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‘China is What Europe Makes of it’: Impacts of Sino-Serbian Relations to Serbia’s
European Union Membership Process1
Nobuhide Mert Matsumoto
Marmara University / Faculty of Political Sciences – Political Sciences and International
Relations (MA) / Communication Faculty – Journalism (Bachelor Graduate)
1) Abstract
After the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the fall of the Milosevic regime, Serbia
experienced tremendous changes in its foreign policy. While the country tried to distance
itself from the past conflicts and nationalist enthusiasms with its European Union
membership; it also copes with historical and political obstacles due to the region’s
characteristics while also simultaneously fight against economic hardships. Serbian
President Alexander Vucic called his country’s relations with China as an ‘opportunity’ to
meet the EU’s economic and social standards. But on Brussels’s side, the same story looks
different as, EU increasingly sees China as alien power in a region, where the ghost of
nationalist and authoritarian experiences continues to coexist. This research will compare
both Serbia and the EU’s views towards the Sino-Serbian relationship as to whether an
opportunity for furthering the Europeanization process of Serbia or whether as an off-track
path towards an old-school nationalism and authoritarianism.
Key Words: China, BRI, Serbia, Balkans
1 You can cite this article as; ‘Matsumoto, M. N. (2021). ‘China is What Europe Makes of it’: Impacts of
Sino-Serbian Relations to Serbia’s European Union Membership Process, Marmara University,
Turkey, Academia.edu: https://marmara.academia.edu/MertMatsumoto.’
2
2) Introduction
Increased Chinese influence with the rise of its relative economic and political
power created discerned considerations of its foreign image. One of the most controversial
ones of this was the one in the Balkan region where its footprints increased with Belt and
Road Initiative and its under branch, CEEC or 17+1 Initiative for Central and Eastern
Europe.
In 2016, China signed 23 deals with Serbia which also comprised the country in its
ambitious 17+1 (back then called as 16+1) Initiative.2 Lately established ties created biases
and concerns over the extent of major ex-Yugoslav state Serbia’s policy re-orientation
which shifted to the West after the start of 2009 European Union (EU) accession talks.
However, this was not the single case when Sino-Serbian relations were questioned by the
West. While regional dynamics and socio-political realities of the region were persistent to
continue these controversies will linger to exist. As the West and the EU increasingly
become suspicious about Chinese activities and Serbia’s intentions over this issue; the vice-
versa situation could also apply to Serbia’s perception of the EU. After the amplified
pressures former Serbian Foreign Minister Ivica Dacic supported 17+1 for reducing the
economic gap with the EU while also boosting the country’s acceleration process.3 Not
only governmental sources but also Serbian popular opinion increasingly see China as an
essential partner and a prospect to realize economic development and as a bargaining
opportunity. As this research will show Sino-Serbian-EU trilateral relations are highly
important to understand why China matters much for the EU and also for acknowledging
the problems of integration of Southeastern European states to the Union.
This research will primarily build-on Internet databases as main source of
references. Mainly, Google Scholar and Academia will be my main online libraries. As
many reports and articles show both researchers from Serbia and the West have different
Chinese perceptions in their underlying works. This research will focus on these many
‘Chinese perceptions’ of Europeans, Serbians, Americans, and even Chinese self-
2 Trošić, S. J., Stojanović-Višić, B., & Petrović, V. (2018). NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR FURTHER
IMPROVEMENT OF ECONOMIC COOPERATION BETWEEN SERBIA AND CHINA. The Review of
International Affairs, Vol. LXIX, No. 1169, p. 24.
3 Taken from Xinhua. (2019, April 19). EU should acknowledge benefits of China-CEEC cooperation:
Serbian FM. Xinhua: http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-04/19/c_137991595.htm
3
perceptions and try to balance and make further analysis of Chinese influence in Serbian
politics.
As this research will reveal Chinese views and perceptions regarding the Balkan
region changed and evolved thoroughly as internal dynamics transformed. After the
Second World War when Yugoslavia emerged as a socialist state in the region, Chinese
leader Mao Zedong established the first official relations in 1955. 4 This relationship,
however, changed due to both regional dynamics in Balkans and also due to internal factors
that shaped both Chinese and Serbian foreign policy. Significantly this research will focus
on post-2009 Sino-Serbian relations and Chinese perception over the Balkans after its
‘opening-up’ policy in the 1990s. Thus current Chinese leader Xi Jinping visits Serbia
nearly in every two years, this research will indicate the reluctance of China to interfere in
Balkan political matters even how its relations with Serbia were so-close.
The subsequent part will go deep on Western, primarily on the EU’s, perceptions
and the position of the European Union over the course of the Sino-Serbian relationship.
Since 2009 when Serbia started its EU membership journey, concept of the
Europeanization of Serbia surrounded around emancipation of Serbia from ‘savagery
Europe perception that shapes perceptions over the Balkans since the 19th Century’.5 As
the European Union’s Serbia’s membership process report of 2019 underlined that Serbia
still has some problems concerning political criteria and limited development in terms of
its relationship with Kosovo and other membership candidate countries.6 This research will
also include more critical voices raised within the Western camp, mainly from Washington
since it has huge impact on the Brussels, regarding the intentions of China in Serbia and
other Balkan states. CSIS’s report indicates that increasing Chinese influence over Serbia’s
political, economic, and technological development will inevitably lead China to become
a patron state over Serbia which will hamper the country’s Europeanization process.7 Even
4 Trošić, S. J., Stojanović-Višić, B., & Petrović, V. (2018). NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR FURTHER
IMPROVEMENT OF ECONOMIC COOPERATION BETWEEN SERBIA AND CHINA. The Review of
International Affairs, Vol. LXIX, No. 1169, p. 23.
