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This work analyzes the mutual dependence linking digital platforms, i.e., 'Big Tech', and the military apparatus. Three main elements are at the roots of such dependence: an 'originary linkage' binding the development of digital platforms with governments' R&D military efforts, the critical nature of infrastructures and technologies controlled by platforms, and their role as their government's 'eyes and ears' (both at home and abroad). Focusing on the US, we first document the growing relevance of these corporations as Department of Defence contractors. Second, we explore a selection of multi-year contracts entrusting platforms to develop and manage critical technologies and infrastructures for military purposes. Finally, we document the direct involvement of major US-based platforms in war scenarios. JEL classification: L12, L22, P12.
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LEM
LEM
WORKING PAPER SERIES
Blurring boundaries: an analysis of the digital
platforms-military nexus
Andrea Coveri 1
Claudio Cozza 2
Dario Guarascio 3
1 University of Urbino, Italy
2 University of Naples Parthenope,Italy
3 Sapienza University of Rome, Italy
2023/47 December 2023
ISSN(ONLINE) 2284-0400
1
Blurring boundaries:
an analysis of the digital platforms-military nexus
Andrea Coveri
*1
, Claudio Cozza
†2
, Dario Guarascio
‡3
1
University of Urbino Carlo Bo
2
University of Naples Parthenope
3
Sapienza University of Rome, GLO
Abstract
This work analyzes the mutual dependence linking digital platforms, i.e., ’Big
Tech’, and the military apparatus. Three main elements are at the roots of
such dependence: an ‘originary linkage’ binding the development of digital
platforms with governments’ R&D military efforts, the critical nature of
infrastructures and technologies controlled by platforms, and their role as
their government’s ‘eyes and ears’ (both at home and abroad). Focusing on
the US, we first document the growing relevance of these corporations as
Department of Defence contractors. Second, we explore a selection of multi-
year contracts entrusting platforms to develop and manage critical
technologies and infrastructures for military purposes. Finally, we
document the direct involvement of major US-based platforms in war
scenarios.
JEL classification: L12, L22, P12.
Keywords: Monopoly capital, imperialism, war, nation-states, digital platforms, military industry.
“Everywhere do I perceive a certain conspiracy of rich men seeking their own advantage
under the name and pretext of the commonwealth” (Sir Thomas More, 1516, as cited in
Hobson, 1902).
“People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but the
conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to raise
prices” (Adam Smith, 1776).
*Corresponding author. Department of Economics, Society, Politics, University of Urbino Carlo Bo. E-mail
address: andrea.coveri@uniurb.it
Department of Economic and Legal Studies, University of Naples Parthenope. E-mail address:
claudio.cozza@uniparthenope.it
Department of Law and Economics, Sapienza University of Rome. E-mail address:
dario.guarascio@uniroma1.it
2
1
Introduction
Large digital platforms, also known as ‘Big Tech’, are now at the centre of attention in several streams of
research, including economics, management studies, sociology, international political economy, labour
law, and industrial relations. A number of reasons may explain their prominence. First of all, digital
platforms have given rise to an unprecedented concentration of techno-economic power (Coveri et al.,
2022; Vasudevan, 2022). Considering the major US-based platforms (e.g., Alphabet, Amazon and
Apple), their overall market capitalisation is larger than the GDP of countries like Japan. The same
goes if one looks at their Chinese counterparts, like Alibaba or Tencent (Jia et al., 2018; Li and Qi,
2022). This is largely associated with the staggering technological power that platforms concentrate in
their hands, which is apparent when examining the distribution of patents on a global level in key
fields such as Artificial Intelligence (AI): few platforms hold the majority share and the trend is in the
direction of an even stronger concentration (Fanti et al., 2022; Calvino et al., 2023). It is therefore no
coincidence that platforms are key stakeholders in the growing geopolitical tensions that pit the US
and China against
each other. Digital corporations directly (and often exclusively) control strategic
knowledge, infrastruc
tures and (dual) technologies of key relevance for both economic and military
purposes (Farrell and Newman, 2019). In turn, geopolitical tensions ultimately affect the extent of
platforms’ global reach, the market outlets they have access to and the amount of data they can collect
(Rikap and Flacher, 2020). Innovation patterns and ecosystems are also reshaped by the emergence
of platforms (Lundvall and Rikap, 2022). On the one hand, the latter enables the mobilization (and
combination) of knowledge and
technologies with unprecedented speed and efficiency (Gawer, 2022;
Jacobides et al., 2024). On the other hand, most of the relevant innovations are then siphoned out by large
platforms through, e.g., strategic
acquisitions of start-ups which are
de facto
shielded, if not
strengthened, by innovation-based competition (Kurz, 2023). Moreover, the rise of platforms has
challenged the very conceptualization of the firm (Pitelis, 2022). In fact, by monopolizing data (Zuboff,
2023), platforms exercise power and control far beyond their physical and legal perimeter,
subordinating seemingly autonomous and distant organizations (Ietto-Gillies and Trentini, 2023).
