No full-text available
To read the full-text of this research,
you can request a copy directly from the author.
Why Are Older People More Likely to Vote? The Impact of Ageing on Electoral Turnout in Europe
Abstract
This article analyses the reasons for higher voting participation among older people in Europe. Over their lifetimes, citizens tend to habituate voting and comply with a growing subjective norm of voting. Furthermore, the average voting participation of older people is influenced by their longer duration of residence, the lack of a mobilising partner, worse physical health and less education, although life experience replaces the function of formal education over a lifetime. Most of these factors are founded on the very nature of human behaviour and the social context of our life course. Thus, they arguably stand outside of the political process and will remain stable into the future.
... The reasons why older people vote at higher rates than younger people may be related strictly to age: by virtue of having spent more of their lives at or above the voting age, older people may be more strongly habituated to voting (Goerres, 2007). However, high voting rates among older adults may also be a result of period or cohort effects: today's older people have a stronger normative attachment to voting because of their political socialization in the immediate post-war period (Goerres, 2007), while post-Baby Boom generations vote at lower rates than earlier cohorts (Bhatti & Hansen, 2012, 271). ...
... The reasons why older people vote at higher rates than younger people may be related strictly to age: by virtue of having spent more of their lives at or above the voting age, older people may be more strongly habituated to voting (Goerres, 2007). However, high voting rates among older adults may also be a result of period or cohort effects: today's older people have a stronger normative attachment to voting because of their political socialization in the immediate post-war period (Goerres, 2007), while post-Baby Boom generations vote at lower rates than earlier cohorts (Bhatti & Hansen, 2012, 271). If very high voting rates are unique to people socialized in the immediate post-war period, differences in turnout rates between age groups may well decline in future elections. ...
... In general, this work suggests that insiders tend to have more structural power than outsiders. Both because of their links to traditional left parties and unions (Thelen, 2014), long-standing mobilization as 'policy takers' (Pierson, 1996) and higher propensity to vote (Goerres, 2007), the policy process is more likely to respond to the demands of these groups. The result then, is a relative under-investment in youth-based policies, and many of the pre-requisites to healthy ageing. ...
Background
Given that there is not much evidence that ageing imperils the finance and provision of health care, why do so many policymakers act like it does?
Methods
We break conventional wisdom down into myths and realities, identifying the evidence against them.
Results
A first myth is that ageing produces unsustainable health care costs, which in turn, creates intergenerational conflict over public policy. A second myth is that older people behave as a single group, always pursuing policies that benefit themselves. The final myth is that decisions about policy are made by politicians who pander to that elderly block. The first reality is that most of the problems ascribed to inequality between generations (intergenerational equity) are actually problems of inequality within society as a whole that span across age groups (intragenerational equity). The second reality is that policies that address these broader inequalities are built on the life-course perspective, which focuses on identifying the policies which can make people happier and healthier at all ages by drawing on the context and circumstances under which aging occurs. The third reality is that it is possible to construct coalitions of politicians and interests that can develop and support sophisticated life-course policies that lessen the burdens of ageing and health on everybody.
Conclusions
Intergenerational inequality is not, and need not be, a significant problem for rich countries. It is substantially a product of current and past intragenerational inequality, and in fact inequality between generations often goes with inequality within generations. Intergenerational conflict is a distraction from policies that promote greater equality within and between generations, and talk of an ageing crisis is frequently just another version of longstanding arguments against public social investment from cradle to grave.
... The reasons why older people vote at higher rates than younger people may be related strictly to age: by virtue of having spent more of their lives at or above the voting age, older people may be more strongly habituated to voting (Goerres, 2007). However, high voting rates among older adults may also be a result of period or cohort effects: today's older people have a stronger normative attachment to voting because of their political socialization in the immediate post-war period (Goerres, 2007), while post-Baby Boom generations vote at lower rates than earlier cohorts (Bhatti & Hansen, 2012, 271). ...
... The reasons why older people vote at higher rates than younger people may be related strictly to age: by virtue of having spent more of their lives at or above the voting age, older people may be more strongly habituated to voting (Goerres, 2007). However, high voting rates among older adults may also be a result of period or cohort effects: today's older people have a stronger normative attachment to voting because of their political socialization in the immediate post-war period (Goerres, 2007), while post-Baby Boom generations vote at lower rates than earlier cohorts (Bhatti & Hansen, 2012, 271). If very high voting rates are unique to people socialized in the immediate post-war period, differences in turnout rates between age groups may well decline in future elections. ...
... In general, this work suggests that insiders tend to have more structural power than outsiders. Both because of their links to traditional left parties and unions (Thelen, 2014), long-standing mobilization as 'policy takers' (Pierson, 1996) and higher propensity to vote (Goerres, 2007), the policy process is more likely to respond to the demands of these groups. The result then, is a relative under-investment in youth-based policies, and many of the pre-requisites to healthy ageing. ...
One major implication of the previous two chapters is that the politics of ageing is actually the politics of inequality – not a chimera of intergenerational inequality, but rather the inequalities that scholars of politics, social policy and health have long studied and understood (Lynch, 2020). As chapter two showed, one of the problematic assumptions of the ‘ageing crisis’ narrative is precisely the belief that older populations are homogeneous in their experience and outlook. This ignores the significant health inequalities which exist amongst older populations and overlooks the degree to which the costs of an ageing population are actually rooted in these inequalities. Without this framing, debates about intergenerational inequalities and the ‘ageing crisis’ are a distraction from both the deep social inequalities that exist in terms of gender, geography, race and ethnicity, socioeconomic status and the ways in which these social inequalities produce inequities in health. Intentional or not, to focus on intergenerational inequalities diverts attention from the real inequalities that shape people’s lives and the politics of ageing and health.
... International research on turnouts has repeatedly shown the inversely u-shaped association between age and turnout: the youngest and the oldest members of societies vote less often compared to the middle-aged. Given that the age differences in turnout are comparatively constant over time and place, this effect is somehow related to individual age and less likely attributable to cohort effects (Dassonneville, 2017;Goerres, 2007;Melo & Stockemer, 2014). There is evidence that ill health contributes to low turnout among the oldest-old (Gehring & Wagner, 1999;Mattila et al., 2013). ...
... Building on these more general models, specific explanations have been invoked to explain age differences in turnout and also different voting behaviours among older adults (Becker, 2002;Dassonneville, 2017;Goerres, 2007Goerres, , 2010. These explanations can be broadly grouped into four different categories: explanations that consider the (1) health status, (2) the social embeddedness, (3) the habituation, or (4) the socioeconomic resources of older adults. ...
... (2) Social embeddedness: Social embeddedness through partnerships, friendships, or other social relations and activities also increases the likelihood of voting (Goerres, 2007;Smets & van Ham, 2013) and undergoes changes when people reach old age (Gagné et al., 2020;Nie et al., 1974). Examples are retirement, institutional living, and the deaths of friends or partners that can change an individuals' social relations and social embeddedness. ...
Background If voter turnout reflects social or health inequalities, then these inequalities can reduce equal political representation. Research suggests that poor health impedes voting and contributes to low turnout, especially among the oldest-old (80 years and older). Therefore, we examine the determinants of voting behaviour in more detail, with a special focus on the role of health status among the oldest-old. Methods The analysis was based on a population-based sample of older adults living in Germany’s largest federal state, North Rhine-Westphalia (n = 1826). The outcome was participation in the last federal election. As determinants, we included subjective, functional, mental, and cognitive health; mobility; institutional living; education; social embeddedness; party attachment; habituation; and conformist attitudes. We used logistic regression models to calculate odds ratios and 95% confidence intervals. Results The overall turnout rate was 84.6% (95%-CI:82.9–86.3), which shows that most of the oldest-old participate in elections. Results from logistic regressions revealed that lower formal education and limitations in functional, cognitive, and mental health were associated with lower odds of voting; while habituation, party attachment, and partnership were associated with higher odds of voting. Conclusion Most of the oldest-old in Germany participate in elections. Still, our results hint at the existence of important inequalities in turnout rates. Given that older adults constitute an increasing share of the electorate, and that those who are less likely to vote are often among those most directly affected by political decisions, all individuals who are willing and able to participate in elections should be given the necessary support to actually do so.
... Los estudios sobre participación electoral consideran la edad como una de las variables explicativas más significativas (Blais, 2008, Goerres, 2007. La afirmación de que "los jóvenes votan menos" es generalizada para todas las democracias occidentales (Blais, 2008, Blais & Rubenson, 2013, Blais & Loewen, 2011, Goerres, 2007, Wass, 2007, Lyons & Alexander, 2000. ...