5 ‘Mazower coined the term ‘Savagery Europe from Harry de Windt’s book of ‘Through Savage
Europe’ in 1907 and underlined region’s lawless side.’ Mazower, M. (2017). Balkanlar. Istanbul: Alfa
Tarih. p. 29.
6 European Commission. (2019). Serbia 2019 Report. Brussels: European Commission, p. 5.
7 Conley, H. A., Hillman, J. E., McCalpin, M., & Ruy, D. (2020). Becoming a Chinese Client State: The Case
of Serbia. Washington DC: CSIS.
4
this research will not rule out such kind of possibility, it will focus more on the EU’s
perception toward Serbia and its Enlargement policy. As the Union increasingly feels
enlargement fatigue and an inward focus due to Eurozone Crisis and following the Brexit
process8, France blocked the new accession talks with North Macedonia and Albania in
2019. This will show the readers that ‘how the EU’s reluctance over enlarging and its
perception over Serbia construct a threatening Chinese presence in the region.
The latter part of this research will further focus on the Serbian perspective. On
how officials in the Belgrade and public of Serbia perceive EU membership and Chinese
involvement. While Serbian officials renew their willingness to commit to Europeanization
efforts more, public consent on the EU membership of Serbian people falls to %43 in 2017
from an avalanche of ‘yeses’ with %67 in 2009.9 This part will also show how regional
dynamics like nationalism shaped Serbia’s perception over the EU membership and also
again economic dynamics re-shaped Chinese identity within the country.
The last part will focus on present-day relations between Serbia, China, and the
European Union with focusing on-going COVID19 pandemic. Serbian President
Alexander Vucic underlined the lack of adequate economic and political support from the
Brussels and even promoted China to ‘brotherly friendship’ status which was a privileged
status of Russia until this time.10 This part will also help leaders of this research to generally
understand how Serbian and Western construction of Chinese identity in the region will
affect the future of the trilateral relationship.
3) China in Serbia: A Patron or a Partner
As a far-east Asian country, China perceives the Balkans as all foreign lands while
the Balkans see China as an alien culture that not has anything in common. However, after
1955, the Chinese vision on the Balkans changed as Tito organized a socialist state in the
8 Kaze, N. M. (2018). European Union’s enlargement fatigue: Russia’s and China’s rise in Southeast
Europe? Australian and New Zealand Journal of European Studies Vol. 10 (1), p. 50.
9 Popovic, M. (2017). Serbia and Major Powers: Public Opinion on EU and Russian Influence. Belgrade:
Belgrade Centre for Security Policy, p. 19.
10 Taken from CGTN. (2020, October 2). Serbia vows to maintain 'brotherly friendship' with China
regardless of any pressure. CGTN: https://news.cgtn.com/news/2020-10-02/Serbia-vows-to-
maintain-brotherly-friendship-with-China-UgsNbc451K/index.html
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Balkan peninsula while also initial relations started on a cultural basis in 1957.11 After the
Tiananmen Square Protests in 1989, Chinese scholars accept Eastern Europe (东欧) as
‘anti-socialist’ and focused on declines in economies and internal troubles of these states.12
But the main eye-focusing event occurred in the 1990s where the Communist and
Socialist world sees deep changes and transformations. In 1999, when the West led a
military intervention in Kosovo against Serbia led by Milosevic, both Russian and Chinese
eyes turned to this region.
The earliest relationship with Milosevic’s Serbia mostly focused on China’s
militaristic spectatorship in the intervention. Chinese officials underlined the importance
of Yugoslavia’s asymmetric weaknesses that they faced and their responses in Kosovo
Operations and tried to learn their best to address these issues.13 For this Chinese officials
maintained close links through its Belgrade Embassy for day-to-day communication with
both Yugoslavian officials and also through its diplomatic staff. As in that time, Western
officials suspiciously observed Sino-Serbian relations and tried to determine to what extent
they are charming closer and closer. On the 7th May 1999, an American B-2 bomber
accidentally bombed Chinese Embassy in Belgrade and killed four civilians. 14 This
generated a diplomatic row between the two countries. Some even speculated that this was
a CIA response to the Chinese plan to buy the wreckage of a downed American F-117
plane from the Milosevic regime.15 While this was never proved or admitted by both
country’s officials; the issue left a colossal mistrust in both sides over the relations with
Serbia even today.
After the end of war and ceasefire, Sino-Serbian relations evolved to a new path
which mostly demarcated in terms of economic cooperation. Even immediately after of
11 Trošić, S. J., Stojanović-Višić, B., & Petrović, V. (2018). NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR FURTHER
IMPROVEMENT OF ECONOMIC COOPERATION BETWEEN SERBIA AND CHINA. The Review of
International Affairs, Vol. LXIX, No. 1169, p. 23.
12 Turcsányi, R., Qiaoan, R., & Kříž, Z. (2014). Coming from Nowhere: The Chinese Perception of the
Concept of Central Europe. The Quandaries of China's Domestic and Foreign Development,
Contemporary Asian Studies Series, p. 164.
