Content uploaded by Vincent Lyne
Author content
All content in this area was uploaded by Vincent Lyne on Feb 04, 2024
Content may be subject to copyright.
Was MH370 Debris Adrift in the Leeuwin Current?
Dr. Vincent Lyne (Retired Scientist)
Hobart. Tasmania. Australia.
Version 2.0: 4th February 2024
Update: Damage to US Airways 1549
Summary
Seemingly more bizarre is a veteran fisherman, Christopher (Kit) Olver, apparently
hauling up in his 24-metre trawler the Vivienne Jane, what was claimed to be MH370’s wing.
It was snared in his trawl net, whilst fishing for deep-sea Alfonsino fish, in October 2014 off
Robe, South Australia. Then, after an all-day struggle, he was forced to jettison the
expensive net and catch. On reporting the incident, officials suggested he hooked up a
shipping container (a young Mr. Olver flew several small planes). Here, a precautionary
approach, that MUST be used in such circumstances, is used to assess the drift of large
debris items with oceanographic currents to determine if they could have drifted with the
Leeuwin Current which flows swiftly from central Western Australia to South Australia and
beyond, during winter months. I examine whether it was possible for a large MH370 debris
item to reach the discovery location at the correct time. Previous drift models focused on
various drift formulas where surface winds provided an added drift component from the so-
called Stokes Drift associated with wave and wind action. These concluded that drift from
the official 7th arc locations were sped up beyond reasonable bounds to reach discovery
locations and no simulations resulted in debris on the Australian coast. However, with
reasonable drift rates, I concluded that, in addition to explaining all debris landings, a
Malaysian Airlines towelette found by the Millers at Thirsty Point, Cervantes in early July
2014 could only have come from the Penang Longitude Deep Hole (PL) location. That
conclusion refuted 7th arc locations as the source of MH370 debris, and furthermore suggests
that beachings along the Australian coast were possible.
Here, I model drifters using a more accurate updated database of ocean currents
from CSIRO. I developed an innovative new drift algorithm (The MH370 Drift Algorithm)
using well-known observations of drifters following swiftest currents, and recent advances
in our understanding of significant biases between drifters and data-assimilated ocean
model currents. I investigated whether the relatively rapid find (about 6 months after the
crash) could be due to the wing, or other large MH370 debris, hitching a ride in the Leeuwin
Current ocean-super-highway. Remarkably, model simulations showed drifters could have
"Seeing a ship on shore, wrecked or beached is really bizarre, it's the perfect
example of something that's not meant to be" Dr James Hunter III1-
commenting on South Australia’s shipwrecks.
drifted ~3000 kilometers with the Leeuwin Current to the precise focal “chokepoint”
discovery site, offshore of the treacherous South Australian shipwreck coast, within the
expected timeframe or sooner. This finding was supported by observations from the NOAA
Ocean Drifter Program. Further, item(s) may have drifted off to Bass Strait either to beach on
the western coast of Tasmania’s Flinders Island (or in depths less than the debris length).
Failing that they would have existed through Bass Strait’s “Eye of the Needle” to be
advected south by the extended East Australia Current. Then turning east at the bottom end
of Tasmania to head off to southern New Zealand on a lengthy circumpolar trip along the
northern edge of the Sub-Antarctic Front. More likely, the item is still near where it was left
(~100 m depth) or at the bottom of the continental slope (>4000 m) from a nearby canyon.
Our “Precautionary-Principles” investigation concludes that we should have taken
this discovery seriously, even if it proved false. We also conclude that many debris items
(not positively attributable to MH370) could have beached along the western and southern
Australian coasts, particularly the treacherous coasts south of the Abrolhos Islands and
along South Australia, perhaps even in Bass Strait and beyond.
Lastly, if correct, these drift simulations from the Penang Longitude Deep Hole lends
added credibility to that start-location as the only site where MH370 lies either within and/or
near the edge of a narrow secret ultra-deep 6000 m hole, 1500 km west of Perth. It is an
extremely difficult site to search by sonars due to its depth and ruggedness. No doubt it was
selected specially for that reason! Regardless of the wing investigation, all other discarded
evidence, new evidence including a debris trail from the site and hidden riddles in the Pilot
Simulator Track all point to this precise location. Its confirmation does not depend on the
outcome of the Kit Olver’ find, but Kit’s find does depend on it, if the debris is from MH370.
History will record where MH370 is and whether or not it has its right wing intact or
outboard flap – a vindication or refutation of results reported here as a precautionary
measure. However, regardless of findings, no vindication is possible for those who did not
choose a precautionary approach; they are adrift on MH370 debris and in for a very rough
ride!
1. Background
Veteran skipper Christopher (Kit) Olver knows very well what it means to be an
MH370 “rejected one” after being shunned for reporting to authorities in September-October
2014 that he snagged in his fishing net, off Robe, what he thought may have been a wing
from MH370. Officials instead told him that what he caught was a shipping container.
Precaution was thrown out as they were never going to investigate Kit’s claim.
Here, we take a precautionary approach to investigate whether or not a large debris
item could have broken off from MH370, and if so, whether it could have floated and then
drifted to the location off Robe within the estimated discovery time. In other words, are the
necessary conditions met to support the discovery as being plausible from MH370. We are
not saying that the discovery was an MH370 wing, or other large debris from MH370. What
we are asking is: “was it possible?” And even if it was, we are not saying that it is from
MH370. We are merely taking the first step in doing any due-diligence investigation to
assess all scenarios and ask if any are plausible.
For example, there were two theories of what happened to MH370: (1) a theory of
fuel-starvation resulting in the aircraft undergoing a high-speed dive with “fluttering-flaps”;
and (2) a secret “controlled ditching” mastermind plot for MH370 to be never discovered.
The official theory (1) led to failed locations at the western end of Broken Ridge, while (2)
would have led to the deep hole locations, of small areas, at the eastern end (Lyne 2022b). A
Precautionary Approach that considered both would have resulted in searches of narrow
deep holes sites at the eastern end before search ships headed off to the western end (with
no need for any substantive extra travel distance). But as it stands, as shown in Figure 1,
search ships, and other research ships, were mapping bathymetry lines whilst heading to the
west and passed south and north of the Penang Longitude Deep Hole (PL Hole). If any one
of those ships had passed over the location, I would not be writing this report as MH370
would either be found, or my theory would be relegated to the over-full failed-theory bin,
which by the way is in urgent need of over-due emptying.
The other significant point to make about the search is that now that we know the
southern Pilot-in-Command (PIC) simulated track held the secret location of MH370 (Lyne
2023b, 2023c), searches should focus on mapping along that PIC track near the anticipated
landing location, rather than the 7th arc.
Figure 1 Location of the Penang Longitude Deep Hole in relation to high-resolution multi-beam mapped data (masked in
red), overlaid on GEBCO bathymetry data based on low-resolution satellite data. High-resolution mapping tracks pass north
and south of PL.
Opportunities to rectify this sad investigation of MH370 are slipping by whilst
officials stick with their failed theory and searches, rather than being brutally honest and
saying we are not certain but we will take a Precautionary Approach that considers all
reasonable possibilities.
We focus here on simulations of the potential drift of a large MH370 debris to reach
offshore of Robe, South Australia by at the end of October 2014 (as Mr. Olver was uncertain
of the exact date but suggested it was in September - October 2014). Theories of MH370, and
how to use science principles to assess them, are relegated to the Appendix and we focus on
Penang Longitude Deep Hole
the only location as the source of the possible debris: the Penang Longitude Deep Hole (PL)
that so far has reconciled all discarded evidence and uncovered new evidence including
hidden riddles in the Pilot Simulator Track. Suffice to note for now that the location is
approximately at the intersection of the 33oS latitude with the longitude of Penang (Figure
1). Please refer to the MH370 reports available on my Researchgate page and listed at the
end of this report for additional background information on the integrated theory. Just for
background, the brief summary of the theories is given below.
