfollowed me, because I shared those posts online.
Yehyun Chun’s case also suggests the widespread presence of antifem-
inist reactions in online platforms:
I saw many cases where people just have an allergic reaction to feminism.
Even on YouTube channels, when the word “feminism” is mentioned in a
video, some people comment, “I am disappointed in you.” When I compare
male-dominant YouTube channels with female-dominant ones, I definitely
see more hate speeches against feminism in the male-dominant channels.
Similarly, Najin Hwang reported a significant amount of cursing
directed at feminists in online spaces, with misogynistic comments
appearing on her school website as well as on Naver, one of the largest
portal sites in Korea. Due to the pervasive infiltration of antifeminist dis-
courses into major portal sites and websites catering to college students,
many students were cautious about expressing their feminist views in
online spaces. Previous research and survey data also support our find-
ings, indicating that gender-based hate speech has continued to increase in
Naver (M. Y. Choi et al. 2022) and that the most targeted groups for online
hate speech are women and feminists (K.-H. Kim, Cho, and Bae 2020).
Research also shows that gender-based hate speech targeting feminism
230 GENDER & SOCIETY / April 2024
and affirmative action for women was prevalent in Everytime, the online
platform for college students (Y.-S. Choi 2019). A sense of resentment
toward perceived unfairness based on the ideologies of meritocracy and
competition also plays a significant role in fueling gender-based hate
speech in Everytime (Lee, Park, and Lee 2021).
When asked about their online feminist activities, most participants did
not mention their participation as a feminist in any digital activism. Only
two students specifically mentioned their feminist actions online, but even
those activities occurred in “safe” settings, such as joining a digital femi-
nist community or reporting misogynist comments anonymously on
Naver. Moreover, two other students who used to fervently fight against
misogyny online had stopped engaging in the digital battle, because they
felt emotionally depleted and drained from the online verbal attacks by the
opponents of feminism. Hyunji Song shared,
I used to be very upset at every single [misogynist] post, but now I feel so
tired. Whenever some serious incidents [threatening women’s rights] hap-
pened, I was so angry, together with my friends. I was like, “This is non-
sense!” I used to sign online petitions and post my opinions on Facebook
and Instagram. But now, I feel quite tired. So, these days, when I see those
[misogynistic] postings online, I think, “Okay, it is happening again. They
are doing this again . . .” That sort of helpless feeling, or I feel too tired to
do anything.
Hyunji Song felt a sense of anger and frustration on misogynistic post-
ings in online space. Similarly, Suhjoo Ji realized that her anger toward
misogyny provided only short-term motivation for her feminist actions, as
it quickly drained her emotionally. Suhjoo also highlighted that studying
feminism on her campus helped her better understand the reality of gender
inequality, as opposed to simply expressing her anger online. These
accounts may serve as indicators of why most of our participants prioritize
their feminist practice in private offline settings rather than in online
spaces, in addition to their fear of becoming targets for digital harassment.
In addition, young students’ quiet feminism was motivated by the
widely expressed antifeminist sentiments encountered directly and indi-
rectly in their daily interactions. The students explained how they fre-
quently witnessed male students’ hostile reactions to feminism in general,
and some directly experienced antifeminist backlash in their interactions
with other students on campus. Hyunji Song mentioned that one male
student in her class became very antagonistic toward her when she
expressed her interest in feminism during a classroom discussion. She
Jung and Moon / QUIET FEMINISM IN THE ERA OF BACKLASH 231
also felt silenced when the male editors of her school magazine refused to
cover a gender topic she suggested for an upcoming issue due to concerns
about possible criticisms from the readers. Similarly, Kyujin Seo encoun-
tered blatant hatred toward feminism from her friends in the department:
In my department, we had several antifeminism incidents. Some [of the]
students openly commented about [the] other [female] students’ appear-
ance, and one senior student made sexual remarks toward junior [female]
students during the department retreat. After that, a feminism club was cre-
ated within the department. Then, there was huge backlash about the club
coming from a lot of the students, including the student representative of
the department, and [the] students were talking [about us] behind our back.
