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Support for Campus Censorship
*Cory J. Clark1
*Bo M. Winegard
Dorottya Farkas2
1University of Pennsylvania
2Eötvös Loránd University
*Equal contribution
Corresponding author: Cory Clark; Email: cjclark@sas.upenn.edu
Data availability statement: All data will be made publicly available on Open Science
Framework upon acceptance for publication.
The authors declare no conflict of interest.
https://doi.org/10.32388/CMVJP3.2
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Abstract
Many scholars conceive modern Western universities as places for open inquiry and relentless
pursuit of truth. Yet in recent years, some scholars have expressed concerns about increasing
censoriousness on college campuses. The present investigation tested whether people have
heightened desires to censor information on campuses that is perceived as threatening to group
equality or reinforcing of status hierarchies—specifically, information that portrays low-status
groups unfavorably. Across four samples from three countries (U.S. adults, U.S. college-aged
adults, undergraduates at a U.K. university, and undergraduates at a Hungarian university; total
n=1,616) and three domains of group differences, we found that people were more censorious of
statements that portray lower status groups unfavorably (women, Black people, Muslims) than
otherwise identical statements that portray higher status groups unfavorably (men, White people,
Christians). We also found that these differential standards in censorship preferences increased
as participants self-identified as more politically liberal, perhaps reflecting Liberals’ greater
aversion to inequality and protectiveness toward low-status groups. Such patterns (especially in
conjunction with other recent work finding similar patterns) challenge the conventional wisdom
that evaluative biases generally harm low-status groups and reinforce existing hierarchies. Our
results suggest instead that, at least in recent years in modern Western societies, biases in
information evaluations seem designed to help low-status groups and to eliminate or reverse
existing hierarchies.
Keywords: social cognition, censorship, cognitive biases, political psychology, cross-
cultural psychology
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Highlights
• People were more censorious of information that portrays low-status groups unfavorably
than information that portrays high-status groups unfavorably
• This difference in censoriousness toward information that portrays low and high-status
groups unfavorably was larger as participants self-identified as more politically liberal
• These patterns were similar across the United States, United Kingdom, and Hungary
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“If this nation is to be wise as well as strong, if we are to achieve our destiny, then we need more
new ideas for more wise men reading more good books in more public libraries. These libraries
should be open to all—except the censor. We must know all the facts and hear all the alternatives
and listen to all the criticisms. Let us welcome controversial books and controversial authors.”
--John F. Kennedy
Censorship is often regarded as inimical to a liberal society (e.g., D’Souza, 1991; Milton,
1644/1965), yet throughout history, everyday people, governments, institutions, and other
authorities have censored information thought to undermine certain ideas and ideologies
presumed beyond question or criticism (Clark et al., 2023; Cramer, 1945; Fishburn, 2008;
Thomas, 1969). These include that the sun has flaws (Mayer, 2011), that the Earth is not the
center of the cosmos (Finocchiaro, 2008), and that humans are the product of natural selection.
Although resistance to information that opposes one’s sacred beliefs is likely a natural feature of
human psychology (Clark et al., 2019), the precise information that people wish to censor varies
across time, culture, and context. For example, support for Democracy, an idea embraced and
lauded by many Western societies, is subject to censorship in modern China (Bamman et al.,
2012). If humans have a proclivity to suppress information that challenges sacred values, it’s
reasonable to examine whether modern humans, even in Western societies that promote free
speech and inquiry, also desire to suppress challenging or taboo information. In the present
paper, we test one possible target of censorship: information that portrays low-status groups
unfavorably. We test and find support for the claim that people are particularly censorious of
information that portrays low-status groups unfavorably compared to identical information that
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portrays high-status groups unfavorably, and, perhaps paradoxically, especially among those
who self-identify as “liberal.”
Modern Sensitivities
Societies across the globe are reckoning with long histories of failing to live up to their
own ideals of justice. Most modern Western societies explicitly endorse human equality for all
their citizenry regardless of gender, race, or religion, yet were built upon unjust systems that
violated these noble goals. Moreover, even in the most progressive and advanced societies,
numerous disparities between demographic groups persist, which many consider prima facie
evidence of discrimination. Social justice is now a key motivating force behind many
organizations, ideologies, fields of study, institutions, and social movements (e.g., Hage et al.,
2020; Mills & Ballantyne, 2016; Moroni, 2019). Some scholars have contended that social
justice issues have become a sacred concern in modern Western societies (Clark & Winegard,
2020; Honeycutt & Jussim, 2020; Pinker, 2018).
Sacred concerns or sacred values are identity-important, protected values that are
relatively insensitive to tradeoffs (e.g., Fiske & Tetlock, 1997; Tetlock et al., 2000). To protect
sacred values, people forego information and data that could allow them to have a more well-
rounded understanding of empirical reality. For example, people selectively avoid information
that challenges their moral and political beliefs (e.g., Stroud, 2010), and people more negatively
evaluate information that challenges their moral and political beliefs than identical information
that supports them (e.g., Ditto, Clark, et al., 2019; Ditto, Liu, et al., 2019). In persistent striving
for group equality, people may be motivated to avoid, reject, and perhaps silence any
information that threatens this goal (Haidt, 2020; Winegard et al., 2023). People may therefore
wish to censor information perceived as reinforcing a status hierarchy (information that portrays
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low-status groups unfavorably) relative to information that could help level or reverse the
playing field (information that portrays high-status individuals and groups unfavorably)
(Honeycutt & Jussim, 2020).
Although concerns about inequality are widespread (e.g., Pew, 2020), people who self-
identify as politically liberal (or leftwing) are particularly disturbed by inequality (Jost et al.,
2008) and particularly empathic toward low-status groups (e.g., Hasson et al., 2018; Jeffries et
al., 2012; Lucas & Kteily, 2018). Consequently, self-identified Liberals may be especially
motivated to reject information that is perceived as threatening group equality. Over the past few
years, a growing body of work has found that people, but especially self-identified Liberals,
interact with information in ways that favor relatively low-status members of society (Clark et
al., 2019; Winegard et al., 2023). For example, people upwardly adjust their evaluations of
essays when they learn a writer is female (Jampol & Zayas, 2021); people are more bothered by
female underrepresentation in desirable careers than male underrepresentation (Block et al.,
2019); and people more favorably evaluate research on female-favoring sex differences than
research on male-favoring sex differences, especially Liberals (Stewart-Williams et al., 2021;
von Hippel & Buss, 2017; Winegard et al., 2023). Liberals also are more inclined to amplify the
successes of women and Black people than men and White people, whereas Conservatives treat
the successes of groups more similarly (Kteily et al., 2019); people have more generous
acceptance criteria for admitting Black than White candidates to an honor society, especially
Liberals (Axt et al., 2016); Liberals more favorably evaluate research on Black-favoring race
differences than research on White-favoring race differences (von Hippel & Buss, 2017;
Winegard et al., 2023). Although there is a small tendency for those high in social dominance
orientation (SDO, which is strongly correlated with conservatism) to favor a White over a Black
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job applicant, there is a larger and more reliable tendency for those low in SDO to favor a Black
over a White job applicant (Reynolds et al., 2020). And whereas those high on system
justification (also strongly correlated with conservatism) find jokes that target low and high-
status groups similarly funny, those low on system justification find jokes that target low-status
groups particularly unfunny (Purser & Harper, 2023).
