Available via license: CC BY
Content may be subject to copyright.
Communication Not peer-reviewed version
Field Report of the 2024 Noto Peninsula
Earthquake
―
Current Status and
Challenges of Evacuation Centers in
Wajima City
Tomoya Itatani * , Michio Kojima , Junichi Tanaka , Ryo Horike
Posted Date: 29 January 2024
doi: 10.20944/preprints202401.2042.v1
Keywords: Disaster; earthquake; seismic emergency; evacuation; seafloor uplift
Preprints.org is a free multidiscipline platform providing preprint service that
is dedicated to making early versions of research outputs permanently
available and citable. Preprints posted at Preprints.org appear in Web of
Science, Crossref, Google Scholar, Scilit, Europe PMC.
Copyright: This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons
Attribution License which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any
medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
Communication
Field Report of the 2024 Noto Peninsula
Earthquake―Current Status and Challenges of
Evacuation Centers in Wajima City
Tomoya Itatani 1,*, Michio Kojima 2, Junichi Tanaka 3 and Ryo Horike 4
1 School of Nursing, Faculty of Medicine, University of Miyazaki; tomoya_itatani@med.miyazaki-u.ac.jp
2 NGO Think Locally Act Globally; ngo.tlag@gmail.com
3 Department of Sociology, Faculty of Sociology, Hokuriku Gakuin University;
tanaka.j@hokurikugakuin.ac.jp
4 Public Health Nursing, Osaka Medical and Pharmaceutical University; ryo.horiike@ompu.ac.jp
* Correspondence: tomoya_itatani@med.miyazaki-u.ac.jp ; Tel.: +81-985-85-9814
Abstract: On January 1, 2024, a huge earthquake occurred in Noto region, Japan. Many buildings
collapsed by the violent shaking. Electricity and water supplies were cut off, and communication
was disrupted. Immediately after the earthquake, we visited Noto, and conducted disaster relief
activities. This report integrates and discusses the results of site visits, information broadcasts by
public institutions, and previous research. Evacuation centers lacked water and proper sanitation,
leading to health issues, including infectious diseases. Disaster Medical Assistance Teams (DMAT)
were delayed in implementing infection control measures. Isolated evacuation centers faced
communication and supply challenges. Infrastructure restoration, power supply, and toilet facilities
at evacuation centers were delayed due to geographical challenges. lack of intervention by medical
professionals in evacuation centers were because DMAT was forced to invest manpower in rescue
operations. It is important to have a team that can determine and carry out the necessary activities
on site, even without instructions from the DMAT. Under these circumstances, it is important for
evacuees to operate the evacuation centers autonomously. There are concerns that evacuation
centers could pose health risks if people stay in these centers for long periods. We hope that medical
professionals intervene as soon as possible.
Keywords: disaster; earthquake; seismic emergency; evacuation; seafloor uplift
1. Introduction
On January 1, 2024, at 16:10 (Japan Standard Time), an earthquake with a magnitude of 7.6 and
a maximum seismic intensity of seven occurred in Japan, with its epicenter on the Noto Peninsula in
Ishikawa Prefecture. The epicenter depth was shallow at 16 km, and tremors were observed across
almost all of Japan. In the Noto region, which was the epicenter of the earthquake, many buildings
collapsed because of the violent shaking. The earthquake also triggered a tsunami that damaged at
least 160 ha in Suzu City and Noto Town [1]. A large-scale fire occurred in Kawai-machi, Wajima
City, destroying more than 200 buildings, including stores and homes. Owing to the earthquake,
electricity and water supplies were cut off, and communication was disrupted. More than 1,000
aftershocks, including earthquakes with a seismic intensity of five or higher, occurred within a week,
forcing more than 20,000 residents of the Noto region to evacuate [2]. This earthquake was one of the
largest disasters in Japan in recent years. Even after two weeks from the disaster, the full extent of
the damage remains unknown. The search for missing people and support for disaster victims is
ongoing.
Immediately after the earthquake, the authors visited Wajima City, the disaster area, and
conducted disaster relief activities. We patrolled Wajima City and checked the conditions of the roads
Disclaimer/Publisher’s Note: The statements, opinions, and data contained in all publications are solely those of the individual author(s) and
contributor(s) and not of MDPI and/or the editor(s). MDPI and/or the editor(s) disclaim responsibility for any injury to people or property resulting
from any ideas, methods, instructions, or products referred to in the content.
Preprints.org (www.preprints.org) | NOT PEER-REVIEWED | Posted: 29 January 2024 doi:10.20944/preprints202401.2042.v1
© 2024 by the author(s). Distributed under a Creative Commons CC BY license.