As discussed previously, the search for MH370 was officially decided between one of
two competing theories rather than a precautionary one that considered both together. The
official theory was fuel-starvation at the 7th arc followed by a high-speed dive. This theory
failed to find the plane, or any debris along that arc, despite a huge area being search
(120,000 km2) at great expense involving many months of ship crews being sent out to one of
the most inhospitable and dangerous oceanic regions on the planet. The alternate theory was
one of “controlled ditching”, as documented by Larry Vance, combined with the unravelled
mastermind plan that I discovered, hidden in riddles in the Pilot Simulator Tracks (Lyne
2023b, 2023c), to secretly fly MH370 to the ultra-deep 6000 m hole at the PL location. Precise
planning to this location included very careful studies of the seafloor, fuel consumption, and
most probably included a no-power or low-power glide phase before the final landing
phase—to ensure fuel was available for full-power control during landing as near level as
possible on the ocean surface as explained by Larry Vance in his book. Experienced retired
pilots also agree with this assessment of powered (attempted) controlled-ditching at the end.
What is generally not appreciated is that this glide phase was most likely conducted before
the final landing phase so that fuel would be available for the full-power near-level landing.
The end of the glide landing was most likely also at the 7th arc when electronic systems were
being switched back on briefly and the plane was in a relatively steep but controlled descent
to the south east (the southerly track claimed by the official theory was not possible (Lyne
2022a) ). Both the official theory and the new PL theory have the plane at or near fuel
exhaustion so there is no disagreement on that criteria, and both track lengths are about the
same as I explain in the towelette discovery report (Lyne 2023d):
“Hence, it is of no surprise that both paths end near fuel exhaustion – the fundamental
premise of the failed search theory which also applies equally to the PL Hole theory.”
But the critical difference is the official theory is an “uncontrolled” crash, but the PL
Hole theory is precisely “controlled” in almost all aspects except the failed attempt at a “no-
debris controlled ditching” in the wild Southern Ocean; and one of the reasons for this
report. Success at that final stage of a mastermind plot would have hidden MH370 for a very
long time, till accidental discovery in the very distant future. But here we are, large MH370
debris have washed ashore and now we investigating the possibility that a whole wing or
other large debris may in fact have broken off; all indications that the mastermind plot did
not go as planned. Sure, it could have if the Southern Ocean was as calm as Hudson River!
But those of us who have been out to the “roaring 40’s, even in large sea-worthy research
vessels know that a commercial plane landing on the Southern Ocean will not end well! In
fact, it’s a wonder that not many more debris did not get emitted from MH370, so there was
an extraordinary attempt at the landing which could have failed more disastrously.
Larry Vance and colleagues previously concluded from their meticulous forensic
debris reanalysis (also shunned and criticized by officials) that MH370 most probably
breached the fuselage at the wing-root; possibly breaking off at that point, or else is still
attached but broken (Larry Vance, pers. comm.). Here, I suggest that with the engine becoming
detached under catastrophic impact, plus massive upward bending wing pressure, and full-
frontal leading-edge impact, fracture of the wing just inboard of the engine mount may also
fracture the wing near the flaperon supports and set the flaperon free. Hence, despite some
reservation on complete detachment, beyond-necessary precautionary conditions exist for a
broken wing or other large MH370 debris, which may also clarify the possible manner of
separation of flaperon and flap. Also, heaving Southern Ocean waves may have repeatedly
flexed any brittle fractures to complete separation.
The meticulous reassessments by Larry Vance (retired veteran and decorated
Canadian aircraft crash investigator) and colleagues (Vance 2018) concluded that MH370
glide-landed under full engine power, with hydraulic pumps operating to activate wing
flaps. According to the PL Theory, the landing had to be nailed precisely right above the
deepest part of the deep hole. With fuel running low, and Southern Ocean waves
threatening to spoil the meticulous plan, the plane HAD to land. But this was no Hudson-
River landing! With a massive storm raging further southwest in the Southern Ocean, panic
would have ensued from the unplanned event of the right wing catastrophically ploughing
through a Southern Ocean wave. The flaperon and flaps were in an extended position
(presumably to arrest the landing precisely) and suffered trailing-edge damage, causing
substantial upward bending forces (as water is ~830-times denser than air) on the wing (~36
m length) and the long flap (~13.4 m) causing fracturing of various supports, breakage of the
flap, and frontal impact that would have ripped off the engine and caused a breach at the
wing-root (Vance 2018). The flap, detached of its hydraulic mounts, was also free to flail
about both during the landing (as explained by Larry), and if still attached in the ocean,
waves would continually cause further damage and detachment; this may be a much more
reasonable explanation compared to the “fluttering flaps” proposed by theorists wedded
intimately to their failed high-speed dive scenario. The nature of the wing-root damage was
severe enough to allow internal parts to escape. Whether or not the right wing fractured off
at the wing-root is an open question that none of us can answer. Likewise, there is the
question of what happened to the outboard end of the flap. The ~3.5 m inboard end was
discovered in Tanzania, which leaves open the question of what happened to the remaining
longer ~10 m outboard flap piece. Precaution dictates that we assume that it was indeed
possible for a large debris (wing or flap) to have detached. The next question is whether or
not it could have floated, and then whether it could have drifted to the discovery site on
time. And then the question of why this drift was so different to the others ending in the
western Indian Ocean.
On floatation, both the large MH370 flaperon and inboard flap floated for many
months (more than 15) before being found. However, across history, one of the larger
floating debris pieces was a substantial tail section from Air France 447 as seen in Figure 2,
which appeared to float very close to the surface with more than enough buoyancy to
support the added weight of salvage workers.
Figure 2 Left: Floating tail section from Air France 447 that crashed in the Atlantic in 2009 (Image credit: Brazil Air Force).
Right: Large domed canister from a rocket washed up on Green Beach in July 2023 (Image credit: Australian Space Agency).
Not related, but still significant in terms of large debris, was the domed canister from
a rocket found at Green Beach, Western Australia in 2023 (Figure 2, right image). This item
was just north of the Malaysian Airlines towelette discovery whose drift I simulated using
CSIRO’s drift model with a standard drift formula (Lyne 2023d). Evidence is there that both
small and very large pieces of aircraft/rocket debris, designed specifically with strong light-
weight materials are capable of floating in the ocean, particularly if they are designed to
contain fuel as the domed canister was, or within the wing of an aircraft.
Let’s take another look also at US Airways 1549, which was forced to land on the
Hudson River after a bird strike in January 2009. Despite a successful “controlled ditching”,
by Captain Sully and First Officer Jeffrey Skiles, on the relatively placid river, there was
significant damage from landing on the river as shown in Figure 3, Figure 4, and Figure 5.
Damage included: a detached left engine; part of the right wing missing but with engine
largely intact; damage to both frontal leading-edge wing areas just above the engine;
substantial damage to flaperon and flaps with many missing/fractured pieces particularly
the right-hand side.
Figure 3 Right image shows damage to the left-hand side engine of US Airways 1549, while left image shows an intact
engine on the right-hand side. Note damage to wing just above the engines. Crumpled left engine indicates hydroplane
impact damage to the bottom half. (Images from the internet).
Figure 4 Images of the right engine showing the front largely intact but with rear coverings damaged. Note also the
substantial damage to the leading edge of the wing above the engine. (Image credit: David Daoust)
Figure 5 Images showing damage to the flaperon (missing), flaps and wing-tip on the right hand side, and damaged/missing
flaperon/flap behind the engine on the left hand side. (Images from the internet)
Captain Sully ditched at a slow speed of 120 knots (~220 km/hr) with flaps extended
to the intermediate “Position 2” rather than full flaps. Even with this slow speed,
intermediate flap extension and calm conditions, there was substantial damage to the rear of
the wing from hydrodynamic forces. The impact of the forces is clearly obvious to the left
engine which seemed to hydroplane with a substantial chunk of the flaperon/flap at the rear
detaching with the engine—supporting Larry Vance’s assessment that MH370 was also
ditched with flaperon and flaps extended.
A demonstration is clearly useful to prove floatation, even though we know that
aircraft are designed to float for long periods if the fuselage is intact. But for now, without
access to conduct the tests, we just have to take a precautionary approach and assume some
large item from MH370 did float off. We reserve our conclusion as to what it might have
been but the evidence is there that MH370’s right wing and flaps did suffer catastrophic
impact. Likewise, the 15-months’ drift of the ~2.4-meter long MH370 flaperon to Réunion
Island also ensures necessary conditions for flotation, especially considering that the wings
have substantial fuel tanks—mostly empty in the case of MH370.