All of this suggests that people prefer information that promotes the well-being of low-
status groups over information that could conceivably undermine their well-being. And there is
greater evidence that this is true of Liberals than of Conservatives. This is not to say that
Conservatives are not censorious. Indeed, the American Library Association’s Office for
Intellectual Freedom documents the most challenged and banned books in the United States, and
books related to sexuality and gender identity—issues of concern to Conservatives—frequently
make the list. However, because we are looking at desires for censorship on university campuses,
in the present paper, we focus on issues that we expect to be of concern on university campuses.
Censorship on Campuses
The present work seeks to determine whether concerns for low-status groups are reflected
in the kinds of information people wish to censor on university campuses. Universities are
conceived by many prominent thinkers and institutions as places for free thought, open
discourse, and the relentless pursuit of truth (e.g., Lukianoff & Haidt, 2019; Powell et al., 2017;
Rauch, 2021). University mottos across the United States and Europe, Veritas. Virtus. Libertas.
(Truth. Bravery. Freedom.), Per libertatem ad veritatem (Through freedom to truth), and
Libertas perfundet omnia luce (Freedom bathes everything with light), reflect beliefs that truth is
best achieved through freedom. And famous classical liberals across history, from Jefferson to
Mill, have argued that the best way to obtain true beliefs is to challenge ideas vigorously in a
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kind of battle so that strong ones prevail while weak ones are rejected. In 2014, the University of
Chicago released a report on freedom of expression supporting “free, robust, and uninhibited
debate and deliberation,” among other principles of academic freedom; these “Chicago
Principles” have since been adopted by over 70 colleges and universities in the United States
(FIRE, 2020). Thus, at least in principle, many universities support academic freedom on their
campuses.
Yet in recent years, there has been much discussion of the “free speech crisis on campus”
and many scholars have lamented the increasing censoriousness on university campuses
(Lukianoff & Haidt, 2019). Such concerns have prompted scholars to explore both
censoriousness and self-censorship among college students and faculty on campuses. Among
other findings, such reports have found that (1) a minority of students have been disciplined
(3.03%) or threatened with discipline (6.03%) by their college’s administration for their
expression on campus (FIRE, 2023), (2) 63.2% of students report that their campus climate
prevents people from saying things they believe because others might find those views offensive
and self-identified Republican students express more reluctance to discuss controversial topics
than students who self-identify as Democrats (Zhou & Barbaro, 2023), (3) 11% of faculty report
having been disciplined or threatened with discipline because of their teaching and one-third of
faculty report that they self-censor on campus fairly or very often with conservative faculty
reporting higher rates of self-censorship and higher rates of discipline or disciplinary threats
(Honeycutt et al., 2023), and (4) a minority of students endorse blocking speakers with whom
they disagree, with higher numbers among liberal students, and many students report censoring
themselves for fear of negative reactions from peers, with higher numbers among conservative
students (Larson et al., 2020). These findings suggest that modern liberal sensitivities set the tone
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on campuses regarding which kinds of ideas should be aired. Some scholars have contended that
the political correctness more typical of the left is comprised of (1) concerns with promoting
socially disadvantaged groups and (2) desires to censor language that could offend socially
disadvantaged groups (Moss & O’Connor, 2020). The new censoriousness on university
campuses in the past several years may have arisen from increasing aversions to inequality and
desires to protect relatively low-status groups from any possible further disadvantage.
The Present Studies
In the present studies, we hypothesized that people would wish to censor information that
portrays low-status groups unfavorably more than identical information that portrays high-status
groups unfavorably, and that this tendency would be stronger among those who identify as more
politically liberal. We tested this across three different paired categories that prior work
(Winegard et al., 2023 Study 1a) has shown are perceived to differ in their relative advantage in
society (high-status: men, White people, Christians; low-status: women, Black people, Muslims).
We tested our hypothesis first in an adult U.S. sample, and then in three college-aged samples in
the U.S., the U.K., and Hungary. Exploring this pattern across four distinct but contemporaneous
populations allowed us to test the generalizability of this trend across modern Western societies
in the early 2020s.1 Last, we meta-analyzed our results across the four samples.
Open Science Statement
Study 1 was preregistered: http://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=9se8wq; Study 2 was not
but followed nearly identical procedures. No participants were excluded from any study except
1In the present paper, we measure only self-reported political ideology on a continuous scale
from very liberal to very conservative, but ideology is a complex construct and different
measurements can have different meanings especially across different countries. We discuss the
need to replicate our findings using alternative measures of ideology in the Limitations section.
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as described in the preregistration. There are no undisclosed manipulations and no undisclosed
dependent variables. There are no file drawer studies. All data and syntax will be made publicly
available on Open Science Framework upon acceptance for publication.2
Study 1
This study tested the prediction that people would support more censorship of books on
college campuses stating that (1a) Men evolved to be better leaders than women than that (1b)
Women evolved to be better leaders than men, that (2a) Islam is violent than that (2b)
Christianity is violent, and that (3a) White people score higher than Black people on intelligence
tests than that (3b) Black people score higher than White people on intelligence tests. We
expected that this would be particularly true as people were more politically liberal.
Method
We preregistered the hypothesis that Liberals would wish to censor information that
portrays low-status groups unfavorably more than Conservatives wish to censor such
information: http://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=9se8wq. We followed methods for the
preregistration exactly except that because of an error in setting participant inclusion criteria, we
ended up recruiting 45 more participants than planned. We also report additional cross-checking
and exploratory analyses that were not preregistered.
