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‘Security from below’
A qualitative analysis of Syrian and Iraqi refugees’
human (in)security
Master’s Thesis
Master en droit en sciences criminelles, mention criminologie et sécurité
Ajil Ahmed
Nelkenweg 2
4665 Oftringen
Directrice : Prof. Manon Jendly
Encadrement : Claudia Campistol Mas
Lausanne, 2 août 2017
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Acknowledgements
This thesis was my companion on airplanes, trains, in cars and on buses. It was with me in
cafés and bars, in parks, at libraries and universities, in airports and in train stations. It trav-
elled with me to Chicago and New York, to Montreal and Toronto and through the Mexican
peninsula of Yucatán. It came with me to Spain, Croatia, Germany, Austria, Serbia and
France. And, of course, it was with me in Jordan and in Switzerland. It is, in a sense, the
cosmopolitan product of more than a year’s work. It has taken part of my life that I will never
get back. Yet this sacrifice is minor, if it achieves the goal it set itself, namely to carry out
into the world the voices of those who are too rarely heard and too often ignored.
This thesis would not look the way it does today without the incredible support I was privi-
leged to receive from Claudia Campistol Mas and Professor Manon Jendly. They were al-
ways easy to reach and communicate with and provided not only academic and intellectual
guidance, but also invaluable personal support. It was an immense pleasure to work under
their supervision.
I am indebted to the School of Criminal Sciences of the University of Lausanne for their in-
frastructure and administrative support. I am grateful to my professors who have all contrib-
uted greatly to my intellectual and academic development.
I thank the gatekeepers Basil, Dr. Hussein, Saleem, Rebekka, Johanna and Anna for their
crucial help in connecting me to the respondents. I thank my aunts Zahrah and Souham for
accommodating me during my time in Jordan and Mama for being the most awesome travel
partner on both trips. I thank Baba, Shahed and Maria for their help with the Arabic version
of the mind map and the consent form. I was also extremely glad to receive constructive
feedback and thoughtful comments on previous versions of the thesis from Maria, Illan and
Christina.
Writing a thesis can sometimes be a lonesome struggle. I am humbled by the love and under-
standing that my family and friends have demonstrated throughout all phases. They were
there when I needed them most.
At the core of this thesis are not the words that I typed and re-typed, but the voices of those
who are too often unheard. I thank all respondents for their trust, their willingness to share
their stories and their admirable optimism. I wish them all the strength they need to keep their
smile, even when the water is black.
A. Ajil - ‘Security from below’
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Abstract
By including the voices of Syrian and Iraqi urban refugees in Jordan in the production of
knowledge, this master’s thesis aims to direct the criminological gaze to contexts that usually
escape it and to explore what security looks like ‘from below’, based on the subjective under-
standing of individuals and their everyday security practices and experiences. This thesis
analyses the (in)security of Syrian and Iraqi refugees through the framework of ‘human secu-
rity’. Using interviews conducted in Jordan between 2016 and 2017, it provides insights into
the threats to refugees’ security which pushed them to leave their home country and the chal-
lenges they are facing living in Jordanian urban areas. The results reveal that all respond-
ents were seeking personal, community and political security, when they came to Jordan, and
suggest that they found that ‘narrow’ kind of security. However, they are confronted with a
different kind of human insecurity, which is ‘broader’ in nature. Threats to their security in
exile emanate from economic, environmental, health and food-related difficulties. In light of
these findings, the author of this thesis argues that a flexible, rather than restrictive, interpre-
tation of security is better equipped to capture and explain the insecurity of individuals in
difficult contexts. The feelings of insecurity of these individuals are inherently subjective and
escape objective readings.
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Table of Contents
Acknowledgements .................................................................................................................. 2!
Abstract ..................................................................................................................................... 3!
1.!Introduction .................................................................................................................... 12!
1.1!Context ............................................................................................................................... 12!
Dangerous places ......................................................................................................................... 12!
Jordan: a haven for Arab refugees ............................................................................................... 13!
1.2!Urban refugees ................................................................................................................... 14!
1.3!A matter of security ........................................................................................................... 16!
1.4!Security from below .......................................................................................................... 17!
1.5!Clarification of concepts ................................................................................................... 19!
Urban refugees ............................................................................................................................. 19!
2.!Theoretical Framework: Human security explained .................................................. 20!
2.1!Origin .................................................................................................................................. 20!
2.2!Definitions .......................................................................................................................... 21!
Three freedoms ............................................................................................................................. 21!
Characteristics .............................................................................................................................. 21!
2.3!Threats ................................................................................................................................ 22!
3.!Literature review ........................................................................................................... 24!
3.1!What is security? ............................................................................................................... 24!
Security for whom and from what? .............................................................................................. 24!
From the security of individuals to the security of the nation ...................................................... 24!
Security, a ‘speech act’ ................................................................................................................ 25!
Security and insecurity ................................................................................................................. 25!
3.2!Criminology’s engagement with security ........................................................................ 26!
Let’s talk about security... ............................................................................................................ 26!
...but just how much? ................................................................................................................... 26!
3.3!Broadening and deepening the security discourse: Human Security ........................... 27!
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Critique of human security ........................................................................................................... 29!
Defence of human security ........................................................................................................... 30!
Vigilant optimism ......................................................................................................................... 30!
3.4!Coupling refugees, human security and criminology ..................................................... 31!
Who should we ask? ..................................................................................................................... 33!
3.5!Why do people flee? .......................................................................................................... 35!
A complicated human movement ................................................................................................. 35!
A ‘relatively’ safe haven .............................................................................................................. 36!
3.6!Insecurities of urban refugees .......................................................................................... 36!
Syrian and Iraqi urban refugees in Jordan .................................................................................... 36!
Main findings ............................................................................................................................... 37!
4.!Methodology ................................................................................................................... 40!
4.1!Choice of research sample ................................................................................................ 40!
4.2!Respondents’ characteristics ............................................................................................ 42!
4.3!Interviews ........................................................................................................................... 43!
4.4!Transcription and translation .......................................................................................... 44!
4.5!Analysis ............................................................................................................................... 45!
5.!Results ............................................................................................................................. 48!
5.1!Reasons for fleeing ............................................................................................................. 48!
What made you flee your country? .............................................................................................. 48!
Internal violence & criminality .................................................................................................... 50!
Conflict and fighting .................................................................................................................... 51!
Loss of faith in rule of law ........................................................................................................... 52!
5.2!Human security: before flight .......................................................................................... 53!
5.3!Difficulties in Jordan ......................................................................................................... 55!
What do you struggle with in Jordan? .......................................................................................... 55!
Livelihood .................................................................................................................................... 58!
Work ............................................................................................................................................. 58!
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Housing ........................................................................................................................................ 61!
Discrimination and hostilities ...................................................................................................... 63!
5.4!Human security: in exile ................................................................................................... 65!
6.!Discussion ....................................................................................................................... 68!
6.1!Reasons for flight ............................................................................................................... 68!
6.2!Insecurities in exile ............................................................................................................ 68!
Relative security ........................................................................................................................... 70!
6.3!Human security .................................................................................................................. 70!
Context-specific ........................................................................................................................... 71!
Interrelatedness ............................................................................................................................ 71!
Threats .......................................................................................................................................... 72!
Practicality of HS ......................................................................................................................... 72!
6.4!Implications for our understanding of security .............................................................. 74!
6.5!Limitations ......................................................................................................................... 75!
Sample-related limitations ........................................................................................................... 75!
Interview-related limitations ........................................................................................................ 76!
Analysis-related limitations ......................................................................................................... 77!
7.!Conclusion ...................................................................................................................... 79!
8.!References ....................................................................................................................... 82!
9.!Annex .............................................................................................................................. 90!
I. Interview mind map .................................................................................................................... 90!
I.I English, version 1.0 ................................................................................................................. 90!
I.II English, version 2.0 ................................................................................................................ 92!
I.III Arabic, version 1.0 ................................................................................................................ 94!
I.IV Arabic, version 2.0 ................................................................................................................ 96!
II. Informed Consent Agreement .................................................................................................. 98!
II.I Version 1.0 ............................................................................................................................. 98!
II.II Version 2.0 (front page changed only) ............................................................................... 101!
A. Ajil - ‘Security from below’
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II.III Example of used consent form .......................................................................................... 102!
III.!Report form ...................................................................................................................... 103!
IV.!RQDA ............................................................................................................................... 107!
IV.I Codes .................................................................................................................................. 107!
IV.II Code categories ................................................................................................................. 108!
IV.III Coding output ................................................................................................................... 109!
V.!Matrices ............................................................................................................................ 110!
V.I Overview answers ................................................................................................................ 110!
V.II ‘What made you flee your country?’ .................................................................................. 110!
V.III ‘What struggles are you facing in Jordan?’ ....................................................................... 110!
V.IV Human security before flight ............................................................................................ 111!
V.V Human security in exile ...................................................................................................... 111!
VI.!Database overview ........................................................................................................... 112!
VII.!Field note: Gatekeepers or not? ..................................................................................... 112!
VIII.!Update on change of sample in April 2017 .................................................................... 113!
Change of sample ....................................................................................................................... 114!
Adaptation of mind map ............................................................................................................. 114!
Adjustments to objectives and research questions ..................................................................... 115!
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Table of figures
Figure 1: Top 10 countries by number of refugees hosted in 2015 and 2016 (UNHCR, 2017b,
p.15; UNHCR 2014b). ..................................................................................................... 14!
Figure 2: Distribution of Syrians and Iraqis registered with UNHCR in Jordan (UNHCR,
2017a) .............................................................................................................................. 15!
Figure 3: The triangulation of refugees, human security and criminology .............................. 18!
Figure 4: Three freedoms (GPPAC, 2016) .............................................................................. 21!
Figure 5: The seven dimensions of human security (based on HSRG, 2014) ......................... 22!
Figure 6: Human security in perspective ................................................................................. 28!
Figure 7: Coupling refugees, human security and criminology, based on the literature review
.......................................................................................................................................... 33!
Figure 8: 'Forcibly displaced population and proportion of population forcibly displaced',
end-2016 (UNHCR, 2017b, p.9) ...................................................................................... 40!
Figure 9: Proportion of urban vs. in-camp refugees (UNHCR 2016c) .................................... 41!
Figure 10: Number of refugees per 1,000 inhabitants, end-2016 (UNHCR, 2017b, p.20) ...... 41!
Figure 11: Reasons mentioned by respondents for fleeing their home country ...................... 49!
Figure 12: Reasons Iraqis mention for fleeing their country ................................................... 49!
Figure 13: Reasons Syrians mention for fleeing their country ................................................ 50!
Figure 14: Human security aspects affected before flight ....................................................... 54!
Figure 15: Human security aspects affected before flight (Iraqis) .......................................... 54!
Figure 16: Human security aspects affected before flight (Syrians) ........................................ 55!
Figure 17: Aspects of life in Jordan affected by insecurities, as expressed by respondents .... 57!
Figure 18 : Aspects of life in Jordan affected by insecurities, as expressed by Iraqis ............. 57!
Figure 19: Aspects of life in Jordan affected by insecurities, as expressed by Syrians ........... 58!
Figure 20: Human security in exile .......................................................................................... 66!
Figure 21: Human security in exile (Iraqis) ............................................................................. 66!
Figure 22: Human security in exile (Syrians) .......................................................................... 67!
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List of tables
Table 1: Restrictive vs. flexible understandings of security .................................................... 34!
Table 2: Respondents' city of origin and level of education .................................................... 42!
Table 3: Year of respondents' arrival to Jordan ....................................................................... 42!
Table 4: Cities where interviews were conducted ................................................................... 44!
Table 5: Respondents’ answers to the question ‘What made you leave your country?’ ......... 48!
Table 6: Aspects of human security affected before flight ...................................................... 53!
Table 7: Respondents' answers to the question 'What do you struggle with in Jordan?' ......... 56!
Table 8: Human security in exile ............................................................................................. 65!
Table of images
Image 1: Artistic depiction of the war-torn countries Syria and Iraq (Signed by ‘Marqi’; this
picture was circulating on social media in 2014 (Shahedon, 2016)) ............................... 13!
Image 2: Map of Jordan indicating locations of Amman and Mafraq ..................................... 44!
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List of acronyms
1994 HDR
Human Development Report 1994
3RP
Regional Refugee & Resilience Plan
ASC
Asylum Seeker Certificate
HS
Human Security
HSRG
Human Security Research Group
ILO
International Labour Organization
JD(s)
Jordanian Dinar(s), equals 1.36 CHF (Swiss
Francs) and 1.41 USD (US Dollars)
NGO(s)
Non-governmental organisation(s)
NRC
Norwegian Refugee Council
RQDA
R package for Qualitative Data Analysis
UN
United Nations
UNDP
United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR
United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees
UNTFHS
United Nations Trust Fund for Human Se-
curity
WFP
World Food Program
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‘Refugees are doubly insecure:
they flee because they are afraid;
and in fleeing, they start a precarious existence.’
(Sadako Ogata, former UN High Commissioner for Refugees (1991-2000), 1999)
‘We are not going back.
Because the most important thing is safety.
In a place with no safety, a human being cannot live.’
(Hayat, from Syria, living in Mafraq, Jordan)
‘It’s about more than just eating and drinking.
We are, in the end, human elements, not animals.
We need more than that. We have goals, dreams in life.’
(Burhan, from Iraq, living in Amman, Jordan)
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1. Introduction
1.1 Context
Dangerous places
On March 20, 2003, American and British troops invaded Iraq with the objective of toppling
Saddam Hussein. A short conventional war between allied and Iraqi troops ended in April
2003, but quickly morphed into a conflict between armed forces and insurgents and later into
a full-blown sectarian civil war (Encyclopaedia Britannica Online, 2017). The number of
casualties1 was estimated at more than 7,000 during the initial phase of the invasion (March-
April 2003); over 50,000 during the post-invasion period until July 2006; and almost 90,000
in the civil war between July 2006 and May 2014. In June 2014, so-called Islamic State mili-
tants entered and captured the northern city of Mosul. Since then, the fighting has led to an-
other 60,000 civilian deaths. On 9 July 2017, Iraqi Prime Minister Haider Al-Abadi declared
victory of the Iraqi armed forces over the ‘Islamic State’ (Reuters, 2017).
Throughout these different phases of fighting (invasion, insurgency, civil war) Iraq has be-
come a ‘dangerous place’ (Green & Ward, 2004, p.610), pushing masses of Iraqis out of their
country, many into neighbouring Jordan (Sirkeci, 2005). In 2007, their number in Jordan was
estimated to be between 400,000 and 500,000 (Fafo, 2007). Latest numbers provided by
UNHCR on 30 June 2017 indicate that 63,417 Iraqis are registered with UNHCR in Jordan2
(UNHCR, 2017a).
In 2011, the so-called Arab Spring provoked unrest in several Arab countries. In Syria, the
protests were quickly met with violent state suppression (Al Jazeera, 2016). Since then, vari-
ous states and local and foreign insurgent groups have entered the civil war. The fighting has
cost more than 250,000 civilian lives, produced more than 4.5 million refugees and led to the
internal displacement of more than 6.5 million Syrians (BBC, 2016). As of 30 June 2017,
660,836 Syrians are registered with UNHCR in Jordan3 (UNHCR, 2017a).
1 Based on numbers provided by Iraq Body Count (2017).
2 Since not all refugees register with UNHCR, this number underestimates the actual number of refugees in Jor-
dan.