... Los estudios sobre participación electoral consideran la edad como una de las variables explicativas más significativas (Blais, 2008, Goerres, 2007. La afirmación de que "los jóvenes votan menos" es generalizada para todas las democracias occidentales (Blais, 2008, Blais & Rubenson, 2013, Blais & Loewen, 2011, Goerres, 2007, Wass, 2007, Lyons & Alexander, 2000. Esto puede explicarse por lo que Franklin (2004) llamó el young initiation (iniciación política de la gente joven), refiriéndose a que los jóvenes y las jóvenes adquieren el derecho a votar en un momento donde tienen otros intereses, tales como entrar a la universidad, comenzar a trabajar, participar en otro tipo de actividades, o simplemente tienen otras prioridades. ...
(analítico): Según sus promotores, la adopción del voto voluntario en Chile produciría un aumento en la participación electoral y un mayor involucramiento de los jóvenes en política. Sin embargo, los resultados de las últimas elecciones presidenciales mostraron todo lo contrario. La participación se redujo a niveles históricos y los jóvenes siguen siendo el grupo con menor predisposición a votar. En un país donde la pobreza ha retrocedido, pero los niveles de desigualdad prácticamente no han variado, la introducción del voto voluntario ha profundizado no sólo el sesgo etario, sino que también el denominado sesgo de clase en el voto. Es decir, que las personas con mayores ingresos votan más que las de menos ingresos. Probamos estas hipótesis con datos individuales de las encuestas de la Universidad Diego Portales (UDP) y con datos electorales desagregados hasta el nivel comunal.
... The coefficient for age is 0.088 (p = 0.002), indicating that older individuals are more likely to engage in formal political activities. This finding is consistent with previous studies suggesting that political participation tends to increase with age due to accumulated political experience and stronger attachments to political institutions (Campbell and Binstock, 2011;Dim and Schafer, 2024;Goerres, 2007). However, the relationship between age and formal political participation is not linear, those aged 70 years and older are more likely to be uninvolved in formal politics, such as voting, because they feel that have less influence on politics (Purdam and Taylor, 2024), or in Tambe and Kopacheva (2024), the relations follow a curved pattern, with younger and older age groups less likely to participate. ...
This study examines political participation in rural areas, emphasizing class configurations shaped by agricultural practices and socio-economic structures. A household survey of 261 respondents was conducted and regression analysis was applied to assess rural class configuration and political participation, using Gowa Regency in South Sulawesi, Indonesia, as the focal area due to its agricultural importance and class complexity. The findings identify six class configurations—Fully-Proletariat-Farmer, Proletariat-Farmer, Semi-Proletariat-Farmer, Petty Commodity Producer, Capitalist-Farmer, and Capitalist-Landlord—based on property ownership, land relations, and employment. The findings demonstrate that landowners and capitalist farmers have greater access to formal political processes, whereas small-scale farmers and landless laborers exhibit lower levels of participation. However, informal participation, such as participation in village meetings, is more prevalent among economically vulnerable groups. Regression analysis reveals that class configuration positively correlates with formal and informal political participation, suggesting that improving socio-economic conditions can enhance civic participation. Education, age, and employment in non-agricultural sectors significantly increase political participation. To strengthen rural political participation, policies should focus on equitable land distribution, expanded political education, inclusive governance, and gender-responsive initiatives. Economic diversification should also be encouraged to reduce dependence on agriculture and increase political participation. Future research should explore long-term class transitions and their implications for democratic participation in rural communities. These efforts can contribute to a more inclusive and participatory rural governance structure.
... To what extent and in which direction does age influence electoral turnout? Classic and contemporary literature on electoral turnout has systematically addressed these questions (Frank & Martínez i Coma, 2023;Goerres, 2007;Niemi et al., 1984;Wolfinger et al., 1990). However, this exercise has not been done to emphasise the non-citizen population, with a few exceptions mentioned above. ...
It is often argued that non-citizens are less interested in the political processes of the host country and, therefore, vote less than citizens. We discuss this using Chile’s administrative electoral census for the 2012–2023 elections. We choose Chile for three reasons. First, it is one of the few countries worldwide that allows non-citizens to vote in local and national elections. Second, Chile requires only five years of permanent residence for non-citizens to vote. Third, Chile implemented a voluntary voting system between 2012 and 2021 and a compulsory voting system in 2022. This latter particularity means that voting is compulsory for non-citizens registered on the electoral roll. How much and how did the electoral participation of citizens and non-citizens change with the introduction of compulsory voting? Four results stand out. First, citizen turnout averaged 44.7% under voluntary voting, while non-citizen turnout averaged 17.1%. Second, with the introduction of compulsory voting, the figures narrowed. Citizens averaged 86.3% and non-citizens 60.0%, tripling their turnout compared to elections organised under voluntary voting. Third, there is a gender gap in voter turnout in favour of women, both among citizens and non-citizens. Fourth, since 2020—when a constitutional referendum was held during the Covid-19 pandemic—there has been a higher turnout of young people in citizen and non-citizen groups. These results are beneficial for assessing the institutions that regulate the right and exercise of the vote for non-citizens, the impact of compulsory voting on electoral participation, and the re-boosting of youth participation.
... Early conceptualizations used the so-called "senior power" (Binstock 2000) or "grey power" (Skocpol 2003) model to explain older people's political activism. Considering the unusually high turnout rates in this sector of the population (Goerres 2007), there was some speculation regarding the emergence of a "grey" or "senior" bloc with common political interests and capacity for affecting policy decisions (Schulz and Binstock 2006). However, it has been argued that a specific age cohort, which by definition is a highly diverse entity, is unlikely to present a homogeneous political consciousness and behavior in later life (Binstock 2006;Goerres 2009). ...
... Ein weiterer Bereich der Mikroebene, der im Zuge der gesamtgesellschaftlichen Alterung von politikwissenschaftlicher Relevanz ist, ist der Zusammenhang zwischen individueller Alterung und dem Wahlverhalten. Von besonderer Bedeutung sind hierbei Studien, welche die Wahlteilnahme als individuelle Gewohnheit verstehen, die mit zunehmendem Lebensalter zunimmt ("voting as a habit"; Goerres 2007;Franklin 2004;Plutzer 2002). Es gilt jedoch zu beachten, dass auch Kohorteneffekte auftreten und sich daher nicht die gesamte, zu einem bestimmten Zeitpunkt beobachtete Differenz zwischen Altersgruppen durch das Alter erklären lässt (Bhatti und Hansen 2012;für Deutschland Konzelmann et al. 2012). ...
Zusammenfassung
Global betrachtet sind die Auswirkungen des demographischen Wandels unübersehbar. Die durch steigende Lebenserwartung und sinkende Geburtenraten ausgelöste Entwicklung ist eine der größten Errungenschaften des 20. Jahrhunderts. Demographische Veränderungen werden grundlegend durch drei Hauptfaktoren ausgelöst: Mortalität, Fertilität und Migration . All diese Faktoren haben Gesellschaften innerhalb des letzten Jahrhunderts stark geprägt. Deutschland als alterndes Land ist hier keine Ausnahme. In den letzten 20 Jahren hat sich ein aktives Forschungsfeld entwickelt, welches die Wechselwirkungen zwischen demographischen und politischen Faktoren untersucht und im Rahmen dieser Literaturübersicht vorgestellt wird. Trotz einer Vielzahl an Veröffentlichungen fehlt es außerhalb der Migrationsforschung an Vernetzung und Austausch, obwohl schnell voranschreitender demographischer Wandel eine der am besten vorhersagbaren zukünftigen Entwicklungen ist. Innerhalb der deutschen Politikwissenschaft werden demographische Faktoren trotz ihres großen Einflusses und der immer stärker zutage tretenden Auswirkungen des demographischen Wandels noch zu selten in Analysen miteinbezogen und ein Austausch mit der Bevölkerungswissenschaft ist selten. Wir plädieren daher für eine stärkere Miteinbeziehung demographischer Prozesse – sowohl in der Forschung als auch in der politikwissenschaftlichen Ausbildung und Lehre.