Participants. U.S. participants (Mage=37.11, SD=11.16; 235 female) were recruited via
Mechanical Turk. We aimed for 550 participants based on funds available to pay them, but we
had to repost the study after realizing we accidentally set inclusion criteria to masters workers
only. This resulted in the recruitment of 595 participants. The data were not downloaded or
2 The authors declare no conflict of interest. These studies were conducted with ethics approval
from the first and second authors’ universities.
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analyzed until the study concluded with 595 participants. As indicated in the preregistration, we
excluded participants who failed an attention check, resulting in a final sample of 559
participants, which gave us power to detect a small effect size (at a= .05, two tailed, 80% power;
GPower; Faul et al., 2007). Participants leaned slightly liberal (M=3.36, SD=1.76).
Procedure. Participants were told they would be reading and responding to controversial
passages from books. They read five passages in total that were made up for purposes of this
study. Two (involving swearing and gore) contained no experimental manipulation:
Swearing, No manipulation: “Reclining in his chair, Bill reached for a can of beer.
“Fuck the fucking stupid cubs. They always fucking lose. I’m sick of this goddamned
shit.” Pg. 188
Gore, No manipulation: “He stabbed his stomach and sliced his waist through his neck.
His internal organs fell out onto the ground with a large pool of blood. He then took a
hacksaw and slowly cut off his head; then he pulled out one of his eyes and ate it raw.”
Pg. 204
Three passages (involving leadership, violence, and intelligence) were experimentally
manipulated either to portray a relatively low-status group or a relatively high-status group
unfavorably. The alternate conditions are displayed in parentheses.
Leadership, Sex manipulation: “Researchers have argued that men(women) are better
leaders than women(men). That is, genetically men(women) appear to better able to lead large
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groups of people. Because of this, it is not only fair, but positively crucial, that more
men(women) are leaders than women(men).” Pg. 25
Violence, Religion manipulation: “Islam(Christianity) was a powerful ideology that
spread rapidly across the Arabian Peninsula. It was also a violent, warlike religion that
promoted domination of other people. To this day, it inspires hatred, bigotry, and even terrorism.
Many scholars have suggested that Islam(Christianity), of all religions, is particularly hateful
and likely to motivate gruesome crimes, and bigotry.” Pg. 345
Intelligence, Race manipulation: “Scholars have suggested that white(black) people
score higher than black(white) people on intelligence tests. It is likely that at least some of this
gap is caused by genetics. That is, whites(blacks) are genetically smarter than blacks(whites).”
Pg. 64
Following each passage, participants rated their agreement with four statements (“They
should remove the book from the library.”, “A professor should not be allowed to require the
book for class.”, “Students should not be allowed to cite the book.”, and “It would not be good if
students read the book.”) on 7-point scales from 1=Not at all to 7=Very much so, which were
combined into indices of support for censorship,
a
s>.93.3 Participants also reported some
demographic variables including their political ideology on a 7-point scale from Very liberal to
3One reviewer noted that the final item “It would not be good if students read the book” was less
face valid than the others, and so we reran primary analyses in both Studies 1 and 2 with this
item removed. Across both studies, the same patterns hold with this item removed.
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Very conservative, a common measure of self-identified political ideology (e.g., Ditto et al.,
2018). No other data were collected.
Results
In three separate regressions (one for each passage), we regressed support for censorship
on the experimental manipulation, ideology (centered), and their interactions.
Leadership. As can be seen in Table 1, there was a significant main effect of the sex
condition such that participants supported more censorship of the passage indicating that men
evolved to be better leaders than women than the reverse passage. There was no main effect of
ideology. And the predicted interaction emerged. Consistent with predictions, simple slopes one
standard deviation above and below the mean of ideology revealed that more liberal participants
supported censorship more when the passage indicated men were better leaders than women than
vice versa (b=1.09), t=5.22, p<.001. More conservative participants displayed a similar pattern,
but to a weaker extent (b=.36), t=1.70, p=.089. In the condition in which women were said to be
better leaders, there was virtually no effect of ideology on censorship support (b=.00), t=-0.06,
p=.950, but in the condition in which men were said to be better leaders, more liberal ideology
predicted more censoriousness (b=-.21), t=-3.74, p<.001.
Violence. There was no main effect of the religion condition. There was a small main
effect of ideology, such that liberalism was associated with less censoriousness. We again found
the predicted interaction. Simple slopes one standard deviation above and below the mean of
ideology revealed that more liberal participants supported censorship more when the passage
indicated that Islam was violent than that Christianity was violent (b=.80), t=3.62, p<.001. More
conservative participants displayed a marginal effect in the opposite direction (though to a
weaker extent) such that they supported censorship more when the passage indicated that
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Christianity was violent than that Islam was violent (b=-.40), t=-1.80, p=.072. In the condition in
which Islam was said to be violent, more liberal ideology predicted more censoriousness (b=-
.21), t=3.32, p=.001. In the condition in which Christianity was said to be violent, this
relationship was reversed, with more liberal ideology predicting less censoriousness (b=.13),
t=2.06, p=.040.
Intelligence. There was a significant main effect of the race condition such that
participants supported censorship of the passage indicating that White people score higher on
intelligence tests than Black people than vice versa. There was no main effect of ideology. And
we again found the predicted interaction. Liberal participants supported censorship more when
the passage indicated White people score higher on intelligence tests than Black people than vice
versa (b=1.09), t=4.82, p<.001. More conservative participants displayed no such pattern
(b=.24), t=1.04, p=.297. In the condition in which Black people were said to score higher on
intelligence tests, there was no effect of ideology on censorship support (b=-.05), t=-0.68,
p=.498. However, in the condition in which White people were said to score higher, more liberal
ideology predicted more censoriousness (b=-.29), t=-5.30, p<.001.
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Table 1
Support for censorship regressed on condition, ideology, and the interaction
within each of the three passage types
β
t
p
95% CI
semipartial r
Leadership
Sex Condition
.20
4.89
<.001
.43, 1.02
.20
Ideology
.00
0.06
.950
-.12, .13
.00
Condition x Ideology
-.15
-2.47
.014
-.38, -.04
-.10
Violence
Religion Condition
.06
1.30
.194
-.10, .51
.06
Ideology
.13
2.13
.034
.01, .26
.09
Condition x Ideology
-.23
3.83
<.001
-.51, .16
-.16
Intelligence
Race Condition
.17
4.13
<.001
.35, .98
.17
Ideology
-.04
-0.70
.482
-.18, .09
-.03
Condition x Ideology
-.16
-2.65
.008
-.42, .06
-.11
Cross-check and visualization. We created a categorical ideology variable for Liberals
(those who responded 1-3 on the 7-point ideology scale; n=307), Moderates (those who
responded 4; n=114), and Conservatives (those who responded 5-7; n=135) for purposes of
cross-checking the results and creating easy visualizations of the data in three 2 (condition) x 3
(categorical ideology) Univariate Analysis of Variances (ANOVAs). There were again
significant main effects for the sex and race conditions, ps<.010, ηp2s=.02, and not for the
religion condition. All three significant interactions emerged, ps<.044, ηp2s>.01. These data are
reported in Table 2 and Figure 1.
