Available via license: CC BY
Content may be subject to copyright.
Societies2024,14,16.https://doi.org/10.3390/soc14020016www.mdpi.com/journal/societies
Article
RethinkingDignityandExploitationinHumanTrafficking
andSexWorkers’RightsCases
WilliamPaulSimmons
Gender&Women’sStudies,HumanRightsPracticeProgram,UniversityofArizona,Tuc son ,AZ85721,USA;
williamsimmons@arizona.edu
Abstract:Asforcedmigrationincreasesdramaticallyduetosuchfactorsasclimatechange,rising
conflict,andauthoritarianism,morelegalcasesonhumantraffickingandsexworkaresuretoarise.
Todate,veryfewcasesontheseissueshavebeendecidedininternationalhumanrightstribunals,
andtheyhavebeensubjecttoextensivecriticism,especiallyfortheirconflationofslavery,human
trafficking,forcedprostitution,andconsensualsexwork.Thismanuscriptanalyzesrecentjurispru-
dencefromEuropeandAfricatoaddressthisconceptualconfusionandarguethattribunalsmust
interrogatetheiruseofthetermsdignityandexploitationorriskfurthermarginalizingalreadymar-
ginalizedpeople.
Keywords:humantrafficking;consensualsexwork;dignity;exploitation;EuropeanCourtof
HumanRights
1.AnOpeningVignee
Abouttenyearsago,whileconductinganethnographicstudyinArizonaofundocu-
mentedmigrantskeptagainsttheirwillindrophouses[1],atellingexchangehappened
wheninterviewingafederallawenforcementofficerwithexpertiseinhumantrafficking.
Iknewtheinterviewee,aswehadpreviouslycollaboratedontwoseparateprojectson
migrationandtrafficking,andIhadaendedanantitraffickingworkshopthatshehad
co-led.Wewerenowtalkingaboutherroleonanewlyconstituteddrophousetaskforce
inPhoenixthatwaschargedwithtacklingtheproliferationofdrophouses,especiallyin
homesthathadbeenabandonedduetothehousingmarketcollapse.Severaltimesa
week,lawenforcementwouldfinddozensofmigrants,mostlyfromMexico,beingheld
againsttheirwillinresidentialhomesthathadbeenboardedup.Manywerebrutalized,
andmostwereheldashostagesuntilfamilymembersintheUSwouldagreetopayran-
som.Whenfreedbyalawenforcementraid,themigrantstoldchillingstoriesofkillings,
torture,sexualassaults,andotherabuses.
Neartheendoftheinterview,Iaskedwhethertheagenthadeverseenanyexamples
ofhumantraffickingintheirwork;andsherepliednegatively.Here,anagentwhowas
extremelywell-trainedinthedefinitionsofhumantraffickingwasnotseeinghumantraf-
fickingwhenshedealtwithitdaily.Thesemigrantsclearlymetthethree-pronginterna-
tionaldefinitionoftraffickingvictimswiththemethodoftrafficking,themeansoftraf-
ficking,andthepurpose.Theywere(1)harboredagainsttheirwill(2)throughforce,co-
ercion,orfraudfor(3)exploitation(theUNProtocol[2]aswellastheEuropeanConven-
tion[3]definetraffickingas“therecruitment,transportation,transfer,harboringorreceipt
ofpersons,bymeansofthethreatoruseofforceorotherformsofcoercion,ofabduction,
offraud,ofdeception,oftheabuseofpowerorofapositionofvulnerabilityorofthe
givingorreceivingofpaymentsorbenefitstoachievetheconsentofapersonhavingcon-
troloveranotherperson,forthepurposeofexploitation.Exploitationshallinclude,ata
Citation:Simmons,W.P.Rethinking
DignityandExploitationinHuman
TraffickingandSexWorkers’Rights
Cases.Societies2024,14,16.hps://
doi.org/10.3390/soc14020016
AcademicEditors:BenBrewster,
ToddLandman,LaurenEglen
andErgulCeliksoy
Received:11November2023
Revised:12December2023
Accepted:19December2023
Published:26January2024
Copyright:©2024bytheauthor.
LicenseeMDPI,Basel,Swierland.
Thisarticleisanopenaccessarticle
distributedunderthetermsand
conditionsoftheCreativeCommons
Aribution(CCBY)license
(hps://creativecommons.org/license
s/by/4.0/).
Societies2024,14,162of17
minimum,theexploitationoftheprostitutionofothersorotherformsofsexualexploita-
tion,forcedlabororservices,slaveryorpracticessimilartoslavery,servitudeorthere-
movaloforgans”).Buttoher,mostlikelyinfluencedbythevitriolicanti-immigrantrhet-
oricinArizona,theywereeithermerelyvictimsorillegalmigrantswhoweretoberepat-
riatedtoMexicoassoonaspossible.Sincetheywerenotidentifiedastraffickingvictims
bylawenforcement,theywerenotofferedthesocialservicesorrelieffromdeportationto
whichmanywereentitled.
Thisisnotanisolatedcase,thereismuchconfusionbetweenconceptualcategories
ofirregularandforcedmigrants,individualsbeingsmuggled,andtraffickingvictims,and
thisconfusionisoftenexacerbatedbypoliticalrhetoric.Theconfusionincreasesdramati-
callywhenaemptingtodistinguishbetweenconsensualsexworkersandsextrafficking
victims,assomebelievethatnoonewouldfreelyentersexwork.Anditincreaseseven
furtherasmanyacademicsandactivistshavepushedtoconnecthumantraffickingwith
modern-dayslavery.Thismovemayhaverhetoricalpunch[4](butmostforcedmigrants
whoareexploitedandevenmosttraffickingvictimsdonotlooklikeslavesinthepublic
imagination,especiallywhenslaveryisdefinedthroughtheprincipleofownership,asit
hasbeeninsomerecentinternationalcases.
Theconfusioniscompoundedasamigrantmaybewillingtobesmuggledatone
partoftheirjourneyandthenkeptagainsttheirwillandexploited(thusatraffickingvic-
tim)duringanotherpart[5].Indeed,theymightnotevenknowtheirownstatus,i.e.,
whethertheyarekeptagainsttheirwill,unlesstheytrytoflee.Forexample,WestAfrican
migrantsarewillinglysmuggledthroughtheSaharaDesert,onlytobekeptindetention
facilitiesrunbymilitiasandcriminalelementsinNorthAfrica,thusmakingthemtraffick-
ingvictimsorevenslaves.Oncetheirransomispaidortheyescape,manymakeitto
Europebybeingsmuggledinboats,onlytobecometraffickingvictimsagainiftheyare
keptagainsttheirwillinadrophouseorinforcedlaborcontexts.
Itshouldnotbetoosurprisingthenthatlegaltribunalsalsoexperienceconceptual
confusion.AsoneAust r alianjusticebemoaned,“thosewhoengageinthetrafficinhuman
beingsareunlikelytobesoobligingastoarrangetheirpracticestoconformtosomecon-
venienttaxonomy”[6].
2.Introduction
Thesedistinctionsarecriticalasforcedmigrationincreasesdramaticallyduetosuch
factorsasclimatechange,risingconflict,andauthoritarianism.Forcedmigrantsfre-
quentlyfaceextremetypesofexploitationfrommultipleactors[5,7],includinghuman
trafficking,forcedprostitution,andlaborexploitation.Theyarealsomorelikelytotake
upconsensualsexwork.
