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The Effectiveness of the United Nations Security
Council in Maintaining International Peace
Mohammed Anmar Shakir
Supervisor:
Prof. Dr. Israa Shariff
University of Baghdad
College of Political Science
Department of Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding
Acknowledgements
I would like to begin by thanking Dad and Mom, who, if it wasn't for them, I
would not exist in this world. And also, to my brother, Noor Anmar Shakir and my
grandmother (Madiha Abduljabbar), who have been with me for my entire life. As my
dearest person, I would like to express my deep gratitude to my grandmother, who played
an invaluable role in my life, raised and grew me and taught me and will always be in my
heart forever.
My brother Noor and grandmother were an inspiration and an unwavering support
for me. Through their permanent presence, they shared with me moments of joy, sadness,
and challenges, and were always on my side all the time.
I also would like to express my gratitude to the modern and open-source
technologies that help and support scientific research. Moreover, I would like to thank
everyone who’s trying to make a change whether in the field of Political Science or other
fields. Also, climate change is the most dangerous and an existential threat that is
happening right now, it is real, and it needs collective and immediate action.
Contents
Abstract: ...................................................................................................................................................... 1
Introduction: ............................................................................................................................................... 3
Chapter 1: The Formation of the United Nations and the Purpose of Maintaining International
Peace and Security ...................................................................................................................................... 8
The Purpose Behind the Establishment of the Security Council: Is it Collective Security? .......... 12
The Debate Around the Veto ......................................................................................................... 22
The United Nations Security Council and the Principle of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) ... 26
CHAPTER 2: Global Governance and The Security Council, and The Topic of Disarmament ....... 31
What is Global Governance? ......................................................................................................... 32
Global Governance and the Security Council ................................................................................ 35
The Issues of Nuclear Proliferation and Disarmament .................................................................. 44
Chapter 3: Mechanisms of the Security Council and Case Studies of Iraq, Syria, and Ukraine ...... 57
The Sanctions Regime ................................................................................................................... 58
United Nations Peacekeeping Operations ...................................................................................... 62
The Case Study of Iraq .................................................................................................................. 70
The Case Study of Syria ................................................................................................................ 82
The Case Study of Ukraine ............................................................................................................ 91
Chapter 4: Reform of the Security Council, Inevitability or Upcoming Irrelevance? ....................... 98
Increasing calls, less action? .......................................................................................................... 99
Attempts at a reform consensus ................................................................................................... 101
A Security Council for the Twenty-First Century ....................................................................... 105
Conclusion: .............................................................................................................................................. 111
The potential way forward for the Security Council: .................................................................. 114
BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................................................................................................... 116
1
Abstract:
The Security Council is one of six bodies that make up the United Nations. The
Security Council was assigned the responsibility of maintaining international peace and
security by the United Nations Charter.
Using qualitative analysis, this thesis looks at the context of the establishment of
the United Nations and the Security Council, outlining the structure of the Security
Council by examining its composition, theory, and practice.
There has always been debate around the theory of the Security Council and
whether the drafters of the United Nations Charter intended the Council to be a system of
collective security. Moreover, there have been new developments in the practise of the
Security Council, like the use of new principles such as the Responsibility to Protect
(R2P) in the drafting of the resolutions and the Protection of Civilians (PoC) as the main
principle and task for the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, which have seen an
increase in importance as well as innovations for their implementation.
The thesis discusses the critical resolutions and mechanisms of the Security
Council, like sanctions, which are one of the most important mechanisms to coerce states
to comply with the resolutions against threats to international peace and security. As well
as the theory of global governance and its developments, its relation to the Security
Council, and the role of the Security Council in the issues of disarmament and nuclear
proliferation.
2
The thesis also qualitatively examines three case studies, which are the most
recent examples of wars in the twenty-first century and they are Iraq, Syria, and Ukraine,
and how the Security Council addressed those conflicts.
The reform of the Security Council is a long-discussed topic with many calls and
proposals. There are no doubt implications, whether the Council is reformed or remains
in the same structure. Currently, calls for reform and restructuring are at an all-time high
as the world sees major developments.
3
Introduction:
The United Nations is one-of-a-kind organization, a system of global governance
and multilateralism that deals with all issues of international relations, and the Security
Council was designed to be the sole responsible organization for international peace and
security through Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.
The Security Council operates withing the authority given to it by the United
Nations Charter, which has the state sovereignty as its cornerstone, that makes the United
Nations in general, a minimally interventionists organization. Nevertheless, notions of
state sovereignty took many developments since 1945 and became more complicated and
decentralised than ever. At the same time, the Security Council is authorized to “take
such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore
international peace and security.” 1
The Security Council has what is known as the permanent five members, they are
the powers that won World War Two, and they are (Russia, the United Kingdom, The
United States, France, and China) there has been many criticisms that the Security
Council is severely influenced by the them.
The permanent five members of the Security Council, known as the P5 are the
most distinctive feature of the council, since they have the power of the veto, that any
resolution has to have the concurring votes of the permanent members, otherwise it will
1 United Nations, ‘United Nations Charter (Full Text)’, United Nations (United Nations), accessed
19 March 2023, https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/full-text.
4
not pass, unless one of the permanent members chooses to abstain, which does not
amount to a negative vote.
It can be said that the Security Council has the most difficult task, that is the
maintenance of international peace and security, that it comes as no surprise that the
council is criticised from academics and prominent politicians, but the dynamics of
international relations is fraught with complexity that an understanding of the Security
Council requires an understanding not only of international relations, but also the
dynamics of great powers, historical background, developments and the current context.
The second Secretary-General of the United Nations, Dag Hammarskjöld
famously said that the United Nations "was not created to take mankind to heaven, but to
save humanity from hell." 2 A quote that was said in 1954 can still be a reminder for the
importance not just of the United Nations, but also of multilateralism in general.
The Security Council was not created to be a politically neutral organization, but
rather to find balances of power and consensus regarding issues pertaining to the
maintenance of international peace and security, it is clear that the drafters of the United
Nations Charter learned from the mistakes of its predecessor, the League of Nations and
that is why there are permanent and non-permanent members of the Security Council, and
that is why the permanent members has the right to veto a resolution. The Security
Council was created as an institution made up of member states with the superpowers in
2 Dag Hammarskjöld and Un Secretary-General, ‘Address by Secretary-General Dag
Hammarskjöld at University of California Convocation, Berkeley, California, Thursday, May 13, 1954, at
10:00 a.m. (Pacific Coast Time)’, 13 May 1954, https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/1291161.
5
the middle, yet it was created to act as an institution with a margin of consensus enough
to act collectively, whether that was reality, it is questionable.
The methodology of the thesis is qualitative and theoretical analysis, not to decide
through a yes or no answer to whether the Security Council has been effective in
maintaining international peace and security, but rather this thesis will look into some of
the many mechanisms, dynamics, resolutions and developments of the security council
throughout the years starting from its inception in 1945 and up to 2023. As well as taking
the case studies of Iraq, Syria, and Ukraine, those three cases are arguably the scenarios
that led to the calls for the reform of the council to be more legitimate due to how the
council failed to act and were not able to solve the crises and as a result, those crises
exacerbated and brought disappointments to the council. This thesis will also look into
principles such as the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) which challenges the Westphalian
notion of state sovereignty and brings a possibility of intervention in the affairs of a
sovereign state by means of a collective action by the United Nations Security Council
which was also used by regional arrangements as basis for intervention.
There have been many developments on the international stage since World War
2, which in return reflects on the work of the council. Nevertheless, calls for reform are
louder than ever, that almost everyone agrees that the Security Council needs to be more
effective and efficient as the main international organization responsible for international
peace and security. It took many crises for the reform position to be the norm, after the
bypassing of the Security Council and the invasion of Iraq by the United States and the
allies, the civil war of Syria, and the conflict in Ukraine. All of those crises and conflicts
led to the rise in awareness that the Security Council needs to be more assertive and
6
effective, otherwise the council would risk being irrelevant and would lose its legitimacy
on the international stage. As well as the rise of new powers such as India, Germany,
Japan, and Brazil that are known as the group of 4 (g4) and they are actively seeking the
permanent membership of the council.
It is clear that the Security Council is influenced by the national and self interest
of nation states, whether resolutions or rhetoric of the Security Council on the myriad of
issues that the Council deals with, dynamics of geopolitics are a critical aspect of the
practise of the Security Council, despite the fact that the drafters of the United Nations
Charter sought that the Council through balance of power would find consensus on the
issues pertaining to international peace and security, which can be said that the drafters of
the Charter were too idealistic.
Because the Security Council deals with many issues, this thesis will look into
some of the issues that are linked with international peace and security to analyse and
assess how the Security Council acted through resolutions and whether those resolutions
were efficient and effective enough for their respective issue.
Chapter One beings by taking the context of the formation of the United Nations,
the drafting of the United Nations Charter, how the context of World War 2 and the
failure of the League of Nations influenced the formation of the United Nations and the
Security Council, as well as the key events and people that influenced the United Nations
such as Franklin D. Roosevelt, Winston Churchill as Joseph Stalin, also how new
principles like the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) are changing traditional concepts of the
nation state, as well as the principle of collective security.
7
Chapter Two beings by taking the concept and definition of global governance,
how it is becoming ever more pressing for global cooperation, as well as the theory and
work of the Security Council along the lines of global governance. Following by the topic
of disarmament and the issue of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the Security Council efforts in the
treaty.
Chapter Three dissects the mechanisms of the practise of the Security Council as
such the sanctions regime, what is known as ‘’smart sanctions’’ as well as the famous
United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, the developments in those mechanisms, as well
their criticisms. Furthermore, Chapter Three will have three cases studies, that of Iraq,
Syria, and Ukraine.
Chapter Four takes the calls and proposals for reforming the Security Council,
proposals from prominent politicians as well as proposals from members states such as
Liechtenstein proposal, the group of four (G4) proposal, the Uniting for consensus (UfC)
proposal and the possible way forward for the Security Council.
8
Chapter 1: The Formation of the United Nations and the Purpose of
Maintaining International Peace and Security
In order to understand the purpose behind the initial establishment of the United
Nations, we need to take a look at the context and the circumstances at the time of its
establishment. That is 26th of June 1945, the day the Charter of the United Nations was
signed in San Francisco and the events that lead to that conference.
The ideas of international peace and security in the UN Charter began to emerge
with the ideas expressed in the Atlantic Charter in August 1941. However, two months
earlier, in London, a Declaration spoke of the need for global cooperation.
‘’That the only true basis of enduring peace is the willing co-operation of free
peoples in a world in which, relieved of the menace of aggression, all may enjoy
economic and social security; and that it is their intention to work together, and with
other free peoples, both in war and peace to this end.’’ 3
The Atlantic Charter was drafted in a meeting between the United States President
Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom Winston Churchill
and it referred to ‘’certain common principles in the national policies of their respective
countries on which they base their hopes for a better future for the world.’’ And also
foresaw the need for the establishment of a world order based on common security as
mentioned in the eighth paragraph ‘’the establishment of a wider and permanent system
of general security, that the disarmament of such nations is essential.’’
3 United Nations, ‘Preparatory Years: UN Charter History’, United Nations (United Nations),
accessed 7 June 2023, https://www.un.org/en/about-us/history-of-the-un/preparatory-years.
9
On the 1st of January 1942, twenty-six countries who were at war with the Axis
Powers, the United States, the United Kingdom, the Republic of China, and the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), those countries met in Washington DC and agreed on
the principles of the Atlantic Charter, which became known as the 'Declaration by United
Nations', later, twenty-one additional countries signed the Declaration.
The Declaration by the United Nations was followed by the Moscow and Teheran
Conferences in 1943, at the time World War 2 was concluding towards the victory of the
allies against the Axis Powers. Later from 21 August to 7 October 1944, representatives
of China, the USSR, the United States and the United Kingdom met in Dumbarton Oaks
to lay the ground for an international system that would ensure peace and security, which
was the main theme for the conference.
The voting procedure of the United Nations Security Council was left unsolved in
Dumbarton Oaks, then it was discussed in early 1945 in Yalta, Crimea, where Churchill,
Roosevelt, and Stalin met with their foreign ministers and chiefs of staff. General
Secretary of the USSR Joseph Stalin mentioned during the conference that “the main
thing was to prevent quarrels in the future of the three Great Powers [USA, Britain, and
the USSR] and the task, therefore, was to secure their unity for the future” 4
On February 11, 1945, the conference announced that this question had been
resolved and called for a Conference of United Nations to be held in San Francisco on 25
April 1945 Soon later, in early April, President Roosevelt passed away unexpectedly,
President Truman opted not to postpone the preparations for this significant event, which
4 ‘The UN during the Cold War: “A Tool of Superpower Influence Stymied by Superpower
Conflict”?’, E-International Relations (blog), 10 June 2011, https://www.e-ir.info/2011/06/10/the-un-
during-the-cold-war-a-tool-of-superpower-influence-stymied-by-superpower-conflict/.
10
took place on the scheduled day. It is worth mentioning that President Truman was less a
proponent of collective security and more a believer in the superiority of the national
interest, unlike President Roosevelt, which was a firm believer in the collective security,
and that being the main purpose behind the establishment of the United Nations. 5
Finally, the San Francisco conference marked the birth of the United Nations in
1945, which declared the UN charter with the presence of 50 nations, 850 delegates,
which along with their advisors and staff, with the conference secretariat brought the total
to 3,500, that lead it to be called the largest international gathering ever to take place.
According to Oliver Lundquist, the State Department's San Francisco "visual
presentation" official, his office was told to create “a circular organization chart so it
didn’t have the hierarchy of one organization being at the top and the rest filtering down
from it.'' 6 Meaning that the organization of the United Nations is not strictly hierarchical,
according to Lundquist.
During World War II, President Franklin D. Roosevelt envisioned a system of
collective security among nations to create a lasting world peace. After Roosevelt died,
President Harry Truman assumed responsibility for making Roosevelt’s idea a reality
with the creation of a charter for the United Nations at the San Francisco Conference in
the spring of 1945. Over the next few years that followed, former First Lady Eleanor
Roosevelt furthered her husband’s vision by leading the U.S. effort to encourage the U.N.
General Assembly’s adoption of a Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 7
5 United Nations, ‘History of the United Nations’, United Nations (United Nations), accessed 8
June 2023, https://www.un.org/en/model-united-nations/history-united-nations.
6 Ian Hurd, After Anarchy: Legitimacy and Power in the United Nations Security Council (Princeton
University Press, 2008) 84.
7 Eleanor Roosevelt and the United Nations’, Bill of Rights Institute, accessed 8 June 2023,
https://live-bri-dos.pantheonsite.io/essays/eleanor-roosevelt-and-the-united-nations/.
11
The United Nations Charter drafters kept in mind that this organization should not
end up a failure like its predecessor, that is the League of Nations. And by doing so it
needed to make sure that the major powers of the time are present, that lead to what is
later known as the P-5, that is five permanent members of the Security Council, and the
power of the ‘’veto’’, In spite of the fact that the latter was not explicitly mentioned in the
charter. Thus, making the veto One of the most controversial aspects of the charter and its
interpretations, At the San Francisco Conference in 1945, a number of small and
medium-sized governments’ representatives raised a concern about the power of the
permanent members' veto, at the argument that the veto can be implemented to defend the
national interests of the five permanent members at the expense of the small and medium-
sized states. 8
Chapter III (Organs) Article 7 identifies the establishment of six ‘’organs’’ of the
United Nations and they are: a General Assembly, a Security Council, an Economic and
Social Council, a Trusteeship Council, an International Court of Justice and a
Secretariat’. 9 The second paragraph of the same article mentions that other organs may
be established if necessary, and in accordance with the present charter.
One issue that is debated in International Relations is that did the United Nations
Security Council established for the purpose of collective security, or as a ‘’wartime
alliance’’ at the times when World War two was about to be concluded as a victory for
the allies, and thus the five permanent members of the Security Council (The Republic of
8 The Veto : Research Report : Security Council Report’, accessed 19 May 2023,
https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/research-reports/the-veto.php.
9 Ibid.
12
China, France, The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America).
The Fifth chapter of the UN charter (The Security Council) Article 24 (1) states:
‘’In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its
members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of
international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this
responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf.’’
This article of the charter is still debated up to this day on whether this article
serves as a call for the establishment of a collective security system.
In 1965, there has been an increase to the non-permanent members of the Security
Council, The General Assembly issued resolution 2101, by making an amendment to
Article 23, the Security Council non-permanent members has been increased from eleven
to fifteen. 10 Which also made an amendment to article 109 by changing the word
‘’seven’’ to ‘’nine’’ regarding the making of a General Conference of the United Nations
members for the purpose of making amendments to the present charter.
The Purpose Behind the Establishment of the Security Council: Is it Collective
Security?
There are many definitions to collective security, a classical definition is ‘’A
system, regional or global, in which each state in the system accepts that the security of
one is the concern of all, and agrees to join in a collective response to threats to, and
10 UN General Assembly (20th Sess.: 1965), ‘Amendment to Article 109 of the Charter of the
United Nations.’, 1966, https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/203695.
13
breaches of, the peace.’’ 11 Other definition of collective security is “An
arrangement where each state in the system accepts that security of one of them is a
concern of all, and agrees to join in a collective response to aggression.” 12
Woodrow Wilson, who is a proponent of collective security describes it as "There
must be, not a balance of power, but a community of power; not organized rivalries, but
an organized common peace." 13
Were the drafters of the United Nations Charter too idealistic? Especially that for
many scholars and politicians, the Security Council is indeed a system for collective
security. Moreover, the drafters of the Charter did not take into serious consideration
many critical aspects of realism, the elements of power politics as well as the dynamics of
geopolitics. Could it be that the idealistic nature of the Charter was in on itself the
hindrance to the effectiveness of the Security Council?
It is important to differentiate between collective security and collective defence,
whilst both operate under the all for one and one for all idea, collective security takes
more a global level, whilst collective defence is more regional and selective to the
member states of the collective defence alliance.
John Mearsheimer mentions that Woodrow Wilson and others created the theory
of collective security in the early twentieth century, which served as the foundation for
the League of Nations, and in his words caused the failings of the organization, he goes to
mention Claude’s Power and International Relations saying ‘’Men involved in ...
11 Vaughan Lowe et al., The United Nations Security Council and War: The Evolution of Thought
and Practice Since 1945 (Oxford University Press, 2008) 13.
12 Lawrence Wesley Mwagwabi and Claude Jr, ‘THE THEORY OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY AND ITS
LIMITATIONS IN EXPLAINING INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS’, n.d., 21.
13 Earl C. Ravenal, ‘An Autopsy of Collective Security’, Political Science Quarterly 90, no. 4
(1975): 697–714, https://doi.org/10.2307/2148751.
14
establishing a collective security system ... their devotion to the ideal has been more a
manifestation of their yearning for peace and order as an end than as an expression of
conviction that the theory of collective security provides a workable and acceptable
means to that end.’’ 14
Mearsheimer goes to say that collective security refers to the premise that nations
would act in accordance with realism's mandates. But the goal is to go beyond the self-
help world of realism, that nations fear each other and are driven by balance-of-power
concerns, even if the theory implies that military force will continue to be a reality in the
international system. Institutions, according to proponents of collective security, are
critical to achieving this ambitious goal. The purpose is to persuade nations to base their
actions on fundamentally anti-realist norms. 15
Realists are in principle against the idea of collective security, their argument
stems from the claim that the international system is dominated by anarchy and security
concerns which results in a world where cooperation is limited and thus the idea of
collective security is too idealistic. But not to say that states do not cooperate, in a world
bound by realism, states in fact do cooperate, but their cooperation is limited within the
realm of balance-of-power reasoning, and that frequently leads to governments forming
alliances and cooperating against shared foes. Realists believe that authentic peace or a
world without power struggles is unlikely.
Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan in their critique of Mearsheimer’s
notion of collective security argue that Mearsheimer's critique is centred on idealistic
14 John J. Mearsheimer, ‘The False Promise of International Institutions’, International Security
19, no. 3 (1994): 5, P-27 https://doi.org/10.2307/2539078.
15 Ibid., 28.
15
collective security, a version in which nations make automatic and legally binding
promises to respond to hostility wherever and whenever it arises. He expressly excludes
from consideration alternative institutional formulations, such as concerts, which rely on
looser and more informal balancing regulation, stating that they do not create collective
security. According to Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan, the result of this
definitional technique, Mearsheimer aims his critique at a straw man and fails to
acknowledge the essential conceptual problem at hand, whether regulated,
institutionalized balance is advantageous to unregulated balancing under anarchy. 16
Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan claims that there are two main
categories for the advantages of collective security, it enables a more effective defence
against aggressors and encourages trust and cooperation. Collective security tries to
create a more effective mechanism for balancing against aggressors when they arise as
well as to reduce the likelihood of aggression by improving the competitive nature of
international relations. Collective security is fully aware of the war-causing
characteristics of the international system. 17
The United Nations Charter is said that it does not refer to the term ‘collective
security’ and thus the United Nations Security Council is not to be perceived as an
organization for collective Security. 18 In that regard, it is important to differentiate
between connotation and denotation, considering that the UN Charter does not refer
explicitly to ‘collective security’ Article 1(1) mentions that:
16 Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan, ‘The Promise of Collective Security’,
International Security 20, no. 1 (1995): 52, https://doi.org/10.2307/2539215.
17 Ibid., 54.
18 Lowe et al., UN Security Council and War, 13.
16
‘‘To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective
collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the
suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by
peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law,
adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a
breach of the peace.’’ 19
Thus, the term ‘’collective measures’’ explicitly mentions the possibility of
collective effort to prevent and remove threats to peace. The United Nations is intended
as the unity of the world states for economic, social and scientific cooperation, just as the
Security Council was intended for the collective security of ‘’peace loving nations’’. The
collective security project of the Security Council was struck by difficulties due to the
west and east divide which was translated to the establishment of The North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949, that is four years after the establishment of the
United Nations, and then the signing of the Warsaw Pact in 1955.
One of the majors constrains to the United Nations as a whole and especially the
Security Council is the dilemma of the national interest, Jussi M. Hanhimaki goes to say
that: ‘’The basic problem for the UN as the overseer of international security was and
remains simple: how to deal with conflicts—be they between or within states—without
offending the national sovereignty of its member states’’. 20 He goes as far as saying that
the ‘‘design was flawed’’. Notwithstanding the fact that the United Nations was created
19 United Nations, "Charter of the United Nations," October 24, 1945.
20 Hanhimaki Jussi, The United Nations: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford University Press, 2008)
3-4.
17
after the failure of the League of Nations, and like its predecessor, was created by the
wartime allies.
It is important to take into consideration the fact that the UN Charter was drafted
by the end of World War two as it clearly states in the Preamble of the Charter:
‘’We the peoples of the United Nations determined to save succeeding generations from
the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind…’’
The Preamble of the Charter was looking to set the ground for a new world order,
based on international cooperation and social and economic progress to set a complete
framework to ensure global peace, which explains its many organs.
Article 27 (3) goes to mention that ‘’Decisions of the Security Council on all
other matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members including the
concurring votes of the permanent members’’ which is taken as a connotation for the
veto, it can be explained that the UN Charter drafters wanted the five permanent
members to agree on an issue in order for it to be the backbone for the legitimacy of the
Security Council, and to avoid the catastrophe of the League of Nations, when Germany,
Italy, and Japan left the organization, which by 1940 was the establishment of the ‘’axis’’
powers. 21
Further emphasis for the establishment of a world order based on the United
Nations can be seen in Article 31 and 32:
Article 31
Any Member of the United Nations which is not a member of the Security
Council may participate, without vote, in the discussion of any question brought before
21 Konstantin D Magliveras, ‘The Withdrawal From the League of Nations Revisited’, Penn State
International Law Review, Vol.19, 60.
18
the Security Council whenever the latter considers that the interests of that Member are
specially affected.
Article 32
Any Member of the United Nations which is not a member of the Security
Council or any state which is not a Member of the United Nations, if it is a party to a
dispute under consideration by the Security Council, shall be invited to participate,
without vote, in the discussion relating to the dispute. The Security Council shall lay
down such conditions as it deems just for the participation of a state which is not a
Member of the United Nations. 22
This emphasis not just on the importance of the participation of member states but
also the participation of non-member states wanted to give the structure of the United
Nations full legitimacy on the global stage, the drafters of the Charter did not want to risk
decreased legitimacy of the organization and thus irrelevancy, especially for the Security
Council, which was supposed to have the responsibility for ‘’maintenance of international
peace and security.’’ Article 2(6) goes as far as saying ‘’The Organization shall ensure
that states which are not Members of the United Nations act in accordance with these
Principles so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and
security.’’ Which goes to show the importance of whole-participation in the structure of
the United Nations.
What the United Nations and its Charter was caught up in from the start of the
organization, even before that at the drafting of the charter is the dilemma of state
22 United Nations, "Charter of the United Nations," October 24, 1945.
19
sovereignty as the sole legitimate when it comes to the state’s internal affairs, Article 2(7)
says:
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to
intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or
shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter;
but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under
Chapter Vll.
Another topic of controversy is the veto power and it's ''shadow'' that is present at
the council, if it wasn’t for the veto power, there would be a fair risk that one of the P-5
would have left if the Security Council has passed a resolution that would hurt the
interests of a permanent member. Thus, the United Nations as a whole is caught up
between nation states, their national interest, and task of the maintenance of international
peace and security. That is why the Security Council saw decreased relevance in the cold
war and the ''iron curtain'' that divided Europe by 1948.
Another interesting fact in the UN Charter is the ‘’Military Staff Committee’’ that
is mentioned 7 times in the Charter in Article 26, Article 45, Article 46, Article 47 (1),
Article 47(2), Article 47(3), and Article 47(4). 23
The first Security Council resolution (passed without a vote) gave the Military
Staff Committee the green light on 1 February, 1946. Twenty-nine months later, on 2nd
July 1948, the Military Staff Committee reported to the Security Council that it was not
able to fulfil its mandate. Which goes to show that the drafters of the charter failed to take
23 ‘The Military Staff Committee: A Possible Future Role in UN Peace Operations?’, accessed 26
June 2023, https://archive.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/199-peacekeeping/40932-the-
military-staff-committee-a-possible-future-role-in-un-peace-operations-.html.
20
into consideration the realistic aspects of geopolitics and national interest, which is
something the UN has always struggled with up to the present time. 24
Even after the end of the Cold War, the Military Staff Committee woke up to take
the task of coordinating a naval interdiction against Iraq under SC resolution 665, and
after two or 3 informal meetings of the Military Staff Committee held in the French
Mission concluded against the formal activation of the Committee. 25 Which goes to
show that even after the end of the cold war, the UN is still caught up under the dilemma
of national interest and geopolitics. Political Scientists like Ralph M Goldman argued in
1990, that after the end of the cold war the MSC would be revived saying "As NATO and
the Warsaw Pact diminish, becoming more political than military, or possibly disappear,
something will have to take their place. A future Military Staff Committee and the UN
Security Council may prove to be the best alternative." But that did not resort to reality.
Chapter VII talks about the responsibility of the UNSC to determinate (Article
39), prevent (Article 40) and to react without the use of force but instead by the cessation
of economic and/or diplomatic relations Article (41), and if none of those measures
proved successful then the UNSC may use ‘’action’’, interestingly it mentions the use of
air then sea, and then land forces to maintain or restore international peace and security.
Which goes to show that there is some aspect of realism in the drafting of the Charter in
its declaration that the ‘’use of force’’ as an acceptable action if it is to stop or prevent the
factual or potential threat to international peace and security. Article (43)(44) and Article
(45) calls all nations that are members of the United Nations to comply with the decisions
of the UNSC, and furthermore to provide all possible assistance whether it may be armed
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
21
forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage. Etc. The purpose of those
Chapter VII, clearly, was to strengthen the legitimacy of the UNSC and its superiority as
the sole responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security.
On 22 August 2022 at the Security Council meeting on “Maintenance of
International Peace and Security: Promoting Common Security through Dialogue and
Cooperation” United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres stated that:
‘’Today’s collective security system is being tested like never before. Our world
is riven by geopolitical divides, conflicts and instability. From military coups, to inter-
State conflicts, invasions, and wars that stretch on year after year. Lingering differences
between the world’s great Powers — including at this Council — continue to limit our
ability to collectively respond. Humanitarian assistance is stretched to the breaking
point. Human rights and the rule of law are under assault. Trust is in short supply.’’ 26
The Secretary-General was referring to the conflict in Ukraine that was turned to
a full-scale war on the 22 February 2022. Moreover, what he most likely meant is the
system of the resolution-issuing Security Council and the how it failed to prevent war in
Ukraine, and the threats of nuclear escalation. Not that the Security Council as it is today
is an actual system of collective security. The Secretary-General also acknowledged the
division between the superpowers and the need for new agendas and mechanisms to try to
tackle those divisions.
26 As World Faces Maximum Danger, Ensuring Collective Security Requires Dialogue,
Cooperation, Secretary-General Tells Security Council | UN Press’, accessed 5 June 2023,
https://press.un.org/en/2022/sgsm21421.doc.htm.
22
The Debate Around the Veto
Since the establishment of the United Nations, the veto power that the five
permanent members possess has been the subject to many critics claiming that unlike the
General Assembly, the Security Council is ‘’undemocratic’’ could it be that this
particular element of political realism decreased the effectiveness of the Security council,
made it less relevant and even rendered it completely useless?
In accordance with paragraph three of article 27 of the United Nations Charter,
each of the five permanent members of the Security Council (China, France, Russia, the
United Kingdom, and the United States) has used their right to veto non-procedural
decisions made by the Council at some point since the organization's inception.
To varied degrees, they have followed this course of action. The Soviet Union and
after 1991, Russia used their right to veto 121 times, with 35 of those vetoes having to do
with membership applications to the United Nations during the organization's formative
years. On March 17, 1970, the United States exercised the first of its 82 vetoes (S/9696
and Corr. 1 and 2), at which time the Soviet Union had already used its veto power over
80 other draft resolutions. Since the 23rd of December 1989 (S/21048), when France and
the United Kingdom, together with the United States, blocked the Security Council from
denouncing the invasion of Panama by the United States, neither country has used their
veto power since then. 27
During the Suez Crisis on October 30, 1956 (S/3710), the United Kingdom used
its veto power for the first time. By the time it stopped doing so at the end of 1989, it had
27 Dag Hammarskjöld Library, ‘Research Guides: UN Security Council Meetings & Outcomes
Tables: Vetoes’, research starter (United Nations. Dag Hammarskjöld Library).
https://research.un.org/en/docs/sc/quick/veto
23
used its veto power a total of 29 times. France used its veto power for the first time on
June 26, 1946 (S/PV.49). From that date until the end of 1989, France used its veto power
a total of 16 times. On October 25, 1971, the People's Republic of China took over the
seat that had been occupied by the Republic of China. Since that date, the People's
28
Republic of China has exercised its veto power 17 times.
More than 266 Security Council Resolutions has been vetoed since the Security
Council’s first meeting on 17 January 1946, that large number of Resolutions vetoed had
no doubt altered the work and effectiveness of the Security Council, according to the UN
Charter, the Permanent five members must agree or not oppose. Interestingly, the use of
the veto has declined since the end of the cold war, in other words, the veto has been used
the most during the cold war.
29
In order to eliminate the veto power, the UN charter itself must be modified, and
the permanent members of the Security Council must agree to give up their veto power,
as some critics argue that the Security Council represents the world of 1945 rather than
the power distribution of the twenty-first century, and that is why the council is risking
irrelevance, no clear model has a consensus of the great powers as well as the rising
30
powers.
One of the most recent examples of the irrelevance of the Security Council is the
US-led invasion of Iraq without the authorization of the former, sparked widespread
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
30 The Veto: Problems and Prospects’, E-International Relations (blog), 27 March 2014,
https://www.e-ir.info/2014/03/27/the-veto-problems-and-prospects/.
24
apprehension that the United States unilateral actions after the end of the cold war has led
31
United Nations to be pushed it to the side.
The five permanent members' (P5) change in power and policies, as well as their
complicated relationships, have drastically altered the dynamics of the Security Council,
giving birth to a new set of challenges. The possibility of a standoff between newly found
assertiveness of Russia and China on one hand and the United States and the west on the
other as well as the United States being seen as progressively reluctant to carry as much
international burdens after its debacles in Iraq and discomfiting experiences in
Afghanistan poses the greatest threat to the Security Council's relevance today.
The crisis in Syria is another notable example in the Security Council's post-Cold
War practice that highlights the inability of the Security Council to find consensus and
act collectively in response to the crisis of 2014 in Syria, beyond the veto, the Security
Council needs to act as a unified body other than an international body of separate
members states, with the permanent five in the middle, at least that was the goal for the
drafters of the Charter.
Questions of the possibility of the neutrality of the Security Council arises, the
dilemma of the national security will always prevail as well as the dynamics of
geopolitics, they are the elements of political realism that are almost impossible to erase,
at least during the present times. Thus, the task here is to try to find consensus outside
and within the Security Council, as it was intended to be during its establishment and as
31 Sebastian von Einsiedel, David M Malone and Bruno Stagno Ugarte, ‘The UN Security Council in
an Age of Great Power Rivalry’, United Nations University, Working Paper Series, Number 04, February
2015, 2.
25
the drafters of the Charter intended it to be. Finding consensus is the most critical task of
the Council, not only to make it relevant but also to make it more effective.
China and Russia rejected a draft resolution criticizing the Syrian regime that
called for an immediate halt to the conflict and a ceasefire October 2011, despite the
United Kingdom and France removing any mention of sanctions or military options. This
contrasts with Resolution 1973 on Libya, which was passed by the Council six months
earlier and, among other things, established a No-Fly Zone and authorized Member States
to "act nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, and acting in
cooperation with the Secretary-General, to take all necessary measures... to protect
civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in Libya, including Benghazi.
32
Russia and China abstained from voting on the resolution but did not use the veto.
Concerning the current veto authority held by the Five Permanent Members, it is
quite evident that the majority of states who are members of the United Nations are in
favour of doing away with this privilege. The African Union, the Arab League, and the
Group of Non-Aligned Nations are all pushing for this kind of change, and a large
number of western nations are also supporting it.
The United States, Russia, and China are the only states that have publicly stated
their support for the present veto authority (Poland, Australia and Singapore figuring
among the exceptions). However, in order to effectuate a change of the United Nations
Charter, concurring votes and ratification from the Five Permanent Members are
32 P. Webb, ‘Deadlock or Restraint? The Security Council Veto and the Use of Force in Syria’,
Journal of Conflict and Security Law 19, no. 3 (1 December 2014): 475.
26
required. As a result, the majority of states have given up on removal proposals and have
33
instead put-up ideas that are less strong, mostly restraining the veto.
The United Nations Security Council and the Principle of the Responsibility to
Protect (R2P)
The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is defined: ‘’Is an international norm that
seeks to ensure that the international community never again fails to halt the mass
atrocity crimes of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.’’
34 This principle marks the further collision between state sovereignty, its monopoly on
its internal affairs on one hand and its obligations towards its citizens and the
international system of the United Nations on the other. The notion arose as a result of
the international community's inability to appropriately respond to mass atrocities
committed in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s.
At the United Nations Millennium Assembly in September 2000, Canadian Prime
Minister Jean Chrétien announced the establishment of an independent International
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in response to Secretary-
General Kofi Annan's challenge to the international community to pursue a new
international consensus on how to act in the face of massive violations of human rights
and international humanitarian law.
33 Jan Wouters and Tom Ruys, Security Council Reform: A New Veto for a New Century?, Egmont
Paper 9 (Gent: Academia Press, 2005) 21.
34 What Is R2P?’, Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, accessed 8 June 2023,
https://www.globalr2p.org/what-is-r2p/.
27
During 2001, the International Committee on Intervention and State Sovereignty,
set up by the Canadian government, established the principle of R2P in a report entitled
‘’The Responsibility to Protect’’.
This report, which is known as the ICISS report, emphasizes sovereign
governments' fundamental obligation to defend their own populations against mass
murder, large-scale loss of life, rape, and other forms of violence. The ICISS study also
emphasizes that when nations are unwilling or unable to protect their citizens, the
35
responsibility for preventing genocides must be shared by the international community.
The ICISS report starts with ‘’right of humanitarian intervention”: the question of
when, if ever, it is appropriate for states to take coercive – and in particular military –
action, against another state for the purpose of protecting people at risk in that other
state.’’ The ICISS admits the dilemma between state sovereignty and if there is an
instance when there is a meaningful, justified intervention in another state’s affairs.
At the UN World Summit, the biggest meeting of Heads of State and Government
in history, overwhelmingly approved the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) in 2005. Heads
of State and Government affirmed their responsibility to protect their own populations
from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity in paragraphs
138 and 139 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document and accepted a collective
responsibility to encourage and assist each other in upholding this commitment. 36
35 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty et al., eds., The Responsibility
to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (Ottawa:
International Development Research Centre, 2001).
36 UN General Assembly (60th Sess.: 2005-2006), ‘2005 World Summit Outcome :: Resolution /:
Adopted by the General Assembly’, 24 October 2005, https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/556636.
28
They also stated their willingness to take prompt and concrete action, in
accordance with the United Nations Charter and in collaboration with appropriate
regional organizations, in instances when national authorities fail to protect their citizens.
37
The ICISS makes it clear that the United Nations Security Council is the
‘’appropriate body’’ and there is no alternative to deal with military intervention concerns
for the sake of human protection, that the Security Council should make the difficult
judgments on overriding state sovereignty in difficult circumstances, that the ‘’central
role’’ of the Security Council is at the forefront of deciding the means and instances for
intervention.
The report mentions three elements that the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) take
into account and they are the responsibility to prevent, the responsibility to react, and the
responsibility to rebuild. 38
Taken into account those three elements, as well as the ability to bypass the
Security Council’s veto, a lot of critics to the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) principle
argue that nations can use the principle to advance their national interest agenda as well
as take it as an excuse for military intervention for regime change, in which the critics
bring the NATO military intervention in Libya during the First Libyan Civil War in 2011,
among other instances of military interventions.
It is worth noting that the current international norm of the conception of nation
states came to existence after the signing the Peace of Westphalia, which marked the end
37 Ibid.
38 International Commission, The Responsibility to Protect, XI.
29
of thirty years war (1618-1648) the Thirty Years war was a conflict between contending
Catholic and Protestant estates from within the Holy Roman Empire that grew to cover
most of Europe. It is said that the Peace of Westphalia marked the birth of what is later
known as the ‘’nation-state’’ and laid the ground base for state sovereignty and modern
39
methods of international relations like diplomacy and mediation. That is why there was
a clear need for the development of principles like the R2P and it is why the current
system of the United Nations has witnessed difficulties from its start in dealing with the
complex system of international relations.
The ICISS also mentions the concept of sovereignty has evolved to represent, in
the ‘’Westphalian idea’’ a state's legal identity under international law. 40 That it is a
notion that promotes order, stability, and predictability in international relations by
treating all sovereign states as equals, regardless of size or resources. Article 2 (1) of the
UN Charter establishes the concept of sovereign equality of nations. Internally,
sovereignty denotes the ability to make authoritative choices on the people and resources
within the state's territory.
Article 2 (4) of the Charter of the United Nations states that ‘’All Members shall
refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with
the purposes of the United Nations.’’ This clearly states that at the writing of the United
Nations Charter, the drafters of the Charter believed that state authority and sovereignty
39 Steven Patton, ‘The Peace of Westphalia and It Affects on International Relations, Diplomacy
and Foreign Policy’, The Histories 10, no. 1, 2019, 91.