Finally, labour fragmentation is significantly exacerbated by platforms both locally and on a global
scale (Casilli et al., 2023) , with relevant implications in terms of working conditions, economic
vulnerability (see
inter alia
, Kenney and Zysman, 2020; Cirillo et al., 2023) and social conflicts (Della
Porta et al., 2022).
What is relatively less investigated is the nexus linking large digital platforms and nation-states. Yet,
this is a crucial dimension to be analyzed in order to understand why platforms have become so powerful
and why such power is so difficult to undermine. Indeed, the fact that the state-corporation nexus is
crucial to understanding the nature, behaviour, and systemic consequences of the firm was very clear to
the Classical economists (e.g., Smith, 1776 and Marx, 1867). The converging strategies of monopolies
(and cartels), on the one hand, and of colonial states, on the other, are at the heart of the theories of
imperialism (Hobson, 1902; Lenin, 1917; Hilferding, 1923a). Likewise, the key role of the state in
supporting large corporations, encouraging their internationalization, and bailing them out during
downswings, is central to the Monopoly Capital (MC) tradition (Baran and Sweezy, 1966). In both cases,
there is a peculiar component of the nation-state apparatus that plays a pivotal role: the military sector.
At the time of Hobson (1902)’s writings, military campaigns were crucial to open up new
opportunities for capitalistic accumulation, secure productive inputs, and put competitors out of
business. As capitalism expands across the globe and large transnational corporations (TNCs) come to
increasingly shape its evolution, governments’ military-related investments become essential to
support capital accumulation, especially during stagnation phases (Baran and Sweezy, 1966). No less
relevant, military-related R&D and public procurement assume a key role as vectors of technology
transfer, especially for the development and introduction of radical innovations (Mowery, 2009). In
the US case, the linkage between military-oriented R&D investments and the rise of high-tech TNCs
3
was at the basis of what, after WWII, has been popularized as the ’military-industrial complex’
(Mowery, 2010). Since then, the
latter has been one of the main ingredients of US military and
technological hegemony (Galbraith, 2007).
In this work, we explore the
mutual dependency
linking large
digital corporations and the military sec
tor, bridging imperialism studies (Lenin, 1917), the MC tradition
(Baran and Sweezy, 1966) and more recent literature analysing the peculiar characteristics of platforms
and the origins of their power (Conyon
et al., 2022). We focus on the US, being the country where the
first and most important digital platforms were developed (O’Mara, 2020), documenting both elements
of continuity and discontinuity in the evolution of the US military-industrial complex (Pianta, 1989). In
so doing, several research questions are addressed. First, to what extent the military sector is and has
been relevant to the expansionary strate
gies of digital platforms? And, in turn, to what extent are
platforms important for the military apparatus
to pursue its objectives? Second, what is the role of
platforms’ techno-organizational characteristics in shaping their relationship with the military and
intelligence activities? Third, what are the main dif
ferences between digital platforms and traditional
defence contractors that usually partner with the US military sector (e.g., enterprises that stably supply
armaments and equipment to the military)?
