Content uploaded by Anton Vesper
Author content
All content in this area was uploaded by Anton Vesper on Jan 09, 2024
Content may be subject to copyright.
Department of Speech Communication, Argumentation Theory and Rhetoric
M.A. Discourse and Argumentation Studies
– Thesis –
Strategically Avoiding Escalation
Rerailing a Critical Discussion in a Most Civilized Way
Written by: Supervised by:
Anton Vesper (6308848) Dr. Bart Garssen
Dr. José Plug
Abstract: Van Eemeren and Houtlosser propose a pragma-dialectical strategy to repair
fallacious strategic maneuvers. With pointing at the mistake their idea to overtly rerail
contains the risk of face-threatening acts yielding the escalation of the situation.
Inspired by Searlean insights an alternative rerailment tool, a Relevance Question, is
developed. A Relevance Question is a relevant politeness strategy and a strategic
maneuver. Its aim is to initiate the rerailment of a specific fallacy and to make the
guilty party recognize his mode of strategic maneuvering as a violation of one
commandment from the neutral code of conduct. An instance of the tu quoque fallacy
is analyzed. Overtly rerailing yields negative social side-effects, the rerailment fails.
Rerailing with a pertaining Relevance Question turns out to be a well mannered and
successful way to repair the fallacy.
Amsterdam, 2011, June 17th
2
Table of Contents
1 Introduction .......................................................................................................................................... 4
2 Fallacies and Ideas of Fixing Them ................................................................................................... 5
2.1 Fallacies in Krabbe‟s Formal Dialectical Approach – Fixed with
Metadialogues? .......................................................................................................................................... 7
2.2 Jacobs‟ Notion of Fallacy – Realistic Fixing with Counter-Fallacies? ............................... 11
2.3 Fallacies in van Eemeren‟s (Extended) Pragma-Dialectical Approach –
Fixing with Rerailments ........................................................................................................................ 13
3 Rerailment in Practice ....................................................................................................................... 18
3.1 Introduction to the Relevance Theory as a Pragmatic Meter .................................................. 19
3.2 Two Views on Relevance ......................................................................................................... 21
3.3 Introduction to the Politeness Theory as a Pragmatic Meter .................................................. 22
3.4 The Problem to be Solved: an Accusation of Being Mistaken as an
Additional Interactional Effort ............................................................................................................ 23
3.5 A Solution to the Problem: Relevance Questions ...................................................................... 25
3.6 The Example: A Case of tu quoque .......................................................................................... 31
3.6.1 Van Eemeren and Houtlosser‟s Rerailment Strategy in Actual
Execution............................................................................................................................................ 32
3.6.2 A Rerailment with a Relevance Question ..................................................................... 35
4 Conclusion .......................................................................................................................................... 38
5 References .......................................................................................................................................... 40
3
4
1 Introduction
Fallacies are objectives in actual argumentative discussion
1
since they obstruct the
reasonable resolution of the difference of opinion on the merits. Properly reacting to
a fallacy is a crucial task of the parties in practice in order to keep the discussion
going. In the concept of strategic maneuvering, thus in actual discussions
2
, fallacies are
called derailments of strategic maneuvering. In order to get back on a reasonable track of
the discussion rerailments of strategic maneuvering repair the fallacies. Hence fallacies and
their repair in actual argumentative discussions can be explained within the
theoretical framework of strategic maneuvering which is therefore used as the
departure in this thesis.
This thesis is concerned with “[…] fallacies that may hinder the resolution
process but do not completely block the discussion.” (van Eemeren & Houtlosser,
2009: 199)
3
The aim of the thesis is to present a practical guideline how to rerail a
derailment in an actual argumentative discussion. The research question to be
answered is:
How should parties who perceive a move as fallacious act in order to
repair this derailment of strategic maneuvering in a most civilized way
4
,
so the discussion can accomplish its end?
Chapter 2 is the theoretical basis of the thesis. It reflects on the state of arts of
dialectical theories and how they suggest parties to react on moves they have
perceived as fallacious. Krabbe‟s formal dialectical approach to fallacies is discussed
(2.1). Then Jacobs‟ normative pragmatic approach to fallaciousness is regarded (2.2).
1
“Actual” means “in reality”. The practical actual argumentation is demarcated from the argumentation
in the theoretical ideal model of a critical discussion.
2
Parties in actual argumentative discussions are assumed to maneuver strategically in order to
reconcile their dialectical obligations and their rhetorical goals (van Eemeren, 2010: 40).
3
There are other possibilities how a fallacy can affect the discussion. First, the fallacy hinders the
continuation of the discussion, so the critical exchange stops. This could be the case when a person
harshly attacks his opponent with an abusive ad hominem. Second, the parties could ignore the fallacy.
Still they could go on trying to resolve their difference of opinion, but by leaving the fallacy pass by
unnoticed their reasonable resolution procedure – by definition – has been worsened by the
unreasonable move.
4
In order to prevent the discussion from escalating “a most civilized way” means that face-threats are
avoided to not destroy the relation between the parties.
5
Next, van Eemeren‟s extended pragma-dialectical theory is elaborated on. Two
conditions as well as five analytically distinguished steps for a felicitous rerailment are
extracted (2.3).
Chapter 3 is the practical component of the thesis dealing with the rerailment
of fallacious moves in actual argumentative discussions. In order to tackle actual
discourse the pragmatic Relevance Theory (3.1) is introduced. After having refined the
type of relevance used in the thesis (3.2) the Politeness Theory is presented as a second
pragmatic theory (3.3). Then, the insights gathered are used to evaluate the rerailment
concept proposed by van Eemeren and Houtlosser in terms of face-threatening acts
which may lead to an inefficient processing of the input information, thus impeding
the optimal understanding of the speaker‟s intention to initiate a rerailment, thus
impeding the most reasonable resolution of the difference of opinion (3.4). A
solution to this problem is presented with the idea of Relevance Questions which are
shown to be strategic maneuvers (3.5). According to an example of tu quoque first a
pragma-dialectical rerailment scenario following the concept of van Eemeren and
Houtlosser is presented, then a scenario with a Relevance Question is shown (3.6).
Chapter 4 is the conclusion of the thesis. It sums it up and assesses the scopes
of Relevance Questions to fix fallacious argumentation in actual argumentative
discussions.
2 Fallacies and Ideas of Fixing Them
Current dialectical theories under observation in this chapter are formal dialectics
represented by Erik Krabbe, normative pragmatics represented by Scott Jacobs and
pragma-dialectics represented by Frans van Eemeren and Peter Houtlosser.
Erik Krabbe departs from the approach of formal dialectics. He considers
argumentation as the only means to resolve a conflict between at least two parties
(Krabbe, 2002: 156). The critical exchange checking the acceptability of a thesis
before the background of certain concessions (premises, starting points) that the
parties have agreed upon
5
is conducted within the strict boundaries of a set of rules.
5
Hence the parties argue ex concessis.
6
Scott Jacobs‟ is a normative pragmatist. Argumentation is considered to be a
social activity to overcome doubts and to answer objections. In dependence of the
context – an ideal argument is a “fitting response to the circumstances of its occurrence”
(Jacobs, 2000: 273, italics by A.V.) – the participants accept (or reject) an
argumentation to reasonably justify (or reject) a claim. Jacobs argues that a rhetorical
strategy, which means purposefully handling content and form of one‟s argumentation in
the given discursive situation, is the strategic rationale of ordinary language users
who aim at “foreseeable consequences” (Jacobs, 2009: 56, 58).
6
Frans van Eemeren and Peter Houtlosser departing from the pragma-
dialectical approach consider argumentation to occur in a critical discussion between
a protagonist and an antagonist aiming at reasonably resolving their difference of
opinion by arguing ex concessis (van Eemeren & Grootendoorst, 1994: 20). 15
technical rules (first order conditions) embody reasonableness and govern the critical
exchange.
7
Moreover they are used as norms to reconstruct an actual argumentative
discourse into the ideal model of a critical discussion. The pragmatic dimension of pragma-
dialectics is the arguer‟s use of speech acts in actual argumentative discourse. The
dialectical dimension is derived from the rule-governed achievement of the main-
and subgoals during a critical discussion. Strategic Maneuvering as the Extended Theory of
Pragma-Dialectics fits well into the pragmatic and dialectic stances. It bridges the gap
between dialectic and pragmatic by taking into account rhetorical insights.
Essentially, it reconciles the resolution-oriented dialectical obligations, i.e. following
the rules of a critical discussion, and the acceptance-oriented rhetorical aims of the
participants in the given context.
8
Rhetorical insights are functionally incorporated in
– and obedient to – the dialectical frame of rules by only taking those rhetorical
6
Jacobs‟ pragmatic theory becomes rhetorical in the sense that the context-dependent reasonableness
implies a relativistic concept of rationality. Indeed, “foreseeable consequences” which should still be
in line with the rationality of argumentation (to overcome doubts and answer objections) could be
easier achieved with one audience than with another, depending on how critical the audience is. Hence
Jacobs has a tendency to a persuasive-oriented, relativistic and rhetorical perspective.
7
In Fallacies and Judgments of Reasonableness (2009) van Eemeren, Garssen and Meuffels present evidence
from empirical research that the pragma-dialectical rules indeed do correspond to actual
argumentative discussions. For instance, fallacious moves are perceived as less reasonable.
8
The macro-context, the Communicative Activity Type, on the one hand constrains the strategic
maneuvering and on the other hand provides opportunities to maneuver strategically and therefore
has to be taken into account by the actual arguers and hence by the analyst (van Eemeren, 2010: 129 -
162).
7
viewpoints into account that play a constructive role in the (dialectical)
reconstruction of discourse (van Eemeren, 2010: 90).
2.1 Fallacies in Krabbe’s Formal Dialectical Approach – Fixed with
Metadialogues?
According to the formal dialectical theory of argumentation discussants resolving a
conflict need to argue from the commitments the parties can be held responsible for,
i.e. ex concessis. Moreover, they have to obey to the rules for the critical testing
procedure of a thesis that Barth and Krabbe provide in From Axiom to Dialogue
(1982).
Krabbe‟s concept of fallacies is simple and strict: any move that cannot be
shown to obey to the formal dialectical rules is a fallacy. With the help of profiles of
dialogue Krabbe (2002) describes this elaborately. In practice, profiles of dialogue
provide a “description of the dialogue” in the form of descriptive and empirical profiles of
possible oncoming moves in an argumentative discourse taken from reality (Krabbe,
2002: 154). The descriptive profiles display only moves that are permitted within the
normative boundaries of the formal dialectical rules, thus are seen as instantiations of
normative profiles. In order to determine fallaciousness, the observed (empirical,
descriptive) profile derived from actual argumentative practice and the theoretical
(abstract, normative) profile derived from the rules are compared. Deviations that
can be found lead to the identification of fallaciousness. Krabbe sums this up in the
following way:
“[…] [I]f we are in possession of a normative profile for the given type
of fragment, we can check whether […] this normative profile
coincides with, or […] is instantiated by, the concrete empirical profile.
