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The Capone hypothesis: Do antagonistic individuals view themselves as more good than evil?
... Although this understanding is likely complex, psychologists have long speculated that antagonistic individuals may struggle to change because they lack insight into their moral deficiencies (Miller et al., 2018;Sleep et al., 2019;Tyrer, 2009); however, some available data seemingly fails to support (or contradicts) this speculation. For example, people higher versus lower in antagonistic personality constructs rate themselves lower on moral traits and higher on immoral traits, and rate prototypical features of their personalities (e.g., being manipulative) as, generally, undesirable (Hart & Tortoriello, 2019;Hart et al., 2024;Miller et al., 2018;Sleep et al., 2019Sleep et al., , 2022. As such, it has been suggested that this longstanding speculation could be somewhat inaccurate: That is, antagonistic people may be aware of their moral shortcomings and find these shortcomings problematic, which bodes well for personality change (Miller et al., 2018;Sleep et al., 2019Sleep et al., , 2022. ...
... If this normative judgment bias extends to antagonistic people's perspective on their moral character, a different impression of how such individuals regard their character emerges: More versus less antagonistic people may rate themselves lower on moral characteristics (Hart & Tortoriello, 2019;Miller et al., 2018;Sleep et al., 2019), but highly antagonistic people may still believe they compare favorably to average others on these characteristics; that is, they still think they are, relatively speaking, morally proficient people (Alicke & Govorun, 2005). Indeed, although more versus less antagonistic people may be somewhat less motivated to claim moral characteristics to self-enhance, they still find these characteristics desirable (Miller et al., 2018) and pursue this path to self-enhancement (Baumeister, 2012;Campbell et al., 2002;Cease et al., 2024;Scully & Marolla, 1984;S. G. Taylor et al., 2021). ...
... The sample was a nonclinical/nonforensic convenience sample; such normative samples have been frequently used in the prior work upon which we seek to build (e.g., Hart & Tortoriello, 2019;Miller et al., 2018;Sleep et al., 2019Sleep et al., , 2022. Although most people in these samples tend to be absolutely low in antagonistic personality features, some people in these samples do report at least some "possession" of antagonistic personality features (i.e., report scores that suggest overall agreement with items indicative of having an antagonistic personality feature; Hart et al., 2024). To reach encompassing conclusions about antagonistic personality, participants completed well-validated indicators of each D4 construct. ...
Although clinical psychologists have long speculated that antagonistic individuals may lack insight into their moral deficits, some evidence has shown that more (vs. less) antagonistic people view moral traits as somewhat desirable and rate themselves as lower on moral characteristics (suggestive of some insight). But, we suggest that antagonistic people’s struggles with insight can be detected as part of a basic social–cognitive bias that entails believing the self is better-than-average on socially desirable characteristics (i.e., the “better-than-average effect” [BTAE]). Specifically, although antagonistic people may rate themselves lower on moral characteristics than less antagonistic people, they may still believe that their relative standing on moral characteristics compares favorably to others. Participants (N = 515) completed indicators of the Dark Tetrad (D4) constructs (narcissism, Machiavellianism, psychopathy, and sadism) and rated themselves in relation to others on moral and immoral character traits. Overall, participants exhibited very large BTAEs (i.e., rated the self as “better-than-average” on moral character traits); only psychopathy and sadism consistently related negatively to BTAEs, but people with elevations in each D4 construct (or any D4 facet) still exhibited large-to-very-large BTAEs. Such antagonistic participants viewed themselves as possessing substantially greater amounts of moral than immoral character traits but viewed average others as possessing an equal mix of these traits.
... Given such findings, there is a growing recognition that D4 traits are an admixture of moral and immoral character features (Hart et al., 2024). Moral character can be defined as characteristics that give rise to a disposition towards engaging in prosocial behaviors (e.g., helping individuals or groups; Jiao et al., 2021;Kaufman et al., 2019). ...