13 Sakaguchi, Y., & Mayama, K. (2002). Significance of the War in Kosovo for China and Russia. NIDS
Security Reports, No. 3, p. 4.
14 Marshall, T. (2019). Shadowplay: Behind the Lines and Under Fire: The Inside Story of Europe's Last
War. London: Elliott & Thompson Ltd. (For Details Look p. 162)
15 Marshall, T. (2019). Shadowplay: Behind the Lines and Under Fire: The Inside Story of Europe's
Last War. London: Elliott & Thompson Ltd. (For Details Look p. 163)
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war, China proposed a developmental aid of 300 million dollars for saving Serbia’s health
system and repairing of Serbia’s bombed cities by NATO.16 Even China seemed like one
of the paramount supporters of Milosevic’s regime until Otpor! Protests started in the
streets of Belgrade on October 5. As again Tim Marshall noted the Chinese Ministry of
Foreign Affairs declared their ‘respects to the will of Serbian people’ which demonstrates
the reluctance of Chinese intervention in domestic affairs of Serbia.17
After China’s stance in both through and aftermath of Kosovo Operation, Serbian
people started to admire China as a friendly actor when it compared to West and especially
NATO member states. Also economically China started to open up to the world, its
commitment to Serbia concentrated on economic assistance rather than a political one. In
2007, former Serbian Foreign Minister Vuk Jeremić called his country as an ‘European
country’ that believes in the fastest integration with the Union while also uttered their
sympathy for Chinese Premier Wen Jiabo’s concept of shared destiny which emphases on
an international society based on equality and non-intervention.18 The main contradiction
over Serbia’s relations with China and the EU derives from this point. Hence memories
like the Bosnian and Kosovar Intervention make the ‘non-interventionist’ policy of China
attractive, state elites also want European ‘integration’ for furthering Serbian economic
capabilities.
For this reason, Wen Jiabo proposed Serbia to participate in China’s New Silk Road
Initiative.19 While the initiative was first voiced out by Wen Jiabo in 2011, it comes into
effect in 2012 when Serbia signed China’s “Twelve Measures for Promoting Friendly
Cooperation with Central and Eastern European Countries”.20 The initiative which was
16 Guardian. (1999, December 10). China to aid Yugoslavia with millions of dollars. Retrieved from
Guardian: https://www.theguardian.com/world/1999/dec/10/2
17 17 Marshall, T. (2019). Shadowplay: Behind the Lines and Under Fire: The Inside Story of Europe's
Last War. London: Elliott & Thompson Ltd. (p. 260)
18 MFA. (2007, September 13). “Serbia’s Foreign Policy and the Relationship with China” Address
Before the China Institute of International Studies (CIIS) by H.E. Mr. Vuk Jeremić Minister of Foreign
Affairs of the Republic of Serbia. Retrieved from Serbian Ministry of Foreign Affairs:
http://mfa.gov.rs/en/component/content/article/3264-serbias-foreign-policy-and-the-relationship-
with-china-address-before-the-china-institute-of-international-studies-ciis-by-he-mr-vuk-jeremi-
minister-of-foreign-affairs-of-the-republic-of-serbia-beijing-1
19 Sokołowski, M. (2018). New Silk Road on the Balkans. Case of Macedonia and Serbia. Polish Journal
of Political Science, vol. 4, no. 2, p. 32.
20 Obradović, Ž. (2018). “One Belt and Road” in the Balkans and in Serbia (cooperation challenges).
The New Silk Road: European Perspectives: Security Challenges/Risks Within the Initiative 16+1, 11, p.
194.
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later named 16+1 (now 17+1 with the inclusion of Greece). Despite its earlier roots;
promotion and realization of the initiative was made by China’s new leader Xi Jinping in
2016 as part of the ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
When this research refers to Sino-Serbian Relations, Xi Jinping, is an important
personality to underline whose foreign policy approach drastically changed the scope and
spectrum of this bilateral relation. As 79% of Chinese FDI in the Balkans went to Serbia
which made the country the primary recipient in the region.21 Xi Jinping stressed China’s
ambitions were nothing but merely promoting reciprocal development and people-to-
people connections.22 Through increasingly outward-looking China with Xi Jinping’s
policies, Serbia also started to enlarge its cooperation on the economy to fields like culture,
politics, and even on security. With this augmented attention Serbia also take an ambitious
position within the Initiative. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Serbia underlined that BRI
helps Serbia to became a crossroad in the Balkans between Central and Northern Europe
with its geostrategic location.23
This research will refer to the current economic, cultural, and political relations of
Serbia and China in the last part of the article. As we can see Chinese economic
development and non-interventionist political approach become more and more attractive
to Belgrade. Former Foreign Minister Dacic said ‘working with China increasingly become
the best option for Serbian foreign policy.’24 And this condition generates dissimilar
perspectives within the EU and Serbia over Serbia’s EU membership and intentions of
China.
4) Brussels’s Serbia: A Reluctant Candidate
While Serbia started its EU membership process in 2009, its candidate status was
granted by the European Council in 2012. Even these developments, Serbia’s
21 Rrustemi, A., Wijk, R. d., Dunlop, C., Perovska, J., & Palushi, L. (2019). Geopolitical Influences of
External Powers in the Western Balkans. Hague: The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, p. 96.
22 Dimitrijević, D. (2017). Chinese Investments in Serbia—A Joint Pledge for the Future of the New
Silk Road. Baltic Journal of European Studies Vol. 7, No. 1 (22), p. 66.