If it happens to be the case the given fragment was in accordance with
the norms contained in the profile, if not we can point to the
discrepancies and […] criticize the given fragment as fallacious on
account of these discrepancies.” (Krabbe, 2002: 155)
8
The disadvantage of this idea is that the normative system loses its normativity if it is
being checked by empirical proof. In this sense it is not so clear how the profile can
uphold the claim to be normative. On the other hand, it is an advantage that not only
fallaciousness within the descriptive profile can be checked.
9
By constantly evaluating
argumentation with that “comparison method” an analyst can also check the worth –
and find potential errors – of the normative system he uses. If the same discrepancies
occur over and over again the analyst should wonder if his normative system is
appropriate to evaluate fragments from argumentative practice.
10
Krabbe examines some examples to identify fallacious argumentative moves
in his article Profiles of Dialogue as a Dialectical Tool (2002). For instance, he finds a
fallacious dialectical (internal) shift in the following example:
“Peter: The fine skating whether is holding.
Olga: Why?
Peter: Why not?” (Krabbe, 2002: 156)
Krabbe points out – based on a comparison between the normative profile of rules
11
and a descriptive profile of the actual discourse – that in the third turn Peter commits
the fallacy of shifting the burden of proof, since he does not advance argumentation
when asked to do so. What Krabbe misses, though, is that the third turn is also an
instance of the fallacy of evading the burden of proof. By counter-asking “Why not?”
Peter indeed shifts the burden of proof at Olga, but at the same time he evades his
obligation to give an answer on Olga‟s critical reaction given in the second turn.
Furthermore, Krabbe finds a straw man in the third turn because Peter fallaciously
attributes a standpoint to Olga by suggesting that she takes an opposing position.
Peter thereby claims she has a burden of proof to justify her position.
9
In my view the concept is indeed an “[…] instrument that serves as a heuristic device to obtain
adequate formalizations of dialogical normativity […]” (Krabbe, 2002: 155, italics by A.V.).
10
In this sense, constant comparisons of the profiles can be interpreted as an empirical testing method
to test the normative system.
11
Krabbe points out the fallaciousness by referring to the pragma-dialectical rules of a critical
discussion. He does not explain the fallacies to be violations of the formal dialectical rules. (Krabbe,
2002: 157)
9
Krabbe discusses an option to handle moves perceived as fallacious.
Unfortunately, his fallacy criticism does not describe how to repair a fallacy but how to
determine a fallacy as such:
12
A “fallacy criticism […] is upon the critic to show why an alleged move
in critical discussion is so completely wrong that it cannot […] be
accepted as a serious contribution to the discussion. Thus fallacy
criticism leads to a critical discussion on a second level, a discussion
about the permissibility of a move in the ground level discussion.”
(Krabbe, 2002: 162)
This definition of fallacy criticism is fully in line with the immanent dialectical view
Krabbe assigns to arguers.
13
The ground-level of the dispute is the initial discussion.
If the parties decide to negotiate about a potentially fallacious move from the initial
discussion this will take place in a metadialogue. A metadialogue is a “dialogue about a
dialogue or about some dialogues.” (Krabbe, 2003: 641) The fallacy criticism in the
first instance of metadialogue(s) is a second order discussion (Krabbe, 2002: 163) whose
purpose is to “[…] help the first [ground-level, A.V.] dialogue achieve its end […]”
(Krabbe, 2003: 641).
Thus Krabbe‟s fallacy criticism suggests what arguers are supposed to do
when they have perceived a move as fallacious, namely discuss in a metadialogue
whether the move has indeed been fallacious. But there are problems with that. The
immanent dialectical view makes the fallacy criticism a subjectively regulated
procedure. No recommendations or tools to be used for the procedure are
presented, e.g. when to enter a discussion about a potential fallacy and how a
metadialogue is likely to be successful, thus when and in which way it actually helps
the initial discussion achieve its end in practice. Presumably, the parties – perhaps
confusingly – debating about the potential error run danger that the fallacy leads
them to the end of their exchange without having found a reasonable solution or
12
In order to do justice to Krabbe it should be said that he never claims to show a concept how to
repair a fallacy in actual argumentative practice. He rather asks questions like “How is one to judge
Peter‟s last move?” (Krabbe, 2002: 156). Thus he is indeed more after determining fallacious moves as
such with the theoretical fallacy concept as background.
13
The immanent dialectical view means that the status, thus (non)fallaciousness, of an argument must
be decided in discussion by the participants themselves (Houtlosser & van Laar, 2007: 206).
10
maybe even into a quarrel about the potential fallacy.
14
In order to acquire a general
theory of fallacy-fixing, which can also be applied in actual discourse, it seems
desirable to have a general and systematic concept and procedure.
Another problem is Krabbe‟s tacit presupposition that the parties are
prepared to enter a metadialogue, which per definition might be about one or more
dialogues.
15
Maybe, for practical reasons of convenience, a party would rather leave a
potential fallacy pass than initiate a (meta)discussion about it. Leaving a fallacy pass
would mean to distort – or even seriously impede – the process of reasonably
resolving the conflict.
Finally, there are serious conceptual problems with the metadialogues. The
demarcation problem amounts to the question how to distinguish a ground-level
dialogue from a meta-level dialogue. The infinite regress problem should, at least for
practical reasons, be solved. The problem of equity amounts to the question how to
handle presumably fruitless metadialogues.
But suppose that the parties have indeed jointly determined a move as
fallacious. Krabbe gives no proposal how to repair the fallacy, so the arguers are “left
alone” with their insight into the fallaciousness of a certain move. In which way does
the fallacy criticism then “help the first dialogue achieve its end”? Essentially, the
only serious conclusion to be drawn with respect to repairing a fallacy is that the
“innocent party” who has not committed the fallacy should make the “guilty party”
retract his fallacy, as van Eemeren (2010: 258) points out.
16
14
Van Eemeren (2010: 254) also mentions that a fallacy might lead to the end of the exchange. But he
finds the reason for that in the strictness of the formal criteria in the formal dialectical theory of
fallacies. A party who has committed a fallacy and thereby dismisses himself automatically from the
“game” is likely to have immediately lost the discussion, he assumes.
15
It can be the case that another discussion on a third level about the second order discussion
emerges as Krabbe (2002: 162-163) shows in an example. On the third level the discussants have a
dispute about the correctness of discussing the “initial” fallacy (from the ground-level) on the second
level. The infinite regress problem means that in theory the system of metadialogues is infinite.
Krabbe asks “Where do all these questions [on meta-levels, A.V.] lead to?” (Krabbe, 2003: 641) It
could be the case that initiating a meta-discussion might turn out to be a fallacious move itself, hence
results in another metadialogue. Thus complex “systems of metadialogues” (Houtlosser & van Laar,
2007: 206) can come into being. In conclusion, if necessary, the parties need to accept a system of
metadialogues which would mean even more effort to – only! – determine a move as fallacious.
16
Besides, Krabbe introduces the (rather odd) idea that the guilty party has to “pay the fine of $1, that
goes with committing a fallacy” (Krabbe, 2002: 163). Two evaluative remarks on that: First, this
fallacy-treatment is not theoretically founded and second, it is certainly an odd idea for actual
11
2.2 Jacobs’ Notion of Fallacy – Realistic Fixing with Counter-Fallacies?
Jacobs promotes “conceptualizing argument situationally” to examine its function in
context (Jacobs, 2009: 61). A rhetorical strategy – and every argument put forth
necessarily implies a rhetorical strategy used (Jacobs, 2009: 56) – is good if it
increases the deliberative quality of the discourse. Jacobs extracts his definition of
fallacy:
“A fallacy is generally regarded as so bad that an argument is spoiled and
making such a charge suspends deliberation.” (Jacobs, 2009: 60)
A fallacious argument is somewhat a negative thing in the process of deliberation, a
bad rhetorical strategy. In order to identify a fallacy the analyst must wonder if the
argument (its rhetorical strategy) at issue improves or degrades the quality of
deliberation (Jacobs, 2009: 60-61). This can be found out by looking at the expressed
communicative intentions and the perlocutionary effects that have been obtained.
Such a take means a contextual dependency of argumentative soundness, thus
determinations of fallacies are relativistic (Jacobs, 2009: 64).
In Rhetoric and Dialectic from the Standpoint of Normative Pragmatics Jacobs (2000)
elaborates on the potential fallaciousness in a blunt emotional appeal from an ad of
pro-life-activists. The headline of the ad says:
“Killing mostly-born infants with a pair of scissors. We‟re debating this?”
Jacobs examines the value of the argumentation from an external moral stance.
17
He
analyzes the rhetorical strategy (the “color”, Jacobs, 2009: 56) of the argumentation
as “loaded and biased” (Jacobs, 2000: 277) which he exemplifies by the terms
“killing” and “infants”. Still Jacobs does not identify the example as fallacious per se.
He argues that there is an “inconsistency in ordinary discourse between the fact of
rhetorical strategy and the demands of argumentative ideals” (Jacobs, 2009: 60) and
concludes that fallacious moves might be permitted if they contribute to the
argumentative practice. Presumably, people would be oversensitive in identifying fallacies and discuss
moves endlessly in order to receive money from the other party.
17
Thus, Jacobs measures the argumentation against moral values and not against a set of normative
rules as previously described in Krabbe‟s approach.
12
discourse in a pragmatic sense, in fact when they reflect the arguer‟s effort to handle
the non-ideal argumentative reality. Several questions arise from that concept. If a
fallacy can be a permitted move, why then call it a fallacy?
18
What makes a fallacy a
somewhat negative thing in a deliberation process? What are the criteria that it does
(not) contribute to the deliberation process? And in general, when does a move
become an effort to manage the in non-ideal argumentative reality? Just as his
relativistic approach to rational argumentation and rhetorical strategy Jacobs‟ concept
of fallacy seems odd and arguers in actual argumentative discussants will have a hard
time only determining fallacies.
Jacobs says – and this seems to be a realistic stance – that in any situation the
task of the arguers is to “make the best of the situation” (Jacobs, 2000: 273), thus in
appearance of a fallacy this means “making the best of […] [a] bad situation.”
(Jacobs, 2000: 281). As seen, according to Jacobs, fallacies can be useful moves.