The analysis is developed along two main lines. First, building on previous studies (among
others, Pianta, 1989; Mowery, 2009, 2010), we detect three main channels defining the platforms-military
nexus: (i) the “originary linkage" and the role of technology transfer; (ii) the platforms’ control of critical
technologies and infrastructures and their role in the military-related supply chains; (iii) the peculiar
position of platforms as ‘eyes and ears’ of the military apparatus. Second, we provide quantitative and
qualitative evidence assessing: (i) the growing relevance of platforms as contractors of the US
Department of Defence (DoD); (ii) the size and technological content of key DoD procurement
contracts; (iii) the revolving doors linking platforms’ boards and the military and security apparatuses;
(iv) the active role platforms in warfare scenarios, with particular reference to the Russia-Ukraine
conflict.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on the state-corporation nexus,
from the early stages of imperialism to the most recent developments in MC theory. Section 3 illustrates
the main channels shaping the mutual dependence holding platforms and the military apparatus
together. The quali-quantitative analysis is provided in Section 4 while Section 5 concludes, taking
stock of the main results, discussing their implications and avenues for further research.
2
The State-corporation nexus: yesterday and today
According to liberal philosophy and neoclassical economics, the public and the private spheres are
sharply separated. For classical liberalism, the public sphere is the (well-circumscribed) domain where
the State pursues the collective interest, taking care of the public good (Hayek, 1946). In neoclassical
economics, the State is there to provide those goods for which private incentives are missing, but that
are essential for market interactions to take place (as in the tradition of both Old and New Welfare
Economics) (see, e.g., Stiglitz, 1991). In this context, security and defence are, above all others, the
activities through which the State preserves the community’s superior values, beyond any particular
private interest. By safeguarding social order internally and protecting the community against
external threats, it allows free economic interactions to take place and, therefore, the maximization of
social welfare to occur.
Classical economists used to have an antipodal (and yet more realistic) understanding of the State
and its relationships with the private sphere. According to Adam Smith, one of the most common
activities carried out by capitalists during the early stages of industrialization was to join their forces to
’conspire’, aiming to influence the State to their own advantage (e.g., preventing regulations that may
get in the way of their accumulation strategies). An even more radical rejection of the aforementioned
separation can be found in Marx and Engels’ Communist Manifesto:
‘The executive of the modern state is
[nothing] but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie’ (Marx and Engels, 1848).
4
As monopolies and cartels become capitalism’s major driving forces and global conflicts loom on
the horizon, a ‘new stage of development’ is reached (Lenin, 1917).
1
At the dawn of WWI, imperialism
theories unravelled the peculiar role of the State and, more importantly, of its military apparatuses. The
latter operate as ’internal forces’, providing crucial support to the process of capitalistic accumulation
(Hobson, 1902; Hilferding, 1923b).2 Military campaigns are instrumental in entering new markets, seiz
ing
raw materials, expanding the pool of labour to be exploited, and cutting out competitors from the
most advantageous trade routes. In turn, companies provide the State with capital goods and artefacts,
including weapons, necessary to successfully conduct such campaigns. Not a harmonious division of
roles aimed at ensuring peace and freedom, as suggested by liberal thinkers and neoclassical economists,
but an ‘alliance’ in which the violence of the State and its hegemonic ambitions (Arrighi, 1981) are
inter
twined with the profit-maximization strategies of the monopolistic firm (Vasudevan, 2021).