3 idem
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Image 1: Artistic depiction of the war-torn countries Syria and Iraq (Signed by ‘Marqi’; this picture was circulating on so-
cial media in 2014 (Shahedon, 2016))
Jordan: a haven for Arab refugees
Jordan has been a haven for Arab refugees long before the millennial turn. Since the occupa-
tion of Palestine in 1948, migration flows and populations have shaped the country’s politics,
economy and society (Chatelard, 2010). Iraqi refugees, too, have sought refuge in Jordan be-
fore 2003, namely after the 1991 Gulf War, reaching a number of over 100,000 before 1996
(CARE, 2016). Jordan is not signatory to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Ref-
ugees, but has signed a Memorandum of Understanding4 with UNHCR in 1998, guaranteeing
the principle of non-refoulement (CARE, 2016; ILO, 2015b; Chatelard, 2010).
The presence of refugees is frequently framed as a burden by Jordanian officials in appeals
for international solidarity5. Jordan’s policies towards refugees cannot be said to foster inte-
gration. Rather, they tend to be based on the perception of refugees as ‘guests’ (Chatelard,
4 Copy of MoU available at http://carim-
south.eu/databases/legal/Jordan/Bilateral%20Agreements/LE2JOR002_AREN.pdf
5 See, for example, Queen Rania’s speech at the UN Summit for Refugees and Migrants in 2016 (available at:
https://www.queenrania.jo/en/media/speeches/queen-ranias-speech-un-summit-refugees-and-migrants-ny-usa)
or the contribution of Saleh Al-Kilani, Refugee Affairs Coordinator in the Jordanian Ministry of Interior, to the
FMR (2015) (http://www.fmreview.org/syria/alkilani.html)
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2011, p.19). One Jordanian Minister6 said in 2002, in anticipation of the Iraqi refugee influx,
that Jordan ‘simply can’t absorb them’ and that only those in transition to a third country
would be allowed into the country (Sassoon, 2009, p.34). For refugees in Jordan, obtaining
residence permits, let alone citizenship, is extremely difficult (Crisp et al., 2009). The ex-
tremely complicated process of securing a work permit has been dubbed the ‘work permit
maze’7 (JIF, 2016).
Some (Achilli, 2015; Turner, 2015) argue that Jordan has effectively adopted an ‘encamp-
ment policy’, a complex landscape of rules and legislations, which complicates leaving the
five official refugee camps legally. The ’14 July Legislation’, for instance, was the instruc-
tion of UNHCR by the Jordanian government, on 14 July 2014, that no Asylum Seeker Cer-
tificates (ASCs) would be issued to people leaving the camp without a proper ‘bailout’ pro-
cedure (Achilli, 2015). Without an ASC, a refugee has no formal legal status in Jordan and is
exposed to countless vulnerabilities ranging from non-eligibility for assistance by the UN,
labour exploitation, victimisation to deportation to the camp or back to Syria (Turner, 2015;
Chatelard, 2011).
1.2 Urban refugees
6 Mohammad Adwan, Jordan’s Minister of State for Political Affairs and Information stated that his govern-
ment ‘won’t allow huge floods of refugees. We simply can’t absorb them.’ (Human Rights Watch, 2003).
7 The ‘work permit maze’ is illustrated and described here:
https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/53371
Figure 1: Top 10 countries by number of refugees hosted in 2015 and 2016 (UNHCR, 2017b, p.15; UNHCR 2014b).
A. Ajil - ‘Security from below’
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This encampment policy can be understood as a way of managing and controlling refugees –
which is easier when they remain inside the camps (Jacobsen, 1996) – and discouraging them
from establishing themselves in urbanised areas (Achilli, 2015; Turner, 2015). Therein, Jor-
dan is not an exception: Encampment policies can be found in most countries hosting large
numbers of refugees (Crisp, 2003; Jacobsen, 1996). Still, most of the world’s refugees
(87.8%) in 2015 lived in private accommodation in the urban milieu (UNHCR, 2016b).
Moreover, there seems to be a trend of people avoiding or leaving the camps: in 2013, 34.4%
of refugees lived in camps; in 2015, this number decreased to 25.4% (UNHCR, 2016b). In
Jordan, Iraqi Refugees tend to live in urban centres8 (Sassoon, 2009), while that is the case
for 78.7% of Syrian refugees (UNHCR, 2017a). The four Jordanian cities Amman, Irbid,
Mafraq9 and Zarqa host together 70% of refugees living outside camps (Achilli, 2015; UN-
HCR, 2017a).
8 Our research has not yielded any information indicating that camps in Jordan host Iraqi refugees
9 Syrians make up almost 90% of Mafraq’s population (Anadolu Agency, 2015)
Figure 2: Distribution of Syrians and Iraqis registered with UNHCR in Jordan (UNHCR, 2017a)
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The motivations to move to the urban sphere, away from the support structures provided in
camps, vary widely. Refugees who have grown up and lived in the city tend to encounter dif-
ficulties adapting to a rural way of life and prefer the urban habitat, which they can navigate
more easily (Crisp, Morris & Refstie, 2012). Other factors include greater opportunities for
economic activity, the availability of services such as banks and hospitals, more autonomy
and freedom of movement (Kobia & Cranfield, 2009). Sassoon (2009) also argues that the
memory of overcrowded and mismanaged Palestinian refugee camps, ingrained in the collec-
tive Arab consciousness, continues to act as a deterrent for Arab refugees specifically.
In recent years, awareness of the presence of urban refugees has grown. The 2009 UNHCR
policy on refugee protection and solutions in urban areas emerged as a paradigm shift (Ref-
ugee Studies Centre, 2010, p.22): it formalised the desire of the international community to
devote more attention and resources to refugees outside camps. However, most existing liter-
ature on refugees still focuses on camps (Culbertson, Oliker, Baruch & Blum, 2016). Little is
known about refugees in urban areas.
1.3 A matter of security
Topics related to migration and refugees have been discussed in disciplines ranging from in-
ternational relations, political science, development studies, security studies, geography, over
health studies, economics, psychology, criminology, to sociology, anthropology and ethnolo-
gy. This wide range is testimony to the variety of perspectives that can be adopted when dis-
cussing phenomena related to refugee flows. There is, however, undeniably, a tendency to
frame refugee issues in terms of ‘security’: ‘refugees and asylum seekers are never far from
international and domestic security discussions’ (Edwards, 2009, p.774). Too often, the ques-
tion that academics, policymakers, media and people seem to ask, when ontologically juggl-
ing with notions of refugees, threats and security (Turner, 2015; Barmaki, 2009; Türk, 2003),
is
What security threats do refugees pose?
This formulation is problematic. Aas’ (2012) interrogation ‘Who is the ‘subject at risk’ and
who is the ‘risky subject’?’10 (p. 12) urges us to remain vigilant when faced with such formu-
10 ‘The dilemmas of weighing security and justice may look substantially different depending on the geopoliti-
cal position of the participants in the debate and the affected subjects.’ (Aas, 2012, p. 12)
A. Ajil - ‘Security from below’
17
lations. The above question, formulated this way, constructs refugees as ‘risky subjects’ and
someone or something else (e.g. domestic population, the receiving nation-state, international
security) as the referent and beneficiary of security. The consequence is an increasing ‘secu-
ritisation of migration’, which implies that transnational migrants are conceived as threats to
security and confronted with measures intended to protect national security (Bigo, 2002;
Mountz, 2011); measures that include the incrimination, detention and exclusion of refugees
and the violation of fundamental human rights (Turner, 2015; Aas, 2011; Barmaki, 2009;
Bosworth, 2008; Sirkeci, 2005).
This thesis would like to depart from this assumption and adopt a different perspective, by
reformulating the question into:
What threatens the security of refugees?
In so doing, this thesis, admittedly, enters the security discourse on refugees. It does so, how-
ever, from the opposite direction, namely by considering refugees as ‘subjects at risk’. Using
the concept of ‘human security’ and based on field research conducted between 2016 and
2017, this paper intends to gain a better understanding of how Iraqi and Syrian urban refu-
gees in Jordan themselves perceive and prioritise challenges to their security.
The analysis of their personal narratives ought to yield answers to the following two empiri-
cal questions:
1.a. What insecurities push Syrians and Iraqis to flee their countries?
1.b. What insecurities do Syrian and Iraqi refugees living in urban areas in Jordan
grapple with?
Based on the collected data and this empirical analysis, we shall address two conceptual
questions:
2.a. What do these insecurities look like when expressed through the HS framework
and how useful is HS as a framework of analysis?
2.b. What implications does this analysis have for understandings of (in)security
across international relations, security studies and criminology?
1.4 Security from below
‘If criminology aspires to an understanding of murder, rape, theft and the like that
is not limited to the richest and most peaceable regions of the modern world, it
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must understand them in relation to war and particularly civil war’ (Green &
Ward, 2009, p.609).
This thesis is intended to be part of an endeavour to draw the attention of criminologists to
regions and locations that tend to escape their gaze. As Green & Ward (2009) argue, a true
understanding of crime phenomena and security dynamics cannot limit its scope to developed
and peaceful societies.
This thesis is also a response to criminologists’ recent calls for the ‘inclusion of other voices’
(Aas, 2012) and for the analysis of ‘security from below’, i.e. designating the individual as
the main referent for discussions on security, by focusing on ‘everyday security’, i.e. the se-
curity practices and experiences of individuals, in different cultural and social contexts
(Crawford & Hutchison, 2016; Walklate & Mythen, 2016). It is within this triangulation of
refugees, human security and criminology that this paper aspires to contribute to the produc-
tion of knowledge11.
1. Empirically, by using the HS framework to qualitatively assess how the security of
Syrian and Iraqi urban refugees in Jordan is compromised (before flight and during
exile);
11 Each of the couples (‘HS-criminology’, ‘refugees-criminology’ and ‘refugees-HS’ (indicated by numbers on
the edges of the above triangle) is explored either empirically, conceptually or methodologically, as explained in
points 1-3.
2
3
1
Refugees
Criminology
Human Security
Figure 3: The triangulation of refugees, human security and criminology
A. Ajil - ‘Security from below’
19
2. Conceptually, by taking this understanding of ‘security from below’ to explore the
pertinence of human security as a concept and in relation to security studies and crim-
inology;
3. Methodologically, by adapting a qualitative research method to the urban refugee con-
text and exploring challenges related thereto.
1.5 Clarification of concepts
The concepts of ‘security’ and ‘human security’ will be clarified in the two following chap-
ters. At this point, we will therefore limit ourselves to defining the notion of ‘urban refugees’.
Urban refugees
The UN Refugee Convention 1951 (art. 1) defines as a ‘refugee’ whoever,
‘owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, na-
tionality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside
the country of his nationality, and is unable to, or owing to such fear, is unwilling
to avail himself of the protection of that country’.
It is important to note that the term ‘refugee’ remains vague, is frequently used to describe
people who do not neatly fit the criteria of this definition (asylum seekers, displaced persons
etc.) and has been amended several times by the UN itself (Barmaki, 2009).
We will consider as ‘urban refugees’ those refugees who establish themselves in the urban
area, defined as a ‘built-up area that accommodates large numbers of people living in close
proximity to each other, and where the majority of people sustain themselves by means of
formal and informal employment and the provision of goods and services’ (UNHCR, 2009, p.
2).
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2. Theoretical Framework: Human security explained
In this chapter, the foundation of the concept of human security, as defined by UN bodies and
human security scholars, is outlined. The debates surrounding the way the concept has been
received by academics and policymakers follow in the literature review.
2.1 Origin
From the 1990s onwards, Western countries started seeking a more active role in the resolu-
tion of conflicts worldwide (Christie, 2010). There seemed to be a broad consensus that the
liberal world order and the spread of liberal democratic governance were the right response to
ensure international security (Christie, 2010), but the international community was struggling
to find the right approach. As former UN High Commissioner for Refugees Mrs. Ogata sug-
gested in a speech in 1999:
‘It is not surprising that the world, disoriented and frustrated by the difficult task
to adapt to a new and yet unclear international system, often finds it easier to re-
sort to tools and concepts developed during the Cold War, with which it is more
familiar’ (UNHCR 1999, p.6)
In the era of ‘new wars’ (Kaldor, 2013), however, these traditional ‘Cold-War’ understand-
ings of security, focusing on the protection of nation-states against external threats, proved
insufficient as frames of analysis and guidance for policy (Edwards, 2009).
‘Human security’ emerged as a more contemporary approach to security, by shifting the fo-
cus from states to individuals. The 1994 UNDP Report on Human Development first coined
the concept. The report proposed a reconceptualisation of security as
a) safety from chronic threats such as hunger, disease and repression and
b) protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life – whether in
jobs, in homes or in communities (UNDP, 1994, p.23).
By transcending conventional distinctions between foreign and domestic issues (Gasper &
Gómez, 2015), it provided ‘a theoretical perspective and an operational framework for solv-
ing foreign policy problems in the post-Cold War era’ (Hudson, Kreidenweis & Carpenter,
2013, p.24).
A. Ajil - ‘Security from below’
21
2.2 Definitions
Three freedoms
The UN General Assembly’s resolution 66/290 (2012) on human security defines it in para-
graph 3(a) as:
‘The right of people to live in freedom and dignity, free from poverty and despair.
All individuals, in particular vulnerable people, are entitled to freedom from fear
and freedom from want, with an equal opportunity to enjoy all their rights and ful-
ly develop their human potential’
This definition – beyond highlighting the focus on individuals – mentions two types of free-
doms, namely ‘freedom from fear’ and ‘freedom from want’12, but Tadjbakhsh (2013) sug-
gests that, in its broadest form, HS actually pursues three freedoms:
• Freedom from fear (protection from threats to
physical safety)
• Freedom from want (conditions that allow for the
protection of basic needs, quality of life and human
welfare)
• Freedom from indignity (protection of fundamental
rights and possibility to make choices and take ad-
vantage of opportunities)
Characteristics
Mahbub El Haq, the special advisor of the 1994 report, ascribes four attributes to human se-
curity (UNDP, 1994, pp. 22-23):
• Human security is a universal concern (people everywhere in the world need human
security)
• The components of human security are interdependent (e.g. low income affects food
choices or water scarcity can lead to conflict)
• Human security is easier to ensure through early prevention than later intervention13
12 The 1994 UNDP report, which inspired this definition, partly reiterated what Franklin D. Roosevelt had al-
ready said on 6 January 1941, in his State of the Union Address. Roosevelt said that he envisioned a world built
on four freedoms: freedom of speech, of worship, freedom from fear and from want (Tadjbakhsh, 2013).
Figure 4: Three freedoms (GPPAC, 2016)
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22
• Human security is people-centred (individuals, rather than states, are the main refer-
ent of security debates and measures)
Human security is also policy-oriented and normative, meaning its engagement with security
is not amoral: The understanding of insecurities on the individual level should promote poli-
cies that improve the welfare of people (Newman, 2016; Tadjbakhsh, 2013).
2.3 Threats
Hence, human security considers a wide array of threats that menace different aspects of hu-
man life (HSRG, 2014), as illustrated below14:
13 ‘In the final analysis, human security is a child who did not die, a disease that did not spread, a job that was
not cut, an ethnic tension that did not explode in violence, a dissident who was not silenced’ (UNDP, 1994,
p.22).
14 Based on descriptions by UNDP (1994), summarised by Cao & Wyatt (2016)
Figure 5: The seven dimensions of human security (based on HSRG, 2014)
A. Ajil - ‘Security from below’
23
It must be noted, however, that the 1994 HDR does not present this list as an exclusive or ex-
haustive way of understanding human security. It concedes that the categories overlap (e.g.
food and economic insecurity) and that other categories may be included (Gasper & Gómez
2015).