Despitethisurgency,aswellastheplethoraofarticles,NGOs,andproclamations
abouthumantraffickingandsexwork,veryfewcasesontheseissueshavebeendecided
ininternationalhumanrightstribunals,andthesehavebeensubjecttoextensivecriticism.
Forinstance,thefirstmajorcases,theRantsevcaseintheEuropeanCourtofHumanRights
(ECHR)andtheNjemanzecaseintheECOWASCommunityCourtofJustice(ECOWAS
Court),havebeencritiquedbyfeministscholarswhoarguethatjuristshaveworsenedthe
conceptualmorassbyconflatingslavery,humantrafficking,forcedprostitution,andcon-
sensualsexwork.WhiletherecentECHRcaseS.M.v.Croatia(2020)addressedsomeof
theseconceptualissues,majorconcernsremain,especiallyaboutthemeaningofexploita-
tionanddignityinsuchcases.
TheECHRwilllikelyhaveadditionalchancestoclarifywhatitmeansbyexploitation
anddignity,aswellastofurtherclarifydistinctionsbetweentrafficking,slavery,forced
prostitution,andconsensualsexworkintwopotentiallylandmarkrulings.M.A.andOth‐
ersv.Francewasdeclaredadmissiblein2023,butthemeritshavenotyetbeendecidedon.
ItdealswiththecriminalizationofthepurchaseofsexinFrance,theso-calledNordic
modelofsexworkerregulation.Thecomplainantsare261sexworkerswhoarguethatthe
Nordicmodel,whichFranceadoptedin2016,compelsthemtopracticetheirprofession
Societies2024,14,163of17
clandestinelyandthus“exposesthemtogreaterrisksfortheirphysicalintegrityandlives,
andaffectstheirfreedomtodefinehowtheylivetheirprivatelives”[8].TheFrenchConseil
d’Étatheldin2019that“prostitutionisincompatiblewithhumanrightsanddignity”[8],
whilethesexworkersconverselyarguethatitisthecriminalizationofthepurchaseofsex
whichviolatestheirdignityandleadstoexploitativeconditions.Anothercasemightbe
filedwithanearlyidenticalfactpaernasthemuch-malignedRantsevcase[9].Here,a
DominicanmigrantworkerwhotraveledtoCyprusforworkarguesthatshewasforced
tohavesexinaCypriotcabaretandwasthusatraffickingvictimandthatCyprusdidnot
doenoughtopreventherexploitationthroughtrafficking.
Thesecaseswillhingeonthecourt’sunderstandingofexploitationanddignity,and
IarguebelowthattheECHRandothertribunalsneedtofurtherinterrogatetheiruseof
theseterms,ortheyriskfurthermarginalizingalreadymarginalizedpeople.Tomakethis
argument,Iwillfirstdiscusstheevolvingjurisprudenceonhumantraffickinginthe
ECHRfocusingontheRantsevandS.M.cases.WhileS.M.clarifiessomeoftheconceptual
confusionabouthumantraffickingfromRantsev,itopensthedoorforwidelyvaryingun-
derstandingsofexploitationanddignity,especiallyonsexworkers’rights.Indeed,itwill
becomeclearthatRantsevandS.M.canbereadassexworkers’rightscases,oratamini-
mum,thecourtappearstobeprimedtousethesamelegalanalysisinbothhumantraf-
fickingandsexworkers’rightscases.SincetheECHRhasnotyetdelveddeeplyintosex
workers’rights,ImovetotheECOWASCourtinWestAfricaandtheSouthAfricanCon-
stitutionalCourttohighlightthepitfallsthatmightplaguesuchjurisprudenceinthe
ECHRandelsewhere.Iendwithanalysesofdignityandexploitationandcallforheight-
enedscrutinyofatribunal’sunderstandingofexploitationanddignityincasesinvolving
marginalizedpeople.
2.1.TheEuropeanCourt’sEvolvingJurisprudenceonHumanTrafficking
ThefirstmajorrulingonhumantraffickingintheECHRwasRantsevv.Cyprusand
Russia(2012)[10].OxanaRantseva,a20-year-oldRussianstudent,enteredCyprusonan
“artist”visatoworkinoneoftheirnotoriouscabarets,commonlyknownasplacesofsex
work.Tofacilitatehertravel,theownerofthecabarethadtoapplyforthevisawithan
employmentcontract,alongwithRantseva’spassportandmedicalcertificate.Soonafter
herarrival,Rantsevaleftheremployer,whoultimatelylocatedherinanearbydisconine
dayslater.Theownertookhertoapolicestationarguingthatshehadviolatedherem-
ploymentcontractandaskedforhertobedeportedsohecouldhireanotherwomanto
fillhervisaslot.Thepoliceconcludedshehadnotviolatedhercontractandreturnedher
totheowner.Hereluctantlyacceptedherbackandtookhertoanapartmentwhereshe
wasallegedlyheldagainstherwillbyacabaretemployee.Thatnight,shediedinafall
fromafifth-storybalconywhileapparentlytryingtoclimbdownusingbedsheets.The
Cypriotmedicalexaminerconcludedthatnothirdpartywasinvolvedinherdeathand
herinjuriesoccurredbecauseofthefall“incircumstancesresemblinganaccident,inan
aempttoescapefromtheapartmentinwhichshewasaguest”([10],para.41).TheCyp-
riotauthoritiesconductedpreciouslileinvestigationtodetermineifshewasavictimof
trafficking.Herfather,NikolaiRantsev,commissionedanewforensicsreportinRussia,
whichconcludedthatmanyofherinjuriesoccurredbeforeshefell.Hethenworkedwith
aprobonoRussianNGOtoseekredress.Afterunsuccessfullytryingtoopenacasein
Russia,hebroughtacasetotheEuropeanCourtofHumanRights,arguingthatneither
RussianorCyprusdidenoughtopreventthehumantraffickingofhisdaughter.
TheEuropeanCourtruledinhisfavor,concludingthatshewasheldagainst“her
ownfreewill”([10],para.316)thatfatefulnightandwasthusdeprivedofArticle5,which
guaranteestheRighttoLibertyintheEuropeanConventionofHumanRights(European
Convention),andthatCyprusdidnotconductanadequateinvestigationinviolationof
Article2,whichguaranteestheRighttoLife.CypruswasalsofoundtohaveviolatedAr-
ticle4(Slavery)becauseitsartistvisaschemedidnotprotectagainsthumantrafficking.
RussiaviolatedArticle4(Slavery)becausetheydidnotinvestigatewhethershehadbeen
Societies2024,14,164of17
trafficked,includingwhorecruitedherintheircountry.Asreparation,Cypruswasor-
deredtopaythefather40,000Euros,andRussiawasorderedtopay2000Euros.Subse-
quently,Cyprusinitiatedaninvestigationintotheartistvisaprogramandsignificantly
changeditsvisapolicies,thoughcabaretscontinuetobeverypopular.