The State-corporation nexus is also at the centre of the MC tradition (Baran and Sweezy, 1966),
following along the lines traced by Lenin (1917).3 In this literature, TNCs are the ‘hubs’ orchestrating the
allocation of capital, domestically and internationally, giving rise to new forms of subordination and
dependence (Hymer, 1960). These are also the loci where a large share of techno-organizational
capabilities and innovations are developed, representing a key component of the emerging National
Systems of Innovation (NSI) (Freeman, 1995). However, as global interconnectedness increases and
sources of instability multiply, the state-TNC relationship becomes more complex. On the one hand, public
demand results as a key source of reproduction and accumulation, particularly during downswings.4
Similarly, science, R&D, and public procurement, a significant share of which stems from the military
sector, represent a fundamental push for TNCs innovation and growth. On the other hand, growing
complexity may turn into a misalignment of interests and conflicts.
As stressed by Hymer (1972) and discussed at length by Ietto-Gillies (2002), the rise of TNCs may
resize the sovereign capacity of nation-states, diminishing their autonomy and weakening their ability
to steer their own development trajectory. As a result, governments may respond by introducing
regulations (e.g., tax, labour, antitrust and environmental laws) aimed at reducing TNCs room for
manoeuvre. These are not the only sources of potential State-corporation conflicts, though. TNCs’
internationalization strategies, including building ties with foreign governments to facilitate market
penetration, may clash with their home state’s foreign and defence policies (Ietto-Gillies, 2012). Again,
reactions and countermeasures might be in order in an attempt to realign TNCs with their government
goals. These conflicts are one of the key focus of Baran and Sweezy (1966)’s followers (among others,
Cowling, 1982; Cowling and Sugden, 1998; Ietto-Gillies, 2012, 2021). In particular, the post-1970s MC
literature concentrates its attention on the so-called ‘retaliatory strategies’ (Ietto-Gillies, 2012), put forth
by TNCs to counter government actions that may limit their power and related value capture
strategies. A typical example is the threat of moving production (and employment) from countries
with strict to those with more permissive regulations concerning, for example, workers’ rights or
environmental protection (on this point, see Balcet and Ietto-Gillies, 2020). Therefore, marking a certain
discontinuity with Lenin (1917)’ view, the State is no longer seen (or not so explicitly) as an ‘internal
force’ to corporations’ strategies and, more broadly, to the process of accumulation. Rather, the
emphasis is now on TNCs’ attempts to affect those government actions (e.g., taxes and other
redistributive measures, labor-protection laws,
tariffs, investment subsidies, etc.) that can foster or
1Building on Hobson (1902) and Hilferding (1923b), Lenin (1917) proposed a new definition of ‘Imperialism’, conceived as
‘capitalism at that stage of development at which the domination of monopolies and finance capital is established; in which the export of capital
has acquired pronounced importance; in which the division of the world among the international trusts has begun; in which the division of all
the territories of the globe among the biggest capitalist powers has been completed.
2
During the same period, another popular definition of imperialism is provided by Rosa Luxemburg. According to her per-
spective, imperialism should be interpreted as the colonization, mostly aimed at exploiting human and natural resources, of “what
remains still open of the non-capitalist environment" (Luxemburg, 2015).
3For a detailed review of MC theories see, among others, Foster (2014) and Sawyer (2022)
4According to Baran and Sweezy (1966), the growing dominance of TNCs is associated with the saturation of domestic markets
and the exhaustion of profitable investment opportunities, leading to stagnation tendencies. Within this framework, states play a
key role in providing monopolies with a way out of stagnation through defence spending.
5
hamper their growth (Cowling, 1982; Ietto-Gillies, 2012).