... Interest in politics is thought to be higher among older people and among men. Several authors claim (Rubenson et al. 2004, Goerres 2007, Dalton 2008) that younger people are more active in using their right to candidate, or alternative forms of political engagement (protests, demonstrations), while older people prefer traditional forms of political participation (right to vote). However, van der Kolk (2003) draws attention to the fact that we see a greater tendency to preferential voting in the age category of 30-50 years old, compared to younger, but also older age groups. ...
Preferential voting is becoming an increasingly popular tool through which voters can prioritize their preferred candidate within the candidate list of a given political party, thereby influencing the intra-party struggle for public office to some extent. Candidate information is known, but which voters tend to use their preferential vote? Are they men or women, younger or older people, voters with lower or higher educational attainment? The presented study aims to evaluate the relationship between preferential voting and selected socio-demographic variables at the level of Slovakia, its regions and districts. We are analysing the results of the 2023 elections to the National Council of the Slovak Republic alongside socio-demographic data from the 2021 census. In order to identify a possible statistical relationship between the investigated variables, the method of linear correlation analysis was applied, using the Pearson correlation coefficient. The results indicate that at the national level, considering data from more than 2,900 municipalities in Slovakia, no relationship between preferential voting and selected socio-demographic characteristics of the population was demonstrated. Certain patterns were observed within spcecific population groups at a lower spatial-hierarchical level (in the case of the Bratislava region and Žilina region, and in selected districts of the Bratislava, Trnava, Žilina and Banská Bystrica regions), but the informative value of several of them is limited by the low number of cases entering the correlation analysis.
... Studies highlight that the behaviour of voters is influenced by several factors. For instance, socio-demographic factors such as educational level (Harder & Krosnick, 2008), age (O'Toole, Lister, Marsh, Su & McDonagh, 2013;Quintelier, 2007;Goerres, 2007) and gender (Anderson, Loewen & McGregor, 2018). Other factors include the social environment and election campaign characteristics. ...
This study ascertained the influence of political party campaign message information search on the behaviour of voters in Ghana. The researchers however conducted this study by applying the perspectives of consumer behaviour to voter behavior with an objective to examine how the behaviour of consumers (voters) is influenced by the search for information on election campaign messages in their decision-making process. The examination used quantitative research to determine the relationship between voting behaviour and political campaign with the cross-sectional survey deployed to collect data from 7203 voters in Accra. These voters were selected through random sampling and the data was collected with questionnaires. The study measured voter (consumer) behaviour from three dimensions namely psychological, social and personal behaviour. The Structural Equation Model (SEM) in Amos was used for the analysis to establish the relationship between the variables. The study revealed that significant positive relationship between campaign message information search and voter psychological behaviour. Likewise, information searches on campaign messages significantly influence voters' social and personal behaviour. The study concluded that the behaviour of voters is influenced by their search for content or details of political campaign messages. The study concludes that there are opportunities for political marketing and change in voter behaviour. Still, sufficient attention should be given to developing and deploying a consumer behaviour model that recognises the challenges and changes with political-marketing campaigning for vote in Ghana Political parties/candidates should make available adequate information on their campaign promises and manifestos to voters to influence their behaviour towards winning their votes. This study has contributed significantly to the knowledge of literature in the field of political marketing. Nonetheless, further studies should be conducted in other jurisdictions other than Ghana to validate the model or test the hypotheses.
... The debate around the value of negative campaigning to gain votes is still very much ongoing (Goerres, 2007). Gerbaudo et al (2019) analysed the Labour and Conservative party Facebook campaigns during the 2017 General Election. ...
Europe Votes offers the most comprehensive look back at how election campaigning has evolved in a democracy (the second largest after India) serving 400 million voters and features twenty experts analysing developments in nine countries from the inaugural election of 1979 to the ninth and most recent one in 2019.
... No, i ovdje među biračima novih stranaka i izbornim apstinentima postoje vidljive razlike. Građani koji izlaze na izbore i glasaju za nove stranke su politički informiraniji, imaju veće povjerenje u institucije i interes za politiku te pozitivniji subjektivni osjećaj vlastite političke efikasnosti od izbornih apstinenata (Karp i Banducci, 2008;Jung, 2017;Grönlund i Setälä, 2007;Cześnik et al., 2013;Goerres, 2007;Zagorski i Santana, 2021;Stanley i Cześnik, 2022). Nadalje, oni su spremniji na druge oblike političke participacije, poput referenduma, te imaju pozitivan odnos prema participativnoj demokraciji. ...
Parlamentarni izbori 2020. godine potvrdili su dotadašnji trend pojave novih stranaka na izborima, sad uzduž cijelog političkog spektra. Koristeći anketne podatke, rad pokušava identificirati izvore izborne podrške novim strankama te utvrditi koliko se nove stranke uklapaju u tradicionalne političke rascjepe. Rad nalazi da se birači novih stranaka razlikuju od birača starih stranaka prije svega po odnosu prema načinu na koji politika funkcionira u Hrvatskoj te da dolaze iz mlađih generacija. Istovremeno, birači novih stranaka ljevice, odnosno desnice u svom su odnosu prema tradicionalnim rascjepima vrlo slični biračima starih stranaka ljevice, odnosno desnice, što ukazuje da su rascjepi temeljeni na odnosu prema povijesti, religiji i tradiciji i dalje dominantni. U drugom koraku analiza uključuje i izborne apstinente te pokazuje da su izborni apstinenti slični biračima novih stranaka u svom odnosu prema politici, ali da se od njih razlikuju po tome što su puno manje uvjereni da mogu utjecati na političke događaje.
... Economically, extensive studies have shown that older people are the wealthiest demographic group and are more likely to own assets and investments (Advani et al., 2021;Gale et al., 2020). Politically, studies have consistently revealed that older adults are more likely to vote and participate in the political process (Goerres, 2007;Quintelier, 2007). ...
Sustainable finance and investment has become an important factor in achieving environmental sustainability. Evidence also suggests it has become more prominent in the global financial system. Although academic interest has increased in recent years, most prior studies have investigated support for sustainable finance within corporate environments. Studies examining the support of individuals, or the wider public, are scarce. Consequently, using a Eurobarometer survey of 27,862 Europeans across all 27 EU countries, this study explores support for sustainable finance among people in Europe. We used a nested fixed effects model – with two levels – to examine the influence of sociodemographic factors, knowledge of sustainable finance, and a country's progress towards attaining the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Our results show that sociodemographic factors are the most influential predictors of support for sustainable finance. We found that age, gender and living in rural/urban areas all influenced people's support for sustainable finance. Meanwhile, the influence of sustainable finance knowledge and SDG progress were either negligible or negative.
... The first line emphasizes that political attitudes tend to be relatively stable during one's life (A. Campbell et al., 1980;Goerres, 2007a;Peterson et al., 2020). In situations where they do change, however, liberals are more likely to become conservatives than vice versa (Peterson et al., 2020). ...
The study’s main aim is to look for relationships between political beliefs and political subjectivity of grey voters (over 65). Political beliefs contain a motivational element, mainly due to being embedded in the values and needs of the respective individuals. This can affect the consciously created place of the citizen within the political system in different directions. The orientation of the study on the grey voters may be cognitively engaging due to the several sources related to historical events that took place in Poland. Political beliefs were conceptualized through dimensions on a left-right scale, where xenophobia and religious fundamentalism were diagnosed in the area of cultural beliefs. In contrast, acceptance of capitalism and anti-welfare were diagnosed in the area of economic beliefs. Political subjectivity was diagnosed using an original tool, whose preliminary analysis made it possible to distinguish three factors of the construct: political initiative, political sense, and identification with the political system.
... Specific demarcation lines of chronological age, such as 18 years of age for reaching legal majority or 65 for pension age, exist in some countries and define an individual's relationship with the state and its public policies. Next to age group experiences, ageing is a longitudinal process at the individual level that often captures life experience or political experience (Goerres 2007). ...
... Political parties can start to treat retired older people as their main voters and prepare program proposals in such a way as to win their votes. An important argument is also the higher level of participation of older people in elections (Goerres, 2007). All this means that in an aging society, older people have an increasing influence on the results of elections and the directions of development of individual countries. ...
The handbook aims to serve as a reference for discussion and assessment of practical cases that consider the points previously mentioned, placing at the forefront the development of digital capability and an entrepreneurial mindset in students to address contemporary societal challenges.
... At the individual level, demographic characteristics such as age, gender, education, income, and race/ethnicity have been found to influence voting decisions (Evans 2000). For instance, older individuals tend to have higher voter turnout rates, while younger voters are often more politically engaged and inclined towards progressive policies (Goerres 2007). Educational attainment has been linked to increased political participation and liberal policy preferences (Tenn 2007). ...
