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Separation of Powers and Responsiveness
of Unilateral Policymaking
Evidence from Climate Change Presidential Directives
in Fifty-four Presidencies
Takaharu Saito ∗
March 12, 2024
Abstract
Unilateral policymaking is a crucial source of policy change for presidents in the world. Scholars scrutinize the
dynamic between the separation of powers and presidential unilateralism. Our research elucidates that the
interplay is specically contingent on public demand. We establish that while judicial constraints generally
reduce the propensity for unilateral decision-making by presidents, when these constraints intersect with
public demand, they can paradoxically encourage such an approach. Further, an ancillary quantitative text
analysis of Climate Change Presidential Directives (CCPDs) discloses that their diversity is indicative of
the nature of the respective political regimes. Collectively, these insights underscore that the separation of
powers signicantly contributes to the responsiveness inherent in unilateral executive actions.
Key words
Presidency, Separation of powers, Unilateral action, Environmental politics
∗Nagoya University of Commerce and Business. E-mail: takaharu_saito@nucba.ac.jp. This research is
funded by the Japanese Society for Promotion of Science (JSPS) (KAKENHI 23K18768) and the Nagoya
University of Commerce and Business’s research grant. I thank Susumu Annaka (Hirosaki University) for
his kind advice and ChatGPT and DeepL for their help with coding and editing.
1
1 Introduction
Presidential systems are distinguished by a separation of legislative and executive powers be-
tween the legislature and the president. This division serves as a fundamental mechanism for
checks and balances (Montesquieu, 1949; Hamilton, Madison and Jay, 2009). Consequently,
unilateral policymaking becomes a crucial tool for presidents in implementing their policy
agendas (Shair-Roseneld and Stoyan, 2017, 2018; Opalo, 2020; Lowande and Rogowski,
2021). Environmental policy, in particular, often sees the application of unilateral executive
actions, as documented by the literature (Kraft and Vig, 1984; Percival, 1991; Daynes and
Sussman, 2010; Vig, 2012, 2019; Shae, 2020)1. A notable instance was observed during
the latter stage of Barack Obama’s presidency in the United States. Confronted with a
Republican-dominated Congress, Obama faced signicant legislative hurdles, impeding var-
ious policy initiatives, including Supreme Court nominations (Elving, 2018). However, in
2015, he circumvented these challenges by implementing the Clean Power Plan, a bold strat-
egy to reduce CO2emissions by 2030, leveraging existing statutory interpretations rather
than new legislative enactments (Jones, 2019). This strategy, faced with immediate Republi-
can resistance2, highlights the strategic value of unilateral executive actions in environmental
policy.
In South Korea, a similar approach was adopted by President Moon Jae-in. Following his
party’s decisive victory in the 2020 elections, Moon took bold unilateral steps in environmen-
tal policy. He introduced the ambitious 2050 Carbon Neutral Scenario Roadmap, aiming to
transform South Korea’s economy and society towards sustainability. This comprehensive
plan outlines strategies for drastically reducing greenhouse gas emissions, investing in renew-
able energy, and promoting eco-friendly technologies. It also includes measures for adapting
the country’s industries and infrastructure to a low-carbon future, such as transitioning to
1Kaufman and Rogowski (Forthcoming) shows that the presidents in the U.S. issue presidential directives
agriculture, civil rights, defense, domestic commerce, education, energy and so on.
2Republicans criticized the Obama administration, saying “EXPENSIVE, ARROGANT,” “I will do ev-
erything I can to stop it,” “energy tax” and so on (Mason and Volcovici, 2015)
2
electric vehicles and enhancing energy eciency in buildings. The Roadmap reects the
signicant impact of electoral gains on a president’s ability to shape environmental policy
(Young, 2022; Joo, Paavola and Van Alstine, 2023; Farand, 2020).
This study oers a comprehensive analysis of unilateral environmental policymaking
across 54 presidential democracies, shedding light on the global systemic nature of presi-
dential unilateralism beyond the traditionally U.S.–centric focus in environmental politics
(Provost and Gerber, 2019; Shae, 2020; Fitz, 2023). In addition, by moving beyond single
(Howell, 2003; Chiou and Rothenberg, 2017; Bolton and Thrower, 2022) or few-country anal-
yses (Howell, 2003; Chiou and Rothenberg, 2017; Bolton and Thrower, 2022; Shair-Roseneld
and Stoyan, 2017, 2018)3, this research presents a comparative perspective on unilateral pol-
icymaking practices in a wide array of presidential nations.
Examining the interaction between independent judicial systems and public demand
demonstrates that while judicial constraints can limit presidential autonomy, they can also, in
conjunction with public demand, support a president’s unilateral approach to policy-making.
This nuanced understanding challenges the conventional wisdom that the separation of pow-
ers merely restricts presidential power (Howell, 2003; Chiou and Rothenberg, 2017; Bolton
and Thrower, 2022), oering new insights into the conditional eects of these powers on
presidential unilateralism.
Overall, this study makes signicant contributions to both the eld of environmental
politics and presidential studies. It enriches our understanding of how political systems
and public demand interact globally to shape environmental policymaking, highlighting the
importance of comparative analysis in uncovering the nuanced ways political regimes inuence
policy outcomes.
3One of the exceptions is Reeves and Rogowski (2023), which studies 26 countries in the Americas and 37
countries in Africa focusing on the public opinion the unilateral policymaking in these countries.
3
2 Unilateral Policymaking and Environmental Politics
Presidential systems are characterized by a division of legislative and executive powers be-
tween the legislature and the president, forming a foundational check-and-balance mechanism
(Montesquieu, 1949; Hamilton, Madison and Jay, 2009). In contemporary settings, a notice-
able trend is the growing inclination of presidents to formulate policies independently of the
legislature, a phenomenon termed unilateral action, now central to presidential governance
(Moe and Howell, 1999a,b).
This body of research probes into scenarios prompting presidents to engage in unilat-
eral policymaking. The pioneering empirical studies explored the role of executive-legislative
partisan conict in fostering unilateral approaches (Deering and Maltzman, 1999; Howell,
2003; Fine and Warber, 2012; Chiou and Rothenberg, 2017; Lowande and Rogowski, 2021).
For example, theoretical studies suggest that Congressional gridlock prompts the president
to resort to unilateral policymaking because it circumvents the necessity for immediate leg-
islative consent (Moe and Howell, 1999b,a). However, most empirical studies suggest that
presidents are more likely to resort to unilateral policymaking when the executive branch and
Congress are unied (Howell, 2003; Fine and Warber, 2012; Chiou and Rothenberg, 2017).
Subsequent research broadens this scope, examining variables like the gender of the president
(Shair-Roseneld and Stoyan, 2018) and the legislative body’s capacity (Shair-Roseneld and
Stoyan, 2017; Bolton and Thrower, 2022).
