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British Foreign Fighters Returning from Syraq

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Abstract

The conflicts in Syria and more recently in Iraq have attracted over 500 British nationals over the past three years. There are growing concerns among security analysts regarding the threat these fighters may constitute upon their return to the UK. Those individuals have been in contact with extremist, anti-Western doctrines and some of them have already uttered menaces of attacks against their homeland. While the authorities have little oversight over the exact number of Britons who have joined the fighting in Syraq, policies need to be put in place in order to address the issue as swiftly and effectively as possible. This paper is an attempt to disintegrate the phenomenon into its various components using the ‘strategic-choice approach’, which will enhance our apprehension of the matter in order to gauge the effectiveness of the UK’s policy options. Broad recommendations shall ensue proposing lines to take for policymakers – neither should they understate the present risk and potentially put the security of the British people in jeopardy nor should they exaggerate the risk and adopt policies that are more likely to create the problem in the first place rather than provide it with a remedy. More specifically, UK authorities ought to aim at broader international cooperation; they need to put mechanisms in place – or adjust existing ones – to support individuals in their rehabilitation and reintegration process; and it will be vital to increase both the transparency and consistency of the measures designed to deal with returning foreign fighters.
1
BRITISH FOREIGN FIGHTERS
RETURNING FROM SYRAQ
MA DISSERTATION
APPLIED SECURITY STRATEGY
STRATEGY AND SECURITY INSTITUTE (SSI)
UNIVERSITY OF EXETER
63004969
I certify that all material in this dissertation which is not my own work has been
identified with appropriate acknowledgement and referencing and I also certify
that no material is included for which a degree has previously been conferred up-
on me.
August 20141
1 All information available before 31 August, 2014 is taken into consideration
2
ABSTRACT
The conflicts in Syria and more recently in Iraq have attracted over 500 British
nationals over the past three years. There are growing concerns among security
analysts regarding the threat these fighters may constitute upon their return to
the UK. Those individuals have been in contact with extremist, anti-Western doc-
trines and some of them have already uttered menaces of attacks against their
homeland. While the authorities have little oversight over the exact number of
Britons who have joined the fighting in Syraq, policies need to be put in place in
order to address the issue as swiftly and effectively as possible. This paper is an
attempt to disintegrate the phenomenon into its various components using the
‘strategic-choice approach’, which will enhance our apprehension of the matter in
order to gauge the effectiveness of the UK’s policy options. Broad recommenda-
tions shall ensue proposing lines to take for policymakers neither should they
understate the present risk and potentially put the security of the British people
in jeopardy nor should they exaggerate the risk and adopt policies that are more
likely to create the problem in the first place rather than provide it with a reme-
dy. More specifically, UK authorities ought to aim at broader international coop-
eration; they need to put mechanisms in place or adjust existing ones to sup-
port individuals in their rehabilitation and reintegration process; and it will be
vital to increase both the transparency and consistency of the measures designed
to deal with returning foreign fighters.
3
LIST OF CONTENTS
Abstract ................................................................................................................................... 2!
List of Contents ....................................................................................................................... 3!
Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 4!
Part I: Foreign Fighters History, Definition and the Current Threat to the UK ............ 8!
Part II: Putting the FF Issue into Strategic Perspective ................................................... 14!
The Actors .............................................................................................................. 14!
The Foreign Fighters ......................................................................................... 15!
Muslim Community ........................................................................................... 19!
The Authorities .................................................................................................. 22!
The Environment .................................................................................................. 25!
The Virtual Environment: Social Media .......................................................... 25!
The Legal Environment: Acts and Criminal Measures ................................... 28!
The Interaction ...................................................................................................... 30!
1.!Neglecting the Threat ................................................................................. 31!
2.!Focus on Reintegration ............................................................................... 32!
3.!Criminalising Fighting Abroad .................................................................. 33!
Part III: Policy Recommendations ....................................................................................... 35!
Conclusion ............................................................................................................................. 41!
Appendices ............................................................................................................................ 44!
References ............................................................................................................................. 47!
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INTRODUCTION
The recent execution of US journalist James Foley by a British foreign fighter has
brought the debate about British nationals in Syraq to yet another level (FP 2014,
Telegraph 2014), but various security officials had already started voicing their
concerns a while ago: ‘A growing proportion of our casework now has some link to
Syria, mostly concerning individuals from the UK who have travelled to fight
there or who aspire to do so’, Andrew Parker revealed in his Director General’s
speech at RUSI2 on 8 October 2013 (MI5 2013). Metropolitan Police commissioner
Sir Bernard Hogan Howe stated that the prospect of FFs returning was his big-
gest concern’ (BBC 2014). Europol director Rob Wainwright mentioned that ‘there
is growing concern about the threat posed by [foreign fighters] given the possibil-
ity of their returning to the European Union intent on committing acts of terror-
ism (CFC 2013). A less serious comparison has been made by the Daily Mail
(2014), which claimed that there have been more people signing up to fight along-
side a rebel faction in Syraq than joined the Army Reserve last year. Prime Min-
ister David Cameron also promised that more efforts would be redirected towards
this growing threat:
‘The number of foreign fighters [...] from the UK who could try to return to the
UK this is a real threat to our country. [...] We will do absolutely everything we
can to keep our people safe. That means stopping people from going, it means ar-
resting people who are involved in plots, it means focusing our security, our polic-
ing, our intelligence effort on to that area of the world, on to those people.’
(Huff-
ington Post 2014).
2 Royal United Services Institute
5
The abundance of official statements related to foreign fighters (henceforth FFs)
in Syraq insinuates that the problem is being taken seriously across all levels of
government. There is little doubt that intelligence and law enforcement agencies
are already working zealously to identify, observe and scrutinise individuals who
return or intend to leave in order to reduce the risk of an increment in politically
motivated violence in the UK. Policymakers are facing a serious challenge since
the issue is both complex and sensitive given the significant size of the British
Muslim community, where inappropriate criminal measures might lead to a nega-
tive backlash. It is therefore of critical importance to take all aspects of this phe-
nomenon into account if the aim is to produce comprehensive, transparent and
effective policies.
Analytical scope
Exploring all aspects of the FF phenomenon would exceed the format of this pa-
per. Therefore the scope of this analysis will be limited to the last phase of the
FFs’ journey3, i.e. their motivations for returning back to the UK, their intentions
and their outlook. Motivations for travelling abroad or accounts of their activities
within the conflict will not be taken into account, unless they are immediately
linked to their return.
‘Syraq’ circumscribes the region spanning across both Syria and Iraq. Alt-
hough I initially did concentrate on the FFs who left for the Syrian civil war, this
geographical limitation does not make sense anymore given the expansion of ac-
tivities into Iraq that started in early June 2014. The conventional boundaries
between these two countries have been largely undone and separating activities
and rebel factions geographically has become technically unfeasible. In addition
to this, the types of conflict in Syria and Iraq, respectively, are of a different na-
3 The International Centre for Counterterrorism (ICCT 2014) in The Hague defines three
temporal stages of the FF journey: ‚before, during and after travel’
6
ture and the actors involved have different modus operandi given the political
context of the country. It is thus prudent to proceed with the analysis of British
FFs while ignoring these underlying political, societal and structural complexities
that are shaping each conflict zone. This also implies disregarding which group an
individual joins. For instance, the expansion of ISIS4, or IS into Iraq with the in-
vasion of Mosul on 10 June, 2014 has given many fighters a different motivation
to travel to Syraq. Now it is no more only the defence of suffering of fellow Mus-
lims but the participation in the establishment of a so-called ‘state’ or ‘caliphate’
that might propel British nationals to join IS. However, it is extremely difficult to
track individuals let alone identify their motivations for leaving. Therefore the
analysis shall focus on the ‘returning’ phase of FFs because it can be reasonably
separated from both the motivation to leave and the larger political background of
the conflict. This last phase is also clearly the most decisive one in terms of direct
threats to national security.
The overarching question I shall address is thus:
How likely are returning
British FFs, who were previously engaged in combat in Syraq, to pose a risk to
national security and how can this risk be reduced?
In order to do so, I will draw
on policy publications, academic research, expert opinions and personal state-
ments of FFs on social media.
This paper shall be structured in three parts. In a first step, it will be nec-
essary to put the FF issue into its historic perspective in order to get a grasp of its
longevity and origins and it will be important to define the concept and its limita-
tions. In the second part, in order to simplify this complex topic and introduce an
analytical structure, I will draw on the ‘strategic-choice approach’ to look at the
actors involved in this problematic as well as the environment in which their in-
4 Islamic State of Iraq and Al-Sham (Greater Syria)
7
teractions occur. Finally, the third part shall be dedicated to a more thorough dis-
cussion of recommended policy options to deal with returning foreign fighters.
8
PART I: FOREIGN FIGHTERS HISTORY, DEFINI-
TION AND THE CURRENT THREAT TO THE UK
The phenomenon of foreign fighters is not a new one
is a phrase that is often reiterated by a range of academics and experts in this
field: ‘The phenomenon of FFs is not a new one’ (ICCT 2014); ‘The phenomenon of
FFs […] is hardly new’ (Mendelsohn 2011, US News 2014); ‘The phenomenon of
FFs is hardly limited to Syria or new’ (CSS 2014); ‘The presence of FFs in con-
flicts is no novel phenomenon’ (Van Zuijdewijn 2014) and ‘FFs […] are nothing
new’ (The National Interest 2014). People have been leaving their homes to join
conflicts in foreign locations for centuries. The trend has manifested itself on var-
ious occasions in the 20th century, of which the Spanish Civil War seems to be the
most prominent one. After the military putsch by General Franco in 1936, the
conflict swiftly took on an international dimension. The polarisation put “com-
munists” on the side and “fascists” on the other and attracted volunteers from all
over Europe about 2,300 from the UK (Independent 2014) and the United
States (Mendelsohn 2011). Since the pecuniary incentive was mostly inexistent,
these FFs were clearly distinct from the salaried mercenaries that had constitut-
ed the main fraction of the FF element in previous arenas. This suggests that
they were driven by a powerful ideological or political conviction, which prompts
the question as to what defines a foreign fighter.