Alkire (2003) suggests that the ‘objective of human security is to safeguard the vital core of
all human lives from critical pervasive threats, in a way that is consistent with long-term hu-
man fulfilment’ (p.2). He describes these threats as follows:
• Threats are ‘critical’, i.e. they ‘threaten to cut into the core activities and functions of
human lives’ (p.4) and ‘pervasive’, meaning they are large-scale and reoccurring in
one way or another.
• Threats can be ‘direct’ (e.g. genocide, targeted violence) or ‘indirect/structural’ (e.g.
underinvestment in education) (Alkire, 2003).
• Finally, threats can be ‘idiosyncratic’, i.e. affecting a specific person or household
(e.g. work accident), or ‘covariant’, i.e. affecting groups and communities (e.g. civil
war) (Alkire, 2003).
The HS framework seems appropriate for the study of Syrian and Iraqi urban refugees’ inse-
curities in Jordan, because of its broad and contemporary view on what security can and
ought to mean. Furthermore, the lack of empirical exploration of the concept, on the one
hand, and the heated discussions it provokes in security studies and criminology15, on the
other, warrant a thorough assessment of how pertinent the framework is when applied to a
real-life situation.
15 It suffices to glance over the November 2016 issue of the British Journal of Criminology to realise how topi-
cal the debate on human security is.
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24
3. Literature review
3.1 What is security?
Security for whom and from what?
Security has been called an ‘essentially contested concept’ (Smith, 2005; Buzan, 1984; Little,
1981), i.e. a concept for which no universal definition can be found (Gallie, 1955). It is there-
fore unsurprising to find various, contrasting views on what security means. Breaking the
question down into sub-questions such as ‘Whose security? Security as perceived by whom?
Security of which values? Against which threats? Secured by whom? To what extent? By
what instruments?’ (Gasper & Gómez, 2015, p.103) can prove helpful in organising discus-
sions on the meaning of security (Crawford & Hutchinson, 2016). For the purpose of this pa-
per, we shall focus on the questions ‘security for whom?’ and ‘security from what?’.
From the security of individuals to the security of the nation
There is no straightforward answer to the question ‘security for whom?’ (Baldwin 1997,
p.13). Rothschild (1995), in her historical exploration of security (‘What is security?’) traces
the term back to the Latin origin of ‘securitas’, which referred to a condition of individuals. It
meant the ‘absence of anxiety upon which the happy life depends [...] a feeling of being se-
cure’ (‘Sicherheitsgefühl’) (p.61). She found that it was the military period of the French
Revolution that subsumed the security of individuals under the security of the nation, through
the institution of the social contract. National security has since gained prominence and im-
portance in security theory and practice in the 20th century. It has, however, not gained equal-
ly in clarity: Wolfers (1952) argues that the concept has little meaning, beyond the fact that it
subordinates other interests to those of the nation. Baldwin (1997) and Buzan (1984) argue
that a concept of security that does not specify a referent object16 ‘makes little sense’ (Bald-
win, 1997, p. 13), but designating one is already a source of contention: is security meant to
protect individuals or nation-states (Türk, 2003)?
16 Referent objects being ‘things that are seen to be existentially threatened and that have a legitimate claim to
survival’ (Buzan, Weaver & de Wilde, 1998, p. 36)
A. Ajil - ‘Security from below’
25
Security, a ‘speech act’
A second point of contention arises when it comes to defining ‘security from what threats?’
(Baldwin 1997, p. 15). This is where the ‘essentially contested nature’ of the concept truly
comes to the fore: there are diverging views on what should be called a security threat. The
‘speech act’ (Wæver, 1995, p.55) of naming something a ‘security issue’ is also known as the
process of ‘securitisation’: ‘when an issue is presented as posing an existential threat to a des-
ignated referent object’ (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 21), it is attributed ‘urgency, priority and grav-
ity’ (Tadjbakhsh, 2013, p.46) and moved from the realm of normal politics to the realm of
‘extraordinary’ politics, justifying extraordinary resources and measures (Floyd, 2011;
Buzan, Wæver & Wilde, 1998, p.21). Hence, the act of ‘speaking security’ is likely to have
tangible ramifications in real life (Crawford & Hutchinson, 2016). The choice over which
objects are securitised is therefore crucial, and opposes two schools of thought: ‘traditional-
ists’, who understand security as freedom from objective military threats only, and ‘widen-
ers’, who see security as also encompassing economic, societal and environmental factors
(Šulović, 2010, p. 2).
Security and insecurity
The Oxford Dictionary defines security as (a) the state or condition of being or feeling secure
and (b) freedom from danger or threat; safety (Oxford English Dictionary, 2017)17. This defi-
nition provides both an objective and a subjective understanding of security, which has also
been highlighted by Tadjbakhsh (2013), to whom security is ‘as much an objective notion
that can be measured against quantitative indicators (i.e., crime, violence, employment, free-
doms etc.) as a subjective factor that requires qualitative assessment of how people ‘feel’ se-
cure’ (p.45). It is important to bear this distinction in mind for the following discussions on
the meaning of security.
The ‘subjective vs. objective’ distinction has also been maintained by scholars of ‘insecurity’.
Bauman (1999) suggests that the German term ‘Unsicherheit’ conflates three experiences that
have distinct names in English, namely uncertainty and insecurity (subjective) and unsafety
17 The Arabic counterparts are ‘ﻦﻣأ’ (amn) for security (things that are done to keep someone safe), often put in
relation with national, internal or external security, and ‘نﺎﻣأ’ (aman) for safety (a state of being safe from harm
or danger) (Cambridge Dictionary, 2017), also understood as رﻮﻌﺷ سﺎﺴﺣإو صﺎﺨﺷﻷا تﺎﻋﺎﻤﺠﻟاو ﺔﺣاﺮﻟﺎﺑ ﺔﻨﯿﻧﺄﻤﻄﻟاو (peo-
ple and communities’ feeling of comfort and tranquillity) (Saleh, 2016).
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26
(objective). He argues that the absence of any of the three ingredients of ‘Unsicherheit’ es-
sentially has the same effect, namely
‘the loss of trust in one’s own ability and other people’s intentions, growing inca-
pacitation, anxiety, cageyness, the tendency to fault-seeking and fault-finding, to
scapegoating and aggression’ (p.17).
Fighting ‘Unsicherheit’, however, is not equally concerned with all three elements: Bauman
argues that resources are disproportionately dedicated to one ingredient, namely ‘safety, the
only field in which something can be done and seen to be done’ (Bauman, 1999, p.5). Tack-
ling ‘unsafety’ by making people more ‘secure’ through enhanced ‘security measures’ can be
seen, measured and evaluated. Reducing ‘insecurity’ and ‘uncertainty’ of people, on the other
hand, has less political appeal, since its results are hard to evaluate, let alone demonstrate.
3.2 Criminology’s engagement with security
Let’s talk about security...
These preceding discussions around the notion of security have not escaped criminology.
Zedner (2007) argues that criminology is undergoing a reformation concerning its object of
study, in two respects: Temporally, criminologists have started shifting their attention from
the ‘post-crime’ to the ‘pre-crime’ period; regarding its ‘object’, criminology’s interest has
extended beyond the restrictive understanding of ‘crime’ to also encompass issues only re-
motely related to crime. Criminology is now less concerned with ‘reacting to, controlling or
prosecuting crime than addressing the conditions precedent to it’ (Zedner, 2007, p.265). This
shift is a sign of criminology’s growing preoccupation with ensuring security. The ‘growing
pervasiveness of ‘security talk’, the increasing articulation of ‘crime’ and ‘security’ and the
shifting priorities of [...] policymakers and research-funding bodies’ (Crawford &
Hutchinson, 2016, p.1056) can hardly be understated.
...but just how much?
Within criminology, there are arguably two perspectives that dominate discussions revolving
around the ‘fear of crime’ and the ‘feeling of insecurity’ (De Donder et al., 2009). Adherents
of the ‘rationalist perspective’18 defend that feelings of insecurity are mainly the result of
vulnerability, i.e. (objective or subjective) exposure to criminal victimisation (insecurity be-
18 E.g. Killias (1990)
A. Ajil - ‘Security from below’
27
ing ‘unsafety’ in Bauman’s words). To them, it is via the situational prevention of crime (e.g.
better street lightning) that such feelings can be reduced. Advocates of what may be called
the ‘symbolic perspective’, in contrast, argue that ‘fear of crime’ is only part of a general
feeling of malaise, that may well result from vulnerabilities as understood by ‘rationalists’
(Killias, 1990), but more often from difficulties such as ‘illness, financial insecurity, general
urban unease, social exclusion, etc.’ (De Donder et al., 2009, p.5).
This debate about ‘feelings of insecurity’, what they mean and how they should be addressed,
raises a more general question concerning the very object of criminology: Just how much can
we talk about security before, as Valverde (2013) argues, we ‘leave criminology altogether’
(p.1)? Should criminology continue to focus on crime and crime only, lest it loses pertinence
as a discipline, or should the focus of the discipline be ‘widened’, as Zedner (2007) proposes?
Shearing (2015) advocates for challenging ‘criminology’s established boundaries [to] ad-
vance understandings of the governance of security’ (p.264)19 in order to live up to the de-
mands of contemporary security challenges. One concept, which has recently attracted crimi-
nologists’ attention, epitomises Shearing’s call for broadening the criminological scope: hu-
man security.
3.3 Broadening and deepening the security discourse: Human Security
Essentially, Baldwin’s (1997) questions ‘security for whom?’ and ‘security from what?’ are
answered by HS as illustrated below:
19 Cao & Wyatt (2016) recently responded to Shearing’s call by proposing an analysis of Green Criminology.
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28
Figure 6: Human security in perspective20
Essentially, human security is concerned with both military and non-military threats to socie-
ties, groups and individuals (Paris, 2001). Conceived as such, human security ‘is consistent
with the broadening and deepening of security discourse’21 (Wibben, 2008, p. 458), in the
sense proposed by ‘wideners’ in security studies (Gasper & Gómez 2015; Šulović, 2010).
The deepening is performed by shifting the referent object (‘security for whom?’) from states
to individuals, somewhat reverting the historical evolution (see Rothschild, 199522). The se-
curity discourse is broadened by acknowledging that threats to security (‘security from
what?’) may emanate from non-military sources, such as economic or environmental ones
(Paris, 2001; Tadjbakhsh, 2013).
How much attention each aspect of HS should receive is a question that divides human secu-
rity scholars into those who advocate for a ‘narrow’ approach (e.g. HSRG, 2014; Muggah &
Krause, 2006), i.e. one that focuses on threats to personal security (e.g. crime, targeted vio-
lence), and those who promote a ‘broad’ view of human security (e.g. Tadjbakhsh, 2013;
Kaldor, Martin & Selchow, 2007), i.e. the recognition that threats compromising the security
of individuals may stem from multiple and diverse sources (e.g. economic, social, health,
etc.) (Owen, 2004).
20 Adapted from Alkire (2003, p.17) who based this illustration on Paris (2001, p.98).
21 The arrows in the image have been added to illustrate the deepening (vertical arrow) and the broadening (hor-
izontal arrow)
22 see 3.1
A. Ajil - ‘Security from below’
29
Critique of human security
HS has been criticised for its vagueness, fuzziness and analytical weakness (Chandler, 2008;
Paris, 2001) and for not living up to its critical aspiration of challenging the way security is
thought and acted upon (Turner et al., 2010). Two points of criticism are frequently put for-
ward: HS’s hazardous securitisation of everyday life, a critical view on the lexis of HS, i.e.
what is said and written about the security doctrine (Kaldor et al., 2007); and HS being insti-
tutionalised and co-opted into neo-liberal foreign policy, which is a criticism concerned with
the praxis of HS, i.e. what HS means in terms of policy and action (Kaldor et al., 2007).
Chandler (2011) accuses HS of creating new enemies: ‘In the absence of traditional enemies,
human security approaches fill the gap with the securitization [sic] of every issue from health,
to the economy, to the environment.’ (p.124). Aspects of everyday life, usually perceived in
terms of ‘human development’, are labelled ‘security issues’ and thereby elevated to the rank
of extraordinary politics. Making development issues security issues can be hazardous: Pu-
pavac (2005) claims that ‘the broadening of security denotes expansion of security measures
and contraction of the development agenda’ (p.163) and Duffield (2010) warns that, in an era
where underdevelopment comes to be seen as a security issue, the ‘development-security
nexus’ mainly serves the containment and control of the global poor.
Others even argue that HS has been abused as an instrument of neo-liberal foreign policy.
Turner et al. (2010) claim that the concept has been ‘institutionalised and co-opted to work in
the interests of global capitalism, militarism and neoliberal governance’ (p. 83). Chandler
(2012) accuses it of joining the ranks of paradigms such as ‘responsibility to protect’ (R2P)
or ‘resilience’ in their promotion and justification of global interventionism.
These arguments are better understood in their historical context. With the end of the Cold
War, under-development and global poverty came to be seen as threatening international se-
curity; therefore, Western countries started seeking a more active role in the resolution of
conflicts worldwide (Christie, 2010; Pupavac, 2005; Duffield, 2010; Newman, 2016). Since
the 1990s, military interventions in the ‘global South’ (e.g. Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya) con-
ducted in the name of ‘liberation’, ‘freedom’ or ‘democratisation’ have cost tens of thousands
of human lives. If HS emerged as a way of justifying this interventionist agenda, which is
essentially what critics argue, it would defy its very raison d’être, namely the promotion of
the security of individuals.
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30
Defence of human security
Tadjbakhsh (2013), points out that critics fail to distinguish between the broad and the narrow
conception of human security. The latter does indeed focus on ‘hard security’ (‘Buzanian ex-
istential’) threats and is likely to elicit traditional institutional responses. But if justice is done
to the truly critical aspiration of HS, then not only the range of security threats is widened but
also the range of possible responses. Securitisation, according to the broad view of HS,
should ‘not automatically raise alarms to send in the troops’ (Tadjbakhsh, p.47). As Kaldor,
(2011) points out compellingly23, it ‘is very difficult to protect civilians from the air’ (p. 447).
In a similar vein, Newman (2016) suggests that securitisation itself should not be considered
the main issue. Rather, human security advocates should promote securitisation in a way that
‘prioritizes [sic] the ‘human good of security’ as a public good’ (Loader and Walker 2006, p.
166, quoted by Newman, 2016).
Newman further rejects the notion that human security is the ‘dominant framework of inter-
national regulation’, as Chandler (2008, p. 465) had suggested, on grounds that it simply has
not had that much of an impact. Human security endeavours can hardly be said to change the
political structure of the country or region they are operating in. Therefore, accusing human
security policymakers of engaging in a neo-liberal project in the developing world ‘does not
stand up to scrutiny’ (Newman, 2016, p.14). Also, although the HS framework, in its purest
form, is indeed a ‘critical’ idea, its development and implementation have rather taken place
within a ‘problem-solving’ perspective (Newman, 2016; Cox, 1981). Newman (2016) argues
that it is precisely its respect of existing policy actors and structures that have enabled human
security projects to positively impact on the lives of individuals. Activities funded by the
UNTFHS24 have ‘undoubtedly improved the lives of many communities’ (Newman, 2016,
p.9). To refuse to acknowledge the benefits derived from these efforts, which benefited from
the label of ‘human security’, would be ‘morally questionable’ (p.14), Newman suggests.