40 International Commission, The Responsibility to Protect, 12.
30
are the deciding factor, which makes it almost consistent with the Westphalian idea of
state’s sovereignty.
However, in general, the state's authority is not considered as unlimited, but rather
controlled and governed by binding constitutional contracts. Moreover, outside of the
UN, these growing principles of conditional state sovereignty were created by
international statutes such as the 1948 Genocide Convention.
Principles like the Responsibility to Protect indicates that there is a developing
notion that human rights are inextricably tied to international peace and security, which
goes to show that even outside of the United Nations, the intervention in state sovereignty
that is established in the Treaty of Westphalia were challenged and becoming more
decentralized.
31
CHAPTER 2: Global Governance and The Security Council, and The
Topic of Disarmament
The world lives in an age characterized by interdependence and dynamic
interaction among nations at the global level. In this context, the concept of global
governance is a framework aimed at achieving cooperation and mutual understanding
among nations to ensure sustainable security and peace.
As threats to global peace and security increase in number and size as well as
complexity, there has been a need to find a mechanism for global cooperation to take into
account these threats and discuss them and try to find solutions to them. Global
governance, which refers to the systems, laws, and mechanisms that manage relations and
interactions between nations at the global level, that strengthening global governance
seeks to achieve cooperation among States and promote global peace and security.
The Security Council and global governance are two of the fundamental pillars in
today's international order. Through cooperation and pivotal decision-making, each seeks
to create an international environment that promotes peace and security.
In a general framework, both the Security Council and global governance seek to
discuss issues of a transboundary nature such as increased armaments, nuclear
proliferation and climate change. Each seeks to cooperate and research on these complex
issues in order to find appropriate solutions that guarantee international peace and
security.
32
What is Global Governance?
Global governance is often defined as ‘’the way in which global affairs are
managed’’41 It is often misunderstood and mistook that global governance implies one
global government, instead, global governance includes a variety of players, including
governments, regional and international organizations. Each international organization
specializes and leads in their own respective issues, for instance, the World Trade
Organization (WTO) focuses on the issues of trade, and thus, the Security Council takes
the lead, or at least should, on issues pertaining to international peace and security.
Global Challenges describes that global governance unites disparate players in
order to organize collective action on a global scale. Global governance aims to deliver
global public goods, especially peace and security, justice and conflict resolution
institutions, functional markets, and harmonized standards for international commerce.42
Global Challenges also claims that the United Nations is now the preeminent
organization that is responsible for global governance, the example of the Sustainable
Development Goals which was outlined in 2015, setting shared objectives for the planet's
future is an example of the United Nations taking the lead in global governance.
In the twentieth century, prior to World War I, the world was already governed by
a small network of international organizations, both public and private, connecting the
industrial nations of the predominantly European empires that had just conquered and
41 Defining Global Governance’, Marbella International University Centre, 15 May 2019,
https://miuc.org/defining-global-governance/.
42 What Is Global Governance?’, The Global Challenges Foundation (blog), accessed 17 January
2023, https://globalchallenges.org/global-governance/.
33
divided the whole globe. 43 In contrast, today, the world is largely decentralized and made
up of vast networks of relations, organizations, and companies that sometimes it is hard
to pin down, especially in the post-industrial economies.
Thomas G. Weiss and Rorden Wilkinson go as far as saying that the field of
international relations is dangerously close to falling into irrelevance at this point and
global governance provides a potentially persuasive means of "saving international
relations." That global governance could be the renovation to the field of international
relations. 44 There is a structural problem with regard to international relations, especially
with regard to implementing solutions to global problems, questions of how the world is
governed, why we have the forms of governance that we do, and how we should build
better global and/or local command and control systems. This fundamental issue is the
lack of conceptual traction of global governance, if it is to be useful in the twenty-first
century, the phrase requires careful consideration.
The brilliance of coining the term global governance resided in James Rosenau
and Ernst Czempiel's definition as "Governance without Government" the concept that
multiple kinds of authority and formal as well as informal mechanisms might exercise
governance alone, in parallel, or in harmony.
There is a confusion with the term global governance since governance has
generally been linked with "governing" or political power, institutions, and eventually
control. In this context, governance refers to formal political organizations that seek to
43 Thomas G. Weiss and Rorden Wilkinson, eds., International Organization and Global
Governance, First Edition (London: Routledge, 2013) 23.
44 Thomas G. Weiss and Rorden Wilkinson, ‘Global Governance to the Rescue: Saving
International Relations?’, Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International
Organizations 20, no. 1 (19 August 2014): 19. https://doi.org/10.1163/19426720-02001003.
34
coordinate and manage interdependent societal relations and have the authority to enforce
decisions. 45 In recent years, however, writers like as James Rosenau have used the term
"governance" to refer to the control of interdependent relationships in the absence of an
encompassing political control, as in the example of the international system.
Assessing the predominant world order conceptions is one way for analysing the
progress of global governance. In the two-dimensional and stationary conception of the
Westphalian system as an interstate system, the premise that anarchy is the organizing
principle is not very informative on how the world is structured this way or why we need
to know about its evolution. 46
The example of the 27th Conference of the Parties to the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP27) in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, which
closed with a historic resolution to create and implement a loss and damage fund is a
great example of global governance in the twenty first century, many actors,
governmental and non-governmental coming together.47 From the 6th to the 20th of
November 2022, COP27 hosted more than 100 Heads of Government, over 35,000
participants, and various pavilions showing climate action from across the globe and
across all sectors. The decision was welcomed by the UN Secretary-General António
Guterres saying “The red line we must not cross is the line that takes our planet over the
1.5-degree temperature limit.” Which confirms that global problems require global
45 Ramesh Thakur and Thomas G. Weiss, Global Governance and the UN: An Unfinished Journey
(Indiana University Press, 2010), 6.
46 Thomas G. Weiss and Rorden Wilkinson, ‘Rethinking Global Governance? Complexity,
Authority, Power, Change’, International Studies Quarterly 58, no. 1 (March 2014): 212.
https://doi.org/10.1111/isqu.12082.
47 United Nations, ‘COP27: Delivering for People and the Planet’, United Nations (United
Nations), accessed 18 January 2023, https://www.un.org/en/climatechange/cop27.
35
solutions, going forward, this will be the main premise behind global governance, but the
threats of global decoupling, fragmentation, and regionalism will decide the future of
global governance.
Global governance is usually done through a number of bodies that act as
intermediaries. There are also groups like the EU and ASEAN that are in charge of
regional integration and plan the policies of their members in a certain area. There are
also strategic or economic initiatives led by one country, like NATO for the US or the
Belt and Road Initiative of China, or more general groups like APEC or ANZUS that
work to coordinate defence or financial cooperation.
Global Governance and the Security Council
Global problems require global solutions; thus, the United Nations Security
Council should take the lead in issues and topics that are linked to international peace and
security. But even in the twenty first century, defining and pointing the exact role of the
United Nations in global governance is difficult, from globalism to regionalism of post-
COVID-19, the United Nations finds itself facing a global decoupling, especially after the
Ukraine conflict.
Craig N. Murphy mentions that the Security Council was a ‘’substantial
innovation in global governance’’ 48 Other United Nations Bodies can only give
‘’recommendations’’ the Security Council being the only exception. However, there is an
extreme difficulty in guaranteeing compliance which exemplifies the complexity of
closing governance gaps on a global scale.
48 Weiss and Wilkinson, International Organization and Global Governance, 2013, 27.
36
Furthermore, there are no means to enforce rulings and no procedures to persuade
governments to comply, especially with the Security Council given that it is an arena
where ‘’great power politics’’ in play as John J. Mearsheimer puts it.
A new wave of criticism of global governance is the ‘’new sovereigntists’’
American academics, intellectuals, and officials who see that the rising international legal
order and system of global governance with concern, they consider global governance
fundamentally undemocratic due to the fact that it breaches popular sovereignty and
undermines constitutional government by delegating legislative responsibility to
unelected and unaccountable bodies. 49
However, this view is not entirely new, Americans’ national security outlook is
the most prevalent across different ideologies of international relations, for instance, John
Bolton says that ‘‘The UN should be used when and where we choose to use it to
advance American national interests, not to validate academic theories and abstract
models’’.That shows that the same international system made by the western powers 50
after World War 2 can itself pose a threat to the powers that made it. Again, the tension
between the classic view of the Westphalian system clashes with the developments of
new mechanisms of global governance, sovereignty, and accountability across different
international institutions like the International Criminal Court and the Security Council
among other institutions and mechanisms.
49 Michael Goodhart and Stacy Bondanella Taninchev, ‘The New Sovereigntist Challenge for
Global Governance: Democracy without Sovereignty1: The New Sovereigntist Challenge for Global
Governance’, International Studies Quarterly 55, no. 4 (December 2011): .1047
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2011.00691.x.
50 Ibid., 1050.
37
An example is the case of the sanctions regime imposed on Iraq with what can be
called an international consensus that can be considered a global governance mechanism,
the result was catastrophic, mostly to the Iraqi civilian population. That sanctions regime
was imposed at a time of global unipolar hegemony of the United States, which is
declining as the world turns into multipolarity. Currently, the United States and the
Security Council are using ‘’smart sanctions’’ which targets specific institutions, groups
and individual instead of whole countries.
One of the challenges that the United Nations faces in terms of global governance
is the role of regional organizations, the relationship is very complicated. For instance,
certain regional governance organizations, like the Caribbean Community and the League
of Arab States, have been granted observer status at the United Nations.
Herman Schaper mentions in the book ‘’The UN Security Council in the 21st
Century’’ that the failure of the effort to create a worldwide system of collective security
centred on the UN pushed nations to create other security systems. These mostly took the
shape of regional collective defence systems. 51
The argument that Schaper brings is that because of the veto, the Security Council
provided a false sense of security, to which the west understood and turned to collective
defence systems in the form of regional organizations, then, the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) was signed in 1949.
Article 5 of NATO states:
51 Sebastian Von Einsiedel, David M. Malone, and Bruno Stagno Ugarte, eds., The UN Security
Council in the 21st Century (Lynne Rienner, 2016), 394.
38
“The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or
North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree
that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or
collective self-defence recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will
assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert
with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed
force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.’’ 52
Moreover, some scholars claim that "NATO would no longer be necessary" if the
Security Council could operate as effectively as it was intended for it to be. According to
Article 12 of NATO, a review of the treaty may be conducted after 10 years or at any
time afterwards, considering the potential development of both international and regional
arrangements for the preservation of international peace and security under the UN
Charter. Nevertheless, such a review was never conducted.
One of the most interesting and complicated relationships is the relationship
between the United Nations and NATO, the latter being the most outstanding military
alliance in history. Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter makes it clear that the
Security Council's previous authorisation is required for armed enforcement action by a
regional arrangement, and that the Council must be able to exert ultimate authority and
control over the application of its delegated powers. 53
52 NATO, ‘Collective Defence and Article 5’, NATO, accessed 5 May 2023,
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_110496.htm.
53 United Nations, "Charter of the United Nations," October 24, 1945.
39
NATO launched ‘’Operation Allied Force’’ which started as massive military
airstrikes against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on March 24, 1999, in an effort to
compel the Yugoslav government to end "ethnic cleansing" in the Yugoslav region of
Kosovo. 54 This move was made without the Security Council's previous explicit
delegation of Chapter VII powers to NATO. In formal legal terms, the action was
justified under the concept of humanitarian intervention before the inception of the
responsibility to protect (R2P) Principle.
Throughout the 1990s, the nature of conflicts began to quickly evolve, becoming
more numerous and complicated, with non-state actors, weak nations, and divided
populations becoming more involved. The United Nations was unable to react to these
new disputes or establish new response strategies. Meanwhile, regional organizations
began constructing their own means to react to security concerns, despite not having been
required to do so. Hence, this has been characterized as one of the defining features of the
so-called "new regionalism" 55 Which is only sought to proliferate as and if the world
shifts from unipolarity to multipolarity and from globalism to regionalism.
The UN Secretary General Kofi Annan authored the document A Regional-Global
Security Partnership: Challenges and Possibilities in response to these obstacles. In
August 2006, in accordance with UNSC Resolution 1631, the report states that ''The
resolution reflects the growth of interaction between the United Nations and partner
54 T. W. Beagle, ‘Operation Allied Force’, Effects-Based Targeting (Air University Press, 2001)
69, https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep13830.13.
55 Tânia Felicio, ‘The United Nations and Regional Organizations: The Need for Clarification and
Cooperation’, Studia Diplomatica 62, no. 3 (2009):15.
40
organizations.'' 56 This covers the high-level meetings the Secretary-General organizes
annually with regional and other international organizations, as well as recent Security
Council discussions with regional organizations.
Which marks an attempt by the United Nations to regulate its relationship with
regional organizations, in terms of security, the intricacies of the connection between
regional organizations and the United Nations have become evident. The organizations
partnering with the United Nations have various missions, histories, memberships,
geographic territories, competencies, and balances of power.
As the architecture of global security gets more complex, resolutions 1970 and
1973 are examples of the Security Council acting swift and decisive in action, and
especially on resolution 1973 which authorized the use of force, established a no-fly zone
over Libya, reported the situation in Libya to the International Criminal Court, and
57
instituted an arms embargo and targeted sanctions.
It is significant that Resolution 1973 was the first occasion that the Security
Council authorized the use of force for the protection of civilians against a functioning
state without the consent of those involved in the conflict.
The participation of regional organizations in the enforcement of the No-Fly Zone
in Libya, as which NATO claims it has done so in support of United Nations Security
Council Resolution 1973, 58 raises a lot of questions about the role that regional
56 Un Secretary-General, ‘A Regional-Global Security Partnership :: Challenges and
Opportunities : Report of the Secretary-General’, Summary, 28 July 2006.
57 UN Security Council (66th Year: 2011), ‘Resolution 1973 (2011) /: Adopted by the Security
Council at Its 6498th Meeting, on 17 March 2011’, 17 March 2011,
https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/699777.
58 Ibid.
41
organizations play in collective security in general, and their relationship with the
Security Council in particular. It is not the first time that the United Nations has asked
regional organizations for assistance in enforcing a resolution passed by the Security
Council.
NATO is not an organization that falls under Chapter VIII regarding Regional
Arrangements, the Alliance was first formed in 1949 as an article 51 organization, also
known as a collective defence, and this was explicitly outlined in the organization's treaty
as it states in its preamble ‘’ The Parties to this Treaty…They are resolved to unite their
efforts for collective defence and for the preservation of peace and security. They
59
therefore agree to this North Atlantic Treaty.’’
Moreover, resolution 1973 clearly states the authorization to enforce the need for
the immediate protection of the civilian population as well as the establishment of a no-
fly zone, and also Enforcement of the arms embargo and NATO having maritime borders
with Libya constating of the central Mediterranean, decided to intervene using the
Responsibility to Protect (R2P) as the main justification for the intervention.
The military intervention of NATO in Libya sparked numerous and major
international controversies, with the claiming that the intervention is unjustified. That
international controversy raises so many questions about the principle of the
Responsibility to Protect (R2P) as a mean of justification for the intervention in the
59 NATO, ‘The North Atlantic Treaty’, NATO, accessed 8 June 2023,
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_17120.htm.
42
affairs of a sovereign state, that the principle can be used for the purposes of regime
change.
NATO launched Operation Unified Protector the period from March 31, 2011,
when NATO assumed complete command and control of all military activities in Libya,
through the operation's ending on October 31, 2011. 60
In lig resolution 1973 had developed three operational plans, one for providing
humanitarian aid, one for enforcing a maritime arms embargo, and one for establishing a
no-fly zone. 61
The United Nations ultimately took the responsibility of performing the key
coordinating role in delivering humanitarian assistance since NATO's position in those
operations was so complex. However, this was done to make sure military actions would
not clash with the humanitarian logistics of aircraft, shipments, and land movements into
and within Libya for humanitarian relief provided by the United Nations. There still was
62
close cooperation with NATO.
Resolution 1973 was also criticized saying that the Security Council had not
identified the kind of the actions to be implemented, given operational direction, or
indicated when the principal goal (the protection of civilians) might be deemed to have
been accomplished. The only clear prohibition of the resolution was the exclusion of "a
foreign occupation force of any kind on any area of Libyan territory."
60 Karin Wester, ed., ‘Operation Unified Protector, NATO, and the UN’, in Intervention in Libya:
The Responsibility to Protect in North Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020), 213,
https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108576666.010.
61 Ibid., 215.
62 Ibid.
43
There is a clear need for both more coordination as well as clear framework and
language for the relationship between the Security Council and regional organizations,
treaties and regional integration institutions in order to avoid major controversies as the
one resolution 1973 made.
The Security Council may authorize regional collective defence organizations to
use military force on its behalf, 63 but this does not imply that it should additionally give
up the command and control of the military operation to such organizations. For that also
means the Security Council is giving up the central role of maintaining international
peace and security, which in return means undermining the Charter's Articles and the
Council's structure, and primacy, if a clear and effective partnership framework is not
made, the United Nations and the Security Council would risk its role in matters of peace
and security.
Regional organizations are involved in many ways with the United Nations,
especially in Peacekeeping Operations, alongside standard United Nations operations,
there are several "hybrid" models in which the Security Council authorizes a mission that
is carried out by either an ad hoc group (like the NATO-led Libyan intervention) or a
regional organization (like the AU's AMISOM mission in Somalia), or some combination
64
of the two.
As regional organizations grow and gain more importance, that would impact the
United Nations and its central body, the Security Council. The importance of regional
63 United Nations, "Charter of the United Nations," October 24, 1945.
64 ‘The UN Versus Regional Organizations: Who Keeps the Peace?’, Council on Foreign
Relations (blog), accessed 27 May 2023, https://www.cfr.org/blog/un-versus-regional-organizations-who-
keeps-peace.
44
organizations, treaties and regional integration institutions are indeed growing and the
United Nations is aware of it, and the evidence for that is organizations like BRICS, the
Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) among others.
The Issues of Nuclear Proliferation and Disarmament
Nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament provide the greatest challenge to the
policy of arms control regimes. Without a concomitant need to disarm, the goal of
nuclear non-proliferation is bound to fail. 65 At the Fiftieth Anniversary of Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), UN Secretary-General António Guterres
stated:
‘’The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is an essential pillar of international peace
and security, and the heart of the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. Its
unique status is based on its near universal membership, legally binding obligations on
disarmament, verifiable non-proliferation safeguards regime, and commitment to the
peaceful use of nuclear energy’’ 66
The purpose of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is
to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, to encourage
cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and to advance the goal of nuclear
disarmament and general and complete disarmament. The NPT is the only multilateral
pact that contains a legally enforceable commitment to disarming nuclear-armed states.
65 Thakur and Weiss, Global Governance and the UN, 2010, 107.
66 United Nations, ‘NPT Conference 2020 - EN’, United Nations (United Nations), accessed 8
June 2023, https://www.un.org/en/conferences/npt2020.
45
The Treaty was made available for signing in 1968 and went into effect in 1970. The
NPT has been the centrepiece of the global nuclear non-proliferation framework since its
coming into effect. 191 States parties, including the five nuclear-weapon states, have
joined the Treaty, making the NPT the most extensively subscribed multilateral
disarmament accord. 67
Unlike nuclear weapons, biological and chemical weapons have been universally
prohibited by international treaties. The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), which
was released for signature in 1972 and entered into effect in 1975, restricts the
development, manufacturing, stockpiling, acquisition, and retention of biological and
toxin weapons. 68
The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) was ratified in 1997 after being
signed in 1993. It is the first multilateral pact to prohibit an entire category of Weapons
of Mass Destruction (WMDS), allow for international verification that these weapons
have been destroyed and their production facilities have been transferred to civilian
purposes, and include the global chemical sector in the verification regime. The CWC
also fosters international cooperation in the peaceful use of chemicals and provides help
and protection to signatories who are threatened or targeted with chemical weapons. The
principles of universality, equality, and non-discrimination have ensured that the CWC is
almost universally adhered to 98 percent of the world's population and 98 percent of the
world's chemical industry are represented by governments party to the treaty. 69
67 ‘The IAEA and the Non-Proliferation Treaty’, Text (IAEA, 8 June 2016),
https://www.iaea.org/topics/non-proliferation-treaty.