The floatation of the flaperon has been the subject of detailed field trials by CSIRO
(Griffin, Oke, and Jones 2017) with a critical reappraisal of the flaperon posture in relation to
wind/turbulence and a statistically robust reassessment of the CSIRO drift formulation by
me (Lyne 2023a). Suffice to say that the flaperon was significantly buoyant and hence
primarily located near the surface but its posture and drift rates reduced towards open
ocean values as turbulence increased but were still much faster (2%) than standard (1.2%).
Suffice also to say that it did not come from the official 7th arc location.
On the other hand, the recovered inboard part of the flap, shown in Figure 2 has
received far less attention with the drift model investigations. From the water marks, it
appears to have had a small portion of the upper surface exposed but unlike the flaperon it
appeared to have floated right-side up (as per posture in flight). All exposed trailing edges
seemed to be below water, hence it did not appear to take up a “sailing” posture as the
flaperon did.
Drift rates for this piece would therefore be at about standard rates consistent with
its later find in Tanzania on the 24 June 2016, compared to 29 July 2015 for the flaperon at
Réunion Island (shorter distance travelled). However, simulations with the standard CSIRO
model from the PL location showed arrival was possible by the end of August 2015 (Lyne
2023d) but we are not sure anyone was looking for debris at that location. But it also raises
the question that if this item had remained on the beach for a substantial portion of time, the
water mark lines may not be related to its posture in the ocean. Also note that the flaperon
had barnacle encrustation but these are not visible on the flap. One reason might be that the
flap was constantly under water for most of the time, whereas the flaperon had significant
exposed sections as evident by its higher drift rate. We leave the water marks and barnacles
as open questions for others to investigate.
Figure 6 Left: Top and bottom views of the recovered inboard section from the right wing, with insert to show water-line
mark. Note the clear water-line marks in the end piece closest to the right in the lower images. Assuming the darker
markings are below the water line, both images indicate that only a small portion of the flap section was mainly above water
(the clearer sections with little/no brown stains). Transparent blue polygons indicate the region above water. Right: Blender
illustrations of possible orientation in the water. Top image is top view of the surface with outline of flap below. Bottom is
horizontal view looking from under the surface. Note flap is horiontally inclined in the water and tending to float up rather
than sitting vertically. Blue arrow points up, other arrows are horizontal. Left image credit: ATSB.
My recent drift studies of debris from the crash site has brought into sharp question
both the 7th arc theory and the official studies of the drift of debris including the flaperon
from the 7th arc. In the official study, initial studies with a standard formula of drift speed
equal to 1.2% of the wind speed (plus a tapered speed-up component) found that the
flaperon was four months delayed in reaching Réunion Island. As I reported in a
comprehensive review of the CSIRO official study, the revised flaperon drift included a
perpetual-motion 10 cm/s drift in addition to the standard 1.2% formula (Lyne 2023a). The
origin of the perpetual term was traced to observations of flaperon drift (real Boeing
flaperon cutout to mimic observed damage) in the very calm semi-enclosed North-West Bay
of Tasmania. These observations were in very calm, low wind conditions that allowed the
flaperon to maintain a stable tail-up “sailing” posture into the wind. This posture and sailing
speeds do not translate to the wild Southern Ocean turbulent conditions. Corrections for the
stable conditions indicated that the flaperon does indeed drift faster at near 2% of the wind
speed. But unfortunately, even this faster-than-standard drift left the flaperon 3000 km short
of reaching Réunion Island (Lyne 2023a). The crash site was never at the 7th arc. We now
know that both the theory and the drift model were invalid. Likewise, all scientific analyses
purporting to support a 7th arc crash site contained scientific flaws as I explain in the
Appendix section on Preface to MH370 Theories.
Now we face the question of why even a large piece of MH370 debris will not drift at
either a standard drift rate or perhaps even faster as demonstrated with the flaperon. And if
so, why its trajectory is not similar to the flap (and flaperon) towards the north-western
Indian Ocean off Africa, but instead to South Australia. One answer is that the drift of a
large debris may well be more submerged and hence flowing primarily at the rate of surface
ocean currents without the added Stokes Drift component. We take up this question in the
next section.
To summarise, we have necessary information that a large debris could have
fractured off and floated from the PL location. What remains then is the necessary
conditions for drift from that site to the discovery location.
2. Drift Model
The key differences between the drift model used here and past studies are:
1. Due to the large nature of the debris, we assume that the debris drifts only
with the ocean current in the top layer of the ocean model (Ekman and
geostrophic currents), with no added Stokes Drift component.
2. Recent studies which I participate in by Su et al. (2023) show that ocean
current models severely underestimate the speed of observed Argo drifters,
even in mid-depths of the ocean. In a follow-up study to be reported soon, a
senior co-author of that study, Fan Rong (top Chinese Academy of Sciences
PhD candidate) suggests global ocean models need to be sped up by up to
~50%. Here, we use the results from BRAN2020 which uses multiple
variables and data assimilation that corrects the mesoscale dynamics (as
before in BRAN2015) and includes an extra coarse step that corrects large
scale biases. This reduces biases by 30%. Implications for our drift model is
that we will need to increase model current speeds particularly for high-
current regions where biases are largest but perhaps not as much with the
more accurate BRAN2020.
3. In a pioneering study, Kirwan et al. (1978) make the remarkable observation
that: “Finally it seems that the drifters tend to find and follow the strongest
currents”. Implications here are that weak lateral currents tending to entrap
drifters within the core of swiftest currents may not be captured in coarse
model grids of 0.1o which may span across current jets (as Fan Rong will
report in his upcoming study). What this means for our drift study is that we
will need to “nudge” drifters to ensure that once they reach a core current,
we use the swiftest current near the drifter location to advect it along. This is
an innovation and departure from current models that cannot maintain
drifters in the core of currents due to a lack of ability in modelling the weak
lateral currents, especially with coarse grids. This inability means that all
past drifter studies may be deficient in not being able to guide drifters along
the paths of swiftest currents as concluded by Kirwan et al. (1978) and soon
to be demonstrated by Fan Rong.
4. Finally, the BRAN2020 model masks land pixels with a NaN number. NaNs
are Not-a-Number and any mathematical operation with NaNs returns a
NaN. In essence our drift study will be terminated if we encounter a NaN!
To circumvent pre-mature termination, we changed NaNs to zeros. With this
change, drifters are slowed down as they approach land and there may be
sufficient time to escape being beached. Although, as we show in the
simulations that even with this non-stick condition, locations such as the
coast of South Australia and western coast of Flinders Island prevent escape
due to their intricate coastal complexity and abrupt barrier to ocean currents.
One of the reasons these coasts have entrapped many ships to their untimely
end, along with any drifters that wander into these maritime traps.
These modifications were incorporated into the simple one-step ahead drift
algorithm. One key issue is how these large debris might orient themselves in the water
column. In particular, whether they have any surfaces exposed out of the water surface, like
the flaperon had at times of low wind stress and turbulence, or whether long structures may
orient more vertically with little surface exposed but with various surfaces experiencing
different currents due to ocean currents varying with depths even as shallow as 1 – 10
meters from the surface.
The relative sizes of the potential debris items are shown in Figure 4. It is clear that
the wing is a far far more sizable piece than the other two recovered items! At ~30 m length
and sizable width, there is no mistaking what it is if it did float off and get snagged in a net.
The alternative is the outboard end of the flap.
Figure 7 Location of the recovered flaperon (yellow) and inboard flap (red outline), together with the outboard end of the flap
(left of recovered piece). Image credit: ATSB/DSTG.
Compared to the recovered inboard end, it is much longer at near 10 m length. As
neither was recovered in western Indian Ocean (and they would have been very easy to
spot!), we are left with considering the only other option that either piece would largely be
more vertically oriented due to one of the ends being less buoyant than the other. But,
perhaps still inclined to some extent. Without going into too much technical detail as we are
missing vital information on the find by Kit Olver, we assume that, for precautionary
argument’s sake, the debris item is long enough to straddle the current shear (difference
between surface and deeper current) across the top layer. Typically, this would be the
Ekman layer which has typical scales of about 50 m in mid-latitudes (but varies with wind
speed).