Recent scholarship has focused on the interplay between public opinion and unilateral
policymaking. Studies based on public surveys reveal that public opinion signicantly inu-
ences the U.S. president’s engagement in unilateral policymaking. The public’s evaluation of
such actions is largely dependent on their approval of the president, underlined by partisan
perspectives (Reeves and Rogowski, 2015; Christenson and Kriner, 2017a; Ansolabehere and
Rogowski, 2020). The populace tends to respond negatively to the enactment of policies
through unilateral means, particularly when such actions circumvent the legislative and ju-
dicial branches (Lowande and Gray, 2017; Reeves and Rogowski, 2018, 2022; Christenson
4
and Kriner, 2017b,c). Comparatively, Reeves and Rogowski (2023) further elucidates that
individuals with a strong allegiance to democratic principles and the rule of law are less
inclined to support executive-centric institutional frameworks. Observational research also
underscores the relationship between public sentiment and the U.S. president’s unilateral
maneuvers. Christenson and Kriner (2019) indicates an increased propensity for unilateral
policymaking with higher presidential approval ratings. Rogowski (2023) highlights a trend
where the president is more likely to issue unilateral directives on highly salient issues, espe-
cially those well-understood by the public and involving signicant policy decisions.
While the existing literature extensively examines the eects of public opinion and the
separation of powers on unilateral policymaking, the mechanism of how the separation of
powers and public opinion interact is underexamined.
Unilateral policymaking is a pivotal aspect of environmental politics, prominently illus-
trated by the U.S. federal government. The interplay between the legislature and executive
has been increasingly marred by polarization (Lee, 2015), leading to regular divisions. Due
to these challenges, environmental politics are often driven by administrative mechanisms,
predominantly through the Environmental Policy Agency’s rulemaking processes (Kraft and
Vig, 1984; Percival, 1991; Daynes and Sussman, 2010; Vig, 2012, 2019; Shae, 2020). As a
result, while presidents encounter obstacles in reforming sectors like health insurance, they
have more latitude in altering environmental policies through unilateral means. This trend is
extensively documented in the context of the United States (Percival, 1991; Tzoumis, Bennett
and Stoel, 2015; Jones, 2019; Fitz, 2023).
Nonetheless, the U.S. scenario does not universally reect the dynamics of presidential
democracies, particularly those encompassing authoritarian regimes. The U.S. president’s
authority is constitutionally restricted, necessitating congressional persuasion for policy en-
actment (Neustadt, 1991). Furthermore, Congress maintains oversight mechanisms to mon-
itor presidential actions (Rosenbloom, 2002; Grisinger, 2012), thereby curtailing unfettered
executive order issuance (Bolton and Thrower, 2022).
5
Expanding beyond the connes of U.S.-centric research, the current study evaluates 54
presidencies, following Reeves and Rogowski (2023), which encompass 26 American and 37
African nations to investigate public perspectives on unilateral policymaking. It demon-
strates that while the presence of independent judicial systems acts as a check on presiden-
tial unilateralism, it interacts with public demand to bolster such a style of policymaking.
Additionally, a separate quantitative text analysis elucidates that the variety of Climate
Change Presidential Directives (CCPDs) reects the nature of the political regimes. Col-
lectively, these insights underscore that the separation of powers signicantly contributes to
the responsiveness inherent in unilateral executive actions.
3 Separation of Powers, Public Demand and Unilateral
Policymaking
3.1 Legislature
In the framework of separation of powers, various entities endeavor to restrain presidential
unilateralism. Primarily, the legislature has a pivotal role in checking presidential authority.
The extent to which the legislature can counterbalance the presidency signicantly varies
across political systems. In cases where legislatures are bereft of both autonomy and resources
for policy development, presidential power tends to dominate. Under such circumstances,
legislatures often act merely as extensions of the executive branch (Gandhi and Lust-Okar,
2009; Truex, 2014,; Reuter and Robertson, 2015; Williamson and Magaloni, 2020). This
imbalance predisposes presidents towards unilateral decision-making.
However, when legislatures are endowed with sucient resources and authority to monitor
the executive and advance their policy agendas, they eectively impede presidential unilat-
eralism. For example, the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 in the U.S. expanded the
legislative bureaucracy (Rosenbloom, 2002; Grisinger, 2012), which led to more robust check
6
on the presidential unilateralism through legislative oversight (Bolton and Thrower, 2016).
As a result, the U.S. presidents face signicant legislative constraints on their unilateral pol-
icymaking (Howell, 2003; Kriner and Schickler, 2016). Such robust legislative scrutiny not
only restricts unilateral executive decisions but also elevates public discourse, potentially in-
uencing the president’s prospects for reelection (Christenson and Kriner, 2017b; Djourelova
and Durante, 2022).
Consequently,
Hypothesis 1a: Presidential issuance of directives is more prevalent when legislative
oversight is insucient.
Then, it delves into the interaction between the legislature and public demand. Legisla-
tors within an independent legislature tend to prioritize public interests to secure reelection
(Mayhew, 2004), diverging from merely echoing presidential preferences (Edwards, 1978).
Consequently, such legislatures are more responsive to public demands, often legislating in
accordance with public preferences (Jones and Baumgartner, 2004, 2005; Jones, Larsen-Price
and Wilkerson, 2009). Additionally, these legislative bodies inuence the president to align
policies with both legislative and public interests, prompting the president to enact policies
that bolster his reputation (Rogowski, 2023).
Conversely, in contexts where legislative independence is compromised, the public’s ca-
pacity to inuence legislative representation diminishes. Here, the legislature tends to arm
the autocratic president’s policies, neglecting public interests (Gandhi and Lust-Okar, 2009;
Truex, 2014,; Reuter and Robertson, 2015; Williamson and Magaloni, 2020). As a result, the
public’s voice becomes marginalized in the policy-making process, reducing the impetus for
the president to cater to public demands. Therefore, we hypothesize:
Hypothesis 1b: The interaction of legislative independence and public demand posi-
7
tively correlates with the frequency of presidential directives.
3.2 Judiciary
Secondly, judicial bodies play a crucial role in monitoring the president’s unilateral pol-
icymaking endeavors (Newland, 2015; Driesen, 2018; Manheim and Watts, 2019). Con-
sequently, presidents must contemplate judicial perspectives when engaging in unilateral
decision-making (Thrower, 2017, 2019, 2020; Rottinghaus, 2019).
The judiciary’s inuence also varies signicantly across political systems (Helmke and
Rosenbluth, 2009; Brinks and Blass, 2017). In scenarios where the judiciary maintains inde-
pendence from the executive, as exemplied by the United States, courts can critically assess
unilateral presidential actions (Shane, 2009; Ferejohn and Kramer, 2002). Additionally, a
vibrant party system can bolster judicial independence (Randazzo, Gibler and Reid, 2016;
Boston et al., 2023). In such democracies, courts have the authority to supervise executive
actions and declare presidential directives unconstitutional (Supreme Court of The United
States, 1952, 1974, 2006).
Conversely, when the judiciary is not independent, such oversight is diminished (Helmke
and Rosenbluth, 2009; Brinks and Blass, 2017). During Mexico’s PRI era, the judiciary
was constrained in handling contentious cases and lacked independence, leading to shorter
judicial tenures (Magaloni, 2003). Similarly, under Argentine military rule, the judiciary
faced substantial autonomy challenges (Iaryczower, Spiller and Tommasi, 2002). In these
cases, the court, fearing retaliation from the government, demonstrates judicial restraint
and strategically supports the government (Iaryczower, Spiller and Tommasi, 2002; Walker,
2019; Epperly and Lineberger, 2019). In the worst cases, the court works as an authoritarian
enclave, which preserves the government’s hegemony and constrains political liberalization
(Nardi, 2010; Bali, 2011; Moustafa, 2019).