SincetraffickingisnotexplicitlymentionedintheEuropeanConvention,thecourt
hadtoshowhowhumantraffickingisconnectedtoArticle4oftheProhibitionofSlavery
andForcedLabor.Thefirsttwosectionsreadasfollows:
1. Nooneshallbeheldinslaveryorservitude.
2. Nooneshallberequiredtoperformforcedorcompulsorylabor.
Initsmostcriticizedmove,theEuropeanCourtdeterminedthathumantrafficking
generallyfitsintoArticle4,withoutexplainingwhetherhumantraffickingmetaspecific
partoftheConvention’swordingasbeingeither“slavery”,“servitude”,or“forcedor
compulsorylabor”.Thecourtmerelysaid,“withoutanysubstantiation”([4],p.41),that
“traffickinginhumanbeings,byitsverynatureandaimofexploitation,isbasedonthe
exerciseofpowersaachingtotherightofownership”([10],p.280),andthus,itfitsinto
Article4.Bymakingthisgeneralequivalence,thecourtdisregardedmorerecent,compre-
hensive,andnuanceddefinitionsofhumantraffickingthatemphasizethemethods,
means,andpurposeoftrafficking,suchastheCouncilofEurope’sConventiononAction
againstTraffickinginHumanBeings(Cf.[11]).
Additionally,andrecallingtheopeningvigneeabove,byfocusingontherightto
ownership,thecourtfailedtocarefullyexaminethefactpaernofthecase.Theydidnot
askatwhatpointsRantsevawasexploitedorwhethertheexploitationwaspartoftraf-
fickingoroutsidethegambitoftrafficking.Forinstance,wasRantsevaavictimoftraffick-
ingoramigrantsexworkerwhowasbeingexploited?Whatmessageabouthercondition
wasRantsevcommunicatingbyleavingherworkatthecabaret?Ifthecasehadbeenmade
aboutexploitationinsteadofslavery,thejudgmentwouldalsoextendprotectionstoother
forcedmigrantsandconsensualsexworkerswhoareexploitedbutnottrafficked.Stoya-
navaputsthismetaphorically:“Oncehavingstarteda‘dance’withthehumantrafficking
argument,thecourtperformedonananti-prostitutionandanti-immigrationstage.The
ECtHRshouldnothaveresortedtothehumantraffickingframework.Instead,itshould
havefocusedontheabusivepracticescoveredbyArticle4oftheECHR”([12],p.194).
Thesedistinctionsarecritical.Ifsomeoneisforcedintosexworkandisnotallowedto
leave,thentherelationshipisoneoftrafficking,whichwouldfallintoArticle4according
toRantsev.Butifsomeoneisaconsensualsexworkerandthusnotatraffickingvictim,
butexperiencesexploitationduringtheirwork,dotheyhaveremediesundertheEuro-
peanConvention?
Exploitationaspartoftraffickingandoutsideofthescopeoftraffickingareclearlypre-
sentasdescribedbytheCypriotombudsmaninherstudyofsexworkersinthecabarets.Many
socioeconomicallyvulnerablepeople(mostlywomen)traveltoCyprustoworkinthecabarets
fromRussiaandEasternEurope,andmorerecently,fromtheDominicanRepublic,Philip-
pines,andChina[13].Theirworksituationisnotideal.TheEuropeanCourtquotedtheom-
budsman’sreport:“Usuallytheyareawarethattheywillbecompelledtoprostitutethem-
selves.However,theydonotalwaysknowabouttheworkingconditionsunderwhichthey
willexercisethisjob.TherearealsocasesofalienwomenwhocometoCyprus,havingthe
impressionthattheywillworkaswaitressesordancersandthattheywillonlyhavedrinks
withclients(‘consommation’).Theyaremadebyforceandthreatstocomplywiththerealterms
oftheirwork”([10],para.85).WewouldhopethattheECHRwouldhaveprotectionsforthese
(mostly)womeniftheyareexploited,eveniftheydidnotmeetthelegalstandardsofbeing
traffickedandwereforcedmigrantsorconsensualsexworkers(anearlyanalysisbyAllain
(2010)concludedthat“asaresultofRantsev,MemberStatesoftheCouncilofEuropenow
haveanobligationtosuppressnotonlyslavery,servitudeandforcedlabor,butanytypeof
humanexploitationontheirterritory”([14],p.227).Iagreewiththesentimenthere,butIdo
notbelieveRantsevleadstosuchaconclusion).
Societies2024,14,165of17
2.2.S.M.v.Croatia(GrandChamber,2021)
InS.M.v.Croatia,theECHRseemedeagertoclearuptheconceptualconfusionfrom
Rantsev,asArticle4wasnotpartoftheinitialcomplaintbutwascentraltoitsruling.The
complainanthadaskedthecourttoruleonarelativelyminorproceduralissue:therefusal
toamendacriminalindictmentwhichwasallegedtoamounttoviolationsofArticles3
and8[15].TheFirstSectionortheLowerChamberofthecourt,intheiraempttoclarify
conceptualdistinctionsfromRantsev,furthermuddiedthem,especiallyconcerningcon-
sensualsexwork.CroatiaappealedthecasetotheGrandChamber,whichissueditsmore
nuancedopinionin2021(Cf.[16]).
In2012,then22-year-oldS.M.,reportedtothelocalpoliceinCroatiathatshehadbeen
forcedintoprostitutionbyT.M.T.M.hadapproachedherthroughFacebookandofferedto
helpherfindajobbecauseheclaimedtoknowhermother.Afterbuildingarelationship,T.M.
askedhertoprovidesexualservicesformoneytoothermenandgivehimhalfofthemoney.
WhenS.M.resisted,hewouldthreatenherandsometimeshither.S.M.confidedinafriend
andthenwenttothepolice.ItwasfoundthatT.M.wasaformerpoliceofficerwithprevious
convictionsfor“procuringprostitutionandrape”([15],para.20)andhadpreviouslyserved
morethansixyearsinprison.Attrial,thecourtonlyheardfromS.M.,herfriend,andT.M.It
concludedthatT.M.“hadorganizedaprostitutionringintowhichhehadrecruitedtheappli-
cant”,but“ithadnotbeenestablishedthathehadforcedorpressuredherintoprostitution,
whichwasaconstituentelementoftheoffensehewaschargedwith”([15],para.78).Thecourt
wasespeciallyconcernedwithsomeoftheinconsistenciesofS.M.’stestimonyabouttheforce
thatshewassubjectto.AppealswithinCroatiawereunsuccessful,includingtheattemptto
revisetheindictmenttoalesserchargetoobtainaconviction.Itshouldbenotedthatina
separatelegalprocess,S.M.wasofficiallyidentifiedasatraffickingvictim.Acasewasfiledin
theECHRallegingthatS.M.’srightsunderArticles3(inhumanordegradingtreatmentor
punishment)and8(respectforprivateandfamilylife)wereviolatedbecausetheAttor ney
General’sOfficewasnotallowedtorevisethechargesandbecauseopportunitiestocorrobo-
rateS.M.stestimonyweremissed,asseveralpotentialwitnesseswerenotinterviewedor
askedtotestify(Cf.[16]).