David Malet argues that the reason why researchers employ varying defini-
tions and have not reached any common ground yet is that the phenomenon has
only begun to be studied by international security analysts about a decade ago
(Washington Post 2014). The definition that he postulates, however, is widely
accepted in academic circles and describes them as “non-citizens of conflict states
9
who join insurgencies during civil conflict” (Malet 2013). Thomas Hegghammer
(2011) builds on Malet’s definition and refines it by using four criteria: A foreign
fighter is an agent who
(1) has joined, and operates within the confines of, an insurgency;
(2) lacks citizenship of the conflict state or kinship links to its warring fac-
tions;
(3) lacks affiliation to an official military organization (sic); and
(4) is unpaid.
This definition allows for any person who leaves or tries to leave the West to
fight somewhere else,’ and includes individuals who engage in ‘any military activ-
ity (training or fighting), using any tactic (terrorist or guerrilla tactics), against
any enemy (Western or non-Western) so long as it occurs outside the West
(ICSR 2014). I will further draw on a criterion that was introduced by Van
Zuijdewijn (2014) to demarcate diaspora FFs from those who can be considered as
‘westernised’, i.e. having spent sufficient time in a Western European country in
order to identify to a certain degree with their countries of residence. She pro-
pounds considering those as ‘Western or European FFs’ who have arrived in Eu-
rope before they reached the age of fifteen and who have resided there at least ten
years prior to any terrorist activity5. This is a reasonable distinction since, as
Hegghammer (2011) clarifies, diaspora members have a stake in the conflict, are
more easily drawn to go back to their country of origin to defend it and are less
likely to return.
5 By the time they have spent 10 years in the UK, most foreigners will have obtained Brit-
ish citizenship (Gov.uk). Therefore I will, for the purpose of this analysis, simply consider
all British nationals engaged in combat in Syraq as ‚British FFs’.
10
Islamist Foreign Fighters - a recent trend
The birthplace of the modern Islamist FFs (Hegghammer 2011) is usually consid-
ered to be the Afghanistan war (1979-1989), which saw a significant number of
foreigners mobilise to join the Afghan resistance (HSPI 2010). In the so-called
post-war “bleed-out” phase hundreds of experienced fighters returned to their
countries and spread and perpetuated the idea of ‘global jihadism6(Mendelsohn
2011). One of the major drivers of this new ideology was a sense of obligation to
protect Muslims wherever they are in the world, whether in Bosnia, Palestine,
Chechnya, Afghanistan or Iraq. The fact that Muslims suffered and continue to
suffer in these places feeds into the basic narrative of this network of transna-
tional militancy (Hegghammer 2011, Reuters 2014).
However, what distinguishes this new type of FFs from previous ones, e.g.
the ones who fought in the Spanish civil war? The difference is that the Islamist
FF is no longer driven by parochial ambitions confined to a particular geograph-
ical sphere. The Islamist narrative advocates transnational militancy and often
attacks against Western targets (War on the Rocks 2014). This smooth transition
from fighting in one single country to defending a more global identity such as the
‘ummah’, i.e. the entirety of Muslims in the world, only emerged with the rise of
the Islamist FF (House of Commons Update 2014). Admittedly, the majority of
FFs in Syraq are Muslims who seek to defend fellow Muslims. The ubiquity of the
extremist Islamist rhetoric in the region, however, generates the risk of those in-
dividuals being indoctrinated and starting to aspire for a more global struggle.
The fact that a considerable number of conflict veterans have moved on to inter-
national terrorism in the past makes it indispensable to take the features of Is-
6 ‘Jihad’ describes a personal struggle for Muslims towards self-improvement. Various
religious scholars have used it to justify armed struggle to defend Muslims against op-
pressors and invaders (Van Zuijdewijn 2014).
11
lamist FFs into account when studying British nationals who are engaged in
combat in Syraq (House of Commons 2014).
Where are we now?
Even though the post-1990 conflicts involving populations of Muslim faith have
featured a rising participation of FFs, their number in the conflict in Syria is un-
precedented (ICCT 2013). The so far probably most accurate estimate issued by
the ICSR7 (2013) suggests a number of FFs of over 11’000 a more recent esti-
mates by the policy think tank ‘Soufan Group’ (2014) and Defense One (2014) set
the number at over 12’000 FFs from at least 81 countries. They originate mainly
from the MENA8 region, but a significant contingent about 3,000 (Defense One
2014) emerged from Western European countries. The military contribution of
Western FFs has been questioned by several experts who suggest that they are
being manipulated by local fighters and used as ‘cannon fodder’ (Huffington Post
2014). Since the beginning of the Syrian civil war, the number has steadily in-
creased and most FFs are reported to have joined the radical extremist groups
rather than the secular factions (Quilliam 2014). With the expansion of ISIS into
Iraq we are confronted with highly organised and rapidly advancing groups of
FFs whose areas of operations span across both Syria and Iraq (Zelin 2014). On
24 May 2014, for the first time the threat of returnees came to fruition. Mehdi
Nemmouche who had spent time with rebels in Syria attacked a Belgium Jewish
Museum and killed four people demonstrating that concerns about returning
FFs are not remotely unjustified (BBC 2014).
7 International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation. Statistics issued in December 2013.
8 Middle East & Northern Africa
12
The FF issue for the UK
There has been a continuously growing stream of FFs from Western Europe to
Syraq, whose journey happens with relative ease given the reduced border con-
trols in the Schengen area, the geographical proximity and the availability of
cheap flights to the region (ICSR 2014, ICCT 2014). Estimates of the number of
British nationals in Syraq vary extremely but most experts seem to tacitly agree
on a count between 400 and 750 (Independent 2014, TSG 2014, ITV 2014, Guard-
ian 2014). This trend has led to security concerns over the potential consequences
of their return (MI5 2014). The majority of analysts rely on Hegghammer’s (2013)
finding that
one in nine
returnees is likely to get involved in politically motivated
violence. Factoring in the number of FFs, which is estimated to be in the multiple
thousands across Europe (Pantucci 2014, TSG 2014), concerns about potential
attacks turn out to be more than justified. In a Chatham House Debate in April
2014, RUSI Senior Research Fellow Raffello Pantucci enumerated the four main
preoccupations that FFs generate:
1. The primary concern is that returnees, radicalised and equipped with en-
hanced expertise, engage in politically motivated violence in the UK.
2. Secondly, they could serve as inspirational figures and consolidate the ex-
tremist narrative, which would broaden and intensify the radicalisation
process.
3. A third concern is that they could be used to expand the extremist ‘soft
power’ network. The fact that they are English-speaking and knowledgea-
ble about British society and infrastructure enhances the intellectual ca-
pability of terrorist organisations that are based overseas.
13
4. Finally, there is a high risk that a fraction of them will engage in criminal
activity upon their return. Since many of the fighters appear to have some
kind of criminal record, this is a likely scenario (RUSI 2014).
In an interview9 he added that another risk that needs to be considered is the
likelihood of FFs forming new clusters in their home countries without the direc-
tion of extremist organisations abroad. This would make it even more difficult to
keep sight of the returnees and their activities since they would not be operating
within the fabric of conventionally known extremist groups.
Information about the number of Britons who have died in combat is ex-
tremely hard to verify but the most common estimate is 20 (Yahoo 2014, Tele-
graph 2014). Equally, it is difficult to estimate the number of returnees, which
oscillates between ’50 or more’ (Washington Post 2014) and 250 (The Sunday
Times 2014). Richard Barrett even suggests a number of 300 and adds, im-
portantly, that it is nearly impossible to examine all those individuals in depth
(Independent 2014). It is evident that there is a lack of clarity as far as the num-
bers are concerned and that tracking the entirety of returnees is impossible (TSG
2014). Fortunately, the next chapter will analyse the FF issue as a strategic prob-
lem, which can be done without precise knowledge of the numbers.
9 Full Interview in Appendices
14
PART II: PUTTING THE FF ISSUE INTO STRATEGIC
PERSPECTIVE
Lake and Powell (1999) advocate approaching issues of international relations
from a ‘strategic perspective’, which is based on two major principles: (a) strategic
problems and interactions are the unit of analysis and (b) those strategic interac-
tions are composed of
actors
and their
environment
. This approach, dubbed the
‘strategic-choice approach’, is useful in order to organise any problem of interna-
tional character that involves different state and sub-state agents. In the case of
FFs, I will make use of this approach because it simplifies this multifaceted issue
and shall prove handy in reorganising the various actors into a manageable set of
key groups. The following sections will elaborate on the actors and their environ-
ment.
THE ACTORS
It is reasonable to posit that there are three main groups of actors. Although I am
conscious that I cannot do justice to their heterogeneity, I deem these three
groups to be broadly distinct from each other. According to the strategic-choice
approach these actors are split into preferences, beliefs and sets of actions. How-
ever, defining preferences and beliefs has proven to be a rather speculative en-
deavour in the absence of thorough and updated qualitative evidence. Hence, for
the purpose of this analysis I will limit myself to elaborating the
set of actions
that is available to each actor. It is worth noting that these actions also reflect the
actors’ beliefs and preferences to a certain extent.
15
THE FOREIGN FIGHTERS
British Foreign Fighters’ in this paper are UK nationals who have left the UK to
engage in combat activity in Syria or Iraq. They are embedded in or affiliated to
an organisation that is actively fighting within this geographical area. British,
and Western FFs more generally, have been reported to predominantly join either
Jabhat Al-Nusra (JAN) or ISIS, although the latter seems to be increasingly more
attractive since its expansion and establishment of the ‘caliphate’ (BBC 2014).
There are as many profiles as there are people, but Shiraz Maher (Chatham
House 2014) ascertained some average characteristics that can be distilled from
this myriad:
a) Traditionally, the fighters are men in their 20s;
b) of South Asian ethnic origin;
c) with some connection to higher education;
d) and some connection to activist organisations.