The voting decisions of a population are vital in forming the political structure of a country. Recognizing what influences voters’ selections is key for politicians, candidates, and those crafting policy. This article offers an examination of different factors that shape voting choices within the American populace. Through a comprehensive synthesis and analysis of various studies, this review seeks to give an understanding of the principal elements that drive voter conduct. Additionally, it looks at what these factors mean for democracy and proposes possible directions for continued research.
... The probability of performing a specific behavior tends to increase with the past frequency of that same behavior (Ajzen, 2002); thus, the residual effect of voting increases the future probability of turning out to vote. As Goerres (2007) suggests, the elderly have grown accustomed to voting in the course of their lives, which strengthens a subjective norm to vote as a pattern of social behavior. This higher propensity to vote, combined with their vulnerability described above, might imply greater support among the elderly for ambitious climate change policies. ...
We study the connection between the demographic transition to an aging population and global climate policy ambition in the outcomes from recent international agreements on climate change: We test whether the share of the elderly in a population is a significant determinant of the quantity and ambition of a country’s policy actions against climate change. We use different indicators of climate policy ambition as measured by the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC) of the Paris Agreement as updated in the Glasgow Climate Pact. We also use the number of climate change laws passed in a country to further test robustness of main results. We resort to instrumental variables as part of our identification strategy to account for potential endogeneity. Our econometric results indicate a negative association between the share of the elderly and both policy ambition in climate agreements and the intensity of regulatory initiatives to fight climate change. This suggests that the increasing political influence of the older population as a consequence of aging hinders climate policy ambition. Policy implications are discussed.
... Statistically significant correlation results show that elderly participants have more experience and more information about the voting process than younger participants. This is probably the result of their greater interest in this theme and their life experience (Goerres, 2007). Elderly participants become informed about their voting rights mostly through television as a medium, which is probably the most accessible to this respondent population due to technological advancement and widespread use. ...
The aim of this article is to analyse the political rights of persons with disabilities and gain an insight into their interest in politics, especially their ambition to be actively involved in political life and to make political decisions, which are important for their specific issues. The Republic of Croatia signed and ratified numerous documents such as the Convention on the Rights for Persons with Disability, which promotes social and political activities, as well as equal and undisputed use of voting rights for every person. According to the Croatian Institute for Public Health, more than one tenth of the Croatian population has a disability, so they could significantly influence the election results. Thus there is a need to investigate voting opportunities for persons with disabilities. This study involved 145 participants with intellectual, physical or visual disability from different cities in Croatia. The research team created a questionnaire containing eight questions with the goal of examining the awareness of persons with disabilities of various difficulties. The questions asked about age, gender, place of residence, knowledge of voting rights, social activities, and adaptation options at polling stations. The data were analysed by quantitative data processing, the χ2 test and the method of correlation. The results indicate the need for more customised information on voting rights for persons with disabilities. There is also a need to adjust and improve voting opportunities for all persons with disabilities regardless of type of impairment, age, gender, or place of residence. Compared with participants with physical or intellectual disabilities, those with visual impairment were more often unable to vote independently and secretly because of inadequate balloting.
... The link between health conditions and types of participation is also likely to change over a person's lifespan (see, for example, studies on political participation in older age, Goerres 2007;Bhatti and Hansen 2012;Engelman et al., 2021). However, the few available studies on the potential moderating effect of age have produced mixed results. ...
Unequal political participation is widely considered a problem of democratic representation. Citizens with fewer resources typically report lower levels of participation. Lack of good health has been identified as one barrier to participation. However, poor health may have heterogeneous impacts on participation, depending on the type of health issue. Moreover, poor health may affect participation patterns differently, depending on age. Previous research has not yet systematically examined these issues. We address these gaps by using European Social Survey data, which includes self-reports of a variety of physical health conditions and engagement in different forms of political participation. The results show that most physical health conditions are related to political participation; however, except for turnout, physical health problems mobilize individuals into action. This effect is strongest among younger individuals, and the health gap in participation evens out in later life. The condition-specific effects are similar across different forms of physical health conditions. Our findings are consistent with the grievance and identity theories of political participation. Younger citizens, in particular, may experience poor health or physical impairment as unjust and are then mobilized into political action. We discuss the implications for the broader understanding of mechanisms behind political behavior and suggest that health problems are often a motivator for political action rather than an obstacle.
... Figure 2 reveals an almost universal political demography observation: older people are more likely to go to the polls compared to young people in the same country. Only few countries are on or to the right [Goerres et al., 2020]) of the 45-degree line (which captures countries where the turnout rates are the same), possibly due to a rather universal process of habituation and growing norm-abidance associated with individual ageing (Goerres, 2007b). If we combine these two pieces of information into one data point by producing a ratio (estimated turnout of older people divided by estimated turnout among young people), we get a variable of the turnout of older people (those aged above 60) relative to that of younger people (those aged 18-29). ...
This chapter introduces the overarching questions of our edited book on the politics of population change worldwide, Global Political Demography (Goerres & Vanhuysse, 2021). How do the political economy and political sociology traits of some population groups relative to others—notably in terms of numerical size and political capacity—affect public policies, political actions and political order via the intermediary of political and institutional processes? How does this then produce various feedback effects? What can macro-demographic profiles tell us about the political problems a country or a macro-region faced in 1990, faces today, and will be facing by 2040? We analyse key indicators from the new Global Political Demography Database that accompanies this book and summarize main findings from this first attempt to study the interplay between population change and politics globally. We put forward three propositions: (1) even though political demography remains an unjustly neglected approach, the political consequences and the political embeddedness of population change lie at the heart of the social sciences at large. (2) Population change creates both short-term (migration; frustration) and longer-term challenges (population ageing; fiscal sustainability), all of which require political and policy solutions. (3) Political reactions to population changes follow context-specific paths as their level of salience is socially and politically constructed. Demography is not destiny: politics is key to how population change affects societies.
... Finally, other findings support the notion that younger people avoid electoral participation more than older people (Van Deth 2020; Goerres 2007). However, the opposite occurs for NEP, as older people tend to avoid non-institutional forms of political participation (Dalton 2008a;Marien et al. 2010). ...
One of the most consistent findings in the literature is that non-electoral political participation has a positive and robust association with electoral participation. However, all democracies have citizens who regularly engage in non-electoral political action but do not vote. Curiously, this abstentionist-activist profile has received little attention. Drawing on elements of the civic voluntarism model and electoral theories, this study tests an argument as to why and when active citizensi.e., citizens who are politically active in non-electoral terms—are more likely to abstain from the polls. Using data from the International Social Survey Program and multivariate logistic regressions, the results show that when active citizens lack ties to social organizations, their probability of abstaining from the polls increases significantly. However, the results also showed that membership in organizations is relevant only for active citizens who express a limited sense of civic duty. This article discusses the electoral consequences of growing levels of activism based on forms of coordination that are not rooted in traditional civic associations.
... Cabe añadir que la generación política es un factor que matiza el componente etario de la participación política de las personas mayores. Riley (1985) ya apuntó hace unas décadas que la variable edad incide en función de las características de su cohorte, que va más allá de los cambios derivados del proceso de envejecimiento (vide itemGoerres y Vanhuysse, 2011; Goerres, 2007) 11 . ...
El fenómeno gerontomigratorio es una realidad nacional cuya concreción demográfica a nivel local puede incidir en los resultados de los comicios en los que tienen derecho de sufragio. Este artículo aborda el compromiso cívico de los gerontoinmigrantes de retiro y analiza los factores (des)movilizadores de su voto, siendo las últimas elecciones municipales celebradas en España, de 2019, el caso de estudio. Aparte de los correspondientes datos facilitados por el Instituto Nacional de Estadística y por el Ministerio del Interior, la investigación se nutre de los resultados de una encuesta multidisciplinar realizada durante 2020. Los gerontoinmigrantes de retiro se comportan políticamente en términos similares a como lo hacen los mayores en general. Al analizar los factores con capacidad explicativa del voto frente a la abstención, el Brexit ha aflorado como un fenómeno que afecta y diferencia a los británicos.