TheFirstSectionissuedadecisionin2018andfoundthatS.M.hadherrightsviolated
underArticle4.Toreachitsdecision,theChamberadded,withlileanalysis,theexploi-
tationofprostitutiontotheexpandinglistofviolationsinArticle4,alongwithtrafficking
fromRantsev.“Traffickingandexploitationofprostitutionthreatensthehumandignity
andfundamentalfreedomsofitsvictimsandcannotbeconsideredcompatiblewitha
democraticsocietyandthevaluesexpoundedintheConvention”([15],para.54).Intheir
formulation,the“exploitationofprostitution”isnotconsideredpartofhumantrafficking
butaseparatetypeofactivitythatfallswithinArticle4.Onceagain,thecourtdidnot
adoptthemorenuancedthree-prongdefinitionoftrafficking,andthecourtaddedmore
ambiguity,astheydidnotclarifywhether“exploitationofprostitution”requiredcoercion
orcouldapplytoconsensualsexwork.
AnespeciallystrongdissentingopinionbyJudgeKoskeloargued,interalia,thatthe
ChamberdidnothavetheauthoritytoamendthecomplainttomakethisanArticle4case.
Further,theyhadmistakenlyread“exploitationofprostitution”intothescopeofArticle
4byconfusingthethreeprongsofthecontemporarydefinitionoftrafficking.Theexploi-
tationofprostitutionofothersandotherformsofsexualexploitationareprovidedintraf-
fickingdefinitionsasexamplesoftypesofexploitationandthuspartofthethirdprong,
thepurposeoftrafficking.TheChamber’sjudgmentinsteadmovedtheseconceptstothe
firstprong,theactualactoftrafficking,thushavingitfallwithinArticle4(Cf.[16]).Thus,
“themajorityintroducesanenlargementofthescopeofthatArticlethatisbothsignificant
andobscure”([17],para.18).Koskeloherealsonotesthattheterms“exploitationofthe
prostitutionofotherorotherformsofsexualexploitation”([17],para.31)wereintention-
allyleftundefinedinotherinternationallegalinstrumentsbecauseofthewiderangeof
regulatoryframeworksandopinionsonsexworkintheCouncilofEuropeanstates(see,
forexample[18]).
Societies2024,14,166of17
CroatiaaskedforareferraltotheGrandChamber(GC),whichruledin2021.TheGC
addressedthebiggestdeficiencyoftheRantsevcasebyholdingthattheEuropeanCourt
shouldrelyonmorerecentdefinitionsofhumantraffickingwiththeirthreeprongsof
actions,methods,andpurposes.TheGrandChamberagreedwiththeLowerChamber
that“exploitationofprostitutionisanadditionalelementofArticle4andisnotnecessarily
partoftraffickingorslaveryorservitude”([15],para.300).Theyalsoheldthatexploitation
ofprostitutionrequirescoercion.However,thecourtaddedsomeconfusionbyseeming
tobringexploitationofprostitutioninthrough“forcedorcompulsorylabor…irrespective
ofwhether,intheparticularcircumstancesofacase,theyarerelatedtothespecifichu-
man-traffickingcontext”([15],para.300).Futurecaseswillneedtofurtheruntanglethe
relationshipbetweentheexploitationofprostitutionandforcedlabor([16],p.1059).
Formypurposes,theChamber’saempttodefine“exploitationofprostitution”is
moreproblematic.Ontheonehand,theChamberclarified,contratheLowerChamber,
thattheexploitationofprostitutionrequiresforceorcoercion(relyingonitsonlyprevious
sexworkcaseV.T.v.France2007[19]),andthustheChamberfrequentlyreferredto
“forcedprostitution”asaviolationofArticle4.However,thecourtopenedupPandora’s
boxbylookingatpreviousmigrantlaborcases,especiallyChowduryandOthers(2017),to
definewhatismeantbyforceintheforcedprostitutioncontext.Twomajorclaimsare
foundherethatmakesenseinthemigrantlaborcontextbutarepotentiallyproblematic
intheforcedprostitutioncontext.First,thecourtconcludedthat“force”caninclude“sub-
tleformsofcoerciveconduct”,suchassocioeconomicconditions,andsecond,thatprevi-
ousconsentisnotenoughtoruleoutforcedlabor([20],p.285).
Chowduryinvolved150BangladeshilaborerswhohadtraveledtoGreecetoworkin
largestrawberryfarms.Theworkersworkedextendedhours,werenotpaid,were
guardedbymenwithguns,andlivedinsubstandardhousing.Theywentonstrikethree
timesdemandingtheirpay,andinoneinstance,33ofthemwereshot.TheGreekgovern-
mentonlyrecognizedthosewhowereshotastraffickingvictims,astheotherswerefree
toleaveatanytime.TheEuropeanCourtinsteadruledthatthetreatmentofallofthem
metthedefinitionofforcedlaborunderArticle4.Itwasforcedeventhoughtheyhad
previouslyprovidedconsentandweretechnicallyfreetoleave.Whatcompelledthemto
staywasthattheyhadnotbeenpaid,theirvulnerablecondition,especiallythattheywe
undocumented,andthattheyweresubjecttoarrest.Thiswasamajorvictoryformigrant
workers’rightsinEurope.
Intheconsensualsexworkcontextthough,theseholdingscancutbothways.By
callingintoquestionpreviousconsentandincludingmorestructuralformsofcoercion
suchassocioeconomicconditions,thecourtmayhaveleftthedooropentomakeanar-
gumentthatallprostitutionisforced.Ataminimum,consensualsexworkerswhofreely
entertheprofession,withtheirconsent,becauseofsocioeconomicconditions,couldpos-
siblyfitthedefinitionofforcedprostitution.AsHugheswrites,“thequestionofwhether
thereisadistinctionbetween‘exploitationofprostitution’and‘forcedprostitution’isone
thatisultimatelydeterminedbywhetheroneregardstheformerasinherently‘forced’.
Forthosethatregardatleastsomeformsofprostitutionasanexerciseofchoicethereisa
meaningfuldistinction,whilstforthosethatregardprostitutionasinherentlycoerced
theremaybenodistinction”([16],p.1059).
Recallthatthecourtwastryingtodefinetheexploitationofprostitutionwhenmov-
ingtowardforcedprostitutionandthattheLowerChamberalmostunanimouslywas
willingtoaccepttheexploitationofprostitutionwithoutqualifyingitasforced(thedis-
sentingopinionbyJusticeVillanovaintheGrandChamber’sjudgmentwouldgofurther
andholdthatanyformofprostitutionisaformofslavery:“Humandignitycannotbe
paidfor.Theprinciplethatthehumanbodyisnotpropertyalsoremainsincompatible
withitscommodification(resextracommercium)andunsuitedtothecontextofacontract
ofemployment,whichremuneratesthepersonsconcernedfortheir(physicalorintellec-
tual)effortsandnotformakingtheirownbodiesavailabletoothersontheinstructionsof
theiremployer.”VillanovaendsbyquotingVictorHugo’sLesMisérables,“Wesaythat
Societies2024,14,167of17
slaveryhasvanishedfromEuropeancivilization,butitisnottrue.Slaverystillexists,but
nowitappliesonlytowomenanditsnameisprostitution”[10]).Fromthis,weshould
worrythatthecourtcouldgrantthatprostitutionisbyitsnatureexploitative,orthatthere
isreallynosuchthingasunforcedprostitution.
Inthesameway,radicallydifferentapproacheswouldbepossibleifthecourthadfo-
cusedonexploitation,whetherornotitwastrafficking,asIsuggestedaboveindiscussing
Rantsev.Acourtcouldholdthatsexworkisperseexploitative,whetherornotitiscoerced.