Jonathan Githens-Mazer (RUSI 2014) looks at the possible ramifications of FFs
returning from a broader perspective, including potentially beneficial outcomes:
1. ‘Never Again’: This category encompasses all those who would never con-
sider politically motivated violence at home.
a. Those pious, observant Muslims who went with the sincere inten-
tion to defend suffering people and were shocked by the violence
and futility of the conflict to such an extent that they would refuse
any future participation in violent activities.
16
b. Those who make a clear distinction between fighting abroad and vi-
olence at home and do not abide by ideals of transnational jihadism.
c. At last, those who suffer physically and emotionally from their ex-
periences in combat and have lasting mental damage.
2. ‘Active Dissuaders’: These returnees are equally estranged from violence
but in addition they decide to actively discourage potential fighters from
leaving.
3. ‘Suffered from Dysentery’: These individuals return with a collection of
romanticised stories about their experiences, which are rarely truthfully
reflecting the realities on the ground. They help perpetuate the jihadist
narrative and the myth of ‘five-star-jihad’ that is so appealing to the
younger and more vulnerable portions of the community. They are also
prone to building their own FF network and likely to get involved in ter-
rorism and similar forms of politically driven violence.
4. ‘Transnational Global Jihadis’: This last category includes all those who
fully embrace the ideals and objectives of global jihadism. These individu-
als are a grave security threat, since they will often assume important
roles in transnational extremist networks and actively seek to attack
Western targets and interests.
Githens-Mazer hereby recalls the importance of keeping sight of the various types
of FF. His main compelling message is that the immense panoply of motivations,
objectives and experiences produces sets of returnees who are often completely
distinct in terms of outlook and risk to national security. These sets of returnees
can be associated with broadly three sets of actions:
17
Set of Actions (FFs)
1. No return.
2. Return with no intention to continue politically motivated violence. Willing
to engage in potential rehabilitation program and reintegrate seamlessly
into society. Potentially willing to contribute to discouraging people from
becoming FFs.
3. Return with the intention to engage in politically motivated violence. Con-
tinue preaching, radicalisation, spreading of propaganda and planning ter-
rorist attacks against UK homeland.
In a Pro-ISIS propaganda video (Guardian 2014) released on 18 June 2014 three
Britons, identified as Abdul Raqib Amin, Nasser Muthana and Reyaad Khan, in-
cite people from all over the world to join their struggle in the ‘land of Al-Sham’
fighting ‘the enemies of Allah’. Ubiquitous throughout all of their calls in the vid-
eo is the idea of ‘sacrifice’: Are you willing to sacrifice the fat job you've got, the
big car you've got, the family you have?’ and look around you and ask yourself: Is
this how you want to die?’ Raqib also recalls feeling ‘depressed’ in the West and
lacking a ‘feeling of honour’ to which the only cure is ‘jihad’. Interestingly, howev-
er, none of their speeches reaches a higher political dimension: Neither is the UK
accused nor are non-Muslims targeted in any way. The message is limited to the
emotional level and is meant to evoke a sense of duty and responsibility in fellow
Muslims around the world. Moreover, all of the FFs appearing in the video por-
tray jihad as the last stage before their entering into the ‘jannah’, the paradise.
None of them indicates that there is an intention to return and cause harm back
home. Iftekhar Jaman, who was reportedly the first British national to have
joined ISIS and who was killed in December 2013, made similar statements. In a
Skype interview with BBC Newsnight, he expressed no interest in returning to
18
the UK: They can rest assured. I don’t plan to come back’ (BBC 2013). Another
young man from Cardiff wrote a note to the police when he left his family saying
‘I am going to help the needy and orphans, please leave my family alone. I have
no intention to come back to the UK(CAGE 2014). To those FFs, engaging in the
conflicts in Syraq seems to be a one-way street, which suggests that there is no
immediate threat to the UK.
Within the ‘set of actions’ mentioned above, this type
of FF represents action (1).
Not exactly British, but standing for the attitude of many FFs is Dutch-Turkish
national Yilmaz. In a report by Nieuwsuur (2014) he talks candidly about his ac-
tivities in Syria, where he passes on the military expertise he gained in the Dutch
army to fellow rebels who are fighting for what he views as ‘a noble cause’. Asked
whether he could be a threat back in Holland, he replies: I came to Syria for Syr-
ia only. I didn’t come to Syria to learn how to make bombs […] and to go back.
That’s not the mentality many of these fighters here have. […] So us going back is
not part of our perspective.’ Later in the interview he reveals that he understands
why people are afraid back home but reassures: Don’t worry about me. I’ve cho-
sen this path for myself, and even if I would come back I would just eat… maybe
some sushi, have some Dr. Pepper and give my mother a big, warm hug, sit with
the family. I’ve never been a violent person towards people who are not violent
towards me.A commander of the group Ahrar Al-Sham further explains that FFs
often arrive with benign intentions and are alienated by the wrongdoings and
tactics of the groups they join on the ground. Many of them return home disen-
chanted (TSG 2014). This type of FF is able to draw a clear line between fighting
abroad and violence back home and is usually mainly interested in the protection
of the victims.
This group is associated with action (2).
On the other end of the spectrum there are FFs who have expressed far
more radical intentions. A well-known British contingent of FFs is Rayat Al-
19
Tawhid, which promotes the image of ‘five-star jihad’ and incites fellow Britons to
join them (CTC 2014). It becomes evident, from their presence on social media,
that they deal with extreme violence and bloodshed with relative ease and have
acquired skillsets in bomb-making and guerrilla warfare. The prospect of these
types of individuals returning is worrisome given their desensitisation to violence
and inclination to romanticising warfare. Another Brit, who calls himself Abu
Osama, said if he returned it would only be to raise the ‘black flag over Downing
Street’ when the ‘caliphate would come to conquer Britain’ (Al Alam 2014). ‘There
is nothing in Britain just pure evil’, he said in an interview with BBC’s Nicky
Campbell (2014). Quite disturbing was also his expressed admiration for the 7/7
bombers, which he considers as ‘heroic lions’. He is a prelude of the more terrify-
ing aspects of the FF populationnamely those individuals who are very likely to
pose a threat to the UK if they return.
This group represents action (3).
MUSLIM COMMUNITY
Stringent policies could have negative repercussions among the Muslim Commu-
nity in the UK. However, there are again different attitudes within this portion of
the population, some more and some less sensitive to such policies.
Set of Actions (Muslim Community)
1. Unlikely to be impacted by policies directed at FFs.
2. Contribute to stem the flow of FFs and the radicalisation process by speak-
ing up against it, condemning it and helping authorities deal with the is-
sue.
3. Likely to protest, feel even more stigmatised and therefore sympathise
with radical organisations, potentially supporting their cause.
20
The majority of Muslims in the UK clearly dissociate themselves from extremist
religious practice and have little sympathy with FFs. Many of them remain apa-
thetic, avoid discussions around this subject and are unlikely to feel targeted by
enhanced security measures to stem the flow of foreign fighters. They are equally
unlikely to appear on the radar of any intelligence agency since they present no
connection whatsoever to extremist organisations.
This group represents action
(1).
On the other hand, there are those who consider it as their responsibility
to speak up for the moderate Muslims and correct the image of Islam. People like
these have already with varying degrees of success cooperated with law en-
forcement agencies to either prevent individuals from becoming FFs or detect
those who have left and, in some cases, returned (Telegraph 2014). One example
was the first conviction of a British national for travelling to Syria to join a ‘terror
training camp (Guardian 2014). According to police sources they were informed
by members of the local Muslim community that M. Choudhoury and four other
men intended to follow one of their associates, Iftekhar Jaman, to Syria. In the
case of Abdul Raqib Amin (mentioned earlier), the Muslim congregation of his
hometown Aberdeen recognised him in the video and appealed to him to abandon
the jihadist adventure and return back home ‘but not with his views and ideolo-
gy and what he is doing’ (Guardian 2014). Scotland’s external relations minister
Hamza Yousef further highlighted the need to empower moderate ideology’ in
order to tackle radical belief sets more effectively. And in a strong unified reaction
to Abu Osama, who vowed to return only to ‘raise the black flag over Downing
Street’, 100 Imams sent an open letter to all Muslims in the UK, rejecting the
notion of going to fight abroad in order to alleviate the suffering of the people: ‘We
urge the British Muslim communities to continue the generous and tireless efforts
to support all of those affected by the crisis in Syria and unfolding events in Iraq,
21
but to do so from the UK in a safe and responsible way (Imams Online 2014).
About the same time, an estimated 5,000 Muslims assembled in Surrey in order
to ‘pledge loyalty to Britain’ and recall that the majority of the British Muslims
did not share those extremist ideologies (Guardian 2014).
The people of this kind
favour action (2).
Finally, there are portions of the Muslim community who are extremely
sensitive to any protective measure that might target Muslims more than other
ethnic groups. In an article on the online forum ‘5Pillarz’ (2014), Roshan M. Salih
explores the extent to which community leaders have failed to grasp the serious-
ness of the FF issue. While his comments about the responsibility of British Mus-
lims to condemn FFs seem highly pertinent and valuable, the last paragraph
gives way to his perception of Muslims in the British society. He anticipates that
‘the government will use it [the FF issue] as an opportunity to increase monitor-
ing and harassment of Muslims at home’ and that by not acting against the flow
of FFs they have ‘handed the British state and media a big stick to beat us with’.
Now, while Salih obviously does not sympathise with radical ideologies, he does
reflect the line of thought that is present in the minds of many Muslims who feel
treated unjustly by the authorities. These grievances can, given the right circum-
stances, easily escalate and facilitate radicalisation and boost the appeal of ex-
tremist Islamist groups. Director of a London Mosque, Mohammed Kozbar, voiced
a less radical view but one that portrays the UK government as partly responsible
for the FF phenomenon: ‘If you want to prevent these young people from going to
Syria, the best way to do that is to stop the war (Washington Post 2014).