68 Thakur and Weiss, Global Governance and the UN, 2010, 107.
69 Ibid., 110.
46
The Security Council may enforce the non-proliferation commitments since they
are specific, binding, subject to International Atomic Energy Agency verification, and
enforceable. The disarming provision is ambiguous and declarative, with no schedule,
verification, or enforcement. At least until the International Court of Justice fills this
specific vacuum. 70 The topic of disarmament is mentioned in the UN Charter, Article 26
states ‘’In order to promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and
security with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic
resources’’.
The threat of the proliferation of dangerous weapons extends beyond nation
states, On April 28, 2004, the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted
Resolution 1540 (2004) under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, stating that the
proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, as well as their delivery
systems, poses a threat to international peace and security. The resolution requires states,
among other things, to avoid from assisting non-state actors in developing, acquiring,
producing, owning, transporting, transferring, or employing nuclear, chemical, or
biological weapons and their delivery systems. 71
Resolution 1540 (2004) puts obligatory duties on all States to enact laws to
prevent the spread of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, as well as their delivery
systems, and to establish sufficient domestic controls over associated materials to prevent
illegal trafficking. It also promotes more international collaboration in this area. The
resolution reaffirms that none of the commitments in resolution 1540 (2004) shall conflict
70 Ibid., 108.
71 1540 Committee’ (United Nations), accessed 8 June 2023, https://www.un.org/en/sc/1540/1540-
fact-sheet.shtml.
47
with or modify the rights and obligations of States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Chemical Weapons Convention, or the Biological
Weapons Convention. 72
Resolution 1887 (2009) which was adopted by the Security Council at its 6191st
meeting, on 24 September 2009 marks the Security Council’s commitment to
international nuclear disarmament and to “creating the conditions for a world without
nuclear weapons” echoed similar calls by the nuclear power states (The United States,
The United Kingdom, Russia, China, and France) resolving to pursue a safer world for all
and to establish the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons, in accordance with
the objectives of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), in a
manner that promotes international stability, and on the basis of the principle of
uncompromised security for all.73 Although the resolution did not single out individual
nations, the Council requested that parties participating in "major challenges to the non-
proliferation regime" comply completely with their commitments and reiterated its desire
for them to find early multilateral solutions to their problems. 74
The text emphasized the freedom to develop peaceful nuclear energy under IAEA
oversight, but also encouraged states to restrict the sale of nuclear-related material to
nations that have ceased complying with Agency safeguards agreements. It also
demanded the implementation of stringent restrictions on nuclear material in order to
72 Ibid.
73 UN Security Council (64th Year: 2009), ‘Resolution 1887 (2009) /: Adopted by the Security
Council at Its 6191st Meeting, on 24 September 2009’, 24 September 2009,
https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/665529.
74 Historic Summit of Security Council Pledges Support for Progress on Stalled Efforts to End
Nuclear Weapons Proliferation | UN Press’, accessed 8 March 2023,
https://press.un.org/en/2009/sc9746.doc.htm.
48
avoid it from slipping into the hands of terrorists. Moreover, the Council urged all nations
to abstain from conducting nuclear explosive tests and to ratify the Comprehensive
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in order to expedite its entry into effect. It urged the Conference
on Disarmament to expeditiously establish an agreement prohibiting the manufacturing of
fissile materials for use in explosive devices. 75
One of the most mainstream examples of a possible nuclear proliferation is the
Iranian nuclear program, Iran's nuclear program was launched in the early 1950s, and
although being dormant for a few years after the Iranian Islamic Revolution, it was
quickly reactivated.76
Despite the Iranian rhetoric that claims the program is for peaceful purposes, the
west thinks differently, claiming that Iran is trying to build nuclear weapons. The West
accuses Iran of neglecting to notify to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
its sensitive enrichment and reprocessing programs. At greater enrichment levels, nuclear
enrichment may be utilized to generate uranium for use in nuclear weapons. The West
periodically forecasts that Iran is on the brink of constructing a nuclear weapon, yet there
have been no urgent signals that Iran is really manufacturing a nuclear bomb. 77
Iran has the right to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes under the NPT, but
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) demanded the program be paused until
concerns regarding the previously undisclosed program were resolved. In 2003, in
response to the possibility of international penalties, the administration of then-President
75 Ibid.
76 Agha Ahmad Gul, ‘Iran’s Pursuit of Peaceful Nuclear Technology’, Pakistan Horizon 65, no. 1
(2012): 35.
77 Ibid.
49
Mohammad Khatami decided to halt uranium enrichment activity and permit a higher
degree of IAEA inspections, while continuing discussions with the EU-3 (France,
Germany and Italy). Yet, Iran thought that the pledges offered by the EU-3 in the Tehran
Declaration hadn't been kept. On 4 February 2006, the 35-member Board of Governors of
the IAEA agreed to report Iran to the Security Council. It was endorsed by the US and
supported by the EU-3. 78
As part of international attempts to tackle Iran's nuclear program, the United
Nations Security Council (UNSC) has enacted seven resolutions, but only one is in force
today. On July 14, 2015, after Iran and the P5+1 (China, France, Russia, the United
Kingdom, and the United States; plus Germany) struck a comprehensive nuclear
agreement, the UN Security Council supported the agreement and enacted actions to
remove UN sanctions against Iran's nuclear program.79 The Joint Comprehensive Plan of
Action (JCPOA) signed on 14 July 2015 by China, France, Germany, the Russian
Federation, the United Kingdom, the United States, the High Representative of the
European Union (the E3/EU+3), and the Islamic Republic of Iran was the culmination of
diplomatic efforts to reach a comprehensive, long-term, and appropriate resolution to the
Iranian nuclear program.80 The United States Ambassador to the United Nations,
Samantha Powers that given that Iran would not produce nuclear weapons and keeps the
nature of their nuclear programme peaceful ‘’The JCPOA will produce the
comprehensive lifting of all UN Security Council sanctions as well as multilateral and
78 Ibid., 37.
79 UN Security Council Resolutions on Iran | Arms Control Association’, accessed 8 June 2023,
https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Security-Council-Resolutions-on-Iran.
80 Resolution 2231 (2015) on Iran Nuclear Issue | United Nations Security Council’, accessed 6
March 2023, https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/2231/background.
50
national sanctions related to Iran’s nuclear programme, including steps on access in areas
of trade, technology, finance, and energy.’’ 81
The 2231 resolution maintained some limits on ballistic missile operations and
weapons sales, it was approved by unanimous vote on July 20, 2015, the resolution’s
implementation day transpired on January 16, 2016, when the Security Council obtained
the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) report verifying Iran's nuclear-related
activities, ten years from the date of adoption (18 October 2015), assuming that the
provisions of earlier Security Council resolutions have not been reinstalled in the
meantime, all provisions of resolution 2231 will expire and the Security Council will
have completed its review of the Iranian nuclear program.
Since 2015, when Iran and global powers signed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of
Action (JCPOA, the Iran nuclear deal) in Vienna, they have been attempting to preserve
what is left of it. Both parties question their ability to attain their objectives. With Iran's
rapid nuclear growth, particularly in 2021, the major concern for Washington is the
ability to guarantee the non-proliferation advantages of the original pact. For Iran, the
question is whether the United States can and will give sanctions relief that provides
meaningful, long-term economic advantages, something that has not yet transpired over
the duration of the agreement. 82
Nonetheless, all parties agree, for the time being, that diplomatic measures must
be used since the alternatives are far worse. Time is running out, but it is not yet too late
81 S/RES/2231(2015)’, accessed 8 June 2023,
https://www.undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=S%2FRES%2F2231(2015)&Language=E&DeviceTy
pe=Desktop&LangRequested=False.
82 International Crisis Group, ‘The Iran Nuclear Deal at Six: Now or Never’ (International Crisis
Group, 2022).
51
for the two parties and other JCPOA signatories to establish a revised compliance-based
agreement. This would need realistic suggestions from the U.S. and Europe on how to
convert the easing of nuclear-related U.S. sanctions into meaningful economic relief for
Iran, and a solid commitment by Iran to pull down its nuclear program, thus, Iran cannot
afford for the Vienna talks to cease or get halted since it would mean that the sanctions
are here to stay.
Similar to the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea (DPRK) have their own uranium enrichment programmes, and according to Arms
Control, As of August 2023, North Korea is expected to have constructed 30 nuclear
warheads and to possess the fissile material for 50 to 70 nuclear bombs, in addition to
sophisticated chemical and biological weapons programmes. That makes North Korea
even more difficult and more complicated to deal with that Iran. 83
Pyongyang has increased the frequency of its ballistic missile tests in recent years,
and in July 2017 it conducted two tests of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM)
capable of reaching the United States. The 2003 withdrawal of North Korea from the
nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is controversial. Since 2006, the UN Security
Council has enacted many resolutions demanding North Korea to cease its nuclear and
missile programmes and implementing penalties on Pyongyang for its unwillingness to
comply. As of early 2018, North Korea has shown interest in continuing disarmament
discussions. 84
83 ‘Arms Control and Proliferation Profile: North Korea | Arms Control Association’, accessed 11
November 2023, https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/northkoreaprofile.
84 Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, ‘North Korean Nuclear Capabilities, 2018’, Bulletin
of the Atomic Scientists 74, no. 1 (2 January 2018, 43.
52
Since 2006, the United Nations Security Council has enacted nine significant
sanctions resolutions in response to North Korea's nuclear and missile programs. Each
resolution criticizes North Korea's most recent nuclear and ballistic missile activities and
demands that it discontinue its illegal conduct, which is in violation of prior UN Security
Council resolutions. 85
The Security Council approved all nine resolutions unanimously, and all except
for Resolution 2087 (January 2013) which includes references to Chapter VII, Article 41
of the United Nations Charter (Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of
the Peace, and Acts of Aggression). In addition to imposing sanctions, the resolutions
provide UN member states the right to stop and examine North Korean goods on their
territory, as well as confiscate and destroy any contraband shipments. 86
North Korea was a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in
1985 but later withdrew due to accusations of an illicit uranium enrichment program by
the United States, which are also addressed in the resolutions. Also, the Security Council
has urged North Korea to resume talks in the Six-Party Talks, which include the United
States, South Korea, China, Japan, Russia, and North Korea. 87
From 2003 through 2009, the Six-Party discussions were held, and by the end of
that time, a joint declaration on denuclearization had been drafted. As part of the process,
85 UN Security Council Resolutions on North Korea | Arms Control Association’, accessed 8 June
2023, https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/UN-Security-Council-Resolutions-on-North-Korea.
86 Ibid.
87 Ibid.
53
North Korea also disassembled the reactor responsible for generating plutonium, however
it has since reactivated the facility. 88
Resolution 2397 by the Security Council explicitly mentions the actions of the
DPRK and how it might endanger international peace and security ‘’expressing its
gravest concern that the DPRK’s ongoing nuclear and ballistic missile-related activities
have destabilized the region and beyond. Determining that there continues to exist a clear
threat to international peace and security’’. 89
The same resolution limits annual imports of refined petroleum products into
North Korea to 500,000 barrels, puts in place a yearly cap of 4 million barrels on crude
oil imports, and if North Korea conducts another nuclear or intercontinental ballistic
missile (ICBM) test , the Security Council must put further limits on oil imports, the
resolution also calls for the immediate, or at the very latest, two-year expulsion of all
North Korean laborers from all nations, prohibits the export of food, agricultural goods,
minerals, machinery, and electrical equipment from North Korea, prohibits North Korean
imports of transportation vehicles, industrial machinery, and other heavy machinery, and
added 16 persons and 1 entity to its sanctions list. 90 That makes the resolution an attempt
from the Security Council to try to deal with a complicated state, that is North Korea.
Iran and North Korea are by no means the only two states that has nuclear
weapons outside of the established five nuclear power states. India, Pakistan, and Israel
posses nuclear power. Globally, the number of nuclear weapons is close to 13 thousand.
88 Ibid.
89 S/RES/2397 (2017) | United Nations Security Council’, accessed 8 June 2023,
https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/s/res/2397-%282017%29.
90 Ibid.
54
This number is however, lower than it was during the Cold War, when there were around
60 thousand in the world at the time. 91
It is worth mentioning that destructive power of nuclear weapons has significantly
increased from where they were in World War 2 and also the cold war, that the
technology of nuclear weapons has drastically developed and became far more powerful
that they actually were. That one nuclear warhead in today’s times is far more powerful
than a nuclear warhead during World War 2 and the Cold War, which brings new
questions to the process of nuclear disarmament, the possession or dismantling of nuclear
warhead does not tell the full story of the nuclear capabilities of a country. 92
In addition, practically all major nuclear powers, including the United States,
Russia, and China, are presently considerably expanding the size, capabilities, or both of
their nuclear arsenals. 93 This new arms race increases the possibility of nuclear war. The
Security Council needs to adapt new mechanisms to try to limit the expansion of nuclear
weapons, the major challenge here is how to do so when three of the permanent five are
themselves expanding their nuclear arsenals? Again, here the question of the Security
Council’s neutrality comes to strike, especially with the conflict in Ukraine and how big
powers are quickly expanding their military capacities, proposals of Security Councils
reform, of which there are many, needs to be taken into consideration, this thesis will talk
about in Chapter 4.
91 Nuclear Weapons Worldwide | Union of Concerned Scientists’, accessed 8 June 2023,
https://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear-weapons/worldwide.
92 Ibid.
93 Ibid.
55
On the other hand, there is the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons
(TPNW) which represents an ambitious path for the containment and potentially the
prohibition of nuclear weapons, as the treaty name indicates and ambitiously hopes for,
despite the fact that in realist politics, that is almost an impossibility.94
With resolution 71/258, the General Assembly voted to host a United Nations
conference in 2017 to develop a legally enforceable treaty to ban nuclear weapons,
ultimately leading to their abolition. The Assembly urged all Member States to
participate in the Conference, together with international organisations and members of
civil society. 95
The treaty contains an exhaustive list of limitations on participation in any nuclear
weapon activity, these commitments prohibit the development, testing, production,
acquisition, possession, stockpiling, use, and threat of use of nuclear weapons. In
addition, the Treaty forbids the deployment of nuclear weapons on national territory and
the providing of support to any state engaging in forbidden acts. States parties shall be
required to prevent and repress any conduct forbidden by the Treaty on the Prohibition of
Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) carried out by people or on territory under to their authority
or control. 96
The Treaty also obligates States parties to provide appropriate assistance to
individuals impacted by the use or testing of nuclear weapons, as well as to take the
necessary and suitable environmental remediation measures in areas under their
94 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons – UNODA’, accessed 8 June 2023,
https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/tpnw/.
95 Ibid.
96 Ibid.
56
jurisdiction or control that have been polluted by activities related to the use or testing of
nuclear weapons. 97
The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) was accepted by the
Conference at the United Nations on 7 July 2017 (by a vote of 122 in favour, one against,
and one abstention), and opened for signing on 20 September 2017. Article 15 (1) of the
Treaty stipulates that it will come into effect on 22 January 2021 after the deposit of the
50th instrument of ratification or accession with the Secretary-General on 24 October
2020. 98
The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) is one of the
indicators of the increase of the relevance of the United Nations General Assembly as
more countries develop and rise in importance on the international stage, although the
General Assembly often sets ambitious goals, treaties and agreements which lacks the
mechanisms of enforcements, unlike that of the Security Council.
The General Assembly rise in importance is also because it is getting increasingly
more difficult for the Security Council to find consensus on the important issues, which is
also why calls and proposals for reform are increasing to an all-time high.
97 Ibid.
98 Ibid.
57
Chapter 3: Mechanisms of the Security Council and Case Studies of
Iraq, Syria, and Ukraine
The Security Council has several mechanisms to enforce and ensure compliance
with the Charter of the United Nations and Security Council resolutions, as well as to
ensure the maintenance of peace and global security. One of the most important is the
sanctions regime, which allows the Security Council to impose sanctions on states or
entities that pose a threat to international security or violate international laws.
The sanctions regime is the most used mechanism of the Security Council and is
divided into two types. Economic sanctions include a ban on trade and financial dealings
with the target state, a freeze on financial assets, and a travel and movement ban.
Restrictions on the movement of individuals associated with punishable activities can be
imposed.
The Security Council can also take immediate action to maintain peace and
security by imposing a ceasefire or sending peacekeepers to areas affected by
international conflicts or internal unrest. These peacekeeping forces were established as
part of international efforts to resolve conflicts and contribute to the reconstruction of
affected countries.
The biggest examples of conflicts in the 21st century are Iraq, Syria and Ukraine,
where these examples are significant challenges not only to the Security Council, but also
to the United Nations and the world system as a whole, that there has been widespread
criticism from different parties of how the Security Council has dealt with these conflicts,
which is why they have been selected as a case studies in this thesis.
58
The Sanctions Regime
The Sanctions Regime has been one of the most important methods of the
Security Council in enforcing compliance with Chapter VII. The sanctions regime is
derived from Article 41 of the United Nations Chapter that states:
‘’The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed
force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members
of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial
interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other
means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.’’ 99
The United Nations mentions that under Chapter VII of the United Nations
Charter, the Security Council may take measures to preserve or restore international
peace and security. In accordance with Article 41, sanctions measures comprise a wide
variety of non-military enforcement mechanisms. The Security Council has imposed 31
sanctions regimes since 1966, Southern Rhodesia, South Africa, the Former Yugoslavia
(2), Haiti (2), Angola, Liberia (3), Eritrea/Ethiopia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Côte d’Ivoire,
Iran, Somalia/Eritrea, ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida, Iraq (2), DRC, Sudan, Lebanon,
DPRK, Libya (2), the Taliban, Guinea-Bissau, CAR, Yemen, South Sudan and Mali. 100
Sanctions imposed by the Security Council have taken many forms in pursuit of a
range of objectives. Comprehensive economic and trade sanctions have been used with
more targeted measures such as weapons embargoes, travel bans, and financial or
99 United Nations, "Charter of the United Nations," October 24, 1945.
100 Sanctions | United Nations Security Council’, accessed 8 June 2023,
https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/information.
59
commodity restrictions. The UN Security Council has imposed sanctions to assist
peaceful transitions, prohibit unconstitutional changes, restrain terrorism, defend human
rights, and advance non-proliferation. 101
Sanctions do not function, prosper, or fail in isolation. The measures are most
successful in preserving or restoring international peace and security when they are used
as part of a complete peacekeeping, peacebuilding, and peacemaking strategy. Contrary
to the common belief that sanctions are punitive, numerous regimes are intended to aid
governments and areas striving towards a peaceful transition. The sanctions regimes
against Libya and Guinea-Bissau illustrate this strategy, according to the Security
Council. 102
There are now 15 continuing sanctions regimes that help the political resolution of
disputes, nuclear non-proliferation, and terrorist prevention. Each regime is managed by a
sanctions committee presided over by a non-permanent Security Council member. There
are 11 monitoring groups, teams, and panels that assist 12 of the fifteen sanctions
committees. 103
Sanctions are imposed by the Security Council in three thematic fields: non-
proliferation and disarmament, combating terrorism, and instances of armed conflict
(whether internal or external conflicts). In the three forementioned themes, the Security
Council has devised more sophisticated means of reprimanding the conflict's architects
rather than the broader populace. This is referred to as targeting, as the council targets
101 Ibid.
102 Ibid.
103 Ibid.
60
particular groups, persons, or corporate organisations that feed the conflict, as opposed to
the state. As Mikael Eriksson writes that:
‘’The typical goal of such measures is to influence decision-makers by engaging
or isolating them through targeted financial restrictions, and travel bans and other
measures… targeting involves different tactics, but in principal, pressure is exercised by a
combination of punitive measures, incentives and conditionality to entice or coerce
designated targets to change their behaviour.’’ 104
In all three thematic fields, the Security Council's practise of using targeted
sanctions is well established. Nonetheless, the Council has adopted two additional tactics
for administering penalties in internal conflict situations. First, intrastate targeted
sanctions often target specific geographical areas, commodities, or economic sectors.