23 MFA. (2018, December 3). “Belt and Road” contributes to global connectivity and economic
development of all participating countries. Retrieved from Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Serbia:
http://mfa.gov.rs/en/component/content/article/18423-belt-and-road-contributes-to-global-
connectivity-and-economic-development-of-all-participating-countries
24 Xinhua. (2019, April 19). EU should acknowledge benefits of China-CEEC cooperation: Serbian FM.
Retrieved from Xinhua: http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-04/19/c_137991595.htm
8
Europeanization process and European identity were harshly criticized and suspected by
European actors. Serbia’s engagements in Bosnia and Kosovo shocked Brussels after the
reality of the presence of war in the European neighborhood. From now on, European
Union’s view on nationalism in the Balkans and also its ‘enlargement fatigue’ defined by
Nina Markovic Khaze had a crucial consequence on shaping Chinese perception in Serbia
and also Serbia’s intentions.25
As the EU put the resolution of territorial and political problems between
candidate states as one of the pre-requisite for full membership. In 2013, the EU initiated
and mediated political negotiations among Kosovo and Serbia for complete resolution of
the almost two-decade-long crisis.26 However, talks stalled after regional characteristics
like nationalism and historical enmities take their effects. In 2019 after six years of talks
EU’s report on Serbia indicated that the country should have to take a more conclusive
stance in talks.27 But later debates of the old memories of non-intervention and new school
regionalization continue to engage in contradictory tradeoffs.
In terms of political developments and Serbia’s Europeanization process EU also
takes a hesitant position. Again 2019 report indicated Belgrade’s puny handling of the
democratization process and fight against corruption. 28 Historical perceptions over
authoritarian and ethnically belligerent Yugoslav state machinery make Serbia’s current
developments as troublesome in terms of the membership process. As again report
underlines, in parliament, opposition parties remain ineffective in initiating drafts
furthermore in 2019 when many opposition parties formed Alliance for Serbia, and started
to boycott parliamentary sessions and even elections.29 In such an environment increased
political cooperation with Xi Jinping’s China increased the suspicions in the EU. In 2018,
Chinese Huawei and Serbian officials signed a memorandum for making Belgrade a ‘smart
25 Khaze, N. M. (2018). European Union’s enlargement fatigue: Russia’s and China’s rise in Southeast
Europe? Australian and New Zealand Journal of European Studies Vol. 10 (1), p. 51.
26 Bieber, F. (2015). The Serbia-Kosovo Agreements: An EU Success Story? Review of Central and East
European Law 40, p. 289.
27 European Commission. (2019). Serbia 2019 Report. Brussels: European Commission. p. 3
28 European Commission. (2019). Serbia 2019 Report. Brussels: European Commission. p. 3
29 European Commission. (2019). Serbia 2019 Report. Brussels: European Commission. p. 7
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city’ with a data center and surveillance cameras based on facial recognition technology.30
This development crafts a reaction from European human rights groups who perceive such
kind of change as an old school authoritarian practice.
After the shock of the 2008 Financial Crisis, the EU takes a concrete stance on
candidate countries’ fiscal and budgetary policies. EU wanted Serbia to solve the problem
of the privatization of state-owned companies which is a legacy of the socialist system. As
again 2019 report on Serbia criticized the country’s willingness to realize economic
reforms.31 China’s intensified economic cooperation targets these state-owned enterprises,
creates a new crisis on the horizon. Brussels increasingly perceives Chinese financial loans
and FDIs as a burden on the Serbian economy while also a breach of common regulations
of European trade and fiscal policy.32 Not only in terms of increasing political cooperation
also an economic partnership between Serbia and China is doubted as problematic.
The shock of Brexit twisted a new negative trend in the European enlargement since
the process was stalled. In November 2014, President of EU Commission Jean Claude-
Juncker publicized there will be ‘no new enlargements for next five years for furthering
inward economic progress within the Union.33 This decision creates a huge disappointment
in Serbia as we will see in the next part. Such kind of conclusion created a sense of
‘ambiguity in European enlargement process where talks are occurring but accessions are
none’.34 For managing the divergences that could emerge due to China’s 17+1 Initiative,
the EU, formed the EU-China Collectivity Platform in 2015 while also introduced a new
8.9 billion€ pre-accession aid.35 However, non-consensus of the European Union members
like Germany and Italy over China’s European intentions and also rifts of attitudes between
Germany and France on the fate of the EU enlargement make Brussels to act sluggishly
30 The Diplomat. (2020, September 23). In Serbia, China’s Digital Silk Road Might Be in Trouble Very
Soon. Retrieved from The Diplomat: https://thediplomat.com/2020/09/in-serbia-chinas-digital-silk-
road-might-be-in-trouble-very-soon/
31 European Commission. (2019). Serbia 2019 Report. Brussels: European Commission. p. 75
32 Vučić, M. (2020). European Union integration and the Belt and Road Initiative: A Curious case of
Serbia. MP 2, Vol. LXXII, No. 2, p. 341.
33 Khaze, N. M. (2018). European Union’s enlargement fatigue: Russia’s and China’s rise in Southeast
Europe? Australian and New Zealand Journal of European Studies Vol. 10 (1), p. 53.
34 Khaze, N. M. (2018). European Union’s enlargement fatigue: Russia’s and China’s rise in Southeast
Europe? Australian and New Zealand Journal of European Studies Vol. 10 (1), p. 53
35 European Parliament. (2018). China, the 16+1 format and the EU. Brussels: EPRS European
Parliamentary Research Service, p. 8.