Consequently, Jacobs even finds a benefit in reacting on a fallacy with another fallacy
if it means making the best of the situation. Then, a counter-fallacy can be seen as “[…] a
way to call out and counterbalance the biases and defects in the argumentation of the
other side.” (Jacobs, 2000: 278)
Jacobs‟ proposal is not as realistic as it seems at first sight. The fallacy-fixing
idea with “making the best of a[n] […] bad situation” is vague. What means making
the best of a situation? Certainly, answering one bad move (fallacy) with another bad,
unconstructive move (counter-fallacy) will not “improve the overall quality of the
debate” in any given situation, but will rather be an obstacle in overcoming doubts and
answering objections in a constructive deliberation process.
19
In an actual argumentative
discussion reacting on a fallacy, e.g. take the one from Jacobs‟ example, with another
fallacy will rather lead into a quarrel than to a reasonable resolution of a conflict.
20
In
my view, van Eemeren and Houtlosser correctly observe the possibility “[…] that the
relation between the parties is damaged to such an extent that their appetite for
continuing the critical debate is lost forever.” (van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2009:
204)
18
Is there a distinction between fallacious fallacies and non-fallacious fallacies?
19
Besides, it is not clear what kind of “balance” Jacobs means, in which way it has been damaged,
how and why it is being restored (or counterbalanced) by a fallacious counter-move.
20
Imagine Jacobs‟ example is countered by an abusive or circumstantial ad hominem of similar expressive
force.
13
2.3 Fallacies in van Eemeren’s (Extended) Pragma-Dialectical Approach –
Fixing with Rerailments
In all stages of a critical discussion the speech acts have to conform to the normative
pragma-dialectical rules (van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2003: 388). The presumption of
reasonableness means that both protagonist and antagonist are expected to obey to the
first order conditions at every point of the critical discussion in order to resolve their
difference of opinion in a reasonable manner.
21
A fallacy is any functional mistake
against the rules, hence conditionally related to a certain stage and its speech acts:
“Every violation of any of the rules of the discussion procedure for
conducting a critical discussion (by whichever party and at whatever
stage in the discussion) is a fallacy.” (van Eemeren & Grootendorst,
2004: 175)
Their [of the fallacies] “[…] wrongness consists in the fact that they are a
hindrance or impediment to the resolution of a difference of opinion on
the merits.” (van Eemeren, 2010: 193)
Fallacies from contexts of actual argumentative discourse (pragmatic) are detected
normatively (dialectically). This definition of fallacies results in a systematic analysis
of fallacies with a common rationale for all fallacies. Every fallacy relates to a certain
stage and party.
Strategic maneuvering is considered sound “within the boundaries set by the
rules for critical discussion” (van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2007: 250). In the ambition
of being rhetorically effective with a fallacious move an arguer trespasses the
dialectical boundaries of a critical discussion (van Eemeren, 2010: 198, 264). Van
Eemeren and Houtlosser call a fallacious strategic maneuvering a derailment of strategic
maneuvering. There is a conditional relationship between the standard pragma-
dialectical concept of fallacies and the derailments: Every fallacy in a critical
discussion is a derailment of the strategic maneuvering and vice versa (van Eemeren,
2010: 198).
21
Cf. van Eemeren, 2010: 39, 199.
14
A fallacy judgment not only pertains to the dialectical norms but also to the
pragmatic environment of the argument at issue. Depending on the context – the
Activity Type – there is a continuum from clearly sound to clearly fallacious strategic
maneuvering. The Activity Type implements the general reasonableness criteria – the
first order conditions – in order to realize the institutional point.
22
In this sense the
problem-validity is regulated by the Activity Type and certain opportunities and
constrains to maneuver strategically within that specific macro-context emerge. A
party can “stretch the reasonableness” on the continuum and e.g. try to make a move
seem as if it was a reasonable move (van Eemeren, 2010: 256).
If, in a critical discussion, a party commits a fallacy this “[…] infringement is
not irreversible.” (van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2009: 201). Before the parties can
“[…] bring about a re-railment of the alleged derailment […]” (van Eemeren, 2010:
261) the derailment has to be figured out. The parties critically testing a standpoint
know and follow the pragma-dialectical commandments. Being critical plus the
knowledge of the normative requirements means the possibility to detect the fallacy.
Detecting the fallacy takes place in the mind of the parties and right on the spot of
the actual argumentation.
23
Suppose that the innocent party has indeed perceived a
fallacy. The first step to rerail the move is that he initiates the rerailment by pointing
out the fallacy.
24
“Once it has been pointed out by the other [the innocent, A.V.] party
that an offense against reasonableness has been committed, the
derailment of strategic maneuvering can be instantly repaired.” (van
Eeemeren & Houtlosser, 2009: 201)
When realizing step (1), the parties enter a meta- or subdiscussion about the fallacy.
Subdiscussions are about material starting points, thus about propositions that can be
used in the critical discussion at hand. Metadiscussions are about procedural starting
points, such as rules of procedure that have to be followed. Both meta- and
22
Cf. van Eemeren, 2010: 129-131, 138-162.
23
In this sense, the parties make use of Krabbe‟s profiles of dialogue where the ten commandments
from the Code of Conduct function as the normative system. The derailment is part of a descriptive
profile which fails to be a sound instantiation of the normative profile.
24
Note, that “the innocent party” can – depending on the Activity Type – also be a third party. For
instance, in the legal context a judge could be an institutional antagonist (Feteris, n.d.: 4).
15
subdiscussions are reconstructed as parts of the opening stage. Their function is to
establish the common ground in the critical discussion.
25
(van Eemeren, 2010: 242)
In a nutshell, when pointing out the derailment the innocent party refers to the starting
point that has been violated.
As the next step van Eemeren and Houtlosser state that the guilty party is
obliged to emphasize that he is still committed to the principle of reasonableness:
It is an “[…] imperative for the guilty parts to emphasize that his
general commitment to reasonableness still stands […]” (van Eemeren
& Houtlosser, 2009: 200).
26
Arguers maneuver strategically before the background of the presumption of
reasonableness. Suppose that the innocent party suspects an instance of
unreasonableness at his opponent‟s side and also “points it out”. In case the guilty
party does not signal his commitment to reasonableness the innocent party has to
assume that the critical discussion cannot conclusively obtain its highest goal of
resolving the difference of opinion because a critical discussion requires two
reasonably acting parties (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1984: 18).
Bound to the dialectical obligations of a critical discussion the guilty party has
to revise his instance of unreasonableness. Being prepared to do so is the first general
condition for rerailing a fallacious strategic maneuver.
27
The second general condition
is that the guilty party is not only prepared but also willing to bring the derailed
discussion back on track.
25
Thus it is agreed upon what propositions and rules can be used when arguing ex concessis. Arguing ex
concessis is manifested in the reasonableness criterion of the intersubjective validity. Also in case of a
rerailment arguing ex concessis is compulsory.
26
Reasonableness in actual argumentative discourse is displayed not only by the theoretical two-fold
criterion of pragma-dialectics, i.e. problem-validity and intersubjective validity (van Eemeren &
Grootendoorst, 1994: 20-21). A pragmatic manifestation of reasonableness, for instance, is Grice‟s
Cooperative Principle (CP) (Grice, 1975: 45-50). Following the CP a party is reasonable when he is
cooperative. If one of the parties is e.g. angry he is likely not to behave cooperatively, i.e. reasonable.
So he is no longer a reasonable discussant.
27
Van Eemeren admits an exception to the guilty party‟s obligation to maintain the commitment to
reasonableness: “In my view, only if the commitment of a fallacy signals a fundamental rejection of
the very Principle of Reasonableness does it not make sense to continue the discussion [at all, A.V.].”
(van Eemeren, 2010: 253) Here, the question is what a “fundamental rejection of the very Principle of
Reasonableness” amounts to.
16
As step (3) van Eemeren and Houtlosser suggest the innocent party to say
that the strategic maneuvering of the guilty party in this issue, to this opponent,
presented in this way (thus in this certain critical discussion with its common ground)
does not help to resolve the difference of opinion (van Eemeren, 2010: 260)
28
.
The guilty party should have the chance “[…] to undo the derailment and re-
rail the maneuvering […]” (van Eemeren, 2010: 260), i.e. he should come up with a
suggestion to correct the fallacious move, which is step (4) of the procedure. Every
strategic maneuver brings about the three aspects of strategic maneuvering (van
Eemeren, 2010: 93-128). Depending on the fact which of the three aspects is the
most conspicuous one a certain mode of strategic maneuvering can be identified. For
instance, maneuvering by conciliation – using the technique of conciliatio – means the
conspicuous adaption to the audience demand. (van Eemeren, 2010: 207) Van
Eemeren and Houtlosser propose “[to] make a repair through the readjustment of
those aspects of the strategic maneuvering in which the derailment has manifested
itself.” (van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2009: 205)
29
If, in step (5), all the parties
involved accept the modified maneuver the derailment has been constructively
repaired or rerailed. The sub- or metadiscussion is left, the discussion continues.
Conclusively two conditions (a) and (b)
30
and five steps (1)-(5) of a felicitous
rerailment have been extracted. These conditions and steps are the steps proposed
for a rational reconstruction of the rerailment.
31
(a) The guilty party is still committed to reasonableness. It can be assumed
that he is prepared to rerail his fallacious move.
(b) The guilty party is willing to rerail his fallacious move in order to get back
on track of the reasonable resolution of the difference of opinion.
28
Here van Eemeren speaks of the “responding party”. Thus, he leaves open the possibility that – if
required by the Activity Type – also a third party, e.g. a judge in Court or a therapist in conflict-
management or counseling, can request the rerailment. The aim is to get back on a reasonable track to
the resolution of the difference of opinion. Whoever of the involved parties can help to accomplish
the rerailment is allowed to do so.
29
Van Eemeren suggests ways to repair each of the three aspects of strategic maneuvering and gives
examples for the revisions (van Eemeren, 2010: 261-263).
30
The conditions pertain to the second-order conditions of a critical discussion, i.e. the psychological state
of the participants (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004: 189).
31
The steps are not necessarily taken consciously by the parties in an actual rerailment.
17
(1) The innocent party (or a third party if required by the Activity Type)
initiates the rerailment by pointing out the fallacy. The parties enter a
sub- or metadiscussion.
32
(2) The guilty party emphasizes his commitment to reasonableness (cf.
conditions (a) and (b)).
(3) The innocent party (or a third party if required by the Activity Type)
makes clear
33
the necessity to reconsider the fallacious mode of strategic
maneuvering in the critical discussion at hand.
(4) The guilty party revises his fallacious mode of strategic maneuvering in
the sub- or metadiscussion.
(5) Both parties (and, if required by the Activity Type, the third party) accept
the rerailment on the ground-level.