These
people are associated with action (3).
22
THE AUTHORITIES
The term authoritiesincludes all governmental institutions that are responsible
for dealing with the FF issue, i.e. government, intelligence and security services,
law enforcement bodies.
Set of Actions (The Authorities)
1. Neglecting the threat that is likely to be inflated by the media. No particu-
lar action apart from continuing CONTEST. Continue to apply terrorism
laws and regulations.
2. Accepting that FF pose a risk and acknowledging the difficulty of tracking
them let alone gathering evidence on their activities abroad. Therefore di-
recting efforts towards reintegrating these individuals into society. Reha-
bilitation program accompanied by TPIMs10 and jail sentences for those
who qualify as terrorists.
3. Criminalising fighting abroad altogether. Anyone who goes abroad to join
a foreign combat entity will be subjected to prosecution and according
sanctions.
The independent advocacy organisation CAGE (2014) issued a report on the po-
tential blowback of FFs, which concluded broadly in the assertion that the threat
is overstated and the policies counterproductive. According to their research, the
hostile attitudes towards the UK and the acts of violence committed by extremists
have been driven predominantly by British foreign policy and not previous com-
bat engagement. Some experts also draw parallels between the contemporary FFs
and those who fought for the Republicans in the Spanish Civil War or the Libyan
10 Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures
23
uprising in 2011. Even though the latter lacked support back home, neither of
them was criminalised nor considered as a threat to the UK homeland (CAGE
2014, Guardian 2014). Simon Jenkins (Guardian 2014) further condemns this
‘scaremongering’ and blames Premier David Cameron for elevating the menace
stemming from returning FFs. He argues that security against such a threat can
only be provided by policing and targeted intelligence and does not require over-
protective policies that constrain the liberties of the British people. And George
Monbiot (Monbiot.com 2014) accuses authorities of issuing arbitrary terrorism
laws that run the risk of being ‘used against brown and bearded people who pre-
sent no threat’.
This group advocates that the best way to deal with FFs is action
(1).
Richard Barrett, former head of counterterrorism at the MI6, put it suc-
cinctly when he stated that ‘how you treat people is really important. There is a
balance to be struck, where you do not mistreat people on the one hand, but do
not overlook people who are a threat either’ (CAGE 2014). He thereby puts em-
phasis on the trade-off between security and freedom, which is extremely chal-
lenging when it comes to the FF issue. Charlie Cooper (LeftFootForward 2014),
who is a researcher at
Quilliam,
refutes the arguments of those who attribute the
scaremongering to a ‘White-Hall conspiracy’. ‘Fighters for IS and its affiliates
pose a threat’ because they return with a ‘troubling combination’ of extremist in-
doctrination and military training that is likely to translate into politically moti-
vated violence in part. However, he does concede that this threat ought not to ‘be-
come a scapegoat for the introduction of draconian counterterrorism measures
but that it must not be downplayed at the price of putting British society at risk.
And Boyd Tonkin (Guardian 2014) warns that in the light of ISISextremely ag-
gressive tactics involving slaughters and massacres, it is even ‘more vital than
ever to clear a path back to normality for the drifters, dreamers, malcontents and
24
bedroom zealots once attracted by the Isis cult. The risk of an indiscriminate
criminal stigma might give the doubters and waverers a reason to stick with the
fanatics’. He thereby raises a valid point, which is that reinsertion efforts are like-
ly to be more successful in reducing the security concerns by avoiding alienation
of those who are already exposed to extremist ideologies.
These
experts propose
policies that are related to action (2).
Finally, there are those who advocate banning the act of fighting abroad
per se. The 1870 ‘Foreign Enlistment Act’ constituted an attempt to make it an
offence to ‘assist the armed forces of a state at war with any foreign state at peace
with Her Majesty’ the act was proven ineffective by the Spanish Civil War dur-
ing which it was violated by hundreds of Britons of whom none has ever been
prosecuted (George Monbiot 2005). Other than that, there is no functioning legal
basis that forbids the act of fighting for a foreign entity as such. Nevertheless,
Sue Hemming, the head of counterterrorism at the Crown Prosecution Service
(CPS) explained that ‘our government chooses to have legislation which prevents
people from joining in whichever conflict they have views about. We will apply the
law robustly’ (London Evening Standard 2014). Law enforcement agencies are
already taking the stance that no kind of participation in a foreign conflict will go
unpunished. ‘It is a crime for people from this country to get into a conflict’, she
stated in this regard. In case there are potential offences under the Terrorism Act
2006 e.g. involvement in terrorist training11up to 10 years of prison sentences
await the returnees. Authorities have also started depriving individuals of their
passport or even British citizenship, leaving some of them stateless12 (ICCT 2014,
11 Whereas ‘terrorism’ is ‘any action driven by political, ideological, religious or racial mo-
tive […] to influence the government or intimidate a section of the public’ (London Even-
ing Standard 2014)
12 Stripping citizens of their nationality is against the 1961 UN Convention on the Reduc-
tion of Statelessness that the UK is signatory of (UKSCBlog 2014). Some, however, argue
that swearing allegiance to the recently proclaimed ‘Islamic State’ means these individu-
25
RT 2014). The underlying assertion is that these fighters should not be able to
enjoy the ‘privilege’ of travelling under a British passport or possessing the Brit-
ish nationality (Mail Online 2014).
These people defend the view that action (3) is
appropriate.
THE ENVIRONMENT
The environment in which these three groups interact with each other has multi-
ple facets. Apart from the physical space, where FFs interact with Muslim com-
munities and authorities, i.e. interrogations, prosecutions etc., there are two other
relevant spheres: the
virtual
and the
legal
environment. Whereas the former en-
compasses new technologies of communication, social media in particular, the
latter circumscribes all the legal instruments that are available to deal with FFs.
THE VIRTUAL ENVIRONMENT: SOCIAL MEDIA
The degree to which social media has been used by FFs in the recent conflicts in
Syraq is unprecedented (ICSR 2014). Whether video footage13, pictures, state-
ments or religious dogma anything is being put on social media and disseminat-
ed within seconds across the globe (Quilliam 2014). Thereby, FFs and their re-
spective organisations or groups are able to widen their outreach to a staggering
extent an advantage they use to both portray their values and convictions and
incite sympathisers to join their ranks (Telegraph 2014). Jonathan Russell, liai-
son officer at Quilliam, puts it cogently: ‘If the Gulf War was the first televised
war, this is the first tweeted war. […] there are stories of guys just following
als would in fact not be stateless if deprived from their UK citizenship (Brenner Brief
2014)
13 E.g. the recently videoed beheading of US Journalist James Foley (Stratfor 2014)
26
events on Twitter, or just sending messages to people over there, and then book-
ing an easyJet flight to Turkey.’ (FT 2014). There is a plethora of FFs online
whose accounts are interconnected and thus thickening the web of extremist
propaganda on social media. The fighting groups are conscious of the power that
social media provides them with and have individuals dedicated to the spreading
of information online (ICSR 2014).
The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation (ICSR) at King’s
College London has demonstrated how the FFs’ inclination to voluntarily release
information on social media produces highly valuable pieces of evidence to both
researchers and intelligence agencies. The think tank has issued a report in April
201414 that outlined the virtual FF network by analysing evidence of social media
profiles of 190 Western and European FFs. Their key findings were the following:
1. Their analysis re-emphasises the intense use of social media by FFs. To
them, social media has become a tool to represent what is happening on
the ground and has assumed a function of both inspiration and infor-
mation. To them, [social media] has become an essential part of what is
happening on the ground’.
2. A set of individuals who are not affiliated to extremist factions and who
are rarely physically located within the conflict zone are becoming increas-
ingly influential: the so-called ‘disseminators’ process and present infor-
mation about the conflict. Their accounts and pages are often consulted
with greater frequency than the official media outlets of the groups on the
ground.
3. The growing social media network of FFs has seen the surge of clerical and
inspirational figures that ‘serve as cheerleaders for the cause’. They pro-
14 #Greenbirds: Measuring the Importance and Influence in Syrian Foreign Fighter Net-
works (ICSR 2014)
27
vide religious justification for joining the fighting and support and encour-
age those who sympathise with the extremist factions. Often, they play an
important role in the radicalisation process of Anglophone individuals be-
cause of their fluency in English and their ability to translate material
from Arabic.
4. Finally, the paper demonstrates the immense amount of evidence that can
be gained from social media platforms. The authors therefore advocate
making ‘maximum use’ of these sources rather than taking the approach of
removing and censoring online content.
One significant aspect that this widespread use of social media entails is the phe-
nomenon of ‘normalisation’ (FT 2014). The posts of FFs often seem mundane and
completely harmless, distracting the observer from the violent realities of the bat-
tleground and making it tempting to empathise with them. A recent graphic ex-
ample that went viral online was a report of ‘two jihadists arguing over stolen
M&M’s (Vocativ 2014). Examples such as this Twitter conversation where two
fighters argue over such a trivial topic and deal with it in an apparently light-
hearted way serve to ‘humanise’ them to a certain degree by revealing their faces,
names and character traits. Indisputably, ‘social media has given us the weirdest,
clearest window ever into life on the front lines of mercenary warfare’ (Vocativ
2014).
Nevertheless, there are reasons to reassess the power of social media to
radicalise and entice individuals into going abroad to join a foreign conflict.
RAND Europe (2013) studied 15 cases of extremism and terrorism and investi-
gated the links to online radicalisation. They found that even though the ‘online
world’, i.e. internet and online sources, enhances opportunities to become radical-
ised and confirm existing beliefs, the ‘offline world’, i.e. physical contact with like-
28
minded people is indispensable for a radicalisation process to finalise. The Inter-
net can therefore play a crucial role in facilitating the process but it cannot be the
sole driver of it. Counterterrorism expert Marc Sageman (2008) corroborates this
finding by suggesting that the Internet functions as a medium in the radicalisa-
tion process rather than an initiating driver.