As demonstrated above, young women on campus seldom encountered
positive responses to their feminist beliefs, particularly in their interac-
tions with male peers. Everyday backlash is deeply ingrained in the social
interactions that take place within classrooms, department communal
spaces, social gatherings, and nearby restaurants where these students
engage in their daily routines. Blais and Dupuis-Déri’s (2022) research on
individual feminists’ experiences of antifeminist attacks in their private
social circles also underscores the emotional responses of anger, humilia-
tion, and fear that feminists experience when confronted with everyday
antifeminist behaviors. Similarly, our interview participants recounted
heightened forms of antifeminist attacks and the subsequent fear they felt
due to the ubiquitous presence of such behavior in both online and offline
physical spaces. Consequently, many of the students avoided participating
in any feminist actions in online spaces and redirected their practice of
feminism to private offline settings, particularly within small circles of
friends established as safe havens in their college campus, giving rise to
quiet feminism.
Quiet Feminism: Everyday Feminism as the Process
of Identity Construction
What, then, is the sociopolitical significance of quiet feminism? Based
on our findings, we contend that the practice of quiet feminism represents
a facet of everyday feminism that functions as a means of fortifying one’s
feminist identity, enabling individuals to feel empowered, enlightened,
and rejuvenated, thus allowing them to better shield themselves against
everyday backlash. When queried about their feminist activities, many
students mentioned active engagement in seeking information about
232 GENDER & SOCIETY / April 2024
gender inequality, discussing feminist topics, and contributing to feminist
discourse on campus. These young women students regarded “doing
feminism” as no different from conversing about feminism with friends
during meals or dispelling misconceptions about feminism held by their
friends and family. For many students, such routine activities on campus
resulted in fulfilling and transformative personal growth in terms of com-
prehending current gender issues and strengthening their unwavering
commitment to gender equality.
Their notable everyday practices included reading feminist books, tak-
ing gender-related classes, and integrating their thoughts into school
assignments. A group of students in New Zealand, as reported by Dyer
and Hurd (2018), had similar experiences. They found that enrolling in a
gender course made them more confident and mature, as the class exposed
them to the pervasive nature of gender inequality and its structural barri-
ers. In our sample, students often described their practical engagement
with everyday feminism as “studying feminism.” For many, “doing
feminism” involved reading books about feminism and gender, which
provided a fresh perspective on addressing social issues and fostering
enlightenment. Numerous students expressed how their study and reading
of feminism deepened their comprehension of gender equality and
equipped them to navigate the era of backlash. Suhjoo Ji shared,
During the second semester of my freshman year, the senior students in my
club suddenly added various social science books to our club reading list.
In the beginning, I was like, “what?” but I read those books anyway,
because I liked the people there. In retrospect, studying those books really
helped me see the underlying reasons why people were so upset [about
certain gender issues], which I used to frown upon. That time, I realized
that if I just stay upset about what’s going on [and do nothing], I can’t really
see what the real problem is. Maybe keeping calm and studying society are
what I need to understand this complex society.
Learning the feminist language also heightened the students’ awareness
of the unequal systems they encountered, leading them to recognize that
unjust systems and structures, rather than individuals, were responsible
for gender inequality. In addition to educating themselves about femi-
nism, participants endeavored to apply their feminist knowledge to their
work. They integrated their feminist perspective into school magazines
and course assignments, aiming to bring about small-scale changes among
their classmates, family members, and friends. For instance, Kyujin Seo
mentioned her efforts as a feminist in her various roles, including school
Jung and Moon / QUIET FEMINISM IN THE ERA OF BACKLASH 233
assignments and adding feminist narratives to the media content she han-
dled in her job.
Our participants’ efforts in practicing feminism, such as joining univer-
sity clubs, studying feminist literature, and engaging with feminist content
in their school assignments and other projects, bear some resemblance to
the concept of everyday feminism discussed by Schuster (2017). In a
study of contemporary feminists in New Zealand, Schuster (2017) showed
that women incorporated their feminist perspectives into their relation-
ships with their partners, friends, children, and extended families by
engaging in conversations about gender and sexuality, sharing ideas, and
discussing them. While Schuster’s work emphasized the political nature
of everyday feminism, our findings highlight everyday feminism as the
process through which emerging feminists construct their feminist iden-
tity in an environment hostile toward feminism. We view quiet feminism
as a subtype of everyday feminism that resembles the collective identity
construction process for young feminists situated in an unsupportive cam-
pus climate for feminism (Reger 2008). As noted by Reger (2008), college
students attending a conservative university often perceive their feminist
gathering as havens for like-minded individuals. More precisely, for
young students, their practice of everyday feminism involves developing
and strengthening their feminist identities, as well as gaining a compre-
hensive understanding of knowledge—epistemological and ontological
languages—and laying the groundwork before progressing to more overt
forms of actions. In this regard, we consider the quiet feminism, as
observed in our study, distinct from forms of resistance against political
oppression, as exemplified in Scott’s (1989) notion of everyday forms of
resistance or M. Jung’s (2022) concept of quiet politics. Instead of engag-
ing in contentious politics, these young feminists perceive feminism as an
integral part of their identity construction. The force of the backlash
caused young women to conserve their energy in order to fortify their
identity before engaging in direct political actions. They actively study it
and incorporate it into their daily lives for self-enlightenment and mutual
empowerment.