The theoretical advantages or the rerailment concept are the well-foundedness in the
concept of strategic maneuvering, the clearness of conditions and the analytically
distinguished steps to rerail a fallacy. Furthermore, the analytically clear distinction of
de- and rerailments with respect to the three aspects of strategic maneuvering allows
the specific repair of the “fallacious spot” in the argumentation. The practical
advantage of the concept is its explicitness. The parties clearly know when a move
has been perceived as fallacious, because the innocent party should make clear – thus
explicate – it. Moreover the parties are supposed to jointly, thus explicitly, rerail the
fallacy.
34
However, I think that the concept is not always appropriate for arguers in actual
argumentative practice.
35
I anticipate face-threatening acts, in the vein Brown & Levinson
propose in their Politeness Theory, when making clear that the other party has committed
a fallacy and when requesting to repair the flaw.
36
In a critical discussion overtly
32
When entering the sub- or metadiscussion the parties turn from the argumentation stage to the
opening stage.
33
Cf. van Eemeren & Houlosser, 2009: 204.
34
Thereby the criterion of intersubjective validity of the rerailment is secured.
35
The authors do not explicitly aim at giving a practical guideline to rerail in actual argumentative
discourse.
36
The Politeness Theory is considered to provide a pragmatic, context-dependent concept of
interaction helping to understand practical problems. That is why it is more thoroughly discussed in
section 3.3 which belongs to the practical component of this thesis.
18
pointing out a fallacy amounts to declaring the other party unreasonable which is a
strong accusation in the context of a reasonable discussion. The guilty party could
feel directly attacked. Eventually, it could even be “[…] that the relation between the
parties is damaged to such an extent that their appetite for continuing the critical
debate is lost forever.” (cf. p. 12).
3 Rerailment in Practice
The research question to be answered is how parties in actual argumentative
discourse should react on moves they have perceived as fallacious to rerail in a most
civilized way. A “most civilized way” means that face-threats are avoided in order not
to destroy the relation between the parties. Different theories dealing with actual
argumentative reality can provide insights from different angles.
By implementing the ideal model of a critical discussion in the actual
argumentative reality Strategic Maneuvering bridges the gap between ideal and actual
discussions.
37
The extended pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation has a greater
descriptive and empirical scope than standard pragma-dialectics by assuming that
arguers in actual argumentative discourse do maneuver strategically. They balance the
argumentative predicament
38
, a flaw of that balancing is a derailment which can be repaired
with a rerailment. In this vein, errors and ways to repair them in actual argumentative
discussions can be explained.
39
Assuming that the parties maneuver strategically two pragmatic theories are
used as meters against which the rerailment of a case of tu quoque is measured.
Sperber and Wilson‟s Relevance Theory (1986) is a merely hearer-oriented theory
generally dealing with Communication and Cognition as the subtitle describes. In Brown
and Levinson‟s Politeness Theory (1987) the side-effect of face-threatening of utterances is
37
Cf. van Eemeren, 2010: 39-45, 87-92. Note that van Eemeren & Grootendorst yet in 1984 wrote:
“This means that in a dialectical theory [such as the extended pragma-dialectical theory of
argumentation, A.V.] it will be necessary to propose rules for the conduct of argumentative
discussions.” (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1984: 17, italics by A.V.) Now, with the concept of
strategic maneuvering pragma-dialectics does justice to the conduct of actual argumentation.
38
Cf. van Eemeren, 2010: 40.
39
Since actual discourse is under observation, not the 15 technical rules of pragma-dialectics but “for
practical purposes” the ten commandments will be brought to bear (van Eemeren & Grootendorst,
2004: 190-196).
19
under observation to explain ordinary conversation. These theories are introduced
before they are applied to develop an answer to the research question.
3.1 Introduction to the
Relevance Theory
as a Pragmatic Meter
The Relevance Theory was published by Sperber and Wilson in 1986. The aim of the
theory is to provide insights into communicative interactions in actual conversation
(Sperber and Wilson, 1986: 147). It is a hearer-oriented pragmatic theory
concentrating on cognitive processes (van der Henst & Sperber, 2004: 141).
40
The core of the theory is the term relevance. The human cognition is relevance
orientated, i.e. the cognition is orientated towards those input information
(assumption) that may be relevant (Sperber & Wilson, 1986: 151-152; Wilson, 1994: 44,
46). Every reasonable arguer has a deductive device, which provides the ability to obtain
an interpretation of relevance (Sperber & Wilson, 1986: 97). Relevance is defined in
terms of (cognitive) contextual effects and (mental) processing effort.
The set of contextual assumptions is the “whole of encyclopaedic memory” – i.e.
the “premises” (Sperber & Wilson, 1986: 139) – that is brought to bear to process an
input in a conversation (Wilson, 1994: 41). It is a structure of chunks of encyclopaedic
information
41
, that represents “[…] our beliefs and assumptions about the world […]”
(Wilson, 1994: 42). A contextual effect is a modification or improvement of the set
of contextual assumptions (Sperber & Wilson, 1986: 109). It is triggered by the input,
i.e. the encyclopaedic entry (Sperber & Wilson, 1986: 125, 138), affecting (interacting
with) the given set of contextual assumptions. The greater the contextual effect
achieved the greater the relevance of the input.
For a contextual effect to occur a certain processing effort is required
(Sperber & Wilson, 1986: 124). The hearer‟s processing effort aims at gaining the
intended interpretation of the utterance which yields the intended contextual effect
(Sperber & Wilson, 1986: 109). The processing effort depends first on the effort of
the hearer‟s memory and imagination and second on the psychological complexity of
the new information. Memory includes long-term-, short-term memory and the
40
Wilson writes it is the “[…] goal of pragmatic theory […] to explain how the hearer recognizes the
overtly intended interpretation of an utterance […]” (Wilson, 1994: 57, 42)
41
Cf. Sperber & Wilson, 1986: 138.
20
perception; imagination is needed to process the encyclopaedic entry into the
context, thus to eventually achieve the contextual effect (Sperber & Wilson, 1986:
138). The psychological complexity of an utterance is the lower the less effort the
hearer needs to process its propositional content. The greater the psychological
complexity of an utterance the more processing effort is needed to gain a contextual
effect.
42
The greater the processing effort needed the lower the relevance of the
utterance (Sperber & Wilson, 1986: 125).
The goals of speaker and hearer coincide in the following vein. The speaker
intends the hearer to achieve the intended contextual effects. The hearer‟s presumption
of optimal relevance means that he expects the speaker to be optimally relevant, which
means that the hearer has the least effort necessary to obtain the intended contextual
effects (Wilson, 1994: 47). The hearer seeks efficiency of effort and effect.
An input means for a hearer that the set of contextual assumptions and the
encyclopaedic entry are confronted. The synthetic implication, which is the task of
the deductive device, means processing the input information as a contextual implication
of the premises (Sperber and Wilson, 1986: 137). The input is embedded in particular
context(s) (chunks) accessible at that time (Sperber & Wilson, 1986: 138). Contexts,
i.e. chunks of information that have already been affected by preceding moves are
“easier accessible” than unrelated contexts because they are stored in the short-time
memory.
43
Sperber and Wilson conclude their definition of Relevance to an individual:
“[…] An assumption is relevant to an individual at a given time if and
only if it is relevant [effort and effect] in one or more of the contexts
42
Wilson shows in an example (10) in her article Relevance and Understanding (1994: 46) that there is no
such rule like “A simple linguistic sentence (e.g. less words) means a low psychological complexity”. A
linguistically more complex sentence can have a lower complexity than a linguistically simpler
sentence.
43
For instance, if two men talk about the latest Dutch football results and one of them all of a sudden
says “There is a nice flower shop down the street.” the speaker requires the hearer to affect a context
(presumably) unrelated to the initial context of the talk. In order to access the context flower shops
higher effort is needed than staying in the context football. A sentence like “That second goal of Ajax
was great.” requires less processing effort since the context to be accessed (the latest Dutch football
results) has already been affected.
21
accessible to that individual at that time.” (Sperber & Wilson, 1986:
144)
44
In the best case in an exchange of information the hearer processes optimally, i.e. he first
accesses the intended chunks of information, in this way balances effort and effect
most efficiently and eventually finds the optimally relevant interpretation intended by
the speaker. That is why it is up to the speaker to put his utterance in a way that it is
likely that the hearer‟s first accessible interpretation will bring about the intended
contextual effect(s).
3.2 Two Views on Relevance
Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (2004: 71-87) distinguish two views on relevance. The
interpretative view is concerned with the question “When is a speech act a relevant
reaction to another speech act?”. Sperber and Wilson have this rather descriptive
view in their term of relevance. The evaluative view deals with the question “What are
the criteria to determine a speech as relevant?”. For instance, logical theories
represent this rather normative view on relevance.
Pragma-dialectics – and I adopt that idea in this thesis – goes for a view on
relevance that combines both views. Complex speech acts in actual argumentative
discourse are evaluated to (not) contribute to the conduct of a critical discussion.
Relevance is then determined by the interpretative view, e.g. by taking into account
empirically noticeable adjacency pairs and by the evaluative view, e.g. speech acts‟
contribution to the certain stages‟ aims in the ideal model of a critical discussion.
(van Eemeren & Grootendoorst, 2004: 80-83)
44
The criterion of consistency with the principle of relevance describes that the hearer accepts an interpretation
of an utterance when he thinks his interpretation might be the one intended by the speaker (Sperber &
Wilson, 1986: 251; also Wilson, 1994: 48-49).
22
3.3 Introduction to the
Politeness Theory
as a Pragmatic Meter
In 1978, and in a second edition in 1987, Brown and Levinson presented their
Politeness Theory. It is a pragmatic theory dealing with politeness in actual social
interactions.
45
The main issue of the theory is the face of a person. There are two types of
face. Positive face is a person‟s want for social appreciation in the interaction.
Negative face is a person‟s desire for freedom of action. The face is threatened by
face-threatening acts, which are supposed to be inherently impolite speech acts, but in
fact only function as face-threats within the certain context given.
46
Face-threats
against the positive face are e.g. criticism, disapproval and disagreement and face-
threats against the negative face are orders, requests and threats (Buck: 1997: 84).
Parties in a social interaction try cooperatively and by means of facework not
to lose their faces.
47
On the one hand socializing is important to actors (protecting
positive face), on the other hand they want to appear independent (protecting
negative face), which leads to a basic dilemma which Werkhofer puts like this:
45
“At the base of Brown and Levinson‟s (1987) politeness theory is the assumption that speakers in
any given language do not just convey information through their language; they use their language to
do things.” (Buck, 1997: 83, italics by A.V.) The theory also provides insights into interaction.
Language users “[…] construct and build personal relationships through the dialogue […]” which
“[…] is not necessarily a conscious act.” (Buck, 1997: 84) Since the scopes of Politeness Theory are
argumentative as well as non-argumentative interactions, it can also be applied to actual argumentative
discussions, i.e. arguers maneuvering strategically. Strategic Maneuvering specifically dealing with
actual argumentation is included in the scopes of the Politeness Theory.