... Broadly speaking, moral character is thought of as an amalgamation of a number of positive (e.g., authentic, compassionate, empathetic) and negative character traits (e.g., inauthentic, cruel, unsympathetic), which are likely separate dimensions (Jiao et al., 2021;Kaufman et al., 2019;Krueger et al., 2001) of prosocial (moral) or antisocial (immoral) personality traits (Bartels & Pizarro, 2011;Helzer et al., 2014;Jayawickreme et al., 2014;Melnikoff & Bailey, 2018). It cannot be assumed that when moral character traits are present, a disposition towards immoral character is absent (or vice versa) (Hart et al., 2024;Jiao et al., 2021;Kaufman et al., 2019;Krueger et al., 2001). Moral and immoral character are distinct from endorsing or rejecting moral values, as endorsement of morality has a complex relationship to the behavior that ultimately defines moral and immoral character (e.g., see Schlenker, 2008). ...
... SD = 1.00; 78.6% White; 79.0% female). Data from this sample has been previously published (Hart et al., 2024), but the purpose and analyses presented in the current study are novel. ...
Despite clinical theory suggesting that individuals are largely unaware of personality-related problems (Gallrein et al., 2013; Oltmanns & Powers, 2012); work in this area shows that individuals possess insight into their pathological traits and the impairment they may cause. Individuals generally dislike pathological traits and desire change in the direction of greater adaptivity (Lamkin et al., 2018; Miller et al., 2018). Individuals may also be able to make small, intentional changes in some personality domains (e.g., neuroticism; Hudson & Fraley, 2015; Hudson & Roberts, 2014) but not others (no positive change in conscientiousness or agreeableness). It remains unclear why many individuals exhibit relatively little change in their pathological traits (e.g., antagonism), given their awareness of the problems these traits cause and their desire for change. The goal of the present study was to explore the relation between personality disorder (PD) traits and desire for change, perceived impairment and benefits, and barriers to change among an online sample (N = 497). Findings suggest that most individuals were uninterested in changing their trait levels; however, individuals with elevated PD traits were more interested in change than those with lower levels. Pathological traits were generally perceived as impairing rather than beneficial; however, mean level analyses revealed similar levels of perceived impairment and benefits for those relatively high on antagonism. Individuals reported that personality change was stymied in part because it was too hard, they were unmotivated to make the changes, or they did not know how to go about making such changes. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).
The present study describes the development and validation of the good and evil character traits (GECT) scale. A set of 3,614 good and evil moral character descriptors (i.e., moral and immoral character traits) was selected from a dictionary of contemporary Chinese language and daily life expressions and ultimately condensed into 55 items. Then, exploratory factor analysis (EFA) and parallel analysis (PA) were conducted to explore the structure and final items of the GECT with sample 1 (n = 350), resulting in 21 good items and 32 evil items. After that, in confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) with sample 2 (n = 350), the resulting factor structure was confirmed for the 53‐item scale (Study 1). Additionally, evidence of validity based on correlations with Honesty‐Humility and Dirty Dozen was demonstrated (Study 2). The implications of our findings for the assessment of good and evil characters and further theoretical exploration are discussed.
Although many processes might contribute to the self-perpetuating nature of antagonistic personality, we proposed and tested the “antagonism-confirmation” perspective on this phenomenon. This perspective states that antagonistic personality is based in tendencies to confirm (vs. disconfirm) the self’s beliefs about its personality. Importantly, this explanation uniquely predicts that antagonism-related personality constructs should relate to strategically adopting behaviors that vary on only their signification of higher or lower antagonism levels (and nothing more). In apparent privacy, nonclinical participants completed a color-gazing task, wherein antagonistic people ostensibly see colors become more (more-intense condition) or less intense (less-intense condition) while gazing at them. Consistent with the antagonism-confirmation perspective, antagonism-related personality constructs related to perceiving colors as turning more intense in the more-intense (vs. less-intense) condition. These effects could not be attributed to demand and occurred among a subsample of participants that indicated providing completely authentic responses. Furthermore, participants higher in antagonism-related personality constructs reported a greater likelihood of possessing antagonistic characteristics and that these characteristics were more beneficial; mediation evidence suggested that these reports were influenced by their confirmatory responding on the color-gazing task. Antagonism-confirmation tendencies might partly account for why antagonistic personality persists; broadly, the findings highlight the critical nature of identity management as a feature of antagonistic personality.
