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Conciliatory Institutions and Constitutional Process in Post-Conflict States
Abstract
There are two important questions in post-conflict constitution making, and at present neither of them has a definitive or uniformly accepted answer. The first relates to the best configuration of institutions to adopt in order to ameliorate the problem of the intergroup conflict. The second concerns the process most apt to produce the best configuration of institutions, whatever it might be. The first question is unanswered because there is a dispute among scholars and practitioners between two opposing views of appropriate institutions to mitigate conflict. Constitutional processes have not generally been geared to yield coherent exemplars of either configuration in a sufficient number of conflict-prone countries to provide a convincing demonstration of the superiority of one approach or the other. The second question is unanswered because in many cases constitutional processes are chosen in a haphazard fashion, without regard to the aptness of the process for the problems to be addressed. Meanwhile, advocates have been arguing for a single, highly structured, uniform process that may be apt for some classes of problems but is not necessarily appropriate for the full range of problems constitution makers confront in coping with divided societies. Hence the questions of what and how are both subject to debate. This Article takes up both questions. It surveys the main contending prescriptions for constitutional designs to cope with serious ethnic conflict, and it enumerates some of the main objections to each. It then reviews some of the available evidence on the efficacy of the contending prescriptions before turning to the question of adoptability. The Article notes that there are many obstacles to the adoption of a coherent set of political institutions to mitigate conflict, which derive mainly from processes of constitution making. For this reason, the Article evaluates some of the main suggestions in the recent literature on constitutional process and thereafter devotes considerable attention to the difficult question of designing a process for constitution making that is geared to the specific problems faced by constitution designers.
... Critics, led by Horowitz, have established their own version of power-sharing which is referred to as centripetalism. This integrationist approach intends to mitigate the sense of exclusion of any ethnic community and to empower moderate leaders who are more likely to compromise on ethnic issues (Horowitz, 2008(Horowitz, , p. 1218Reilly, 2001). This alternative view of power-sharing engineers a "centripetal spin" ...
... Proponents of centripetalism believe that consociationalism reinforces ethnic identities by creating a landscape of political mobilization that occurs on the basis of segmental identities, allowing parties to organize themselves strictly on an identity basis (Choudhry, 2008, p. 17). Hence, electoral engineering is vital to prevent divisive ethnic mobilization by providing electoral incentives that compel elites to apply "vote pooling" measures or to appeal to constituents from outside their ethnic community for lowerorder preferences on ranked-choice ballots, such as the alternative vote (AV; Horowitz, 2008Horowitz, , p. 1218. In this way, Horowitz turns Lijphart's postelectoral alliances for governmental formation upside down and emphasizes pre-electoral cross-ethnic alliances (Choudhry, 2008, pp. ...
... A strong president is accompanied by a weak vice president and cabinet (McGarry, 2017, p. 514). In Horowitz's view, this process makes it impossible for one ethnic group to capture and consolidate the state by simply winning the majority in parliament or presidential office (Horowitz, 2008). Centripetalists support a single public identity coterminous with the state's territory or at least believe in the capability of the state to cultivate a new overarching identity through common citizenship over time (Choudhry, 2008, pp. ...
Territorial and institutional settlements—from federalism and regional autonomy to consociationalism, centripetalism, and other forms of power-sharing—represent leading strategies by which to end protracted ethnicized conflicts. Yet there remains considerable debate as to the long-term merits of such approaches. Does consociationalism entrench divisions and immobilize government decision-making? Is federalism merely a precursor to secession? Or are territorial and institutional settlements the best prospect by which to deliver peace, democracy, and stability to deeply divided societies? The debate remains unsettled.
Two main iterations of the debate regarding institutional design choices in divided societies in the Global South can be identified: one—accommodation versus integration—tends to present the options in zero-sum terms. In these earlier stages of the debate, consociationalism and centripetalism are frequently cast as opposing and irreconcilable forms of government in deeply divided societies (e.g., consociationalism versus centripetalism). Later scholarship tracks a different approach. In the second iteration—what can be labeled the turn to hybridity—scholars have shifted toward emphasizing their compatibility (e.g., consociationalism and centripetalism) or charting a path between them (consociationalism, then centripetalism).
Beyond scholarly debates, institutional and territorial settlements in the Global South, including from across Latin and South America, Africa, the Middle East, and Asia, exhibit a wide variety of forms and manifestations, some of which support accommodation while others tend toward integration.