This dichotomy implies that a president’s consideration of judicial response is contingent
8
upon judicial capacity. Therefore,
Hypothesis 2a: Presidential issuance of directives increases in contexts where judicial
oversight is limited.
Subsequently, we examine the role of the judiciary in inuencing presidential responsive-
ness to public demand. In nations with a high degree of judicial independence, the public can
approach the judiciary for redress when dissatised with presidential directives4, particularly
in the absence of legislative intervention (Farhang, 2012). Despite the judiciary’s theoretical
detachment from political inuence, empirical evidence suggests that judges do consider pub-
lic sentiment as a means to bolster the legitimacy of the judicial institution (Gibson, Caldeira
and Baird, 1998; Bryan and Kromphardt, 2016; Epstein and Martin, 2010; Casillas, Enns and
Wohlfarth, 2011; Calvin, Collins and Eshbaugh-Soha, 2011). Consequently, policies unpopu-
lar with the public are more susceptible to being overturned in such environments compared
to nations with less judicial autonomy. The anticipation of judicial oversight encourages
the president to moderate the exercise of unilateral powers (Howell, 2003; Thrower, 2017),
aligning closer with public opinion. Moreover, the prospect of judicial scrutiny may amplify
public skepticism towards presidential decisions (Christenson and Kriner, 2017c), serving
as a preventive measure against presidential overreach in unilateral policymaking. Judicial
oversight, in concert with public demand, acts as a pivotal check on presidential authority,
fostering a governance model that is more responsive to the electorate’s needs.
Conversely, in systems lacking judicial independence, the courts are unable to eectively
supervise executive actions (Helmke and Rosenbluth, 2009; Brinks and Blass, 2017) and
often reinforce governmental dominance, impeding political liberalization (Nardi, 2010; Bali,
2011; Moustafa, 2019). In such scenarios, the public’s trust in the judiciary to address
grievances against presidential directives is markedly diminished (Iaryczower, Spiller and
4The cases against the presidential directives are discussed in articles like Newland (2015).
9
Tommasi, 2002; Staton, 2010). This limitation precludes judicial restraint on unilateral
executive actions contrary to the public interest, enabling the president to issue directives
irrespective of public sentiment. Hence, we propose:
Hypothesis 2b: The interaction of judicial independence and public demand positively
correlates with the frequency of presidential directives.
3.3 Media
Thirdly, the media is anticipated to exert oversight on the president’s unilateral policymaking,
yet its capacity distinctly diverges between democratic and authoritarian regimes (Stier,
2015). When the media enjoys press freedom, they can function eectively as a political
sentinel. It plays a crucial role in disseminating information about governmental policies,
thereby empowering citizens to hold their leaders accountable (Besley and Burgess, 2002;
Brunetti and Weder, 2003; Adsera, Boix and Payne, 2003; Snyder and Strömberg, 2010).
Consequently, media coverage signicantly molds public attitudes toward unilateral pol-
icymaking. In the U.S., public criticism is more pronounced against unilateral executive
actions than legislative processes (Lowande and Gray, 2017; Reeves and Rogowski, 2018).
The criticism is more salient when there is a deadlock between the executive and legislative
bodies (Christenson and Kriner, 2017b; Reeves and Rogowski, 2022), or in anticipation of
judicial rebukes (Christenson and Kriner, 2017c).
In contrast, when the media sees a curtailment of press freedoms, it cannot control the
president. For instance, in regions like Latin America and Africa, even where the media
retains some level of freedom, it can nd itself embroiled in ideological disputes with the
presidency (Boas, 2012). Presidents may engage in media disparagement to galvanize political
support (Kellam and Stein, 2016) and to circumvent media scrutiny that could destabilize
their authority (VonDoepp and Young, 2013). Under such constraints, the media’s capacity
10
to hold power to account is signicantly undermined, leading to a scenario where unilateral
executive actions face minimal public challenge due to the lack of informed citizenry (Besley
and Burgess, 2002).
Thus,
Hypothesis 3a: The prevalence of presidential directives escalates in contexts with
constrained media oversight.
Then, the role of the media in inuencing presidential responsiveness to public demand
is assessed. In environments where the media benets from press freedom, it enables citizens
to demand accountability from their leaders (Besley and Burgess, 2002; Brunetti and Weder,
2003; Adsera, Boix and Payne, 2003; Snyder and Strömberg, 2010). This interaction between
the media and public demand serves as a check on presidential unilateralism (Lowande and
Gray, 2017; Reeves and Rogowski, 2018; Christenson and Kriner, 2017b; Reeves and Ro-
gowski, 2022; Christenson and Kriner, 2017c). Furthermore, a populace informed by a free
press is likely to press the president to align unilateral decisions with public sentiment (Chris-
tenson and Kriner, 2019; Rogowski, 2023).
Conversely, in scenarios where press freedom is restricted, the media’s capacity to con-
strain presidential actions is signicantly diminished (Boas, 2012; Kellam and Stein, 2016;
VonDoepp and Young, 2013). Under such regimes, the media predominantly functions to
bolster the president’s image and electoral appeal (Levitsky, 2011; Enikolopov, Petrova and
Zhuravskaya, 2011; Adena et al., 2015; Cho, Lee and Song, 2017). Media-government collab-
orations often result in agenda-setting that serves mutual interests (Bunce and Hozić, 2016;
Pleines and Somfalvy, 2023). Despite public trust in such media outlets (Truex, 2016; Wang,
Zhu and Zhang, 2023; Moehler and Singh, 2011), the public remains uninformed about crit-
ical issues or unable to eectively communicate their views to the executive (Egorov, Guriev
and Sonin, 2009). Thus, the president is not incentivized to heed public demand, issuing
11
directives irrespective of public consensus. Therefore, we posit
Hypothesis 3b: The interaction of media independence and public demand positively
correlates with the frequency of presidential directives.
4 Data and Method
Drawing from Coppedge et al. (2021), this study encompasses 54 presidencies spanning from
2000 to 2023, excluding periods when certain countries were not governed by presidential
systems5.
Figure 1 delineates the spectrum of democratic governance in these presidencies. Na-
tions such as the United States, Uruguay, Chile, and Costa Rica exemplify robust presiden-
tial democracies marked by ecient checks and balances. In stark contrast, countries like
Uzbekistan and Venezuela are characterized by authoritarian tendencies, with presidential
authority predominating over other state apparatuses, constraining opposition parties, and
limiting civil society’s role.
One of the principal obstacles in conducting a global examination of unilateral policy-
making is the dearth of extensive data sets. Resources such as (Peters and Woolley, 2023)
provide valuable tools for quantitative analysis in the U.S. context. However, analogous
comprehensive data for a wider range of presidencies is notably lacking. While some research
eorts (Shair-Roseneld and Stoyan, 2017, 2018; Capella and Gonçalves, 2019; Opalo, 2020)
have collated data on presidential decrees in select countries, extending such an analysis to
a more extensive set of presidencies is impeded by the unavailability of equivalent data sets.