For over 45 years, research investigating Machiavellianism has largely used the same unidimensional approach, even though empirical research demonstrates that Machiavellianism is comprised of two robust dimensions: views and tactics. This paper elaborates on the theory and conceptualisation behind the two dimensions. It also documents the construction and validation of the 12-item Two-Dimensional Machiavellianism Scale (TDMS), which measures the cynical and untrusting views dimension, and the immoral interpersonal tactics dimension, across six samples (N = 3886, 37.70% men) using confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) and item response theory. The two-factor structure fitted the data well based on CFA, and was invariant across samples, gender, and over a three-month period (N = 338, 59.98% men). Evidence of each subscale’s construct validity was established using structural equation modelling. As expected, the Views subscale was primarily associated with misanthropy, hypersensitive narcissism, lower subjective well-being, and lower emotional stability. The Tactics subscale was primarily associated with psychopathy, lower conscientiousness, lower willingness to reciprocate, and “ends justified the means” behaviour in ethical dilemmas. The TDMS enhances practical and conceptual understanding of Machiavellianism through demarcating the underlying motivations and addresses the need for an updated and psychometrically sound measure of Machiavellianism.
Recent evidence suggests that people’s personality disorder (PD) trait levels relate positively to attitudes toward that PD trait, but amid this evidence has arisen an incongruity. In separate studies, people’s PD
trait levels relate positively to rating that PD trait as beneficial and impairing, so explanations for the positive relation between PD trait levels and PD trait attitudes are needed. We tested 2 explanations using a sample including adults (N = 457) who self-reported PD trait levels as well as PD trait benefit, impairment, and attitudes. The maximization hypothesis, which argues that higher PD trait levels
correspond more strongly to trait-corresponding benefit than impairment, received some support. The weighting hypothesis, which argues that people disproportionately weigh PD trait benefits over impairments upon generating attitudes of a PD trait, received general support. Mediation analyses indicated that for each PD trait domain, the indirect effect of PD trait levels on trait-corresponding attitudes was stronger via trait-corresponding benefit compared with impairment. We also obtained evidence that relations between PD trait levels and trait-corresponding attitudes or benefit ratings, but not impairment ratings, were enhanced as perceived control over that trait’s expressions increased. Findings help illuminate some of the mystery surrounding PD trait evaluation.
While there is a growing literature on “dark traits” (i.e., socially aversive traits), there has been a lack of integration with the burgeoning research literature on positive traits and fulfilling and growth-oriented outcomes in life. To help move the field toward greater integration, we contrasted the nomological network of the Dark Triad (a well-studied cluster of socially aversive traits) with the nomological network of the Light Triad, measured by the 12-item Light Triad Scale (LTS). The LTS is a first draft measure of a loving and beneficent orientation toward others (“everyday saints”) that consists of three facets: Kantianism (treating people as ends unto themselves), Humanism (valuing the dignity and worth of each individual), and Faith in Humanity (believing in the fundamental goodness of humans). Across four demographically diverse samples (N = 1,518), the LTS demonstrated excellent reliability and validity, predicting life satisfaction and a wide range of growth-oriented and self-transcendent outcomes above and beyond existing measures of personality. In contrast, the Dark Triad was negatively associated with life satisfaction and growth-oriented outcomes, and showed stronger linkages to selfish, exploitative, aggressive, and socially aversive outcomes. This exploratory study of the contrasting nomological networks of the Light vs. Dark Triad provides several ways forward for more principled and data driven approaches to explore both the malevolent and beneficent sides of human nature.