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when it compared to Serbian officials engagement with China. The latest veto of France to
start accession talks with North Macedonia and Albania amplified the extent of the
frustration of Balkan states towards the EU’s actual intentions over the Balkans.
As the EU increasingly becoming suspicious over China’s position within the
Balkan region and especially within Serbia, partners across the Atlantic in Washington DC
have more grave and concrete hesitancy over the Sino-Serbian relations. CSIS claimed in
its report that a special relationship between Chinese state-owned-enterprises or SOE’s and
Serbian state officials and SOEs could lead to a ‘patron-client’ relationship where China
emerges as standard and agenda-setter patron in the politics of Serbia.36 Even Serbia’s
relationship with China constantly increases such kind of extraordinary relationship is still
far from the pledge. But this report was so important that this revealed and voice-over the
concerns in the West which even led the Chinese state-owned CGTN news network to
reply these allegations. While CGTN disapproved the report as ‘ideological and
unproductive’ and called it as a double-standard who then reminded 21 million$ worth of
the US assistance to Serbia in 2019.37 However, in 2020, CSIS published a novel report
prepared by the same authors, that blamed both the Serbian state and China for dividing
the EU and defined Serbia as a hub for China to create a strategic footpath to reach within
the European continent.38
These opinions both from the US and the EU show us that even there is no strident
change in China’s intention and over the China’s rhetoric in the region based on ‘non-
intervention’, the West increasingly take a critical stance on China’s position while also to
Serbia’s position as a ‘reluctant candidate’. This comes from the historical suspicion of the
US to Belgrade in Kosovo War, while in terms of the EU, dynamics changed both by the
perception of Serbian identity and also due to its own organizational limits that constrain
further enlargement process of the Union. The subsequent part will change the story vice-
versa which will focus on Serbian position and perception of European and Chinese
36 Conley, H. A., Hillman, J. E., McCalpin, M., & Ruy, D. (2020). Becoming a Chinese Client State: The Case
of Serbia. Washington DC: CSIS, p. 7.
37 CGTN. (2020, September 28). CSIS report on China's investment in Serbia ideological and
unproductive. Retrieved from CGTN: https://news.cgtn.com/news/2020-09-28/CSIS-report-on-
China-s-investment-in-Serbia-is-unproductive--U9cQcktzUc/index.html
38 Conley, H. A., Hillman, J. E., Ruy, D., & McCalpin, M. (2020). China's "Hub-and-Spoke" Strategy in the
Balkans. Washington DC: CSIS, p. 5.
11
identity within the region.
5) Serbia’s Brussels: A Reluctant Partner
After the Kosovo Intervention and Otpor! Protests Serbian public and official view
entered turbulent times. As this paper mentioned earlier, Serbia’s interests in
regionalization or Europeanization and non-intervention have some knotty trade-offs.
While Serbian public opinion takes ‘we will not forget, we will not forgive’ as a principle
with relations with the West after the Kosovo Intervention, President Alexander Vučić
takes ‘ready to forgive but we will never forget’.39 Dissolution of Yugoslavia and Russia’s
inability to help Milosevic created a long term frustration. After outrageous isolation in
1999, Serbia attempted to maintain its relations with new partners like the EU, the US, and
China while also protecting its relations with Russia.
Belief in Serbian public opinion mostly focuses on European integration combined
with military neutrality which means a friendly relationship with Russia while being
distanced from NATO.40 This show us that historical memories still drive Serbian foreign
policy. Most of the Serbian population still does not ready for a tradeoff over Serbia’s
claims in Kosovo in exchange for EU membership.41 While most Serbian politicians see
EU membership from the pragmatic lenses, Brussels’s over-emphasize of Europeanization
criteria rather than solidly economic ones make the process harder than ever. It is highly
important to underline that in a survey majority of respondents see Serbia’s EU
membership as ‘impossible’.42 As these studies shows Serbia’s perception over the EU
experience some pitfalls in recent years, the same public’s opinion over China shows an
entirely different trend.
In the 19th and early 20th Century, Serbia sees Russia as the only brotherly nation
who could aid them in terms of strengthening the country’s international position. While
Tito’s isolationist policies generated a distanced Yugoslavia succeeding Milosevic’s
Yugoslavia even alienated Serbia from the international system further. China who is a
39 Ponomareva, E. G. (2020). Quo Vadis, Serbia? A Multi-Vector Policy as a Way to Retain Political
Agency. RUSSIA IN GLOBAL AFFAIRS VOL. 18, No.1, p. 159.
40 Popovic, M. (2017). Serbia and Major Powers: Public Opinion on EU and Russian Influence. Belgrade:
Belgrade Centre for Security Policy, p. 25.
41 Ponomareva, E. G. (2020). Quo Vadis, Serbia? A Multi-Vector Policy as a Way to Retain Political
Agency. RUSSIA IN GLOBAL AFFAIRS VOL. 18, No.1, p. 166.
42 Popovic, M. (2017). Serbia and Major Powers: Public Opinion on EU and Russian Influence. Belgrade:
Belgrade Centre for Security Policy, p. 21.
12
latecomer to the Balkans region attained a huge public courtesy from Serbia and even it
endorsed to the status of ‘brotherly partner’ which is a historic privilege of Russia for
centuries.
It is just only a decade that China’s CEEC Initiative or 17+1 started in the region.