2
and evacuation centers. We also conducted health observations of the evacuees at the evacuation
centers. This study discusses the characteristics of the disaster and proposes future issues regarding
disaster relief.
2. Materials and Methods
The authors visited disaster-affected areas and examined the damage situation in Wajima City
and the status of the evacuation centers. The authors also spoke to the evacuees and experts working
on the ground. This report integrates and discusses the results of site visits, information broadcasts
by public institutions, and previous research.
Table 1. Summary of the situation in the affected area for 11 days post the disaster.
Date
Event
January 1st
- At 16:10, an earthquake with a magnitude of 7.6 occurred in the Noto region of
Ishikawa Prefecture, with a depth of 16 km. The maximum intensity was seven.
- At 17:30, the Noto Peninsula Earthquake Specific Disaster Response
Headquarters was established.
- Tsunami warnings or major tsunami warnings were issued for a wide range
from Hokkaido to Nagasaki.
- Widespread water outage occurred in Ishikawa Prefecture, with approximately
32,700 households experiencing power outages. A total of 28,655 people
evacuated.
- A large-scale fire occurred in Wajima City.
- In response to Ishikawa Prefecture’s request, the Disaster Medical Assistance
Teams (DMAT) were dispatched.
January 2nd
- Tsunami advisories, which had been in effect since the beginning of the disaster,
were all lifted at 10:00.
- In Ishikawa Prefecture, 57 fatalities were reported, but the full extent is still
unknown.
- Widespread water and power outages continue in Ishikawa Prefecture, with
some areas experiencing communication disruptions.
- Restoration work for electricity is underway, but extensive road damage is
causing delays.
- Self-Defense Forces initiated water supply activities.
January 3rd
- Since the start of the disaster, 455 aftershocks with a seismic intensity of one or
higher have been observed.
- Widespread water outage continues in Ishikawa Prefecture, with over 30,000
households experiencing power outages.
- Communication disruptions remain unresolved, and there are reports of
expanded damage in some areas.
- Landslides and collapses of retaining walls have led to road closures in 40
sections of national and expressways.
January 4th
- The number of evacuees exceeds 33,000 in Ishikawa Prefecture.
- Train services have been suspended in the Noto region since the beginning of
the disaster.
- Eleven medical facilities in Ishikawa Prefecture face difficulties with electricity,
water, and medical gas supply.
- Road-based material transport functions are gradually recovering, and
helicopter transportation is used when land transport is not feasible.
January 5th
- Since the onset of the disaster, 1,035 aftershocks with a seismic intensity of one or
higher have been observed, including six with a seismic intensity of five or higher.
- Self-Defense Forces continue their life-saving activities.
- Water and power outages continue in most areas, despite partial restoration.
Preprints.org (www.preprints.org) | NOT PEER-REVIEWED | Posted: 29 January 2024 doi:10.20944/preprints202401.2042.v1
3
- 39 sections of national and expressways and 65 sections of prefectural roads
remain closed in Ishikawa Prefecture.
January 6th
- Ishikawa Prefecture applies the Disaster Victims' Life Rebuilding Support Act to
19 cities and towns.
- 165 DMAT teams are active within Ishikawa Prefecture.
January 7th
- Noto Airport has a 10-centimeter crack on its runway and remains closed.
- Medical helicopter operations, which had been conducted until the 6th, are
suspended on the 7th owing to snow.
January 8th
- Ishikawa Prefecture reports 161 fatalities and 419 injuries.
- 40 municipalities offer 1,200 vacant public housing units.
January 9th
- Severe damage to distribution facilities in Wajima City and Suzu City, Ishikawa
Prefecture, is expected to prolong recovery efforts.
- Nine medical facilities in Ishikawa Prefecture are facing issues with electricity,
water, and medical gas supply.
January 10th
- Rain and snow accompanied by thunder increase the risk of landslides.
- There are 405 evacuation centers in Ishikawa Prefecture, accommodating over
26,000 evacuees.
January 11th
- Ishikawa Prefecture reports 206 fatalities and 422 injuries.
- Over 106,000 households continue to experience water outages in 12 cities and
towns in Ishikawa Prefecture, with over 13,000 households experiencing power
outages.
*This table was created by compiling reports from the Cabinet Office [2].
3. Results
The Noto area, where the Noto Peninsula earthquake occurred, includes three cities and four
towns: Wajima City, Suzu City, Noto Town, Nakanoto Town, Anamizu Town, Shiga Town, and
Hakui City (see Figure 1). On January 5th, four days after the earthquake, we visited Wajima City,
which was hit hard. The expressway was closed as it entered the Noto area. We drove along the
prefectural roads.