Simple effects revealed that the experimental conditions only ever had a significant
influence among Liberals (and always did so), ps<.003, and never among Moderates nor
Conservatives, ps>.187. There also were significant differences between ideological groups only
in the conditions that portrayed low status groups unfavorably. For the passage that stated that
men evolved to be better leaders than women, Liberals supported censorship more than
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Conservatives and Moderates, ps<.010, whereas Moderates and Conservatives did not differ,
p=.531. For the passage that stated that Islam is violent, Liberals supported censorship more than
Conservatives and Moderates, ps<.027, whereas Moderates and Conservatives did not differ,
p=.630. For the passage that stated that White people score higher on intelligence tests, all
groups (at least marginally) differed, with Liberals supporting censorship more than Moderates,
p=.060, and Moderates supporting censorship more than Conservatives, p=.040. For the passages
stating that women evolved to be better leaders, that Christianity is violent, and that Black people
score higher on intelligence tests, Liberals, Moderates, and Conservatives were similarly
opposed to censorship, ps>.154.
Table 2
ANOVA results with categorical ideology in Study 1
F
p
ηp2
Leadership
Sex Condition
11.83
**
.02
Ideology
5.22
**
.02
Condition x Ideology
3.35
*
.01
Violence
Religion Condition
0.01
.928
.00
Ideology
0.78
.457
.00
Condition x Ideology
5.31
**
.02
Intelligence
Race Condition
8.23
**
.02
Ideology
8.71
***
.03
Condition x Ideology
3.17
*
.01
Note. + p<.100, * p<.050, ** p<.010, *** p<.001
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Figure 1
Means and standard errors of support for censorship by experimental conditions and categorical ideology for each passage type in
the US adult sample in Study 1
Note. Full (7-point) censorship scale was slightly truncated for ease of visualization. Error bars are standard errors.
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Swearing and gore. Although unrelated to our hypotheses, there were significant
relationships between more liberal ideology and lower support for censoring swearing, r=.13,
p=.002, and gore, r=.15, p<.001. In two one-way ANOVAs with categorical ideology (see Figure
2), there were no significant differences between Liberals, Moderates, and Conservatives on their
support for censoring swearing, F(553)=1.21, p =.298, and there was a marginally significant
effect for gore, F(552)=2.55, p =.079, with simple effects revealing a significant difference only
between Liberals and Conservatives, p=.026.
Figure 2
Censorship means and standard errors for swearing and gore passages by categorical
ideological group in Study 1
Note. Full (7-point) censorship scale was slightly truncated for ease of visualization.
Discussion
Results were generally as expected. Participants, but especially Liberals, tended to be
more censorious of information that portrays low-status groups unfavorably than identical
information that portrays high-status groups unfavorably. Study 2 sought to replicate and extend
these results to three college-aged samples by recruiting university students and young adults
rather than a broader range of adults as in Study 1.
Study 2
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Study 2 replicated Study 1 in three college-aged samples (roughly ages 18-26) in the
U.S., the U.K., and Hungary. We expected similar patterns of results, but perhaps with stronger
main effects for the experimental manipulations because younger people tend to lean more
liberal than adults.
Method
Participants. This study was not preregistered because we could not anticipate sample
sizes for two of our three samples (both relied on our ability to recruit as many participants as
possible within a limited time frame). Sample sizes for each sample were determined in different
ways. For the U.K. sample, we collected the maximum number of participants we could during
the 2020 spring semester at a British university (n=128; Mage=19.43, SD=1.07; 112 female). This
sample size is quite small, and thus all results for British participants are interpreted with
caution. For the U.S. sample, we recruited 449 participants from Prolific Academic based on
funds available to pay, restricting participation to those currently living in the U.S. and between
ages 18 and 26 (n=449; Mage=22.29, SD=2.79; 207 female). For the Hungarian sample, we
collected the maximum number of participants we could by the end of October 2020 at a
Hungarian university (n=480; Mage=21.71, SD=3.93; 375 female). The overall sample (n=1057;
Mage=21.68, SD=3.35; 694 female) leaned slightly liberal (M=3.08, SD=1.31; US M=2.93,
SD=1.39; UK M=3.06, SD=1.09; Hungary M=3.24, SD=1.28).
Procedure. The procedure and analyses were nearly identical to our preregistered Study
1 with the exceptions that (1) our recruitment strategies and samples differed as described above,
(2) no attention check was included, (3) for Hungarian participants, all materials were translated
to Hungarian, and (4) our analyses included country predictors and their interactions.
Results
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In three separate regressions, we regressed censoriousness on the experimental
manipulations, ideology (centered), a UK dummy variable, a Hungarian dummy variable, and all
two-way and three-way interactions.
Leadership. As can be seen in Table 3, there was a significant main effect of the sex
condition such that participants supported more censorship of the passage indicating that men
evolved to be better leaders than women than the reverse passage. There was no significant main
effect of ideology. And the predicted interaction emerged. Neither country dummy variable
significantly moderated the condition x ideology interaction, suggesting the patterns were similar
across countries. Given these non-significant moderations, we dropped the country variables and
their interactions for purposes of testing simple slopes. However, the upcoming categorical
results report and display results overall and for each country separately.
More liberal participants supported censorship more when the passage indicated men
were better leaders than women than vice versa (b=2.17), t=13.17, p<.001. More conservative
participants displayed a similar but weaker pattern (b=1.15), t=6.97, p<.001. In the condition in
which women were said to be better leaders, more liberal ideology was associated with more
support for censorship (b=-.23), t=-2.75, p=.006. In the condition in which men were said to be
better leaders, this was reversed, with more liberal ideology predicting less support for
censorship (b=.16), t=2.92, p=.004.
Violence. There was a significant main effect of the religion condition such that
participants supported more censorship of the passage arguing that Islam was violent than the
passage arguing that Christianity is violent. There was no main effect of ideology. We again
found the predicted significant interaction. Neither country dummy variable significantly
moderated the condition x ideology interaction, suggesting the patterns were similar across
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countries, thus we again dropped the country variables and their interactions for purposes of
testing simple slopes.