In addressing the challenge of data limitation, we turned to the comprehensive database
5We assume a country is presidential when citizens directly elect heads of the state and the government
and when they are the same person. We exploit Direct election dimension index (D), HOS directly elected
(D) and HOS = HOG (A*) from Coppedge et al. (2021)
12
provided by the Grantham Research Institute at the London School of Economics and Cli-
mate Policy Radar (2023). This resource documents national climate change legislation and
regulation globally, including their classications as “Executive order” or “Decree.” These are
identied as Climate Change Presidential Directives (CCPD) in our study, and we have quan-
tied them annually per state as the dependent variable N. of CCPD6. Notably, this dataset
encompasses policies with both mitigative and exacerbative impacts on climate change. A
case in point is Brazil under President Jair Messias Bolsonaro, who in 2019 issued con-
troversial decrees that drew criticism from Human Rights Watch for eroding participatory
governance in environmental policy7(Human Rights Watch, 2021).
Figure 2 presents the distribution of CCPDs from 2001 to 2022, while the detailed gures
for each country are provided in the appendix. The 2000s saw a shift in Latin America,
post the neoliberal era (Larson, 2003; Liverman and Vilas, 2006), with leftist governments
increasingly prioritizing environmental concerns (de Castro, Hogenboom and Baud, 2016).
Ecuador’s 2008 constitutional reform and Brazil’s REDD initiative exemplify this trend, with
leftist administrations issuing a notable volume of CCPDs (Baud, de Castro and Hogenboom,
2011).
The 2010s witnessed a diverse political spectrum embracing environmental agendas. Ar-
gentina under President Mauricio Macri, for example, focused on renewable energy initiatives,
evident in the issuance of CCPDs (Casa Rosada, 2018) In contrast, President Bolsonaro of
Brazil represented a regression in environmental commitment.
Our analysis utilizes independent variables from the Varieties of Democracy’s datasets
(Coppedge et al., 2021), focusing on Legislature control of resources, High court indepen-
dence, and Government censorship eorts regarding the media. The rst variable assesses
6Each document is classied into Order, Plan, Decree, Resolution, Strategy, Programme, Policy, Directive,
Royal Decree, Ordinance, Framework, Decree Law, Agenda, Vision, Law, Regulation, Protocol, Criteria,
Rules, Decision, Action Plan, Executive Order, Roadmap, Discussion Paper, Annex, Act, Accord, Summary,
Statement, Press Release, Edict, Decision and Plan, and EU Regulation. We classify Order, Decree, Directive,
and Executive Order as Presidential Directive.
7Bolsonaro issued Decree 9,806 and 10.143 to reduce civil society representatives in the National Council
for the Environment (CONAMA) and the Climate Fund’s steering committee
13
the extent to which a legislature controls its own nancial resources, distinguishing between
legislatures that are nancially autonomous and those dependent on external authorities like
the executive branch. The second focuses on the independence of the high court, measuring
the extent to which court decisions reect government wishes rather than an unbiased inter-
pretation of the legal record. The third variable explores government eorts to censor media,
ranging from direct, routine censorship to more indirect and limited forms, thereby assess-
ing the degree of media freedom and government intervention in information dissemination.
Together, these variables provide a multifaceted view of the balance of power and autonomy
within key institutions of a political system.
Furthermore, our analysis incorporates data on public demand for environmental con-
cerns from the Mass Mobilization Protest Data (Clark and Regan, 2022). This repository
documents instances where a minimum of 50 protesters have publicly demonstrated against
governmental policies, aggregating over 10,000 such events. To discern protests specically
oriented towards environmental issues, we categorized an event as an environmental protest
if it involved environmental activists or centered around environmental concerns8. Conse-
quently, we formulated a binary variable, Environmental Protest, to denote the occurrence
of environmental protests within a given country and year. As part of our methodological
rigor, we also accounted for protests not associated with environmental matters, creating a
parallel variable Non-Environmental Protest.
For control variables, we add GDP, population, whether the executive and the legislature
is divided (Divided party control index), whether the head of state is female (HOS female),
the president’s vote share (Presidential election vote share of largest vote-getter), the share
of female legislators in the lower house (Lower chamber female legislators), and whether
initiatives are permitted (Initiatives permitted) from the Varieties of Democracy’s data sets
(Coppedge et al., 2021).
8The data includes the variables protesteridentity (information of protesters) and note (information on
protests). When at least one of them includes the word “environment,” we assume the protest is environmental
protest.
14
We exploit the two-way xed eect model (TWFE) to control the country and year eect.
5 Results
Table 1 delineates the outcomes. Initially, Hypothesis 1a lacks empirical support, as evi-
denced by the rst two columns indicating that legislative resources have a negligible impact
on the president’s unilateral policymaking in environmental matters. Subsequently, an ex-
amination of the middle columns reveals that judicial independence acts as a deterrent to
unilateral executive action in this domain (Hypothesis 2a). Contrarily, Hypothesis 3a also
lacks support; the analysis of the last two columns demonstrates that media independence
does not signicantly inuence the president’s unilateral actions.
The results underscore the critical role of judicial independence in moderating presidential
unilateralism. Moe and Howell (1999b) posit that the president enjoys a rst-mover advan-
tage, making it challenging for Congress to overturn his decisions collectively. Conversely,
the judicial system appears less burdened by the collective action problems. In addition,
judges, often homogeneous in their elite educational backgrounds (Stubbs, 2016; McConnell,
2018; Rooney, 2023), can be less susceptible to the problem. Therefore, an independent
judiciary emerges as a more formidable check on presidential authority than an independent
legislature.
We then proceed to analyze the interaction between the separation of powers and public
opinion. Table 3, assessing Hypotheses 1b, 2b, and 3b, reveals that the quantity of Country-
Specic Presidential Directives (CCPDs) notably increases in scenarios of high judicial inde-
pendence coupled with intense environmental activism (Hypothesis 2b). In contrast, Models
(1), (2), (5), and (6) illustrate that neither legislative nor media independence substantially
inuences the president’s inclination to utilize CCPDs in response to public demand. Figure
3 also conrms that the interaction of judicial independence and public demand positively
correlates with the frequency of CCPDs.
15
These outcomes highlight the paramount importance of judicial independence in fostering
executive responsiveness. Prior research focusing on U.S. presidencies has underscored the
tendency of presidents to align with public sentiment in their unilateral actions (Christen-
son and Kriner, 2019; Rogowski, 2023). Our ndings elucidate that such responsiveness is
contingent upon judicial oversight. In the absence of signicant judicial checks, presiden-
tial disregard for public demand in unilateral policy formulation becomes evident. However,
neither legislative nor media independence appears to signicantly impact this dynamic.
For methodological robustness, the study underwent reevaluation using varied data dis-
tributions for the dependent variable (Appendix B Table 1 Models (1)–(3), Table 2 Models
(1)-(3) and Table 4 Models (1)-(3), and Table 5 Models (1)-(3)), controlling for the intensity
of climate change disasters (Appendix Table B Table 3 Models (1)-(3) and Table Models 7
(1)-(3)), and eliminating outliers (Appendix Table 6 Models (1)-(3)), all rearming the ini-
tial conclusions. Additionally, a placebo analysis was conducted Non-Environemntal Protests
as a variable, hypothesizing that in democratic settings, presidents do not engage in environ-
mental unilateral policymaking in response to non-environmental public demands. Appendix
Table 8 supports the prediction. Presidents engage in environmental unilateral policymaking
only in response to environmental public demands.