Vigilant optimism
Criminology has already begun critically examining the dangers of calling something ‘securi-
ty’ or ‘crime’ (Aas, 2011; Zedner, 2009; Bosworth, 2008; Loader, 2002) and exposing ‘the
manner in which the governance of security does not necessarily serve human security’
23 In her analysis of ‘Western’ interventions in Libya (2011) and Kosovo (1999)
24 United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security
A. Ajil - ‘Security from below’
31
(Newman, 2016, p. 425). It should therefore remain attentive to both the lexis and praxis of
HS.
Dismissing human security altogether, however, seems precipitate, especially since it is argu-
ably more apt to respond to contemporary security challenges than traditional national securi-
ty (Alkire, 2003): today’s security is ‘on the move’ (Crawford, 2014), with borders – an es-
sential component of the nation-state’s sovereignty (Torpey, 2005) – getting ever more po-
rous, the growing influence of non-state actors, the gradual erosion of the monopoly of the
state and the blurring of distinctions between war, conflict and crime, rebels and criminals,
army and police, the public and the private, and the global and the local (Kaldor, 2013; Craw-
ford & Hutchinson, 2016; Walklate & Mythen, 2016). Human security may well be the ‘cos-
mopolitan political response’ envisaged by Kaldor (2013, p.14) for the development of new
norms of conceiving the global governance of security.
3.4 Coupling refugees, human security and criminology
Refugees and the related migrations flows are a typical expression of the contemporary secu-
rity environment: they are usually the consequence of civil conflicts and proof of states’ fail-
ure to provide security to their people; they are transnational in nature, challenging states’
sovereignty and their borders; they have local as well as global impacts and they are con-
fronted by actors from all levels of governance: the national, international, the local, the pub-
lic and the private. Kaldor (2013) even suggests that ‘forcible [sic] displacement is a central
methodology of new wars’ (p. 10): modern conflicts have lower death rates, but produce
more displacement, which may be due to new communications’ ability to spread fear and
panic.
25 referring to Johnston and Shearing (2003)
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32
The situation of refugees, their securities and insecurities, lend themselves to an analysis
through the framework of human security: the referent object is clearly the individual and not
the state; the panoply of threats that refugees face before, during and after their flight encom-
pass not only direct attacks and prosecutions but also challenges related to financial, econom-
ic, social, health and environmental factors (Cheikh Diop, 2016; Barmaki, 2009; Türk, 2003).
These elements notwithstanding, meagre efforts have been put forth to use the HS framework
in relation to refugees. Examples include Berti’s (2015) analysis of the impact of the Syrian
refugee crisis on host communities in Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey and Sirkeci’s (2005) con-
ceptual essay on the nexus between human security and migration.
As mentioned earlier, criminology has already started engaging with HS. It has been argued
that criminology can benefit from and contribute to the concept, through its individual-based
approach, its methods and its record of critically engaging with questions of security (New-
man, 2016; Zedner, 2009). Also, HS is committed to understanding and tackling the root
causes of insecurity to inform prevention-oriented policies. Criminology has long realised the
need to focus on promoting social justice and inclusive policies and preventing delinquency
and victimisation, rather than dealing with their consequences (Newman, 2016; Zedner,
2007).
Criminology’s engagement with issues related to refugees and migration flows is not new
either. Criminologists have explored the relationship between immigration and crime (e.g.
Stowell & Martinez (2007); Reid, Weiss, Adelman & Jaret (2005)) and the increasing crimi-
A. Ajil - ‘Security from below’
33
nalisation of migration (Van der Woude & Van Berlo, 2015; Aas, 2011; Bosworth, 2008;
Melossi, 2003). Research groups at universities are taking on these subjects specifically26.
As mentioned in the introduction and as illustrated below, it is this coupling of refugees,
criminology and human security that lays the groundwork for this paper and our interroga-
tions concerning the meaning of security.
Who should we ask?
This literature review hardly brings us any closer to a consensual definition of what security
means. If anything, it reinforces the argument that security is ‘essentially contested’, by
bringing to the fore, we argue, a reoccurring cross-disciplinary dichotomy between scholars
who advocate for a restrictive understanding of security and those who promote a flexible
view on security matters. To ‘restrictive’ scholars, notions such as ‘crime’ and ‘security’
should only be used for phenomena that directly threaten the physical integrity of human be-
ings. ‘Flexible’ scholars acknowledge a wider range of phenomena as ‘crime’ and ‘security’,
including actions and conditions that affect the well-being of human beings in the broadest
sense possible.
Object
Opposed understandings
Interpretation
Restrictive
Flexible
26 e.g. ‘Border Criminologies’ at the University of Oxford
Refugees
Criminology
Human Security
e.g. Aas (2011),
Bosworth (2008)
e.g. Zedner (2009), Craw-
ford & Hu tchinson (2016)
e.g. Berti (2015),
Sirkeci (2015)
Figure 7: Coupling refugees, human security and criminology, based on the literature review
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34
Insecurity, Bauman (1999)
Unsafety
Uncertainty, insecurity
Security studies (Šulović,
2010)
Traditionalists
Wideners
Human Security
(Tadjbakhsh, 2013)
Narrow approach
Broad approach
Criminology (De Donder et
al., 2009)
‘Rationalist’ perspective
‘Symbolic’ perspective
Security as a state
(Tadjbakhsh, 2013)
Objective
Subjective
Table 1: Restrictive vs. flexible understandings of security
Whom, then, does one have to ask in order to understand what security means? Academics,
Policymakers and Politicians? Or the people directly affected? Even though all these actors
are relevant, we argue that the views of the latter are understudied and need to be given par-
ticular attention. Thereby, we are joining a range of security scholars and criminologists with
aspirations to ‘drill down to the lived experience of (in)security’ (Walklate & Mythen, 2016,
p.1111) and who have argued that ‘any idea of security that disregards ordinary people is
conceptually, empirically and ethically inadequate’ (Newman, 2010, p. 80) and that ‘security
needs to be defined as a subjective experience at the micro level to gain meaning’
(Tadjbakhsh, 2013, p. 44).
In fact, criminologists have recently called for the ‘inclusion of other voices’ with the aim of
understanding ‘security from below’ by shifting ‘the analysis of security away from states
and public institutions, towards individuals and communities’ (Crawford & Hutchinson,
2016, p. 1064). Crawford & Hutchinson (2016) argue that criminology’s engagement with
security should be enriched by a focus on ‘everyday security’, i.e. individual security practic-
es and experiences, in order to transcend disciplinary boundaries and ‘engage with the wide
variety of inequalities, injustices, and harms that inform contemporary insecurities and the
experiences of people in diverse cultural and social settings around the globe’ (p. 1064).
Aas (2012) points out compellingly that criminology has evolved within a specific geogra-
phy: knowledge is produced by scholars and researchers located in European and Anglo-
American countries. She invites us to imagine what our understanding of crime, security and
insecurity would look like if perspectives outside these parts of the world were given equal
opportunities to influence criminology. In the same vein, criminologists have encouraged a
broadening of criminology’s scope beyond the peaceful regions in which most research has
A. Ajil - ‘Security from below’
35
been undertaken (Green & Ward, 2004; Aas, 2012). This paper’s concern with how Syrian
and Iraqi urban refugees perceive challenges to their own security should be seen as a step in
this direction.
3.5 Why do people flee?
A complicated human movement
According to the theory of ‘forced migration’ (Barmaki, 2009), people are forced to migrate
because of
(1) globalization and the resulting global inequality, job scarcity and economic inse-
curity;
(2) war, genocide, political persecution;
(3) crime and exploitation (sex industry, cheap/forced labour, trafficking, etc.); and
(4) development projects (dams, airports, luxury housing, etc.)’ (p.254).
The UN definition27 only covers the second point. ‘Forced migrants’ therefore seem to in-
clude ‘refugees’, but also encompass economic and environmental migrants28. Sirkeci (2005)
argues that a broad definition is more apt to do justice to the complexity of international mi-
gration, which, to him, is
‘better understood as a complicated human movement, involving different types of
migrants, such as refugees, asylum seekers, family migrants, illegal migrants, mi-
grant workers, and professionals. In most cases it is impossible to distinguish eco-
nomic, political, or cultural reasons from each other, and [...] people often move
with mixed, and overlapping, motivations’ (p.200) [emphasis added]
Sirkeci (2005) further proposes an understanding of migration flows called ‘opportunity
frameworks’. According to this framework, people often harbour intentions of leaving their
country before the eruption of a conflict. The conflict then serves as a justification for them to
flee. Another question is whether people flee because of direct victimisation or because of the
general environment of insecurity. Westermeyer & Williams (1998), based on interviews
with 286 refugees, found that the majority (72.4%) had not experienced direct victimisation
when they fled their country.
27 see 1.5
28 UNHCR, however, clearly distinguishes between the terms ‘forced migrants’ and ‘refugees’. They argue that
the former is a term used in social sciences and the latter a legal concept, protected by international law (UN-
HCR 2016a).
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36
It is not surprising to find various explanations of why people flee. The push-factors are like-
ly to be interconnected and sometimes perhaps only remotely linked to the actual conflict sit-
uation. It is important to keep this complexity in mind when discussing refugees’ experienc-
es.
A ‘relatively’ safe haven
People who flee a conflict situation are often confronted with new threats to their security
upon arrival in a host country, such as labour and sexual exploitation and different forms of
criminality (Türk, 2003). As Mrs. Sadako Ogata (UNHCR 1999) pointed out cogently:
‘Refugees are doubly insecure: they flee because they are afraid; and in fleeing
they start a precarious existence.’ (p. 4)
The security that refugees find in exile has therefore been described as ‘relative’: Even
though they are objectively protected from the repercussions of the conflict, they tend to find
themselves in a less favourable position than people in the host community, often struggling
with socio-economic deprivation (Sirkeci, 2007). This precariousness is often particularly
marked in the case of urban refugees. The failure of host countries to protect refugees also
contributes to ‘secondary onward movement’ (Türk, 2003, p.115).
3.6 Insecurities of urban refugees
In 2012, UNHCR conducted a survey to evaluate the implementation of the 2009 UNHCR
policy in 24 countries with an urban refugee population of at least 5’00029. The report’s find-
ings indicate promising developments in the protection of urban refugees by the local UN-
HCR offices (Morand et al., 2012). However, they also identify gaps such as refugees’ diffi-
culties to obtain documentation or legalise their status due to inaccessibility of the relevant
offices, lacking awareness of their rights and livelihood opportunities, and insufficient self-
reliance (Morand et al., 2012). These and other difficulties can also be identified in the case
of urban refugees in Jordan.
Syrian and Iraqi urban refugees in Jordan
Humanitarian organisations such as UNHCR, CARE International and the Norwegian Refu-
gee Council (NRC) conduct research in Jordan to evaluate the most pressing needs of urban
29 Jordan fits that criterion. It is also among the six most urbanised countries worldwide (with more than 70% of
the population living in urban areas) (Morand et al., 2012).
A. Ajil - ‘Security from below’
37
refugees and whether the aid received helps meet those needs or not. Their research is based
on so-called ‘household surveys’: teams of local volunteers are dispatched into areas densely
populated by urban refugees, where they take residents through a structured questionnaire
(CARE, 2016; UNHCR, 2013)30. The results are evaluated both qualitatively and quantita-
tively. The reports are usually descriptive and followed by policy recommendations, but they
do not refer to the human security framework per se.
Main findings
Reports tend to focus on aspects such as food, tensions with the host community, shelter,
health and livelihood opportunities. These aspects are often identified as the most pressing
needs of urban refugees. Unfortunately, most recent reports focus on Syrian households and
disregard the plight of Iraqi urban refugees. Consequently, there is a dearth of literature on
Iraqi refugees since 2011, which explains the bias of the following section towards Syrian
urban refugees.
Shelter
The primary needs identified across the urban refugee community are related to shelter, with
73% of households identifying shelter needs (CARE, 2014). They mainly lament the high and
increasing rental prices. Reports on household spending vary from 91 JD31 to 166 JD per
month, depending on whether they live in the capital or in one of the more peripheral cities
(UNHCR, 2013). All reports identify cash for rent as one of the primary needs. Moreover,
shelter-related needs such as furniture, equipment and heating are prevailing. In fact, 18% of
households report not having any heating at all (CARE, 2014). Overcrowding is also a seri-
ous concern, with 3.4 persons living in one room on average (NRC, 2015) and 51% of fami-
lies sharing accommodation with other families (UNHCR, 2013).
One in five renting families has no rental contract, and is thus exposed to exploitation and
eviction by landlords (UNHCR, 2014a). 10% of Syrian refugees are assessed as being under
‘immediate threat of eviction’ (NRC, 2015, p. 13), because they are informally housing with
another family, because the landlord wants to raise the rent or because they are behind on
rental payment. About 40% of households moved at least three times in the year preceding
30 Certain methodological challenges arise with this research method (e.g. neutrality of the researcher, biased
research sample, etc.). A discussion of these will be omitted for brevity purposes. The reader of the following
main findings should, however, bear in mind that they are influenced by several methodological flaws.
31 1 Jordanian Dinar (JD) equals 1.36 Swiss Franc (CHF) and 1.41 US Dollar (USD)
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38
the survey conducted by NRC (2015). These frequent disruptions impact negatively upon
families’ mental health and feelings of security (NRC, 2015).
Livelihood: Work & Assistance
Most of Iraqis and Syrians who arrive in Jordan do so on their savings (Culbertson et al.,
2016). Since many of them struggle to find a sustainable source of income and because Jor-
dan is relatively expensive compared to their home country, these savings deplete rapidly,
which increases their debt levels (CARE, 2014; Culbertson et al., 2016). Sources of income
are humanitarian assistance (51.5%), earnings, mostly from informal work (13.2%) and re-
mittances (8.1%) (Morand et al., 2013). Culbertson et al. (2016) also found that many Syrian
refugees perceive aid distribution as biased and unjust. For Iraqis, assistance has been drasti-
cally reduced over recent years (IRIN, 2013).
Around 60% of refugee households in host communities receive earnings from informal
work, while two thirds of them declare earning less than 200 JD per month (NRC, 2015). A
legal work permit is expensive32 and difficult to obtain33, which leads many to engage in ille-
gal work (Culbertson et al., 2016; ILO, 2015: NRC, 2015; CARE, 2014). Certain professions
(e.g. medical, driving, telephone service) are closed to Non-Jordanians altogether (ILO
2015). UNHCR (2014) reports that in only 1% of interviewed households someone has a
work permit (p.28).
Affected refugees are unable to pay the transportation costs to offices of humanitarian organi-
sations, which prevents them from requesting support and engaging in social activities and
further entrenches their invisibility and isolation (CARE, 2014). The struggle to ensure their
livelihood incentivises adopting negative coping mechanisms, such as selling personal items
or food vouchers, child labour, engaging in sexual exploitation and marrying out their girls at
a young age (UNHCR, 2013; CARE, 2014).
Food
Food is not reported as one of the most pressing needs (UNHCR, 2013; CARE, 2014). Most
households spend between 50 and 150 JD per month on food (CARE, 2014). For 89% of the
families (CARE, 2014), most of this amount can be covered through food vouchers, which
32 Work permit fees range from 170 to 700 JD (ILO, 2015a). Iraqis have to prove residency, i.e. either deposit
25,000 JD at a local bank, marry a Jordanian citizen or get a special sponsorship by the employer (IRIN, 2013).
33 Refugees apply for a permit through their employers, who need to prove that the position cannot be filled by a
Jordanian worker (ILO, 2015a)
A. Ajil - ‘Security from below’
39
are distributed by UNHCR, WFP34, Caritas or other NGOs35. It is problematic that most
vouchers are reserved for Syrian refugees, while Jordanian households do not have access to
them. Unsurprisingly, more Jordanian households (20%) than Syrian households (7%) report
food as a primary need (CARE, 2014, p.24). This adds to frustrations of the host community
with the arrival of refugees from Syria (Culbertson et al., 2016).