5
The advent of digital platforms further reshapes the nature of the TNC, including its relationship
with governments (Coveri et al., 2022). By way of illustration, Table A1 in the Appendix provides a
synthetic account of the main discontinuities. While XX century’s TNCs consolidate their presence at
the times of managerial capitalism (Rahman and Thelen, 2019), digital platforms start rising when the
neoliberal paradigm is fully established (Mudge, 2008). Platforms take hold when the large Taylorist
(and then Toyotist) corporation is joined by smaller and more dynamic ICT companies, able to
exploit network economies and operating in a context where state retrenchment, market
liberalization, financial and trade globalization unfold at full steam. Moreover, platforms are able to
rapidly expand their control (and associated value extraction) across countries, sectors and product
segments by relying on a relatively smaller amount of foreign investments as compared to previous
TNCs, i.e., the so-called ‘FDI lightness’ (Ietto-Gillies, 2021), and exploiting the close-to-zero marginal
cost reproducibility of digital services (Coveri et al., 2022). This is lavishly rewarded by financial
markets, with the capitalization of platforms growing relentlessly in spite of a relatively low
dividends/revenues ratio (Kenney and Zys
man, 2020; Li and Qi, 2022). Such a skyrocketing market
capitalization further accelerates their growth,
providing additional resources to invest, selectively, in
R&D and M&A that are crucial to maintain control (and technological primacy) in relevant fields such
as cloud computing and AI (Rikap et al., 2021; Fanti et al., 2022).
As the Internet becomes global, platforms magnify their ability to control data, digital technologies
and related infrastructures (Rikap et al., 2021), as well as the new media where a large share of the
public opinion is formed (Culpepper and Thelen, 2020). This has relevant consequences for the state-
corporation nexus. First, platforms become indispensable partners in the production of public goods
(e.g., the digitization of public services), both in the civilian and military spheres. This contributes
to blurring the public-private boundaries, providing platforms with an ’infrastructural status’ that can
make them indistinguishable from the public operator. Second, the retaliatory power of platforms grows
as compared to previous TNCs (Ietto-Gillies, 2021), as one of the peculiar domains under their control
(e.g., social media) can determine whether political organizations are doomed to succeed or die.
6
Third,
the control of
dual
technologies in security and defence-sensitive domains such as facial recognition,
turn platforms into governments’ ‘eyes and hears’, at home as well as abroad (see the next Section).
Such blurring boundaries and, most notably, the close connection with the security and military
apparatuses make platforms key players in the confrontation between China and the US, the latter being
largely played on the technological field (Rikap et al., 2021). Indeed, China is home to the largest non-
US digital platforms having a global scale e.g., Alibaba, ByteDance, Tencent representing the most
powerful challenger to the US technological (and, hence, military) supremacy (UNCTAD, 2019; Hötte
et al., 2023). To give an example, the Chinese government has raised the Great Firewall to restrict access
to US-based platforms, while promoting the development of its national champions (e.g., Alibaba and
Tencent) to be part of its own (digital) military-industrial complex (Griffiths, 2021). Focusing on such
confrontation, Rolf and Schindler (2023) argues that both the US and China ‘leverage their domestic
platforms to secure the control of data and extend their economic and military projection overseas’.
More than 100 years after Hobson (1902), digital platforms seem to vindicate some of the key
arguments of the theory of imperialism, namely the convergence of economic strategies of TNCs and
military (hegemonic) goals of nation states, the crasis between industrial and military apparatuses, and
th e blurring public-private boundaries. Of course, the shape of the state-corporation nexus is different
and, as we will argue below, this is largely due to the peculiar and pervasive nature of the (dual)
technologies that the platforms control.
5In this way, governments become, at least partially, ‘external forces’. Therefore, the economic roots of imperialism including
the role of the military sector are (at least analytically) lost. In the literature, these are replaced by explanations that super-ordinate
the sociological or political dimensions of conflicts, as also Schumpeter (1972) does in Imperialism and social classes.
6
A paradigmatic example is the Donald Trump’s ban from Twitter and Facebook in 2021. See:
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/10/technology/trump-social-media-ban-timeline.html
6
3
Mutual dependence and the digital platforms-military nexus
Several factors make governments dependent on TNCs. The latter generate a substantial share of output
and employment, are a key ‘complement’ of foreign policy through FDIs and transnational alliances,
and maintain assets and technological capabilities which result essential to govern change internally
and exert hegemony externally (Arrighi, 1981). At the same time, TNCs are often reliant on their
home governments’ support to penetrate and expand in foreign markets (e.g., trade agreements,
diplomatic activities aimed at facilitating the penetration in specific markets), resolve internal (e.g.,
legal and security activities to contrast workers, trade unions or local organization’ struggles, on this
point see also Balcet and Ietto-Gillies (2020)) and external (e.g., settling disputes with foreign
governments or corporations) conflicts, mitigate demand constraints through public expenditure and
investment (Baran and Sweezy, 1966), and support R&D projects characterized by radical uncertainty
(Mazzucato, 2018).