The implication of debris items of ~10 m scale or longer sitting vertically across
currents that are stronger at the surface and weaker below is that the debris is effectively
being pushed along by the stronger surface current whilst being dragged back by the
weaker deeper current as illustrated in Figure 5. One would intuitively assume that this
would result in the debris moving somewhat slower than the surface current, but this is not
necessarily so as there are lateral forces at play that may exert a sideways velocity (in
addition to the Ekman spiral velocities) somewhat like a sail piece. So, the speed of the
debris (from addition of velocity components) could perhaps be greater, but not in the same
direction as the surface current. A more critical dynamic is that by being pushed at the
surface and dragged below, the debris would tend to lift up from the bottom towards the
surface and hence drift along more horizontally and experience a faster net current speed.
The faster current in turn reduces the drag (neglecting horizontal sideways forces). This is a
negative feedback situation that can stabilize the direction and position of debris drift in the
water column, or alternatively having it in an unstable oscillatory motion.
Figure 8 Illustration of the effect of current shear (neglecting Ekman Sprial effects) on a long debris object. Surface currents
push the top against drag from slower bottom currents. The net effect is to lift the object towards the faster surface currents.
To examine the stability and orientation, a simple model can be constructed where
the nett vertical Lift force on the object is balanced by the now hydrodynamically
unbalanced weight due to the rotation (about the surface-pivot end). In other words, if the
stable buoyancy forces only support the weight, then rotating it around will require a
vertical force, which in turn will lift the surface end up. It’s all a bit complex but intuitively
we know that the bottom end will lift up and become more horizontal. Without going into a
detailed model, the simple force balances can be parameterized as:
=∫2
0 (1)
Where, Lift is the Lift Force about the center of buoyant mass. V is the current speed
which varies with z – assumed linear with velocity V0 at the surface and VL at a depth of L
corresponding to the vertical length of the object. is an overall constant scaling factor. D is
the depth at the deep end of the inclined object. We assume that the object is inclined at a
declination angle of θ from the horizontal so that:
D = cos(θ) (2)
Further, we simplify the object as being of uniform mass per unit length—which it
clearly isn’t because one end is more buoyant than the other, but let’s put this aside for the
sake of getting an overall big-picture of what is going on.
The balance of forces then provides the constraint that:
sin3(θ) ≈ WL (0 / )2 cos(θ) (3)
Where, WL is a static combined coefficient that expresses the ratio of (static) weight
and how lift varies with the square of speed (depends on area and roughness). Hence, small
WL values imply weight is relatively low and hence lift will exert more relative horizontal
rotation, and vice-versa for the opposite. These relationships are illustrated in Figure 6,
which shows near horizontal posture for low values of WL up to a ratio of about 0.1 and
then a somewhat slower than linear trend for higher values. As the wing is an airfoil shape,
we expect WL values to be low (high lift for low mass). The variation with velocity shear
(0 / ) profile (lower plot in Figure 6) for shear above about 4 (surface velocity 4 times
velocity at object-length depth), the posture is largely horizontal, and in any case most likely
to not exceed ~50 degrees even for very low shear values.
The principal conclusion of these analyses is that the object will mostly float at a
fairly horizontal slant angle, particularly in swifter currents with strong shear profiles. The
implication is that the swifter the flow, the more of the object is in the surface layer and the
faster the drift of the object. We have not considered lateral deviations which may well add
an additional speed component. But sufficient justification exists for us to simply assume
that the object will drift with the surface layer current (the top 2.5 m in the case of
BRAN2020). This is a somewhat different drift than the drift of other debris which involved
a Stokes Drift component. We are also facing a difference for the situation where the debris
does hitch a ride in a swift boundary current. Let’s proceed then to examine the simulated
results.
Figure 9 Variation of the buoyant object declination angle (from ocean surface) as a function of the Weight/Lift ratio (top
image) and with the ocean current velocity (speed) index, which is the ratio of the speed at the surface divided by the speed
corresponding to the depth of the object length (at D = L).
3. Results
To set the background on the environment during the drift months, Figure 7 shows
monthly sea-surface temperatures from March to October 2014. Of particular note is that
from about April to July, the Leeuwin Current (less obvious in earlier months) appears to
terminate at about the location of Robe in South Australia. The Leeuwin Current is very
distinct with a warmer signature than the surroundings particularly in June and July 2014.
This would indicate a swift current flowing all the way from about Cape Leeuwin to South
Australia; indeed, swift enough that the temperature signal is preserved despite the cooling
that occurs generally as currents go from west to east.
Figure 10 Satellite sea-surface monthly temperature for March to October 2014. Note the distinct extension of the Leeuwin
Current in the images for June and July 2014. Black represents temperatures outside a high threshold and redder
temperatures are higher. The location of the PL and the town of Robe are shown (if you can make it out!).
It comes as no surprise that the site off South Australia where the Leeuwin Current
terminates is littered with shipwrecks, just like the coast of Western Australia south of the
Abrolhos Islands (and including the islands) (Lyne 2023d). Both are locations where current
systems are funneled into a narrowing continental shelf and therefore are prone to drift
ships and debris onto the coast or islands jutting out from the coast, as mapped in Figure 8
for South Australia. However, in our case the Kit-Olver find is in water offshore that is about
100 m deep, but still that area is part of the funneling effect from a narrowing continental
shelf so any debris running with the Leeuwin Current risks the possibility of either beaching
or getting caught up in fishing, as ecologically the funneling effect , or “chokepoint” as I’ve
called it, is also important for biological species such as fish as documented in a chapter I
wrote in Hayes et al. (2008).
Figure 11 Location of shipwrecks, including inland river ones, along the coast of South Australia. Location of the discovery
by Kit Olver is indicated by the cyan open circle. Note the increasing density of shipwrecks to the east of that site
corresponding to a narrowing of the continental shelf. Image provided by www.naturemaps.sa.gov.au.
Simulations were ran with a number of options:
1. No speedup and no guidance: Most of these did not make it to the discovery site
on time and generally headed north of the landing site with a few surprisingly
beaching just south of the towelette discovery site (Thirsty Point, Cervantes) at
about the time the towelette was discovered. This seems to indicate that the
towelette was largely advecting with the ocean currents as captured in
BRAN2020 (an update of the BRAN2015 used in the towelette simulations). These
results add credibility to the claim that the towelette was indeed from MH370 at
the PL location, but more “unguided” due to its light weight and surface position
making it prone to some Stokes Drift randomness as simulated in Lyne (2023d).
2. Speed up and guidance: At first guidance was fixed to the east—meaning that at
each drifter location we searched two pixels along the longitude to find the
maximum west-to-east current speed. This was then used at the drifter location.
We then varied the speedup (factor that the ocean model current speed was
multiplied with) and implemented guidance based on the general direction that
we expected the Leeuwin Current to flow, but still restricting the search to only
two pixels either side of the drifter location but in either or both dimensions as
dictated by the general direction of the current. This worked surprisingly well in
keeping the drifter aligned with the core of the Leeuwin Current as simulated in
the BRAN2020 data.
3. The unexpected outcome of these simulations is that I didn’t need to simulate
hundreds or thousands of particles but just changes in speedup as once the object
hitched a ride in the Leeuwin Current, it was very much captured within the
current, even if it was temporarily diverted by eddies associated with the current,
it was always welcomed back eventually to the core.
Final simulation results are shown in Figure 9. The base-case of no speedup and
west-to-east guidance ends well short of the target location by the end of the simulation end
period at the end of October 2014. With a Speedup = 1.1 (10% faster than BRAN2020 current
speeds), the drifter beaches at Robe (at the coast) on the 13th of September 2014. This track
arrives fairly quickly even though it headed initially in a north-east direction to just offshore
of the Abrolhos Island (and may well have beached there if allowed to). It then caught the
Leeuwin Current but still looped offshore before finally catching the swift Leeuwin Current
of June – July and quickly made its way across to the Great Australian Bight before finally
coming to terminal grief at Robe. The end time is within the timeframe Kit Olver estimated
of September to October 2014. Higher speedups of 1.21 lead to an exit out of Bass Strait and
down the Tasmanian coast (with the extended East Australian Current). A slight increase of
Speedup to 1.22 leads to a termination on the western coast of King Island on the 8th October
2014. Given the results, a 1.1 speedup or slightly less (depending on the exact date of find by
Kit Olver) provides a very surprising confirmation that a large debris object could have
floated from the PL location to the discovery site well within the expected time. Amazing
really! Not what I expected to be honest!