... Critics, led by Horowitz, have established their own version of power-sharing which is referred to as centripetalism. This integrationist approach intends to mitigate the sense of exclusion of any ethnic community and to empower moderate leaders who are more likely to compromise on ethnic issues (Horowitz, 2008(Horowitz, , p. 1218Reilly, 2001). This alternative view of power-sharing engineers a "centripetal spin" ...
... Proponents of centripetalism believe that consociationalism reinforces ethnic identities by creating a landscape of political mobilization that occurs on the basis of segmental identities, allowing parties to organize themselves strictly on an identity basis (Choudhry, 2008, p. 17). Hence, electoral engineering is vital to prevent divisive ethnic mobilization by providing electoral incentives that compel elites to apply "vote pooling" measures or to appeal to constituents from outside their ethnic community for lowerorder preferences on ranked-choice ballots, such as the alternative vote (AV; Horowitz, 2008Horowitz, , p. 1218. In this way, Horowitz turns Lijphart's postelectoral alliances for governmental formation upside down and emphasizes pre-electoral cross-ethnic alliances (Choudhry, 2008, pp. ...
... A strong president is accompanied by a weak vice president and cabinet (McGarry, 2017, p. 514). In Horowitz's view, this process makes it impossible for one ethnic group to capture and consolidate the state by simply winning the majority in parliament or presidential office (Horowitz, 2008). Centripetalists support a single public identity coterminous with the state's territory or at least believe in the capability of the state to cultivate a new overarching identity through common citizenship over time (Choudhry, 2008, pp. ...
Territorial and institutional settlements—from federalism and regional autonomy to consociationalism, centripetalism, and other forms of power-sharing—represent leading strategies by which to end protracted ethnicized conflicts. Yet there remains considerable debate as to the long-term merits of such approaches. Does consociationalism entrench divisions and immobilize government decision-making? Is federalism merely a precursor to secession? Or are territorial and institutional settlements the best prospect by which to deliver peace, democracy, and stability to deeply divided societies? The debate remains unsettled.
Two main iterations of the debate regarding institutional design choices in divided societies in the Global South can be identified: one—accommodation versus integration—tends to present the options in zero-sum terms. In these earlier stages of the debate, consociationalism and centripetalism are frequently cast as opposing and irreconcilable forms of government in deeply divided societies (e.g., consociationalism versus centripetalism). Later scholarship tracks a different approach. In the second iteration—what can be labeled the turn to hybridity—scholars have shifted toward emphasizing their compatibility (e.g., consociationalism and centripetalism) or charting a path between them (consociationalism, then centripetalism).
Beyond scholarly debates, institutional and territorial settlements in the Global South, including from across Latin and South America, Africa, the Middle East, and Asia, exhibit a wide variety of forms and manifestations, some of which support accommodation while others tend toward integration.
... Under virtually every form of fair majoritarian political arrangement and every electoral system, the As will dominate government and Bs will be in opposition for perpetuity. (Horowitz 2008(Horowitz , 1214 Similarly, Arend Lijphart (2004) defines a divided society as one with strong ethnocultural divisions that have the potential to be politically salient and mobilising, threatening the stability of the state and the coexistence of the different groups that live within it. What needs to be underscored is that ethnocultural diversity is not itself problematic from a political point of view. ...
... It introduces a series of proportional representation mechanisms, a grand coalition of communal leaders, group autonomy and mutual vetoes to protect vital interests. The centripetal/integrative approach is mainly associated with Donald Horowitz (1990Horowitz ( , 1991Horowitz ( , 1993Horowitz ( , 2008 and aims to alter the identity of the body politic, away from ethnic affiliations, towards an integrative common demos. To this end, it encourages moderation by advocating institutions that provide incentives for the electoral success of cross-and multi-ethnic parties and candidates. ...
Ethiopia has tried to transit to democracy, in 1991 and 2018. In both attempts, it was not that successful. This paper tries to explain why democratic transition in Ethiopia has not been successful and what lessons can be drawn from these experiences. Democratic transition and consolidation require certain social, economic, cultural and external preconditions. An attempt at democratic transition may not succeed if these preconditions do not exist in the society that attempts it. Ethiopia does not have any of these preconditions. Contrarily, its ethnic diversity, poverty, absence of strong political institutions, polarisation, and culture of solving political differences with conflict and violence make democratic transition and consolidation almost impossible. The Ethiopian experience provides that for states like Ethiopia, democratic transition is hard and sustaining it is even harder. For states like Ethiopia, the best way to transit to democracy is to first develop the democratic preconditions, such as political compromise and fidelity to peaceful resolution of political conflict, before an attempt at democratic transition can be made.