AsStoyanovawroteofRantsev,“Itneedstobenotedthattheinterpretativeopenness
oftheterm‘exploitation’iswideenoughtocoveranyformsofprostitution,evenforms
notinvolvingcoercion”[21].Hughes(2022)suggeststhatonewayofdistinguishingbe-
tweenconsensualandforcedprostitutionwouldbetotakeadeeperlookattherelation-
shipbetweenArticle4anddignity[16](here,shedrawsonthecourt’sstatementfoundin
RantsevandcitedapprovinglyinS.M.that“traffickingthreatensthehumandignityand
fundamentalfreedomsofitsvictimsandcouldnotbeconsideredcompatiblewithadem-
ocraticsocietyandthevaluesexpoundedintheConvention”([10],para.281)).However,
amovetodignityispotentiallyproblematic,asacourtcouldfindthatsexwork,whether
consensualornot,isagainstthedignityoftheindividualsexworkerorevenofsocietyas
awhole,asAfricancourtshaveinrecentcases.
3.DignityandExploitationinRecentSexWorkers’RightsCases
Tobeerunderstandtheintersectionofdignity,exploitation,trafficking,andsex
work,Inowturntotwowell-knowncasesfromAfricancourtswheretheseissueswereat
theforefront.
DorothyChiomaNjemanzeandThreeOthersV.TheFederalRepublicofNigeria(2017)[22]
fromtheECOWASCommunityCourtofJustice(howtheECOWASCourt,atribunalfor-
merlydevotedtoeconomiccasesbetweenWestAfricannations,wastransformedintoa
significanthumanrightstribunalwithveryinnovativerulingsisdiscussedinAlteretal.
[23])wasthefirstcasetofindviolationsundertheveryprogressiveProtocolfortheAfri-
canCharteronHumanandPeoples’RightsontheRightsofWomeninAfrica,knownas
theMaputoProtocol.NigeriaalsowasfoundtohaveviolatedtheAfricanCharterand
severalotherinternationaltreatiesanddeclarations.
DorothyNjemanzeisaNigerianactivist,Nollywoodactress,investigativejournalist,ra-
diopersonality,andracecardriver.SheformedtheDorothyNjemanzeFoundationtofight
violenceagainstwomenandtheoverreachoflawenforcementintheNigeriancapitalof
Abuja.Thecityhadcreatedaprogramtocleanupthestreetsandfighthumantraffickingto
“sanitize”’thecity.ThisauthoritywasgiventotheAbujaEnvironmentalProtectionBoard
(AEPB),whichtellinglyhastheresponsibility“toridAbujaanditsenvironsofwhateverwill
constitutepublicnuisance”andisalsoresponsibleforsuchtasksas“wastecollectionanddis-
posal,landfilldevelopment,monitoringofcleaningcontractors,[andthe]maintenanceofthe
centralsewerlines”[24].TheAEPBworkedwithalocalNGOcalledtheSocietyAgainstPros-
titutionandChildLaborinNigeria(SAPCLN)toeliminatestreetprostitution,withpanelvans
labeledwithbothAEPBandSAPCLNpatrollingthestreetsofAbujaatnightarrestingany
womenthoughttobeaprostitute.Manyofthewomenwerebeatenandsexuallyassaultedby
theauthorities.Njemanzeandhergroupspokeoutabouttheprogramandstartedfollowing
thevanstomonitorandrecordtheiractions.
Onenightin2011,Njemanzewasinformedthatmembersofaweddingpartyhad
beenarrestedandthrowninavan.Sheandothermembersoftheweddingpartyfollowed
thevansasmorewomenwereabductedoffthestreetbyplain-clothedofficers.Theyfol-
lowedthevanstotheAEPBofficeandprotestedthearrests.Oneofthesupervisorscame
outandsaidthat“ifitwereuptohim,hewouldalsohavearrestedallthewomenwho
accompaniedthefirstPlaintiff(Njemanze)tothepolicestationbecausetohimtheylooked
likeprostitutes”([22],p.5).AsNjemanzewalkedtohercar,anotherofficergrabbedher
breastandthenforcedherintooneofthevans.Whenshetriedtogetoutofthevan,she
wasbeatenbymilitaryofficers,oneofwhompulledhisgunandthreatenedtokillher
Societies2024,14,168of17
[22].Atseveralpointsduringtheconfrontations,thewomenwerecalled“ashawo”(ade-
rogatoryslangtermforprostitute)bythelawenforcementofficers.Afterbeingreleased,
Njemanzeandhercolleaguesaemptedtostartaformalinvestigationagainstthepolice,
includingcontactingtheNationalHumanRightsCommission,withnosuccess(formore
informationaboutthesearrestsandthecontextoftheantiprostitutioncampaigninAbuja,
seethefilm“SilentTears” byTheOpenSocietyInitiativeforWestAfricaandAmateur
HeadsProductions[25]).
Withthehelpofapan-AfricanNGO,theInstituteforHumanRightsandDevelop-
mentinAfrica,NjemanzeandthreecolleaguesbroughtacasetotheECOWASCourt,
whichheldthatNigeriaviolatednumerousprovisionsofnumerousinternationalinstru-
ments.Substantively,theseincludedthefirstrulingintheAfricansystemonviolence
againstwomenundertheMaputoProtocol;violationsoftheduediligenceto“investigate,
prosecute,andpunish”violatorsofhumanrights;cruel,inhumane,anddegradingtreat-
ment;andarbitraryarrest.ThestatealsofoundthattheNigerianpenalcodehadbeen
appliedinadiscriminatorymannerbecausetheAEPB(withthehelpofSAPCLN)was
patrollingthestreetslookingonlyforwomen.Anymenwhowereonthestreetslateat
nightwerenotconsideredprostitutesandwerenotarrested.
Twoaspectsofthejudgmentareofspecialinteresttomyargument.First,thecourt
determinedthatcallingthewomen“ashawo”was“humiliating,derogatoryanddegrad-
ing”andthusanaffronttothewomen’sdignityunderArticle5oftheAfricanCharterof
HumanRights.ItwasanaffronttodignitybecauseNigerianlawenforcement“failedto
provideanyreasonablejustificationforitsallegationanduseofsuchdegradingwordon
theplaintiffs”([22],p.40).Inotherwords,ifthewomenweresexworkers,thentheuseof
thederogatorytermwouldlikelynotbeaviolation.Aderogatorytermcouldbeapplied
toonegroupofwomenbutnotanother.
Indeed,theentirecaseseemstohingeonwhetherthewomenweresexworkers.The
courtwrites,“theissuetobeaddressediswhetherornottheDefendanthasshownrea-
sonablegrounduponwhichtobasetheirassertionthatthePlaintiffsareprostitutes”([22],
p.36).Onecanreadthejudgmenttomeanthatiftheplaintiffsweresexworkers,their
arrestandmostoftheirill-treatmentwouldnotbeaviolationoftheirhumanrights.Ni-
geriainitsfilingsclaimedtheyweresexworkersandthusanuisanceandagainstAfrican
values.Thecountrywentsofarastoarguethatbecausetheywereprostitutes,human
rightsstandardsdidnotapplytothem.Thejudgmentdoesnotexplicitlyagreewiththat
stance,butsadly,itdoesnotdirectlyrefuteNigeria’sclaim.AsO’Connell[26]argues,
accordingtothejudgmentandquotingtheplaintiffs’ownfiling,“therearetwotypesof
women,namely,thosewomenwhoarehumiliatedbyeventheperceptionthattheymay
beanashawo(‘prostitute’),andthosewomenwhoinfactaresexworkers.Ratherthanalign
themselveswiththerightsofallwomen,includingsexworkerswhoarewomen,theplain-
tiffsrebuffedthestate’sallegationsthatthiscaseconcernedsexwork”(p.516).Thecourt
didnotcriticizethegovernmentforroundingupsexworkers,nordidtheyevendiscuss
thegovernment’sclaimthatsexworkerswerenotentitledtointernationalhumanrights.