... To explain why older adults share more links from partisan websites on Facebook, we think that older adults might simply be more engaged in traditional political activities as can be seen in the age patterns in voting, party identification, and newspaper consumption. Research has consistently shown over the years that in most countries, voter turnout increases with age until physical debilities reduce participation (Goerres 2007). Party identification has also been found to increase with age (Shively 1979). ...
A growing body of literature has noted an age pattern in the sharing of false news in social media, with older people sharing more often misinformation than younger users. In this article we supplement this literature by documenting two distinct but complementary phenomena: Facebook users share more content as they get older regardless of whether it is political; and that this increment in sharing activity as age increases is more intense with political and partisan URLs. Based on the Facebook Privacy-Protected Full URLs Data Set, a vast Facebook database with demographic information of those who saw and shared links on Facebook in 46 countries, we investigate the impact of age on link-sharing activity. We found that in 43 countries, the average age of people who shared links was considerably higher than the age of those who saw the links. In a more detailed study, with Facebook users in South America, we find that the average age increases consecutively in the sharing of non-political content, in the sharing of political content, in the sharing of partisan sites and in the sharing of right-leaning partisan sites.
... There are crossnational differences, with Lithuanians and Latvians most likely to say they feel healthy and the Swiss and the Irish least likely to do so, or Lithuanians and Latvians least likely to say they are hampered in their daily activities and Italians and Spaniards most likely to say so.2 Thus, researchers have found, for example, that inequalities in population health are lower in the more generous and universal welfare states of Scandinavia[34] or that the choices governments make when it comes to designing health, education, and social policies are systematic drivers of health outcomes that mediate the impact of people's socio economic position on their wellbeing[35].3 Often examined in the context of age and lifecycle effects in health and voting, researchers have found that ill health reduces turnout, and this effect is especially pronounced later in life. ...
Governments in liberal democracies pursue social welfare, but in many different ways. The wellbeing approach instead asks: Why not focus directly on increasing measured human happiness? Why not try to improve people’s overall quality of life, as it is subjectively seen by citizens themselves? The radical implications of this stance include shifting attention to previously neglected areas (such as mental health and ‘social infrastructure’ services) and developing defensible measures of overall wellbeing or quality of life indicators. Can one ‘master’ concept of wellbeing work to create more holism in policy-making? Or should we stick with multiple metrics? These debates have been live in relation to an alternative ‘capacities’ approaches, and they are well-developed in health policymaking. Most recently, the connections between wellbeing and political participation have come into sharper focus. Wellbeing remains a contested concept, one that can be interpreted and used differently, with consequences for how it is incorporated into policy decisions. By bringing together scholars from economics, psychology and behavioural science, philosophy and political science, the authors explore how different disciplinary approaches can contribute to the study of wellbeing and how this can shape policy priorities.
... Para analisar a polarização afetiva, foram utilizadas as respostas às questões sobre identidade política e animosidade política no questionário Lapop de 2017 (Tabela 1). A polarização das identidades de esquerda e de direita entre os mais velhos é um fenômeno consistente com tendências identificadas em outros países, que mostram que as pessoas mais velhas têm identidades partidárias mais sólidas (Shively, 1979;Dalton, 2000), participam mais de eleições (Goerres, 2007) e são mais polarizadas (Boxel, Gentzkow e Shapiro, 2017). Há um grande debate sobre se esse fenômeno se deveria propriamente à idade ou a um efeito de coorte (Danigelis, Hardy e Cutler, 2007;Twenge et al., 2016). ...
Embora tenhamos muitas evidências anedóticas sobre a polarização política no Brasil, os estudos empíricos têm se concentrado, em grande parte, no padrão de voto. Partindo de duas séries históricas de pesquisas de opinião (Lapop e World Values Survey), investigamos o fenômeno da polarização política em quatro sentidos consagrados: polarização das opiniões sobre temas políticos, polarização das identidades políticas, alinhamento das opiniões com identidades e polarização afetiva. Verificamos que há polarização de opiniões sobre direitos dos homossexuais e sobre o divórcio, como processo e como estado, respectivamente. As identidades políticas também se polarizaram a partir de 2010, sobretudo entre os mais velhos e menos escolarizados, o que não implicou um aumento de alinhamento. Por fim, constatamos que, entre as pessoas engajadas, há polarização afetiva em torno de algumas identidades.
The ability to effectively use digital technology and problem-solve are critical skills for maintaining democratic health, particularly as civil society and the modern digital landscape continuously evolve. However, information on whether individuals have the critical problem-solving skills to use digital technology and confidently affect change is yet to be further explored. Using data from the 2017 Program for International Assessment of Adult Competencies ( n = 2749), we examined the associations between digital problem-solving skills and the three levels (low, neutral, high) of external political efficacy in the U.S. adult population. We used multinomial logistic regression and found a positive association between digital problem-solving skills and external political efficacy, while explanations for the three levels of efficacy are nuanced. Continuous development of digital problem-solving skills through adult education has implications for political efficacy, and ultimately for the promotion of a variety of civic engagement in the adult life stages.
Existe un amplio debate sobre la extensión de los derechos de ciudadanía para la población inmigrante. Chile destaca por su diseño institucional incluyente. Los inmigrantes tienen derecho a voto luego de acreditar cinco años de residencia y, además, quedan inscritos automáticamente en el padrón electoral. La teoría ha avanzado significativamente en comprender la participación electoral de los inmigrantes, pero en general se estudian las elecciones nacionales y se dejan en un segundo plano las votaciones locales. Sugerimos que es, precisamente, en las elecciones locales unipersonales, con sistemas electorales mayoritarios, donde el voto inmigrante puede definir una elección. ¿De qué depende la participación electoral de los inmigrantes?, ¿en qué medida el sexo y la edad de los inmigrantes explica su participación electoral?, ¿en qué municipios el voto inmigrante podría ser más decisivo? Respondemos estas preguntas a partir de tres resultados. Primero, advertimos una brecha de género en la participación electoral de los inmigrantes favorable a las mujeres. Después constatamos que el efecto cuadrático de la edad sobre la participación electoral es menos intenso en el grupo de inmigrantes comparado con los nacionales. Por último, proponemos un índice de incidencia municipal de los inmigrantes (IMIM) que permite identificar las comunas más propensas a definir la elección de alcaldes de acuerdo con el volumen de población inmigrante.
This article aims to explain why participation in presidential elections increased among people who feared the risk of worsening COVID‐19 in Africa. The analysis is based on a sample of 16,890 people living in 34 African countries. Econometric results suggest that fear of the pandemic's escalation can reduce citizens' willingness to participate in presidential elections. However, this negative effect changes based on perceptions of government management of the pandemic. We show that the likelihood of voting in a presidential election increases significantly among those afraid of the pandemic's worsening with (i) a lack of confidence in government statistics on COVID‐19; (ii) perceived corruption related to the COVID‐19 pandemic; (iii) a lack of confidence in the government's ability to ensure the safety of COVID‐19 vaccines; (iv) perceived insufficient public investment in combating health emergencies; and (v) perceived insufficient intervention by law enforcement in enforcing COVID‐19 control measures.
Related Articles
Onyango, Gedion, and Japheth Otieno Ondiek. 2022. “Open Innovation during the COVID‐19 Pandemic Policy Responses in South Africa and Kenya.” Politics & Policy 50(5): 1008–31. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12490 .
Stockemer, Daniel. 2016. “Is the Turnout Function in Democracies and Nondemocracies Alike or Different?” Politics & Policy 44(5): 889–915. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12174 .
Stockemer, Daniel, and Stephanie Parent. 2014. “The Inequality Turnout Nexus—New Evidence from Presidential Elections.” Politics & Policy 42(2): 221–45. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12067 .
Governments may have the capacity to flood social media with fake news, but little is known about the use of flooding by ordinary voters. In this work, we identify 2107 registered US voters who account for 80% of the fake news shared on Twitter during the 2020 US presidential election by an entire panel of 664,391 voters. We found that supersharers were important members of the network, reaching a sizable 5.2% of registered voters on the platform. Supersharers had a significant overrepresentation of women, older adults, and registered Republicans. Supersharers’ massive volume did not seem automated but was rather generated through manual and persistent retweeting. These findings highlight a vulnerability of social media for democracy, where a small group of people distort the political reality for many.
Objectives
Political participation differs across the age range, but little is known about these patterns outside of developed countries. Political context is a particularly important consideration for all political behavior in Africa, where only a few countries are fully democratic. Drawing from political opportunity structures theory, we investigate how political freedom conditions the age-based pattern of electoral and non-electoral political engagement, as well as protesting.