46
Many authors have shown instances of supposedly face-threats which, couched in a certain context,
do not appear to be (im)polite (Watts, 2003: 89, 101-103,; Buck, 1997: 88 , Werkhofer, 2005: 158, 171-
172, Bousfield, 2008: 22-23). Watts states that “What is „polite‟ or „impolite‟ language can only be
assessed as such by analyzing the context of real social practice. Impoliteness […] emerges
contextually from instances of socio-communicative interaction […]” (Watts, 2003: 141) Buck
concludes it is wise to speak of the “face function” (Buck, 1997: 93) which hints at the idea that a
speech act unfolds its function in the context of its occurrence (cf. Jacobs, section 2 and 2.2). From a
pragma-dialectical viewpoint the context-dependency of face-threatening acts can be explained by the
higher order conditions of a critical discussion (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004: 189-190). The
perception of face-threats depends on the second order conditions, i.e. the attitudes of the individuals
engaged, e.g. a person can be oversensitive and could feel face-threatened quicker than another
person. Also the third order conditions, i.e. the cultural background, or the institutional setting implying
certain power structures among the parties explain the perception of face-threats.
47
Threatening the other party´s face might yield the other party to defend his face by attacking the
opponents face. A conflict is likely to arise.
23
“The polite utterance is then a compromise between saying as much as
possible of what the speaker had actually been intending [protecting
negative face], on the one hand, and avoiding the risk of a social conflict
[protecting positive face], on the other.” (Werkhofer, 2005: 156)
In order to reduce face-threatening Brown and Levinson present politeness
strategies, which “[…] acknowledge and recognize the face wants of the other
participants.” (Buck, 1997: 84) Positive politeness strategies aim at enhancing the
positive face of the hearer and negative politeness is used to avoid the limitation of
the hearer‟s freedom of action.
48
For instance, one negative politeness strategy is to
be conventionally indirect (strategy #16, Watts, 2003: 90).
3.4 The Problem to be Solved: an Accusation of Being Mistaken as an
Additional Interactional Effort
A rerailment aims at repairing a violation of a first-order condition in a critical
discussion. Thus, the only (in the pragma-dialectical sense) relevant context in a
rerailment is the set of first order conditions. The set of contextual assumptions shared by
the parties is composed of the critical discussion‟s set of material starting points
including e.g. propositional commitments and procedural starting points including
e.g. the ten commandments. These premises are easily accessible by both parties.
49
Moreover, both parties follow the presumption of reasonableness. They expect all
moves, including those to rerail, to be reasonable contributions to the resolution of
the difference of opinion. In this (foremost evaluative, but still necessarily
interpretative) sense every move is expected to be relevant, thus worth being heard,
hence worth being processed within the set of premises.
There are three potential face-threats in the five analytically distinguished
rerailment steps proposed by van Eemeren and Houtlosser. The first is in step (1).
Initiating the rerailment by overtly putting the finger on the fallacy can be perceived
48
Watts subscribes the two forms of politeness strategies as “‟positively colored‟ politeness” and
“‟negatively colored‟ politeness” (Watts, 2003: 109). In the wording there is an obvious similarity to
Jacobs‟ definition of rhetorical strategy (cf. section 2 and 2.2). In Jacobs‟ sense the politeness strategies
are types of rhetorical strategies.
49
Since the parties are supposed to argue ex concessis from these premises it can be assumed that these
premises are constantly stored in the short-time memory.
24
as an accusation of wrong reasoning, hence of being an unreasonable interlocutor
(threat against positive face).
50
Step (3) inheres the danger to be face-threatening by
overtly making clear the need to repair the flaw. Making clear may include an overt
explanation of the failure, which can be perceived as a specific disapproval or again
as an accusation of erroneous thinking (threat against positive face). Also an overt
request to repair the move could be perceived as a face-threat. Suppose the
protagonist did not follow the request he would be considered unreasonable. In that
sense he is put under pressure to act in a certain way (threat against negative face).
The social problem (face-threatening acts) can become an interactional
problem with respect to the aim of the critical discussion.
51
Face-threats not only
require processing effort within the relevant context of the rerailment, within the
context of the first order conditions, but further effort is needed
52
for processing the
face-threats, within the context of e.g. higher order conditions. Processing besides the
context of primary (dialectical) interest – namely the rerailment of a fallacious strategic
maneuver (a violation of a first order condition) in order to reasonably solve the
difference of opinion – means additional effort on the side of the guilty party. Hence
an innocent party who performs face-threatening speech acts during a rerailment
procedure is less likely to convey his intended interpretation in an optimally relevant
manner. The social problem of face-threats becomes an interactional problem in the
understanding of the intention.
Suppose a strategic maneuver implies a face-threat. Then this utterance is
somewhat a “bad” (or “poor” or “weak”) strategic maneuver, in the sense that a
party perceiving a face-threatening speech act is likely to consider the opponent
50
In order to clarify the illocutionary function of the accusation it is useful to consider the felicity
conditions of the speech act of accusation. For instance, a preparatory condition. There is the
convention to be polite in a normal course of events. Here the normal course of even is the
reasonable critical discussion. Thus accusations within the conduct of the critical discussion shall be
avoided. The preparatory condition for the speech act of accusing somebody is then that the normal
course of events is intervened. With the fallacy the normal course of events of the discussion is being
intervened. The preparatory condition for accusing somebody is fulfilled. The illocutionary force of
the speech act can – but must not! – unfold.
51
Aiming at the resolution of the difference of opinion, the innocent party‟s intended contextual effect in
a rerailment is that the guilty party recognizes the need to repair the derailment. Hence, put optimally
relevant the innocent party‟s utterances would yield the guilty party to recognize the need to rerail.
52
“Contextual effects and processing effort […] exist whether or not the individual is consciously
assessing them, whether or not they are conceptually represented.” (Sperber & Wilson, 1986: 131,
italics by A.V.; also cf. Buck, 1997: 84 with respect to the Politeness Theory)
25
unreasonable. He may wonder to what extent a face-threat is a reasonable
contribution to the actual argumentative discussion and conclusively doubt that the
interlocutor obeys to the boundaries of reasonableness. Therefore face-threatening
acts by an arguer may lead his opponent to the impression that the aim of being
effective has overruled the obligation of being reasonable. Hence, from a descriptive
viewpoint (of relevance) face-threats can certainly impede the resolution of the
dispute.
53
However, in van Eemeren and Houtlosser‟s step (4) the guilty party is
supposed to alter his fallacious expression from the insight into the necessity to
change it – the insight gained by face-threats! From a realistic, pragmatic perspective I
assume that the face-threatening acts lead to an escalation of the situation. Ending up
in a quarrel, an actual social problem between the parties rather than the insight into
the mistake is to be expected. Hence it is not likely that the participants get back on
track of their joint reasonable resolution of the difference of opinion.
54
3.5 A Solution to the Problem:
Relevance Questions
The problem to be solved is how to yield a rerailment without accusing the other
party of wrong reasoning. The solution is to replace the speech act of an accusation
with the indirect speech act of a request. The request is used by the innocent party.
The aim of the request is to initiate the rerailment at the side of the guilty party by
nudging him to rethink the derailment. The attempt in this thesis is to check if a
question, which I call Relevance Question, can be used for that purpose.
55
53
All the same, from an evaluative perspective face-threatening speech acts are not necessarily a
hindrance to the resolution of the difference of opinion (in the sense of a fallacy).
54
Keep in mind that a party tries to protect his faces.
55
I do not claim my proposal to be applicable in any actual argumentative situation. Just as face-threats
depend on the higher order conditions which are unique in every discussion, the Relevance Question
proposed depends on the higher order conditions. Some people may like the way of rerailing
“directly” better (without the use of questions as indirect requests) and generally in some situations
and contexts the “direct rerailment” might be more applicable or effective. I am well aware of the
problem that with regard to “[…] his true intentions, the polite speaker […] will tend more or less to
hide and obscure them […]” (Werkhofer, 2005: 161). However, using Searlean insights from speech
act theory as well as insights about relevance of utterances the Relevance Questions are shown to yield a
proper understanding of the polite rerailment initiation.
26
Why make it Relevance Questions? Relevance Questions are indirect speech
acts, thus they convey more than what is literally said.
56
In the secondary meaning,
which the hearer perceives first, the guilty party is asked if he is able to explain the
derailed maneuver.
57
Using a question to convey the secondary meaning has obvious
advantages. First, there is no blunt assessment of the fallaciousness of a certain move.
58
Second, without pointing out that the derailed maneuver has been fallacious, the face-
threatening function of an accusation of erroneous thinking is avoided. Hence, the
guilty party is likely to interpret the question as an ordinary initiation of a
subdiscussion.
59
Hence the escalation of the situation is prevented. The primary
meaning of a Relevance Question is a request to think about the reasonableness – the
relevance in the evaluative sense – of the previous move.
60
Being conventionally indirect is a politeness strategy protecting the negative
face of the interlocutor.
61
Still, in a Relevance Question also the speaker’s intention is
appreciated. Using Werkhofer (2005: 160) the nail is simply hit on the head:
Relevance Questions are “[…] expressing the speaker‟s intentions as
much as possible, on the one hand, and that of doing so indirectly
enough not to run the risk of a social conflict, on the other. Politeness is
then a kind of indirectness.”
Why call it Relevance Question? Relevance Questions are relevant in the pragma-
dialectical sense combining interpretative and evaluative relevance. First, they display
the interpretative view on relevance, in fact as being questions (seeking an answer as a
relevant reaction) they are used in the actual context of the argumentative discussion.
With regard to Sperber and Wilson‟s Relevance Theory, the Relevance Questions
suppose a set of contextual assumptions of the parties involved and a processing effort
conducted by the hearer‟s deductive device. During the whole discussion, the concept of
56
Cf. Searle (1975).
57
Thus, just as in the example “Can you pass the salt?” the ability of the guilty to do something, the
preparatory condition, is asked for.
58
The innocent party‟s perception of the flaw stays implicit.
59
The guilty party gets no hint that the subdiscussion is about a mistake in his argumentation.
60
The guilty party is supposed to interpret the question about his ability (the secondary meaning) as a
request to perform a certain action, in fact to repair the derailment.
61
Werkhofer mentions findings from empirical research showing that an indirect request is per ceived
as more polite than a direct request (Werkhofer, 2005: 171).
27
critical discussion is being accessed as part of the shared – and therefore neutral
62
– set
of contextual assumptions. For certain, related chunks such as commandments and
fallacies are also quickly accessible.