+
Figure 12 Simulated drifter tracks using current speedup factors (shown in Legend) and selection of fastest current two
pixels either side of drifter location. The baseline case of Speedup = 1 is for no speedup and guidance restricted to west-to-east
current only.
4. Evidence from the Global Drifter Program
Is there any evidence available from drifter results from the many years of added
drift results since the work done by CSIRO in 2017? I analysed data from NOAA’s Global
Drifter Program to:
• Check on pathways
• Timings to go across GAB
• Ending locations
I also analyzed two special drifter deployments: one resulting in it being near the
MH370 location when it landed. Another deployment was in the Southern Ocean but made
it way to the western GAB before traversing across the GAB with the Leeuwin Current
ending its journey just offshore of Kangaroo Island.
To explore the ambit of possible drifter paths transiting through the PL Hole
location, drifters passing through a rectangular box around the PL hole were selected from
the NOAA ERDDAP (Environmental Research Division's Data Access Program) data server
which provides procedures for downloading, graphing, and mapping subsets from very
large scientific databases in common file formats. We used the 6-hourly quality-controlled
interpolated dataset1.
The bounds of the selection box were narrow in the latitude direction and wider in
longitude. I chose these bounds as the PL hole is where currents are mostly zonal (guided by
the direction of Broken Ridge) but turn dramatically towards the northeast once past the PL
Hole. In effect the PL Hole is an oceanographic “chokepoint” (for definition, see Chapter I
wrote in Hayes et al. (2008)) whereby currents funnel in from the west and geostrophic
forces built up by the Broken Ridge are suddenly released at its eastern end. Currents then
curve around but variation of Coriolis and other oceanographic forces with latitude forces
currents to curve back, heading for “chokepoints” to the north and south of Madagascar.
Thus, the latitudinal position of drifters within the bounding box may control the later
trajectory with more southern drifters taking a longer curve to the northeast or possibly
towards Western Australian. The chosen bounds were:
Latitude: Lower bound: -33.5; Upper bound: -32.5 ( 1-degree range)
Longitude: Western bound: 98.0; Eastern bound: 102.5 (4.5-degrees range)
Keep in mind that NOAA drifters may be picked up and redeployed elsewhere so
there is no guarantee that once it passes through the search box, it will faithfully depict a
continuous track. Indeed, we will touch upon a special drifter which was near MH370 when
it landed but was then repositioned the next month, so its track was not depicting a
continuous path.
The NOAA Drifter tracks that entered the test box are shown in Figure 10. To ensure
that tracks were continuous and relevant to our study, we only used tracks up to 600 days
after they passed into the search box; also bearing in mind that the flaperon was discovered
just after 500 days adrift. Some debris, notably those found in Africa, were discovered after
this period. Even so, there is remarkable confirmation of the major MH370 drift discoveries
in the western Indian Ocean within the gamut of drifter tracks which passed the PL Hole.
Others have used this dataset and their own simulations with many more tracks (100’s to
many 1000’s in the case of simulations) and focus on a few, but here we have virtually all
tracks within the ambit of the discoveries. This includes the Malaysian Airlines towelette
discovered in early July 2014 which was ignored by officials as just a “common item” (Lyne
2023d); a label that will probably come to haunt official investigators in future. This gamut
of NOAA drifter tracks from the PL Hole adds further evidence to an overwhelming catalog
of evidence that this is where MH370 lies (Lyne 2022b).
However, with reference to the “wing” discovery, the disappointing finding from the
NOAA drifters is that, for whatever reason, none made it past about Cape Leeuwin, and
there were none making their way to the Great Australia Bight. One likely conclusion is that
during their drift, the likelihood of drifters crossing over to drift in the Leeuwin Current is
slim—but necessary to explain the towelette find That implies there were unusual
1 https://erddap.aoml.noaa.gov/gdp/erddap/tabledap/drifter_6hour_qc.html
conditions for the towelette discovery (winter storms) that did not coincide with the NOAA
drifters in that area.
Figure 13 Tracks taken by NOAA drifters up to 600 days after passing a rectangular box around the PL Hole location—
indicated by the green rectangular box with a red-cross. Colors of the tracks indicate range of days once drifters entered the
PL Hole box: Black: 0-100; Red: 100-200; Green: 200-300; Blue: 300-400; Cyan: 400-500; Purple: 500-600. MH370 debris
locations are indicated but note that these mostly occurred after 600 days. Note potential debris locations around Australia
(towelette and “wing”). The simulated drifter track that reached offshore of Robe is shown in magenta. Note also the absence
of NOAA drifter tracks throughout the Great Australia Bight.
To investigate absence of drifters in the GAB from the PL Hole, a test box was
located south and west of Cape Leeuwin to follow any drifters coming south with the
Leeuwin Current. The intention was to see whether any would make it into the GAB. This
test showed that there were drifters coming south and into the GAB but most ended their
drift by heading offshore or heading inshore to the head of the GAB. A test box around Robe
indicated that the bulk of drifters which beached or passed there were from offshore and not
the Leeuwin Current. These observations indicate two regimes of flow experienced by the
drifters: From the west the Leeuwin Current typically wanes before it reaches the head of
the GAB. This is to be expected as the well-known north-south driving forces that propels
the Leeuwin Current south along the West Australian coast now becomes a weakened west
to east force. However, near South Australia, the coastline once again has a north-south
oriented component allowing forces and the extended Leeuwin Current (called the Zeehan
Current off western Tasmania) to start up again. Hence the Robe drifters generally do not
come from the Leeuwin Current as it rounds Cape Leeuwin in the west. An immediate
implication, if we accept this interpretation of a divided Leeuwin Current, is that the “wing”
find is not from MH370! It can’t be as there is no way of drifting across the GAB, and the
source of the Robe drifters are from offshore. A disappointing conclusion in the end that
leaves one with a nagging thought this conclusion may be flawed if we are to believe Kit
Olver. The only explanation left is the obvious one from observations shown in Figure 7,
that the Leeuwin Current was only temporarily persistent from west to east during the
winter months of June-July 2014.
My search for the west-to-east link (and I was trying hard) was failing till I was
gathering material for the non-committal conclusion and noticed a NOAA publication that
showed all drifter tracks from 1979 in the Southern Ocean, as shown in Figure 11. There I
noticed what looked like a solitary track proceeding west to east across the Great Australia
Bight. That observation gave hope that the west-east journey could be made.
Figure 14 A plot from the NOAA Drifter Program showing all drifter tracks from 1979. Red-box zoomed in view to the
right shows a drifter track from west to east across the Great Australia Bight ending just west of Spencer’s Gulf in South
Australia.
I eventually found Drifter 5600502, shown in Figure 12 which was south of Cape
Leeuwin in December 2010 and then proceeded towards the Leeuwin Current in April 2011.
It subsequently proceeded swiftly to a termination off South Australia in very early August
2011. Maximal speeds of this drifter were as expected during the start of winter in May-June
of that year. This finding reassures us that drift across the GAB as simulated by our drift
model was in fact possible and takes us over the threshold of believing that the debris
discovered by Kit Olver could have been carried by the Leeuwin Current across the divide
of the two current systems linking up near the head of the GAB.
Figure 15 Top plot shows the track of Drifter 5600502 (red track) which headed up to the Leeuwin Current and made its
way to offshore of South Australia within a matter of months. Bottom-left plot shows the Drifter’s Longitude by date, which
indicates that the drifter was in the Leeuwin Current by April and made its way to South Australia by the 3rd August, 2011;
about 4 months to track across the GAB. The Longitude-speed plot to the right shows maximal speeds about May-June. The
black track in the upper plot is that for Drifter 5600557 which was near the MH370 landing site on the 8th March 2014. It
encircled the landing site for one-and-a-half loops before exiting and then terminating north east of the site on the 4th May
2014. The NOAA Drifter record indicates that it stopped transmitting; it would be interesting to understand why.
Unfortunately, we are not clear as yet to declare the Kit-Olver find was in fact a
debris from MH370. What we have clearly demonstrated is that sufficient conditions exist
for it to be from MH370. The alternative claim could legitimately be made that those self-
same conditions could have resulted in a different debris being advected from offshore (not
within the Leeuwin Current). We have no way of assessing the probability of this without
further information from the find.