Overall, it can be said that ubiquitous communication through social me-
dia has, if not changed the nature of guerrilla warfare, definitely changed the way
it is perceived by spectators around the globe. Nowadays, individuals who are not
physically involved can play an active role in the ideological outreach and re-
cruitment effort of an extremist organisation. On the positive side, there is a
greater panoply of evidence available to analysts, allowing them to develop a
more thorough understanding of the motivations, personalities, activities and
intentions of FFs. All this suggests that social media activities need to be moni-
tored and ideally confronted with a counter-narrative empowering moderate ide-
ology, but in terms of policy no adjustments will be proposed within this paper.
THE LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: ACTS AND CRIMINAL MEASURES
A range of legal tools is available to deal with returning FFs. First and foremost,
the Terrorism Act 200615 provides a comprehensive set of provisions to scrutinise
and prosecute individuals who are engaged, in one form or another, in the prepa-
ration, commission or instigation of acts of terrorism. As far as FFs are con-
cerned, several sections apply. Sections 1-4 cover all actions that are associated
with the ‘encouragement of terrorism’. Under those sections, any statement that
glorifies, encourages or induces directly or indirectly to the ‘commission, prepara-
tion or instigation of acts of terrorism’ qualifies as an offence. It is irrelevant
15 available at: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/11/contents. Clarifications about
the legal text are available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-terrorism-
act-2006
29
whether this statement relates to future or past acts and whether anyone actually
is inspired to act by it. It is further specified that the dissemination of terrorism-
related material is prohibited whether this happens physically or via electronic
means. Sections 5-8 deal with the ‘preparation of terrorist acts and terrorist train-
ing’. Any preparations for acts of terrorism whether carried out alone or in an
assisting function are considered as an infringement of the law. And not only is
it illegal to provide or receive training in skills that are designed to prepare and
commit acts of terrorism; it suffices to attend a terrorist training camp without
receiving any instruction personally to commit an offence. The rest of the text
provides further clarifications and procedural details but it becomes clear from
sections 1-8 already that an immense spectrum of activities is covered by this act.
Authorities have therefore a powerful tool to pursue any FF who is proven to have
glorified, encouraged, prepared or committed acts of terrorism.
In case no evidence is available to substantiate a terrorist offence, other
mechanisms can be put in place, one of which are TPIMs. They are employed in
order to complement the Terrorism Act where officials do not have sufficient evi-
dence to charge or deport an individual (Quilliam 2014). In the wake of the grow-
ing flow of FFs the use of TPIMs is likely to become more common. Quilliam re-
searchers, however, assert that the current implementation of TPIMs does not
happen in accordance with the UK’s human rights commitment and lacks effec-
tive follow-up measures. They advocate granting accused individuals a fair trial
and a legal representative in order to raise transparency of the procedures. They
also highly recommend accommodating TPIMs to a process of deradicalisation
and reintegration since within the current system individuals are simply released
after the designated period without demonstrating any ideological change
(Quilliam 2014). Moreover, authorities have powers to issue travel restriction
orders, deport individuals and deprive them of their citizenship within the Royal
30
Prerogative and British Nationality Act. It has also been suggested to use Anti-
Social Behaviour (ASBOs) against FFs (Daily Mail 2014).
Finally, there are potentially ways to prosecute FFs via international
crimes. International humanitarian law (IHL) does not only apply to inter-state
conflicts but is also increasingly acknowledged to be valid in intra-state conflicts
where several sub-state actors are involved in the fighting. Within IHL FFs can
commit
war crimes, i.e. acts of violence against persons not actively taking part
in the conflict or placed
hors de combat
;
crimes against humanity, i.e. any kind of crime committed systemati-
cally and in a large scale against any civilian population;
genocide, i.e. killing or seriously injuring members of a group with the
aim of eradicating it in whole or in part.
Since the statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) has not been ratified
by Syria, it cannot prosecute individuals as an international entity. However,
states that are signatory parties to the treaty, such as the UK, can (and are en-
couraged to) prosecute their citizens for these international crimes (ICCT 2014).
THE INTERACTION
There are two interactions that stand out in the discussion of the FF issue:
1. How are the authorities’ actions perceived by the FFs? And what is the
impact they might have on the FFs?
2. How does the Muslim community perceive the actions of the authorities?
What is the impact they are likely to have on them?
31
Since the aim of this paper is to improve policymaking with respect to FFs, these
two questions are the ones that need to be looked into. Richard Barrett framed it
very cogently when he said that ‘there is a balance to be struck. Where you do not
mistreat people on the one hand, but do not overlook those who are a threat ei-
ther’ (2014). There is a risk of exacerbating the issue by implementing policies
that are too stringent but there is another serious risk of understating the
threat and thereby potentially compromising the security of British citizens. It is
therefore of utmost importance to critically assess the impact FF policies are go-
ing to have or already having on these two groups of individuals16.
1. NEGLECTING THE THREAT
The threat that returnees pose is likely to be overstated. Experts and policymak-
ers have a natural tendency to assume the worst and thereby often run the risk of
giving the public the impression of an impending doom (Boulevard Extérieur
2013). Thus, one way to approach the issue is to continue as though nothing had
changed. Individuals who infringe the terrorism laws will be prosecuted as always
and subjected to TPIMs and those who return with no sign of extremist ideologi-
cal conviction will face no sanctions.
FFs
who would like to return to the UK would not have to dread prosecu-
tion if they have not violated the terrorism laws. Some of them will have fought
alongside secular or other factions that are completely detached from any kind of
extremist ideology. For those, returning to the UK equates to returning home.
Those who did fight alongside an extremist rebel faction, potentially with ties to
16 The following sections reflect my personal appraisal of the potential consequences, thus
the scarce referencing.
32
AQ17 or ISIS, but do not have grievances against the UK will have no reason to
develop any. They will reintegrate into society and are likely to distance them-
selves from radical doctrines over time. Those who are deeply indoctrinated and
venerate extremist ideologies will know that they are still not welcome back in
the UK. Many of them were already on the radar of intelligence agencies prior to
their departure and are unlikely to evade it upon their return. They will be prose-
cuted as usual according to terrorism legislation.
The Muslim Community
will not be impacted since there will be no additional
policies that may concern them.
2. FOCUS ON REINTEGRATION
Instead of pondering ways to criminalise fighting abroad, it might be more effec-
tive to focus on the reintegration process of returnees. A successful reintegration
program would need to assess the state of radicalisation of individuals and their
intentions back home. TPIMs will be employed to observe individuals who are
suspected to sympathise with extremist organisations or inclined towards politi-
cally motivated violence but who have not committed any crime yet.
Some FFs
may welcome such a programme; particularly those who have only
benign intentions. Little stigma is attached to it because these individuals are
aware of the concerns that British society and authorities have. Those who refuse
to undergo such a procedure are more likely to be subjected to TPIMs. If individu-
als have infringed terrorism laws and evidence proving this is available, they will
be prosecuted as usual. Nevertheless, there is unfortunately little evidence avail-
able about how FFs think about such a program but it is reasonable to assume
that those who are adamant about reintegrating into British society will be ready
to make the effort of participating in it.
17 Al-Qaeda
33
Again, these measures will not affect the Muslim Community if there is suffi-
cient transparency as to why an individual is expected to undergo such proce-
dures. For example, the dialogue with families of returnees needs to be sought in
order to promote mutual understanding.
3. CRIMINALISING FIGHTING ABROAD
The line that is being taken at the moment, however, is one of criminalising FFs
indiscriminately for travelling abroad to fight in Syraq. In December last year, it
was revealed that the Home Office had deprived 20 UK nationals of their citizen-
ship (Independent 2014, Telegraph 2014) and withheld passports of 23 citizens
since April 2013 (BBC 2014). There are indeed countries, such as Switzerland for
example, that forbid foreign fighting per se and convicted nationals who fought in
the Spanish civil war on these grounds (BBC 2009). However, the UK has no rec-
ord of (properly18) banning foreign enlistment which does not impede it from
attempting it now: As Ms Sue Hemming stated, authorities are aiming at making
fighting in a foreign conflict illegal in the case of Syraq. But failing to distinguish
between those who are willing and able to reintegrate into society and those who
are a potential risk to the UK can prove hugely counterproductive: ‘[…] If the
near-certainty of UK criminal sanctions closes down your road to reintegration,
why not rise to the fanatics’ bait? What have you then got to lose?’ (Guardian
2014). It is not far-fetched to imagine such a scenario, where draconic criminal
measures might actually exacerbate the problem. Many FFs will wish to return
home, several hundreds have done it already, and if their intentions were benign
in the first place, they might be given a reason to choose the extremist path now
that these stringent policies come into effect (TSG 2014, Guardian 2014). Moreo-
18 Considering that it was attempted with the 1870 Foreign Enlistment Act
34
ver, imprisoning FFs could again increase those individuals’ sympathy with radi-
cal groups, especially since the danger of being radicalised in prison is significant
(Inside Time 2014).
Within the Muslim Community, some could perceive these measures as ex-
cessive. Treating returnees who might be innocent as criminals may cause nega-
tive reverberations in this community and further alienate those who already
consider themselves as being treated in a discriminatory manner. This could
eventually incite those who are already vulnerable and receptive to extremist,
anti-government narratives to cross the line and join an appealing group or or-
ganisation.
What the strategic-choice approach tells us
The strategic-choice approach serves to explore the various aspects of the FF phe-
nomenon and the most important interactions that occur within it. It shows that
there are basically sufficient legal mechanisms to criminalise FFs for going to
Syraq and that more efforts should be directed towards using the data available
on social media platforms in order to garner understanding about their motiva-
tions and intentions. It further demonstrates that any set of policies designed to
tackle returnees must be well pondered in order to do justice to the complexity of
the matter. Measures that simplify the problem by putting all FFs into the same
basket are very likely to alienate a significant portion of British society and in-
crease the likelihood of FFs developing grievances against their homeland. Hence,
strict but legally sound measures accompanied by efforts to rehabilitate and rein-
tegrate these fighters into society are more likely to succeed in reducing the risk
to the UK than the simplistic and generalised condemnation of FFs.