But almost 79% percent of Serbian youth heard the 17+1 Initiative while 86% heard the
BRI which is a highly important sign of a effective public relations campaign for China.43
Not only in terms of fame in terms of economic benefits and geopolitical significance BRI
and CEEC Initiative achieved a vast success. All responders said that BRI has great
importance for Serbia while also for the CEEC 92% answered in favor.44 Almost the same
opinions could also be given for China and its initiatives’ importance in global politics.45
This shows that not only in national terms, Serbian opinion in terms of Beijing’s global
position is also highly supportive.
Rather than political support, however, Serbian people see China as its greatest
economic partner. But also the political and cultural significance of the relations were
cumulative. Serbian people have positive opinions regarding the preservation and creation
of jobs, cheap products, infrastructure development, and social development.46 It is also
highly important to note that while most of the Serbian youth supported the EU
membership, spontaneously they are also one of the biggest groups who support further
cooperation with China for national security purposes.47 Again dissimilar from European
assistance which based on making political and economic reforms for EU membership
adjustments, Chinese investments were exceedingly visible and attractive to Serbian
people. Many of young Serbian people see China’s Pupin Bridge and Kostelac Coal Plant
as the utmost visible and usable investment made in the country.48
43 Petrović, J. (2018). Attitudes and knowledge of young people in Serbia toward People Republic of
China’s development. Budapest: China-CEE Institute, p. 6.
44 Petrović, J. (2018). Attitudes and knowledge of young people in Serbia toward People Republic of
China’s development. Budapest: China-CEE Institute, p. 6.
45 ‘More than %80 of Serbian population thinks CEE and BRI has great importance for the world.’
Petrović, J. (2018). Attitudes and knowledge of young people in Serbia toward People Republic of
China’s development. Budapest: China-CEE Institute, p 6.
46 Ponomareva, E. G. (2020). Quo Vadis, Serbia? A Multi-Vector Policy as a Way to Retain Political
Agency. RUSSIA IN GLOBAL AFFAIRS VOL. 18, No.1, p. 175.
47 Petrović, J. (2018). Attitudes and knowledge of young people in Serbia toward People Republic of
China’s development. Budapest: China-CEE Institute p. 16.
48 Petrović, J. (2018). Attitudes and knowledge of young people in Serbia toward People Republic of
China’s development. Budapest: China-CEE Institute p. 8 and p. 15.
13
The last part will show how the Serbian view on the EU and China while also
Brussels’s view on Serbia and China affects the current dynamics and image of China in
the Balkans. For understanding, this research will focus on Serbian and European points of
view over nationalism in Serbia, economic and political cooperation with China and lastly
over the response to the Covid-19 which is the latest rift between Belgrade and Brussels.
While positive public opinion arises about China, and its activities, Belgrade’s cooperation
with Beijing also becomes deeper and solid in contrast to its commitment to European
Union membership.
6) ‘China is What Europe Makes of It’: Current Dynamics in Sino-Serbian-
EU Relations
Prominent Social Constructivist scholar Alexander Wendt argues in his article
‘Anarchy is What States Make of It’ that the basis of anarchy emanates from national
interests which derive from ‘identities’ of respective states.49 Even China barely changed
its position regarding its relationship with Serbia. Perceptions of Serbia and the European
Union towards each other and also towards China see drastic changes. This part will show
how nationalist, economic, and political identities of the EU and Serbia change the
perception of China and its impacts on EU membership.
49 Wendt, A. E. (1992). Anarchy is States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics.
International Organization Vol. 46, No: 2, p. 396.
14
Figure 1: Mirror Effect of Alexander Wendt and its implication to Sino-EU-Serbia
Relations.
Wendt argues that identities are ‘inherently relational’ based on socially self-
construction of ‘us’ and ‘other’.50 As the EU increasingly became inward-looking while
Serbia sees Brussels as reluctant to accept them as a member, which reaffirms the historical
understandings of self and other conceptualization among two parties. This could be seen
as an example of ‘mirror effect’ of a predatory power as Wendt argued which could also
mean ‘China is What Europe and Serbia Make of It’.51 Even Belgrade sees China as a
beneficial partner, the European Union and West increasingly see China as a ‘predatory’
power. In terms of intersubjective analysis, both European and Serbian expectations craft
a manipulated and provisional perception and identity of China over the EU enlargement.
It is not the changing attitude of Beijing but rather the changing mirror effect between
Brussels and Belgrade.
a) Nationalism
Historical and regional characteristics in the Balkans region made nationalism an
imperative factor to consider. While the success story of the EU enlargement to abolish
war from their relations in post-war Europe convinced technocrats over the peaceful
50 Wendt, A. E. (1992). Anarchy is States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics.
International Organization Vol. 46, No: 2, p. 397.
51 Wendt, A. E. (1992). Anarchy is States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics.
International Organization Vol. 46, No: 2, p. 408.
15
environment in the continent, the dissolution of Yugoslavia become a shock with its
following conflicts. Even these conflicts reminded the EU over historical belief in
‘savagery’ Europe where ethno nationalism combined with war crimes, they also created a
new opportunity to feast European idealism to this historically challenging region.