Consequently, sanctions would often aim to deprive the targets of their money or limit
the market for goods such as diamonds, lumber, and oil that fuel violence. 105
The stance of security council members concerning sanctions has at times been
rife with inconsistencies and marked by hesitation. When examining the use of UN
sanctions over the years and across cases, it is striking how much has been accomplished,
both in terms of the effects and the development of council procedures, despite the
political difficulties and disagreement that have almost always associated this issue
within the council.
104 Kristen E Boon, ‘The Legal Framework of Security Council Sanctions’, Terminating Security
Council Sanctions, Apr. 1, 2014, International Peace Institute, 4.
105 Ibid.
61
Economic sanctions are called an act of war and in the course of history,
economic sanctions caused hunger and illness that have killed more people than any other
kind of warfare. However, as with all other tools, their success is contingent on the
conditions under which they are applied and the policies they support. Economic
sanctions are not only used for crippling regimes’ ability to cause a threat to international
peace and security but also used as a fierce political tool to try to bring regime change for
the countries that they target, but it is always the case that the civilian population takes
the toll of those economic sanctions, and they bring about indescribable sufferings in
every sector of life.
Although, the application of UN targeted sanctions has undergone a considerable
evolution during the last quarter century. In lieu of comprehensive economic embargoes
like the one imposed on Iraq in the early 1990s, which had detrimental humanitarian
effects, the Security Council shifted to "targeted" or "smart" sanctions as an approach of
concentrating measures on the legislators and their principal supporters responsible for
transgressions of international norms. Since 1994, all UN sanctions have been targeted in
some way. 106
The number of initiatives addressing several of these issues has increased.
Coordination and complementarity issues are raised by the increasing use of other crisis
management tools besides United Nations sanctions, such as mediation, peacekeeping,
and referrals to international courts, as well as the introduction of sanctions by entities
other than the United Nations, such as regional organizations and nation states
106 Von Einsiedel, Malone, and Stagno Ugarte, The UN Security Council, 2016, 413.
62
themselves.
United Nations Peacekeeping Operations
The United Nations describes its peacekeeping operations as an instrument that
helps countries torn by conflict create conditions for lasting peace, peacekeeping is based
on three basic principles, consent of the parties, impartiality, and non-use of force except
in self-defence and defence of the mandate. 107
Peacekeeping operations today must do more than just keep the peace and keep
people safe. They also must help with the political process, protect civilians, help disarm,
demobilize, and reintegrate former combatants, help in the set up of elections, protect and
promote human rights, and help restore the rule of law. United Nations peacekeeping is
an unprecedented global partnership. It unites the General Assembly, the Security
Council, the Secretariat, troop and police contributors, and the host nation in an effort to
maintain international peace and security. Its strength derives from the legitimacy of the
United Nations Charter and the large number of participating countries that contribute
valuable resources. 108
In 1948, the Security Council authorized the deployment of UN military observers
to the Middle East, marking the beginning of United Nations Peacekeeping, as the
official UN Peacekeeping website puts it. The mission's objective was to oversee the
Armistice Agreement between Israel and its the Arab surrounding states; this operation
107 What Is Peacekeeping’, United Nations Peacekeeping, accessed 8 June 2023,
https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/what-is-peacekeeping.
108 Ibid.
63
became known as the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO).
Peacekeeping was focused primarily to sustaining ceasefires and stabilizing situations on
the ground, thereby providing essential support for political efforts to resolve conflict
through peaceful means. 109
Peacekeeping was developed in the context of the Suez Crisis by UN Secretary-
General Dag Hammarskjöld, Canadian Foreign Minister Lester Pearson, and UN
Undersecretary for Special Political Affairs Ralph Bunche, which was a significant
departure from the Charter's original vision, namely the United Nations Military Staff
Committee that is stated in the Charter and that was mentioned in Chapter 1 of this thesis.
110
Despite its name, the first UN Emergency Force (UNEF I), which was deployed
along the Suez Canal in 1956 to supervise the withdrawal of armed forces from Egyptian
territory and, later, to serve as a line of contact between Egyptian and Israeli forces, was
never intended to use force, and it is rather interesting of the fact that two of the Security
Council's permanent members (France and the United Kingdom) were among the troops
withdrawing. The multinational UNEF peacekeeping soldiers that took their place lacked
the mission, ability, and the will to carry out any enforcement action. Despite carrying
firearms, their mission was essentially symbolic, meant to offer cover for an organized
departure of British, French, and Israeli forces and to serve as a political reminder for the
Security Council if it had the will to act. 111
109 Our History’, United Nations Peacekeeping, accessed 8 June 2023,
https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/our-history.
110 Von Einsiedel, Malone, and Stagno Ugarte, The UN Security Council, 2016, 374.
111 Ibid.
64
The end of the cold war and the subsequent massive growth of UN peacekeeping
missions in scope and number significantly transformed the notion of the use of force in
UN operations. Peacekeepers faced non-state actors that showed little regard for
international law and were tasked with additional responsibilities such as protecting
humanitarian workers. A rising number of missions were authorized under Chapter VII of
the Charter in this setting, which took on new significance. The initial intent of Chapter
VII provisions was to overcome the objections of a member state, particularly one that
potentially be the aggressor, such as Germany in the 1930s, by permitting the Security
Council to decide on the use of force. Even with the host country's approval, Chapter VII
became associated with "robust use of force" by the 1990s, but member states remained
divided on the issue. 112
The mission that put the notion of robust peacekeeping to the test is the UN
operation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which was deployed during the
Second Congo War, which included the militarizes and associated armed groups of nine
of Congo's neighbours. Initially deployed in response to the 1999 Lusaka Agreement, the
UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, known as MONUC
after its French acronym, was tasked with assisting the belligerent groups and multiple
state parties to the conflict in implementing a ceasefire. Although MONUC was
originally entrusted with "protecting civilians under imminent threat of physical
violence," its unit structure was not initially built for any kind of substantial
peacekeeping. It had barely more than 5,000 soldiers for a nation almost the size of
112 Ibid., 375.
65
Western Europe, and its major responsibility was to secure the security of the bases from
which military observers would monitor the ceasefire lines. 113
The responsibility that guides peacekeeping operations is the Protection of
Civilians (POC), all aspects of a peacekeeping mission, including civilian, military, and
police duties, fall under the umbrella of the Protection of Civilians (POC) duty. For
numerous times, peacekeeping missions are permitted to use all necessary means,
including the use of deadly force, to stop physical violence or threats of physical violence
against civilians, as long as they do so within their scope of operations and without
jeopardizing their relationship with the host government. 114
The Security Council is increasingly giving peacekeeping operations the
responsibility of the Protection of Civilians (PoC). At its core, PoC is based on
international humanitarian law, human rights law, and refugee law. It is generally
accepted that people should be shielded from the effects of violent conflict and should not
be acceptable targets in war. Protecting civilians, however, is a more difficult undertaking
to accomplish as a realistic goal. For various parties, the actual implementation of civilian
protection can and does mean different things. Thus, conceptual disagreements over the
term "protection" are similar to those over other contested terms like "security," which
can refer to a variety of actions including traditional national defence, global collective
security, or broad human security and involves specific policy instruments and desired
results.115
113 Ibid., 378.
114 Protection of Civilians Mandate’, United Nations Peacekeeping, accessed 8 June 2023,
https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/protection-of-civilians-mandate.
115 Michael G. Smith, Jeni Whalan, and Peter Thomson, ‘The Protection of Civilians in UN
Peacekeeping Operations: Recent Developments’, Security Challenges 7, no. 4 (2011): 27–38.
66
There are similarities and differences between the Responsibility to Protect (R2P)
which was mentioned in the first Chapter and the Protection of Civilians (PoC), Savita
Pawnday, the deputy executive director of the Global Centre For The Responsibility To
Protect, and Jaclyn Streitfeld-Hall, the Research Director, released an article in July 2021
on the connections between the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and the Protection of
Civilians (POC). Although the main objective of each of these protective agendas is to
better protect vulnerable populations, they each serve a different function. The Protection
of civilians (PoC) calls for ''“all necessary action, up to and including the use of force,
aimed at preventing or responding to threats of physical violence.” POC generally refers
to armed combat settings. 116
In a peacekeeping environment, this must be done while respecting the host
government's primary duty to protect its population and within the capabilities and
operational domains of the mission's mandate. In contrast, the Responsibility to Protect is
a principle intended to stop and prevent crimes against humanity, war crimes, ethnic
cleansing, and genocide. According to R2P, each state has the primary responsibility to
protect its citizens from the four types of mass atrocity crimes, the larger international
community has the responsibility to support and encourage each state to fulfil this duty,
and if a state is blatantly failing to uphold its obligation to protect its citizens, in
compliance with the UN Charter, necessary collective action must be taken in a timely
and decisive way, that is according to Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect. 117
116 PoC and the Responsibility to Protect: Commonalities and Differences’, The CoESPU
Magazine, no. 2–2021 (2021), 14.
117 Ibid.
67
The emergence of a consensus in the early 2000s that the UN should be permitted
to generate more efficient field intelligence for peacekeeping missions may have marked
the beginning of this trend. In 2006, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations of the
United Nations (DPKO) determined that all peacekeeping missions should have a Joint
Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC) which sees a development in the work of peacekeeping
operations. 118
Another development is Resolution 2589 (2021) in which the Security Council
urged Member States hosting or having hosted United Nations peacekeeping operations
to take all appropriate measures to protect mission personnel, and tasked the Secretary-
General with establishing a comprehensive online database of assaults against them. 119
The Council asked the Secretary-General for updates on Member States' efforts to
prevent, investigate, and prosecute crimes against peacekeepers as well as actions taken
to advance accountability within their domestic justice systems, in accordance with any
relevant international obligations, to be included in his reports and comprehensive annual
briefing in order to obtain these measures. Additionally, the Secretary-General was
tasked with providing updates on the steps the UN has taken to monitor instances and aid
Member States in enabling accountability. 120
The Council specifically asked that an extensive online database of crimes against
UN peacekeepers be created within the current budget and to be made available to all
118 Peacekeeping Resources, ‘Peacekeeping Resource Hub: Peacekeeping Resource Hub:
Resources and Guidance’, accessed 8 June 2023,
https://peacekeepingresourcehub.un.org/en/training/resources.
119 Adopting Resolution 2589 (2021), Security Council Calls on Governments to Protect
Peacekeepers, Requests Creation of Online Database Cataloguing Attacks | UN Press’, accessed 8 June
2023, https://press.un.org/en/2021/sc14606.doc.htm.
120 Ibid.
68
concerned Member States, including host countries, nations that provide troops and
police, and nations where civilian personnel is nationals. The tool would also provide
details on the capacity-building support provided by the UN to Member States and the
advancements achieved in prosecuting offenders of such crimes. 121
There is an increase for the consideration of the safety, security, and training for
the UN peacekeepers in which there is innovation regarding not just databases but also
digital transformation, a field the United Nations is making it one of its priorities, in the
world of conflict, digital technologies are playing a bigger and more complicated role.
They are impacting the behavior and activities of conflict actors as well as conflict
situations. In addition to posing new dangers, digital technologies also provide fresh
possibilities for enhancing the efficiency of peacekeeping operations and the security and
safety of peacekeepers. The Secretary-General, António Guterres spoke that: “Digital
technologies can support United Nations peacekeeping efforts globally, including by
ensuring the safety and security of peacekeepers.” 122
Due to the United Nations transparency and the principle of impartiality that
guides its peace operations, ''UN intelligence'' is subject to a variety of restrictions.
Consequently, the UN's ability to share or receive information is hindered by the system's
self-inflicted inadequacy. The unique relationship between the United Nations and the
host nation can also be a vulnerability. In addition, UN peace operations must manage
space for other actors, such as humanitarians the "blue UN" who have distinct cultures,
principles, and procedures and must remain impartial to maintain their access and safety.
121 Ibid.
122 Strategy for the Digital Transformation of UN Peacekeeping’, United Nations Peacekeeping,
accessed 8 June 2023, https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/strategy-digital-transformation-of-un-peacekeeping.
69
Nonetheless, peacekeepers have occasionally used informants and intercepted
communications (such as the Swedish troops in the 1960s UN Operation in the Congo).
They have done so only temporarily and for a specific or tactical purpose. 123
The United Nations Peacekeeping Operations makes it clear and calls it ‘’United
Nations Peacekeeping-Intelligence’’ which is not the same as ‘’intelligence’’ as it is
known.
The Effectiveness of Peace Operations Network (EPON) have discovered that
peacekeeping efforts have been successful in the prevention of large-scale conflicts.
However, as Jessica di Salvatore pointed out, the standards on how to assess performance
statistically varies substantially. Recently, there has also been a growth in the quantitative
studies of the effectiveness of peace operations. She also made note of the fact that many
quantitative studies do not appear to address the issue of whether and how the standards
are meaningful for practitioners and policymakers. The research's conclusions are also
difficult to put into practice. For instance, the claim that a large soldier deployment
increases a peace operation's success appears basic; nevertheless, it is not always simple
to guarantee a large force deployment since this relies on the internal politics of the
troop-contributing nations. Therefore, how we might encourage the recruitment of
additional troops or what drives nations to contribute are more pertinent questions for
politicians. 124
123 Olga Abilova and Alexandra Novosseloff, ‘Limitations to Intelligence in UN Peace
Operations’, Demystifying Intelligence in UN Peace Operations: (International Peace Institute, 2016),
https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep09563.9.
124 Are UN Peacekeeping Operations Effective, and If so, at What Exactly?’, EPON, accessed 8
June 2023, https://effectivepeaceops.net/news-item/are-un-peacekeeping-operations-effective-and-if-so-at-
what-exactly/.
70
The Effectiveness of Peace Operations Network (EPON) calls for the necessity of
research with both qualitative and quantitative characteristics in order to address such
problems. Both qualitative and quantitative are necessary for practitioners and
policymakers in order to make future peacekeeping more effective. 125
There seems to be a general consensus both at the United Nations and in academia
that ‘’peacekeeping works’’ UN Peacekeeping Operations (PKOs) have seen a sharp rise
in both the amount of money spent and the number of soldiers deployed during the past
two decades. Numerous studies have pinpointed specific mechanisms by which UN
PKOs effectively promote peace. PKOs make it much less likely that conflicts will spread
from one country to another. They also reduce the intensity of conflicts, shorten their
length, and make peace last longer after they end. 126
The Case Study of Iraq
Since 1984, when it despatched an investigative team to the region, and more
consistently since 1988, when it began monitoring a cease-fire involving Iran and Iraq,
the United Nations has maintained a physical presence in Iraq. From a truce-monitoring
group to a coalition of states assembled to repel Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, to arms
inspections, sanctions enforcement, humanitarian relief, and to the latest political
assistance, electoral assistance, and support for state-building, the form of the United
Nations involvement has changed substantially. Since World War II, the Middle East has
been significantly influenced by larger patterns of international relations, which have
125 Ibid.
126 Håvard Hegre, Lisa Hultman, and Håvard Mokleiv Nygård, ‘Peacekeeping Works: Evaluating
the Effectiveness of UN Peacekeeping Operations’, Conflict Trends (The Peace Research Institute Oslo
(PRIO), June 2017).
71
been represented and characterised by the Security Council's participation in and with
Iraq since 1980. 127
In the light of resolution 660 of 2 August 1990 that states the invasion of Kuwait
by Iraq that happened at the same day of the resolution as a breach of international peace,
this was approved by 14 votes to none in the Security Council. One member did not
participate in the voting (Yemen). 128 It is believed that the Iran-Iraq conflict cost Iraq
around US $450 billion. Taking into account this battle and Iraq's financial collapse,
Kuwait started to urge Iraq for border concessions. It surpassed its OPEC oil production
limit, overwhelming the market and reducing Iraqi oil prices, which fell from $20 to $14
between January and June 1990. At a time when Saddam Hussein wanted to provide
incentives for his nation after the battle with Iran has ended. Kuwait's demands and
actions threatened to further discredit him in the eyes of the population of Iraq and the
Arab world. 129
Resolution 660 followed by Resolution 678, which was adopted on November 29,
1990, and called on member states cooperating with Kuwait to "use all necessary means
to uphold and implement Resolution 660 and all subsequent resolutions and to restore
international peace and security in the region." Prior to it, Council members had agreed
on further measures, particularly the adoption of sweeping economic sanctions against
Iraq, a vote reached four days after the Iraqi forces has entered Kuwait with just two
127 David M. Malone, The International Struggle Over Iraq: Politics in the UN Security Council
1980-2005 (Oxford University Press, 2006), 2. https://doi.org/10.1093/0199278571.001.0001.
128 UN Security Council (45th Year: 1990), ‘Resolution 660 (1990) /: Adopted by the Security
Council at Its 2932nd Meeting, on 2 August 1990.’, 2 August 1990,
https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/94220.
129 Poorvi Chitalkar and David M Malone, ‘The UN Security Council and Iraq’, United Nations
University, Working Paper Series, November 2013, 2.
72
abstentions (Cuba and Yemen). The referred to as ceasefire resolution of 687, demanded
that Iraq eliminate its weapons of mass destruction and authorised the establishment of a
UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) to ensure compliance with non-nuclear (chemical
and biological) disarmament regulations and to assist the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) in the nuclear domain. 130
Operation Desert Storm which was conducted as a response by the international
coalition to the Invasion of Kuwait was hailed as a success and an example of the United
Nations collective security system. It is not a coincidence that both Operation Desert
Storm and the Invasion of Kuwait happened in 1991, for it is also the year the Soviet
Union has dismantled as the world was experiencing massive changes.
Moreover, the early unanimity of the Council’s permanent members on Iraq was
brief. The United States and Britain, on the one hand, and France and Russia, on the
other, quickly diverged on the enactment of sanctions and the inspection system, with
China "somewhere in the middle". Russia and France began calling for a "road map" to
the lifting of sanctions from as early as 1994, and the cessation of operations of
UNSCOM from Iraq in late 1998, followed by a US-UK military campaign (Operation
Desert Fox) launched without the Security Council authorization, marked a complete
breakup of the Gulf War alliance. The United States and the United Kingdom kept on
patrolling the no-fly zones established in 1991 and 1992 also without the Security
130 Mats Berdal, ‘UN Security Council and the Crisis over Iraq’, The UN Security Council
(Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, 2003), 11. https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep20290.6.
73
Council authorization, and the "oil for food" initiative provided a muddled solution on the
sanctions problem. 131
In resolutions 706 and 712 of August and September of 1991, the Security
Council's reaction to Iraqi needs fell significantly short of the United Nations staff's
recommendations. According to Fine, accepting the recommendations of the UN staff to
minimise suffering of civilians would not have taken away the Security Council's power
of influence over the Iraqi government, nor would it have allowed the regime to advance
farther than it has in regaining control of the country. 132
As a consequence of the Security Council's activities and the Iraqi regime's
predicted rejection of its criteria, the Iraqi population continued to suffer from increasing
malnutrition, insufficient power, water, sanitation, and health care facilities, and a
quadrupling of child mortality. 133
James Fine mentions that this crisis may have been avoided if the Bush
Administration and its UN allies had adopted suggestions on humanitarian necessities
and monitoring safeguards provided by UN relief staff officials in July 1991. 134
A UN interagency humanitarian mission to Iraq, headed by Prince Sadruddin Aga
Khan, the UN Secretary-General's Executive Delegate in charge of Iraq and Gulf aid,
requested on July 15, 1991 that Iraq be authorised to begin restricted oil sales in order to
pay desperately needed humanitarian supplies. The mission determined that international
131 Ibid., 12.
132 James Fine, ‘The Iraq Sanctions Catastrophe’, Middle East Report, no. 174 (January 1992): 36,
https://doi.org/10.2307/3012970.