35
PART III: POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
International cooperation
‘[The FF issue] is a global crisis in need of a global solution’ (NBC News 2014). US
General Attorney Eric Holder urged the international community to work closely
together in order to tackle the issue of FFs. Lord David Richards, former British
CDS stated on a similar note that this problem ‘is way beyond Britain’ and re-
quires ‘a global solution’ (Independent 2014).
Extremist ideologies pursue a strategy with transnational aims that is cer-
tain to affect more than one single country. Furthermore, in an era of enhanced
mobility, cooperation across borders is vital and countries should share their in-
telligence with global databases such as Interpol in order to facilitate the detec-
tion and pursuit of travelling individuals. In order to implement international law
on a broader basis, countries need to be willing to extradite foreign nationals sus-
pected to have committed crimes, which are punishable in their respective home
countries. On the diplomatic level, efforts have been made to address the issue of
FFs and terrorists more generally. UNSC19 Resolution 1373 (2011) urges all
member states to ensure that individuals who participate in the planning, financ-
ing, preparation or perpetration of terrorist acts are brought to justice. More re-
cently, the UNSC Resolution 2170 adopted on 15 August 2014 in light of ISIS’
increasingly aggressive expansion into northern Iraq, calls on all states to develop
national measures to ‘suppress the flow of foreign terrorist fighters (UN News
Centre 2014). The fact that in the month of September 2014, US president Barack
Obama will be personally hosting the UN Security Council because of the FF
problematic reflects the growing awareness within the international community
that a multilateral approach is required to address the issue (US News 2014).
19 United Nations Security Council
36
EU Terrorism Chief Gilles de Kerchove also puts emphasis on larger coop-
eration within the EU by setting joint objectives and coordinating security
measures. He further alludes to an important point that has not been addressed
sufficiently hitherto, which is the porosity of the Turkish border (CFC 2013). A
journalist at the airport of Gaziantep20 lamented a severe lack of security provi-
sions: ‘How easy is it for fighters to pass through here, with not a policeman, offi-
cial or passport checker in sight? Just how seriously are the authorities taking the
threat of jihadi tourism?(London Evening Standard 2014). Establishing a check-
point at Gaziantep airport would not be an immense effort if the burden is shared
by several members of the EU but could prove highly effective.
Step up border controls
So far, about 60 to 70 returnees have been detained at the border, which is indica-
tive of increasingly rigorous border controls (Telegraph 2014). The advantage of
being surrounded by water allows Britain to technically supervise all entry points
to the country. This is vital in order to intercept the maximum amount of return-
ees and assess their intentions and outlook.
Case-by-case assessment
After spotting and detaining individuals on the border it is crucial to put mecha-
nisms in place that allow for a swift appraisal of the risk they pose to society, i.e.
their ideological state and mental health. Preferably, this examination needs to
be carried out on an individual basis (TSG 2014). As stated earlier, there are as
many motivations as there are FFs, therefore putting all of them ‘into the same
basket as terrorists plotting on London’s subway system’21 would be futile. Hence,
20 located an hour’s drive from the Syrian border and one of the most important crossovers
from Europe into rebel-held areas (CFC 2014)
21 Full Interview with Raffaello Pantucci in Appendices
37
mechanisms need to be put in place to assess whether this person is a risk or
whether they need psychological support (House of Commons 2014). Clearly, if
criminal sanctions apply, the corresponding legal provisions come into effect and
TPIMs are employed where deemed necessary. If the assessment shows that this
individual has no criminal record related to his (or her) period abroad, a super-
vised reintegration into society ought to ensue.
All this is to say that criminalising FFs indiscriminately is counterproduc-
tive. Although strict and indiscriminate detentions must occur once these indi-
viduals cross the border into the UK in order to allow authorities to proceed to an
in-depth analysis, imposing the same sanctions on all of them would equate to a
complete failure to understand the issue and respond appropriately. The Austral-
ian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) illustrated how policies ought
not
to look like by cancelling, without prior notice, the passports of over 20 individu-
als who were deemed to have a ‘jihadi mentality’ (SMH 2014, The Conversation
2014) and who are ‘trained killers’ (Times of India 2014). The ambiguity of these
terms and the uncooperative implementation of the policy demonstrate a tragic
lack of understanding of how complex and multi-layered the issue is.
Reintegration programme
It has been reported that some of them are already being put on programmes in
cooperation with schools and youth organisations in order to gauge whether they
are fit to reintegrate into society (BBC 2014). RUSI expert Raffaello Pantucci22
similarly suggests that undertaking a ‘de-programming effort like that used for
soldiers would be good’23. The Saudi Arabian authorities have already proceeded
with the implementation of this concept. They are offering ex-terrorists participa-
22 Full Interview in Appendices
23 Labour politician Ed Miliband, on 29 August 2014, also advocated introducing a ‘man-
datory programme of deradicalisation for anyone who is drawn into the fringes of extrem-
ism in Syria an Iraq’ (Independent 2014)
38
tion in ‘life-after-jihad’ programmes that prepare them for their reinsertion into
society. This is primarily to ensure that they do not suffer a relapse into violence
once they are released (WSJ 2014, Bloomberg 2014). Saudi Arabia has chosen this
hybrid approach of security measures and rehab program after years of experi-
ence with returning FFs - a fact that suggests they may have grasped how to ap-
proach the FF issue more sensibly. Also, the framework of a rehab or reintegra-
tion programme enables religious experts to intervene and challenge the radical
views of these young people.
Strict implementation of terrorism laws
All this, however, is not to downplay the threat. Security measures need to be
enforced with utmost rigour given the severity of the potential outcomes should
the threat materialise. Those who are judged to be a risk or against whom evi-
dence of crimes can be gathered need to face sanctions that are legally sound and
justifiable (LeftFootForward 2014). More drastic measures such as citizenship
stripping and passport cancellations are effective if citizens are outside the UK
since they severely restrict their mobility and possibilities of return (Independent
2014). Also, making use of the provisions of IHL to prosecute individuals who are
suspected or proven to have committed abhorrent crimes would be a recommend-
able course of action.
Transparency
Although Mehdi Nemmouche is not the first returning FF to have attempted an
attack smaller plots were thwarted in France, Kosovo and Holland in the past
two years he demonstrates that concerns about returnees are not simply the
products of scaremongers. Nevertheless, tragic events like these can be used to
raise awareness among both authorities and communities and urge them to take
39
bolder stances. Unfortunately, such an opportunity was missed in the UK where a
‘Mumbai-style’ plot was undermined in October 2013 but went largely unreported
and with scarce disclosure to the public. It would have been preferable to inform
the public about the attack and thereby urge community leaders to be more pro-
active in dissuading young people from going to Syraq. (War on the Rocks 2014)
Consistency
…in the treatment of FFs
Of further concern is the repeated lack of consistency in the treatment of FFs in
recent years. In reaction to the resumption of the conflict in Palestine-Israel about
4,600 foreigners have joined the IDF as FFs roughly 100 from the UK (Wash-
ington Post 2014, Al Jazeera 2014). None of them has been portrayed as a risk to
national security nor have policymakers taken steps to prevent them from leav-
ing. Another example was Libya 2011: While both authorities and media in the
UK did not object yet rather support the considerable outflow of Britons to
Libya to support the overthrow of Muammar Ghaddafi, their stance took a drastic
turn when it came to Syria (CAGE 2014). It can be conceded that there is clearly
a difference between a Briton who joins a secular uprising considered as legiti-
mate by the UK and a Briton who joins a radical Islamist group that has greater
ambitions in both temporal and geographical terms and that threatens to attack
British interests and personnel. However, inconsistent treatment of FFs is proof
of a feeble strategy that will eventually undermine the UK’s credibility. It is
therefore crucial that policymakers determine and align their stances toward the
FF phenomenon in order to develop consistent and transparent policies. This will
need to be reflected in the UK’s counterterrorism strategy CONTEST that has not
yet been updated with respect to the FF issue.
40
…in UK Foreign Policy
This last point will need to be explored in a much larger discussion of the UK’s
foreign policy. Mentioning UK foreign policy with respect to FFs is insofar perti-
nent as it is reportedly one of the most prominent drivers of acts of terrorism
and equally one that government officials admit to least (CAGE 2014). The post-
9/11 era in which the ‘War on Terror’ dominated US and UK foreign policy has
fuelled the grievances that individuals in various parts of the world have against
Western countries. In addition to being a powerful driver of politically motivated
violence, it fits and feeds into the narrative of extremist Islamist groups who are
therefore able to attract individuals with similar types of grievances. In order to
address the root causes of the FF phenomenon, the UK will have to profoundly
reappraise its foreign policy and investigate into how it may have contributed to
creating this problem in the first place.
41
CONCLUSION
How likely are returning British FFs, who were previously engaged in combat in
Syraq to pose a risk to national security and how can this risk be reduced?
Although there is a serious risk given the vast amount of FFs and the broad spec-
trum of intentions, the threat is being overstated by the media and politicians.
Only few hard-line extremists have uttered menaces against the West and should
not be deemed representative of all FFs. Nevertheless, the risk must not be ne-
glected and policies need to be adopted promptly in order to contain and reduce it.
After discussing the FF phenomenon and looking at it through the ‘strategic-
choice’ lens it becomes evident that there is no one-size-fits-it-all solution to this
issue. Policymakers must be sensitive to the heterogeneity of the FF contingent,
which comprises innocent people and others who could help reduce the appeal of
foreign fighting by giving truthful and authentic accounts of their experiences
abroad. With respect to policy, three major recommendations stand out:
1. Broader international cooperation
The UK must encourage other countries to share their intelligence and databases
and enhance cooperation in the domain of international law and national security
measures. The FF issue does not affect one single country and will therefore need
to be tackled collectively.