6 Environmental Authoritarianism?
The study’s outcomes suggest a higher frequency of Climate Change Policy Directives (CCPDs)
implementation in authoritarian regimes, where judicial independence is typically underpro-
tected. Although the analyses in Table 3 suggest that the relationship is not so simple, the
negative correlation between judicial independence and unilateralism aligns with the concept
of environmental authoritarianism, positing that such regimes are potentially more eec-
tive in addressing environmental issues (Winslow, 2005; Shearman and Smith, 2007; Beeson,
16
2010; Gilley, 2012)9. Nonetheless, contemporary scholarship advises a nuanced view of this
hypothesis (Brain and Pál, 2020; Selseng, Linnerud and Holden, 2022).
In exploring this premise, we engaged in quantitative text analysis of the CCPDs, utilizing
summaries in English from Grantham Research Institute at the London School of Economics
and Climate Policy Radar (2023). Applying Structural Topic Model (STM) methodology
(Roberts, Stewart and Tingley, 2019), we investigated the interplay between topical content
and high court independence. The procedure is detailed in the Appendix C.
Figure 4 delineates a divergence in thematic focus contingent on the presence of judicial
independence. Countries lacking judicial independence predominantly feature clean energy
topics, whereas procedural topics are less prevalent. This pattern indicates a preference
among authoritarian leaders for clean energy policies within their environmental agendas.
Brain and Pál (2020) contend that authoritarian leaders emphasize environmental policies
that enhance their stature on both domestic and international fronts. Clean energy policies,
necessitating signicant infrastructural investment, are congruent with authoritarian prin-
ciples and aid in consolidating resources among supportive elites (Gandhi and Przeworski,
2006; Ward, Cao and Mukherjee, 2014).
In contrast, democratic leaders tend to favor procedural integrity over clean energy
themes, reecting their commitment to the rule of law and necessitating comprehensive pro-
cedures in environmental policy formulation, even in cases of unilateral enactment.
This analysis leads to the conclusion that the greater occurrence of CCPDs in author-
itarian regimes does not inherently signify enhanced environmental governance. Rather, it
illustrates how the nature of the regime shapes the diversity of CCPDs.
9Gilley (2012) denes environmental authoritarianism as “a public policy model that concentrates author-
ity in a few executive agencies manned by capable and uncorrupt elites seeking to improve envirommental
outcomes.”
17
7 Conclusion
This research has systematically analyzed unilateral environmental policymaking across 54
presidential democracies, revealing critical insights into the strategic use of presidential pow-
ers in the realm of environmental governance. Our quantitative analysis reveals that while
independent courts can serve as a check on presidential powers, they interact with public de-
mand to enhance the president’s responsiveness in unilateral policymaking. Furthermore, the
quantitative text analysis of Climate Change Presidential Directives (CCPD) reveals that the
variety of CCPDs not only reects a president’s environmental priorities but also indicates
broader political dynamics within presidential countries. Collectively, these insights under-
score that the separation of powers signicantly contributes to the responsiveness inherent
in unilateral executive actions.
In contributing to the elds of environmental politics and presidential studies, this re-
search moves beyond the predominant U.S.-centric focus, highlighting the systematic nature
of presidential unilateralism in global environmental policymaking. It also transcends tradi-
tional single-country and limited multi-country analyses, providing a comparative perspec-
tive that enriches our understanding of unilateral policymaking practices in a diverse array
of presidential nations.
In conclusion, this research not only sheds light on the strategic use of unilateral poli-
cymaking in environmental issues by presidents but also prompts a reevaluation of the bal-
ance between eective environmental action and democratic accountability in presidential
democracies. As the world grapples with pressing environmental challenges, understanding
the dynamics of unilateral environmental policymaking becomes ever more crucial in the
broader context of global environmental governance and democratic practice.
8 Competing Interests
None
18
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Figure 1: Liberal Democracy in Presidencies
URY
USA
UZB
VEN
ZMB
ZWE
SSD
SYC
TCD
TJK
TKM
TUR
TZA
UGA
PAN
PER
PHL
PRY
SDN
SEN
SLE
SLV
LKA
MDV
MEX
MOZ
MWI
NAM
NGA
NIC
GNQ
GTM
HND
IDN
IRQ
KEN
KOR
LBR
COL
COM
CRI
CYP
DOM
ECU
GHA
GMB
AFG
ARG
BDI
BEN
BOL
BRA
CHL
COG
2010 2010 2010 2010 2010 2010
2010 2010
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
Year
Liberal Democracy Index (Vdem)
Note: This chart illustrates liberal democracy across fty-eight countries. In nations like Turkey,
where the presidential system wasn’t always in place, the data from the years without a presidential
system are not included.
32
Figure 2: Number of Climate Change Presidential Directives
4
8
12
16
2000 2005 2010 2015 2020
Year
Total Number of Climate Change Presidential Directives
33
Table 1: Results on H1a, H2a, and H3a
Dependent Variable: N. of CCPDs (log)
Model: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables
H1a: Legislative resources -0.1616 -0.0328
(0.1726) (0.2644)
H2a: Judicial independence -0.2147∗-0.2336∗
(0.1238) (0.1329)
H3a: Media independence 0.1926 0.2143
(0.1587) (0.1657)
Female President -0.1867 -0.1956 -0.1872
(0.4419) (0.4354) (0.4429)
President’s vote shate 0.0069 0.0053 0.0092
(0.0120) (0.0117) (0.0115)
Female legislator’s share 0.0042 0.0023 0.0066
(0.0129) (0.0125) (0.0137)
Legal provision for initiatives -0.2286 -0.1471 -0.3107
(0.2539) (0.2753) (0.2613)
Divided Government 0.1122 0.1280 0.0821
(0.1253) (0.1171) (0.1234)
GDP (log) 0.5297 0.5691 0.3631
(0.4535) (0.4055) (0.4107)
Population (log) -4.155∗∗ -4.294∗∗ -3.972∗∗
(1.654) (1.654) (1.681)
Fixed-eects
Fixed Eect (Country) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Eect (Year) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fit statistics
Observations 951 943 953 943 953 943
R20.23608 0.24490 0.23718 0.24621 0.23761 0.24667
Within R20.00033 0.01277 0.00162 0.01448 0.00218 0.01509
Clustered (Fixed Eect (Country)) standard-errors in parentheses
Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1
34
Table 2: Results on H1b, H2b, and H3b
Dependent Variable: N. of CCPDs (log)
Model: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables
Environmenrtal Protest (EP) -0.8904 -0.8675 0.0383 0.0297 0.3037 0.2679
(0.5492) (0.5802) (0.5288) (0.5216) (0.6582) (0.6932)
H1b: Legislative resources (LR) -0.1685 -0.0288
(0.1812) (0.2685)
H1b: LR ×EP 1.056 1.063