Consistent with predictions, liberal participants supported censorship more when the
passage indicated that Islam was violent than that Christianity was violent (b=1.65), t=4.53,
p<.001. More conservative participants displayed the same pattern to a weaker extent (b=.83),
t=2.30, p=.022. In the condition in which Islam was said to be violent, more liberal ideology
predicted more support for censorship (b=-.17), t=-2.70, p=.007. In the condition in which
Christianity was said to be violent, this relationship was reversed, with more liberal ideology
predicting less support for censorship (b=.14), t=2.54, p=.011.
Intelligence. There was a significant main effect of the race condition such that
participants supported more censorship of the passage indicating that White people score higher
on intelligence tests than Black people than the identical passage indicating the reverse. There
was no main effect of ideology. Here, we observed no significant interaction between the
condition and ideology, p=.128, although the pattern was in the expected direction. Again,
country did not significantly moderate the (non-significant) condition x ideology interaction, and
so we again dropped the country variables and their interactions for purposes of testing simple
slopes.
Consistent with predictions, liberal participants supported censorship more when the
passage indicated White people score higher on intelligence tests than Black people than vice
versa (b=2.04), t=12.26, p<.001. More conservative participants displayed the same pattern to a
slightly weaker extent (b=1.34), t=8.04, p<.001. In the condition in which Black people were
said to score higher on intelligence tests, there was no effect of ideology on censorship support
CENSORSHIP ON CAMPUSES
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(b=.03), t=0.54, p=.591. However, in the condition in which White people were said to score
higher, more liberal ideology predicted more support for censorship (b=-.23), t=-3.70, p<.001.
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Table 3
Support for censorship regressed on condition, ideology, country, and interactions in Study 2
β
t
p
95% CI
semipartial
Lower
Upper
r
Leadership
Sex Condition
.31
7.39
<.001
0.86
1.49
.199
Ideology
.11
1.95
.052
0.00
0.31
.052
UK Dummy
-.05
-1.27
.206
-0.78
0.17
-.034
Hungary Dummy
-.24
-6.18
<.001
-1.23
-0.63
-.166
Condition x Ideology
-.19
-3.68
<.001
-0.64
-0.20
-.099
Condition x UK
-.05
-1.26
.207
-1.10
0.24
-.034
Condition x Hungary
.24
5.23
<.001
0.73
1.60
.141
UK x Ideology
-.02
-0.37
.709
-0.47
0.32
-.010
Hungary x Ideology
.04
0.81
.417
-0.13
0.30
.022
Condition x UK x Ideology
.03
0.67
.500
-0.39
0.80
.018
Condition x Hungary x Ideology
-.03
-0.55
.583
-0.43
0.24
-.015
Violence
Religion Condition
.29
6.57
<.001
0.78
1.45
.190
Ideology
.09
1.56
.120
-0.04
0.30
.045
UK Dummy
-.04
-0.96
.336
-0.74
0.25
-.028
Hungary Dummy
-.13
-2.98
.003
-0.79
-0.16
-.086
Condition x Ideology
-.12
-2.07
.039
-0.49
-0.01
-.060
Condition x UK
.01
0.29
.770
-0.60
0.82
.008
Condition x Hungary
.05
0.97
.331
-0.24
0.70
.028
UK x Ideology
-.04
-0.97
.335
-0.67
0.23
-.028
Hungary x Ideology
.04
0.69
.490
-0.15
0.32
.020
Condition x UK x Ideology
.06
1.34
.180
-0.20
1.05
.039
Condition x Hungary x Ideology
-.07
-1.37
.171
-0.59
0.11
-.040
IQ
Race Condition
.27
6.44
<.001
0.78
1.47
.177
Ideology
-.01
-0.21
.836
-0.20
0.16
-.006
UK Dummy
-.05
-1.24
.215
-0.84
0.19
-.034
Hungary Dummy
-.25
-6.20
<.001
-1.35
-0.70
-.170
Condition x Ideology
-.08
-1.53
.128
-0.44
0.06
-.042
Condition x UK
-.04
-0.86
.393
-1.05
0.41
-.023
Condition x Hungary
.25
5.43
<.001
0.85
1.82
.149
UK x Ideology
.01
0.18
.856
-0.43
0.52
.005
Hungary x Ideology
.07
1.34
.180
-0.08
0.41
.037
Condition x UK x Ideology
.01
0.28
.780
-0.55
0.74
.008
Condition x Hungary x Ideology
-.09
-1.79
.074
-0.70
0.03
-.049
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Patterns within countries. Despite that the country dummy variables did not
significantly moderate the interactions between condition and ideology, we report the results by
country in Table 4. Across all countries, the experimental manipulations always had a significant
effect such that young adults were more censorious of passages that portray low-status groups
unfavorably than of passages that portray high-status groups unfavorably. The interactions
between the experimental manipulations and ideology were in the expected direction for all
passages in the U.S., but this pattern was statistically significant for the leadership passage,
p<.001, and the violence passage, p=.027, but not the IQ passage, p=.103. In the U.K., the
interactions between the experimental manipulations and ideology were in the expected direction
only for the leadership passage and to a small degree the IQ passage, and none of the interactions
were statistically significant. Recall the U.K. sample was much smaller than the others, so these
estimates may be unreliable. In Hungary, the interactions between the experimental
manipulations and ideology were significant and in the expected direction across all passages,
ps<.001. These main effects and interactions are meta-analyzed below.
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Table 4
Support for censorship regressed on condition, ideology, and the interaction in Study 2
β
t
p
95% CI
semipartial
Lower
Upper
r
U.S.
Leadership
Sex Condition
.33
7.56
<.001
0.87
1.48
.330
Ideology
.12
1.99
.047
0.00
0.31
.087
Condition x Ideology
-.23
-3.76
<.001
-0.64
-0.20
-.164
Violence
Religion Condition
.32
7.05
<.001
0.80
1.42
.314
Ideology
.11
1.67
.095
-0.02
0.29
.075
Condition x Ideology
-.14
-2.22
.027
-0.47
-0.03
-.099
IQ
Race Condition
.31
6.90
<.001
0.81
1.45
.308
Ideology
-.02
-0.22
.825
-0.19
0.15
-.010
Condition x Ideology
-.11
-1.63
.103
-0.42
0.04
-.073
U.K.