CONCLUSION
This study examines the practice of everyday feminism among young
women in contemporary Korea during an era of backlash. Our interviews
with 40 Korean female college students show that most of the participants
234 GENDER & SOCIETY / April 2024
consider themselves to be feminists and tend to participate in the practice
of offline feminism on campus by doing small things in their daily lives.
Interestingly, this covert approach to everyday feminism contrasts with
the active participation observed in digital feminism (Keller 2012;
Mendes, Ringrose, and Keller 2019; Pruchniewska 2019). To unravel this
empirical puzzle, we draw a connection between everyday backlash and
the students’ offline everyday feminism, or quiet feminism.
Our participants frequently encounter antifeminist backlash in the
online and offline contexts of their daily lives. They avoid openly reveal-
ing their feminist identity as a response to this everyday backlash and
create safe spaces within their college campuses, where they can access
liberal and progressive knowledge while refraining from online feminist
activities. Furthermore, we assert that the practice of everyday offline
feminism among female college students serves to develop, solidify, and
strengthen their feminist self-identity, preparing them for further steps in
bringing about social change.
Given the persistent scrutiny, questioning, and challenges they face due
to everyday backlash, these young women engage in daily discussions
about feminism and seek a deeper understanding of the movement through
such activities as reading books, taking classes, and participating in club
activities. These endeavors empower them, enhance their emotional resil-
ience, and lead to feelings of empowerment and enlightenment.
Our research advances scholarship on the contemporary practice of
everyday feminism and its relation to backlash. It reintroduces the impor-
tance of offline everyday feminism to scholarly discussions that have
focused predominantly on young women’s online feminist practices
(Mendes, Ringrose, and Keller 2019; Pruchniewska 2019; Schuster 2017).
It underscores that offline gatherings of like-minded individuals, espe-
cially within college campuses, can serve as vital incubators for emerging
feminists. Crossley’s (2017) work in the United States has demonstrated
that gender studies programs, women’s centers, and feminist student
organizations acted as supportive environments for feminist activism,
particularly during anti-sexual violence campaigns in the mid- to late
2010s. Our analysis reveals that debate clubs and feminism study groups
in Korean college campuses, which have recently regained popularity,
function as safe havens where feminist students can engage in everyday
feminism, shielded from the pervasive backlash.
In addition, our study directs researchers to pay close attention to the
impact of everyday backlash on individuals’ practice of feminism. Some
of the students in our study practiced offline feminism instead of digital
Jung and Moon / QUIET FEMINISM IN THE ERA OF BACKLASH 235
feminism, after experiencing burnout and emotional exhaustion from
antifeminist backlash online. From the mid- to the late 2010s, young
Korean women, particularly digital feminists, were active in practicing
online feminism to counteract the growing online misogyny as well as
gender-based crimes that target women, as demonstrated by the forma-
tion of Megalia, Womad, and the 2018 Women’s March.12 However,
most of our interview participants did not engage in online feminism in
2020, which they attributed to the antifeminist sentiments prevalent in
online spaces. The difference between the mid-2010s and early 2020s in
terms of antifeminist backlash may be that backlash has evolved from
online misogyny that circulated predominantly in a male-centered
manosphere to everyday backlash that is present in large-scale online
portals and digital communities as well as social interactions in offline
settings. The predominant antifeminist backlash observed in online
communities may incur costs, as young women, in response to the back-
lash, may prioritize reinforcing their identities over participating in
outward political activities.
Future research would also benefit from investigating whether this
everyday backlash is a local phenomenon or a global trend. We contend
that everyday backlash may indeed be a global phenomenon. Although the
well-established online landscape within Korean society has created a
conducive environment for the rapid dissemination of antifeminist senti-
ments in Korea, recent scholarship also shows that social media has
facilitated antifeminist men’s surveillance of feminist activities and popu-
lar misogyny online around the globe (Banet-Weiser 2018). This has
resulted in the growing digital abuse, harassment, and trolling of feminists
worldwide (Megarry 2018). Moreover, scholars have observed that con-
tent from the manosphere can easily penetrate other digital spaces, mixing
with content from different men-dominant digital communities, by refram-
ing misogynistic ideology to a common language (Nagle 2017).