Methods
This study merges the fifth, sixth, and seventh rounds of the Afrobarometer datasets, spanning 36 African countries, with country-level data on political freedom from Freedom House. Using multilevel regression models, we examine how political freedom shapes the relationship between age and three forms of political participation.
Results
Africans aged from 18 to 60 years and living in non-free countries are most engaged in electoral and non-electoral political activities, though participation begins to drop off markedly past age 60. For protest participation, young Africans living in partially- and non-free countries are the most engaged in protests; yet limited political freedom again means a sharp age-based decline.
Discussion
The impact of political context on the age-participation association is nuanced in ways not anticipated by mainstream research on the developed West. Repressive regimes, while spurring engagement at younger ages, appear to disproportionately deter older Africans from political engagement, especially its riskiest forms. We conclude by calling for more country-comparative gerontological research with careful attention to contextual heterogeneity, particularly in the understudied Global South.
Previous literature argues that social pressure during democratic elections motivates citizens to vote. Studies in western democracies find that social pressure is especially ingrained among older generations who possess a deeper sense of civic duty. I test this argument in a new democracy, Tunisia, where citizens of all ages are experiencing democratic elections for the first time. I analyze the results from an original survey that includes an experiment measuring social pressures to vote across generations. The results show that contrary to findings in developed western democracies, Tunisians fail to socially sanction or reward an individual based on voting behavior despite believing that citizens should vote. This finding implies a democratic transition might encourage individuals to ascribe to the norm of voting, but citizens are unlikely to fully internalize this participatory norm in a way that activates and enforces this norm to pressure people to vote. These results speak to the wider generalizability of the impact of civic duty and norm enforcement on voter turnout in nascent democratic contexts.
Due to the demographic growth of older population segments, psychological research is increasingly devoted to the determinants of successful aging. The current study investigates the relationship between older people’s self-perception of aging and its potential political and psychosocial antecedents. We concentrate on a subjective aspect of successful ageing, so we refer to these self-perceptions as self-rated successful ageing. We examine two groups of potential antecedents of self-rated successful ageing associated with political participation (political subjectivity and political agency) and the resources that an individual possesses: personal (a sense of autonomy) and social (perceived social support). Informed by previous research, our study compares two age-separated groups of older people—conveniently labeled the Young-Old (Y-O), aged 65–74, and the Old-Old (O-O), aged 75–95. In line with prior findings, our regressions confirm the importance of autonomy as a positive self-rated successful ageing predictor among the elderly, regardless of whether they fall into the Y-O or O-O group. Political subjectivity, however, turns out to be a significant predictor of self-rated successful ageing only in the Y-O group of the elderly.
A growing literature over the past 10 years on health and political behavior has established health status as an important source of political inequality. Poor health reduces psychological engagement with politics and discourages political activity. This lowers incentives for governments to respond to the needs of those experiencing ill health and thereby perpetuates health disparities. In this review article, we provide a critical synthesis of the state of knowledge on the links between different aspects of health and political behavior. We also discuss the challenges confronting this research agenda, particularly with respect to measurement, theory, and establishing causality, along with suggestions for advancing the field. With the COVID-19 pandemic casting health disparities into sharp focus, understanding the sources of health biases in the political process, as well as their implications, is an important task that can bring us closer to the ideals of inclusive democracy.
This paper analyzes the impact of technological progress on individual political engagement using longitudinal data from the British survey. The analysis suggests that regional technological progress, measured as the gross value added per worker, the number of patents per capita, and the share of employed in R&D, reduces individual identification with a particular political party, individual interest in politics, and participation in elections. The individual assertion that vote is a social norm, the self-assessed cost of political participation, and the awareness of voter irrelevance are not found to be mediating the impact of technological progress on political disengagement.
One of the most important political and economic challenges facing Europe and elsewhere is the ageing of societies. Must ageing populations create conflict between generations and crisis for health systems? Our answer is no. The problem is not so much demographic change as the political and policy challenge of creating fair, sustainable and effective policies for people of all ages. This book, based on a large European Observatory study, uses new evidence to challenge some of the myths surrounding ageing and its effects on economies and health systems. Cataclysmic views of population ageing are often based on stereotypes and anecdotes unsupported by evidence. How we address ageing societies is a choice. Societies can choose policies that benefit people of all ages, promoting equity both within and between generations, and political coalitions can be built to support such policies. This title is available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.
Autori se u naknadnom komentaru osvrću na teorijske i metodološke ne-dostatke svoje ranije objavljene studije o dobi i biračkom ponašanju u Hrvatskoj. Na teorijskoj razini ističu nedovoljnu razrađenost konceptualnog okvira i izostanak smještanja studije u odnosu na druga relevantna istraživanja koja se bave političkom socijalizacijom, političkom identifikacijom i društveno-političkim rascjepima. Na metodološkoj razini ističu probleme nedovoljne transparentnosti u prezentaciji rezultata testova multikolinearnosti i faktorske analize te u koncipiranju među-odnosa, operacionalizaciji i mjerenju varijabli poput dobi, obrazovanja, autoritarnosti, konzervativizma i populizma. Skromno zaključujući kako njihov rad ipak pri-donosi napretku razumijevanja odnosa dobi i biračkoga ponašanja, autori pozivaju na buduća longitudinalna istraživanja koja bi mogla više reći o eventualnoj promje-ni u intenzitetu utjecaja rascjepa na dobne kohorte. Njihov znanstveni autodafe kojim priznaju nedovoljnu komparativnu utemeljenost prethodnog istraživanja, konceptualnu i empirijsku, sažet je u pluralizaciji odabrane naslovne metafore kojom se ti izgubljeni akademski dječaci vraćaju putu akademske zrelosti pa dijete u vremenu postaje djecom u vremenu.
This paper explores how Japan's aging population impacts the politics of monetary policy. Previous research suggests that the elderly have a variety of distinct policy preferences. Given that elderly voters also have higher voting rates, the rapid greying of the population could have significant effects on distributive struggles over economic policy across much of the developed world. In Japan, aging is advancing rapidly, and the central bank has engaged in massive monetary stimulus to induce inflation, which existing work suggests the elderly should oppose. Analyzing results from three surveys, this paper has three central findings: (1) the elderly tend to have higher inflation aversion, (2) the elderly display some opposition to quantitative easing (QE), and (3) despite such policy preferences, the concentration of elderly in electoral districts has no significant effect on the preferences either of legislative incumbents or candidates. The third finding is attributable to the fact that elderly opposition to QE is moderated by their partisan identification. Elderly Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) voters have systematically lower opposition to QE, likely reflecting that these voters have aligned their preferences with the LDP's policies.
Research dealing with various aspects of* the theory of planned behavior (Ajzen, 1985,
1987) is reviewed, and some unresolved issues are discussed. In broad terms, the theory is
found to be well supported by empirical evidence. Intentions to perform behaviors of different
kinds can be predicted with high accuracy from attitudes toward the behavior, subjective
norms, and perceived behavioral control; and these intentions, together with perceptions of
behavioral control, account for considerable variance in actual behavior. Attitudes, subjective
norms, and perceived behavioral control are shown to be related to appropriate sets of salient
behavioral, normative, and control beliefs about the behavior, but the exact nature of these
relations is still uncertain. Expectancy value formulations are found to be only partly
successful in dealing with these relations. Optimal rescaling of expectancy and value
measures is offered as a means of dealing with measurement limitations. Finally, inclusion of
past behavior in the prediction equation is shown to provide a means of testing the theory*s
sufficiency, another issue that remains unresolved. The limited available evidence concerning
this question shows that the theory is predicting behavior quite well in comparison to the
ceiling imposed by behavioral reliability.
Free elections blow away the pretensions of dictators to speak for everyone; this was spectacularly demonstrated after the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989. Although elections had been held in Communist party-states, they were elections without choice. Officially reported turnout was virtually 100 percent and more than 99 percent of the electorate was counted as having voted for the ruling party. Free elections have shown that the results of Communist ballots were literally too good to be true. In place of the former unanimity, citizens register big differences about who should govern. The purpose of this book is to report the results of free elections to analyze electoral competition comparatively in eleven new post-Communist democracies. The framework in part I sets out what we need to know to understand election outcomes in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the Czech Republic, and Slovenia since 1990. In particular, it emphasizes the initiatives of political elites in creating a floating system of parties by launching, merging, splitting, and dissolving parties. The evidence is detailed in the chapters of part Two, which record in prose and tables the history, laws, and election result of these new democracies. The outcome of an election is a function of laws that determine how votes are cast and converted into seats in parliament; the number of parties supplied by political elites; and how voters respond to the choices that are offered. While specialists address Rose, Richard and Neil Munro, 2003. Elections and Parties in New European Democracies. Washington D.C., CQ Press.