133 Ibid., 36.
134 Ibid., 36.
74
assistance efforts, including government-funded programmes administered by UN
agencies and the International Committee of the Red Cross, could not begin to fulfil
humanitarian needs on their own. 135
The United Nations assumed a variety of duties in maintaining the order that it
had helped to establish. This variety of responsibilities necessitated a more diverse
approach to peace operations than was customary. In Iraq, humanitarian aims were
included with the deployment of United Nations "Guards" to northern Iraq in to
safeguard returning refugees and the engagement of the United Nations in delivering
humanitarian aid to those people during the no-fly zone that was established by the
United States, the United Kingdom and France in northern and southern Iraq starting
from 1991 and up until the US-led invasion in 2003. 136
The United Nations gradually assumed the role of surrogate government in
regions not under Iraqi sovereignty, up until the invasion of Iraq by the US-UK led
coalition in 2003.
One of the roles that the United Nations took is weapon inspection, The United
Nations Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) was
established on 17 December 1999 by Security Council resolution 1284. UNMOVIC was
to take over the former UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) and carry on with the
latter's mandate to disarm Iraq of its supposed weapons of mass destruction (chemical,
biological, and missiles with a range of more than 150 km), and to function a system of
135 Ibid., 36.
136 Malone, The International Struggle Over Iraq, 2006, 84.
75
continuing oversight and verification to check Iraq's adherence to its commitments and
not to recover the same weapons prohibited by the Security Council. 137
The United Nations Secretary-General selected Dr. Hans Blix of Sweden as the
Commission's Executive Chairman. Furthermore, the Secretary-General named sixteen
members to the College of Commissioners of UNMOVIC, which advises and guides the
Chairman in the performance of his responsibilities. In accordance with the United
Nations Charter, the Commission's personnel are recruited on the basis of ensuring the
highest standards of efficiency, competence, and integrity, while also taking into account
the necessity of hiring people from a geographically diverse pool. Staff members of the
Commission include weapons experts, analysts, scientists, engineers, and operational
planners. 138
The Commission is sponsored by a fraction of the percentage of the funds from
Iraq's oil exports ("oil-for-food" initiative). Unlike its predecessor, UNSCOM, the
personnel of UNMOVIC are United Nations employees. In addition to the Office of the
Chairman, which has executive, legal, and liaison responsibilities, UNMOVIC consists of
four departments (Planning and Operations, Analysis and Assessment, Information,
Technical Support and Training) and an administrative service. The Commission's
headquarters are located in New York at the United Nations. Every three months, the
Executive Chairman must report to the Security Council on the work of UNMOVIC.
According to the resolution establishing UNMOVIC (resolution 1284) he is required to
confer with the College of Commissioners before submitting written reports to the
137 UNMOVIC’, accessed 27 March 2023, https://www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/.
138 Ibid.
76
Council. Thus, the College of Commissioners of UNMOVIC meets in private session at
least four occasions every year to consider the report and other organizational and
operational tasks. 139
David M. Malone mentions that in the 1990s, the Security Council and Kofi
Annan faced a difficult challenge in reconciling the United Nations' Iraq policies with the
organization's fundamental objectives: international peace, security, development, and
human rights. He goes as far as saying that those whose security considerations
outweighed other considerations favoured sanctions; those to which the humanitarian
considerations took precedence, most notably, the United Nations officials themselves,
including those on the ground in Iraq, they argued against sanctions and for programmes
to mitigate the sanctions impact on the population. 140
In a similar manner to how administrative law principles constrain regulatory
decision-making in domestic national spheres, organizations of global governance, such
as the Security Council, ought to be subject to these principles when they engage in legal-
regulatory functions. By embracing this viewpoint, the Council would not solely be
maintaining the principle of legality, but also amplifying its own authenticity and
trustworthiness. The effectiveness of the Council is reliant upon the acknowledgement of
its jurisdiction by the member states of the United Nations. A Council that is perceived as
being accountable and responsible is more likely to receive such recognition. 141
139 Ibid.
140 Malone, The International Struggle Over Iraq, 2006, 135.
141 Chitalkar and Malone, 'The UN Security Council and Iraq', 2013, 5.
77
The legal-regulatory approach could benefit from the valuable insights obtained
from Iraq with regards to the Security Council's effectiveness. The first point out of three
points that could increase the effectiveness of the Security Council that Poorvi Chitalkar
and David M. Malone specifies is that it is important that regulatory bodies are provided
with unambiguous mandates. In order to ensure effective delegation, it is imperative that
resolutions are formulated with precision. This entails the inclusion of explicit details
regarding the rules that the delegated agent is expected to implement, the extent of
powers available to them for the purpose of implementation, and the prescribed process
for enforcement. 142
The United Nations' sanctions imposed on Iraq constituted the most extensive,
intricate, and enduring regime of its kind. The objective of the P-5, namely disarmament,
regime change, or attaining wider regional stability in the Middle East, lacked clarity and
was a point of dispute among the members. The duration of the sanctions regime was left
unspecified and the requirement for P-5 unanimity for change, known as the 'reverse-
veto' dynamic, transformed it into an indefinite one. This occurred even after
international support for the sanctions had dissipated. 143
Secondly, it is imperative that both member states and regulatory agencies are
held accountable. The United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) serves as an
important example of a regulatory endeavour undertaken by the Security Council that is
hindered by unclear lines of responsibility. The appointment of the Chairmen of United
Nations Special Commission was the responsibility of the Secretary-General; however,
142 Ibid.
143 Ibid.
78
their reporting was directed towards the Council. The trilateral association encountered
significant difficulties when there was a divergence of opinions on substantive matters
between Richard Butler, the Head of United Nations Special Commission, and Kofi
Annan, the Secretary-General. 144
The lack of clarity regarding the accountability of United Nations Special
Commission arose when allegations surfaced that the United States was utilising the
organisation for its own intelligence objectives. The Volcker inquiry report discovered
significant deficiencies in the management of the Oil-for-Food Programme (OFF) by
both the United Nations Secretariat and member states. The report highlighted that there
was a lack of clear leadership from both the Security Council and the Secretariat, the
report also used the term "egregious lapses" to describe the severity of the shortcomings
identified. 145
Thirdly, it is necessary that agents exhibit independence and possess sufficient
resources to ensure their ability to execute their duties efficiently. The oversight of
Resolution 611's extensive and intricate contracts was mandated to be carried out by the
Council members comprising the 661 Sanctions Committee. 146
As the coalition-led forces invaded Iraq in 2003 on the grounds that Iraq
possesses Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) the coalition powers and other member
states, stunned by the UN's immediate and complete irrelevance in Iraq, were left to
determine the organization's future role there. 147
144 Ibid.
145 Ibid.
146 Ibid.
147 Ibid., 6.
79
The United Nations tried to act on the reality of the invasion of Iraq then the
Security Council adopted Resolution 1483 on May 22, 2003, which recognized the
United States and the United Kingdom as occupying powers and appointed Sergio Vieira
de Mello as special representative of the secretary-general (SRSG) to Iraq, the resolution
stressed that ‘’ Iraqi people freely to determine their own political future and control their
own natural resources.’’ 148
Secretary-General Kofi Annan envisioned a comprehensive multidisciplinary
assistance operation, to be carried out by the new United Nations Assistance Mission to
Iraq (UNAMI), which would include constitutional, legal, and reforms to the judiciary,
police training, demobilization and integration of former military forces, public
administration, and rebuilding the economy. 149
The United States relied increasingly on symbolic support from the United
Nations to strengthen its efforts in Iraq. Adopted in June 2004, Resolution 1546
supported the agreements negotiated by the United States and Iraqi political parties.
Following detailed negotiations over the extent of the government's control over
Coalition military operations, an annex to the Resolution outlined the coordination and
partnership between the interim government and the United States. Some viewed the
Resolution as legitimizing the strategy the Coalition had followed since Saddam
Hussein's overthrow, while the majority viewed it as an attempt to support the new Iraqi
authorities prior to the June 30, 2004 transfer of limited sovereignty to them. 150
148 UN Security Council (58th Year: 2003), ‘Resolution 1483 (2003) /: Adopted by the Security
Council at Its 4761st Meeting, on 22 May 2003’, 22 May 2003, https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/495555.
149 Poorvi Chitalkar and David M. Malone, ‘Recurring Pathologies of the Un Security Council:
The Instructive Case of Iraq’, Journal of the Indian Law Institute 55, no. 3 (2013): 319.
150 Malone, The International Struggle Over Iraq, 2006, 232.
80
On 22 February 2022, by Security Council adopted resolution 2621 confirming
That the Iraq-Kuwait Mandate of the UN Compensation Commission has been
completed. The United Nations Compensation Commission was established in 1991 as a
subordinate body of the Security Council with the responsibility of processing claims and
disbursing compensation for losses and damage sustained as a direct consequence of Iraqi
forces entering Kuwait in 1991.151
Following the decision, Michael Gaffey, the head of the United Nations
Compensation Commission's governing council, gave the council the commission's final
report. Almost 31 years after the Council reiterated Iraq's duty under international law
for any direct loss or damage emanating from the invasion of Kuwait, it summarises the
Commission's activities since its formation, which was created under resolution 692. 152
Iraq's foreign minister Fouad Hussein stated that Iraq had paid the last payment of
$52.4 billion in a speech delivered during a briefing at the UN Security Council on
terminating the Compensation Commission's authority over Iraq's compensation to
Kuwait. 153
On 30 May 2023, resolution 2682 was unanimously adopted by the Security
Council in order to extend the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI)
mandate by one year and until 31 May 2024. UNAMI was tasked by the Security Council
to prioritize giving the Iraqi Government and People advice, support, and assistance on
151 Security Council Unanimously Adopts Resolution Confirming United Nations Compensation
Commission Has Fulfilled Its Iraq-Kuwait Mandate | UN Press’, accessed 8 June 2023,
https://press.un.org/en/2022/sc14801.doc.htm.
152 Ibid.
153 Government of Iraq, ‘Iraqi Government Announces Iraq’s Exit from Chapter VII’, Government
of Iraq (blog), 23 February 2022, https://gds.gov.iq/iraqi-government-announces-iraqs-exit-from-chapter-
vii/.
81
furthering inclusive political dialogue and reform, national and local reconciliation giving
the involvement of women a very high priority, taking into consideration the participation
of civil society and young people. 154 Moreover, the resolution mentions the negative
effects of climate change, ecological changes, and natural disasters, among other things,
can exacerbate any existing instability, resulting to more desertification and drought, sand
and dust storms, and negatively affect livelihoods, food security, water scarcity, and the
humanitarian situation. Finally, the resolution asks the Secretary-General to conduct and
submit to the Security Council, no later than 31 March 2024, a full strategic review of
UNAMI, in consultation with the Government of Iraq, evaluating the existing threats to
Iraq's peace and security as well as the ongoing applicability of UNAMI's tasks and
priorities.
In conclusion, The United States and the coalition forces campagin in Iraq
without the explicit authorization of the Security Council rendered it irrelevant and
ineffective and that was seen by many as a complete sidelining of the United Nations as it
did not have an assertive role in Iraq.
That clearly indicates that the Security Council as well as the other organs of the
United Nations are prone to the influence of superpowers, the latter resulted to many
criticisms of the United Nations whether from politicians, academics, leaders and others.
The forementioned leads to many calls to reform the Security Council and the United
Nations, this thesis will outline the reform proposals of the Security Council in Chapter 4.
154 Resolution 2682 (2023) | United Nations in Iraq’, accessed 8 June 2023,
https://iraq.un.org/en/234475-resolution-2682-2023, https://iraq.un.org/en/234475-resolution-2682-2023.
82
The Case Study of Syria
The unique case of Syria demonstrates a very interesting development on the
international affairs, like Iraq, Syria is a diverse country in the middle east. The events
that took place since 2011 has been the focus of the international community from the
beginning, the United Nations and the Security Council stance on Syria was not as firm
and assertive as it was on Iraq, especially during the 1990’s. The crisis in Syria did not
only showcase the complexity of the situation in Syria but also the upcoming complex
situation of the world order.
Started in March 2011, Syria's government, which is run by President Bashar al-
Assad, was put to the test like never before when pro-democracy protests were ignited,
wanting to overthrow President Bashar Al-Assad and the protests were spread across the
country. The protesters called for an end to the authoritarian policies of the Assad
government, in their own words, which have been going on since 1971, when Assad's
father, Hafiz al-Assad, became president. The Syrian government used a lot of police,
military, and militia forces to stop protests by using violence. In 2011, groups of people
who were against the government started to form gangs. By 2012, the conflict had grown
into a full-blown civil war. 155
In an interview with The Wall Street Journal in January 2011, Syrian President
Bashar Al-Assad was asked if he thought the wave of protests that was sweeping the
Arab world at the time (which had already overthrown rulers in Tunisia and Egypt)
would reach Syria. Assad admitted that many Syrians had been struggling economically
155 Syrian Civil War | Facts & Timeline | Britannica’, 8 June 2023,
https://www.britannica.com/event/Syrian-Civil-War.
83
and that political reform had been slow and stop-and-go. However, he was sure that Syria
would be excluded from the protests because his administration's policy of opposing the
United States and Israel was in line with what the Syrian people wanted. In contrast, the
rulers who had already fallen had made pro-Western decisions that went against what
their people wanted, according to President Bashar Al-Assad. 156
Protests against the government started just a few weeks after the interview. This
showed that Assad's position was much worse than he was ready to accept. In fact, the
country was moving towards instability because of several long-term political and
economic problems, although the western influence and attempts at regime change cannot
be taken out of the equation.
On the 14th of April 2012, The Security Council reaffirmed its call for the
Government to start removing armed personnel from populated centres and to stop using
heavy weapons there, while also approving an advance mission to observe the ceasefire
in Syria, which it said all parties "appeared to be observing." 157
The Council unanimously approved resolution 2042 (2012) and it also gave
permission for a group of up to 30 unarmed military observers to communicate with the
parties and start reporting on the execution of a complete end to all kinds of armed
conflict by all parties. 158
156 Ibid.
157 Security Council Unanimously Adopts Resolution 2042 (2012), Authorizing Advance Team to
Monitor Ceasefire in Syria | UN Press’, accessed 8 June 2023,
https://press.un.org/en/2012/sc10609.doc.htm.
158 Ibid.
84
It emphasized the need of reducing military presence and rapidly putting Kofi
Annan's six-point plan into action, who is the Joint Special Envoy of the United Nations
and the League of Arab States. The Six-Point Proposal of the Joint Special Envoy of the
United Nations and the League of Arab States consists of first, the agreement on the
collaboration with the Envoy in a political process that is inclusive of all Syrians in order
to address the legitimate aspirations and concerns of the Syrian people. 159
Second, commit to ending hostilities and achieving an effective ending of armed
violence by all parties under United Nations supervision as soon as possible in order to
protect civilians and stabilize the country. 160
Third, ensure prompt delivery of humanitarian aid to all regions affected by the
conflict; to achieve this, accept and put into effect a daily humanitarian pause of two
hours; coordinate the daily pause's precise timing and modalities through a productive
mechanism, including at the local level. Forth, accelerate the pace and scale of releasing
people who have been arbitrarily detained, including those who belong to particularly
vulnerable groups of people and those engaged in peaceful political activity; immediately
start organizing access to these locations; and through the proper channels, quickly
respond to all written requests for information, availability, or release regarding such
persons. 161
Fifth, guarantee journalists' freedom of movement throughout the nation and a
non-discriminatory visa policy. And sixth, abide by the legal guarantees of the right to
159 Ibid.
160 Ibid.
161 Ibid.
85
free association and peaceful assembly. Kofi Annan's six-point plan marked a multilateral
peacemaking attempt based on a Security Council Resolution, despite that effort, the
situation in Syria got deteriorated and more became complicated. 162
Resolution 2043 built on the goals of the previous Resolution 2042. It sent a full-
fledged UN operation to the ground for an initial time of ninety days, officially set up the
United Nations Supervision mission in Syria (UNSMIS) and set up a 15-day reporting
period. The resolution called for the initial deployment of "up to 300 unarmed military
observers as well as an appropriate civilian component as needed by the Mission to fulfil
its mandate." In the weeks that followed, the Security Council did get a lot of information
for its Syria file. The UNSMIS sent reports every two weeks, and Joint Special Envoy
Annan gave regular meetings. It was clear reports from the ground were getting worse
about how unstable and uncertain the security situation was and the parties were quickly
backing out of their commitments under the six-point plan and UNSC Resolutions 2042
and 2043. 163
It is likely that the Syrian regime perceived that accepting the six-point plan
would give too much concessions and would quasi accept the dividing of the country, for
the Syrian regime wanted to regain control of as much territories as possible back from
the protesters, accepting the six-point plan might be the equivalent of accepting the no-fly
zone that was imposed on Iraq from 1991 to 2003, although the latter was not a choice for
the Saddam regime.
162 Ibid.
163 Esmira Jafarova, ‘Solving the Syrian Knot: Dynamics within the UN Security Council and
Challenges to Its Effectiveness’, Connections 13, no. 2 (2014), 31.
86
The alleged use of chemical weapons in an attack on Ghouta on the edges of
Damascus on August 21, 2013, which is said to have killed more than a thousand people,
sparked major controversy around the world and made it harder for the Security Council
to take deal with the Syria case, although it was already difficult. The Council said that
the attack is condemned and told the United Nations chemical weapons inspectors, which
came in the country on August 17, to start looking into the case right away in Damascus.
Under Ake Sellstrom's direction, a Swedish scientist, the Mission did the study and put
together its report in rather quickly. 164
The United States and the United Kingdom got intelligence that a chemical attack
had happened, and that sarin gas was used. The UN Commission came to the same
conclusion, which is that the attack did happen, and that sarin was used. The United
Nations mission's report on the alleged use of chemical weapons came to the same
conclusion, which is that the attack did happen, and that sarin was used. 165
The Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon in an addressing to the Security Council and
the General Assembly on 16 September 2013 states:
‘’The Secretary-General expresses his profound shock and regret at the
conclusion that chemical weapons were used on a relatively large scale, resulting in
numerous casualties, particularly among civilians and including many children. The
Secretary-General condemns in the strongest possible terms the use of chemical weapons
and believes that this act is a war crime and grave violation of the 1925 Protocol for the
Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of
164 Ibid., 37.
165 Ibid.
87
Bacteriological Methods of Warfare and other relevant rules of customary international
law.’’ 166
On 27 September 2013, the Security Council adopted Resolution 2118 and the
Security Council agreed about the necessity of destroying Syria's chemical weapons
programme as soon as possible. And if Syria does not comply, Chapter VII measures will
be put in place, sending a strong message to Assad’s regime that if the chemical weapons
programme is not destroyed, there will be firm measures declaring that the situation in
Syria is a threat to international peace and security. 167
The Council unanimously passed resolution 2118 (2013) stating that the use of
chemical weapons anywhere was a threat to international peace and security. It also
called for the full implementation of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical
Weapons' (OPCW) 27 September 2013 decision, which includes special procedures for
the quick and verifiable destruction of Syria's chemical weapons. 168
In particular, the Council told Syria that it could not use, develop, produce,
otherwise get, stockpile, keep, or transfer chemical weapons to other States or non-State
actors. The Council also stated that no one in Syria should use, develop, produce, get,
stockpile, keep, or transfer such weapons. 169
166 Un Secretary-General and UN Mission to Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical
Weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic (2013), ‘Report of the United Nations Mission to Investigate
Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic on the Alleged Use of Chemical
Weapons in the Ghouta Area of Damascus on 21 August 2013 :: Note /: By the Secretary-General’, 13
September 2013, https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/756814.