“Thestatemadenoaempttodenythatitcondonesthearbitraryarrestofwomenbyits
agents,revealingthatinpracticeitsofficersarefreetomakejudgmentsaboutwhoisand
whoisnotaprostitutebasedonprofiling,stereotypes,andindividualbias”([26],p.518).
Thecourtmissedanopportunitytoaddresshowvaguelawsempowerlawenforcement
totargetdisfavoredgroups(seetheinfamouscaseofMonicaJonesinArizonawhowas
arrestedfor“manifestingprostitution”[27,28]).Theyevencouldhaveheldthatspeech
thatisanaffronttodignitycouldleadtoviolenceandlawenforcementoverreach.Finally,
thecourtdisregardedtheplaintiff’srequestforinnovativereparationsthatcouldhave
addressedthesocietalacceptanceofdiscriminationandviolenceagainstwomen,aswell
asthetrainingoflawenforcementofficialsonsuchissues.Instead,thestatewasonlyor-
deredtopaymonetarydamages.
Societies2024,14,169of17
3.1.Jordanv.SouthAfrica(2002):UpholdingtheDignityofSexuality
InJordanv.SouthAfrica(2002)[29],threewomenwhoworkedatabrothel(asex
worker,theowner,andthereceptionist)appealedtheirconvictionsundertheSexualOf-
fencesAct23of1957,whichcriminalizedtheprovisionofsexforrewardandbrothel-
keeping.Notably,thelawpunishedthesellingofsexandnotthepurchaseofsex,soit
wastheoppositeoftheNordicmodel.Theappellantsclaimedthattheirrightstoprivacy
andfreedomfromdiscriminationanddignitywereinfringed.Thejudgesunanimously
concludedthattheprostitutionprovisiondoesnotinfringeontherightstohumandignity,
andthatifitdoeslimittherighttoprivacy,suchlimitationisjustifiable.Onthequestion
ofdiscrimination,anarrowmajorityheldthatSouthAfrica’ssexworklawwasgender-
neutralbecauseitdidnotexplicitlytreatmenandwomendifferently.Theminority
thoughheldtherewasdefactodiscrimination,asthepurchasersofsexareusuallymen
andtheprovidersofsexareusuallywomen.Topunishonewithouttheother,especially
asthecourtimaginedtwopeopleengagedinasexualactwouldhavea“differentialim-
pactbetweenprostituteandclient”thatis“linkedtoapaernofgenderdisadvantage”
([29],para.60).(ThroughouttheConstitutionalCourt’sopinion,thereissignificantdefer-
encetothelegislaturetodecidehowbesttoregulatesexworkfromarangeofchoicesthat
othercountrieshavedecided.Adraftbillwasintroducedin2022todecriminalizesex
work.)
Thechallengetotherighttodignitywasnotdiscussedinthemajorityopinion,except
tosaythattheyagreewiththeminorityopinionthatthechallengetotherighttodignity
(aswellasthoseonfreedomofperson,privacy,andeconomicactivity)“mustfail”.Asfor
thediscussionofhumandignity,whichwasunanimouslyacceptedalthoughitwasinthe
minorityopinion,itisremarkableforitsbrevity,consistingoffewerthan400words,and
ithasbeenmetwithhundredsofpagesofcritique.Tofleshoutthecourt’sunderstanding,
wewillalsoneedtoconsidertheirjustificationastowhytherighttoprivacywasnot
violated.
Thediscussionofdignitybeginswithuniversalistandessentialistlanguagethatin-
timatelyconnectsbodilydignitywithhumandignity.“OurConstitutionvalueshuman
dignitywhichinheresinvariousaspectsofwhatitmeanstobeahumanbeing.Oneof
theseaspectsisthefundamentaldignityofthehumanbodywhichisnotsimplyorganic”
([29],para.74).Thisbodilydignityisnot“somethingtobecommodified”(ofcourse,one
couldargueastheyoungKarlMarxdidthatalllaboriscommodificationofbodies)and
“theverynatureofprostitutionisthecommodificationofone’sbody”([29],para.74).So,
totheextentthatcriminalizationofsexworkinfringesondignity,itisduetotheprior
infringementofdignitybythesexworkerwhochoosessuchaprofession.Thecourtun-
derstands“thatprostitutesmayhavefewalternativestoprostitution”butstillblamesthe
infringementofdignityonthosewhoare“engagingincommercialsexwork”([29],para.
74).Ofcourse,criminalizationdoesnotgivefreereintolawenforcementorthepurchaser
ofsexworktodowhattheywant,sexworkersmaintaintheirinherentdignityandhuman
rights.ThisiswhatIcallthedignitytwo-step,thesimultaneoustakingawayandgranting
ofdignity.
Thecourt’sunderstandingofsexworkcomesfurtherintofocusinthediscussionof
therighttoprivacy.Theplaintiffsclaimedthatbeingarrestedforengaginginconsensual
sexualrelationsviolatedtheirrighttoprivacy,whichincludestherighttomake“mean-
ingfuldecisionsaboutdeeplypersonalandintimateaspectsoftheirlife”([29],para.77).
Whilethispersonalandintimateactinvolvesacommercialdecision,itis,theyargue,sim-
ilartothepaymentfromapatienttoadoctor,whichdoesnotchangetheexpectationsof
privacy.Thecourtemphasizedinsteadthatthecommercialnatureofsexworkradically
changesthedynamicofthesexualactitself.“Theprostitutemakeshersexualservices
availabletoallandsundryforreward,deprivingthesexualactofitsintimateandprivate
character”([29],para.78).ItfollowsthenthattheSexualOffencesActupholdsthedignity
ofsex,atleastsexthatis“intimateandprivate”,whilethesexwithinasexworkrelation-
shipisnotdeservingofasignificantlevelofprivacy.Thecourtlaysoutseveralwaysthat
Societies2024,14,1610of17
thesexinsexworkisdifferentfromthetypesex(supposedlyinmarriage)whichwould
bedeservingoftherighttoprivacy.Thesexinsexworkis“indiscriminateandloveless”
anddoesnotinclude“deepaachmentandcommitmentstothenecessarilyfewother
individualswithwhomonesharesnotonlyaspecialcommunityofthoughts,experiences
andbeliefsbutalsodistinctlypersonalaspectsofone’slife.
Bymakinghersexualservices
availableforhiretostrangersinthemarketplace,thesexworkeremptiesthesexactof
muchofitsprivateandintimatecharacter.Sheisnotnurturingrelationshipsortaking
life-affirmingdecisionsaboutbirth,marriageorfamily;sheismakingmoney”([29],para.