Tensions with host community
The increased competition over employment opportunities, mostly in the informal sector,
housing and access to social support has engendered negative sentiments towards refugees
(Achilli, 2015; CARE, 2014). Evidence suggests that the refugee instream into the Jordanian
informal labour market has pushed down the wage for daily labour, since refugees tend to
accept less favourable working conditions than Jordanians (CARE, 2014; Culbertson et al.,
2016).
Health
73% of households report at least one person with a mild medical condition (UNHCR, 2013).
Unfortunately, serious illnesses often remain unattended because their treatment is simply too
costly and not covered by the public health care plan that is free to registered refugees (UN-
HCR, 2013; CARE, 2014). These would need to be treated by private health care, which only
a minority of refugees (8%) can afford (UNHCR, 2013). On average, households report
spending 59 JD per month on health-related expenses (CARE, 2014).
34 The World Food Program (WFP) food voucher program stepped up in August 2012 and provides 24 JD per
person to a reported 98% of all refugees outside the camp (UNHCR, 2013). However, since October 2014, WFP
has had to cut their support to host communities twice (NRC, 2015).
35 e.g. www.collateralrepairproject.org
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40
4. Methodology
4.1 Choice of research sample
The choice of focusing on Iraqi and Syrian urban refugees in Jordan can be justified on dif-
ferent grounds.
• Syrians and Iraqis, because of the Syrian and Iraqi conflicts’ significant contribution
to the rise in displacement levels worldwide (UNHCR, 2017b) and the considerable
public interest in their human consequences. Iraqis and Syrians also share a common
Arab language and culture and while each conflict has its particularities in how it
causes displacement, the experience of Syrians and Iraqis in exile is likely to be com-
parable.
• Urban refugees, because they vastly outweigh camp refugees, but receive comparably
little attention by the media, humanitarian agencies and academics. Understanding of
their living conditions and insecurities is lacking, also due to their relative invisibility
in the urban context (Culbertson et al., 2016).
Figure 8: 'Forcibly displaced population and proportion of population forcibly displaced', end-2016 (UNHCR, 2017b, p.9)
A. Ajil - ‘Security from below’
41
Figure 9: Proportion of urban vs. in-camp refugees (UNHCR 2016c)
• Jordan, because Iraqis and Syrians seek refuge in neighbouring countries, preferably
Arab-speaking ones, such as Lebanon and Jordan (Sassoon, 2009). Also, Jordan has
been among the ten major refugee-hosting countries for years and ranks second in
terms of refugees per capita (UNHCR, 2017b, p.20).
Figure 10: Number of refugees per 1,000 inhabitants, end-2016 (UNHCR, 2017b, p.20)
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42
Our human resources have also influenced this choice. Being arabophone and relatively well-
acquainted with the Jordanian context, I disposed of the linguistic and cultural mobility to
achieve the desired conversational depth in interactions with the respondents.
4.2 Respondents’ characteristics
A total of 23 respondents were interviewed (20 male, 3 female36). On average, respondents
were 32 years old. 16 of them were married and had 3 children on average. 12 had left school
during or after primary school, 7 finished secondary school and 4 had a tertiary education de-
gree.
Table 2: Respondents' city of origin and level of education
Respondents arrived in Jordan between 2009 and 2016, most of them (19) between 2012 and
2014. 7 came from Iraq (6 from Baghdad, 1 from the southern city of Amara) and 16 from
Syria (8 from Aleppo, 3 from Homs, 2 from Damascus, 2 from Daraa and 1 from Al-
Salamiyah, northeast of Homs).
Table 3: Year of respondents' arrival to Jordan
People were contacted directly or through ‘gatekeepers’ (Saunders, 2006): 2 local and 3
Swiss humanitarian workers as well as one local dentist. In four cases, the gatekeepers were
present during the interview. The contact was established through phone calls, text
(WhatsApp) or social media (Facebook)37.
36 The initial objective was to interview men only, given that the interviewer is male and that creating mixed-
gender interview situations in the socio-cultural context of the Levant is usually a delicate endeavour. However,
gatekeepers sometimes offered to connect the interviewer to female respondents, which he gladly accepted. Al-
so, during many interviews with male respondents, female family members were around and made valuable
contributions. In those cases, they were, however, not counted as primary respondents.
37 The respondents were chosen through personal connections of the interviewer, who had previously spent time
working in Jordan.
A. Ajil - ‘Security from below’
43
4.3 Interviews
As McCracken (1998) elegantly suggested, interviews can ‘take us into the lifeworld of an
individual, to glimpse the categories and logic by which he or she sees the world’ (p.9). Giv-
en our aspiration of gathering subjective experiences and understandings of security, inter-
views seemed appropriate for the data collection.
Interviews were semi-structured (Luna Reyes & Anderson, 2003) and conducted by me per-
sonally38. I used a mind map39 to orient my questions, but adjusted them based on the re-
spondent’s narrative. Respondents were given space to speak freely, tell stories and anec-
dotes, which I considered crucial for the discovery of novel or counterintuitive aspects of
their situation40.
Each interview started with the observation and question: ‘You are in a country different from
your home country. What made you leave your home country?’. This kick-off question
prompted respondents to talk about the general and more specific circumstances that made
them leave their country. From there, the interview transitioned to their situation in Jordan.
For most interviews, it sufficed for me to listen and occasionally ask clarifying questions.
Interviews were conducted in vernacular Arabic, as opposed to literary or standard Arabic,
which is officially used in newspapers, on television and in formal contexts. This created a
familiar and informal space, which allowed respondents to answer in their mother tongue41.
Before the interviews in Jordan, one exploratory interview was conducted with an Iraqi refu-
gee in Istanbul42. It was used to test the mind map, the form of consent, the interview situa-
tion and to get a first impression of the type of narrative that would be provided.
A total of 17 interviews were conducted; 10 of them in July 2016 and 7 in April 2017. Eight
interviews were conducted in the capital Amman; One in Marka, a few kilometres outside
Amman; seven in the northern city of Mafraq; and one in Manshia, a village close to Mafraq.
38 Therefore, in this chapter, the first-person-narrative will be used.
39 See annex I
40 Also described by Luna Reyes & Anderson (2003)
41 The Syrians from a more rural background used expressions that were sometimes unknown to the interviewer.
Usually, they would become clear in context. Otherwise, he would ask for clarification or make a note in the
transcription.
42 Initially, interviews were planned in Turkey as well. It was later decided to focus on Jordan only. See annex
VIII.
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44
Most interviews (14) were conducted with one respondent only. Three interviews were con-
ducted with two, three and four people respectively43.
Image 2: Map of Jordan indicating locations of Amman and Mafraq44
Most of the interviews (13) were conducted at respondents’ homes45, 3 in public places (cof-
fee place, public park) and 1 at the respondent’s workplace. On average, interviews took one
hour and 19 minutes. The transcribed interviews comprise over 100’000 words.
Table 4: Cities where interviews were conducted
4.4 Transcription and translation
Interviews were recorded using Philips VoiceTracer, a small, rather inconspicuous device.
The transcription and translation into English were conducted by the interviewer, using Mi-
crosoft Word and QuickTime Player. Where an English translation was not possible, the Ara-
bic expression used was noted. The translation was not literal, but faithful, i.e. attempting to
‘produce the precise contextual meaning of the original within the constraints of grammatical
43 See full database in annex
44 Source: http://acc.teachmideast.org/maps/jordan.gif
45 Often, other family members, like children, were around during the interview.
A. Ajil - ‘Security from below’
45
structures’ (Ordudari, 2007). The main objective was the reproduction of narrators’ subjec-
tive views and feelings as expressed in their mother tongue.
4.5 Analysis
McCracken’s (1998) 5-step method of analysis for long interviews, as described by Piercy
(2015), is a common approach to make sense of large amounts of qualitative data and can
contribute to ensuring that the final product is ‘credible and confirmable’ (Guba & Lincoln,
1989, pp. 242-243). Although the following steps do not exactly reflect the 5-step method,
our analytical procedure was very similar in its essence.
• In a first step, each transcript was carefully read and coded (internal analysis) using
RQDA46. The codes were created in line with the research questions, the existing liter-
ature and the content of the respondents’ narrations47. Passages of text were attributed
to codes such as ‘work’, ‘housing’ or ‘authorities’. Several codes were attributed to
the same passage when deemed necessary.
• In a second step, the code outputs (e.g. ‘housing issues’) across all transcripts were
analysed (transversal analysis). This process allowed for the identification of patterns
and themes, i.e. ‘statement[s] of meaning that [run] through all or most of the perti-
nent data’ (Ely et al., 1991, p. 150).
• In a third step, we proceeded to some basic quantitative assemblage of the collected
data in order to gain a better overview of the vast amount of information. An excel
sheet was created that assembled the answers of all respondents to recurring questions
(e.g. ‘why have you left your home country?’), in line with recommendations formu-
lated by Basit (2003)48.
• In a fourth step, two matrices were created to analyse the answers provided by re-
spondents to the questions ‘What made you flee your country?’ and ‘What are you
struggling with in Jordan?’49. Two other matrices were built to code the information
according to the human security framework (one for the decision to flee and one for
the situation in exile. If the respondent mentioned difficulties or insecurities that fit
46 R package for Qualitative Data Analysis, http://rqda.r-forge.r-project.org. RQDA allows for the creation of
codes and code categories, to which segments of texts can be assigned.
47 See annex IV
48 see annex V.I
49 see annex V.II and V.III
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46
into one of the seven aspects of human security, a ‘1’ was inserted into the corre-
sponding cell, otherwise a ‘0’50. The result was an overview51 of which insecurities
and which aspects of human security were most often addressed across all inter-
views52. The Syrians and Iraqis were grouped separately in order to identify differ-
ences between their answers.
Most of the time, the aspect was easily identified53. For some information, however, the
choice was more ambiguous (e.g. ‘fearing presence of rebel groups’ could be seen as a threat
to personal, community or political security). We therefore adapted the definitions provided
by UNDP (1994) and developed by (Cao & Wyatt 2016, p. 422) to the context of this re-
search, based on the answers provided by the respondents. This guided and simplified our
coding.
Aspect of human security
Definition
Economic Security
No work, unstable income, little or no humanitarian aid, labour
exploitation
Food Security
No or little physical and economic access to food, worry about
sufficient food, trading food for rent, no or little access to food
coupons
Health Security
Difficulty of access to health care, medication, medical aid,
treatment
Environmental Security
No or little protection from weather, bad housing, access to
clean water, eviction from home, frequent displacement
Personal Security
Attacks on and threats to personal integrity, exposure to vio-
lence, fear for personal safety, unlawful detention
50 see annex V.IV and V.V
51 Tables and pie charts were used to visualise the results (see chapter 5)
52 see chapter 5
53 e.g. ‘difficulty of obtaining medical treatment’ means that health security is compromised
A. Ajil - ‘Security from below’
47
Community Security
Feeling targeted or discriminated for being part of a racial, eth-
nic, national, religious group or sect54
Political Security
Fragile legal status, lack of faith in state and rule of law, pres-
ence of militias, compromised human rights, inequality before
justice, fear of being recruited for military service
• In a fifth and final step, the three main themes for each situation (before flight and
during exile) were explicated and illustrated with quotes. The results are presented in
the next chapter.
54 The internal violence in Iraq has taken a sectarian dimension, opposing those who adhere to a Sunni interpre-
tation of Islam and those who consider themselves as Shia. Iraq is one of the few Shia-majority countries in the
world.
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48
5. Results
5.1 Reasons for fleeing
What made you flee your country?
There are, obviously, individual thought processes and motives behind respondents’ decision
to leave their home country. Across the narratives, however, certain motives (push-factors)
appear repeatedly and seem to capture the majority of the answers given to the question
‘What made you leave your home country?’, which was, as mentioned, the kick-off question
in all interviews. What follows is an overview of the number of times each factor was men-
tioned:
IRAQ
SYRIA
What made you leave your country?
Total
(N=2255)
7
15
Loss of faith in rule of law, state authority
22
7
15
Crime, gangs, kidnappings, robbery
19
6
13
Conflict situation: Bombings, fighting
15
0
15
Discrimination based on religion, ethnicity or else
14
7
7
Price inflation, loss of work, difficulty to get food
12
0
12
Personal attacks and threats
9
6
3
Avoiding military service
5
0
5
Need for medical treatment or surgery
2
0
2
Table 5: Respondents’ answers to the question ‘What made you leave your country?’
55 One respondent did not intend to flee Syria, but came to Jordan for administrative issues.
A. Ajil - ‘Security from below’
49
Figure 11: Reasons mentioned by respondents for fleeing their home country
Figure 12: Reasons Iraqis mention for fleeing their country
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50
Figure 13: Reasons Syrians mention for fleeing their country
Internal violence & criminality
The most frequently mentioned reasons for their flight were linked to the threat posed by dif-
ferent forms of internal violence and criminality. Respondents could often not distinguish be-
tween the activities of militias or those of criminals. An Iraqi mother describes a situation
where the family’s car was stopped and controlled by unknown armed men in a market in
Baghdad:
‘In a situation like that [random control by armed men in public places], if they
took down one of my kids for example, they could kill him in front of you. What
would be your position? Your blood goes for nothing, in a country where you
have spent all your life? Why should I give my blood and my son? To people who
don’t deserve it. After this situation, we got back home and I said, I won’t be stay-
ing in Iraq anymore. [...] I won’t stay in a country like this. If my country doesn’t
want me, I don’t want it!’ (Suhayla, Iraq)
Ragheed, a Syrian father of five, also mentions gang activities and criminality as a factor that
pushed him to leave his country:
‘Honestly, we were good there, living a beautiful life. But then, the gangs, and the
crimes etc. and the weapons, so I had to flee, mostly because of my children’
(Ragheed, Syria)
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51
For Adel, a young Iraqi man, the constant fear and the threats directed at his brother were the
tipping point which made them take the decision to leave Iraq in 2013:
‘Look, if I left the house, after two minutes, my mother would call me and ask
where I was. Anything could happen, bombings, kidnappings, a car stops and they
arrest you. [...] They threatened Bakr [his brother] ... the gangs. They threatened
him with killing him. Then we said, that’s it.’ (Adel, Iraq)
Finally, a Syrian woman, living in Mafraq with her family, describes a situation where a bus
that she and her parents were travelling on, was kidnapped by unknown armed men:
‘15 February 2012. Until now, I remember that situation. Just like that, suddenly
they came out of nowhere. And I knew that my country was safe. And suddenly,
they told us that they had burned some trains and that there were shots. [...] And I
didn’t see anything until suddenly guys appeared, armed and carrying weapons
[...] I was afraid that they would shoot my father and my mother in front of me. I
couldn’t imagine this happening in front of me. I died from fear. And they were
afraid for me as well. So, they kidnapped the bus, told us to lower our heads. It
was at night. [...] They took the guys out first. Whether they kidnapped them,
killed them, I don’t know [...] As soon as we got home, I told my parents that I
would not come back to Syria anymore.’ (Maryam, Syria)
Conflict and fighting
The conflict situation was the second most important push-factor. It is distinct from the inter-
nal violence and criminality in that it relates to the activities and consequences of the fighting
between the parties participating in the conflict (e.g. combat situations, bombings, etc.). The-
se activities usually don’t target civilians, but cause ‘collateral damage’, i.e. the injuring and
killing of people not participating in combat. The following quotes illustrate how living in a
war zone was the main cause for leaving the country:
‘Fear, because there were bombings and we wouldn’t know where they come
from. There were many bombings in the centre, where we were living. And once,
the ceiling fell down on us. So, I was afraid for the kids.’ (Hayat, Syria)
‘In the first bombing, 45 people died. The gas station was bombed as well. Maybe
50 people died in our village, which is not next to the gas station. Imagine how
many people died on the mountain and next to the gas station. The regime was like
crazy, [bombing] until noon, from six in the morning. The planes came and the
people started running. I went to the roof, with my brother. We were upset, but I
told him ‘laugh’. ‘Laugh!’. We went to the roof and looked down on the people
running. It was a saddening view.’ (Laith, Syria)
‘We were in Damascus, in safety. The revolution started in Daraa, but it was calm
in Damascus. For a year maybe. We had friends and family coming over, and then
all of a sudden, the bombing and fighting started. We got scared and everyone
tried to hide somewhere, some under the bed, others inside. And then we had to
leave – they got us a car and we left with it. We fled from our neighbourhood.’