167 Security Council Requires Scheduled Destruction of Syria’s Chemical Weapons, Unanimously
Adopting Resolution 2118 (2013) | UN Press’, accessed 8 June 2023,
https://press.un.org/en/2013/sc11135.doc.htm.
168 Ibid.
169 Ibid.
88
Esmira Jafarova mentions that looking at what has happened in the UN Security
Council in relation to the Syrian crisis shows how challenging it is to determine whether
the global body is fulfilling its promise in dealing with crises of the twenty first century.
Even though it would be easier and simpler to say that the Council's work is either
"effective" or "ineffective," there are too many associated factors to ignore. A task as
massive and complex as maintaining international peace and security should not be
determined as either effective or ineffective, for that outlook can be harmful and
reductionist. 170
Peter Nadin mentions that ‘’Whenever the Security Council membership is not
unified, the Council cannot be effective. There are no exceptions.’’ 171 Finding consensus
among the permanent members of the Security Council is the most important aspect, yet
the most difficult.
He goes to mention that voices from the international community demanded a
military intervention to bring regime change in Syria and to stop the mass detention and
crimes committed by the Syrian regime at the high of the conflict. 172
Unlike Libya, the principle of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) was not invoked
as a cause for intervention, which resulted in Assad’s regime staying in power, especially
that the Syrian Democratic Forces and the Free Syrian Army (now Syrian National
Army) did not succeed in overthrowing Assad’s regime, the Security Council itself is
blamed for the failure to invoke R2P. Moreover, after the failure to invoke R2P in Syria,
170 Jafarova, 'Solving the Syrian Knot', 2014, 41.
171 Peter Nadin, ‘How the UN Security Council Failed Syria’, 30 August 2017,
https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/how-un-security-council-failed-syria.
172 Ibid.
89
there are doubts of the possibility of invoking R2P again whether in Syria or elsewhere.
Although the United States, United Kingdom, and France support the Syrian opposition,
Russia supports the Syrian regime and President Bashar al-Assad, whilst China does not
want to get involved to get rid of his rule. That is the primary reason why the Security
Council did not act firmly and that is why it is difficult to find consensus among the
permanent nuclear power members of the Security Council.
There are considerable differences between Libya and Syria that resulted in R2P
not being invoked, the rebel actions in Syria weren't nearly as big as those in Libya, and
the ethnic diversity that is in Syria is different than that of Libya, aside from the fact that
the Syrian government's tanks and artillery are more powerful than the rebels' rifles and
homemade bombs, the Syrian regime also has a unified army that is committed to putting
down the protests with force. This makes it different from countries like Tunisia and
Libya, where the military helped get rid of controversial leaders. Another big difference
between the crisis in Syria and the one in Libya is that the Syrian government still has
strong and long-lasting ties with Iran and Russia. 173
The United Nations Human Rights Office released an assessment in June 2022
stating that between March 1, 2011, and March 31, 2021, 306,887 civilians were killed in
Syria because of the conflict. This number is based on a thorough review and statistical
analysis of data on civilian deaths. This is the most recent estimate of how many civilians
have died in Syria because of the war. 174
173 Caitlin Alyce Buckley, ‘Learning from Libya, Acting in Syria’, Journal of Strategic Security 5,
no. 2 (June 2012) 82.
174 UN Human Rights Office Estimates More than 306,000 Civilians Were Killed over 10 Years in
Syria Conflict’, OHCHR, accessed 8 June 2023, https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2022/06/un-
human-rights-office-estimates-more-306000-civilians-were-killed-over-10.
90
As of December 2022, there is approximately 14.6 million people in need, 6.5
million of which are children, 6.9 million are internally displaced, 3 million of which are
children, according to UNICEF. 175
With resolution 2672 (2023), the Security Council decided to confirm, in
accordance with resolution 2642 (2022), the extension of its previous authorization of the
Bab al-Hawa crossing point on Syria's border with Turkey, which was first set out in
paragraphs 2 and 3 of resolution 2165 (2014). The Council also asked the Secretary-
General to give a special report on Syria's humanitarian needs by June 10, 2023. 176
As of the time of writing this thesis, the Security Council vetoed 17 draft
resolutions on the situation is Syria 177, with Russia and China being the recurring
vetoers, which marks a new era for the Security Council, reminiscent of the cold war era
which was called an era of ‘’paralysis’’ for the Security Council due to the geopolitical
clash between the bipolar powers of the world at the time (the Soviet Union and the
United States) the new era of the Security Council has led to many calls to reform the
Security Council to not go back to that era of paralysis and to move forward towards an
effective Security Council. In Syria, continuous vetoes of resolution drafts and just the
threat of a veto have halted talks and left the Security Council essentially inactive due to
the disagreements from the permanent members on how to deal with the crise that was
175 Humanitarian Action for Children 2023 - Syrian Arab Republic - Syrian Arab Republic |
ReliefWeb’, 12 January 2023, https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/humanitarian-action-
children-2023-syrian-arab-republic.
176 Adopting Resolution 2672 (2023), Security Council Renews Cross-Border Aid Operations into
North-West Syria for Six Months, Requests Special Report on Humanitarian Needs | UN Press’, accessed 8
June 2023, https://press.un.org/en/2023/sc15168.doc.htm.
177 UN Documents for Syria: Security Council Resolutions’, accessed 8 June 2023,
https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un_documents_type/security-council-
resolutions/?ctype=Syria&cbtype=syria.
91
erupted in Syria, the case of Syria perfectly highlights the limits of the Security Council
amidst the geopolitical interests of superpowers which as a result, limits the mechanisms
of global governance, for that, there has been many calls and proposals for ‘’innovation’’
in global governance and its mechanisms, a number of those proposals and calls with be
discussed in Chapter four.
The Case Study of Ukraine
On the 24th of February 2022, the Russo-Ukrainian War, which started in 2014,
significantly escalated when Russia attacked and annexed areas of Ukraine, which also
started the worst refugee crisis in Europe since World War II. Russia annexed the
peninsula of Crimea on March 18th of 2014 triggering the crisis between Russia and
Ukraine. 178
The crisis was triggered when Viktor Yanukovich, the President of Ukraine at the
time, opted not to sign an association agreement (AA) with the European Union (EU), it
led to significant pro-European demonstrations throughout Ukraine. The Ukrainian
parliament decided to remove Yanukovich from office in February 2014, and he left
Kyiv. Russia responded by annexing Crimea. 179
After two agreements (the Minsk I and Minsk II) which are two agreements made
by Russia and Ukraine regarding the situation in Donetsk and Luhansk in Eastern
Ukraine which consist of mostly Russian speaking population. Minsk I was made In
September 2014, the rebels supported by Russia and Ukraine reached an agreement on a
178 Russia-Ukraine War | Casualties, Map, Causes, & Significance | Britannica’, 8 June 2023,
https://www.britannica.com/event/2022-Russian-invasion-of-Ukraine.
179 Ukraine: The Minsk Agreements Five Years on | Think Tank | European Parliament’, accessed
8 June 2023, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/EPRS_ATA(2020)646203.
92
12-point cease-fire in Belarus's capital, its terms included the removal of heavy weapons,
humanitarian relief delivery, and prisoner exchanges. Whilst Minsk II was signed by
leaders of two pro-Russian separatist regions, as well as representatives from Russia,
Ukraine, and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) which
included a 13-point agreement reached in Minsk in February 2015. 180
The Security Council made no official role in both peace agreements, Minsk II
also known as the Minsk Accord was mediated by France and Germany with the
participation of a regional security organization (OSCE). The non-participation of the
Security Council clearly indicates both the lack of adequate mechanisms and the loss of
the primacy of the Council in issues pertaining to international peace and security.
As early as 2014, the Security Council urged for the halting of military activities
in Eastern Ukraine, when the Malaysian Airlines flight MH17 crashed on 17th of July
2014, the Council called for that military ''groups'' to agree to an investigation in
accordance with the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). 181
Security Council resolution 2202 of 2015 which called for the implementation by
all parties regarding the “Package of Measures for the Implementation of the Minsk
Agreements” which included a ceasefire in the areas of areas of the Donetsk and
Luhansk as well as withdrawal of all heavy weapons by both sides at an equal distance to
establish a safe zone that is no less than 50 km wide from the other. The package also
180 Reuters, ‘Factbox: What Are the Minsk Agreements on the Ukraine Conflict?’, Reuters, 6
December 2021, sec. Europe, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/what-are-minsk-agreements-ukraine-
conflict-2021-12-06/.
181 Security Council Coalesces around Resolution 2166 (2014) on Malaysian Jet Crash Demanding
Accountability, Full Access to Site, Halt to Military Activities | UN Press’, accessed 8 June 2023,
https://press.un.org/en/2014/sc11483.doc.htm.
93
called for Ukraine to undergo changes with a new constitution coming into effect by the
end of 2015. Decentralization was mandated in that agreement, along with the adoption
of permanent regulations governing the unique status of certain Donetsk and Luhansk
regions. 182
The United Nations responded to the humanitarian side of the crisis and on
February 25, the Secretary-General of the United Nations named Amin Awad of Sudan to
be the UN Crisis Coordinator for Ukraine, and he was given the title of Assistant
Secretary-General. 183
A Security Council resolution urged that Moscow immediately cease its offensive
in Ukraine and evacuate all soldiers was vetoed by Russia. China, India, and the United
Arab Emirates abstained from voting. Moreover, 15 out of 11 of the Council's voted in
favour of the resolution. 184 The veto of the resolution by Russia led to a massive reaction
and criticisms of the Security Council, especially coming from western nations. That is
why criticisms against the use of the veto are more evident. Whilst it is easy to criticise
the veto power, it is very difficult to change the historic realities of the Security Council,
Chapter 4 will talk about the reform possibilities of the Security Council.
The veto of the resolution from Russia has led American academics such as Ian
Hurd to go as far as saying Russia and China are not members of the United Nations
Security Council, citing misnomers of Article 23 of the United Nations Charter mentions
182 UN Security Council (70th Year: 2015), ‘Resolution 2202 (2015) /: Adopted by the Security
Council at Its 7384th Meeting, on 17 February 2015’, 17 February 2015,
https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/787968.
183 The UN and the War in Ukraine: Key Information’, United Nations Western Europe, 8 March
2022, https://unric.org/en/the-un-and-the-war-in-ukraine-key-information/.
184 Russia Blocks Security Council Action on Ukraine | UN News’, 25 February 2022,
https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/02/1112802.
94
the five permanent members of the Security Council as France, the United Kingdom, the
United States, the Soviet Union, and the Republic of China. 185
Consequently, matters where turned to the General Assembly considering that the
Security Council was struck by a deadlock and was unable to fulfil its main responsibility
to maintain international peace and security because of the absence of consensus among
its permanent members as Resolution 2623 mentions and calls for an emergency special
session to be held by the General Assembly to talk about the breach of international
peace and security. 186
In a letter dated February 27, 2022, the Secretary-General notified Member States
that the eleventh emergency special session would be held on Monday, February 28,
2022, at Headquarters of the United Nations.187
At the eleventh emergency special session, which took place on March 2, 2022,
the United Nations General Assembly passed Resolution ES11/1, to which 141 countries
voted for, 5 voted against, 35 abstained, and 12 were absent. The resolution condemned
Russia's invasion of Ukraine and called for a complete withdrawal of Russian military as
well as a reversal of its decision to recognise the Donetsk and Luhansk People's
Republics. 188
185 Ian Hurd: Read the Words as They Appear — Russia Is Not a Member of the United Nations
Security Council – Chicago Tribune’, accessed 8 June 2023,
https://www.chicagotribune.com/opinion/commentary/ct-opinion-russia-un-security-council-ukraine-
20220228-5ftidozwlbdx5k2ex6qera5skm-story.html.
186 UN Security Council (77th Year: 2022), ‘Resolution 2623 (2022) /: Adopted by the Security
Council at Its 8980th Meeting, on 27 February 2022’, 27 February 2022,
https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3958807.
187 Ibid.
188 A/RES/ES-11/1
95
George Soros, the billionaire businessman, stated that the invasion of Ukraine
might be the start of the "Third World War" which would bring an end to civilization, he
also said that as the war proceeds, climate change has become less important to the
international community, even though experts say its effects are close to becoming
permanent, which may spell the end of society as well. 189
John J. Mearsheimer describes the conflict in Ukraine as a ‘’phenomenon’’ that
happened twice in the last 75 years, first with the Vietnam war and second with the Iraq
war. Also, Mearsheimer claims that the United States ‘’miscalculated so badly’’ since the
U.S. and its NATO partners were key players in the events that led to the Ukraine war
and are now key players in the war itself, it is important to figure out if the West bears
responsibility for this catastrophe. 190
Jonathan Masters writes in an article for Council on Foreign Relations that the
conflict in Ukraine puts Europe and Russia at a ‘’crossroads’’ and indeed the conflict has
both indicators as well as ramifications for the international order for its significance and
importance in the security architecture of the world. 191
The conflict in Ukraine is named as a Russian war of aggression in the west and
western-aligned countries, whilst in Russia and Russian-aligned countries it is named as a
‘’special military operation’’ which is an illustration of the crisis of the world order, the
Security Council clearly lacks the mechanisms and procedures to tackle, let alone solve
189 Jared Gans, ‘Soros: Invasion of Ukraine Possibly the Beginning of “Third World War” That
Ends Civilization’, Text, The Hill (blog), 25 May 2022, https://thehill.com/policy/international/3501232-
soros-invasion-of-ukraine-possibly-the-beginning-of-third-world-war-that-ends-civilization/.
190 John J. Mearsheimer, ‘The Causes and Consequences of the Ukraine Crisis’, The National
Interest, 23 June 2022, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/causes-and-consequences-ukraine-crisis-203182.
191 Jonathan Masters, ‘Ukraine: Conflict at the Crossroads of Europe and Russia’, 14 February
2023, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/ukraine-conflict-crossroads-europe-and-russia.
96
this issue, which is mainly a collective security issue in the divide between the west and
Russia, and the integration of Ukraine withing NATO. It is not surprising that criticisms
of the Security Council after the Ukraine conflict became more evident than ever.
The conflict in Ukraine saw irregular methods of warfare being used, what is
called the non-kinetic warfare which is a non-conventional and non-physical warfare
methods, more specifically, information warfare. Information warfare is defined as “the
employment of military capabilities in and through the information environment to
deliberately affect adversary human and system behaviour and to preserve friendly
freedom of action during cooperation, competition, and conflict.” 192
Information warfare was first coined by the American scientist Thomas P. Rona
in a study he did in 1976 about how people would use the electromagnetic spectrum in
the future. 193
the Security Council lacks the mechanisms to deal with evolving methods of
information warfare and information technology like disinformation and misinformation,
the Security Council during the Ukraine conflict turned into a mere forum of divided
geopolitical blocks instead of functioning like a multilateral organization and to find
consensus.
Moreover, the Russian annexation of Ukrainian territories in a country that is a
candidate for NATO membership is the biggest threat to the current world order that is
founded after the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. That is why the event of the Ukrainian
192 Karen Guttieri, ‘Accelerate Change: Or Lose the Information War’, Æther: A Journal of
Strategic Airpower & Spacepower 1, no. 1 (2022): 91–105.
193 Ibid.
97
conflict is very important to the global world order which is why a long list of nations
have been pouring humanitarian aid and military assistance amounting to hundreds of
billions to Ukraine. According to Kiel Institute For The World Economy, from January
24, 2022 through February 24, 2023, more than 150 billion dollars has been given as aid
to Ukraine, the aid is mostly military and security assistance but also financial and
humanitarian. With the United States being the largest contributor, other contributors are
the European Union Institutions, The United Kingdom, Germany, and Japan,
respectively. 194
Those variables of the conflict in Ukraine have direct implications for the practise
of the Security Council, primarily for the use of the veto which has repercussions and a
dead-lock to the Security Council. The ramifications of the conflict in Ukraine will likely
decide the upcoming world order and will change the multilateral and security
architecture of the world.
194 Ukraine Support Tracker - A Database of Military, Financial and Humanitarian Aid to
Ukraine’, accessed 8 June 2023, https://www.ifw-kiel.de/topics/war-against-ukraine/ukraine-support-
tracker/?cookieLevel=not-set.
98
Chapter 4: Reform of the Security Council, Inevitability or
Upcoming Irrelevance?
The issue of Security Council reform has garnered considerable reservations and
criticisms, a trend not of recent origin. However, it is noteworthy that calls for reform
have reached an unprecedented historical peak, driven by numerous and substantial
global changes, particularly in the twenty-first century.
Prominent ideas and proposals often center around the expansion of both
permanent and non-permanent membership to better align with demographic and
economic shifts worldwide. This adjustment aims to enhance the Council's
representation, particularly by accommodating more members from developing countries
and reflecting the changes in the global population.
A contentious point prompting calls for reform revolves around the veto power
held by permanent members, allowing them to impede resolutions. Proposals for veto
amendment suggest introducing specific requirements or restrictions, potentially
increasing the Security Council's effectiveness, and contributing to more comprehensive
and impactful resolutions.
Furthermore, there is a growing demand for the establishment of response
mechanisms to address emerging challenges such as cybersecurity, environmental issues,
and climate threats, all of which pose existential threats to life on Earth.
99
Numerous academic and international proposals outline various directions for
Security Council reform. However, it is likely that the final decision will rest with the
five permanent member states.
Increasing calls, less action?
While there are many proposals, calls and talks about the reform of the Security
Council, this chapter will take the most relevant ones into consideration for the purposes
of this thesis, it is natural that the proposals, calls and talks about the reform mainly
centres around making the Security Council more effective in maintaining international
peace and security. Like the characteristics of international relations, geopolitics and
national interests, the work of the Security Council is complex and fraught with
difficulties.
United States President Joseph R. Biden said that the US supports expanding the
number of permanent and non-permanent members on the UN Security Council (UNSC)
during his address to the UN General Assembly (UNGA) on September 21, 2022.
President Biden specifically referred to the inclusion of nations from the African
continent, Latin America, and the Caribbean, and to also include Germany, Brazil, India,
and Japan who are known as the G4, and to support their aspiration to become permanent
members. 195
Russia’s representatives supported the expansion of the Security Council to add
members from Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Whilst supporting permanent
195 C. G, ‘Biden and the United Nations Security Council Reform: True Commitment or
Tokenism? • Stimson Center’, Stimson Center (blog), 5 October 2022,
https://www.stimson.org/2022/biden-and-the-united-nations-security-council-reform-true-commitment-or-
tokenism/.
100
membership for India and Brazil, Russia’s statements during the plenary session of the
UN World Peace Forum called that if Germany and Japan were given permanent
membership, it will change the internal balance of the council 196, meaning that Germany
and Japan are aligned with the west and giving them permanent membership would harm
Russia interests and their allies.
China sees the United Nations as ‘a symbol of multilateralism’, the systemic
reform of the United Nations in the eyes of China has two components. China maintained
that "the Security Council reform must be multi-faceted, including both the enlargement
of its composition and the improvement of its working methods". 197 China supports the
United Nations and insists on improving its legitimacy as well as enhancing the
effectiveness of the Security Council.
The Indian Prime Minister, Narendra Modi in his speech at a meeting on the side
of the G7 Summit in Hiroshima on the 21st of May 2023, he asked why the United
Nations has not been able to achieve peace, in his own words. 198 The Indian leader
argued for a reform saying that the United Nations and Security Council will only be a
"talk shop" if they do not represent the realities of the real world "The United Nations
was established with the very purpose of establishing peace. Why does it often fail to
prevent conflicts today? Why, even the definition of terrorism has not been accepted in
the UN yet?".
196 Russia Comments on UN Security Council Expansion Prospects’, RT International, accessed 8
June 2023, https://www.rt.com/russia/558345-russia-members-un-security/.
197 Wencheng Wu, ‘China’s Position towards UN Security Council Reform: Balancing Legitimacy
and Efficiency’, Strategic Analysis 44, no. 5 (2 September 2020): 503.