(0.6643) (0.6561)
H2b: Judicial independence (JI) -0.2738∗-0.2900∗∗
(0.1372) (0.1416)
H2b: JI ×EP 0.5718∗0.6160∗∗
(0.2853) (0.3011)
H3b: Media independence (MI) 0.1758 0.1938
(0.1638) (0.1700)
H3b: MI ×EP 0.0911 0.1335
(0.3836) (0.4153)
Female President -0.1698 -0.1988 -0.1844
(0.4483) (0.4479) (0.4471)
President’s vote shate 0.0051 0.0051 0.0086
(0.0119) (0.0116) (0.0115)
Female legislator’s share 0.0065 0.0063 0.0074
(0.0131) (0.0129) (0.0137)
Legal provision for initiatives -0.3413 -0.2143 -0.3443
(0.2587) (0.2716) (0.2647)
Divided Government 0.1200 0.1293 0.0865
(0.1274) (0.1179) (0.1246)
GDP (log) 0.4881 0.5942 0.3567
(0.4448) (0.3924) (0.4045)
Population (log) -4.106∗∗ -4.386∗∗∗ -4.004∗∗
(1.605) (1.627) (1.676)
Fixed-eects
Fixed Eect (Country) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Eect (Year) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fit statistics
Observations 951 943 953 943 953 943
R20.24206 0.25098 0.24184 0.25148 0.23884 0.24810
Within R20.00816 0.02073 0.00772 0.02138 0.00380 0.01695
Clustered (Fixed Eect (Country)) standard-errors in parentheses
Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1
35
Figure 3: The interaction of judicial independence and public demand positively correlates
with the frequency of CCPDs
−2
0
2
4
−2 −1 0 1 2
Judicial Independence
Effect on N. of CCPDs (log)
36
Figure 4: Judicial Independence and Topics
Clean Energy
Procedure
−2 −1 0 1 2 −2 −1 0 1 2
−0.10
−0.05
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
−0.05
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
Judicial Independence
Expected Topic Proportion
37
Separation of Powers and Responsiveness
of Unilateral Policymaking
Online Appendix
March 12, 2024
Contents
A Details of N. of CCPDs 3
B Robustness Check 4
C Procedure of Structural Topic Model (STM) Analysis 14
List of Figures
1 Number of Climate Change Presidential Directives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
List of Tables
1 Poissonmodel................................... 6
2 Negativebinomialmodel............................. 7
3 ClimateChangeDisaster............................. 8
1
4 Poissonmodel................................... 9
5 Negativebinomialmodel............................. 10
6 Outliersremoved ................................. 11
7 Climate change disasters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
8 Interactions with Non-Environmental Protests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
9 Result of Structural Topic Model (STM) Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2
A Details of N. of CCPDs
Figure 1: Number of Climate Change Presidential Directives
URY
USA
UZB
VEN
ZMB
ZWE
SSD
SYC
TCD
TJK
TKM
TUR
TZA
UGA
PAN
PER
PHL
PRY
SDN
SEN
SLE
SLV
LKA
MDV
MEX
MOZ
MWI
NAM
NGA
NIC
GNQ
GTM
HND
IDN
IRQ
KEN
KOR
LBR
COL
COM
CRI
CYP
DOM
ECU
GHA
GMB
AFG
ARG
BDI
BEN
BOL
BRA
CHL
COG
2010 2010 2010 2010 2010 2010
2010 2010
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
−0.050
−0.025
0.000
0.025
0.050
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
−0.050
−0.025
0.000
0.025
0.050
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
−0.050
−0.025
0.000
0.025
0.050
−0.050
−0.025
0.000
0.025
0.050
−0.050
−0.025
0.000
0.025
0.050
−0.050
−0.025
0.000
0.025
0.050
−0.050
−0.025
0.000
0.025
0.050
0
2
4
6
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
−0.050
−0.025
0.000
0.025
0.050
−0.050
−0.025
0.000
0.025
0.050
−0.050
−0.025
0.000
0.025
0.050
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
−0.050
−0.025
0.000
0.025
0.050
0
1
2
3
4
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
−0.050
−0.025
0.000
0.025
0.050
−0.050
−0.025
0.000
0.025
0.050
−0.050
−0.025
0.000
0.025
0.050
−0.050
−0.025
0.000
0.025
0.050
−0.050
−0.025
0.000
0.025
0.050
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
−0.050
−0.025
0.000
0.025
0.050
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
0
1
2
3
4
−0.050
−0.025
0.000
0.025
0.050
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
−0.050
−0.025
0.000
0.025
0.050
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
−0.050
−0.025
0.000
0.025
0.050
−0.050
−0.025
0.000
0.025
0.050
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
−0.050
−0.025
0.000
0.025
0.050
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
−0.050
−0.025
0.000
0.025
0.050
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
−0.050
−0.025
0.000
0.025
0.050
−0.050
−0.025
0.000
0.025
0.050
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
−0.050
−0.025
0.000
0.025
0.050
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
Year
Total Number of Climate Change Presidential Directives
Note: This chart illustrates the evolution of presidential directives across fty-eight countries. In
nations like Turkey, where the presidential system wasn’t always in place, the data from the years
without a presidential system are not included.
3
B Robustness Check
Our study incorporates several robustness checks and placebo analyses to validate the nd-
ings. Initially, we evaluated the distribution of the dependent variable using a Poisson model
as an alternative to the OLS model. The outcomes in Appendix B Table 1 are congruent
with those presented in Table 1.
Additionally, we employed the negative binomial distribution for analysis, as depicted in
Appendix B Table 2, arming results akin to Table 1.
The study also contemplates the possibility that presidential responses align more with
the exigencies of climate change rather than public advocacy. To this end, we incorpo-
rated Climate Change Disaster as a control variable, derived from the EM-DAT database
(Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters, 2023), categorizing and quantifying
climatological disaster-related fatalities. The analyses in Appendix B Table 3 demonstrate
consistency with Table 1.
For interaction models, we reconducted analyses using the Poisson model, as shown in
Appendix B Table 4, yielding results parallel to those in Table 3.
The same approach using the negative binomial distribution is presented in Appendix B
Table 5, corroborating ndings similar to Table 3.
In a further scrutiny to eliminate potential biases, we excluded the top 10 outliers, as
documented in Appendix B Table 6, with the outcomes remaining in line with those in Table
3.
Then, we reassessed the scenario where presidential directives are inuenced by the ac-
tual context of climate change, as opposed to solely public demand. Appendix B Table 7,
incorporating Climate Change Disaster as a control variable, arms the original ndings,
underscoring the robustness of our conclusions.
Lastly, a placebo analysis was conducted using Non-Environemntal Protests as a vari-
able, hypothesizing that in democratic settings, presidents do not engage in environmental
unilateral policymaking in response to non-environmental public demands. Appendix Table
4
8 supports the prediction. Presidents engage in environmental unilateral policymaking only
in response to environmental public demands.