The frequency with which a behavior has been performed in the past is found to account
for variance in later behavior independent of intentions. This is often taken
as evidence for habituation of behavior and as complementing the reasoned mode
of operation assumed by such models as the theory of planned behavior. In this article,
I question the idea that the residual effect of past on later behavior can be attributed
to habituation. The habituation perspective cannot account for residual effects
in the prediction of low-opportunity behaviors performed in unstable contexts,
no accepted independent measure of habit is available, and empirical tests of the
habituation hypothesis have so far met with little success. A review of existing evidence
suggests that the residual impact of past behavior is attenuated when measures
of intention and behavior are compatible and vanishes when intentions are
strong and well formed, expectations are realistic, and specific plans for intention
implementation have been developed.
Review essays in the previous handbooks of political psychology have been titled "political socialization" and have focused largely on the childhood acquisition of specifically political orientations (Merelman, 1986; Niemi, 1973). We broaden our scope to the full life span and to a broader array of political and social orientations. We begin with a discussion of the acquisition of basic dispositions in preadult life, with particular focus on moral and cognitive development, ethnic and racial identity, ethnic and racial prejudices, and basic partisanship. We then consider the later life history of such dispositions, with particular attention to their persistence, as well as susceptibility to change in an "impressionable" period lasting up through early adulthood. Finally we take up applications of these ideas to the question of political generations and to the case of immigrants to another country. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Conventional wisdom holds that young people in Britain are alienated from politics, with some claiming that this reflects a wider crisis of legitimacy that should be met by initiatives to increase citizenship. This article addresses these areas, presenting both panel survey and focus group data from first-time voters. It concludes that, contrary to the findings from many predominantly quantitative studies of political participation, young people are interested in political matters, and do support the democratic process. However, they feel a sense of anti-climax having voted for the first time, and are critical of those who have been elected to positions of political power. If they are a generation apart, this is less to do with apathy, and more to do with their engaged scepticism about ‘formal’ politics in Britain.
In this paper, we examine the political effects of local age distributions, with an eye to understanding geographic variations in voter turnout. The Depression era birth cohort is now elderly and will soon make a final exit from the electorate through mortality. The Baby Boom generation is quickly closing on retirement. These older generations are highly participatory for both generational and life-cycle reasons, but the enormous post-Boomer age cohorts show signs of being less participatory. These generalizations about political activity within age cohorts raise questions about the extent to which local turnout levels are affected by the relative size of these groups in local electorates. We find that aggregate local turnout is highly sensitive to the age distribution, rising with the percentage over age 60, falling sharply with increases in the percentage between age 18 and 29. We find the greatest effects in those counties with the highest population growth rates, and we argue that the age gap between the general population and the active electorate will be greatest in these fast-growing locales. We conclude with some reflections about the importance of mobilizing younger voters who have not yet established a habit of voting.
This article looks at the socio-demographic sources of turnout decline in Canada. The analysis is based on the Canadian Election Studies that have been conducted between 1968 and 2000. There is a small period effect which suggests that the propensity to vote has declined marginally (by about three percentage points) in all demographic groups. There are substantial life cycle effects – that is, turnout shifts within a given cohort as members of that cohort grow older. There are powerful generation effects: turnout differs among the various cohorts even when we compare them at the same stage of their life cycle. The much lower turnout among the post-baby-boomers is the main reason why turnout has declined overall in Canada. The most recent generations are less prone to vote in good part because they pay less attention to politics and because they are less likely to adhere to the norm that voting is not only a right, but also a moral duty. The decline in turnout thus reflects a larger cultural change. Education remains an important correlate of voting. The increase in educational attainment has contributed to dampening the decline in turnout. There is no evidence that the decline in turnout has been more acute among certain sub-groups of the electorate (leaving aside age and education).
This book is the first in the ‘Beliefs in government’ series, and examines the general consensus that the relationship between citizens and the state in Western European societies have undergone a fundamental change over the last few decades, to the detriment of representative democracy. Addressing the problem from the citizen's perspective, it identifies the ten fundamental components of the view that representative democracy is under threat, and then proceeds to test them empirically against the dataset supplied by the Beliefs in Government research project. The results are startling. They refute the idea that citizens in Western Europe have withdrawn support from their democracies, but show exactly how the citizen–state relationship has changed over recent years. Traditional forms of expression have clearly declined, but others have evolved in their place. Citizens have become more critical towards politicians and political parties, and they are prepared to use non‐institutionalized forms of political action to pursue their goals and interests.
This empirical investigation attempts to answer the question whether the change in voter turnout at the German general elections is related to cohort specific voting behavior of political generations, also taking into account age and period effects. Furthermore, it is asked whether the decline of voter turnout after the 1972 German general election is a statistical artefact of official statistics. Both questions are investigated with retrospective life history data about voting behavior of individuals from several birth cohorts. It is analyzed that the voter turnout has really declined in the 1980s because of the increased number of determined non-voters. There is evidence that the changes of the voting behavior of younger individuals in successive political generations results in the social change of the general voter turnout. While the effects of the citizens' age on the voter turnout are minimal for the whole period between 1953 and 1987, the impact of period effects are less important for the historical change of voter turnout as often assumed.
Research on political participation shows a positive correlation between age and voting participation. Voting participation in old and very old age however has not yet been examined on a qualified empirical basis. It is widely assumed that a decline in voting participation of the elderly results as a consequence of poor health condition. Based on data of the Berlin Aging Study it is shown that health is indeed the strongest factor influencing the voting participation of the elderly. However, also the level of formal education and living in an old-age home are important explanatory variables, hence socioeconomic factors still have a significant impact on voting participation even in old and very old age.
Political Choice in Britain uses data from the 1964 to 2001 British election studies (BES), 1992 to 2002 monthly Gallup polls, and numerous other national surveys conducted over the past four decades to test the explanatory power of rival sociological and individual rationality models of electoral turnout and party choice. Analyses endorse a valence politics model that challenges the long-dominant social class model. British voters make their choices by evaluating the performance of parties and party leaders in economic and other important policy areas. Although these evaluations may be largely products of events that occur long before an election campaign officially begins, parties' national and local campaign activities are also influential. Consistent with the valence politics model, partisan attachments display individual- and aggregate-level dynamics that reflect ongoing judgements about the managerial abilities of parties and their leaders. A general incentives model provides the best explanation of turnout. Calculations of the costs and influence-discounted benefits of voting and sense of civic duty are key variables in this model. Significantly, the decline in turnout in recent elections does not reflect more general negative trends in public attitudes about the political system. Voters judge the performance of British democracy in much the same way as they evaluate its parties and politicians. Support at all levels of the political system is a renewable resource, but one that must be renewed. © Harold D. Clarke, David Sanders, Marianne C. Stewart, and Paul Whiteley 2004. All rights reserved.
Cross-sectional data on voter turnout and political interest from 28 American national surveys, and data from a cohort analysis of voter turnout, indicate a pronounced increase in political interest and participation from young adulthood to middle age. Voter turnout apparently remains almost constant from middle age to advanced maturity, and average political interest apparently increases. These findings are related both to theories of political participation and to Cumming's and Henry's notion of disengagement of the aged. Some pitfalls of the use of cross-sectional data to infer changes with aging are discussed.
The report of the Kennedy Commission on Registration and Voter Participation, the 1964 Current Population Survey of the Census Bureau, and other data indicate a number of facts about United States voter par ticipation. People tend to "overstate" their participation in elections. Men vote more than women, the middle-aged more than the young and the elderly, whites more than Negroes. The curve of voter turnout parallels those of education and income. Turnout is lower in the South than in other areas and also varies by urban, suburban, and rural areas. Turn out is generally greater in elections for higher government levels and greater in general than in primary elections. One group of nonvoters is deterred by such major legal-administra tive obstacles as citizenship, registration, and absentee voting requirements, racial and religious disabilities, and administra tive regulations for voting times and locations. A second group of nonvoters are those who meet legal-administrative requirements but exhibit "lack of involvement." Age, sex, and social-economic status affect lack of involvement. So do importance and closeness of elections and competitiveness of the political atmosphere. Total voter participation in elec tions is a dubious goal. Perhaps the goal should rather be to increase access to the polls by eliminating or altering legal and administrative barriers to voluntary voting.—Ed.