Recognizing and accommodating diverse ethnic, religious, and language identities has become the new feature of twenty-first-century politics. In many parts of the world, people are mobilizing around old grievances involving ethnic, religious, or cultural identities and demanding acknowledgment and recognition by a wider society. They are protesting discrimination, marginalization from social and economic opportunities, and demanding social justice. Political scholars and leaders have long argued against explicit recognition of cultural identities because they pose threats to social harmony. Effective constitutions have two basic elements: A system of government with a set of institutions to make and implement laws and policies and people’s shared acceptance that the constitution is authoritative. Authoritarian constitutions are window dressing that provide lip service to the rule of law and other fundamental freedoms without the intention to enforce them.
Pizzorno’s distinction between ‘manifest’ and ‘hidden’ politics helps to explain the resilience of the consociational systems of Lebanon and Iraq in times of crises. Through the lens of ‘manifest’ politics, the Lebanese and Iraqi political systems are permanently on the brink of collapse. By contrast, through the lens of ‘hidden’ politics, the Lebanese and Iraqi political systems manifest their organised resilience. This comparative analysis of the responses to the Covid-19 pandemic in Iraq and Lebanon contributes to the debate over how consociational power-sharing works in practice as a fine-grained system to maintain the status quo.
Constitutional bargains are seen as cornerstones of democratic transitions in much of the world. Yet very few studies have theorized about the link between constitution-making and democratization. Shifting the focus on democratization away from autocratic regime break down, this book considers the importance of inclusive constitution-building for democratization. In this pathbreaking volume, Tofigh Maboudi draws on a decade of research on the Arab Spring to explain when and how constitutional bargains facilitate (or hinder) democratization. Here, he argues that constitutional negotiations have a higher prospect of success in establishing democracy if they resolve societal, ideological, and political ills. Emphasizing the importance of constitution-making processes, Maboudi shows that constitutions can resolve these problems best through participatory and inclusive processes. Above all, The 'Fall' of the Arab Spring demonstrates that civil society is the all-important link that connects constitutional bargaining processes to democratization.
Using insights from social choice theory, particularly Black's concept of single-peaked preferences and Downs's median-voter model, the authors previously investigated the theoretical impact of the alternative vote system (AV) on the success of moderate parties in an ethnically bipolar society. Focusing on the simplest case, that with one moderate and one extremist ethnic party associated with each of the two ethnic groups, they found that for AV to necessarily yield outcomes that favor moderate parties there must be majority support for moderation and voter preferences that are single peaked with respect to the ethnic-conflict-defined dimension. Here, the authors test these assumptions with data from the 1999 and 2001 elections in Fiji, an ethnically bipolar society. They show that Fiji's objective of ameliorating ethnic divisions by the adoption of AV was not successful. In elections in 1999 and 2001, moderate parties would have fared better under a proportional representation system.
Reinterpreting the principle of self-determination, some theorists have
proposed that victimized ethnic groups ought to have a right to secede
from states in which they are located. Proponents of such a right assert
that, by separating antagonistic groups, secession can alleviate ethnic
conflict. Secession, however, does not create homogeneous successor states
or assure protection of remaining minorities, and its converts domestic
ethnic conflict into more dangerous international conflict. Recognition
of a right to secede would dampen attempts to adopt conciliatory policies
in the undivided state, and would likely increase ultimately fruitless
secessionist warfare. The best hope for severely divided societies lies
not in encouraging secession or partition but in devising institutions
to increase the satisfaction of minorities in existing states.
Taiwan (the Republic of China, ROC) adopted a semi-presidential system in the 1997 constitutional reform. That system is now being put to the test through the transfer of power from the Kuomintang (KMT) to the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) given that the DPP won the 2000 presidential elections. This paper first develops a theoretical framework to analyze political stability under different types of semi-presidential systems. Three factors are singled out as the most critical: presidential power (high or low), president-parliament relations (congruent or incongruent), and party system (biparty or multiparty). Following is a look into Taiwan's institutional background and its process of constitutional reform. We discover that after the inauguration of President Chen Shui-bian, Taiwan fell into a highly unfavorable situation, with a low stability rating. The second part of the paper focuses on the interaction mode between the president and the parliament which is characterized by incongruent relations. Four empirical cases are used to demonstrate the four interaction modes under incongruence: the French Fifth Republic ("cohabitation"), Finland ("division of labor"), Weimar Germany ("collision"), and the Russian Federation ("supremacy of the president"). The Chen (Shui-bian)-Tang (Fei) duarchy is closer to the Finnish "division of labor" system than to any other interaction mode, but with less presidential concessions. This setup is clearly a compromise rather than cohabitation. As such, the Chen-Tang svstem is useful in defusing parliamentary opposition in the short term, but is conflict-prone in nature, as born out by its ultimate collapse.