(Layla, Syria)
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52
‘It was the bombing. The bombing. The fear. Everything. Nothing was left. Syria
was the mother of safety. We wouldn’t lock the main door. Night and day, it was
open. That was before. Now, there is horror and fear. Even, if you are neutral, an-
yone can come and fight you. There is no safety. The country was hit by bombing,
destruction, robbery, exploitation…all of the difficulties of the world in Syria!’
(Habeeb, Syria)
Loss of faith in rule of law
The third factor that was mentioned most often was a loss of faith in the rule of law and the
protection by the state. Respondents explained that they became increasingly suspicious of
uniformed men supposed to be representing the state.
‘I told you that there was a situation where I felt threatened to death. And I
thought to myself... I thought of my son, who was a year and a half. I would be-
come one of those numbers that would be forgotten. Someone who is lost and
people get up the next morning and eat breakfast. Another day passes. But I would
leave a whole family destroyed, without a breadwinner. [...] I was going to a place,
outside of Baghdad, in a military vehicle. [...] I mean, I rode with people who
were supposed to be imposing the rule of law on others. But then, four or five
people stopped us, armed, with long beards, and wearing military pants and asking
for our identity! You are asking for my identity? Who are you to do that? Natural-
ly, [...]…those were all militias! So, in that second, I remembered those videos
that they show on youtube. I asked myself who they were, sunna, shia, Daesh,
AQ? You don’t know who they are!56 (Burhan, Iraq)
‘If I could, I would go back tomorrow to Baghdad. But I can’t. If I go back, I will
be killed. Now the situation is very, very bad, you can’t imagine. The one at the
checkpoint himself, you don’t know if he is with the army or with the militias.
They are wearing the same things. [...] They stop you at the checkpoint, four men
checking your trunk. You don’t know!’ (Maher, Iraq)
Avoiding conscription was mentioned by several Syrians (5) as a reason for fleeing the coun-
try57. A Syrian man explains that he fled because he was given information that he had been
put on a list of men who had to serve in the army, which was distributed to checkpoints.
‘Someone told me. Of course, he was against the regime, but he had to cooperate
with them. He was from the same village. We were 24 men. He told us our names
were at the checkpoint. So, we had to flee. Because as soon as your name is pub-
lished, you can consider yourself killed. And whoever has children, tries to flee
with them to the end of the world. So that nothing happens to them. [...] The secu-
rity, and the regime and the militias that are with the regime. This is what made us
flee our country.’ (Usama, Syria)
56 This last sentence also reveals the difficulty of distinguishing between militias, criminals or government
troops (see p.50)
57 Although this factor is not immediately linked to the crumbling of the rule of law (it is also separate from it in
table 5), the quote shows how fear of being conscripted has to do with a loss of faith in the regime and the army.
A. Ajil - ‘Security from below’
53
5.2 Human security: before flight
Read through the lens of human security, the answers provided by the respondents58 indicate
that certain dimensions of HS were more affected than others, when they took the decision to
leave their home country. The following table is constructed by coding respondents’ answers
based on the definitions established in the methodology59.
IRAQ
SYRIA
Which aspect of Human Security was affected?
Total
(N=2260)
7
15
Political Security
22
7
15
Personal Security
22
7
15
Community Security
14
7
7
Economic Security
8
2
6
Food Security
8
0
8
Environmental Security
6
0
6
Health Security
2
0
2
Table 6: Aspects of human security affected before flight
All respondents who fled their home country did so because of a threat to their political secu-
rity, most notably a loss of faith in authorities and the state. Threats to or actual attacks on
people’s personal integrity and safety (i.e. death threats, bombings, criminality) – hence, dan-
gers to personal security – were also mentioned by almost all respondents as reasons for de-
parture. Community insecurity, most often the result of feeling targeted for being part of a
religious group (e.g. Christians in Iraq) or for living close to an area where there is outspoken
resistance against the government (e.g. Syrians living in the periphery of Aleppo), was the
third most affected aspect of human security.
58 see 5.1
59 see 4.5
60 see footnote 55
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Figure 14: Human security aspects affected before flight
Figure 15: Human security aspects affected before flight (Iraqis)
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Figure 16: Human security aspects affected before flight (Syrians)
5.3 Difficulties in Jordan
What do you struggle with in Jordan?
Respondents answer to the question ‘What do you struggle with in Jordan?’ are summarised
in the table below.
IRAQ
SYRIA
N=23
7
16
What do you struggle with in Jordan?
Livelihood (Either Work / Humanitarian assistance affected)
23
7
16
Humanitarian assistance (insufficient or inexistent, corruption and
injustice)
22
7
15
Housing (rent issues, (threat of) eviction, breach of contract, frequent
displacement, insufficient protection, overcrowding, neighbours)
21
6
15
Work (No right to work, possibilities of work, low salary)
19
5
14
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Health (need for/lack of access to medication, treatment, doctors,
had unsuccessful surgery/treatment)
15
4
11
Discrimination (verbal harassment, exclusion, rejection, unequal
treatment, hostilities)
14
2
12
Food (insufficient choice, trading food coupons for cash)
14
1
13
Authorities (lack of faith in justice system or authorities, hesitation
to report incidents to police, fear of imprisonment, deportation)
12
1
11
Legal status (no authorisation, no residency, overstayed visa, fled
camp illegally, no work contract, no registration with humanitarian
organisation)
11
5
6
Exploitation (at work (e.g. non-payment of salary), unfair treatment,
exploitation of ignorance or weakness)
8
2
6
Environment (access to clean water, protection from extreme condi-
tions)
4
1
3
Victimisation (faced violent attack or threats, been detained unlaw-
fully)
3
0
3
Table 7: Respondents' answers to the question 'What do you struggle with in Jordan?'
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Figure 17: Aspects of life in Jordan affected by insecurities, as expressed by respondents
Figure 18 : Aspects of life in Jordan affected by insecurities, as expressed by Iraqis
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Figure 19: Aspects of life in Jordan affected by insecurities, as expressed by Syrians
Livelihood
The answers provided indicate that ensuring their livelihood is a concern for all respondents.
The livelihood indicator in the table above includes mention of difficulties to either work or
humanitarian assistance or both, since they are mentioned in direct relation to insufficiency of
financial means. It seemed appropriate to choose this indicator, because it is a concern shared
by those who work and those who don’t. In what follows, however, difficulties related to
work and issues with humanitarian assistance are treated separately.
Work
‘I was never looking for a place where I could sit down and be fed by others. I
want to live in a society where I can get tired and work and sweat and do things.
That’s all I want.’ (Burhan, Iraq)
In line with the quote above, the impression that most respondents gave was that they are
willing and able to work. Work-related difficulties were mentioned by 19 of 23 respond-
ents61. Especially young men who are willing to work, say that they are frustrated with the
61 It should be noted that of the 3 females in the sample, only one talked about work issues that affected her hus-
band. Two male respondents said that they cannot work due to health issues. Hence, all respondents who were
either working or looking for work expressed work-related concerns.
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labour legislation. Iraqis need a residency permit to work and Syrians a work permit, which is
difficult to obtain. Respondents lament being unable to look after themselves or provide for
their families, which results in them being socially stuck and dependent upon humanitarian
aid. Some respondents are working on a voluntary basis, to stay active or practice their skills,
get in touch with society and feel useful, or because they hope to be remunerated after some
time working for free.
‘The idea that I cannot work, just because I am Iraqi, is difficult to accept. That’s
something that hurts. You are a young man, 28 years old, you want to work. I
mean, also not to lose the medical skills that I have acquired. [...] So, that’s what
makes me want to leave Jordan. I don’t have any freedom here, and no future.’
(Muneer, Iraq)
‘The most difficult country to live in! First of all, it’s expensive. And then, forget
about the work opportunities, forget about them! Unless you know someone, who
can help you. And even then, they only give you the work permit if you have a
frozen amount on the bank. [...] For the work permit, you need 15,000 dollars.
And you have to freeze them. If I had that much, I would flee from this country
No, the work thing is very difficult here.’ (Maher, Iraq)
‘So, the most difficult thing is the money. Work, you can’t work, because they
will tell you, you don’t have a permit. A work permit, specific to each profession!
I am a builder for example, you want to go work on the field, you need a specific
permit!’ (Omar, Syria)
We don’t want anything. Just let us work, so we can provide for ourselves. Just al-
low us to do that. Because it’s a psychological suffering – it’s like a prison! (Ab-
delrahman, Syria)
‘All I want is to work in dignity. I don’t want anyone to take care of me. I can
work in anything. I don’t want to take from anyone... ‘can I have some ciga-
rettes?’, I want to take from myself.’ (Samer, Syria)
Some have also faced discrimination when looking for work. As this Syrian teacher, living in
Mafraq, reports:
‘The most difficult thing is that I cannot work in my profession, as a teacher.
Whenever I go apply for jobs, I swear, these people, [...] they are not qualified.
The organisations are focusing on pretty girls! If she’s pretty, she’s employed. If
she’s good, they keep her. If not, they get someone else. (Laith, Syria)
Those who did work, reported difficult working conditions, low salaries and bad treatment:
‘In the summer, we would work in the fields. We would leave at 6 AM and come
back at 1 PM. They would give us 6 JD per day. Just two or three months in the
summer. Then, I go out in the winter and collect bread. Hard bread that you find
on the street, next to containers. I would sell bags of ‘crispy’ bread. For 1 JD or
so. It was just enough to survive.’ (Usama, Syria)
‘Honestly, I won’t find anything better than that. I have to keep it. Since I have to
work. The work I do here [play station café] is great, but over there, in the factory,
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their treatment is bad, but I have to endure it.62 [...] The employers are bad. The
salary I get is less, but the pressure and the workload is higher. [...] I mean, I work
the same, but my salary is less. Much less. It’s about 275. They get 350 and more.
At least 350! Some get 500, 600...’ (Ameen, Syria)
Many respondents reported working illegally, which puts a lot of pressure on them at the
workplace. They fear controls by the government, because they could lead to their deporta-
tion. Also, working illegally exposes them to various forms of exploitation, such as non-
payment of salary, salary dumping and long working hours, and discourages them from re-
porting incidents to the police. Of the 10 respondents working, 8 had experienced some form
of labour exploitation.
‘Of course. When I work, I am vigilant. I am checking. As soon as they [inspec-
tors] arrive, I have to run. [...] They’ve never caught me. Once they got really
close, but I jumped the fence. They saw me leave through the door, so they fol-
lowed me. But I escaped. The problem is that this makes you feel like you are do-
ing something really wrong. Like you are here illegally. But the real problem is
that you can’t get a work permit.’ (Ameen, Syria)
‘For example, I want to go work. The work would be worth 100 or 150 JD for ex-
ample. He would say, I will pay you afterwards. When you’re done with the work,
you tell him to give you the money, they say they can’t. What can you do? You
can’t do anything. You can’t report him.’ (Omar, Syria)
‘No, that time, the owner didn’t pay me. He took the salary I was entitled to. But I
can’t say anything, because I don’t have a work permit. Although, if I report him,
he will be punished for employing me illegally.’ (Ayman, Iraq)
Finally, some expressed frustration with the fact that their work is entrenching them in a posi-
tion of immobility. They feel like they are spending their days working without getting any-
thing in return beyond their salary. Ameen expresses this feeling persuasively:
‘Here, my life... I would say, it’s frozen, stopped. You are standing on the same
spot, not moving. It’s like they’d say…you are living every day to pay your day.
Your rent, you have to pay it. Your food, you pay for it. There is nothing you can
save. No way to develop. You’re at the same spot. Your life is stuck. I don’t feel
like I can develop myself. I like sports, I like reading. But I don’t feel like I can
progress. For example, I like reading English. Had I had the chance, I would have
studied English. And sports, I would be training. I am just turning in a circle.
Work – Home. Work – home. As they say, you stay where you are. Not a single
step forward.’ (Ameen, Syria)
Humanitarian assistance
For Iraqi refugees, humanitarian aid is difficult to obtain. All Iraqi respondents are living on
their savings or engage in informal work. Former beneficiaries reported that their support
62 Ameen was working two jobs at the same time: at the café in the evening and at the factory during the day.
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from UNHCR was cut without proper justification. 12 respondents, all Syrians, reported re-
ceiving monthly assistance from UNHCR, between 40 and 190 JD, although it has been di-
minishing recently. Syrians in Mafraq further receive food coupons, which they depend upon
heavily. In contrast to the literature, food does seem to be a common preoccupation, since
food vouchers are considered insufficient. The Iraqi refugees in the sample do not receive any
coupons.
14 respondents think that the UN and other aid organisations are either corrupt (misuse of
funds, discrimination, etc.) or not sufficiently competent to distinguish between honest and
dishonest refugees (people providing inaccurate information about their possessions and fi-
nancial means).
‘If you want me to tell you the biggest problems? It’s the housing problem and the
problem with the charity organisations! So, these things you should write about.
The charity organisations are thieves! The only organisation that is respectful and
that helps the people, is the charity Bshara. […] In the other charities, there is
fraud and cheating and theft.’ (Yassin, Syria)
‘They are Syrians, they were employed to work there, because the one who is
building is a Syrian from Saudi Arabia. What annoys me is that they all get sup-
port and assistance. That’s what I have seen with my own eyes. And they get way
more than me. Although they have enough.’ (Laith, Syria)
‘Why does a person get 10 JD and another 20 JD? What’s the difference between
them? For example, we have two kids. Me and my wife, we get 40JD. There are
two people who get 40 JD. But the 40 JD [...] are never enough for milk and pam-
pers!’ (Yasser, Syria)
Housing
5 respondents, all Syrians, reported spending between 2 days and 3 months in the Zaatari
camp when they first arrived in Jordan. Because of the difficult living conditions and crimi-
nality there, they decided to leave the camp. Apart from one person who got bailed out legal-
ly by a Jordanian relative, all did so illegally. Housing-related difficulties also take different
forms. The most frequently mentioned problem were expensive rents.
‘The most difficult thing is finding a place to live. The rents are very high, you
can’t find homes. It’s the most difficult thing. For them also, it got more expen-
sive, for the Jordanians. It’s not like in Syria, here it is very expensive.’ (Layla,
Syria)
‘The problem here was the rent. It was really expensive. A house like this, you
couldn’t have it for less than 150 JD. And the assistance is 120 JD. So, it’s not
enough.’ (Habeeb, Syria)
‘Once you make sure you have the amount needed for the rent, you can say
alhamdillah. Because you can eat for 1JD or 20 JD. But as to the rent, there is no
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mercy. When the time comes, you have to pay. And you have to go ask people for
money. This one 5, this one 10. I always indebt myself.’ (Usama, Syria)
Respondents reported that landlords are relentless when it comes to payment of the rent. They
are continuously worrying about being able to pay the rent at the end of each month.