In either case, the fate of the find, whether from MH370 or some other debris, is that
its drift either terminated near where it was found, or else despite being draped over by
weighted fishing gear it is still buoyant enough to drift away. A third possibility is that the
debris was in fact at the bottom of the seafloor at 100 m depth to begin with. In that case, it is
almost certainly not from MH370 as there is no way a debris of that size could have drifted
off and be fortuitously at the seafloor bottom at that time. The physics of such a situation is
not possible. Lastly, if the debris was weighted down enough to sink, all air pockets in the
honeycomb structure would have collapsed under the weight of near-ten atmospheres at 100
Leeuwin Current
m depth. With all air pockets collapsed, buoyancy also collapses and the debris would not
be able to continue its drift near the surface. Under such circumstances, work that I and
others have done on sediment transport down canyons on the continental slope (Lyne and
Butman 1986), would suggest that the debris will eventually finds its way to the nearest
canyon (under persistent gravitation drag), and once there, it would rapidly descend down
to the foot of the continental slope; which in that region is a long way down at over 4000 m
depth. That would obviously be a much much harder depth to search than 100 m. A lack of
precaution makes investigations nine years or more later almost impossible, but perhaps we
can only hope that the item is still near where it was left.
Finally, note that as shown in Figure 13 there is good agreement in the trend of drift
across the GAB by month between Drifter 5600502 and the 10% Speed-up simulation from
the PL Hole. The good agreement allows us greater confidence in calling for precautionary
due-diligence to be conducted, even at this very late stage, on Kit Olver’s find.
Figure 16 Comparison of the drift of Drifter 5600502 (red line) with the simulated drift from the PL Hole (blue line) by Date
since the 8th March, but note that these are for different years (2011 for Drifter and 2014 for simulation). Note the good
agreement overall in the trend of drift between the two. The green illustrative curve is the red one shifted over in time and
along Longitude to provide a matching endpoint.
Before we end the story of the Drifters, there is the remarkable story of one other,
Drifter 5600557, that was coincidentally very near the landing site of MH370 on the 8th
March 2014 as shown in Figure 14. At that time, all indications were that the drift at the
landing site was to the south-east, which is also evident in the Drifter track, which provides
some confirmation of drift agreement in general. However, the Drifter had lost it sea-surface
temperature (SST) signal before January 2014 (Figure 15) so we are unable to determine
what temperature was being experienced near the landing site. Temperatures were rising
rapidly before then but we are uncertain whether that was a sign of actual temperature or an
indication that the SST sensor was starting to become unreliable. It’s a great pity that the
drifter track terminated when it did as it would have closely mimicked the track of debris
from the site. An opportunity was lost but perhaps further investigation by NOAA may be
helpful to understand what happened to Drifter 5600557.
Figure 17 This plot shows the remarkable coincidence of Drifter 5600557 being near the MH370 landing site on the 8th
March 2014—indicated by the magenta cross. It subsequently did one-and-a-half loops around the landing site before
heading off north-east and terminating its transmission on the 4th May 2014.
Figure 18 Temperature (degrees Centigrade) record of Drifter 5600557 from December 2013. Unfortunately, the record
terminates and no SST data was being recorded during its drift near the MH370 landing site. The rapid rise in temperature
indicates either a sensor malfunction or the drifter rapidly proceeding north into warmer waters.
5. Conclusions
Against cautionary advice from colleagues, I sought to provide much-needed
support to Kit Olver for his claim in September-October 2014 that he had snagged what may
8th March 2014
PL Hole
have been a “wing” from a commercial jet airline. Oceanographically the only way for that
“wing” or other large debris from MH370 to reach that location was via the swift Leeuwin
Current. I developed a novel guided-drift algorithm (named MH370 Drift Algorithm) to
concord with our best understanding of how drifters behave in the open ocean and within
swift currents like the Leeuwin Current. Simulations with the algorithm provided sound
confirmation that the drift was indeed possible all the way from the only location which
reconciles all MH370 evidence: the Penang Longitude Deep Hole. This is a very surprising
and remarkable finding! Analyses of past drifters suggests that during early winter, the
western and eastern segments of the Leeuwin Current which are nominally segregated,
were joined temporarily to enable drift from west to east. NOAA Drifter 5560502 provided
the observational support for such a drift. Another Drifter 55600557 was fortuitously located
near the landing site on the 8th March 2014 but its sensors were failing and it eventually
terminated in May 2014, but its drift provided confirmation of the simulated drift pattern
after landing. Taking all these findings into consideration, I conclude that there is more than
sufficient evidence for a precautionary investigation to be conducted of Kit Olver’s find.
Further information is required of the find. But the debris item is likely to be still near where
Kit left it (easy search), or at the bottom of the continental slope of a nearby canyon (much
much more difficult search).
6. MH370 Dedication
As with all my other works, I dedicate the novel drift algorithm developed in this
study to the innocent lost in MH370, and name it the MH370 Drift Algorithm.
Funding: This research received no external funding.
Acknowledgments: I am extremely grateful to those responsible for developing and
maintaining the updated BRAN2020 model of CSIRO. Thank you also to my
colleagues for their concern that I might be embarking on a study that might derail my
reputation (which some, in any case, would consider derailed already!). A special
thanks to Kit Olver for his courage in reporting his find, and to Tony Wright (associate
editor and special writer for The Age and The Sydney Morning Herald) for publishing
the story. To Larry Vance, a special thank you for his patient and knowledgeable
answers to all my questions on MH370 debris. As always, a sincere thank you to the
unknown voices for providing the insights. Rest in peace.
Conflicts of Interest: The author declares no conflict of interest.
7. References
Davey, Sam, Neil Gordon, Ian Holland, Mark Rutten, and Jason Williams. 2016. Bayesian Methods in the
Search for MH370 (Springer Singapore).
Griffin, D.A., P.R. Oke, and E.M. Jones. 2017. "The search for MH370 and ocean surface drift – Part II."
In, 26pp. Hobart. Australia: CSIRO Oceans and Atmosphere.
Hayes, K. R., V. Lyne, J. M. Dambacher, R. Sharples, and R. Smith. 2008. "Ecological Indicators for the
Exclusive Economic Zone Waters of the South‐West Marine Region. Final report (08/82)." In.
Hobart. Tasmania. Australia: CSIRO.
Holland, Ian D. 2018. 'MH370 burst frequency offset analysis and implications on descent rate at end
of flight', IEEE Aerospace and Electronic Systems Magazine, 33: 24-33.
Kirwan, A. D., G. J. McNally, E. Reyna, and W. J. Merrell. 1978. 'The Near-Surface Circulation of the
Eastern North Pacific', Journal of Physical Oceanography, 8: 937-45.
Lyne, V. 2023a. "“Drift” Versus “Sail” of MH370 Flaperon to Réunion Island." In, 26. Hobart, Australia.
Lyne, V. D., and B. Butman. 1986. 'Chapter 3: Sand Transport and Fine Particle Suspension Within and
Around Lydonia Canyon.' in Bradford Butman (ed.), Environmental Geologic Studies on the
United States Mid and North Atlantic Outer Continental Shelf Area, 1980-1982, Vol. II. Final Report
to the Bureau of Land Management (U.S. Department of the Interior: Geological Survey (USGS):
Woods Hole. Massachusetts. USA.).
Lyne, Vincent. 2022a. 'Final Communications from MH370 Supports Controlled Eastward Descent
Scenario', Journal of Navigation, (Under Review).
———. 2022b. 'There Lies MH370: Sights and Sounds Point to Iconic Deep Ocean Site', Researchgate: 44.
———. 2023b. "MH370 Flight Hidden in Simulated Triple-Twist Riddle." In Researchgate, 7. Hobart.
Tasmania. Australia: Researchgate.