We also consider the impact of quiet feminism on Korean feminist
politics. Following the peak of popular feminism, the feminist movement
in Korea appears to have entered a period of transition or abeyance. The
highly organized collective feminist activities that thrived in the mid- to
late 2010s have become less prominent, and individual feminists are
adopting a low-key approach, engaging in quiet feminism. Recent schol-
arship, including studies by T. Kim and Yuk (2022) and Oh (2022), notes
that internal conflicts and controversies within the feminist movement
have left young women uncertain about their feminist identities and the
future goals of feminism. In this context, quiet feminism may signify a
236 GENDER & SOCIETY / April 2024
state of abeyance for the Korean feminist movement. Drawing on Taylor’s
(1989) concept of abeyance, we propose that the movement has the poten-
tial to rebound, as abeyance structures foster collective identity and sus-
tain movement objectives. Crossley (2017) similarly observed “everyday
abeyance structures” in U.S. colleges, which maintained the feminist
movement during the down times of the movements through individuals
who integrate feminist principles into their daily lives, albeit with no
physical collective mobilization. Similar to this, the increasing interests of
young Korean women in feminism and gender issues, despite the escalat-
ing backlash against feminism (J. S. Kim 2021; Oh 2022), suggest that
there may be a significant pool of sympathizers and potential recruits that
can join the future feminist movement in Korea.
One limitation of our research lies in our sample being exclusively
drawn from university women in Seoul, thus missing out on other femi-
nists in their 20s residing outside Seoul and those without or beyond col-
lege education. For instance, T. Kim and Yuk’s (2022) study focusing on
young feminists, many of whom are non-college students living in local
Korean provinces, reveals their continuous engagement in digital feminist
communities, primarily due to a lack of alternative spaces to connect with
like-minded feminists. Nevertheless, their research also reports women’s
experiences of widespread antifeminist attacks in their daily lives, leading
them to maintain a low profile, similar to our participants. This raises
further questions about contemporary Korean feminism: Will young
feminists return to more overtly organized and mobilized collective
actions, either online or offline? And how will this period of abeyance
conclude, whether through the decline or rejuvenation of feminism in
Korea? Future research could investigate whether quiet feminism might
temporarily constitute a new form of feminism in Korea or persist as one
of the diverse feminist expressions observed worldwide.
AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS
Both authors contributed equally to this work.
ORCID IDS
Gowoon Jung https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7157-2370
Minyoung Moon https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4746-2080
Jung and Moon / QUIET FEMINISM IN THE ERA OF BACKLASH 237
NOTES
1. Sticky activism refers to the involvement of young women in offline
political action following the 2016 Gangnam Station murder in South Korea. This
involved the placement of handwritten sticky notes in public spaces and the dis-
semination of images of the notes through digital media (J. S. Kim 2021).
2. The issue of gender became a significant strategy employed by candidates
from both the conservative right and the progressive left to garner support from
young people. Both presidential candidates, Yoon Seok-yeol from the People
Power Party and Lee Jae-myung from the Democratic Party, recognized the
potential risk of losing support of young voters and made concerted efforts to
secure their backing. For example, during his campaign, Yoon criticized the
Ministry of Gender Equality and Family (Yeoseonggajokbu), arguing that there
is no structural gender discrimination in Korea, and promised to raise the monthly
wage of conscripted soldiers as part of his plan to enhance the troops’ working
conditions. Yoon specifically targeted young male supporters during his cam-
paign, while Lee focused on gaining support from young female voters (H. J. Kim
and Lee 2022).
3. The term kimchi-nyeo, used derogatorily to refer to Korean girls and
women, gained popularity within the male user–based online community Ilbe.
In the discourse surrounding kimchi-nyeo, Korean women are depicted as self-
ish, manipulative, infringing on men’s rights, and driven by materialistic
motives. Ilbe members employ the kimchi-nyeo discourse as a way to justify
their use of hate speech against Korean women. The term carries a misogynistic
undertone, serving to rationalize and legitimize misogynistic hate speech and
attacks (J. S. Kim 2018).