63
The secondary meaning of the Relevance Question takes into account the
certain content and formulation of the pragma-dialectical commandment which has
been violated by the fallacy. Thus, computing the input information its secondary
meaning is supposed to be processed within the chunks of encyclopaedic
information of critical discussion.
Foremost, the Relevance Questions display the evaluative view of relevance.
64
The view is represented by the fact that Relevance Questions (indirectly) question
the relevance of a certain move with respect to a certain normative criterion, in fact a
commandment from the critical discussion. Every fallacy is a violation of a
commandment. Every Relevance Question sets off to rethink a (derailed) move, i.e. a
certain fallacy. When operating with a Relevance Question the guilty party is
supposed to understand his derailment as a violation of a commandment.
65
When is a Relevance Question processed optimally? The guilty party perceives
the secondary meaning of the Relevance Question. Due to the presumptions of
relevance and reasonableness, he takes the Relevance Question serious. Probably, as
a rational arguer he is sure to be able to explain his previous move. Thus, he starts to
compute an explanation of his previous move. This processing effort occurs within
62
“Neutral” in this endeavor means “not loaded with the potential of being face-threatening”. The
commandments have been mutually agreed upon by the parties, thus the parties are committed to
them and should not be face-threatened when a commandment is called out.
63
Cf. Sperber & Wilson, 1986: 138.
64
Since the primary (the speaker‟s) meaning of the Relevance Question accounts for the evaluative view
this view is foremost at issue.
65
In pragma-dialectics, fallacies can be seen as failed attempts to stretch the boundaries set by the
rules of critical discussion within the given argumentative situation. An innocent party can use a
Relevance Question when he is certain about the fallaciousness of a certain move. However, also in
case of uncertainty about the fallaciousness of a move the innocent party can pose a Relevance
Question. Then the question is used to check the acceptability of the move concerned: Has the
(potentially) guilty party simply stretched the boundaries of reasonableness in a – still – acceptable
manner? Then, he will certainly have no problem to explain a sound move as abiding the
commandments. Or has he indeed stepped over the boundaries of reasonableness, i.e. committed a
fallacy? In this case the Relevance Question immediately functions as the initiator of the rerailment.
Altogether, the Relevance Question can function as a kind of polite clarifier in the critical discussion.
28
the context of critical discussion which has already been activated.
66
From the
secondary meaning of the Relevance Questions he – or more precisely his deductive
device – is hinted at the commandment violated. By comparing the move to this
commandment the guilty party figures out that he has committed a fallacy, in fact a
violation of this very commandment. Here he accesses the processing chunk of
fallacies (derailments), then the chunk of rerailments as the dialectically needed
consequence. Now he gets the primary meaning of the Relevance Question. In this
way the intended interpretation of the Relevance Question is the first interpretation
computed.
67
The question has been optimally put and optimally processed. The
interaction has been felicitous, because the guilty party has figured out the violation
of one commandment – hence a derailment –, thus he has understood the need to
rerail.
68
Relevance Questions only require the processing in the already
accessed and shared set of contextual assumptions. There is no pointing at a
mistake, no reproach at the person, neither an accusation of false reasoning nor a
blunt assessment of a mistake. Hence there is no extra processing effort.
Why are Relevance Questions strategic maneuvers? To summarize the previous
elaborations and to prepare the explanation why Relevance Questions are indeed
strategic maneuvers Searle‟s definition of indirect speech act is echoed:
“In indirect speech acts the speaker communicates to the hearer more than he
actually says by way of relying on their mutually shared background
information, both linguistic and nonlinguistic together with the general powers
of rationality and inference on the part of the hearer.” (Searle, 1975: 60-61)
As indirect speech acts Relevance Questions balance the arguer‟s commitment to
reasonableness and his rhetorical goal of being effective. Face-threats may cause the
impression of being unreasonable because they may obstruct the resolution of the
66
Why should he process within another context than the one already accessed? Based on the
presumptions of reasonableness and relevance and aiming at efficiently balancing processing effort and
contextual effects he will certainly not compute within another context.
67
Hence, the hearer‟s first interpretation of the Relevance Question is in line with the criterion of consistency
with the principle of relevance.
68
Now it becomes apparent if the guilty party is (a) prepared and (b) willing to rerail.
29
difference of opinion.
69
Relevance Questions avoid face-threats, thus they avoid
seeming unreasonable. In fact, they are moves representing the arguer‟s commitment
to reasonableness. However, the innocent party has a certain rhetorical goal when he
uses a Relevance Question. Relevance Questions are effective when they yield a
rerailment.
70
In this sense, Relevance Questions balance reasonableness and
effectiveness and can be seen as strategic maneuvers.
From van Eemeren‟s justification of his use of the notions it can be derived
that Relevance Questions are strategic because they are “clever and skillful planning”
by avoiding face-threats. They are maneuvers because with regard to their aim they
mean “moving towards the best position in view of the argumentative
circumstances”. (van Eemeren, 2010: 40-41)
If a Relevance Question is a strategic maneuver then it necessarily brings
about the three aspects of strategic maneuvering. On the level of topical potential
this means that the arguer opts for the use of a Relevance Question for initiating the
rerailment. The adaptation to audience demand consists in the avoidance of face-
threats. And the level of presentational choice is, for instance, using a question, and
neutrally formulating the question with reference to the commandment violated.
Relevance Questions indirectly request the guilty party to repair the fallacy.
But they do not precisely request the repair of the certain fallacious mode of strategic
maneuvering. Since the guilty party is supposed to figure out (to process the
wrongness of) the fallacy himself, he is supposed to find and repair the flaw of his
mode of strategic maneuvering as well.
71
What about a clear procedural structure and benefits from using Relevance
Questions? The following five analytically distinguished steps for the rational
69
Cf. p. 25.
70
In a critical discussion the repair of a dialectical flaw implies the higher rhetorical goal of resolving
the difference of opinion in one‟s own favor. Imagine the rerailment fails , the relation between the
parties is damaged and the discussion stops. When there is no discussion whatsoever there is no
resolution in one‟s own best interest. Thus, the innocent party has a serious interest to rerail a fallacy.
It becomes obvious why in strategic maneuvering the rhetorical goals are subordinate to the dialectical
obligations.
71
In fact, Relevance Questions do not need to address the three aspects of strategic maneuvering. Van
Eemeren points out that the three aspects of strategic maneuvering are distinguished only for analytic
purposes. In actual argumentative discourse they always occur simultaneously (van Eemeren, 2010: 93)
and Relevance Questions are primarily designed for actual argumentative practice rather than for
analytic purposes.
30
reconstruction of a rerailment with Relevance Questions can be distinguished.
72
The
pragma-dialectical rerailment conditions (a) and (b) remain.
(a) The guilty party is still committed to reasonableness. It can be assumed
that he is prepared to rerail his fallacious move.
(b) The guilty party is willing to rerail his fallacious move in order to get back
on track to the reasonable resolution of the difference of opinion.
(01) The innocent party (or a third party if required by the Activity Type)
initiates the rerailment by asking a Relevance Question. The parties enter a
sub- or metadiscussion.
73
(02) The guilty party emphasizes his commitment to reasonableness (cf.
conditions (a) and (b)).
(03) The innocent party (or a third party if required by the Activity Type)
makes indirectly clear the necessity to reconsider the fallacious mode of
strategic maneuvering.
(04) The guilty party revises his fallacious mode of strategic maneuvering based
on his understanding of the mistake.
(05) Both parties (and, if required by the Activity Type, the third party) accept
the rerailment on the ground-level.
The overt face-threatening acts from step (1) and (3) are avoided. Step (01), the
initiation, is not overt because the guilty party only perceives the secondary meaning
of the Relevance Question. Step (03) is not overt, because the guilty party gains the
insight into the fallaciousness himself
74
, thus the innocent party does not need to
request the repair of the certain aspect of the mode of strategic maneuvering. Suppose
the guilty party would not repair his fallacy then he would run danger of being
considered unreasonable by his opponent. Thus, even without overt face-threatening
72
The differences to the five steps van Eemerne and Houtlosser propose are marked in italics.
73
When entering the sub- or metadiscussion the parties turn from the argumentation stage to the
opening stage.
74
The insight will bring to light if the two rerailment conditions (a) and (b) are fulfilled.
31
acts in the initiation and the demand of the rerailment, the repair can be conducted
successfully.
75
3.6 The Example: A Case of
tu quoque
In order to compare the applicability of van Eemeren and Houtlosser‟s rerailment
proposal with the proposal to use a Relevance Question a case of tu quoque is analyzed.
Certainly the example is not likely to occur only in one specific context.
76
The example
regarded is the following.
(i) P: “I am of the opinion that a Minister may never conceal information
from the house; that would be a deathblow for democracy.”
(ii) A: (guilty party): “You would have to say that; you yourself did at one
time conceal a case of subsidy fraud for months.” (van Eemeren, Garssen
& Meuffels, 2009: 65)
A‟s argumentation is an instance of the ad hominem fallacy of tu quoque. It violates the
pragma-dialectical commandment 1 – the Freedom Rule – and is committed during the
confrontation stage. It is an accusation of pragmatic or logical inconsistency derailing
when “[…] the reason-giving amounts to saying that the protagonist‟s proposal to
treat a proposition as a starting point is not acceptable because the proposition is
inconsistent with something the protagonist has said or implied (by what he said or
did) on a different occasion.” (van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2004)
77
P taking the dialectical role of the protagonist used to be a Minister. A is
assigned the dialectical role of the antagonist and is supposed to criticize P‟s
standpoint that “a Minister may never conceal information from the house”. The
75
In case a certain Relevance Question repeatedly fails to yield a successful rerailment in actual
argumentative discussions the question should be changed. In this sense, the applicability of the tool
can be constantly empirically tested.
76
Cf. p. 33 where in footnote 83 two possible contexts for the given fragment are presented.
77
Van Eemeren & Houtlosser (2004) propose four conditions to identify pieces of argumentation as
belonging to one and the same critical discussion or what is meant by “on a different occasion”.
32
criticism has to be an argumentation ex concessis.
78
However, in turn (ii) A‟s strategic
maneuver derails in pointing out that P himself did at one time conceal a case of
subsidy fraud for months. This very fact is not an awowed, propositional
commitment allowed to be used as a starting point in the critical discussion at hand.
P‟s past opinions or actions are not at issue (cf. the standpoint).
79
Thus A has failed
to argue ex concessis from the set of (material) starting points given. The antagonist A
has committed an ad hominem fallacy, in fact a tu quoque.
Notice that in the present case turn (ii), the tu quoque, is a face-threat against P.
P‟s positive face is threatened by accusing him of an inconsistency. P‟s negative face
is threatened by restricting him to put forth a standpoint. This – supposedly face-
threatening – speech act displays the violation of the freedom rule.