Mixed findings exist as to whether personality pathology involves a critical lack of awareness and insight. Research questions about insight and awareness in personality pathology are typically assessed via comparing self- and informant reports of traits. However, recent studies have measured insight by asking individuals to evaluate additional questions about impairment and desire to change. The present study uses a variety of approaches to examine these issues, including investigations of convergence between self- and informant reports ( N = 197 dyads; correlations and comparisons of means) of personality psychopathology, desired trait levels, and perceptions of impairment. Convergence was observed between levels of self- and informant-reported traits, desired traits, and impairment. However, individuals rated themselves higher on pathological trait levels and impairment than did their informants. Furthermore, individuals with relatively higher pathological traits desired higher levels of these traits (but lower than their actual scores) than individuals with lower scores; on the actual measurement scale, however, these higher scorers rated their desired level below the neutral point. Overall, individuals with pathological personality traits possess a reasonable degree of insight into their actual trait levels and associated impairment.
Historical conceptualizations have framed personality disorders (PDs) as unchanging and ego-syntonic. However, recent evidence suggests that individuals with PD traits may have some insight into their personality and consider those traits to be somewhat ego-dystonic. To replicate and extend previous findings, participants (N = 328) self-reported their PD trait levels, likability of those traits, impairment, capability for change, and desired trait levels. The results demonstrated that individuals with PD traits tolerate but still dislike those traits, believe that they cause them problems, and are interested in reducing them. Level of PD trait did not relate to perception of capability for change. Likability and impairment moderated most of the relations between actual PD trait and desired level. That is, there was a stronger correlation between actual and desired levels among individuals who liked the trait more; there was also greater agreement between actual and desired levels among individuals who found the traits less impairing. For 2 of the traits—Negative Affectivity and Detachment—individuals who felt more capable of changing these traits demonstrated greater agreement between their actual and desired levels. These data suggest that individuals with PD traits do not generally see them as particularly likable and see them as impairing; such impressions may have important implications for where individuals ultimately prefer to reside on these PD trait domains.
The term dark personalities refers to a set of socially aversive traits in the subclinical range. Not extreme enough to invite clinical or forensic attention, they can get along (even flourish) in everyday work settings, scholastic settings, and the broader community. Along with my research group, I have studied a constellation of these personalities—Machiavellianism, narcissism, psychopathy, and everyday sadism—under the label “Dark Tetrad.” We have argued that, because of their overlap, these four traits should be studied in concert. Recently developed inventories now facilitate identification of the unique contributions of each trait. The present review highlights key advances and controversies emerging from work on these malevolent, yet fascinating, characters.
That people evaluate themselves more favourably than their average peer on desirable characteristics - the better-than-average effect (BTAE) - is one of the most frequently cited instances of motivated self-enhancement. It has been argued, however, that the BTAE can be rational when the distribution of characteristics is skewed such that most people lie above the mean. We addressed whether the BTAE is present even among people liable to be objectively below average on such characteristics. Prisoners compared their standing on pro-social characteristics - such as kindness, morality, law abidingness - with non-prisoners. Prisoners exhibited the BTAE on every characteristic except law abidingness, for which they viewed themselves as average. Given that prisoners are unlikely to be objectively above average on pro-social characteristics, the findings push for a motivational interpretation of the BTAE.
Past research on socially aversive personalities has focused on subclinical psychopathy, subclinical narcissism, and Machiavellianism-the "Dark Triad" of personality. In the research reported here, we evaluated whether an everyday form of sadism should be added to that list. Acts of apparent cruelty were captured using two laboratory procedures, and we showed that such behavior could be predicted with two measures of sadistic personality. Study 1 featured a bug-killing paradigm. As expected, sadists volunteered to kill bugs at greater rates than did nonsadists. Study 2 examined willingness to harm an innocent victim. When aggression was easy, sadism and Dark Triad measures predicted unprovoked aggression. However, only sadists were willing to work for the opportunity to hurt an innocent person. In both studies, sadism emerged as an independent predictor of behavior reflecting an appetite for cruelty. Together, these findings support the construct validity of everyday sadism and its incorporation into a new "Dark Tetrad" of personality.