Voting is a habit. People learn the habit of voting, or not, based on experience in their first few elections. Elections that do not stimulate high turnout among young adults leave a ‘footprint’ of low turnout in the age structure of the electorate as many individuals who were new at those elections fail to vote at subsequent elections. Elections that stimulate high turnout leave a high turnout footprint. So a country's turnout history provides a baseline for current turnout that is largely set, except for young adults. This baseline shifts as older generations leave the electorate and as changes in political and institutional circumstances affect the turnout of new generations. Among the changes that have affected turnout in recent years, the lowering of the voting age in most established democracies has been particularly important in creating a low turnout footprint that has grown with each election.
This paper summarizes research on determinants of repeated behaviors, and the deci- sion processes underlying them. The present research focuses on travel mode choices as an example ofsuch behaviors. It is proposed that when behavior is performed repeatedly and becomes habitual, it is guided by automated cognitive processes, rather than being preceded by elaborate decision processes (i.e,, a decision based on attitudes and inten- tions). First, current attitude-behavior models are discussed, and the role of habit in these models is examined. Second, research is presented on the decision processes pre- ceding travel mode choices. Based on the present theoretical and empirical overview, it is concluded that frequently performed behavior is often a matter of habit, thereby es- tablishing a boundary condition for the applicability of attitude-behavior models. How- ever, more systematic research is required to disentangle the role of habit in attitude-behavior models and to learn more about the cognitive processes underlying habitual behavior.
The dominant paradigm in political participation studies largely ignores the microcontexts within which citizens are embedded.
Drawing on generic processes of persuasion and selection, this study specifies six testable research hypotheses about individuals'
attitudes and behaviors as consequences of the form and content of their ego-centric networks. Using the network measures
from the 1987 General Social Survey, respondents'perceptions of their egocentric networks are found to predict involvement
in national elections. The more frequently people discuss political matters with their intimates, the greater their interest
and participation in national campaigns and voting. The partisan composition of the network strongly influences their participation,
even after controlling for party identifications and selection effects of social attributes. However, respondents' closeness
to network others has few substantial effects, and most of the interaction terms are not significant. For members of voluntary
associations, having at least one other with whom they frequently discuss politics strongly boosts mobilization in internal
organizational affairs and in the local community, again controlling for social attributes.
I show that restrictive registration laws do not dissuade individuals with lower levels of education from voting any more than individuals with higher levels of education. This finding contradicts the result reported in Wolfinger and Rosenstone's classic analysis of turnout. I show that their conclusion was actually an artifact of the methodology they employed. Examining predicted probabilities generated by a nonlinear model such as probit or logit may produce spurious results when used to determine interactive effects between two independent variables. By respecifying the model of turnout to explicitly include terms to test interactive hypotheses and reanalyzing the data from the 1972 Current Population Survey (as well as data from the 1984 survey), I show that in fact, no such substantive interactive effect between registration laws and individuals' level of education exists at the micro level.
The frequency with which a behavior has been performed in the past is found to account for variance in later behavior independent of intentions. This often taken as evidence for habituation of behavior and as complementing the reasoned mode of operation assumed by such models as the theory of planned behavior. In this article, I question the idea that the residual effect of past on later behavior can be attributed to habituation. The habituation perspective cannot account for residual effects in the prediction of low-opportunity behaviors performed in unstable contexts, no accepted independent measure of habit is available, and empirical tests of them habituation hypothesis have so far met with little success. A review of existing evidence suggests that the residual impact of past behavior is attenuated when measures of intention and behavior are compatible and vanishes when intentions are strong and well formed, expectations are implementation have been developed.
Without meaning to minimize the importance of institutional factors in understanding political decisions, this chapter will focus on how individual political actors make decisions. Individual decision-making has been the primary concern of psychologists, while economists, sociologists, and organizational theorists have more frequently studied larger aggregates like institutions and firms. The literatures are largely distinct; both are voluminous. I will narrow my focus and concentrate on the individual perspective. For good overviews of research aimed more at the institutional level, the reader is referred to the many works of March (e.g., 1988, 1994; March & Olsen, 1989; March & Simon, 1958) and the earliest research of Simon (1947). Allison (1971; Allison & Zelikow, 1999) does an excellent job of contrasting the two perspectives in the context of the Cuban missile crisis. In this chapter I will try to provide a general framework for studying decision-making that applies to both everyday citizens (i.e., the "mass") and to political elites. Political elites and common citizens differ not only in the amount of expertise they typically bring to the decision-making task, however, but also in the type of decisions they are generally asked to make. I will try to point out some of the more obvious differences. In my examples and extensions of the basic decision-making framework, I will concentrate on the decision-making of everyday citizens. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Habit is a frequently mentioned but understudied cause of political action. This article provides the first direct test of the hypothesis that casting a ballot in one election increases one's propensity to go to the polls in the future. A field experiment involving 25,200 registered voters was conducted prior to the November general election of 1998. Subjects were randomly assigned to treatment conditions in which they were urged to vote through direct mail or face-to-face canvassing. Compared to a control group that received no contact, the treatment groups were significantly more likely to vote in 1998. The treatment groups were also significantly more likely to vote in local elections held in November of 1999. After deriving a statistical estimator to isolate the effect of habit, we find that, ceteris paribus, voting in one election substantially increases the likelihood of voting in the future. Indeed, the influence of past voting exceeds the effects of age and education reported in previous studies.
This empirical investigation attempts to answer the question whether the change in voter turnout at the German general elections is related to cohort specific voting behavior of political generations, also taking into account age and period effects. Furthermore, it is asked whether the decline of voter turnout after the 1972 German general election is a statistical artefact of official statistics. Both questions are investigated with retrospective life history data about voting behavior of individuals from several birth cohorts. It is analyzed that the voter turnout has really declined in the 1980s because of the increased number of determined non-voters. There is evidence that the changes of the voting behavior of younger individuals in successive political generations results in the social change of the general voter turnout. While the effects of the citizens’ age on the voter turnout are minimal for the whole period between 1953 and 1987, the impact of period effects are less important for the historical change of voter turnout as often assumed.
The electronic version of this book has been prepared by scanning TIFF 600 dpi bitonal images of the pages of the text. Original source: To vote or not to vote? : the merits and limits of rational choice theory / André Blais.; Blais, André, 1947-.; viii, 200 p. ; 24 cm.; Pittsburgh, Pa. :; This electronic text file was created by Optical Character Recognition (OCR). No corrections have been made to the OCR-ed text and no editing has been done to the content of the original document. Encoding has been done through an automated process using the recommendations for Level 2 of the TEI in Libraries Guidelines. Digital page images are linked to the text file.
The culmination of one of the most famous long-term studies in American sociology, this examination of political attitudes among women who attended Bennington College in the 1930s and 1940s now spans five decades, from late adolescence to old age. Theodore Newcomb's 1930s interviews at Bennington, where the faculty held progressive views that contrasted with those of the conservative families of the students, showed that political orientations are still quite malleable in early adulthood. The studies in 1959ââ¬â60 and 1984 show the persistence of political attitudes over the adult life span: the Bennington women, raised in conservative homes, were liberalized in their college years and have remained politically involved and liberal in their views, even in their sixties and seventies. Here the authors analyze the earlier studies and then introduce the 1984 data. Using data from National Election Studies for comparison, they show that the Bennington group is more liberal and hold its opinions more intensely than both older and younger Americans, with the exception of the generation that achieved political maturity in the 1960s. The authors point out that the majority of the Bennington women's children are of this 1945ââ¬â54 generation and suggest that this factor played an important role in the stability of the women's political views. Within their own generation, the Bennington women also appear to hold stronger political views than other college-educated women. Innovative in its methodology and extremely rich in its data, this work will contribute to developmental and social psychology, sociology, political science, women's studies, and gerontology. Duane F. Alwin is professor of sociology and research scientist at the Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan. Ronald L. Cohen is professor of psychology in the Social Science Division, Bennington College. Theodore M. Newcomb (1903-1984) was professor emeritus of psychology and sociology at the University of Michigan and had taught at Bennington College from 1934 to 1941.
Thesis (Ph. D.)--Michigan State University. Dept. of Political Science, 1982. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 170-172).