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National Constitutions as a Source of State Fragility

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Abstract

Recognizing and accommodating diverse ethnic, religious, and language identities has become the new feature of twenty-first-century politics. In many parts of the world, people are mobilizing around old grievances involving ethnic, religious, or cultural identities and demanding acknowledgment and recognition by a wider society. They are protesting discrimination, marginalization from social and economic opportunities, and demanding social justice. Political scholars and leaders have long argued against explicit recognition of cultural identities because they pose threats to social harmony. Effective constitutions have two basic elements: A system of government with a set of institutions to make and implement laws and policies and people’s shared acceptance that the constitution is authoritative. Authoritarian constitutions are window dressing that provide lip service to the rule of law and other fundamental freedoms without the intention to enforce them.

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