‘But here, 27th or 28th of the month, he will be knocking on your door. For the
rent of the next month. He doesn’t wait. It’s a big problem. That, we suffer from
most. It’s the rent. The house that was 50, is 150 now. [...] you tell them you can’t
pay and they say, ‘I don’t care’. If I tell you, I can give you 50 now, but will pay
the rest. He says ‘now’. He wants the whole amount at once.’ (Usama, Syria)
‘If the rent is 200 JD, and you get 100 JD. What can you do with them? And your
food and water? You want to go buy a biscuit, and you have 10 kids, each biscuit
is 1 JD. And after half an hour, an hour, they say they want a juice. I have
7,8…this one wants a biscuit, this one a juice…can I buy for everyone? It doesn’t
work! Then go to the bakery get bread, for 1 JD, you get home, it is finished. And
I mean 3,4 JD…and then the gas, the electricity, the water…and the landlord. At
the beginning of the month, he is at your doorstep! Before you even put your foot
inside the house, he asks for the rent.’ (Abdelrahman, Syria)
‘And then the house, you need to manage to pay the rent before food and water.
We could live on anything, but the landlord comes at the beginning of the month
and wants the rent. And the landlord is not generous, he doesn’t let a piaster go
through.’ (Hayat, Syria)
Seven respondents have been forced to leave their homes, either for being unable to
pay the rent in due time or because the landlord breached the contract.
‘The weather was cold, it was snowing. Then he said he wanted the house back. I
said, our contract was one year. Then I said, ok, but give me at least 15 days. He
said, ‘no, I won’t wait for 15 days’. The neighbours were saying ‘don’t leave, he
doesn’t have the right to throw you out’. I said, ‘I am not a son of this country’. I
mean, I can’t report him, if I report him, maybe he’ll send some people for me. I
mean what should I do? It’s better to leave in dignity.’ (Ragheed, Syria)
‘I overran the rent by 5 days. He was a good man to let me stay a bit longer. But
then he said, that if I wanted to pay the rest of the month I could stay, otherwise I
had to leave. I said, you have my ID, wait a month or two, as soon as God eases
the situation, I will pay you. But then I left. I mean, he let us at least 5 days more.
Then I came here, to live with my parents.’ (Yasser, Syria)
Another reason that made me leave, because at the beginning I had agreed with
the landlord on a certain rent. We had agreed on 110, but then he wanted 130.
(Laith, Syria)
Respondents also reported that their homes were in a bad state and that landlords
refused to do anything about it and pressured them to stay and pay the rent. Prob-
lems with neighbours seem to be common as well.
‘So, I rented that small place for 150 JD, I had to when I came here. I couldn’t
stay with nobody else. It was a bakery! So, a lot of insects, full of them. I put up
with it for two or three months.’ (Hayat, Syria)
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‘Even here, this was a big hall. Not made to be lived in anyway. The height is 5
meters. There are insects and big rats. Because of the canals. So, life is bad here.’
(Usama, Syria)
‘He took a 3 months advance payment. In the winter, everything started rotting.
And insects ... so after 2 months, I said I had to leave. ‘Please give me back the
month I’ve paid already’. He said ‘find me a lessee and you’ll get your month
back. If you don’t find anyone, I can’t reimburse you.’ (Nasser, Iraq)
‘My neighbours are loud; the street is close. The neighbours play loud music. My
mother is annoyed by this a lot. You tell them to please turn it down. They would
do so for a while and then turn it up again. And then we stopped asking them. We
got fed up.’ (Ameen, Syria)
‘I wanted to leave and the landlord said that I had to stay for a year. I had told him
to come fix some things and he didn’t. How could I stay in a rotting flat? Why?
After a month or two, I couldn’t take it anymore and left. That’s the worst thing.
And even in the end, he insisted. Finally, I consoled him with a small amount.’
(Burhan, Iraq)
The various issues with housing force respondents to move frequently, which causes addi-
tional stress.
‘In the beginning, it was very hard. I found it difficult to move around all the time.
And even from one workplace to another, it always takes you about one month to
learn how everything works. I suffered a lot in the beginning. And who wants a
house, with five children, is refused.’ (Ragheed, Syria)
It’s annoying to change a lot. Because there is nowhere you can relax really. And
you are not in your country. Back home, I could go out and laugh with everyone.
Here, I cannot do this. Here, we have to change from one place to another. (Hayat,
Syria)
Discrimination and hostilities
Even though ‘only’ half of the respondents expressed concerns related to this aspect, we think
it is worth being highlighted, particularly because of the strong negative impact it has on
those affected. 14 respondents said that they experienced discrimination: 13 because of their
nationality (apart from 1 Iraqi and 1 Syrian-Palestinian, all Syrians) and 1 because of his reli-
gion (Christian Iraqi).
‘The mere fact that they call you out for being Syrian all the time... [...] clients and
the employer as well. The Jordanian people don’t accept you among them, be-
cause you’re not doing anything for them. But I think we’re doing something for
them. When I see someone, I greet them warmly. But they respond coldly, they
treat you in a bad way.’ (Ameen, Syria)
Many respondents reported being subjected to verbal harassments on the street or in the
neighbourhood, being discriminated against when asking for housing and tricked by taxi
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drivers or landlords. One respondent was tricked by a member of the landlord’s family who
offered him a ride to the mall, just to take advantage of his food coupon.
‘He came up to me and asked whether I wanted to go to the mall. I said, there is
not much left, maybe 60 JD, on the coupon. [We went] and he entered the mall be-
fore me! Although he said he would stay in the car. He took bags of sugar, [...]
bags of rice [...] He said, ‘one more or less doesn’t change much, right, brother?’.
[...] We left and he had used about 16 JDs! [Then] he asked me to offer him that
amount, for driving me to the mall. The taxi to the mall and back is 1 JD! [...] I
said, in my whole lifetime, I will not repeat this mistake! I mean, he took 16 JD of
the 60 JD I had [...] This is called exploitation! The control over the poor and the
needy. Just because you can control me, you do this? This is humiliation. He un-
dressed me publically, so to say! I didn’t say anything. But I was exploding.’ (Ab-
delrahman, Syria)
These hostilities are a major source of insecurity. Physical abuse or attacks were reported in
three cases. Two respondents reported arbitrary and unjustified detentions.
‘They imprisoned him for seven days. We went to find out where he was. They
made us pay to see him. Although they don’t need the money. We left Syria for
this? To lose him again? We had never been to a court in Syria. Here we went to
court, to prison. And we saw him, it was obviously injustice.’ (Layla, Syria)
‘They told me they had someone. I went and there was no one there. I was impris-
oned for twelve days. It felt like 12 or 13 years. My whole life in Syria I didn’t go
to prison. Even inside the prison, there is a lot of racism. They made me work in
the toilet, clean the beds, under the beds. Because I am Syrian. So, I would have to
do everything. They are racist. The Jordanian prisoner doesn’t work. He would get
razor blades, the Syrians wouldn’t. Nothing. Most of the food they get it for free
and we have to pay for it. Twelve days were like twelve years.’ (Omar, Syria)
However, actual victimisation is no prerequisite for generating feelings of insecurity. The
hostile treatment is enough for these refugees to feel unsafe.
‘Alhamdillah, there are not too many pressures in the sense that someone would
attack me. But at the same time, you don’t feel safe, because the people here don’t
accept you. Nobody likes you here. So, you feel unsafe, in a way. Because the
people don’t want you. That’s why you go from home to work and back. So, I
don’t mingle with people on the street. I come here and go back home. If I go out
on the street, it’s when it’s empty. Just like that, I wouldn’t go out. We don’t like
to mingle.’ (Ameen, Syria)
Only 8 of 23 respondents said that they would report a violent incident. Many assume that
Jordanians would be treated more favourably by the law anyway and that legal entanglements
could jeopardise their eligibility for resettlement or lead to their deportation.
‘No, we can’t [report them]. I think they will send us away, deport us immediate-
ly. And my husband, if he goes back to Syria, he will be arrested as well. They are
looking for him there.’ (Layla, Syria)
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65
‘They asked why [their resettlement offer was withdrawn] and the UN told them
that their name was registered with the police. That was the problem. I mean, ok,
she was the one who was harmed! But because she reported, she was registered
with the police. So, from hearing this, we started to be afraid [to report to the po-
lice].’ (Nasser, Iraq)
The resulting feeling of injustice is metaphorically summarised by Omar:
‘No, there is no justice. You know, on the courts buildings, there is the scale [Li-
bra]. You look at it, the two platforms are at the same height. It would be better if
one side was lower! Because there is no justice here.’ (Omar, Syria)
5.4 Human security: in exile
Respondents’ answers coded according to our definitions of the different aspects of HS63
provide the following overview:
IRAQ
SYRIA
Total
(N=23)
7
16
Which aspect of Human Security is affected in Jordan?
Economic Security
23
7
16
Political Security
20
4
16
Health Security
17
5
12
Environmental Security
15
2
13
Food Security
14
1
13
Community Security
14
2
12
Personal Security
3
0
3
Table 8: Human security in exile
Respondents’ narratives indicate that the most affected aspect of human security of their lives
in Jordan is economic security. This insecurity is mainly due to the absence of a stable source
of income linked to an inability to work, an insufficient salary or no to little humanitarian aid
received. Political security is the second most affected aspect, mainly because of respond-
ents’ fragile legal status and little faith in authorities and the justice system. Third, the diffi-
culty of accessing health care (e.g. medication, treatment, surgery) and the experience of
failed surgeries64 are common threats to health security.
63 see 4.5
64 For instance, one respondent said that she lost her husband to a wrong blood transfusion at the hospital.
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Figure 20: Human security in exile
Figure 21: Human security in exile (Iraqis)
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Figure 22: Human security in exile (Syrians)
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6. Discussion
6.1 Reasons for flight
Respondents’ reasons for fleeing are diverse and rarely due to one single factor, which corre-
sponds to Sirkeci’s (2005) point of refugee flows being a ‘complicated human movement’.
Reading the motivations through the framework of ‘forced migration’ (Barmaki, 2009)65
shows that all factors apart from the last one (development projects) have, at least partial, ex-
planatory value. The predominant factor is, however, ‘war, genocide, political persecution’.
This is not surprising, since all of our respondents fit the UN definition of ‘refugees’ which
requires a ‘well-founded fear of persecution’. It is important to note that direct victimisation,
i.e. physical harm, as a reason for flight has been mentioned by one respondent only. This is
in line with what Westermeyer & Williams (1998) have observed.
The Iraqi and Syrian conflict being different in nature today (Syria being in an ongoing con-
flict and Iraq more in a post-conflict situation), it is not surprising to find differences between
respondents’ answers. All Syrians left, at least partly, because of the conflict situation, while
this did not apply to Iraqis. On the other hand, all Iraqis expressed loss of faith in the rule of
law and the authority of the state, which is likely to be due to Iraq’s civil war and post-
conflict situation, where the activities of state and those of non-state actors are increasingly
blurred and where there is popular disenchantment with the state’s failure to provide security
(Green & Ward, 2009). This applied to half of the Syrian respondents only. And while almost
all (6) Iraqis fled because of a threat or attack targeting them personally, this was the case for
only 3 Syrian respondents. On the other hand, fear of being conscripted, inflation and the un-
availability of work were motivations specific to the Syrian situation. In sum, Syrians fled
from a more heterogeneous and general insecurity, while Iraqis fled mainly because of per-
sonal attacks by gangs, criminals or militias, discrimination and the loss of faith in the rule of
law66.
6.2 Insecurities in exile
In exile, a salient challenge to refugees’ security is their hampered ability to ensure their live-
lihood. The difficulties related to the legal restrictions placed upon refugees correspond to the
65 See 3.5
66 The reader is invited to compare figures 12 and 13 (see 5.1), which illustrate this difference well.
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69
results provided by UNHCR, the different NGOs, the ILO and Achilli (2015). However, cer-
tain aspects, such as discrimination when looking for work and at the workplace, different
forms of labour exploitation67 and the extent of psychological suffering (e.g. feeling ‘stuck’),
are not mentioned in those reports. This lacuna could be due to those organisations’ preoccu-
pation with the provision of humanitarian assistance and livelihood opportunities to the most
vulnerable. Those who have been able to find work are likely to be considered less vulnerable
and their work-related struggles less urgent. Given the weight of these struggles in respond-
ents’ narratives, however, we suggest that there is space and need to conduct research in this
area.
The extent of humanitarian assistance that respondents receive mirrors the results provided
by the literature. Allegations of corruption and inequality of distribution are also frequently
mentioned, which is in line with what Culbertson et al. (2016) have suggested. One important
aspect, however, is not mentioned per se, but reveals itself manifestly in the bias of the dis-
cussed reports, which focus almost exclusively on Syrian refugees: Iraqi urban refugees are
neglected when it comes to financial assistance. They depend entirely on savings, remittances
and the earnings from illegal work (IRIN, 2013).
The literature’s highlighting of shelter issues (NRC, 2015; CARE, 2014) seems justified in
light of our research findings. Shelter-related difficulties are a common feature of the lived
experience of our respondents; expensive rents, pressure by the landlord, bad housing condi-
tions and the stress of frequent displacement are all factors that make it difficult for urban
refugees to find a safe home where they can be at peace.
While the literature mentions tensions between refugees and the host community, it does not
develop how they translate into the everyday experience of urban refugees. Our results show
that negative sentiments held by the host community have tangible ramifications for refu-
gees’ well-being and impact negatively on their feelings of security. It would be worthwhile
to dedicate more attention to this aspect of urban refugees’ lived experience, especially be-
cause a hostile attitude may be indirectly or inherently supportive of various forms of dis-
crimination, violence and injustice that target refugees. It is further worrisome that refugees
fear reporting to the authorities and that they accept their predicament: several respondents
said that they were not a ‘son of this country’ (ibn al balad) and, therefore, not entitled to the
67 Labour exploitation is usually discussed in relation to child labour.
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same rights as Jordanians68. These tensions also push them to isolate themselves (19 of 23
respondents indicate that they ‘don’t mingle’ with Jordanians), which is likely to exacerbate,
rather than alleviate, frictions between urban refugees and the host community.
Relative security
In sum, Sirkeci’s (2007) suggestion that refugees’ security in exile is ‘relative’ becomes all
too clear from our results. While the respondents are, in principle, glad to benefit from the
rule of law and a functioning state, they all express different forms of insecurity related to
their living situation in Jordan. The following quote captures this dimension of ‘relative secu-
rity’ well:
‘[The situation in Jordan] is not bad, because I can go and come back home and
find my children safe. You can go out at night, buy groceries. Nobody bothers
you. That’s the first thing. Then, if you look at Lebanon and Syria, Turkey in the
camps…here, there are possibilities to breathe, to go to Amman, Mafraq…nobody
bothers you. If you don’t cause problems, nobody hurts you. If you are a young re-
spectful man, respect yourself, you will impose your respect on others. ...
Why not good? Because the kids don’t have a future. I want to put them in kinder-
garten, it’s 900 JD per year. In a private kindergarten. At school, they take 1000
JD. Public school, they can go there in the afternoon. So, their future is bad here.’