2. Rehabilitation and reintegration mechanisms
Despite the fact that a rehab and reintegration program will cost more efforts and
money in the short run, it is more likely to produce sustainable solutions. It will
be indispensable to assess returnees on a case-by-case basis in order to choose the
42
most appropriate measure to deal with them. Such programs will aim to ensure
that the ideological state and mental health of the individual does not pose a risk
to British society and that their reinsertion into their social networks is facilitat-
ed.
3. Consistency and transparency in the treatment of FFs
The UK needs to be clear about how it wants to handle FFs. Authorities have
tended to treat returnees differently depending on the country they fought for and
their religious, cultural or ethnic identity. This inconsistency has translated into
an inconsistent strategy, which continues to confuse and alienate significant por-
tions of the British population. Moreover, transparency of criminal measures and
legal proceedings will enhance mutual understanding and increase awareness. As
a consequence, people will be more likely to cooperate with the authorities and
less likely to feel stigmatised.
Nevertheless, I am aware that we are on the cutting edge of this topic. As I am
writing these lines, UK policymakers are deliberating on ways to respond not only
to the threat of foreign fighters at home, but more directly to the rapid and stag-
gering expansion of ISIS in recent weeks. On Monday, September 1, Prime Minis-
ter David Cameron is going to address the parliament on the issue of FFs and is
likely to discuss some of the measures proposed in this paper. On 29 August 2014,
the UK terror threat level was raised from ‘substantial’ to ‘severe’, meaning that a
terrorist attack is ‘highly likely’ and likely to involve returning FFs (BBC 2014).
The only thing the current situation promises is more uncertainty, more volatility
and less visibility.
As to the murder of James Foley: Although a deplorable and tragic act of
violence, events like these ought not to change the UK’s overarching strategy in
43
dealing with FFs. Because unfortunately, more appalling episodes are probably
yet to come and if every one of them has the potential to unsettle the UK’s ap-
proach to FFs, the results are more than likely to be dissatisfactory. In order for
policies to corroborate national security, a strategy is required that is both robust
and consistent at any given point in time.
44
APPENDICES
Name: Vlado Azinovic
Organisation: University of Sarajevo, Bosnia
Function: Associate Professor and Researcher
Date: 18 June 2014
1.) Could you perhaps give me an update on numbers? (a) How many have left,
(b) how many returned, (c) how many have been convicted?
The record shows that some 150 men, and 20 women, as well as 15 children
have left the country. Some 100 men returned. There were no convictions or
charges thus far, as the new legislation is not yet officially being enforced.
2.) What are the most significant threats posed by returning foreign fighters?
Is it that they will further divide society by inspiring religious extremism
among Muslims? Or is it that they could be planning an attack on BiH home-
land? If an attack is the main risk, who is the most likely target: other ethnic
groups or politicians and government?
Battle-hardened, ideologically radicalised individuals present a potential
threat to every society. In Bosnia they can establish new recruitment cells or
terrorist networks, but their impact is mostly likely to be societal. They could
easily emerge as new leaders in their respective communities where they are
already seen as authentic role models. Previous attacks by these groups and
individuals were aimed at Bosnian police and foreign embassies.
3.) When it comes to arresting returning fighters, the main concern of UK author-
ities is not to send the wrong signals to the domestic Muslim communities.
Muslims could feel criminalised and discriminated by excessive legal and po-
licing action against them. Assuming that in BiH this risk is present to a simi-
lar degree, how is it handled by the authorities? And is the legislation
fit-for-purpose in this respect?
There is a consensus among legal experts and law enforcement officials that
the legislation will be very difficult, if not impossible, to enforce as prosecutors
will have problems in proving that an individual was indeed in Syria, and par-
45
ticipated in fighting. However, once finally in place, the legislation could serve
as a tool for criminalising those engaged in recruiting and inciting people to go
to Syria.
4.) When it comes to preventing young people from going abroad, the UK is trying
to build a counter-narrative to demonstrate the drawbacks of travelling to
Syria to join rebel ranks. Other than that, they are also targeting hate
preachers and radical mosques. What is being done in BiH (by the govern-
ment, local authorities, media, schools etc.) in order to delegitimise the
myth of ‘five-star-jihad’ and prevent young people from going to
Syria?
Unfortunately, there are still no concerted efforts aimed at developing an ef-
fective, or any counter-narrative for that matter to curb the trend. The stories
about Bosnian fighters in Syria are reaching media every now and then, most-
ly when someone is killed, but except from reporting and registering those
who had left, there doesn't seem to be any other activity directed toward ad-
dressing the issue. There are some discussions on various salafist websites,
but these are mostly reduced to the debate over which faction should one sup-
port in Syria. In his sermons the Grand Mufti of Bosnia has already con-
demned those who are leaving for Syria, warning them that they are getting
themselves involved into something they don't understand, and risking to end
up serving other people's interests.
Name: Raffaello Pantucci
Organisation: Royal United Services Institute (RUSI)
Function: Senior Research Fellow
Date: 14 July 2014
1.) Are there any other risks that have become apparent since the Chatham
House debate?
I would refine the first to say that returnees in particular need to be of con-
cern for a number of reasons: some might be directed by groups on the battle-
field to launch attacks (by a major group linked to AQ or ISIS for example),
46
but also smaller clusters of foreign fighters deciding to do it for their own rea-
sons. IE: A French network might decide to launch an attack without the di-
rection of AQ/ISIS/JaN, using its people and networks.
2.) You mention the need for a sort of ‘reintegration program’ for individuals to
‘demobilise or to return to some sort of ordinary life’. Do you have suggestions
for how the threat of returning fighters should beassessed and how returnees
who are deemed ‘benign’ are to be reintegrated? Should issues of mental
health be addressed through the same mechanisms that are being employed
for military personnel?
Yes, a de-programming effort like that used for soldiers would be good. It
would be good to garner proof and understanding of who it was they had
fought alongside. It would also be important to identify what their motivations
were for going and who they are connected to.
3.) Finally, considering modifications of CONTEST and the legislation, i.e. Ter-
rorism Act: When is anupdate to be expected? In legal terms,
which activities that foreign fighters engage in abroad should be specifical-
ly punishable (e.g. should fighting abroad in Syria be prohibited in all cases
or only if it is in connection with AQ-operatives or ISIS?)? How
does CONTEST need to be adjusted in order to address this issue?
I think the refinement needs to be made to talk about people who have joined
groups that have threatened the west and have expressed an intent and
agreement with this mentality. I think that CONTEST needs to think about
whether there is much use to trying to prosecute people who are going over
and fighting with little aim or goal to come back. We need to make sure that it
is not encouraged that people go abroad to fight, but at the same time, make
sure that we are not putting people just going over to fight into the same bas-
ket as terrorists plotting on London’s subway system.
47
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http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/terrorism-theater#axzz3Bl51kn5K (Accessed:
29 August 2014)
The Conversation (2014)
Foreign Fighters Passports and Prosecutions in Gov-
ernment Sights.
Available at: http://theconversation.com/foreign-fighter-
passports-and-prosecutions-in-governments-sights-30197 (Accessed: 7 August
2014)
The Financial Times (2014)
Jihad By Social Media.
Available at:
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/907fd41c-b53c-11e3-af92-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz3Bi7eBVWD (Accessed: 8 April 2014)
The Guardian (2014)
Aberdeen Man Identified as Third Briton in Isis Video.
Available at: http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/jun/24/scottish-man-
identified-third-briton-isis-video (Accessed: 7 July 2 014)
The Guardian (2014)
First British Conviction.
Available at:
http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/may/20/briton-convicted-terror-
offence-syria-jihadist-training-camp (Accessed: 20 May 2014)
The Guardian (2014)
Orwell was Hailed a Hero for Fighting in Spain. Today
He’d Be Guilty of Terrorism.
Available at:
53
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/feb/10/orwell-hero-
terrorism-syria-british-fighters-damned (Accessed: 19 April 2014)
The Guardian (2014)
The Scaremongering Has Begun. Isis Is not a Threat to
Britain.
Available at:
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/jun/23/scaremongering-isis-
no-threat-to-britain-liam-fox-mi6-iraq (Accessed: 2 July 2014)
The Guardian (2014)
Theresa May Strips Citizenship from 20 Britons
Fighting in Syria.
Available at:
http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2013/dec/23/theresa-may-strips-
citizenship-britons-syria (Accessed: 24 May 2014)
The Guardian (2014)
UK Will Feel Fallout of War in Syria ‘for Years to Come’,
Warns Top Met Officer.
Available at:
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/22/uk-syria-islamic-extremism-
isis-muthana-cressida-dick (Accessed: 25 June 2014)
The Independent (2014)
Exclusive: No Way Back for Britons Who Join the
Syrian Fight, Says Theresa May.
Available at:
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/exclusive-no-way-back-for-
britons-who-join-the-syrian-fight-says-theresa-may-9021190.html (Accessed: 9
April 2014)
The Independent (2014)
Will The Young Britons Fighting in Syria Be Allowed
to Return Home and Resume Their Lives.
Available at:
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/will-the-young-britons-
fighting-in-syria-be-allowed-to-return-home-and-resume-their-lives-
9624383.html (Accessed: 31 July 2014)
The National Interest (2014)
Cutting Off ISIS Foreign-Fighter Pipelines.
Available at: http://nationalinterest.org/feature/cutting-isis-foreign-fighter-
pipelines-10783 (Accessed: 5 July 2014)
The New York Times (2014)
A Dutch Jihadist in Syria Speaks, and Blogs.
Available at: http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/01/29/a-dutch-jihadist-in-
syria-speaks-and-blogs/ (Accessed: 11 August 2014)
The Soufan Group (2014)
Foreign Fighters in Syria.
Available at:
http://soufangroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/TSG-Foreign-Fighters-in-
Syria.pdf (Accessed: 21 July 2014)
The Sunday Times (2014)
250 Jihadis Spark UK Terror Alert.
Available at:
http://www.thesundaytimes.co.uk/sto/news/uk_news/National/article1376586.e
ce (Accessed: 29 April 2014)
The Sydney Morning Herald (2014)
ASIO Cancels Passports of Western Syd-
ney Men for ‘Jihaed Mentality’.