Prefectural roads were undulated and damaged in several places. Many utility poles fell, and
buildings were damaged everywhere. Prefectural Route 1, which connects to Noto, experienced
landslides in several places, narrowing the width of road for vehicle to travel. Prefectural Route 1 had
alternating traffic, making it prone to traffic jams. The east-west coastal road leading to Wajima was
closed because of landslides and road collapses (see Figure 2).
We entered Wajima City and saw the city destroyed. A large building collapsed (see Figure 3 ),
and a wide area of Kawai-machi was destroyed by fire (see Figure 4). We stayed there for a week and
toured the evacuation center. The evacuation center was without water. They cooked with water
brought in by Self-Defense Forces. Because water cannot be flushed down toilets, it was solidified
with a coagulant before disposal. The evacuation center was managed by evacuees. The evacuation
center leader, who was also an evacuee, took command, and the evacuees worked together to sort
and cook the relief supplies. The population of Noto is aging. Many people gathered at the evacuation
centers were older adults. At the evacuation center, the amount of exercise among the evacuees
decreased. The sanitary environment at the evacuation center could not be considered adequate.
Some evacuees got sick. However, there were no regular rounds for medical professionals. Infectious
diseases were prevalent in many evacuation centers. Influenza and new coronavirus infections were
particularly common. In Japan, when a large-scale disaster occurs, a Disaster Medical Assistance
Team (DMAT), a trained medical team with the mobility to act during the acute phase of a disaster,
is activated [3]. DMAT also implements measures for infectious disease control. However, owing to
the widespread damage caused by this earthquake, infection control measures were delayed.
Many evacuation centers in Wajima City were isolated because roads were cut off. We visited
an isolated evacuation center on foot on January 10th (see Figure 5). Village residents gathered at the
evacuation center. Most were older adults. The power outage continued, and communications, such
Preprints.org (www.preprints.org) | NOT PEER-REVIEWED | Posted: 29 January 2024 doi:10.20944/preprints202401.2042.v1
4
as mobile phones and the Internet, were unavailable. Evacuees at the isolated evacuation center did
not know exactly what the conditions were in the Noto area. The Self-Defense Forces transported the
supplies needed at the isolated evacuation centers. The evacuees said that there was no intervention
by medical professionals.
Additionally, a phenomenon in which the sea floor is rising has been observed on the north coast
of the Noto Peninsula [4]. This caused many ports to become unavailable. The port of the isolated
area we visited had also become unusable due to upheaval. Perhaps for this reason, Self-Defense
Force ships were anchored slightly offshore, and Self-Defense Force members were transporting
supplies in rubber boats (see Figure 6).
Figure 1. Topography of Ishikawa Prefecture.
Preprints.org (www.preprints.org) | NOT PEER-REVIEWED | Posted: 29 January 2024 doi:10.20944/preprints202401.2042.v1
6
Figure 4. Kawai-machi where buildings were destroyed and burned down (Photo by Tomoya
Itatani).
Figure 5. Cross the road blocked by a landslide and head toward the isolated area (Photo by Tomoya
Itatani).
Preprints.org (www.preprints.org) | NOT PEER-REVIEWED | Posted: 29 January 2024 doi:10.20944/preprints202401.2042.v1
7
Figure 6. The coast of Wajima where the seabed has risen; (a) 2023 cost; (b) Coast after the 2024
earthquake. Red arrows in (a) and (b) point to the same location. (Photo by Tomoya Itatani).
4. Discussion
4.1. Characteristics of this disaster
In this earthquake, the recovery of infrastructure and the response to evacuees tended to be
slower than in previous earthquakes. During the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake, there was a large-
scale power outage in the Tohoku Electric Power Company; however, three days after the disaster,
power was restored to approximately 80% of the area, except for Miyagi Prefecture [5]. Conversely,
restoration work for the power outage caused by this earthquake is continuing in most areas even 10
days after the disaster, and there is no hope of complete restoration. Temporary toilets were available
at evacuation centers three days after the Great East Japan Earthquake. However, even after one
week, the installation of temporary toilets at the evacuation center was not completed.
The delay in restoration is due to the geographical characteristics of Ishikawa Prefecture. When
the Great East Japan Earthquake occurred in 2011, rapid recovery efforts were carried out by sending
support units into the affected area in a comb-like pattern from the north-south road [6]. Ishikawa
Prefecture has a long and narrow topography running north to south. Only a few major roads connect
the northern and southern parts of the Noto area. This earthquake not only caused major damage to
the main roads but also heavy traffic congestion. In addition, roads from the east and west coasts of
Wajima were closed because of widespread landslides. Consequently, disaster relief and construction
vehicles for infrastructure restoration were unable to enter the area, causing delays in recovery. In
addition, most of Noto is mountainous. This earthquake caused many isolated villages owing to
large-scale landslides over wide areas. Not only was it difficult to transport supplies in isolated
villages but communication was also cut off because of power outages, which made it difficult to
gather information. Furthermore, the incredible phenomenon of seafloor upheaval may also prevent
ships form approaching areas where roads have been cut off, potentially delaying recovery.