3.6.1 Van Eemeren and Houtlosser’s Rerailment Strategy in Actual
Execution
Reenacting the two conditions and five steps to rerail the fallacy it is important to
notice that these steps and conditions are analytically distinguished. In the clean-cut
form proposed they do not occur in actual argumentative discussions. In practice,
parties could rerail the same instance of tu quoque in various orders and manners; with
successfully passing all the steps. However, a possible actual scenario I expect to
occur could be the following. Notice, that the accusation of inconsistency in turn (ii)
is not only a dialectical flaw but also a face-threat against P.
(i) P: “I am of the opinion that a Minister may never conceal
information from the house; that would be a deathblow for
democracy.”
78
Andone (2009: 155-157) presents soundness conditions for felicitous (ex concessis) accusations of
inconsistencies, such as the essential condition that A has to raise a charge against P for being
committed to p (the standpoint) and –p and the preparatory condition that A believes that P accepts
being committed to p and –p, hence being committed to an inconsistency.
79
In another critical discussion literally the same move of A could have been permissible in case the
commitment brought to bear was an accepted material starting point of that critical discussion then.
Hence the context-dependency of the fallaciousness of modes of strategic maneuvering becomes
apparent.
33
(ii) A: (guilty party): “You would have to say that; you yourself did at one
time conceal a case of subsidy fraud for months.”
(iii) P: “Huuu?!! By digging up something from my past you exclude me from
that discussion! You should better think about that sentence again!”
(iv) A: “MY sentence? There‟s nothing wrong with my sentence! I‟d
rather say there‟s something wrong with you… „EXCLUDED me from
the discussion‟??? Pff…”
(v) P: “No, NOT „Pff‟! Whatever I did in the past…! We‟re talking about
the NOW! You better look at the way you argue!!”
(vi) A: “WHAAAT??!! Are YOU in charge of telling ME how to argue???!
[…]”
Turn (iii) represents the initiation of the rerailment.
80
P‟s utterance shows that the tu
quoque surprises him (“Huuu?!!”), it obviously has a face-threatening force.
Consequently P tries to preserve his face reacting intensely. However, P‟s reaction
entails the effort to initiate the rerailment since he has decided and assessed that A
has indeed committed a tu quoque. P points at the flaw that A has violated the
freedom rule (“you exclude me from that discussion!”). From turn (iii) to (vi) the parties
are supposed to have a subdiscussion about the permission to use a propositional
commitment (the fact that P has concealed a case of subsidy).
81
P specifies the
criticism pointing at A‟s wrong selection from the topical potential (“digging up
something from my past”). He also makes clear that A is supposed to revise the topical
choice (“You should better think about that sentence again!”) referring to the
unaccepted propositional commitment used.
82
In turn (iv) it becomes apparent that A perceives the overt request to rethink
turn (ii) as a face-threat, as an accusation for he has made a mistake, he has given an
erroneous reasoning (“MY sentence?”).
83
A may feel attacked because P has simply
80
Thus step (1) is realized.
81
As will be analyzed that subdiscussion can hardly be found.
82
Step (3) of the rerailment procedure is realized.
83
However, depending on the context of the dialogue face-threatening acts in turn (ii) and (iii) are more
or less likely, but I expect in either context they will be perceived. Imagine the fragment stems from a
parliamentary debate between politicians P and A. Suppose a law is to be approved. Directly pointing at
the mistake in turn (iii) could be perceived as an accusation of erroneous thinking, of being foolish to
argue. This could threaten A‟s negative face as a politician who wants to be free in arguing his case. A
34
determined the flaw as such and now pointed it out reflecting his clear disapproval.
Thus P has threatened A‟s positive face. Accused of wrong thinking A immediately
prevents his face (“There‟s nothing wrong with my sentence!”) and attacks P
personally (“I‟d rather say there‟s something wrong with you…”)
84
. Obviously A
does not accept P‟s effort to repair the fallacy (“‟EXCLUDED me from the
discussion’??? Pff…”). “Pff…” is a face-threat against P showing A‟s disrespect –
obviously A feels accused of being foolish to reason.
However, in turn (v) – trying to preserve his own (negative) face – P counters
by insisting on his desire to rerail (“No, NOT „Pff‟!”). P explains the flaw (“Whatever I
did in the past…! We‟re talking about the NOW!”) and repeats his request to repair the
move, which he – obviously emotionally touched himself – frames in another blunt
face-threat against A‟s negative face (“You better look at the way you argue!!”)
85
. A
may think that P considers him inferior because P has explained (taught) him the
mistake. These two face-threats (demand to rethink, explanation of what is “right”)
lead A to react very confronting to save his face (“WHAAAT??!! Are YOU in charge
of telling ME how to argue???! […]”).
All in all, the fallacy has “set a fire” between the parties which is never
extinguished up to the end of the fragment. The overall tone is increasingly
aggressive. The guilty party A never gets aware of the tu quoque because he is
emotionally (and in terms of processing effort) too much involved in preserving his
face. Thus A never processes optimally but he always has the additional – an
obviously foremost – effort to process the face-threats. This means that he can never
explicate if he is (a) prepared and (b) willing to rerail. Therefore, he never realizes
step (2) of the rerailment. Also he never conducts step (4), the revision of the
fallacious mode of strategic maneuvering.
86
Without step (4), consequently step (5) is
not realized either.
perceives a violation of the second order condition, the desire to reasonably solve the difference of
opinion. A third order condition violation he perceives is that in a parliamentary debate a free exchange of
ideas should be possible. Or, as a second context, imagine P and A are retired politicians who have
become friends sharing an interest in politics. The face-threatening acts in turns (ii) and (iii) would
perhaps be not as strong as in parliament but still very likely.
84
This is an obvious abusive ad hominem.
85
One could read this as an ad baculum, a threat against A.
86
Being engaged in processing the face-threats the guilty party has no processing capacities left – thus
he has not even the chance – to contribute with “his” tasks in the rerailment procedure, step (2) and
(4).
35
The overt rerailment is supposed to be a joint rerailment procedure.
87
Hence,
P should put his utterances in such a way that A optimally processes the intended
intention and can then react accordingly by putting his answer in an optimally relevant
way. But P‟s overt initiation of the rerailment is obviously not put optimally relevant.
That is why the (constructive) rerailment escalates, turning out to be a mere exchange
of face-threats.
88
The attempt to overtly fix the fallacy has led the parties into a quarrel-like,
aggressive exchange which totally strays from the point, namely from the dialectical
flaw which should be repaired. The discussants are not acting rationally anymore
89
,
which yields them not putting their utterances in an optimally relevant manner. Their
relationship is likely to be damaged. The fragment leaves open the end of the
discussion, but it seems that the parties are not on their way to jointly rerail the fallacy
to get back on a reasonable path to resolve their difference of opinion.
3.6.2 A Rerailment with a
Relevance Question
The tu quoque fallacy violates commandment 1, the Freedom Rule which reads:
“Discussants may not prevent each other from advancing standpoints or
from calling standpoints into question.” (van Eemeren, Grootendorst,
2004: 190)
The rerailment scenario with a Relevance Question is given in the following.
(vii) P: “I am of the opinion that a Minister may never conceal
information from the house; that would be a deathblow for
democracy.”
87
The parties are supposed to make use of their immanent dialectical view by together deciding upon the
acceptability of the correction, cf. step (1)-(5).
88
Some of these face-threatening speech acts are again fallacies, e.g. the direct ad hominem shown.
Strictly speaking, these fallacies also need to be rerailed before the argumentative discussion continues!
These rerailments again could lead to even more emotional and complicated quarrel-like scenarios.
89
It seems that the parties are no longer committed to the Cooperative Principle.
36
(viii) A: (guilty party): “You would have to say that; you yourself did at one
time conceal a case of subsidy fraud for months.”
(ix) P: “Huuu?!! Well…hmmm… Can you explain why something from a
previous occasion should prevent me now from saying that?
(x) A: “Sure I can. Well… some time ago you have…hmmm…oh,
wait…Le‟ me… Maybe I should better say this: concealing
information could also be a good thing, even from the perspective of
preserving democracy. For instance, why is it a „deathblow for
democracy‟ if Ministers conceal the information that […]”
(xi) P: “Alright, that‟s true. But still – I‟d say that …”
Turn (xiii) is assumed to be a face-threat. P – in turn (ix) – is obviously surprised
about the threat, certainly he does perceive it (“Huuu?!!”). However, P calms down
(“Well…”) and figures out that A has neglected the freedom rule with an instance of
tu quoque. Thinking about the Relevance Question pertaining to the fallacy
(“hmmm…”) he finally asks it to initiate rerailment covertly “Can you explain why
something from a previous occasion should prevent me now from saying that?”).
First, the Relevance Question requests an explanation of the previous move
(“Can you explain…”). Second, it takes into account the character of the fallacy of tu
quoque by pointing at the discrepancy of past and presence (“something from a
previous occasion”). Third, it refers as much as possible – without sounding artificial
– to the formulation of the clear and neutral commandment (“should [the Relevance
Question hints at the normative commandment] prevent me from saying that”). In this
sense the commandment “leads” (to) the formulation of the Relevance Questions.
By concentrating on the dialectical value of the fallacious move the innocent party
stresses his obedience to dialectical reasonableness.
90
Based on the presumption of reasonableness and the presumption of optimal
relevance, in turn (x) A reconsiders his move in order to follow the request to explain
his move, i.e. he signals to have understood the secondary meaning of the Relevance
Question (“Sure I can.”). Elaborating on the request (“Well… some time ago you
have…”) he figures out – triggered by the specific formulation of the Relevance
90
Jacobs‟ proposal, for instance, i.e. reacting on a fallacy with a counter-fallacy, falls short of stressing
one‟s commitment to reasonableness.
37
Question – that the freedom rule is concerned. He checks his argument with the
commadment (“hmmm…”), just as he is supposed to do in van Eemeren and
Houtlosser‟s rerailment proposal after step (3), the overt request by the innocent
party to rethink the move.
Eventually A finds out that he has not obeyed to the freedom rule (“oh,
wait…”). Consequently he hints at repairing the flaw himself (Le‟me… Maybe I
should better say this: […]”). Immediately he rerails the derailment (“[…] concealing
information could also be a good thing, even from the perspective of preserving
democracy. For instance, why is it a „deathblow for democracy‟ if Ministers conceal
the information that […]”). In turn (xi) the innocent party agrees with the repair of
the topical choice (“Allright, that‟s true.”) and signals to continue the discussion
(“But still – I‟d say that …”). The rerailment has been successful, the discussion
continues.