The most widely used measure of trait narcissism is the Narcissistic Personality Inventory (NPI), which can provide both total and subscale scores. However, with a length of 40 items, this measure may not be ideal in settings in which time or participant attention may limit the types of measures that can be administered. In response, Ames, Rose, and Anderson (2006) created the NPI-16, which provides a shorter, unidimensional measure of the construct. In the present research, we examine the reliability and validity of the NPI-16 in conjunction with a new short measure of narcissism, the NPI-13, which provides both a total score and 3 subscale scores (Leadership/Authority; Grandiose Exhibitionism; Entitlement/Exploitativeness). Across 2 studies, we demonstrate that both short measures manifest good convergent and discriminant validity and adequate overall reliability. The NPI-13 may be favored over the NPI-16 because it allows for the extraction of 3 subscales, consistent with the use of its parent measure. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2013 APA, all rights reserved).
Ten years ago Paulhus and Williams (2002) called attention to the ‘Dark Triad’, a constellation of three conceptually distinct but empirically overlapping personality variables. The three members – Machiavellianism, narcissism and subclinical psychopathy – often show differential correlates but share a common core of callous-manipulation. There are now dozens of studies on the triad and, according to Google Scholar, over 350 citations. The goal of this review is to update and critically evaluate this rapidly expanding literature. The standard measures of each Dark Triad member are reviewed along with newer combination measures. The Dark Triad members are located in mainstream structural models, namely, the interpersonal circumplex as well as Five- and Six-Factor Models. Key issues and controversies are addressed.
Special issue: Methodological developments in personality research. Examines the usefulness of factor analysis (FA) in developing and evaluating personality scales that measure limited domain constructs. The approach advocated follows from the assumptions that a scale ought to measure a single construct, that FA ought to be applied routinely to new personality scales, and that the factors of a scale are important if they are differentially related to other measures. A detailed study of the Self-Monitoring Scale illustrates how FA can help determine what a scale measures. A 2nd example uses the self-esteem literature to illustrate how FA can clarify the proliferation of scales within a single content domain. Confirmatory techniques are also introduced as a means for testing specific hypotheses.
This research examined the role of mechanisms of moral disengagement in the exercise of moral agency. Regulatory self-sanctions can be selectively disengaged from detrimental conduct by converting harmful acts to moral ones through linkage to worthy purposes, obscuring personal causal agency by diffusion and displacement of responsibility, misrepresenting or disregarding the injurious effects inflicted on others, and vilifying the recipients of maltreatment by blaming and dehumanizing them. The study examined the structure and impact of moral disengagement on detrimental conduct and the psychological processes through which it exerts its effects. Path analyses reveal that moral disengagement fosters detrimental conduct by reducing prosocialness and anticipatory self-censure and by promoting cognitive and affective reactions conducive to aggression. The structure of the paths of influence is very similar for interpersonal aggression and delinquent conduct. Although the various mechanisms of moral disengagement operate in concert, moral reconstruals of harmful conduct by linking it to worthy purposes and vilification of victims seem to contribute most heavily to engagement in detrimental activities. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
G*Power is a free power analysis program for a variety of statistical tests. We present extensions and improvements of the version introduced by Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, and Buchner (2007) in the domain of correlation and regression analyses. In the new version, we have added procedures to analyze the power of tests based on (1) single-sample tetrachoric correlations, (2) comparisons of dependent correlations, (3) bivariate linear regression, (4) multiple linear regression based on the random predictor model, (5) logistic regression, and (6) Poisson regression. We describe these new features and provide a brief introduction to their scope and handling.