4.2. The importance of autonomous disaster relief
The damage caused by this disaster was so extensive that it was difficult for DMAT to
understand the entire situation. It can be assumed that the delay in infection control measures and
lack of intervention by medical professionals in evacuation centers in remote areas were because
DMAT was forced to invest manpower in rescue operations. In this situation, we believe that team
activities that support DMAT are important. It is important to have a team that can determine and
carry out the necessary activities on site, even without instructions from the DMAT. After receiving
general information from DMAT, they go to the site and perform activities based on their own
Preprints.org (www.preprints.org) | NOT PEER-REVIEWED | Posted: 29 January 2024 doi:10.20944/preprints202401.2042.v1
8
judgment. and share the results with the DMAT. We believe that if such activities are implemented,
the burden on DMAT will reduce and detailed support will be provided at evacuation centers. In
addition, we think it would be effective for DMAT and local governments to plan with support teams
about what to do in case of an emergency before a disaster occurs, so that disaster support can be
implemented autonomously without detailed instructions after a disaster occurs.
4.3. The importance of autonomy for evacuation centers
As mentioned above, in the case of a large-scale disaster over a wide area, there is a possibility
that the DMAT's activities may not have been carried out in detail. In some remote evacuation centers,
DMAT teams are rarely able to visit. Under these circumstances, it is important for evacuees to
operate the evacuation centers autonomously. We believe that healthy evacuation center
management can be achieved by considering the situation of the evacuees and taking the necessary
actions. Discussion among residents is an important prerequisite for the autonomous operation of
evacuation centers. Therefore, regular communication among residents is important, and the
formation of a healthy community is one type of disaster prevention.
5. Conclusions
This earthquake was characterized by transportation being blocked owing to geographical factors,
which made infrastructure restoration and support activities difficult. Under such circumstances, it is
important for disaster victims to manage their own evacuation centers. In addition, support teams that
can operate independently are required in evacuation centers in remote areas where the support of DMAT
teams cannot reach sufficient levels. To prepare for a disaster, administrative agencies and support teams
need to plan in advance what they will do in the event of a disaster.
Disaster recovery is expected to take a long time. There are concerns that evacuation centers run
by local governments could pose health risks if people stay in these centers for long periods. We hope
that medical professionals intervene as soon as possible. The next severe disaster could occur in Japan
soon. We hope that our experience of this disaster can be used to prepare for future disasters.
Acknowledgments: We would like to thank Editage (www.editage.jp) for its pro bono support for the Noto
Peninsula Earthquake for English editing.
Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare no conflicts of interest.
References
1. 2024 Noto Peninsula Earthquake. Available online:
https://www.jrc.or.jp/english/relief/2024NotoPeninsulaEarthquake.html (accessed on 31 Jan 2024).
2. Disaster Management in Japan (in Japanese).Available online:
https://www.bousai.go.jp/updates/r60101notojishin/r60101notojishin/index.html (accessed on 31 Jan 2024).
3. Wato, Y. Japanese DMAT (Disaster Medical Assistance Team) and the Future National Disaster Medical
System. The Journal of Japan Society for Clinical Anesthesia 2014, 34(5), 692-698.
4. Coastline change caused by the 2024 Noto Peninsula Earthquake detected by ALOS-2 SAR satellite image (Jan.
4, 2024). Available online: https://www.gsi.go.jp/uchusokuchi/uchusokuchi-e31001.html (accessed on 31 Jan
2024).
5. Chen, X.; Numada, M.; MEGURO, K. The Priority of Electric Power Restoration in the East Japan
Earthquake (in Japanese). Available online: http://library.jsce.or.jp/jsce/open/00578/2012/4-323.pdf
(accessed on 31 Jan 2024).
6. Earthquake Memorial Museum, Kushinoha-Sakusen (Operation Comb Teeth) (in Japanese). Available
online: https://infra-archive311.jp/s-kushinoha.html (accessed on 31 Jan 2024).
Disclaimer/Publisher’s Note: The statements, opinions, and data contained in all publications are solely those
of the individual author(s) and contributor(s), not of the MDPI and/or editor(s). The MDPI and/or the editor(s)
disclaims responsibility for any injury to people or property resulting from any ideas, methods, instructions, or
products referred to in the content.
Preprints.org (www.preprints.org) | NOT PEER-REVIEWED | Posted: 29 January 2024 doi:10.20944/preprints202401.2042.v1