In the example, the first and the third step – (01) and (03) – occur
simultaneously. The overt face-threats of step (1) and (3) are avoided in step (03)
because the speaker‟s request to reconsider the fallacious move is conveyed
indirectly
91
by referring as much as possible to the neutral and accepted
commandment violated.
92
When the protagonist follows the request to explain his
previous move he accesses the encyclopaedic chunk of commandment 1, measures
the relevance of his argument against it and concludes his fallacy.
93
Since he does not
want to appear unreasonable he repairs the move immediately and thereby realizes
step (02) implicitly – fulfilling the conditions (a) and (b) – and step (04) explicitly. By
step (05) the intersubjective validity of the rerailment is assured.
Three positive results can be seen from using a Relevance Question. First and
most important indeed, it has successfully initiated the start and it has led the
91
“[T]he polite utterance reveals the speaker‟s true intentions only indirectly. […] [T]he message the
speaker originally intends to convey; it would, if it were uttered as intended, to a larger or lesser
degree, threaten the addressee‟s face.” (Werkhofer, 2005: 160) Apparently, the Relevance Question
turned out to be felicitously polite.
92
Wilson (1994: 54) states that “Indirectness involves making the hearer derive as a contextual
implication something that could have been said directly.” As in turn (iii) the innocent party could
have said “By digging up something from my past you exclude me from that discussion!” also
referring to the freedom rule. But by triggering the guilty party to think about the move before the
background of the freedom rule he omits the face-threat.
93
Figuring out the fallacy happens by comparing the normative system provided by the ten
commandments with the mode of strategic maneuvering. Thus, here relevance in the evaluative view is
the main focus.
38
rerailment to its “happy” end and has thereby helped to achieve the stage‟s and
therefore the overall goal of the resolution of the difference of opinion. Second, the
rerailment has been conducted in a civilized way by avoiding overt face-threats, i.e.
with least danger that the dialectical problem of the fallacy yields a social problem of
face-threats, hence a damage of the relation between the parties. Thus the critical
discussion is likely to be continued. Third, the Relevance Question also called into
mind again, thus reestablished commandment 1 which may help to prevent further
vioaltions of that commandment. In contrast, in the rerailment scenario using van
Eemeren and Houtlosser‟s strategy the flaw has been let unrepaired and the relation
between the participants has gotten damaged.
4 Conclusion
In this thesis a practicable possibility to rerail derailments in actual argumentative
discussions – with the help of a Relevance Question – has been developed and applied
with an instance of tu quoque.
The theoretical grounding in chapter 2 has yield several useful insights that
have been used in the practice-oriented chapter 3. Krabbe‟s fallacy criticism with a
comparison of an empirical and a normative profile of dialogue has been shown to
be useful in actual argumentative discussions to determine a fallacy. Jacobs‟ notion of
rhetorical strategy has provided useful insight into an idea of a pragmatic, realistic – but
still – context-dependent rationale behind moves, politeness strategies have been shown
to be types of Jacobs‟ rhetorical strategies. Van Eemeren and Houtlosser‟s rerailment
proposal has been used as the inspiration and theoretical departure of the thesis. Two
conditions and five analytically distinguished steps for a felicitous rerailment have
been extracted from their concept.
In chapter 3, two notions of relevance have been introduced as well as the
pragma-dialectical notion of relevance reconciling both. Based on this notion of
relevance and insights from the Politeness Theory and the Relevance Theory it has been
shown that van Eemeren and Houtlosser‟s rerailment proposal inhere the danger of
face-threatening acts, i.e. being impolite. Due to these social problems the parties are
required an additional processing effort which can easily lead to an interactional
problem. This core problem has been solved by presenting the idea of Relevance
39
Questions. Relevance Questions are not any questions. They are special questions that
set off a certain reaction at the guilty party‟s side. In fact, they are strategic
maneuvers. Following Searle they are an indirect speech acts. They have the
secondary meaning of asking for the ability to explain the fallacious move. They have
the primary meaning of a request to first rethink and hence repair the derailed
maneuver. They make the guilty party aware of the flaw and yield its repair. The
primary meaning unfolds while processing the secondary meaning. The rerailment
conditions proposed by van Eemeren and Houtlosser have remained fulfilled
whereas the five analytically distinguished steps to rerail have been altered.
At last, an example of tu quoque has been analyzed. Van Eemeren and
Houtlosser propose to repair a fallacy by overtly referring to the mistake it represents.
This has been shown to bring about the danger of being repeatedly accusing the
opponent of erroneous thinking. Consequently, a rerailment scenario with van
Eemeren and Houtlosser‟s concept has been shown to escalate, to end up in an
aggressive and emotional quarrel in which the issue of primary interest – the
derailment – is not addressed. According to the same instance of tu quoque a
Relevance Question has been proposed. By being conventionally indirect as a
politeness strategy protecting the negative face and the strategic formulation of the
question the rerailment has turned out to be successful.
Relevance Questions are supposed to help to rerail independent from the
argumentative situation given.
94
However, in some Communicative Activity Types they
may not yield the rerailment because the guilty party does not compute the primary
meaning of the indirect speech act. It is still possible to rerail. The innocent party can
then employ the overt rerailment strategy proposed by van Eemeren and Houtlosser,
being bluntly clear about his intentions and risking face-threats. Perhaps – this is
what the actual discourse then shows – the parties are more likely to rerail that more
direct way. Finally I want to endorse that – either way – the rerailment as the focus
94
Strategic Maneuvering occurs in various contexts (van Eemeren, 2010: 129-162). A Relevance
Question is systematically assigned to a fallacy. Fallacies are systematically connected to the various
stages of the ideal model. Hence, a Relevance Question can be systematically connected to the
stage(s). It is worth a thought if it is possible to find Relevance Questions for other fallacies violating
other commandments. By rerailing fallacies with Relevance Questions the questions support the
accomplishment of the stages‟ goals and hence of the global, overall resolution of the difference of
opinion in various contexts of strategic maneuvering.
40
of attention is supposed to achieve its aim: It should yield an ongoing reasonable
resolution of the difference of opinion on the merits.
5 References
Andone, C. (2009). Accusing someone of n inconsistency as a confrontational way of
strategic manoeuvring. In F. van Eemeren (Ed.), Examining Argumentation in
Context: Fifteen studies on strategic maneuvering (pp. 153-169). Amsterdam:
John Benjamins Publishing Company.
Bousfield, D. (2008). Impoliteness in Interaction. Amsterdam: John Benjamins
Publishing Company.
Buck, R. (1997). Towards an extended theory of face action: Analyzing dialogue in E.M.
Forster's A Passage to India. Journal of Pragmatics (27), pp. 83-106.
Feteris, E. (n.d.). The Role Of The Judge In Legal Proceedings. A Pragma-Dialectical
Analysis. Amsterdam.
Grice, H. (1975). Logic and Conversation. In J. Kimball, P. Cole, & J. Morgen (Eds.),
Syntax and Semantics (pp. 41-58). New York: Academic Press.
Houtlosser, P., & van Laar, A. (2007). Metadialogues: Krabbe's Immanent Dialectic. In
Argumentation (21) (pp. 205-208).
Jacobs, S. (2000). Rhetoric and Dialectic from the Standpoint of Normative Pragmatics.
Argumentation 14, pp. 261-286.
Jacobs, S. (2009). Nonfallacious Rhetorical Design in Argumentation. In F. H. van
Eemeren, & B. Garssen (Eds.), Pondering on Problems of Argumentation (pp.
55-72). Springer Science+Business Media B.V.
Krabbe, E. (2002). Profiles of Dialogue as a Dialectical Tool. In F. H. van Eemeren (Ed.),
Advances in Pragma-Dialectics (pp. 153-167). Amsterdam: Sic Sat.
Krabbe, E. C. (2003). Metadialogues. In F. H. van Eemeren, A. J. Blair, C. A. Willard, &
A. F. Snoeck Henkenmans (Eds.), Proceedings of the Fifth Conference of the
International Society for the Study of Argumentation (pp. 641-644). Amsterdam:
Sic Sat.
Searle, J. (1975). Indirect Speech Acts. In J. Kimball, P. Cole, & J. Morgan (Eds.), Syntax
and Semantics (pp. 59-82). New York: Academic Press.
Sperber, D., & Wilson, D. (1986). Relevance: Communication and Cognition (2 ed.).
Oxford, Cambridge: Blackwell.
41
Van der Henst, J., & Sperber, D. (2004). Testing the Cognitive and Communicative
Principles of Relevance. In I. Noveck, & D. Sperber (Eds.), Experimental
Pragmatics (pp. 141-171). Macmillan: Palgrave.
van Eemeren, F. H. (2010). Strategic Maneuvering in Argumentative Discourse.
van Eemeren, F. H., & Grootendoorst, R. (1994). Rationale for a pragma-dialectical
perspective. In F. H. van Eemeren, & R. Grootendorst (Eds.), Studies in Pragma-
Dialectics (pp. 11-28). Amsterdam: Sic Sat.
van Eemeren, F. H., & Grootendoorst, R. (2004). A Systematic Theory of Argumentation -
The pragma-dialectical approach.
van Eemeren, F. H., & Houtlosser, P. (2003). The Development of the Pragma-dialectical
Approach to Argumentation. Argumentation 17, pp. 378-403.
van Eemeren, F. H., & Houtlosser, P. (2007). Countering Fallacious Moves.
Argumentation 21, pp. 243-252.
van Eemeren, F. H., & Houtlosser, P. (2009). How Should One Respond to Fallacious
Moves? Argumentation and Advocacy, pp. 198-206.
van Eemeren, F., & Grootendorst, R. (1984). Speech Acts in Argumentative Discussions.
A Theoretical Model for the Analysis of Discussions Directed towards Solving
Conflicts of Opinion.
van Eemeren, F., & Grootendorst, R. (1995). The Pragma-Dialectical Approach to
Fallacies. In H. Hansen, & R. Pinto (Eds.), Fallacies: Classical and
Contemporary Readings.
van Eemeren, F., & Houtlosser, P. (2004). More about fallacies as derailments of
strategic maneuvering: the case of tu quoque. In H. Hansen, C. Tindale, J. Blair,
R. Johnson, & R. Pinto (Eds.), Argumentation and its applications: Informal
Logic.
van Eemeren, F., Garssen, B., & Meuffels, B. (2009). Fallacies and Judgments of
Reasonableness. Dordrecht.
Watts, J. (2003). Politeness. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Werkhofer, K. (2005). Traditional and modern views: the social constitution and the
power of politeness. In R. Watts, S. Ide, & K. Ehlich (Eds.), Politeness in
Language: Studies in its History, Theory and Practice (pp. 155-182). Berlin: De
Gruyter.
Wilson, D. (1994). Relevance and Understanding. In Brown (Ed.), Language and
Understanding (pp. 35-59). Oxford: University Press.