198 PM Modi Asks Why UN Fails to Prevent Conflicts, Highlights Need for Reform’, The New
Indian Express, accessed 8 June 2023, https://www.newindianexpress.com/nation/2023/may/22/pm-modi-
asks-why-un-fails-to-prevent-conflicts-highlights-need-for-reform-2577443.html.
101
The Turkish prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has criticised the Security
Council in many occasions and proposed that the it needs reform because it is committed
to the will of its five permanent members, also saying that satisfy existing demands, the
United Nations should be more equitable, effective, transparent, and efficient. 199
The influence of the five permanent members has been the main visible feature of
the council. Nevertheless, there is ongoing changes in the distribution of powers on the
international level that is also can be noticed in the Council which leads for the calls of
reform to be even more legitimate.
Attempts at a reform consensus
One of the proposals for reform is the need for the enlargement of the Council, the
member states generally agree that the Security Council should be expanded, however,
there are many different concepts and models about 'how' it should be done.
Proponents for the expansion say that the Council needs to add other rising world
powers and geographic areas to its permanent seat membership. If it fails to do so, there
are fears the Council would lose its global authority and legitimacy. Rising powers like
Brazil, India, and the growing economies of Germany and Japan are candidates for the
permanent seats of the council, which combined, are named the Group of Four (G4) as
forementioned. Currently, there is not any permanent members from the global south,
which is a hindrance to both the effectiveness of the Security Council and the principle of
fair representation.
199 UN Security Council Must Be Reformed: Erdogan’, Middle East Monitor (blog), 25 October
2019, https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20191025-un-security-council-must-be-reformed-erdogan/.
102
In September 2007, Member States voted for what is known as the
Intergovernmental Negotiations on Security Council Reform in accordance with Decision
62/557 of 2008, which established the IGN's guidelines. 200 Intergovernmental
Negotiations on Security Council Reform meetings have mostly been about different
points of view on participation types, regional representation, and the size of the
expanded council.
The Group of Four (G4) is one of the most active inside the Intergovernmental
Negotiations. whilst seeking a permanent membership, it also supports the African
Group's push for two permanent seats for Africa. India and Brazil usually back their bid
by pointing out that they are candidates from the "global south." The G4 has been ready
to give up the veto right, saying that they could put it on hold until the veto right is
undergone a review. 201
It is a fact that the only continent without permanent representation at the Council
is Africa, that is why the African Union through their position stated in the Ezulwini
Consensus, and it requests two permanent seats with veto power and five non-permanent
seats for Africa. The most important part of their viewpoint is that the African Union
should decide which two states will have permanent seats to be allocated for Africa.
Some African states argue that these seats should change from country to country based
on what the African Union decides. At the moment, Nigeria, South Africa, and Egypt are
the countries that are most likely to be considered for the two permanent seats.
200 UN General Assembly (62nd Sess.: 2007-2008), ‘Question of Equitable Representation on and
Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Related Matters’, 2008,
https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/1312992.
201 Intergovernmental Negotiations (IGN)’, accessed 8 June 2023,
https://old.centerforunreform.org/?q=IGNreform.
103
In opposition to the expansion of the permanent seats of the council, Uniting for
Consensus (UfC), found in the 1990’s with the leadership of Italy, is seeking to challenge
the proposals for permanent seats put out by the G4 countries (Brazil, Germany, India,
and Japan) and calling for a consensus before a decision that is made on the structure and
size of the Security Council. Their argument is maintaining the number of permanent
seats, claiming that increasing the number of permanent seats would create a privilege for
the new permanent countries, one of the privileges is veto power, all of that against the
interest of the international community, as they put it. 202
Moreover, Uniting for Consensus advocates for increasing the non-permanent
seats of the council, for it to be more inclusive of all regions of the world, and more
representation for Africa and developing nations. In a press release on September 23,
2021, Italy as the leader of (UfC) is advocating for 26 members for the council, with 21
non-permanent members. Uniting for Consensus (UfC) currently consists of Argentina,
Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Italy, Malta, Mexico, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, San
Marino, Spain, and Turkey. 203
The Permanent Representative of Liechtenstein to the United Nations sent a letter
to the Secretary-General on December 4, 2015, which in their words seeks a more
effective Security Council action to prevent or end genocide, crimes against humanity
and war crimes. 204
202 Uniting for Consensus (UfC) – Rappresentanza Permanente d’Italia ONU – New York’,
accessed 8 June 2023, https://italyun.esteri.it/en/italy-and-the-united-nations/uniting-for-consensus-ufc/.
203 Ibid.
204 Code of Conduct Regarding Security Council Action against Genocide, Crimes against
Humanity or War Crimes’, Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, accessed 8 June 2023,
https://www.globalr2p.org/resources/code-of-conduct-regarding-security-council-action-against-genocide-
crimes-against-humanity-or-war-crimes/.
104
The Code of Conduct which tells all Security Council members, both the
permanent five and elected, that they should not vote against or veto any resolution to
that aims to stop genocide, crimes against humanity or stop atrocities, which is a hopeful
act yet it ignores that great powers would sometimes favour national interest over ethics.
The Code of Conduct was made by the Accountability, Coherence, and Transparency
Group (ACT Group) with the help of States, civil society, and the United Nations
Secretariat. In short, the Code of Conduct is seeking to ask the Council to put the
Responsibility to Protect principle into priority regarding the resolutions of the Council,
that to which raises so many questions on the applicability of the Code of Conduct on one
hand, and is too hopeful that it ignores the fact of realist politics on the other.
After the onset of the conflict in Ukraine, reform of the Security Council is now
the normal position and there is a clear consensus on it, particularly the expansion of the
council and even the veto reform, although the issue of the veto reform is more complex
and divisive.
on 17 November 2022, the General Assembly opened its annual debate on
Security Council reform, and the debate unsurprisingly concluded with member states
calling for more representation for developing nations and the elimination of the veto
power of permanent members. 205
205 Concluding Debate on Security Council Reform, Speakers in General Assembly Urge More
Representation for Developing Countries, Ending of Permanent Members’ Veto Power | UN Press’,
accessed 9 May 2023, https://press.un.org/en/2022/ga12473.doc.htm.
105
A Security Council for the Twenty-First Century
Other than the need for more representation and the long-talked issue of the veto,
some argue that increasing the number of permanent members does not necessarily
guarantee global security and solving major crises. the Security Council is said that it was
established under a neo-colonial superstructure after World War II, and it is clear from
this structure that the United Nations member States gave up their authority to the
Security Council, giving the permanent member States power and privilege. 206
That view claims that the economically and militarily smaller member states of
the United Nations have fallen under the principle of equal yet different kind of
responsibility, becoming subjugated to the more powerful States. As a result, smaller
nations are in a quasi-colonised state in the sense that are either unable to determine what
constitutes threats to peace and security on their own terms and conditions or their sincere
concerns are not fully taken into account by the more powerful states in determining what
needs to be done. That is the element of realist politics in that the permanent five would
not tolerate any serious disruption to the order put after chaos of World War 2, learning
from the dramatic end of the League of Nations. 207
It is said many times that the Security Council should be brought to the twenty-
first century, and rightly so. The Security Council should reflect the status of the global
distribution of powers, not only in terms of nations, but also in terms of regions. By doing
so, there will be more inclusivity of the authority of the determination of the threats to
206 Katak B. Malla, ‘Un Security Council Reform and Global Security’, in Asian Yearbook of
International Law, Volume 12 (2005-2006), ed. B.S. Chimni, Miyoshi Masahiro, and Thio Li-ann (Brill,
2007), 31.
207 Ibid.
106
international peace and security, which as a result, will broaden the range of issues
discussed by permanent members and will lead to enhanced global security, at least in
terms of discussions.
Nathalie Broadhurst Estival, the French representative emphasised that the
Council needs to be reformed to increase its legitimacy and representativeness while
keeping its administrative and decision-making functions. An expanded Council might
consist of up to 25 members while maintaining its executive and operational function.
He also stated that France backs a bigger representation for African nations as well as the
candidacy of Germany, Brazil, India, and Japan for permanent membership.
UN Secretary-General António Guterres’ remarks to the Security Council open
debate on multilateralism also reiterated the need for Security Council reform and the
consensus that this topic has:
‘’A majority of Member States now acknowledge that the Security Council
should be reformed to reflect today’s geopolitical realities. I hope regional groups and
Member States can work together to achieve greater consensus on the way forward and
the modalities of the reform. The United Nations and I personally stand ready to provide
the necessary support.’’ 208
There are calls for the ‘’innovation’’ in global governance, one proposal is to
establish multiple Security Councils, Vesselin Popovski suggests establishing three
Security Councils, the Peacebuilding Council, the Climate Security Council, and the
208 Effective, Inclusive Multilateralism Key to Address Current Interconnected Threats, Secretary-
General Tells Security Council, Highlighting New Agenda for Peace | UN Press’, accessed 8 June 2023,
https://press.un.org/en/2022/sgsm21632.doc.htm.
107
Health Security Council, with the Permanent five being present in all of them. The new
Councils would work with and help the current Security Council by taking over tasks
regarding the topics of peacebuilding, climate change, and pandemics, each for their
respective Security Council. Claiming that this would lighten the Security Council's
heavy workload and make it easier for it to focus on issues of international peace and
security and actions under Chapter VII. 209
There is relatively a common agreement that the nature of the threats to
international peace and security are evolving and taking new forms, whilst becoming
more complicated.
The proposal for multiple Security Councils is a new direction for global
governance. Vesselin Popovski mentions that the plan for multiple Security Councils
sends a strong message that, if the P5 continue to stop the Council’s reform, the General
Assembly will break the deadlock by creating new bodies and refocusing efforts in a
positive direction. And that is more and more becoming the case, since inside the General
Assembly it is easier to find consensus, since there is no veto power, notwithstanding the
fact that numerable General Assembly decisions are mostly paying lip service and
recommendation without it being binding. 210
Kishore Mahbubani says that the veto may seem unfair and undemocratic, but it is
necessary to maintain the support of powerful nations for the United Nations. The veto is
a critical tool that the United States would hate to lose, which is maybe the only reason it
209 Vesselin Popovski, ‘Towards Multiple Security Councils’ (Stimson Center, 2020), 5.
210 Ibid., 6.
108
has stayed in the United Nations, 211 it might very well be the case for other permanent
members.
Mahbubani makes the argument that the United Kingdom and France who are no
longer considered to be among the great powers hold the permanent seat whilst excluding
a modern-day great power that is India. Saying that the United Kingdom and France are
aware of this fact and that is why they have not invoked their vetoes since 1989. 212
He also suggests what he calls the 7-7-7 model, which would take into account
the needs of all 193 UN members, according to Mahbubani. In short, there would be
seven permanent members of the UNSC. They would be the European Union, Brazil,
China, India, Russia, the United States, and either Nigeria or South Africa. To meet the
needs of middle powers like Argentina, Pakistan, and South Africa (or Nigeria), a group
of seven out of 28 semi-permanent members would serve once every four terms. The size
of the population and the GDP would be used to choose the semi-permanent members.
So, they would stand for the world's middle powers. Instead of running for seats, they
would not have to do anything to get back. The last seven seats would be temporary and
would be given to the smaller states. 213
It seems rather unfeasible that the European Union would be granted the
permanent seat of the council. First, the European Union is a regional organization and
not one of the 193 member states of the United Nations, and second, the European Union
211 Kishore Mahbubani, ‘Resolving the Dilemma of UNSC Reform’, Survival 63, no. 2 (4 March
2021), 57.
212 Ibid.
213 Ibid., 58.
109
already has internal disputes between its member states and the event of Britain voting to
leave at a referendum in 2016 and completing the procedure in 2020 is an example.
One of the biggest obstacles to the reform of the Council is that it requires making
amendments to the UN Charter which needs a vote in favour of it by two-thirds of UN
member states as well as ratification by all the five permanent members, in accordance of
the 108 of the United Nations Charter. 214
The United States, Russia and China would not give up their veto power, for them
it is crucial for the balance of power to remain. On the other hand, France and the United
Kingdom had called for regulation of the veto. Despite that, it is likely that the veto
power for the permanent members will remain, and the aspiring candidates for the
permanent seat, especially the Group of Four will also likely demand veto powers.
The General Assembly passed a resolution (A/77/L.52) which attempts to hold the
Five Permanent Members of the Security Council accountable for the use of the veto, the
resolution came after the many criticisms of the Council for its failings to deal with the
Russian-Ukrainian crisis. The resolution was introduced by Lichtenstein, and other 83
Member States including France, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The
Russian Federation and China are the other two permanent members of the Council. 215
214 United Nations, "Charter of the United Nations," October 24, 1945.
215 Albania et al., ‘Standing Mandate for a General Assembly Debate When a Veto Is Cast in the
Security Council :: Draft Resolution /: Albania, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Costa Rica,
Croatia, Czechia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Estonia,
Fiji, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Guatemala, Iceland, Ireland, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Latvia,
Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Mexico, Montenegro, Myanmar,
Netherlands, New Zealand, North Macedonia, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea,
Republic of Moldova, Romania, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Timor-Leste,
Turkey, Ukraine, United States of America and Vanuatu’, 20 April 2022,
https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3969448.
110
The resolution decided that if the General Assembly does not call for an
emergency special session to be held on the situation in which the veto was used. the
President of the General Assembly shall call a formal meeting of the General Assembly
to hold a debate on the situation within 10 working days of the casting of the veto by one
or more permanent members of the Security Council. 216
It can be said that the adoption of the resolution is an attempt of the General
Assembly to regulate the use of the veto by the Security Council and to increase the
discourse in the draft resolution that was vetoed, but it does not modify or eliminate the
veto as that requires an amendment to the United Nations Charter as forementioned.
The case of vetoing resolutions by the Permanent Five Members is not the only
barrier that curtails the Council from being effective. Geopolitical clashes, defensive
alliances, and ideological differences and national interests are important aspects that
needs new initiatives to reach consensus and fulfil what the United Nations was created
to be, that is a multilateral organization.
There are new forms of threats to international peace and security like food
security, climate change, cybersecurity, and space technologies that calls for new
processes to address and tackle those issues that are becoming ever more critical and
serious, those types of threats are also subject to geopolitical, regional and alliances
clashes but are relatively easier to find consensus on and are gaining more attention,
especially inside the General Assembly that also needs the authority of the Council to
intervene into those issues in order to issue a binding resolution.
216 Ibid.
111
Conclusion:
The Security Council is the most legitimate international organization and entity
in terms of its authority and the ability of issuing a binding resolution to any nation state,
acquiring the legitimacy from all nations, emanating from authorities given from the
United Nations Charter, especially Chapter VI and VII.
Despite that, the United Nations Charter is based on the respect of the sovereignty
and equality of member states, that is one of the reasons why the Security Council is
minimally interventionist, notwithstanding the fact that it is the only international
organization that can issue the use of force against threats to international peace and
security.
Since the establishment of the Security Council, there has been many new
mechanisms and developments in the theory and practise of the Council, such as the use
of targeted sanctions ‘’smart sanctions’’ as well as the innovations in the Peacekeeping
Operations, and using the Responsibility to Protect principle in the drafting of the
resolutions, with the calls and proposals for innovation in global governance, to the
efforts in dealing with issues of non-proliferation and disarmament.
It is clear that the Security Council is experiencing the possibility of becoming
less effective and relevant, as it does not reflect the current twenty first century
distribution of powers in international relations, that lead the way for regional
organizations and intergovernmental organizations such as NATO, BRICS and Shanghai
Cooperation Organization (SCO) to become more relevant which are pausing a challenge
112
to the United Nations system of global governance, despite the efforts aimed at
strengthening cooperation and multilateralism.
Due to the fact that the United Nations is the main system of multilateralism and
the Security Council is at the centre as the keeper of international peace and security, the
expectations of the Security Council are very high. It is evident that there have been
many disappointments with the practise of the Council and catastrophes that the Council
simply failed to deal with, let alone resolve.
The principle of collective security did not succeed not only in the League of
Nations but also in the early times of the establishment of the Security Council when the
Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union triumphed over the aspiration
for consensus of the superpowers withing the Security Council. The realism of
international relations and the national interest of states, especially that of the interest of
superpowers, are above the interest of the wider international community.
Whilst the collective security principle did not succeed, there are many calls for
innovation in the methods, mechanism and approach of global governance. That if
collective security was achieved, it will make collective defence alliances such as the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the Collective Security Treaty
Organization (CSTO) less needed and it will make the promise of the Security Council in
dealing with threats to international peace and security more effective, currently, the task
is very difficult.
Despite all the shortcomings and disappointments of the United Nations in
general and the Security Council in particular, the system of the United Nations is still
113
critical for avoiding or at least minimizing catastrophises. The mere fact that the United
Nations encompasses 193 member states makes it a forum for discussions that is
indispensable for international relations, to encourage collective action, consensus on
issues, and cooperation between states which makes it possible to find solution to the
problems that are facing the world.
The Security Council initial establishment as the keeper of international peace and
security by having the balance of power of the five permanent members, who are the
victors of World War 2, and since there has been many developments and changes in the
distribution of power in the world, the Security Council needs to be enlarged to include
the new rising powers from all regions of the world and the main candidates for the
permanent seats are as India, Germany, Japan, Brazil, and South Africa. In that case, the
Council will likely be more effective and legitimate.
Moreover, the veto is unlikely to be abolished, since that would curb the authority
of a permanent member state if the Council passes a resolution that affects their critical
interest, especially that of the three biggest superpowers in the world, the United States,
Russia, and China. It is not surprising that they are the loudest in their disapproval of any
proposal for abolishing the veto.
The Security Council is facing a critical challenge after the conflict in Ukraine,
that caused major discontent towards the Security Council. in recent times, the Council
failed to prevent war in three consecutive instances, first, with Iraq, second with Syria,
and third with Ukraine. It is an indicator that the international order needs reshaping with
major considerations to the system of multilateralism, and to how to think about security.
114
The Council needs to be more representative of the global distribution of power
as well as deal with the geopolitical dynamics by finding new mechanisms for the
purposes of reaching consensus amongst nations, especially the great powers, as the
United Nations Charter intended in order to be more legitimate, assertive, and effective.
The answer to the question of whether the Security Council is effective or
ineffective might be that the Security Council is indispensable. Risking irrelevance will
mean that the current international order is bound for major restructuring, which will
have immense ramifications.
The potential way forward for the Security Council:
1. Security Council status: The drafters of the UN Charter wanted the
Security Council to have the last word on issues related to international peace and
security. The purpose of the Security Council status containing the five victorious
countries in the Second World War is to find consensus among the five countries in order
to prevent wars and conflicts in the world, especially to prevent a third world war.
2. The theory behind the Security Council: There is still controversy and
debate on whether the establishment of the Security Council is to build and create
collective security among the countries of the world, especially the permanent members
of the Security Council. But the national interest and conflict among the major Powers
made the application of this theory almost impossible and even "collective efforts" as
stated in the Charter of the United Nations, was and is difficult to implement.
3. The issue of the veto: The veto is also a highly controversial issue, even
during the time of the drafting of the Charter and up to this day, where the drafters of the
115
Charter wanted to avoid the failure of the League of Nations, that is, they wanted to avoid
the withdrawal of one of the major Powers as Japan withdrew after Germany. Therefore,
the veto will not be cancelled and will still exist whether new permanent members are
added or not.
4. Adding new permanent members: Many agree that there are enormous
changes in the world today, these changes relate to the structure, architecture, and
security of the world system as a whole. That is, the structure of the world currently
differs from that of the world at the founding of the United Nations. Therefore, adding
new permanent members is likely, and new permanent members are also likely to be
added soon, or the importance of the Security Council will decline.
5. New threats to international peace and security: There are new threats to
international peace and security such as climate security, cybersecurity and space
security. Therefore, there must be new procedures and mechanisms to deal with such
serious issues by the Security Council, and these mechanisms are often identified through
international agreements and conferences.
116
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