83).Bycriminalizingcertaintypesofsex,suchascommercialsexacts,thestatealsofur-
thersitspreviouslydiscussedinterestinpreservingthedignityofsex.Thestateisprotect-
ingsexualityfrombeingundignified:“therighttoprivacy,therefore,servestoprotectand
fosterthatdignity”([29],para.81).
Asfortheargumentthatcriminalizingsexworkwouldenhancethestigmatization
ofsexworkers,thecourtholds,analogouslytoitsargumentondignity,thatitisthesex
workerwhoisstigmatizingthemselves.Andifthismakesthemmorevulnerable,again
thatistheconsequenceoftheirdecisions.“Byengagingincommercialsexwork,prosti-
tutesknowinglyaccepttheriskofloweringtheirstandingintheeyesofthecommunity.
Inusingtheirbodiesascommoditiesinthemarketplace,theyunderminetheirstatusand
becomevulnerable”([29],para.66).
Manycriticshavepointedoutthatthecourtisholdingupacertainidealofsex,one
thatisa“verysanitized,pastoralpictureofsex”,whichelidesmanyofthelivedrealities
ofsex,suchasits“messiness,complexity,itsuneasyplaywithdanger,itsexcessand
pleasureforpleasuresake”([30],p.233).Anditsviewofsexworkis“predicatedona
particularmoralandsocialviewofthenatureofprostitution,whichis,ofcoursehistori-
callyandculturallycontingent”([31],p.61).Thecourthascreatedtwocaricatures,oneof
sexinaconsensual,presumablymarriedrelationship,andoneofsexworkers.Withthe
court’slogic,thestatecouldbansexclubs,privateorgies,orquickhookups,aswellasany
sexwithoutemotion,whichjustmightincludesomemaritalrelationships.
Thecourt’sargumentsboildowntoassertingthatsexworkers,likeallindividuals,
mayhaveinherentdignity,butthestatecanregulatetheirworkbecauseitdoesnotfitthe
court’svisionofidealsex.Thecourtconcedesthatmanysexworkersfacelimitedlife
choices,whichimpliesthattheirdignityisalreadytenuous,andtheyarealreadystigma-
tizedandvulnerable.Butiftheychoosetoengageinactionsthatdonotfitthecourt’s
standardofsexualpractice,theyareresponsiblefortheirfurtherlossofdignityandpri-
vacy,aswellastheirincreasedstigmatizationandvulnerability.
3.2.PaternalIgnoranceandthe(NearInfinite)RealitiesofSexWork
ThejudgesinJordanandothercasesembraceaVictorianviewofsexwork([32],p.
400)thathingesuponacollageofstereotypesthatmakeupwhathasbeencalledthe
“prostituteimaginary”[33].Thesestereotypesaremostlyignorantofthecontemporary
realitiesofsexwork.Indeed,itishardtoimagineanyotherareaoflawwherejudgesare
moreignorantofthelivedrealitiesofthepeoplewhosefatetheyaredeciding.Justacur-
soryglanceatthewritingsortalksofsexworkersbeliestheviewsofjudges(see,forex-
ample,25–27).Here,Ibrieflydiscussafewaspectsoftherealityofcontemporarysexwork
togiveasenseofthe“prostituteimaginary”:(1)theheterogeneityofcontemporarysex
work,(2)consentandcoercion,and(3)theeffectsofdecriminalization.Mypurposeisnot
tobeexhaustive(thereadercanconsultmanyexcellentsourcesortalktosexworkerrights
organizationsintheircommunityformoreinformation)buttocallintoquestiontheas-
sumptionsthatunderlysomuchofthelawinthisareaandthenexplorewhyjudgesand
othersignoretheserealities.
First,noneofthetribunalsseriouslyconsideredtheheterogeneityofsexworkinthe
twenty-firstcentury,nor,atleastfromthecaserecord,didtheyevenaskwhattypeofsex
workeachoftheimpactedindividualswasengagedin.AsNussbaum(1998)famously
wrote,“prostitutionisnotasinglething”([34],p.700).Contemporarysexworkincludes
Societies2024,14,1611of17
suchdiversejobsassurvivalsex,eroticmassages,cam-girlsandboys,high-endcallgirls,
phonesexoperators,pornographyactors,sugarbabies,sexforbarter,anddominatrices.
Ofcourse,therearesomewhoarestreetworkersengagedintheclassicpimp–prostitute
relationship,butthisisfarfromthenorm,andsuchrelationshipsseemtobemuchless
exploitativethanpopularstereotypes,e.g.,[33,35,36].Andmany,perhapsmost,sexwork-
ersovertimewillengageinseveraldifferentformsofsexworkandwillmoveinandout
ofsexwork.Ofcourse,eachofthesewillinvolvedifferentdynamicsbetweensexworker
andclient,aswellasdifferentrisks,vulnerabilities,andpossibilitiesforexploitation.
Averycommonstereotypeisthatsexworkersarecoercedintosexworkandlack
agencyintheirrelationshipwiththeirclients.Accountsbysexworkersthemselvesreveal
awidevarietyofmotivesforenteringsexwork,almostallofwhichinvolveconsent[33].
Thesecondclaimofcoercionmisreadstherealityofmostrelationshipsbetweensexwork-
ersandclients.TheSouthAfricanCourtclaimedthat“theprostitutemakeshersexual
servicesavailabletoallandsundryforreward”([29],para.83).Butsuchaconditionis
moretheexceptionthantherule.Acursoryglanceattheaccountsofsexworkersfinds
theyregularlyvettheirclientsandplacelimitsonwhattheyarewillingtodo[33,37].
Similarly,theconclusionofthesamejudgesthatsexwork“depriv(es)thesexualactofits
intimateandprivatecharacter”([29],para.83)maybetrueinsomecases,ofteninsurvival
sex,buttestimoniesoftendescribetheintimaterelationshipsthatsexworkersestablish
withtheirclients.Mostpurchasersofsexarenotlookingmerelyforphysicalpleasurebut
forsuchthingsasintimacy,companionship,orvalidation.Somesexworkersevensee
theirrolesaslaytherapistspracticingmentalorphysicaltherapy.Scholarsincreasingly
seesexworkasatypeofemotionaloraffectivelaborthathassignificantaffinitieswith,
forexample,hairstylists,maids,bartenders,caregivers,andtourguides.Foreachofthese,
theworkersandclientsnavigateperformativeandauthenticintimacythatshiftsover
time;see,forexample,[38,39].
Finally,judges,legislators,andothersseemtobeignorantoftheimpactsofthecrim-
inalizationanddecriminalizationofsex.Theycannotconceiveofdecriminalizingsex
work,withonlyNewZealandadoptingafulldecriminalizationmodel.Nonetheless,the
overwhelmingmajorityofexpertreportsrecommenddecriminalization(foroverviews,
see[40,41]),andalargenumberofempiricalstudiesfindthatthecriminalizationofsex
work,includingtheNordicmodelthatonlypunishesthebuyerofsex,hasdeleterious
effectsonsexworkersandothers[42].Criminalizationreducessexworkers’agencyin
theirrelationshipwithclients,astheyaredrivenundergroundandarelessabletonego-
tiatetheconditionsoftheiremployment[39].TheevidencefromNewZealand’sfullde-
criminalizationmodelshowsthatitreducessocialharm,providesgreaterautonomyand
empowerment,reducesstigmatization,andimprovestherelationshipbetweensexwork-
ersandlawenforcementofficials[43,44].Inshort,contrathecasesdiscussedabove,de-
criminalizationincreasesthedignityandreducestheexploitationofsexworkers[39].