This book, comprising papers contributed to a conference entitled Constitutional Design 2000 and held at the University of Notre Dame in December 1999, brings together the views of the leading academic specialists on the theory of effective democratization, and of the institutional design tasks involved.
This article analyzes some factors underlying the spread of insurgent violence in Africa. It focuses on the impact external factors have on power struggles on the continent. The first of these is the unsteady support for democracy from Western donors, which has impeded more far-reaching domestic changes in much of Africa. Second are wider changes in the international setting that dramatically enhanced the international standing of armed movements in the post-1989 period. The article argues that the interplay of both factors has induced would-be leaders to conquer state power by violent rather than non-violent means. This becomes particularly evident in regard to Western efforts to solve violent conflict through power-sharing agreements. The hypothesis is put forward that the institutionalization of this practice for the sake of 'peace', i.e. providing rebels with a share of state power, has important demonstration effects across the continent. It creates an incentive structure would-be leaders can seize upon by embarking on the insurgent path as well. As a result, and irrespective of their effectiveness in any given case, power-sharing agreements may contribute to the reproduction of insurgent violence. © The author [2005]. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Royal African Society. All rights reserved.
This article examines attempts to use electoral politics to promote substantive political change in post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina. Since 1990 elections have been a key part of virtually all negotiated agreements to end civil wars. The utility of democracy for building peace is often asserted but rarely backed with long-term commitment and resources on the ground. Bosnia since 1996 is a rare exception. There, international actors sought not only to establish a democratic political system but to use electoral democracy as a tool with which to transform the nature of politics in Bosnia in short order. This article focuses on efforts to shape the development of political parties and the party system, assesses the degree to which it has succeeded and examines the broader implications of Bosnia's experience for other state-building efforts of its kind.
Under the terms of the Belfast Agreement (1998), community relations policy and practice have progressed from tackling symptoms of the conflict towards adopting a more holistic approach that aims to also address its root causes. In an effort to gauge the impact of political and policy developments on relations between the Protestant and the Catholic communities, this paper examines longitudinal survey evidence of attitudes towards community relations issues amongst a representative sample of the Northern Ireland population. The data (collected in 1989, 1996 and 1999) reveal a growing disparity between Protestant and Catholic responses over time that reflect a Catholic community growing in confidence and a Protestant community feeling increasingly marginalised by wider political developments. In the final analysis we argue that the increasingly negative Protestant response reflects a perception that the current conflict resolution model promotes a Nationalist/Republican agenda that de-legitimises Unionist concerns and political aspirations.
THIS paper describes and analyses the constitutional amendment debate that has taken place in Indonesia since the fall of Soeharto in 1998. In doing so, it goes back to the roots of the Indonesian Constitution, first enacted in 1945, and traces the genesis and development of issues both of substantive and of symbolic importance that have influenced the recent debates. It tracks in particular the major elements of discussion and disagreement over the three years of the constitutional review begun in 1999 and looks in particular at the sessions of the People's Consultative Assembly (Majelis Perwakilan Rakyat or MPR) which have undertaken the task of enacting the amendment. While it is finalised immediately before the 2002 MPR Annual Session and therefore does not contain the final stages of the story, it concludes that the constitutional review, despite criticisms levelled at it, is likely to bring fundamental change to the way the institutions of Indonesia operate.
Scholarly experts can be more helpful to democratic constitution-writers in ethnically divided countries by formulating specific recommendations than by overwhelming them with a barrage of options. Especially the following deserve the highest priority and should be the points of departure in constitutional negotiations: elections by proportional representation (specifically, closed-list proportional representation in not overly large districts), a parliamentary form of government, a cabinet in which power-sharing is prescribed in ethnic or partisan terms, a constructive vote of no confidence, a head of state elected by parliament or whose office is combined with the prime minister's, federalism and decentralization, a federal chamber that is less powerful than the lower house and in which the smaller states are only slightly over-represented, publicly funded autonomous schools for religious groups, and little or no use of the referendum.
Indonesia, the world's largest majority-Muslim society, successfully held three major elections in 2004—legislative elections in April and two rounds of presidential voting in July and September. The two rounds were part of Indonesia's first direct popular balloting for president and vice-president; power peacefully transferred from President Megawati Sukarnoputri of the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) to former general Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) of the Democrat Party (PD). Although the smooth elections secured an important measure of legitimacy on the government, its leaders must now cope with many challenges, including lack of accountability, economic problems, corruption, separatist rebellions, and the tsunami's aftermath.