Concerning digital platforms, what the latter need most is to escape regulations aimed at reducing
their market power (e.g., antitrust policies, forced sale/separation of business units), restricting their
capacity to extract and manipulate data (e.g., privacy policies as the EU’s GDPR) or strengthening workers
bargaining power (e.g., policies aimed at supporting unions). By the same token, platforms’ systemic
relevance further reinforces their position vis-à-vis governments, as the latter would hardly damage
entities generating a substantial share of national income7 and providing other firms with goods and
services that are essential to carry out their economic activity.8 More in general, the stronger the State-
platforms mutual dependence, the lower the risk for the latter to face regulations that damage their
economic and technological dominance (Vasudevan, 2022).
The military sector is where the state-corporation boundaries may become more blurred (Pianta,
1989; Foster and McChesney, 2014; Roland, 2021). In the context of the US military-industrial complex,
a large literature has documented synergies as well as conflicts shaping the relationship between
major contractors and the defence apparatus (see, among others, Markusen and Serfati, 2000;
Dunne
and Sköns, 2014; Smith, 2016).9 While reviewing this vast literature goes beyond the scope of our
contribution, three factors lying at the basis of the corporations-military nexus are worth stressing for
our purposes. These elements have characterized the relationship between the state and corporations
well before the advent of digital platforms. As the latter steps in, though, the same elements become
key drivers of mutual dependence.
Originary linkage
An ‘originary linkage’ binds digital platforms and the military sector. During the 20th and, even
more so, in the 21st century, most of the breakthroughs giving rise to new industries and technological
paradigms were linked to military programs (Polanyi, 2015). These are based on long-term investments,
path-breaking R&D activities and ‘mission-oriented’ projects in areas such as (i) infrastructures, from
railroads to the Internet (O’Mara, 2020), (ii) aerospace (Mowery, 2009), (iii) raw materials and critical
resources, aimed at ensuring the strategic autonomy of countries (Edler et al., 2023), and (iv) weapons
and complementary goods needed for their development and deployment (Pianta, 1989). Major
breakthroughs are often followed by ‘technology transfer’ to the benefit of newborn (or already
existing) corporations that from there on will reap the advantages of their ‘first-mover’ status (Mazzucato,
2018). In turn, such a first-mover advantage may also increase the geo-strategic capacity of their home
states.
7As of April 2023, the three major US-based digital corporations i.e., Alphabet, Amazon and Meta represented close to $3
trillion in market value. Data retrieved from STATISTA, available at: https://www.statista.com/statistics/277483/market-value-
of-the-largest-internet-companies-worldwide/. Last access 15 July 2023.
8
Large platforms provide vital services for companies operating in virtually all sectors, giving rise to what Cutolo and Kenney
(2021) refer to as ‘technological dependence’.
9
The expression “industrial-military complex” was first coined and popularized by President Dwight D. Eisenhower in a
famous speech delivered in January 1961.
7
There is large evidence on how military-related investments and R&D contributed to the emergence
of new industries (see, among others, Mowery, 2010; Jacobsen, 2015).
10
In this regard, the Internet and
most of the digital innovations following its establishment represent a textbook example (for a thorough
account, see, among others, O’Mara, 2020). Mission-oriented projects carried out by major US Federal
Agencies (e.g., the DARPA (Mowery, 2010)) contributed to the development of General-Purpose
Technologies, including semiconductors (Dosi, 1984) or the TCP/IP protocol (Greenstein, 2020), that
have been crucial for the diffusion of personal computers and, later on, of the Internet itself
(Mazzucato, 2018). In other words, military R&D is to a significant extent behind the competitive
advantage of the US in the nascent digital economy. Since the early days of the mainframe industry,
US-based TNCs have taken the lion’s share of global ICT markets with some competition coming, since
the 1980s, from a bunch of Asian high-tech companies (Japanese, above all others).