(Habeeb, Syria)
Also, the insecurity of these urban refugees comprises elements reminiscent of Bauman’s
(1999) definition of ‘insecurity’69: ‘the loss of trust in one’s own ability and other people’s
intentions’ (p.17) shows in respondents’ mistrust towards authorities and humanitarian organ-
isations; and ‘anxiety’ and ‘cageyness’ manifest themselves, for example, in respondents’
tendency to isolate themselves and their reluctance to contact the police.
6.3 Human security
Analysing the insecurities of these urban refugees, including the aspects that made them be-
come refugees in the first place, through the lens of HS leads to the following observations.
To begin with, refugees’ human insecurity is all-encompassing. The diagrams70 illustrate
clearly how ‘generalised’ the insecurity of urban refugees in our sample is. All aspects of
68 ’It’s not your country! You are a foreigner, a stranger. We have a saying: ‘You stranger, be polite’ (Ya
ghareeb, koon adeeb). You are stranger, whatever happens.’ (011AMMI)
69 see 3.1
70 see 5.2 and 5.4
A. Ajil - ‘Security from below’
71
human security, apart from personal security, concern most respondents, when they are in
exile. At the moment of departure, it is the human security of Syrians that is affected more
globally. Iraqis all left their country, almost exclusively, because of threats to political, per-
sonal and community security. It becomes clear that, depending on the stage of respondents’
journey, different aspects of HS are affected.
Context-specific
At the source of respondents’ desire to flee their country were mainly challenges to their per-
sonal, political and community security. These are aspects that are associated with notions of
‘hard security’, such as threats to physical integrity and fear from violence. Threats to envi-
ronmental, economic, health or food security were present, but did not seem to be dominating
respondents’ ultimate decision to flee.
When it comes to their human insecurity in Jordan, one can observe an inversion in respond-
ents’ prioritisation of security aspects. Personal and community security fade into the back-
ground. Syrians and Iraqis who leave their countries seeking security from the conflicts and
their repercussions, seem to find that kind of security in Jordan. However, beyond that ‘nar-
row’ human security, economic, environmental, health and food insecurity become overrid-
ing concerns in their situation in exile.
From this, we can deduce that HS before exile corresponds more closely to the ‘narrow’ un-
derstanding of HS, while it is a ‘broad’ understanding of HS that imposes itself when it
comes to respondents’ situation in Jordan71.
Interrelatedness
The HS lens further highlights the interrelatedness of security aspects. Urban refugees’ eco-
nomic insecurity, e.g. their inability to obtain a reasonable income, has immediate repercus-
sions on other components of human security such as health security (inability to afford
proper treatment), environmental security (inability to afford safe accommodation), and food
security (inability to buy sufficient and healthy food and temptation to sell food vouchers for
non-food items or services or rent). This corresponds to an earlier mentioned attribute of hu-
man security: ‘The components of human security are interdependent’ (UNDP, 1994, p.
71 see 3.3
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72
22)72. This interrelatedness is an argument against rigid categorisation and in line with what
Gasper & Gómez (2015) say about HS:
‘Except for bureaucratic or academic ease, there is little reason to consider any
value area in isolation. Indeed, the 1994 HDR did not present the list of seven73 as
the sole or sufficient way to think about human security. It warned that the catego-
ries link, overlap and do not cover all relevant issues. (p.102)
Threats
Alkire (2003) ascribed various characteristics to HS threats: they are ‘critical’ and ‘perva-
sive’; direct or indirect; idiosyncratic or covariant74. The threats that are mentioned by re-
spondents can all be regarded as ‘critical’ and ‘pervasive’. Whether it is the conflict or post-
conflict situation, the pressure of ensuring the money for the rental payment, food or medical
treatment, the threats are severely affecting respondents’ lives and shaping their everyday
struggles (i.e. critical) as well as recurring in nature (i.e. pervasive).
At both stages of analysis, the threats faced by Syrians tend to be indirect and covariant, ra-
ther than direct and idiosyncratic. In very few cases, respondents mentioned threats that tar-
geted them or their household personally, but generally speaking, they were affected by the
consequences of actions that were producing a general environment of insecurity. For in-
stance, the conflict situation and the state’s belligerent activities were not directed at them,
but were inherent to their decision to flee. Similarly, the lack of humanitarian assistance, re-
strictive labour laws, and the hostile attitude of the host community contribute to creating an
exasperating living situation, from which respondents suffer, albeit indirectly. Rarely, how-
ever, they seem to be targeted specifically and personally. The threats that Iraqis face are of
similar nature, i.e. indirect and covariant, in their situation in exile. Their decision to flee,
however, seems to have been strongly influenced by threats that were direct and idiosyncrat-
ic: 6 of 7 received death threats and experienced direct discrimination and attacks.
Practicality of HS
Using HS as a framework of analysis for the collected data proved to be vague in some re-
spects. If one compares the HS analysis before flight and during exile75, it can be observed
72 see 2.2
73 see 2.3
74 see 2.3
75 Compare 5.2 and 5.4
A. Ajil - ‘Security from below’
73
that political security remains among the top three aspects most affected. It is, however, not
the same political insecurity that affects respondents. In their home country, political insecu-
rity was created by suspicion towards the state – because of its belligerent activities directed
at citizens – and the blurring of state and non-state actors engaged in the conflict or random
controls of citizens. In exile, however, political insecurity is mostly due to their fragile legal
status and their lack of faith in authorities and the justice system. Clumping such diverse as-
pects under the label of ‘political insecurity’ obscures the subtleties and complexities of the
threats to political security.
More importantly, conflating such subtleties is likely to hamper effective policymaking, since
different policies are appropriate for different threats. For instance, struggling to earn a liveli-
hood because of restrictive labour laws necessitates policies improving urban refugees’ legal
situation, while such policies are unlikely to be an effective way of addressing the conse-
quences of price inflation caused by conflict, or the discriminatory practices of humanitarian
organisations. Ensuring economic security, in this case, should take different forms in terms
of policy. When using the HS framework, it is therefore vital to consider the context and find
ways of highlighting hidden subtleties. If necessary, the list of seven should be expanded to
include aspects that are relevant to a specific situation. Otherwise, HS risks being of little per-
tinence to policymakers who are looking for ways to improve the situation of urban refugees.
Nevertheless, the framework is appropriate for bringing the analysis of security down to the
individual level. In fact, it becomes clear from our results that living in a secure country,
which Jordan is, does not mean that individuals living in this country are, themselves, secure.
The various struggles of urban refugees in Jordan clearly reveal a situation of human insecu-
rity, despite the country’s strong security apparatus, which respondents themselves
acknowledge76. The broadening of security performed by HS captures the diversity of this
human insecurity, by acknowledging aspects that go beyond threats to urban refugees’ physi-
cal integrity. It is important to distinguish here between the ‘narrow’ and ‘broad’ views on
human security (Tadjbakhsh, 2013): While a narrow understanding (i.e. focusing on personal
security) would lead to the conclusion that Syrian and Iraqi urban refugees in Jordan are safe,
76 For example: ‘It’s nice, better than Iraq! They have order, they have security. Something we have been miss-
ing for over 10, 11, 12 years! We have lost it. Here there is security, rule of law that protects you. If you are a
citizen of this country, the law protects you.’ (Ayman, Iraq); ‘Yes, security there is. More than there.’ (Ragheed,
Syria); ‘Yes, security, there is security. And other than that, nothing.’ (Khalid, Syria); ‘Here, the situation is
much better. Here, we are safe.’ (Hayat, Syria)
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a broad understanding (i.e. considering all aspects of HS as being of equal importance) shows
that they are clearly unsafe.
In sum, HS provides a useful and multifaceted lens for the analysis of the situation of Iraqi
and Syrian urban refugees in Jordan, including the reasons that caused them to flee their
country, provided that the context and subtleties are taken into account and the categories un-
derstood as being flexible and interrelated.
6.4 Implications for our understanding of security
What implications does this analysis of HS in the case of Syrian and Iraqi urban refugees
have for our understanding, or conceptualisation, of security?
First, the human insecurity of urban refugees in Jordan is better understood as ‘uncertainty’
and ‘insecurity’, going back to Bauman’s (1999) trilogy. While ‘unsafety’ was the reason
why respondents fled their country, their situation in Jordan can be considered as ‘safe’.
However, their narratives reveal that despite being safe from existential threats to their physi-
cal integrity, they suffer from insecurity ‘of position, entitlements, and livelihood’ (Jacobsen,
2016, p.105) and from uncertainty ‘as to their continuation and future stability’ (p.105).
Hence, their situation in exile is clearly shaped by ‘Unsicherheit’ in Bauman’s words. In fact,
Bauman’s trilogy might offer a more convincing tool to grasp the insecurity of our respond-
ents than the concept of human security.
Second, this implies that objectively, these urban refugees are secure (i.e. ‘safe’) in Jordan,
while subjectively, they are not (i.e. ‘insecure’ and ‘uncertain’). Their feelings of insecurity
are not produced by a fear of physical victimisation: respondents express faith in the security
that the Jordanian state provides in this respect. Their feelings of insecurity can be captured
in subjective terms only, which, to reiterate Tadjbakhsh’s (2013) suggestion, ‘requires quali-
tative assessment of how people ‘feel’ secure’ (p.45). It is precisely the qualitative approach
adopted in this paper that allowed for these insecurities to surface.
Third, as mentioned before, the insecurities of urban refugees invite us to think human securi-
ty in a broad, rather than a narrow sense. The threats to their security touch on all aspects of
HS and reducing it to a narrow understanding would mean choosing to be oblivious to the
reality of urban refugees’ everyday security experiences.
A. Ajil - ‘Security from below’
75
Consequently, this analysis invites us to ‘securitise’, i.e. answer the question ‘security from
what?’, the way ‘wideners’ do, rather than ‘traditionalists’77 (Šulović, 2010). The threats to
respondents’ security in Jordan do not emanate from military sources, but from their struggle
with economic, environmental and societal factors. ‘Traditionalists’’ focus on hard security is
ill-suited to understand threats to the security of individuals affected by the repercussions of
‘new wars’ (Kaldor, 2013).
Finally, when it comes to criminology’s engagement with security, the preceding observa-
tions lead us to conclude that ‘fear of crime’ is not merely ‘fear’ of ‘crime’ (De Donder et al.,
2009, p.14). Individuals feel insecure even though they, generally speaking, feel protected
from crime.
By including the voices of human beings, who are directly affected by perilous security envi-
ronments, concerning their everyday security practices and experiences, we aimed to gain a
better understanding of what security looks like from ‘below’. The insights derived from our
analysis of ‘security from below’ impose a flexible, rather than restrictive, understanding of
security on all levels of the dichotomous understandings mentioned earlier78.
6.5 Limitations
The reader is advised to keep the following limitations in mind when analysing the results
and discussions in this paper.
Sample-related limitations
The people who referred me to urban refugees were working in Jordan and having personal
connections to refugees, some through their work in the humanitarian field. I did attempt ran-
domly contacting people, in urban areas where refugees are known to reside, e.g. North Ha-
shem in Amman. After these attempts proved unsuccessful, he decided to stick to contacting
people through gatekeepers79. Some respondents also connected us to other refugees. The un-
fortunate consequence of this method was that there were similarities between some of our
respondents regarding their socio-economic background and trajectory. Given the limited
timeframe, in which interviews took place and the difficulties of recruiting respondents, it
was difficult to fully guarantee internal diversification of the sample (Michelat, 1975). Also,
77 see 3.1
78 see 3.4
79 see annex VII
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the weather in Jordan during both interview rounds was warm. It is likely that conducting
these interviews in the winter would have influenced our results (e.g. more frequent mention
of shelter-related insecurities or issues with overcrowding).
Interview-related limitations
Conducting field research with refugees requires a thorough moral, ethical and methodologi-
cal awareness on the researcher’s side. It has been noted that the research process in a deli-
cate environment has the potential to transform the very phenomenon it is meant to study
(Block, Carr, Ribbs & Gibbs, 2013). The research should therefore be conducted in a way
that is as least disruptive of the everyday life of the participants as possible. I made sure to
engage in a continuous and documented process of self-reflection about my position as a re-
searcher in the field80. I also tried to conduct the interviews in a way that made respondents
feel at ease and allowed them to freely express their opinions.
When conducting research with potentially vulnerable people, there is a risk of a power dy-
namic setting in, especially because the researcher is likely to dictate the framework and the
course of the encounter (Block et al., 2013). By adopting a semi-directed approach and creat-
ing a conversational environment, I believe that I managed to limit this asymmetry of power.
Furthermore, by adopting a posture of a student who is eager to learn more about the situation
of urban refugees, I was actually on the receiving end, and felt like they were ‘teaching’ me
about their experiences81.
Obtaining informed consent has been identified as a methodological challenge specific to so-
called ‘developing’ regions, particularly with regards to interviewee’s literacy (Block et al.,
2013). Several respondents in our sample, especially those living in poorer parts of the urban
setting, were unable to read the consent form82. Aware that this may arise as an issue, I asked
in the beginning whether the person could read or not, making it clear that the ability to read
was not taken for granted. When the respondent answered negatively, I would explain the
consent form in detail or ask another member of the family to read it out loud. While the form
was written in formal Arabic, the oral explanation was in vernacular Arabic.
80 see annex III
81 It is hard to tell how respondents felt about this particular aspect, but the interviewer got the impression, based
on their confident attitude and openness in sharing their stories, that respondents did indeed assume the role of
‘teachers’.
82 see annex II
A. Ajil - ‘Security from below’
77
Researchers agree that the research process should be beneficial to the participant. Some go
as far as advocating that it is immoral not to provide help and assistance to the interviewee
merely for the sake of scientific objectivity (Block et al., 2013). Several participants pointed
out that talking about their experiences and having someone listening to them felt ‘therapeu-
tic’. If anything, this was the benefit that I could provide. I made clear to each participant that
I was an independent student and not a potential source of aid.
Since most gatekeepers had helped interviewees one way or another during their stay in Jor-
dan, their participation in the interview was seen by some as a way of returning a favour,
which could have compromised the quality of the interaction with the interviewer. Generally
speaking, however, participants who were contacted through gatekeepers were engaged and
ready to share their experiences. During some interviews, gatekeepers were present. It is like-
ly that their presence affected the behaviour and answers of the interviewee. Fortunately, the
gatekeepers remained very low-key and did not disturb the interview.
Despite the above-mentioned efforts, it is possible that respondents’ narratives were partially
biased by inhibition or by a desire to present themselves in a particular light83. Narratives
should, anyway, not be expected to always accurately mirror the reality of the narrator’s ex-
perience, but ought to be understood as an instrument providing a window into his or her sub-
jective worldview.
Analysis-related limitations
In our analysis, we pursued a thorough and rigorous system in order to do justice to the
wealth and depth of the collected data84. During the coding process, we developed labels
based on our reading of the data and the literature available. However, attributing codes to
certain text segments is an inherently subjective process and therefore likely to yield different
results depending on who is coding (Chi, 1997). We continuously resorted back to the origi-
nal narratives and adjusted the coding wherever necessary. At different moments, however,
analysing the data required us to take decisions that undeniably influenced our results.
The different aspects of human security not being consensually nor clearly defined, we had to
define them to a certain degree ourselves and adapt them to the context of our research85.
83 Whether positively (by downplaying struggles) or negatively (by highlighting and amplifying difficulties).
84 see 4.5
85 see 4.5
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That a ‘fragile legal status’ is understood as a threat to ‘political security’ was our own deci-
sion, as a direct consequence of which ‘political insecurity’ became such a dominant aspect
of respondents’ insecurity in Jordan. Defining the aspects of HS differently would have
yielded different results. This should be taken into account when reading the results.
A. Ajil - ‘Security from below’