Often,opponentsofhumantraffickingarguethatthecriminalizationofconsensual
workwillaidantitraffickingefforts.Yet,theempiricalevidencesuggeststhatdecriminal-
izationhasapositiveeffectonantitraffickingefforts(i.e.,[45]).Criminalization“instill(s)
fearoflawenforcementwithinsexworkers”andthusdepriveslawenforcementofan
“underusedresourceinlocatingandhelpingvictimsoftrafficking”,assexworkers“may
havemoreaccesstopotentialtraffickingvictimsthananyoneelse”.Further,criminaliza-
tion,becauseitmakessexworkaclandestineactivity,alsoincreasestheriskofbecoming
avictimofhumantrafficking[45].
3.3.PaternalIgnorance
Iwillbrieflydiscusstwopossibleexplanationsforthejudges’ignoranceofthelived
realitiesofalreadyvulnerablepeople.First,itislikelyanexampleofwhathasbeencalled
paternalignorance[46]ortheWhitesaviorcomplex[27].Intherushtosavevulnerable
individuals,theso-calledrescuersdonottakeadequatetimetounderstandthecontext,
nordotheytakethetimetolistentothepeopletheyaretryingtosave[47],cf.[48].Sex
Societies2024,14,1612of17
workersandothermarginalizedindividualsareoftenseenmerelyasvictimswhoare
supplicantsforassistanceandnotseenascompleteindividualswhocanteachfromtheir
experience([49],ch.7).AsoneCatholicthinkerwrote,“manyofthesegroupsrepresent
theirworkasacosmicbaleagainstevilforces,yetimportantstructuralcritiquesareig-
noredintheurgencytorescuewomenandchildren”([50],Synopsis).
Whenconfrontedwiththetestimoniesofsexworkerssayingthattheyareexercising
theirconsentandthattheywouldprefersexworkoverotheroptions,manyofthosewho
seektorescuethemholdontothe“prostituteimaginary”andarguethatthismaybetheir
view,buttheyarelivingatypeoffalseconsciousness.Haker,forexample,arguesthatsex
workersplayapartinsatisfyingtheirclients,andthisbecomesafundamentalpartoftheir
identity:“Eventhoughherself-identitydoesnotmaeratall,asexworkermuststillcre-
ateandmaintaintheillusionofauthenticity.…Inotherwords,itrequireshertomakethe
sexualserviceappeartobeapersonalencounterratherthanthemereuseofherbody
partsinexchangeformoney”([51],p.235).
Second,itistheveryideaofsexworkthatseemstobeanathema—thesellingofsex;
thecommodificationofone’sbody—undignified,andagainstAfricanvaluesorsocietal
valuesmorebroadly.So,itisnotthespecificcontextthatseemstobeimportant.Instead,
itisthemoregeneralcontextofsellingsexthatseemstobethecrux,anditseemstodo
twothings.However,ifthejudgesareseekingtoupholdtheoveralldignityofsexuality,
theyarerelyingonaspecificformofwhatiscalledobjectivedignity,andtheyarenot
seriouslyconsideringtheheterogeneityofcontemporarysexwork.
3.4.TheDignityTwo‐Step
Byrootingtheargumentforcriminalizationindignity,mostactivistsandjudges,espe-
ciallyinthetwoAfricancasesabove,followwhatIcall“thedignitytwo-step.”Interrogating
thisanalyticalmoveiscrucialconsideringtheincreasingimportanceofdignityargumentsin
humanrightslaw,includinginhumantraffickingandsexworkers’rightscases.
Dignityisnotsomeadditionalcontentinhumanrightslawbutitscentralconcept
[52],andyetitcontinuestoescapeseriousscrutinyespeciallybyjurists[31,53].Indeed,
dignityseemstobeusedsomewhatcarelessly:“Inasingleopinionacourtmayrelyon
multiplemeaningsofdignity,whichsometimeswillpointindifferentdirectionsorem-
phasizeverydifferentvalues”([53],p.189).Forthisanalysis,Idrawonrecentframeworks
ofdignitybyMalby[54],Rao[53],andYa c o ub[55]todistinguishbetweenthreetypesof
dignity:objectivedignity,subjectivedignity,andinherentdignity.
Inherentdignitycomestotheforeinthehumanrightsdocumentsdraftedinthewake
ofWorldWarII.Itisaqualityandarightthatinheresineachpersonbecausetheyarea
person[53].AsArticle1oftheUniversalDeclarationofHumanRights[56]states,“A l l
humanbeingsarebornfreeandequalindignityandrights.”Objectivedignityisanolder
versionofdignitythatdominatedfromancienttimesupthroughtheEnlightenmentwith
itsfocusondignitas.Itisgroundedinwhatasocietyorpowerfulindividualsconsiderto
bedignified.Itisajudgmentofsomeone’slifechoicesaboutwhatisbestforthemandfor
society.“Dignitymayrequirebehaving,forexample,withself-control,courage,ormod-
esty.Thisdignityembodiesaparticularviewofwhatconstitutesthegoodlifeforman,
whatmakeshumanlifeflourishfortheindividualaswellasthecommunity”([53],p.187).
Finally,subjectivedignityisthedignitythatsomeonefeelsabouttheirownlifechoices
basedupontheirownlifeexperiences.Subjectivedignityisaclaimbytheaffectedindi-
vidualaboutwhatisdignifiedforthem.Thisisthedignityofmarginalizedgroupswhen
standingupandclaimingtheirrightsagainstanoppressivesociety.
Inpartbecauseitgroundsmosthumanrightsdocuments,veryfewjudgesorcourtsto-
daywilleverclaimthatsomeonelacksinherentdignity.However,inpreviouscenturies,there
werethosewhowereconsideredsub-orsemihumanandlackedfullinherenthumandignity.
Thedebatethenwouldseemtobebetweensubjectiveclaimsofwhatisdignifiedfor
anindividualorgroupversuswhatjuristsandothersclaimisobjectivelydignified.The
juristsinNjemanzeadoptobjectivedignity,wheretheyarethearbitersofindividualand
Societies2024,14,1613of17
socialdignity.SexworkissaidtobeagainstsocialorAfricanvalues.Subjectivedignity
mightbeconsideredinsuchcases,butitwouldbenearlyimpossibletooutweighsociety’s
conceptionofobjectivedignity.ThejusticesinJordanandtheconcurrencebyVillanovain
S.M.concededthatbecauseofsocioeconomicconditions,sexworkersoftenhavelimited
lifechoices.Insuchcases,turningtoconsensualworkcouldbearationalchoicethat
wouldincreaseaperson’sdignityandautonomy.Nevertheless,inbothcases,thejurists
heldthatobjectivedignitytrumpsclaimsofsubjectivedignity.
Here,juristsengageinwhatIcallthe“dignitytwo-step”.Whentheyminimizeclaims
ofsubjectivedignityandleanonobjectivedignity,theyareusuallyquicktopointoutthat
theyarenotsayingthattheaffectedindividualsdonothavetheirinherentdignityasper-
sonsorthattheaffectedindividualsdonothaverights.TheJordancourtclaimedthesex
workerswereharmingtheirandsociety’sdignity,butthatdoesnotmeanthatthepolice