Introduction:
Sadistic pleasure presumably incorporates processes that support an authentic enjoyment of others' pain. However, antagonism confirmation theory, grounded in social-psychological theorizing on identity maintenance and the notion of ego-syntonicity, suggests that individuals higher in sadism report greater pleasure in response to others' pain because such reports are immoral responses that confirm their self-views. This alternative conception has yet to be tested.
Method:
In two preregistered experiments (total N = 968), participants completed measures of sadism, read about situations involving others' pain, and rated their pleasure. We manipulated the extent to which pleasure from others' pain could be used to signal morality or antagonism.
Results:
We found that relatively sadistic people indicated greater pleasure across the studies but, like relatively non-sadistic people, they altered their pleasure ratings to signal greater morality or less antagonism.
Conclusions:
The findings fail to support antagonism confirmation theory, but they support recent perspectives on sadism which suggest that sadistic people may occasionally care about seeming moral (or not seeming antagonistic) and that sadism may be somewhat ego-dystonic in this respect.
The present study tested an ego-syntonic assumption of personality disorders (PDs) by addressing whether people with higher PD traits ascribe higher functionality to various behavior categories (or “expressions”) of PD traits. Participants (N = 241) completed indices of five PD traits, indicators of PD-trait-expression functionality including perceived frequency of strategic expression and beliefs that expressions are beneficial, are normative, and can be easily executed, and an index of anticipated self-recrimination. Participants with high levels of PD traits reported enhanced functionality to expressions of their PD trait but still indicated that these expressions were dysfunctional and likely to evoke self-recrimination. Findings extend understanding of how people with maladaptive traits perceive these traits and contribute to the issue of ego-syntonicity of PDs.
Although previous research suggests that people with high levels of Dark Triad (DT) traits (grandiose narcissism, Machiavellianism, psychopathy) are typically responsible for a disproportionate amount of harm, we propose that such individuals are more likely to help others self-present desired images (i.e., engage in beneficial-impression management ; BIM). In Study 1, participants completed indices of the DT and vulnerable narcissism, and they self-reported their likelihood of using various BIM tactics. DT traits and vulnerable narcissism related to enhanced anticipated use of BIM tactics for both friends and enemies. In Study 2, participants had the opportunity to exaggerate a friend's qualifications on a mock job application under conditions of either high or low self-gain. Each dark trait related to exaggerated ratings of the friend's qualifications, and these effects were particularly pronounced under high self-gain. Findings provided insight on how DT traits and vulnerable narcissism relate to a form of social benevolence but also highlight that such benevolence seems, in part, selfish.
In two college-student samples from Australia (N = 305) and Alabama (N = 207), we examined how the Dark Triad traits (i.e., narcissism, psychopathy, and Machiavellianism) were correlated with individual differences in gender roles and whether gender roles can account for sex differences in the Dark Triad traits. In Study 1, the Dark Triad traits were associated with less femininity and more masculinity and sex differences in the traits were mediated by femininity only. In Study 2, psychopathy and Machiavellianism were associated with less femininity and narcissism and psychopathy were associated with more masculinity and we replicated the mediation for psychopathy and Machiavellianism. We discuss how the gender roles may be part of the coordinated systems of adaptations that comprise the Dark Triad traits.
Aggression is often construed as a unitary trait fully captured by the Buss-Perry Aggression Questionnaire (BPAQ). Our review of the literature questions that assumption in several respects. Instead of a top-down approach, we argue for a bottom-up conception based on the Dark Tetrad of personality, that is, narcissism, Machiavellianism, psychopathy, and sadism. We highlight research showing that each member of the tetrad responds to different provocations. We conclude that the unitary trait conception of aggression has yielded more confusion than understanding. The term aggression should be reserved for outcomes, with many possible trait x situation predictors. Future research should continue the investigation of moderators as well as cognitive mediators to clarify the triggering of aggression in the individual tetrad members.