Leadership
Sex Condition
.24
2.72
.008
0.20
1.28
.238
Ideology
.06
0.48
.633
-0.25
0.41
.042
Condition x Ideology
-.10
-0.85
.398
-0.72
0.29
-.074
Violence
Religion Condition
.37
4.43
<.001
0.67
1.76
.372
Ideology
-.06
-0.47
.637
-0.45
0.27
-.040
Condition x Ideology
.08
0.69
.491
-0.33
0.68
.058
IQ
Race Condition
.23
2.66
.009
0.21
1.41
.234
Ideology
.02
0.12
.904
-0.39
0.44
.011
Condition x Ideology
-.05
-0.36
.723
-0.66
0.46
-.031
Hungary
Leadership
Sex Condition
.55
14.36
<.001
2.02
2.66
.547
Ideology
.15
3.15
.002
0.09
0.40
.120
Condition x Ideology
-.19
-3.93
<.001
-0.77
-0.26
-.150
Violence
Religion Condition
.32
7.38
<.001
0.99
1.70
.318
Ideology
.13
2.38
.018
0.04
0.39
.102
Condition x Ideology
-.20
-3.51
<.001
-0.77
-0.22
-.151
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IQ
Race Condition
.53
13.24
<.001
2.10
2.83
.518
Ideology
.08
1.65
.099
-0.03
0.32
.065
Condition x Ideology
-.18
-3.58
<.001
-0.81
-0.24
-.140
Cross-check and visualization. We again created a categorical ideology variable for
Liberals (n=661), Moderates (n=259), and Conservatives (n=135) in twelve 2 (condition) x 3
(categorical ideology) ANOVAs on support for censorship, first collapsed across all countries,
and then within each country. These results are reported and displayed in Table 5 and Figure 3,
and the statistical significance of all simple effects between conditions within each ideological
group overall and by country are reported in Table 6. Below, we summarize the results most
central to the present hypotheses.
There were significant main effects of all three experimental manipulations overall,
within the U.S., and within Hungary. In the U.K., this was significant for the violence passage,
marginal for the IQ passage, and not significant for the leadership passage.
The interactions between the experimental manipulations and ideology were less
consistent. These were significant overall for the leadership passage and intelligence passage, but
not the violence passage. Within the U.S., the interaction was significant only for the leadership
passage. Within the U.K., the interaction was marginal only for the violence passage. Within
Hungary, the interaction was significant or marginal for all three passages.
Moving on to simple effects, displayed in Table 6, the experimental manipulation had a
significant effect among Liberals overall, within the U.S., within the U.K., and within Hungary
for all three passages (consistent with hypotheses). Among Moderates, the experimental
manipulation had a significant effect for all three passages overall and within the U.S. and
Hungary. Within the UK, the experimental manipulation had no significant effects for
CENSORSHIP ON CAMPUSES
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Moderates. Among Conservatives, the experimental manipulations had a significant effect for all
three passages overall. For Conservatives within the U.S. and UK, this was significant only for
the violence passage, and within Hungary, this was significant only for the leadership and IQ
passages.
Overall interpretation. The overall pattern across samples appears consistent with our
hypotheses. There were strong main effects for the experimental manipulation such that all
young adults across the ideological spectrum and within the U.S., U.K., and Hungary were more
censorious of information that portrays low-status groups unfavorably than information that
portrays high-status groups unfavorably. This pattern is especially characteristic of young adults
who identify as relatively liberal, and it becomes somewhat weaker and more inconsistent among
young adults who identify as more conservative. These patterns were tested in the upcoming
meta-analyses.
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28"
Table 5
ANOVA results overall and within each country with categorical ideology in Study 2
Overall
US
UK
Hungary
F
p
ηp2
F
p
ηp2
F
p
ηp2
F
p
ηp2
Leadership
Sex Condition
99.27
***
.09
16.50
***
.04
1.19
.278
.01
98.19
***
.17
Ideology
0.50
0.605
.00
0.47
.625
.00
0.74
.481
.01
0.01
.992
.00
Condition x Ideology
11.81
***
.02
7.05
**
.03
1.01
.367
.02
6.45
**
.03
Violence
Religion Condition
65.43
***
.06
27.41
***
.06
21.13
***
.15
22.70
***
.05
Ideology
0.20
.821
.00
0.03
.969
.00
0.36
.701
.01
0.32
.727
.00
Condition x Ideology
1.80
.166
.00
1.72
.181
.01
2.97
+
.05
2.87
+
.01
IQ
Race Condition
108.25
***
.09
24.04
***
.05
3.07
+
.03
91.13
***
.16
Ideology
2.49
+
.01
1.48
.229
.01
0.59
.556
.01
1.35
.259
.01
Condition x Ideology
3.31
*
.01
0.67
.512
.00
0.10
.910
.00
4.42
*
.02
Note. + p<.100, * p<.050, ** p<.010, *** p<.001
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29"
Figure 3
Means and standard errors of support for censorship by experimental conditions and categorical ideology for each passage type in
the overall young adult samples and among young adults within each country in Study 2
Overall
Note. Full (7-point) censorship scale was truncated for ease of visualization.
Censor Leadership
Censor Violence
Censor IQ
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30"
Table 6
Significance of simple effects between conditions by ideological group overall and
within countries in Study 2
Overall
US
UK
Hungary
Leadership
Liberals
***
***
**
***
Moderates
***
**
ns
***
Conservatives
*
ns
ns
**
Violence
Liberals
***
***
**
***
Moderates
***
*
ns
***
Conservatives
**
*
***
ns
IQ
Liberals
***
***
*
***
Moderates
***
***
ns
***
Conservatives
**
ns
ns
**
Note. Ns p>.100, * p<.050, ** p<.010, *** p<.001
Swearing and gore. Figure 4 displays mean censoriousness among Liberals, Moderates,
and Conservatives for swearing and gore.4 As in Study 1, more conservative ideology predicted
higher support for censoring swearing, r=.22, p<.001, and gore, r=.17, p<.001. For the swearing
passage, there was a significant main effect of country, F(2, 964)=13.55, p<.001, and ideology,
F(2, 964)=23.19, p<.001. There was no interaction between country and ideology, p>.100. In the
U.S., Moderates were more censorious than Liberals, p<.001, and marginally more censorious
than Conservatives, p=.051, and Liberals and Conservatives did not differ, p=.173. In the UK,
Liberals were less censorious than Moderates, p<.001, and marginally less censorious than
Conservatives, p=.081, and Moderates and Conservatives did not differ, p=.295. In Hungary,
Liberals were less censorious than Moderates, p=.003 and Conservatives, p=.001, and Moderates
and Conservatives did not differ, p=.495.