While the European Union failed to act immediately in 1999 for stopping the
conflict after this it takes an key role to mediate them. As Serbia started its European
membership in 2009, Brussels requested Belgrade to overcome the Kosovo issue for the
sake of European integration. Even in 2017, Serbian President Alexander Vucic underlined
the importance of the Serbian nation to ‘stop hiding its head in the sand’.52 As these words
signified a turning point for Serbia’s Europeanization process; the country’s long
experience of nationalism and reactions to NATO interventionism persisted to create
obstacles over the issue. Despite these words, President, Ministers, and even the public
continued to echoing ‘Kosovo je Srbija’ (Kosovo is Serbia) and its determination to not
‘recognize and acknowledge Kosovo’.53
In terms of the Chinese view, Beijing and Serbia share the identical fears after NATO’s
intervention. As China has a concern over Taiwan, its support to non-intervention and
territorial integrity of Serbia creates sense. In 2014, China expressed its support to Serbia’s
sovereignty and territorial integrity including Kosovo and in return, Belgrade expressed its
support to the ‘One China’ principle.54 Both Serbian officials and the public see China as
an actor who never endangered Serbian security and who don’t have any unsettled issues
and requirements.55 EU’s failure to further and determine the road map to enlargement
push Serbia not to sacrifice considerably to solve the Kosovo issue while also have
economically profitable relations with China.
b) Economy
Another dimension that affects Serbia’s EU membership is Belgrade’s will to make
52 Mirel, P. (2018). The Western Balkans: between stabilisation and integration in the European
Union. European Issues n: 459, p. 10.
53 Mirel, P. (2018). The Western Balkans: between stabilisation and integration in the European
Union. European Issues n: 459, p. 10.
54 MFA. (2014, November 14). China supports Serbia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Retrieved
from Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Serbia: http://mfa.gov.rs/en/component/content/article/13686-
china-supports-serbias-sovereignty-and-territorial-integrity
55 Stojadinović, M., & Talović, V. R. (2018). SERBIA AND CHINA: THE GEOPOLITICAL AND ECONOMIC
IMPORTANCE OF MUTUAL COOPERATION FOR SERBIA. Budapest: China-CEE Institute, p. 5.
16
and commit to Brussels’s standardization rules. China undertakes important infrastructural
projects like Pupin Bridge, Belgrade-South Adriatic Motorway (via Montenegro to Serbia),
Budapest-Belgrade-Piraeus Railway projects which are ambitious in terms of making
Serbia a transportation and logistics hub.56 Even these projects create prospects in terms of
infrastructural development; Brussels has vast hesitations over the future of Serbia’s fiscal
and debt policy. Belgrade’s Government Debt exposed a nearly 50% increase in June 2020
when it compared to 2008.57
In 2020, Serbia started to operate the Kostolac Thermal Plant built by the Chinese Exim
Bank with a loan of 608 million$.58 Plant which uses lignite type coal in electricity
production made a significant environmental impact on the Danube River zone. While the
EU increasingly committed much to its zero-carbon targets, Chinese assistance for fossil
fuel plants (especially coal) in the region increasingly become an obstacle to membership.59
As this research stressed earlier European Union’s goal is to push Belgrade to make
reforms in state-owned enterprises. However, in 2012, after the retaking of the Smederovo
Steel Plant by the Serbian state and Chinese Hesteel Steel Company it becomes another
flashpoint between the EU and Serbia. In 2017, the European Commission started
surveillancing for dumping steel prices but it abstained from listing Serbia to anti-dumping
list as it increasingly receipts reactions of the Serbian public as an attempt to detriment
Sino Serbian cooperation.60
c) Politics
Since the rise of Xi Jinping to power in China, Beijing’s involvement in Serbian politics
and social life also increased. As China’s Serbian policy centered on non-intervention to
domestic politics, Serbia increasingly sees China as a global power in terms of politics. In
56 Obradović, Ž. (2018). “One Belt and Road” in the Balkans and in Serbia (cooperation challenges).
The New Silk Road: European Perspectives: Security Challenges/Risks Within the Initiative 16+1, 11, p.
196.
57 CEIC. (2020, November 17). What was Serbia's Government Debt: % of GDP in Jun 2020? Retrieved
from CEIC: https://www.ceicdata.com/en/indicator/serbia/government-debt--of-nominal-gdp
58 Sokołowski, M. (2018). New Silk Road on the Balkans. Case of Macedonia and Serbia. Polish Journal
of Political Science, vol. 4, no. 2, p. 39.
59 Matsumoto, M. N. (2019, August,). Convergent and Divergent Issues of China's Belt and Road
Initiative in European Politics. Retrieved from Academia.edu:
https://www.academia.edu/40340409/Convergent_and_Divergent_Issues_of_Chinas_Belt_and_Road
_Initiative_in_European_Politics, p. 23.
60 Jojić, S. (2017). How Serbia perceives “The Belt and the Road” Initiative and 16+1 Cooperation.
Budapest: China-CEE Institute, p. 4.
17
2016, Serbia abolished visas with China while in 2019 they signed co-police patrols for
helping the influx of Chinese tourists to Serbia.
Chinese Xinhua and Serbian Tanjung News Agency signed joint symposiums on the
bilateral relationship.61 China opened two Confucius Institutes in Serbian universities to
teach the Chinese language and traditions.62 As mentioned prior, Serbia signed a deal to
make Belgrade a ‘safe city’ based on surveillance which was criticized by the West due to
democratic concerns. While Serbian opposition furthered these claims even into an
autocratic move by President Vucic to guarantee his position in power.63 A deal has a great
risk to fuel historical suspicions on Serbia’s Europeanization process.