The term dark triad refers to the constellation of narcissism, Machiavellianism, and psychopathy. Over the past few years, the concept has gained momentum, with many researchers assuming that the dark triad is a prominent antecedent of transgressive and norm-violating behavior. Our purpose in this meta-analytic review was to evaluate (a) interrelations among narcissism, Machiavellianism, and psychopathy; (b) gender differences in these traits; (c) how these traits are linked to normal personality factors; and (d) the psychosocial correlates of the dark triad. Our findings show that dark triad traits are substantially intercorrelated, somewhat more prevalent among men than women, predominantly related to the Big Five personality factor of agreeableness and the HEXACO factor of honesty-humility, and generally associated with various types of negative psychosocial outcomes. We question whether dark triad traits are sufficiently distinct and argue that the way they are currently measured is too simple to capture the malevolent sides of personality. Because most research in this domain is cross-sectional and based on self-reports, we recommend using a cross-informant approach and prospective, longitudinal research designs for studying the predictive value of dark triad features.
The study addressed individual differences on two types of prosocial behavior on the Internet: Help-giving/sharing and moral courage. A questionnaire to measure these behaviors was developed. We investigated the effects of the Big Five personality traits, sadistic traits, and values on help-giving and moral courage. We found that the willingness to help on the Internet was promoted by open personality, and the relationship was partly moderated by high weekly use of social media. The willingness to act morally courageous was promoted by open personality, inclination toward sadism, and self-transcendence values. Surprisingly, the relationship between moral courage and sadistic traits was not moderated by the time spent online. Willingness to donate to a charity was fostered by benevolence and universalism values. Future studies will need to replicate the results with behavioral observations.
The association between narcissism and aggression has been empirically supported in adults and adolescents, but it is unclear whether narcissism might also be related to prosocial behavior. The present study investigated this issue using self- and peer-informants. Participants were 183 adolescents ages 16–19 (159 males, 24 females; 64.5% Caucasian). Of these participants, 126 (104 males, 22 females) also had peer-reported data available. Self-reported pathological narcissism was positively correlated with self-reports of both prosocial behavior and aggression, but it was not associated with peer nominations of either type of behavior. These findings indicate that adolescents with high levels of narcissism may attempt to bolster their social status by reporting engagement in both prosocial behavior and aggression. However, it appears that such individuals are ineffective at being perceived as prosocial by peers.
Sample correlations converge to the population value with increasing sample size, but the estimates are often inaccurate in small samples. In this report we use Monte-Carlo simulations to determine the critical sample size from which on the magnitude of a correlation can be expected to be stable. The necessary sample size to achieve stable estimates for correlations depends on the effect size, the width of the corridor of stability (i.e., a corridor around the true value where deviations are tolerated), and the requested confidence that the trajectory does not leave this corridor any more. Results indicate that in typical scenarios the sample size should approach 250 for stable estimates.
The relationship between altruism and antisocial behavior has received limited attention because altruism and antisocial behavior tend to be studied and discussed in distinct literatures. Our research bridges these literatures by focusing on three fundamental questions. First, are altruism and antisocial behavior opposite ends of a single dimension, or can they coexist in the same individual? Second, do altruism and antisocial behavior have the same or distinct etiologies? Third, do they stem from the same or from distinct aspects of a person's personality? Our findings indicate that altruism and antisocial behavior are uncorrelated tendencies stemming from different sources. Whereas altruism was linked primarily to shared (i.e., familial) environments, unique (i.e., nonfamilial) environments, and personality traits reflecting positive emotionality, antisocial behavior was linked primarily to genes, unique environments, and personality traits reflecting negative emotionality and a lack of constraint.
Mobster Al Capone ran a soup kitchen during the great depression
- Klein
Knowing our pathology
- Oltmanns
Convicted rapists' vocabulary of motive: Excuses and justifications
- Scully
Taming the devil within us
- Pinker