———. 2023c. "MH370 Malacca Track Riddle." In Researchgate, 7. Hobart. Tasmania. Australia:
Researchgate.
———. 2023d. "Towelette on Treacherous Australian Coast Escaped from MH370." In Researchgate, 7.
Hobart. Tasmania. Australia: Researchgate.
Su, Fenzhen, Rong Fan, Fengqin Yan, Michael Meadows, Vincent Lyne, Po Hu, Xiangzhou Song,
Tianyu Zhang, Zenghong Liu, Chenghu Zhou, Tao Pei, Xiaomei Yang, Yunyan Du, Zexun Wei,
Fan Wang, Yiquan Qi, and Fei Chai. 2023. 'Widespread global disparities between modelled
and observed mid-depth ocean currents', NATURE COMMUNICATIONS, 14: 2089.
Trouillot, Michel-Rolph 2015. Silencing the past : power and the production of history (Beacon Press).
Vance, Larry. 2018. MH370 Mystery Solved (Group of Three Publishing).
Appendix: Preface on MH370 Theories
With the possible discovery of the MH370 wing by Kit Olver, which is the main
subject of this report, we are yet again faced with questions not only about whether the wing
was from MH370 but which theory is able to explain the finding. The underlying science
principles for such an assessment are very clear but somewhat confused in the minds of the
public, officials, and some scientists. This preface sets out those principles and demonstrates
their application to the existing official theory and analyses so that we are all clear on how to
judge any claims of a new theory or evidence. Larry Vance puts forth a similar assessment of
theories in his book MH370 Mystery Solved (Vance 2018)(Location 1361) using “Known
Facts”.
Scientifically, theories of MH370’s location are, by human standards, brutally judged
without compassion as to whether or not they explain the available valid evidence, and
ultimately by a search of the theoretically predicted site. Brutal judgement of the “science”,
and those that led the investigations, is based upon simple principles:
1. ALL valid evidence must be reconciled to the correct location. ALL here means
ALL, with nothing left out or just one or more evidence appearing to be related to a
false location. No “ifs” or “buts” allowed here beyond valid assessments of location
uncertainties related to uncertainties in ALL evidence.
2. The sin in (1) is throwing out valid evidence as irrelevant or not related to MH370.
Simply stated, you may be searching for evidence in the wrong haystack and
thereby rejecting evidence related to the right haystack.
3. Ironically, harshest punishment in the end is reserved for those that brutally
misjudge valid theories or evidence put forth by others. In what I call “scenario
backlash”, the “rejected ones” with the correct location or evidence start rummaging
around for errors in the scientific reports that support the wrong location. Simply,
the science principle here is: all science supporting the wrong location is most
likely based on errors or application of invalid science. It just remains to be found
because the science principle says the error IS there. No amount of social media
news control, or premeditated blindness or deafness to evidence or other theories
will save these lost souls from being exposed. Science in the end has no feelings or
When reality does not coincide with deeply held beliefs, human beings tend to phrase interpretations that
force reality within the scope of these beliefs. They devise formulas to repress the unthinkable and to bring it
back within the realm of accepted discourse”. “Silencing the Past” (Trouillot 2015).
compassion, just honesty that is brutal to those with the wrong theory, and salvation
for those with the correct one.
And so it is, Judgement Day approaches in the search for MH370. Which side are you
on? Are you the one proposing wrong theories, rejecting valid evidence, and ignoring
alternate theories. Or are you a “rejected one” with the correct theory or evidence?
A way around this brutality is to take a “precautionary” approach that does not
reject reasonable evidence and reasonable alternate interpretations of evidence. Those that
take this approach do so as they do not wish to risk being wrong, as “consequences” may be
severe, such as MH370 not being found as possible valid evidence was ignored. But it does
oblige them to conduct careful due diligence before jumping to conclusions, and to answer
any legitimate questions about their decision/investigations. With a non-precautionary
failed search, what emerged in the case of MH370 was a “gambler’s ruin” strategy, with
claims that the location was just beyond the highly certain initial search boundaries, and the
search went on-and-on till it finally ran beyond extended boundaries and beyond available
funds. No progress with this impasse is possible unless alternative theories and evidence are
considered. Disaster otherwise awaits stubbornness to do so.
And then the Pandora’s Box of conspiracies and crazy theories ran rampant, and still
does. Leadership was lost and now anarchy prevails on social media, with officials stunned
into silence, or reluctant admission, without action, that alternate theories may be viable.
Science takes a battering, and so do scientists with alternate theories; except one “credible
one” who in 2022 was offered due diligence2 which resulted in Geoscience Australia
arduously and diligently reviewing, at taxpayers’ expense, 4,900 square kilometers of sonar
data at 30 cm x 30 cm resolution, with a negative conclusion3. Accusations then erupted on
an aviation news site that the due diligence was flawed4. To rub salt into the wound, the
“credible one” then altered the hijack theory to another different theory and another distant
location(s), with no reference to his previous “absolutely certain” theory/location.
Unbelievable, and no wonder officials don’t want to deal with any further theories! To
compound the confusion, social media groups turn on each other leaving the public, news
media, and officials all at a loss to understand what happened. In such circumstances,
science provides leadership in the ultimate test of any theory. Let’s leave this confusion
behind and revert to the science principles.
To demonstrate, let’s apply these principles to the official theory which assumed:
1. All onboard were disabled through hypoxia. The aircraft flew southerly
and ran out of fuel before accelerating into a high-speed dive and crash,
2 https://www.atsb.gov.au/media/news-items/2022/statement-on-mr-richard-godfrey-s-analysis-of-the-location-
for-missing-aircraft-mh370
3 https://www.atsb.gov.au/media/news-items/2022/mh370-data-review
4 https://www.airlineratings.com/news/serious-questions-raised-atsbs-review-mh370-data/
with flaps retracted. To quote from Peter Foley’s (former ATSB/MH370
Search Director) Senate Estimate testimony5:
Mr Foley : Perhaps I can just sum it up for you. Today, we have an analysis of the flap
that tells us it was probably not deployed. We have an analysis of the final two
transmissions that tell us the aircraft was in a high and increasing rate of descent.
We've got almost 30 pieces of debris from around the African coastline, some from
within the fuselage which indicate that there was significant energy on impact—we
won't hazard a guess at how much. So we have quite a bit of data to tell us that the
aircraft, if it was being controlled at the end, wasn't being controlled very successfully.
The flaps weren't deployed. Given the timing, that first logon request, if you like, is
most consistent with a scenario where the aircraft had exhausted its fuel. So we have
quite a lot of evidence to support there being no control at the end. That's the totality
of the evidence.
In disbelief at the official interpretation, a very careful, comprehensive and
integrated re-examination of all debris evidence was conducted by decorated veteran
Canadian air-crash investigator Larry Vance with colleagues providing expert advice: Terry
Heaslip advising on interpretations of the critical flap pan “witness mark”; Elaine Summers
on-site wreckage expertise; and Ted Parisee advising on crash-dynamics. All contributors
had careers with the Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) and were well qualified
to provide evidence. The outcome of that investigation was Larry concluding with "100 per
cent certainty" that Malaysian Airlines Flight 370 was intentionally ditched in the ocean by one of
the pilots…” (https://www.cbc.ca/news/mh370-flight-malaysian-airlines-crash-1.4665938).
Instead of well-deserved thanks, their efforts were criticized in public:
Larry’s work was presented to Mr Foley: Mr Foley said claims the ATSB had ignored a theory in
which the pilot flew the plane to the end were wrong. “There’s no earthly reason why someone
in control of an aircraft would exhaust its fuel and then attempt to glide it when they have
the option of ditching,” Mr Foley said. “The aircraft was probably descending in an
uncontrolled manner.” (https://www.news.com.au/travel/travel-
updates/incidents/australian-transport-safety-bureau-investigators-hit-back-at-
reports-they-ruled-out-mh370-ditching/news-
story/db19bd7225f86d7bd97402818cece877).