4Because of an error, a subset of Hungarian participants were randomly assigned to either
swearing or gore rather than receiving both, thus the n is somewhat smaller for these passages
than the passages containing experimental manipulations.
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For the gore passage, there was a significant main effect of country, F(2, 962)=29.19,
p<.001, and ideology, F(2, 962)=13.11, p<.001. There was no interaction between country and
ideology, p>.100. In the U.S., Moderates were more censorious than Liberals, p<.001, and
Conservatives, p=.006, and Liberals and Conservatives did not differ, p=.300. In the UK,
Moderates were more censorious than Liberals, p=.018, and marginally more censorious than
Conservatives, p=.060, and Liberals and Conservatives did not differ, p=.700.
In Hungary, Liberals were less censorious than Moderates, p=.031, and Conservatives, p=.038,
and Moderates and Conservatives did not differ, p=.843.
Figure 4
Support for censoring swearing passage and gore passage by ideological group (see top right
key) and country in Study 2
Note. Error bars are standard errors.
Mini Metas
As a last step, we conducted six mini meta-analyses on the main effects of each of the
three experimental manipulations and their interactions with ideology for each of the three
passages.
Method
Censor Swearing
Censor Gore
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We included one effect size for each of our four samples across Studies 1 and 2 for a total
of four effect sizes and 1616 participants per meta-analysis. We used procedures outlined by Goh
and colleagues (2016). For both the main effects of the experimental manipulations and the
interaction effects between the experimental manipulations and continuous ideology, we used the
semipartial rs as effect size estimates. The r effect sizes were then Fisher’s Z transformed to rzs.
Because the study methods were identical across samples, we conducted fixed effects meta-
analyses, which weight by sample size (see Goh et al., 2016). The rzs were weighted and
averaged using the formula: Weighted r
[z=Σ([N-3]rz)/Σ(N-3). The r
[zs were then converted back
to r effect sizes. To estimate statistical significance, we used the Stouffer’s Z test, in which the p
values for each effect size were converted to Zs, combined using the formula: Zcombined=Σ Z /
sqrt(k), and then converted back to ps.
Results
Main effects. There were significant main effects for the sex condition, r=.35, p<.00001,
the religion condition, r=.23, p<.00001, and the race condition, r=.33, p<.00001. Participants
were more censorious of information that portrays low-status groups unfavorably than
information that portrays high-status groups unfavorably. Figure 5 displays the effect sizes for
the main effect of the experimental manipulations by passage and sample.
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Figure 5
Effect sizes for the main effects of the experimental manipulations within each passage type and
by each sample
Note. Positive values indicate that participants were more censorious of information that portrays
low-status groups unfavorably than identical information that portrays high-status groups
unfavorably.
Interaction effects. There were significant interactions between ideology and the sex
condition, r=-.13, p<.00001, between ideology and the religion condition, r=-.12, p=.00002, and
between ideology and the race condition, r=-.10, p=.00007. The main effects were larger among
participants who identified as more liberal.
-0,6 -0,4 -0,2 0 0,2 0,4 0,6 0,8
Intelligence
Violence
Leadership
US Adults US Young Adults UK Young Adults Hungarian Young Adults
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Figure 6
Effect sizes for the interaction effects between ideology and each experimental manipulation
within each passage type and by sample
Note. Negative values indicate that the experimental manipulations had larger effects as
participants were more liberal.
General Discussion
Across four different samples (US adults, and US, UK, and Hungarian young adults) and
three domains (sex and leadership ability, religion and violence, and race and IQ scores), we
found consistent evidence for our hypothesis that people would be more censorious of
information that portrays low-status groups unfavorably than identical information that portrays
high-status groups unfavorably. Also as hypothesized, this tendency was stronger as participants
identified as more liberal. These patterns were confirmed in meta-analyses across all three
passage types, suggesting that information that portrays low-status groups unfavorably likely
-0,3 -0,2 -0,1 0 0,1 0,2 0,3
US Adults US Young Adults UK Young Adults Hungarian Young Adults
Leadership
Violence
Intelligence
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constitutes a domain of sensitivity in modern Western societies that provokes desires for
censorship—at least on university campuses.
In recent years, scholars and other public intellectuals have become increasingly
concerned about censorship on campuses, with numerous media outlets publishing articles on
speaker “shout downs” and disinvitations; students protesting books, courses, and faculty
members; and in rare cases, professors getting fired or asked to resign for their research or other
speech (Clark et al., 2023). Beyond anecdotes, the present work is the first (to our knowledge) to
forward and systematically test a specific domain that is likely to be a target of such efforts.
Although there are many types of information people may wish to censor for various reasons,
one type of information people wish to censor is information that portrays low-status groups
unfavorably. Thus, we expect that data, books, scholarly papers, media articles, professors,
researchers, teachers, and journalists who forward this sort of information will be subject to
particularly high censorship pressure.
We theorized that these desires for censorship would be stronger among Liberals because
Liberals are more averse to inequality and more protective of relatively low-status groups
compared to Conservatives; and indeed, this is what we found. However, both Moderates and
Conservatives demonstrated similar patterns (albeit weaker and less consistent) as Liberals, and
particularly among the young adult samples. Young adult Conservatives looked quite similar to
adult Liberals, and young adult Liberals looked perhaps like more extreme adult Liberals. We
cannot know from the present work whether this is a cohort effect or an age effect, but if the
former, we perhaps can expect this particular censorship preference to increase into the future.
The present findings are consistent with a growing body of literature showing that
people—but especially Liberals—evaluate information that favors low-status groups more
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positively than identical information that favors higher status groups (e.g., Axt et al., 2016;
Purser & Harper, 2023; Schaerer et al., 2023; Stewart-Williams et al., 2021; von Hippel & Buss,
2017; Winegard et al., 2023; see also Clark et al., 2019; Clark & Winegard, 2020). Such patterns
are consistent with the idea that people interact with information in ways meant to reverse
existing hierarchies—but they challenge the conventional wisdom that people hold double
standards in ways that harm low-status groups and reinforce existing hierarchies. Instead, in
modern Western societies, at least in recent years, information evaluations seem designed to help
low-status groups and eliminate or possibly even reverse existing hierarchies. It seems quite
possible that this is a relatively recent phenomenon and that ten, twenty, thirty, or forty+ years
ago, people displayed more traditional patterns of discrimination against women and racial and
religious minorities, but that now, people increasingly display the opposite patterns (see, e.g.,
Schaerer et al., 2023). Future work should meta-analyze whether group-based evaluative biases
have changed in their direction over time.