5
Table 1: Poisson model
Dependent Variable: N. of CCPDs
Model: (1) (2) (3)
Variables
H1a: Legislative resources 0.6430
(0.5494)
H2a: Judicial independence -0.5980∗∗
(0.2558)
Female President -0.5043 -0.4411 -0.5199
(0.3615) (0.3234) (0.3456)
President’s vote shate 0.0067 0.0014 0.0065
(0.0123) (0.0110) (0.0117)
Female legislator’s share 0.0199 0.0161 0.0192
(0.0128) (0.0131) (0.0135)
Legal provision for initiatives -0.5778 -0.5783 -0.5813
(0.5863) (0.5728) (0.5942)
Divided Government 0.0999 0.1263 0.1058
(0.1937) (0.1922) (0.1901)
GDP (log) -0.0841 0.0925 0.0155
(0.8812) (0.8747) (0.8459)
Population (log) -6.711∗∗ -6.408∗∗ -5.943∗
(3.352) (3.237) (3.259)
H3a: Media independence 0.0494
(0.3546)
Fixed-eects
Fixed Eect (Country) Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Eect (Year) Yes Yes Yes
Fit statistics
Observations 539 539 539
Squared Correlation 0.35263 0.33977 0.34064
Pseudo R20.22816 0.23091 0.22720
BIC 909.01 906.98 909.72
Clustered (Fixed Eect (Country)) standard-errors in parentheses
Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1
6
Table 2: Negative binomial model
Dependent Variable: N. of CCPDs
Model: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables
H1a: Legislative resources 0.0753 0.6968
(0.2294) (0.5141)
H2a: Judicial independence -0.5884∗∗ -0.5884∗∗
(0.2871) (0.2871)
H3a: Media independence -0.1316 -0.0259
(0.3762) (0.3392)
Female President -0.5357 -0.5338
(0.3653) (0.3520)
President’s vote shate 0.0063 0.0053
(0.0116) (0.0112)
Female legislator’s share 0.0216∗0.0205
(0.0129) (0.0133)
Legal provision for initiatives -0.5347 -0.5243
(0.6065) (0.6118)
Divided Government -0.0130 -0.0045
(0.1708) (0.1703)
GDP (log) -0.3445 -0.1604
(0.8594) (0.9027)
Population (log) -7.035∗∗ -6.246∗
(3.482) (3.329)
Fixed-eects
Fixed Eect (Country) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Eect (Year) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fit statistics
Observations 480 480 481 481 481 480
Squared Correlation 0.31440 0.38168 0.32103 0.32103 0.33354 0.37341
Pseudo R20.18172 0.19473 0.18661 0.18661 0.18275 0.19346
BIC 820.90 855.68 818.21 818.21 820.72 856.51
Over-dispersion 9.9833 169.40 11.112 11.112 13.279 59.213
Clustered (Fixed Eect (Country)) standard-errors in parentheses
Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1
7
Table 3: Climate Change Disaster
Dependent Variable: N. of CCPDs (log)
Model: (1) (2) (3)
Variables
H1a: Legislative resources -0.0402
(0.2690)
H2a: Judicial indep endence -0.2439∗
(0.1333)
H3a: Media indep endence 0.2086
(0.1619)
Female President -0.1996 -0.2110 -0.1979
(0.4502) (0.4439) (0.4508)
President’s vote shate 0.0067 0.0050 0.0090
(0.0120) (0.0116) (0.0115)
Female legislator’s share 0.0039 0.0019 0.0063
(0.0128) (0.0124) (0.0136)
Legal provision for initiatives -0.2313 -0.1479 -0.3120
(0.2499) (0.2680) (0.2583)
Divided Government 0.1125 0.1287 0.0828
(0.1252) (0.1169) (0.1233)
GDP (log) 0.5322 0.5711 0.3670
(0.4541) (0.4048) (0.4099)
Population (log) -4.094∗∗ -4.234∗∗ -3.930∗∗
(1.666) (1.666) (1.695)
Climate Disaster Aected (log) 0.0137 0.0159 0.0113
(0.0228) (0.0226) (0.0222)
Fixed-eects
Fixed Eect (Country) Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Eect (Year) Yes Yes Yes
Fit statistics
Observations 943 943 943
R20.24522 0.24664 0.24689
Within R20.01320 0.01504 0.01537
Clustered (Fixed Eect (Country)) standard-errors in parentheses
Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1
8
Table 4: Poisson model
Dependent Variable: N. of CCPDs
Model: (1) (2) (3)
Variables
Environmenrtal Protest (EP) -5.644∗∗∗ -0.1891 1.077∗
(1.267) (0.4749) (0.5769)
H1b: Legislative resources (LR) 0.4721
(0.5866)
H1b: LR ×EP 3.188∗∗∗
(0.6361)
H2b: Judicial indep endence (JI) -0.6639∗∗
(0.2791)
H2b: JI ×EP 0.4475∗
(0.2608)
H3b: Media indep endence (MI) 0.1933
(0.3096)
H3b: MI ×EP -0.4273
(0.3223)
Female President -0.5290 -0.4448 -0.5149
(0.3702) (0.3297) (0.3421)
President’s vote shate 0.0049 0.0006 0.0040
(0.0126) (0.0112) (0.0121)
Female legislator’s share 0.0213∗0.0180 0.0190
(0.0123) (0.0123) (0.0135)
Legal provision for initiatives -0.5558 -0.5827 -0.5624
(0.5794) (0.5703) (0.5998)
Divided Government 0.0816 0.1213 0.1035
(0.1926) (0.1918) (0.1889)
GDP (log) -0.0447 0.0847 -0.0417
(0.8377) (0.8526) (0.7608)
Population (log) -6.012∗-6.124∗-5.416∗
(3.329) (3.254) (3.291)
Fixed-eects
Fixed Eect (Country) Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Eect (Year) Yes Yes Yes
Fit statistics
Observations 539 539 539
Squared Correlation 0.41609 0.37312 0.39425
Pseudo R20.24124 0.23497 0.23234
BIC 911.94 916.57 918.51
Clustered (Fixed Eect (Country)) standard-errors in parentheses
Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1
9
Table 5: Negative binomial model
Dependent Variable: N. of CCPDs
Model: (1) (2) (3)
Variables
Environmenrtal Protest (EP) -5.644∗∗∗ -0.1892 1.077∗
(1.267) (0.4750) (0.5769)
H1b: Legislative resources (LR) 0.4721
(0.5866)
H1b: LR ×EP 3.188∗∗∗
(0.6361)
H2b: Judicial indep endence (JI) -0.6640∗∗
(0.2791)
H2b: JI ×EP 0.4475∗
(0.2608)
H3b: Media indep endence (MI) 0.1933
(0.3096)
H3b: MI ×EP -0.4272
(0.3223)
Female President -0.5290 -0.4448 -0.5149
(0.3702) (0.3297) (0.3421)
President’s vote shate 0.0049 0.0006 0.0040
(0.0126) (0.0112) (0.0121)
Female legislator’s share 0.0213∗0.0180 0.0190
(0.0123) (0.0123) (0.0135)
Legal provision for initiatives -0.5557 -0.5827 -0.5624
(0.5794) (0.5703) (0.5998)
Divided Government 0.0816 0.1213 0.1035
(0.1926) (0.1918) (0.1889)
GDP (log) -0.0446 0.0847 -0.0417
(0.8377) (0.8526) (0.7607)
Population (log) -6.012∗-6.124∗-5.416∗
(3.329) (3.254) (3.291)
Fixed-eects
Fixed Eect (Country) Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Eect (Year) Yes Yes Yes
Fit statistics
Observations 539 539 539
Squared Correlation 0.41608 0.37310 0.39423
Pseudo R20.21004 0.20351 0.20077
BIC 911.95 916.57 918.51
Over-dispersion 10,000 10,000 10,000
Clustered (Fixed Eect (Country)) standard-errors in parentheses
Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1
10
Table 6: Outliers removed
Dependent Variable: N. of CCPDs (log)
Model: (1) (2) (3)
Variables
Environmenrtal Protest (EP) -0.8193 0.0073 -0.1212
(0.5650) (0.5049) (0.4997)
H1b: Legislative resources (LR) -0.0482
(0.2607)
H1b: LR ×EP 1.020
(0.6515)
H2b: Judicial indep endence (JI) -0.2612∗
(0.1361)
H2b: JI ×EP 0.6162∗∗
(0.2763)
H3b: Media indep endence (MI) 0.2334
(0.1425)
H3b: MI ×EP 0.3574
(0.3646)
Female President -0.1970 -0.2232 -0.1974