In yet another report:
Peter Foley says plane likely ran out of fuel, countering deliberate act theory posited by Larry
Vance. …While the bureau has not said who had initially flown the plane off course, Foley said "it's
absolutely evident" that someone had, ruling out some mechanical or electrical malfunction….Foley
said he still hopes the search will succeed within weeks. "If they're not, of course, that would be a
5
https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Hansard/Hansard_Display?bid=committees/estimat
e/e5833f20-4a8f-43f3-80e0-09ffa20248c5/&sid=0006
great sadness for all of us," he said. (https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/mh370-testimony-
australia-senate-1.4672453).
And so it was that great sadness has befallen. Other experienced pilots were also not
so convinced of the official theory with accusations flying on the internet that the ATSB’s
theory was wrong6, and many have offered up their own theories generally focusing on the
7th arc and now extending out from the official bounds to include a glide landing phase.
However, Mr. Foley still insists that all onboard were suffering hypoxia and the
plane ran out of fuel at the end causing it to crash at or near the 7th communication arc.
Strong support that this was not the case is provided by the extensive, comprehensive, and
expensive failed searches. Let’s turn back to science and rummage through the reports that
were used to support this theory to see what we can find:
First Search: Davey et al. (2016) present the first sophisticated and detailed
“Bayesian” analysis of MH370’s flight path guided by official calculations of fuel exhaustion
at the 7th arc, and path trajectories that took into account a range of uncertainties in
interpreting the satellite communication signals (Burst Timing Offset (BTO) and Burst
Frequency Offset (BFO)). This led to a “heatmap” of a crash site near 39oS near the 7th arc.
The search of that site failed.
I went looking for their error after my manuscript submission to a Nature journal, on
the last two satellite communications that Ian Holland (one of the co-authors of the Bayesian
report) also analysed, was rejected. The reason for rejection from the Editor was that others
had analysed this data in a more “scholarly” and “robust” manner—and, pointing me to the
Davey et al. (2016) report. I wrote back to the Editor, who obviously had not read the highly
technical 128-page report, that acknowledged eminent Prof. Simon Maskell (Liverpool
University, UK). I pointed out to her that deeply buried in that report in the last column of
Table 10.1 was the Sin of three deleted (Burst Frequency Offset) BFO data points. This
included the last two communications that, in my manuscript (now at post-review stage
with a reputable navigation journal) concluded that MH370 was in an eastward controlled
descent (Lyne 2022a) rather than a high-speed dive as claimed by Holland (2018) of DSTG
(Defense Science and Technology Group) who nonetheless did an excellent job of correcting
those data. In a nutshell, by deleting the last two communications that suggested MH370
was veering eastward and descending, the sophisticated Bayesian model was given no
guidance and continued wrongly in a southerly direction till it ran out of fuel at a fictitious
location. It appears not even the authors of that sophisticated report understood why their
model was misguided. How could anybody else be expected to see the mistake then! But
Science says without hesitation that it IS there, and so it WAS. But with no
acknowledgement by officials, or the authors, or their eminent contributors, because none of
them knew how that sophisticated model was misled by the unintended Sin of Science.
Second Search: Failure of the first search led Boeing and officials to propose that
MH370 may have consumed much more fuel than assumed by the first model (their way of
explaining the first model’s failure). This led to a revised set of fuel-exhaustion points on the
7th arc. By this time the flaperon appeared at Réunion Island along with a range of other
6 https://auntypru.com/forum/showthread.php?tid=24&page=35
debris on the coasts of Madagascar and Africa, plus a large internal part found at Rodrigues
Island. CSIRO’s Dr. David Griffin was commissioned to help narrow down the 7th arc
segment from which the debris was likely to have drifted from. The drift modelling using a
standard drift formula of 1.2% of the wind speed plus a speedup factor was stranding the
flaperon about 4 months short of reaching Réunion Island from the 7th arc. Boeing kindly
contributed real flaperons, one of which was cutdown to mimic the MH370 damage. In not
wanting to lose this valuable flaperon, CSIRO conducted field drift trials in the relatively
calm, semi-enclosed, shallow North-West Bay of Tasmania. These conditions allowed the
flaperon to take up a sailing posture resulting in a fast “drift” under light winds and in the
most-likely presence of surface current shear . This super-fast drift formula was used in the
open ocean and “sailed” the flaperon to Réunion Island on time from a 7th arc segment near
35oS (well north of the failed First Search!) using a drift formula that now contained a
perpetual-motion 10 cm/s regardless of wind speed or direction! In addition, investigators
suggested that that drift from that location did not land “positively identifiable” MH370
debris at the Australian coast, as none was officially found despite searches that turned up
“common items” that could not be positively attributed to MH370, but nonetheless could
have turned up only to be shunned as just “common”.
Out of interest, Dr. David Griffin kindly re-ran the CSIRO model from my location
(Penang Longitude Deep Hole), near 33oS and along the longitude of Penang, using the
standard 1.2% drift formula. Surprisingly, the flaperon nearly arrived on time at Réunion
Island without any need for a perpetual motion speedup. Equally surprising, debris drifted
close to the mid-Western-Australian coast. This led me to search for debris that may have
drifted there and I came across the story of Kingsley and Vicky Miller finding a Malaysia
Airlines towelette on a secluded 4WD beach track about 900 m south of Thirsty Point,
Cervantes. Inspection of the CSIRO drift results (Lyne 2023d) showed a remarkable
coincidence of debris arriving there just a day or so before, facilitated by a major storm
hitting the coast and causing intense southerly winds down that stretch of treacherous coast.
The evidence was shunned by officials as it was just a “common item” but they have
hypocritically embargoed the towelette as “confidential”. I was only able to get a copy of a
bad image of the towelette from someone else who obviously had the confidence of the
officials. It was clear that despite the bad image, this towelette had been at sea for a lengthy
period of time, with microdots missing from the stenciling as reported in Lyne (2023d).
To be honest, I was not aware of the perpetual motion term used by CSIRO for the
drift from the 7th arc. But needless to say, that despite a very extensive search of that second
location, MH370 was not found. I then rummaged through the CSIRO reports to find the
perpetual motion term. I then proposed a statistically robust corrected formula for the open
ocean (not the quiet calm bay it was derived from) consistent with what we know about the
effects of turbulence on the motion of an object like a flaperon in the turbulent open ocean,
and a very turbulent one at that in the Southern Ocean. That report concluded that the
flaperon did drift faster at about 2% of the wind speed, but even that speedup left it
stranded 3000 km short of reaching Réunion Island (Lyne 2023a). That’s the most logical
explanation of why MH370 was never at that 7th arc location and why the CSIRO model
could not explain the find of the towelette at Thirsty Point. Ian Holland’s vertical dive model
was also used to support lateral bounds of that failed 7th arc search. But in the upcoming
peer-reviewed publication I demonstrate that MH370 was in a controlled eastward descent
at the 7th arc (Lyne 2022a) and I point out the mathematical problem with the high-speed
dive conclusion.
On fuel starvation, I discovered hidden riddles in the Pilot-In-Command (PIC)
simulator track found in the home aircraft simulator of the pilot that was dismissed by the
FBI and investigators as irrelevant (Lyne 2023b, 2023c). Resolution of the riddles not only
provided a very precise track taken by MH370 but also revealed an incredible mastermind
plan to run the plane till near fuel exhaustion before dropping it into a very deep hole to
never be found again. That plan most likely included a no-power or reduced-power glide
phase that was nearing the end at the 7th arc when engine(s) and power were restored or
electronics started up. The reason for the glide phase before landing was to leave just
sufficient fuel for the full-power landing to enable precise control of the plane as explained
by Larry Vance.
Hence, the Second Search suffered multiple issues from the wrong theory,
uncontrolled fuel starvation instead of carefully planned fuel exhaustion, incorrect
interpretations of the Doppler Shifts, all debris damage explainable by “controlled ditching”
and none by a high-speed dive, a drift model with an invalid perpetual motion term for the
open ocean, and dismissal of the critical PIC track that held the precise landing location for
MH370. Yet we still have officials saying to me that the plane is at the 7th arc. You really
cannot be serious! Incredible!
I will stop here as I can go on at length about all the other evidence that was
reconciled and uncovered at the Penang Longitude location. These reports can be found on
my Researchgate site: https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Vincent-Lyne. I’ve done all I can
but no one can save those that reached out for the imaginary Holy Grail only to fall into the
Abyss.