Recent work has identified similar tendencies such that people (and especially Liberals)
“are easier” on relatively low-status groups. For example, people upwardly adjust their
evaluations of essays when they learn a writer is female (Jampol & Zayas, 2021), people have
more generous acceptance criteria for admitting Black than White candidates to an honor society
(Axt et al., 2016); people present less self-competence to Black than White people (Dupree &
Fiske, 2019); and people find jokes at the expense of high-status groups funnier than jokes at the
expense of low-status groups (Purser & Harper, 2023). Some scholars have suggested that such
patterns are patronizing and ultimately could harm the very groups these behaviors are intended
to help. Could the same be said of having different standards for censoring information? Does
censoring information that appears critical of low-status groups halt opportunities for such
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groups to grow, develop thick skin, and improve? Or, as likely intended, does censoring such
information prevent disadvantages such as psychological harm and negative stereotypes? We
cannot know from the present work whether these tendencies are harmful or helpful or morally
justified or not—only that they exist. We hope future work will explore downstream
consequences of these kinds of behaviors.
The present results raise potential challenges for universities—which, first and foremost,
are meant to pursue truth and generate empirically accurate knowledge through a vigorous clash
of ideas. If groups are not identical in all ways, and many characteristics carry some valence,
occasionally, empirical reality will cast low-status groups in a relatively negative light compared
to high-status groups. This opens the possibility that empirically correct information could be
subject to censorship on university campuses—at least in some cases (see, e.g., Clark et al.,
2024). A perfect understanding of empirical reality is often a moving target, such that even
relevant experts do not always know which information they can reject. In other words, there is
no easy and straightforward way to designate which varieties of censorship are excluding
incorrect or deleterious information from discourse and which varieties are excluding correct or
useful information. Our results support the notion that people may occasionally wish to exclude
information for moral reasons rather than purely accuracy reasons (Clark et al., 2023). We
suspect some universities will find moral concerns a legitimate basis for excluding information
from their libraries and classrooms while others might not—nonetheless, universities likely will
have to continue to grapple with this challenge now and into the future.
Limitations
There are a number of limitations to the present work. First, our studies were all self-
report. Although participants may have expressed support for removing books from libraries and
CENSORSHIP ON CAMPUSES
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preventing professors from assigning books in classes, they may have overestimated (or
underestimated) their boldness in this regard. We hope our results will be helpful for future
researchers in testing whether censorship behaviors in the real world (e.g., protesting the
inclusion of books, signing petitions to have scholars fired, etc.) are similarly higher for
information that portrays low-status groups unfavorably (and the scholars who forward such
information). Although challenging, such efforts should distinguish behaviors that can appear
censorious but constitute legitimate scientific criticism (such as aiming to obstruct the
publication of a scientific paper based purely on quality concerns) from actual censorship (efforts
to obstruct the publication of a scientific paper for reasons other than low quality). For example,
scholars could test for double standards in peer review at journals with open peer review such as
Qeios (Clark et al., 2023). Based on our results, one might predict that papers that portray low-
status groups negatively will be held to higher standards than papers that portray high-status
groups negatively.
Another limitation is that the U.K. sample was very small overall and thus we cannot
have full confidence in the results for the U.K. sample. Although patterns among the UK sample
were quite similar to the other three samples for the leadership and IQ passages, they were a bit
different for the violence passage. Specifically, whereas (similar to the other three samples) they
had stronger desires to censor information that suggested that Islam incited violence than
information that suggested that Christianity incited violence, this pattern slightly increased as
participants became more conservative. This might be surprising because higher religiosity is
associated with conservatism, and thus more conservative participants are more likely to be
Christians themselves. In other words, they are the high-status group that is being portrayed
unfavorably in the high-status condition, which they have relatively weak desires to censor.
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Because this sample was small, we are not confident that this pattern would replicate, but we
hope interested scholars will explore this possible pattern further.
This raises another limitation—we selected our high-status and low-status groups based
on dynamics in the U.S. (and previous work that tested these groups in the U.S. [Winegard et al.,
2023]), thus perceptions of what qualifies as a low-status group could be slightly different in
other countries. However, like the U.S., Great Britain and Hungary are both majority White (of
European ancestry) and Christian (although of different branches of Christianity). European
countries share many cultural ideas and patterns, even if they are different from each other as
well. Furthermore, our results (for the most part) were quite similar across all three countries. It
is unclear whether this means that the same groups are considered similarly in need of protection
in all three countries, or whether, perhaps through the widespread influence of U.S. culture, the
sensitivities of the U.S. have spread to other countries in the Western world.
Relatedly, we measured political ideology in only one way in all three countries, self-
reported along the liberal to conservative spectrum. Ideology, however, is a complex and
multidimensional construct (Costello & Lilienfeld, 2021; Costello et al., 2023) that is
complicated further still when comparing political ideology across countries (e.g., Fatke, 2017;
Nilsson et al., 2020). Future research should seek to replicate our findings using alternative
measures of ideology and should also seek to test whether alternative, but related individual
difference variables might better explain the patterns observed in the present work (e.g.,
authoritarianism, egalitarianism). More generally, we hope our findings will inspire future work
testing the generalizability and limitations of the observed patterns in other samples and
populations, using different and especially behavioral measures of censorship, and using
passages that regard different groups.
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Conclusion
Many scholars have sounded a tocsin about creeping censoriousness in the West,
worrying that it may interfere with a Millian marketplace of ideas, in which theories battle each
other and the truth prevails after a daunting gauntlet of competition. Our results suggest that
scholars and concerned citizens have reason to heed this alarm. Of course, it’s important not to
exaggerate or to politicize these concerns. All too often, such conversations devolve into claims
of right-wing or left-wing malevolence and illiberalism instead of a dispassionate discussion of
the underlying data and the challenges that they present. Our goal here is to shift the focus onto
the data. To grapple with a problem, scholars first need to understand it. But it is also worth
noting that norms about free speech have been a sacred part of Western civilization for hundreds
of years and that they, like all norms, are fragile, requiring constant care and vigilance. Those
who try to censor speech are rarely malevolent; rather, they legitimately believe that certain
kinds of speech and information are dangerous to society. That sense of moral righteousness is
perhaps humanity’s most noble and most dangerous motivation. And understanding it might be
the key to protecting the Millian marketplace for the next generation of scholars and scientists.
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