(0.4149) (0.4145) (0.4114)
President’s vote shate 0.0032 0.0034 0.0075
(0.0120) (0.0118) (0.0116)
Female legislator’s share 0.0051 0.0055 0.0075
(0.0142) (0.0142) (0.0147)
Legal provision for initiatives -0.3559 -0.2448 -0.3839∗
(0.2138) (0.2306) (0.2184)
Divided Government 0.1269 0.1331 0.0862
(0.1236) (0.1160) (0.1207)
GDP (log) 0.5180 0.6111 0.3557
(0.4186) (0.3780) (0.3851)
Population (log) -3.877∗∗ -4.138∗∗ -3.681∗∗
(1.524) (1.549) (1.553)
Fixed-eects
Fixed Eect (Country) Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Eect (Year) Yes Yes Yes
Fit statistics
Observations 933 933 933
R20.22133 0.22199 0.22021
Within R20.01960 0.02045 0.01819
Clustered (Fixed Eect (Country)) standard-errors in parentheses
Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1
11
Table 7: Climate change disasters
Dependent Variable: N. of CCPDs (log)
Model: (1) (2) (3)
Variables
Environmenrtal Protest (EP) -0.8066 0.0048 -0.1213
(0.5548) (0.5053) (0.5055)
H1b: Legislative resources (LR) -0.0509
(0.2615)
H1b: LR ×EP 1.010
(0.6492)
H2b: Judicial indep endence (JI) -0.2695∗
(0.1376)
H2b: JI ×EP 0.6200∗∗
(0.2805)
H3b: Media indep endence (MI) 0.2298
(0.1389)
H3b: MI ×EP 0.3580
(0.3676)
Female President -0.2017 -0.2359 -0.2040
(0.4213) (0.4222) (0.4180)
President’s vote shate 0.0032 0.0032 0.0074
(0.0120) (0.0118) (0.0116)
Female legislator’s share 0.0050 0.0052 0.0074
(0.0140) (0.0140) (0.0145)
Legal provision for initiatives -0.3562 -0.2462 -0.3849∗
(0.2134) (0.2255) (0.2175)
Divided Government 0.1269 0.1337 0.0867
(0.1237) (0.1159) (0.1207)
GDP (log) 0.5191 0.6130 0.3582
(0.4186) (0.3783) (0.3852)
Population (log) -3.856∗∗ -4.091∗∗ -3.657∗∗
(1.538) (1.559) (1.566)
Cl_disaster_aected_1M_log 0.0048 0.0126 0.0067
(0.0234) (0.0239) (0.0233)
Fixed-eects
Fixed Eect (Country) Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Eect (Year) Yes Yes Yes
Fit statistics
Observations 933 933 933
R20.22137 0.22229 0.22029
Within R20.01966 0.02082 0.01830
Clustered (Fixed Eect (Country)) standard-errors in parentheses
Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1
12
Table 8: Interactions with Non-Environmental Protests
Dependent Variable: N. of CCPDs (log)
Model: (1) (2) (3)
Variables
Non-Environmental Protest -0.4229 -0.6830 -0.3139
(0.6689) (1.085) (1.103)
H1b: Legislative resources (LR) 0.0442
(0.4062)
H1b: LR ×Non EP -0.1205
(0.5020)
H2b: Judicial independence (JI) -0.3408
(0.4667)
H2b: JI ×Non EP 0.0967
(0.4684)
H3b: Media independence (MI) 0.2670
(0.3689)
H3b: MI ×Non EP -0.0803
(0.4169)
Female President -0.1978 -0.2105 -0.1949
(0.4503) (0.4443) (0.4499)
President’s vote shate 0.0071 0.0049 0.0091
(0.0123) (0.0120) (0.0116)
Female legislator’s share 0.0040 0.0015 0.0060
(0.0128) (0.0121) (0.0138)
Legal provision for initiatives -0.2212 -0.1421 -0.3013
(0.2521) (0.2651) (0.2606)
Divided Government 0.1108 0.1303 0.0788
(0.1252) (0.1209) (0.1160)
GDP (log) 0.5246 0.5571 0.3661
(0.4574) (0.3949) (0.4123)
Population (log) -4.073∗∗ -4.229∗∗ -3.937∗∗
(1.656) (1.670) (1.699)
People Aected by Climate Disaster (log) 0.0144 0.0169 0.0120
(0.0230) (0.0229) (0.0224)
Fixed-eects
Fixed Eect (Country) Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Eect (Year) Yes Yes Yes
Fit statistics
Observations 943 943 943
R20.24570 0.24718 0.24720
Within R20.01382 0.01575 0.01578
Clustered (Fixed Eect (Country)) standard-errors in parentheses
Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1
13
C Procedure of Structural Topic Model (STM) Analy-
sis
First, the summaries of the Grantham Research Institute at the London School of Economics
and Climate Policy Radar (2023) dataset documents are processed to create a corpus suitable
for STM. This involves removing infrequent terms and plotting the data to identify the
optimal number of topics. The STM is executed with dierent numbers of topics from 5
to 25 to nd a better number of the topics, each time using a spectral initialization and
incorporating variables like judicial independence and liberal democracy scores as covariates.
Based on the “frontier” condition, where no model strictly dominates another in terms of
semantic coherence and exclusivity (Roberts et al., 2014), we decide the number of the topics
as 15.
Appendix Table 4 shows the outcome of STM. We labeled each of the fteen topics and
demonstrated the FREX (FRequency and EXclusivity) words.
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Table 9: Result of Structural Topic Model (STM) Analysis
Procedure feder, clean, nanci, procur, resili, assess, focus
Local politics object, specif, sustain, strategi, region, local, contain
Credit credit, aect, long-term, least, certi, gradual, introduc
Greenhouse Gas adapt, greenhous, mitig, gase, emiss, ecosystem, reduct
Disaster disast, base, civil, risk, will, coordin, emerg
Coordination ministri, economi, committe, interministeri, mechan, charge, chang
Rule clearanc, peatland, extend, instruct, moratorium, sign, primari
Forest (Emission) redd, forest, process, stock, carbon, emiss, minist
Energy Eciency eci, energi, electr, new, consumpt, agenc, light
Pollution transfer, pollut, committe, oci, gazett, publish, regular
Forest (Conservation) land, forest, control, amazon, deforest, encourag, nativ
Clean Energy programm, solar, renew, regulatori, sourc, wind, altern
Biofuel power, decemb, biofuel, detail, poverti, long, rural
Climate Policy countri, chang, convent, citizen, pari, climat, polici
Taxation fuel, tax, price, rate, sale, consum, nbspbrthe
Note: The list of words in each row in the second column is the FREX (FRequency and EXclusivity)
words in each topic. We labeled each topic as words in the rst column based on the result. We
determined the number of topics based on exclusivity and semantic coherence.
References
Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters. 2023. “EM-DAT.”.
URL: https://www.emdat.be/
Grantham Research Institute at the London School of Economics and Climate Policy Radar.
2023. “Climate Change Laws of the World.”.
URL: https://climate-laws.org and https://app.climatepolicyradar.org/search
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Roberts, Margaret E., Brandon M. Stewart, Dustin Tingley, Christopher Lucas, Jeston
Leder-Luis, Shana Kushner Gadarian, Bethany Albertson and David G. Rand. 2014.
“Structural Topic Models for Open-Ended Survey Responses.” American Political Science
Review 58(4):1064–1082.
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