Available at:
The Telegraph (2014)
Britain ‘Very Close’ to Identifying ‘Jihadi John’ Sus-
pected Killer Of James Foley Says Ambassador.
Available at:
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/11053836/Britai
n-very-close-to-identifying-Jihadi-John-suspected-killer-of-James-Foley-says-
ambassador.html (Accessed: 24 August 2014)
54
The Telegraph (2014)
Iraq Crisis: Isis Cracks a Savvy Social Media Advance.
Available at:
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iraq/10907217/Iraq-
crisis-Isis-cracks-a-savvy-social-media-advance.html (Accessed: 17 June 2014)
The Telegraph (2014)
Iraq Crisis: Isis Seeks British Recruits on Twitter as
Cameron Warns of Attacks on Britain to Come.
Available at:
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iraq/10909386/Iraq-
crisis-Isis-seeks-British-recruits-on-Twitter-as-Cameron-warns-of-attacks-on-
Britain-to-come.html (Accessed: 20 June 2014)
The Telegraph (2014)
Iraq Crisis: Jihadists Planning UK Attacks, Warns Da-
vid Cameron.
Available at:
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iraq/10910352/Iraq-
crisis-jihadists-planning-UK-attacks-warns-David-Cameron.html (Accessed:
18 June 2014)
The Telegraph (2014)
Our Generational Struggle Against a Poisonous Ideolo-
gy.
Available at:
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iraq/11039214/Our-
generational-struggle-against-a-poisonous-ideology.html (Accessed: 16 August
2014)
The Telegraph (2014)
The Threat to Britain That Can’t Be Ignored.
Available
at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-
uk/10909334/The-threat-to-Britain-thatcant-be-ignored.html (Accessed: 20
June 2014)
The Times of India (2014)
Australia to Stop ‘Killer’ Jihadists Returning: PM
Tony Abbott.
Available at: http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/rest-of-
world/Australia-to-stop-killer-jihadists-returning-PM-Tony-
Abbott/articleshow/36880425.cms (Accessed: 24 August 2014)
The Wall Street Journal (2013)
Saudi Center Aims for Life After Jihad’.
Available at: http://blogs.wsj.com/middleeast/2013/04/24/saudi-rehab-center-
aims-to-shape-life-after-jihad/ (Accessed: 30 July 2014)
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy (2012)
Syrian Foreign Fighters
Trickle into the Syrian Rebellion.
Available at:
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/foreign-fighters-
trickle-into-the-syrian-rebellion (Accessed: 16 May 2014)
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy (2014)
The Return of Sunni
Foreign Fighters in Iraq.
Available at:
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/the-return-of-sunni-
foreign-fighters-in-iraq (Accessed: 5 July 2014)
The Washington Post (2014)
Foreign Fighters’ for Israel.
Available at:
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/07/22/foreign-
fighters-for-israel/ (Accessed: 22 July 2014)
The Washington Post (2014)
Eric Holder Urges European Countries to Help
Stop Flow of Radicals to Syria.
Available at:
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/eric-holder-urges-
55
european-states-to-help-stop-flow-of-radicals-to-syria/2014/07/08/b50d01ae-
0692-11e4-8a6a-19355c7e870a_story.html (Accessed: 9 July 2014)
The Washington Post (2014)
Europeans Are Flocking to the War in Syria.
What Happens When They Come Back?
Available at:
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/europeans-are-flocking-to-the-
war-in-syria-what-happens-when-they-come-home/2014/01/29/772f56d0-88f6-
11e3-833c-33098f9e5267_story.html (Accessed: 20 April 2014)
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Case Comment: Al Jedda v SSHD [2013] UKSC 62.
Availa-
ble at: http://ukscblog.com/case-comment-al-jedda-v-sshd-2013-uksc-62/ (Ac-
cessed: 3 June 2014)
United Nations Security Council Resolution 2170 (2014) Available at:
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2014/sc11520.doc.htm (Accessed: 15 Au-
gust 2014)
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versiteit Utrecht.
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Pro-ISIS Recruitment Video Encourages Foreign Fighters to
Join Jihad.
Available at: https://news.vice.com/article/pro-isis-recruitment-
video-encourages-foreign-fighters-to-join-jihad (Accessed: 10 August 2014)
Vocativ (2014)
Two Jihadis Arguing Over Stolen M&M’s Will Make Your Day.
Available at: http://www.vocativ.com/world/syria-world/jihadis-theyre-just-
like-us-seriously-guys-stole-mms/#!bLi2lu (Accessed: 14 August 2014)
War in Context (2012)
Is the threat from foreign jihadists in Syria being over-
stated?
Available at:
http://warincontext.org/2012/07/30/is-the-threat-from-
foreign-jihadists-in-syria-being-overstated/
(Accessed: 5 August 2014)
War on the Rocks (2014)
Mehdi Nemmouche and Syria: Europe’s Foreign
Fighter Problem.
Available at: http://warontherocks.com/2014/06/mehdi-
nemmouche-and-syria-europes-foreign-fighter-problem/ (Accessed: 20 August
2014)
War on the Rocks (2014)
The Dangerous Nexus Between Radicalism in Brit-
ain and Syria’s Foreign Fighters.
Available at:
http://warontherocks.com/2014/08/the-dangerous-nexus-between-radicalism-
in-britain-and-syrias-foreign-fighters/ (Accessed: 27 August 2014)
Yahoo News (2014)
Syria: Young Gangsters Flock to Fight and Die in British
Brigade of Jihadists.
Available at: https://uk.news.yahoo.com/syria-young-
gangsters-flock-fight-die-british-brigade-063000575.html#7e1NHcz (Accessed:
5 June 2014)
... Foreign fighting is the term that is commonly used to describe individuals who join foreign armies or armed groups. It has become popular with the growing flow of individuals from various countries joining conflict zones in Syria and Iraq (Ajil, 2014;Dawson & Amarasingam, 2017;Hegghammer, 2013;Malet, 2013). The phenomenon per se is, however, not new. ...
... I was skeptical of the exceptionalising narrative around jihadist engagement for conflicts in the Arab World. Based on research conducted in my Master's thesis (Ajil, 2014), I had maintained an understanding of foreign fighting as being much more complex than a mere religiously-driven lunacy to join a self-proclaimed Islamic State. On a more informal level, I was personally aware of how widespread grievances regarding Western foreign policy were, but that they only rarely led to actual engagement. ...
Thesis
In my doctoral thesis, I present a theory of politico-ideological mobilisation and violence in relation to causes and conflicts in the Arab World based mainly on 109 interviews conducted between 2018 and 2020 in Lebanon, Switzerland and Canada. Among the interviewees are 26 mainly non-violent political activists and 32 individuals who resorted to violent tactics. 51 interviews were conducted with practitioners, researchers and members of the community with first-hand contacts with individuals involved in politico-ideological violence. The findings point to the central importance of sociopolitical grievances in mobilisation processes (both violent and non-violent), which may be instrumentalised to serve idiosyncratic or political objectives. Mobilisation occurs within a specific contextual and social setting, and oscillates between authentic radicalisation and what I have dubbed the "taste of radicality". Implications for research and policymaking are discussed.
Book
In the post-September 11 world, Al Qaeda is no longer the central organizing force that aids or authorizes terrorist attacks or recruits terrorists. It is now more a source of inspiration for terrorist acts carried out by independent local groups that have branded themselves with the Al Qaeda name. Building on his previous groundbreaking work on the Al Qaeda network, forensic psychiatrist Marc Sageman has greatly expanded his research to explain how Islamic terrorism emerges and operates in the twenty-first century. In Leaderless Jihad, Sageman rejects the views that place responsibility for terrorism on society or a flawed, predisposed individual. Instead, he argues, the individual, outside influence, and group dynamics come together in a four-step process through which Muslim youth become radicalized. First, traumatic events either experienced personally or learned about indirectly spark moral outrage. Individuals interpret this outrage through a specific ideology, more felt and understood than based on doctrine. Usually in a chat room or other Internet-based venues, adherents share this moral outrage, which resonates with the personal experiences of others. The outrage is acted on by a group, either online or offline. Leaderless Jihad offers a ray of hope. Drawing on historical analogies, Sageman argues that the zeal of jihadism is self-terminating; eventually its followers will turn away from violence as a means of expressing their discontent. The book concludes with Sageman's recommendations for the application of his research to counterterrorism law enforcement efforts. Copyright
Article
Insurgencies that recruit foreign nationals to join rebel groups in various civil wars around the globe are a source of growing concern to policymakers. Despite attention focused on recent Islamist groups, foreign fighters are a phenomenon that is neither new nor uniquely Islamic. In conflicts from the Spanish Civil War to the Afghanistan War, insurgencies consistently recruited foreigners by framing the local war as one that threatened a shared transnational identity group and necessitated a defensive mobilization. It is therefore possible to draw lessons about combating their flow through counter-recruitment from a wide array of historical cases.
UK Radicals Flock To Syria, Vow to Return With ISIL Flag
  • Al Alam
Al Alam (2014) UK Radicals Flock To Syria, Vow to Return With ISIL Flag. Available at: http://en.alalam.ir/news/1608846 (Accessed: 12 August 2014)
Swiss Pardon Spain War Veterans
BBC (2009) Swiss Pardon Spain War Veterans. Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7940963.stm (Accessed: 24 August 2014)
Briton Iftekhar Jaman 'killed fighting in Syria, family says
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Britons returning from Syria face arrest, says police chief
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Brussels Jewish Museum murders: Nemmouche to be extradited
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Iraq and Syria extremists could return to UK, Met chief warns
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Iraq mission creep: What are the risks? Available at
BBC (2014) Iraq mission creep: What are the risks? Available at: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-28774749 (Accessed: 13 August 2014)