4. According to a survey on news portal usage in 2019, a significant majority
of participants (87 percent of the respondents) predominantly use the Naver portal
as their primary source for accessing news. Less than 2 percent of respondents rely
on Google as their primary source of news (Korea Press Foundation 2019).
5. To the best of our knowledge, there is no existing research that systemati-
cally conceptualizes the notion of quiet feminism. Previous studies that have
mentioned this concept have done so indirectly or briefly, describing instances of
feminism that have quietly emerged within individuals or groups, particularly
those that are not historically recognized. An article by Shonk and McClure
(2017) shares some similarity with our perspective. They describe a phenomenon
as quiet feminism that existed between the second and third waves of feminism,
referring to MTV artists’ introduction of a new version of feminism with a non-
heteronomative and inclusive expression of sexuality during that period.
6. We define students’ participation in university clubs, book clubs, and com-
munal gatherings with classmates, peers, and friends as rather loosely tied social
networks rather than collective activities such as the 2018 Women’s March in
Korea. We distinguish loosely tied social networks from collective activities in
238 GENDER & SOCIETY / April 2024
social movements in that collective activities have specific aims for political
mobilization.
7. The in-depth interviews were conducted in 2020, during the initial phase
of the pandemic when numerous institutions were shut down and social distanc-
ing measures were implemented. It is evident that the outbreak of the pandemic
had a significant impact on the decline of social movements, particularly in terms
of street marches and protests. The ongoing pandemic has also resulted in young
college students being confined to their close-knit social activities.
8. In Korea, as of 2021, nearly 70 percent of the young population (ages
25–34) received higher education (Herald Economy 2022). Therefore, our
sample of college students may be considered representative of the majority of
the young population. In addition, recent surveys conducted in 2019 and 2021
revealed that 40 to 50 percent of Korean women in their 20s identified as femi-
nists (J. S. Kim 2021; Oh 2022), which is in line with our participants’ self-
identification as feminists. However, it is important to note that our sample may
not encompass various subgroups with diverse backgrounds in terms of educa-
tion, class, social status, and political ideologies.
9. The second author made an equal contribution to the development of this
article, spanning from the stage of data coding and identification of analytical
themes to framing our findings within relevant literature and preparing this arti-
cle. This author holds specialized expertise in the field of feminism and women’s
movement in Korea, significantly bolstering our capacity to interpret the empiri-
cal findings effectively.
10. We include these students’ narratives in our analysis of quiet feminism
because we believe that their uncertainty regarding feminist identification is
linked to their narrow definition of feminism, which they associate with active
actions and a comprehensive knowledge of feminism. Similarly, teenage girl
activists in Taft’s (2006) study perceive themselves as nonpolitical actors despite
their politicized actions due to the negative and narrow definitions of politics that
these girls impose on themselves.
11. This is a criminal case involving the sexual exploitation of numerous
female minors and selling of pornographic videos of the victims on the Telegram
application between 2018 and 2020 in Korea. This case attracted public and
media attention when the original creator of the Telegram chat room was arrested.
12. Megalia and Womad are two representative digital feminist groups that
emerged in response to the growing misogyny in Korea during the mid-2010s. As
a counter-activist group, Megalia parodied hate speeches against women in the
manosphere, redirecting them toward men. After Megalia’s brief existence, due to
internal disputes, an offshoot group called Womad emerged, adopting an even more
extreme approach by advocating a female supremacy ideology and employing troll-
ing tactics. Beyond their online efforts, digital feminists also organized the largest
women’s march in Korean history in 2018 to protest against the illegal filming of
women and gender-based police investigation of such crimes (Moon 2022).
Jung and Moon / QUIET FEMINISM IN THE ERA OF BACKLASH 239
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Jung and Moon / QUIET FEMINISM IN THE ERA OF BACKLASH 243
Gowoon Jung is an assistant professor of sociology at Kyung Hee
University, Seoul, Korea. Her main research focuses on gender/sexuality,
family, religion, migration, and globalization. She has published articles in
Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, Sociological Inquiry, International
Sociology, Journal of Homosexuality, Critical Sociology, Research in
Social Stratification and Mobility, Social Compass, and others.
Minyoung Moon is a lecturer in sociology at Clemson University. She spe-
cializes in contemporary feminism, women’s movements, gender politics,
and gender-based violence. Her work has been published in various socio-
logical journals, including Sociological Perspectives, Sociology Compass,
Sociological Focus, and Mobilization.
