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... Land ownership is a spatial system. It exists within nested and conflicting scalar frames, encompassing different properties within a three-dimensional network (Underkuffler-Freund 1996). The dominant metaphor of property ownership in commonlaw system is as a bundle of sticks (Cardozo 2000(Cardozo [1928). ...
... Most decisions made by legislatures and courts about property are inherently social, and as such, balance interests between competing property claims (Underkuffler 2000). Protecting the property rights of one person inevitably results in denying the property rights of another (Underkuffler-Freund 1996). Often these decisions are made in ways that enforce power-laden policy decisions, such as those Joseph Singer has chronicled in his discussion of a wide range of American Indian property claims and disputes (Singer 1991-92). ...
... These English cases were developed over a thousand years of local, royal, and ecclesiastical decision-making, establishing property law as one of the oldest American legal traditions incorporating a variety of societal values (Rose 1996). While legislatures codify some property laws into statutes, most regulations of property are worked out on a case-by-case basis in the courts, inevitably balancing the conflicting property rights of the parties (Underkuffler-Freund 1996). This system means that every property dispute that makes it into the court system has the potential of shifting property law in one or another directions, confirming or shifting power structures both individual and collective (Underkuffler 1990-91). ...
... Michelman 85 describes Poletown as "the sort of case in which the injury suffered by the aggrieved owner is one for which money cannot compensate, because the injury is to some interest of the owner's apart from economic net worth". The state's use of its eminent domain power was in 80 Underkuffler -Freund 1996Notre Dame L Rev 1044 Farms that provide housing to labour tenants or farm workers, often for one generation after the other, are arguably constituent of the occupiers' individual autonomy in the sense that the farm, which represents the occupiers' homes, place of work and immediate community, enables such occupiers to enhance their selfdevelopment and rightful place in society. this case directed at entire neighbourhoods, which included individuals' homes. ...
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American legal academics describe private property as a set of private rights. However, liberal ideas of private control poorly describe legal practices, and thus the bundle of rights is a misleading metaphor for private property. Indeed, social theorists have long understood that property is not the ownership of a thing or a set of individual rights, but a set of social agreements about what ownership entails. In the late twentieth and early twenty-first century, constituents have expected governments to protect the value in their properties, not just their control over the resources. Property rules involve government intimately not only in creating value but also in determining who deserves which valuable resources. Keywords: property; private property; government; land
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