In 2016, China and Serbia also inked a strategic partnership agreement which led
deepening of political relations even further. In July 2020, Serbia takes the delivery of six
Chinese-built CH-92A combat drones (UCAVs) which produced a high concern both in
EU and NATO which could be accepted as a milestone for Sino-Serbian political
cooperation.64 It’s clear that despite refraining from intervening in Serbian politics, Sino-
Serbian Cooperation creates high-anxieties in a period where the EU’s pledge to
enlargement curtails much.
d) Covid-19
In December 2019, an epidemic named COVID-19 started in the Chinese city of Wuhan
in Hubei province. Epidemic speedily turned into a global pandemic which also affected
Serbia with 92.375 cases with 1054 deaths. As the Western world including the US and the
EU take a critical stance over China, Serbian President Vucic criticized the lack of the EU’s
support to Serbia. In March 2020, China send six important epidemiologists and necessary
medical aid to the country, a tabloid close to Belgrade shared a simple message of ‘Thank
you, brother Xi.’65
In the following October, Serbia’s President Vucic again promoted China as a ‘brotherly
61 Tonchev, P. (2020). China’s Soft Power in Southeast Europe. Sarajevo: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, p. 15.
62 Tonchev, P. (2020). China’s Soft Power in Southeast Europe. Sarajevo: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, p. 8.
63 Rrustemi, A., Wijk, R. d., Dunlop, C., Perovska, J., & Palushi, L. (2019). Geopolitical Influences of
External Powers in the Western Balkans. Hague: The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, p. 105.
64 Forbes. (2020, July 9). Missile-Armed Chinese Drones Arrive In Europe As Serbia Seeks Airpower
Edge. Retrieved from Forbes: https://www.forbes.com/sites/sebastienroblin/2020/07/09/missile-
armed-chinese-drones-arrive-in-europe-for-serbian-military/?sh=2cbb3ed979d2
65 Šantić, D., & Antić, M. (2020). Serbia in the time of COVID-19: between “corona diplomacy”, tough
measures and migration management. Eurasian Geography and Economics, p. 3.
18
friend’ which is a privilege of Russia. Even Serbia decided to buy the German-US vaccine
of Pfizer and BioNTech, it will also want to balance this with negotiating to safe anti-body
vaccines from Russia and China.66 While it tries to protect its delicate balance, Belgrade
criticized the EU’s inability to take action. EU responded to Vucic’s claims by underlining
their aid to Serbia in Covid-19 times topped to 3,6 billion€ that includes 93 million€
immediate support and following 455 million€ grants to the private sector.67
These four issues are the significant ones where the European Union and Serbia
differed in their view of each other. So their prevailing effects will have crucial impact on
the development of Chinese identity within the Europe. Contemporary crisis of COVID-
19 showed this kind of process of identity development between the Brussels and Belgrade
which effect Chinese position within the region and unavoidably Serbia’s EU integration
process.
7) Conclusion
This research paper tried to analyze Sino-Serbian-Trilateral relations from the
perspective of identity and perceptions from an intersubjective lens. Even since 2009,
Serbia committed to becoming an EU member state, its cordial relations with China always
appeared as problematic by the Western world. Even in earlier 1999, Yugoslavia’s relations
with Beijing become a great concern in the eyes of the West. Since 2013, with Xi Jinping
arise in power, China’s penetration and openness in world politics increasingly become
visible. This visibility also came to effect in the Balkan region and especially over Serbia
who is looking for new allies to overcome the shocks of the 1990s.
Even the European Union eyed a closer relationship and wider integration in the
Balkan Peninsula its overemphasis on Europeanization rather than just economic
integration create suspected views over the Balkan region. Historical struggles of Serbia
with Bosnia, Croatia, and Kosovo with Belgrade’s hesitancy to undertake economic
reforms formed huge frustration in the eyes of Brussels. After the 2008 Financial Crisis
66 SeeNews. (2020, October 26). Serbia to get 350,000 COVID-19 vaccines by March 2021 - Vucic.
Retrieved from SeeNews: https://seenews.com/news/serbia-to-get-350000-covid-19-vaccines-by-
march-2021-vucic-718449
67 Ruge, M., & Popescu, N. (2020, June 4). Serbia and coronavirus propaganda: High time for a
transactional EU. Retrieved from European Council of Foreign Relations:
https://ecfr.eu/article/commentary_serbia_and_coronavirus_propaganda_high_time_for_a_transactio
nal/
19
and in 2016, with the shock of Brexit, the European Union’s inward focus and open-ended
delays of furthering integration created the same frustrations in the eyes of Serbia.
While Serbian Government re-expresses its will to commit to EU membership,
public opinion increasingly becomes groom as the accession process stall. As the historical
perception of Serbian people is based on ‘to not forgive and to not forget’, China with its
non-interventionist and non-compelling partnership program created an increasing
sympathy within the Serbian population.
This process ended with contradictory and open-ended divergence points over
nationalism, economy, politics, and recently over the Covid-19 pandemic. Even the
Chinese position towards Serbian politics based on ‘non-interference’ remained untouched,
its perception and identity increasingly become an obstacle for Serbia’s EU membership.
EU’s slower reaction to Chinese investments due to interior disagreements and Serbia’s
desire to fast and deep cooperation makes China a ‘threat’ to the Europeanization of Serbia.
Which becomes an evidence for saying ‘China is what regional states of making it’.
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