11
In this context,
the close relationships between DARPA, private corporations, and top universities favoured
technology transfer, and incremental innovations and forged the US National Innovation System (NIS),
including the Silicon Valley (SV). With the commercialization of the Internet’ (Greenstein, 2015), the
US competitive advantage consolidates and the pivotal role of its NIS stands out. By the late 1990s,
SV-based companies i.e. nowadays’ dominant platforms such as Amazon, Google, and Facebook
together with companies such as Apple and Microsoft that, since the 1980s, were already playing a
significant role in the computer industry (O’Mara, 2020) managed to catch the ‘first train’ to the
newborn Internet economy, gaining dominant positions in critical market segments such as search
engines (e.g., Google, now Alphabet), social networks (e.g., Facebook, now Meta), digital marketplaces
(e.g., Amazon) and cloud services (e.g., AWS and Microsoft Azure).
That is, US platforms dominating the Internet economy owe their emergence to military projects
supporting the development of basic knowledge and technologies and, no less importantly, favouring
technology transfer (Mowery, 2010). This originary linkage, however, never fades away completely,
even when the industries that emerged as a result of military-related R&D become mostly oriented
towards private demand and civil purposes. In fact, military apparatuses continue to have an active role,
affecting the evolutionary trajectory of products and technologies (Mazzucato, 2018) via, for
example, military patents (Schmid, 2018). By the same token, institutions and procedures working as an
‘always-open backdoor’ for military apparatuses to monitor and, if needed, affect corporations’ strategies
are systematically established. As industry size and complexity increase and competition-driven
incremental innovations dominate the evolutionary trajectory, the military may become relatively less
active and ‘visible’ (Pianta, 1989). Nonetheless, formal (e.g., laws and regulations) and informal (e.g.,
moral suasion) ties are always in order (Lundvall and Rikap, 2022). Most notably, the active role of
military-related institutions can return to the forefront, as is currently occurring with AI or quantum
technologies (Gonzales, 2023), when resources and strategic direction are needed to push forward the
technological frontier, especially when it comes to dual technologies with relevant security implications.
As technological and geo-strategic conditions require it, the original linkage is revitalized and, with it,
the integration of state-corporation strategies.
Knowledge, technology and critical infrastructures
Contemporary wars are to a significant extent digital (Merrin and Hoskins, 2020). The most
advanced weapons (e.g., drones, missiles, aircrafts) and defence systems (e.g., anti-aircraft systems)
are based on technologies such as AI (Johnson, 2019) or new-generation satellites. Cyber-attacks and
10The need to strengthen nation states strategic capabilities has always been among the key motivations behind public efforts
in areas such as mining and infrastructure, which are not directly related to the military but which, in turn, can have a broader
impact on the economic and technological sovereignty of nations. This is testified by the direct involvement of military resources
in the development of such projects.
11Technological trajectories and related economic developments, however, are never static processes. Since the early 2000s,
China’s industrial policy tirelessly aimed to narrow the technological gap with the US. This has enabled China to achieve
remarkable results that challenge the leadership of the US in key technology areas such as AI (Rikap et al., 2021), while the
ongoing ‘chip war’ testifies to how intense the competition in this area has become (Miller, 2022).
8
actions aimed at preventing them are becoming a matter of life or death during armed conflicts.
Likewise, digital technologies are essential to pursue security and intelligence activities (Brayne, 2020),
both at home and abroad. Therefore, being on the digital frontier and, hence, preventing enemies from
getting close to it is a fundamental objective for governments and their military apparatuses (Rolf
and Schindler, 2023). As largely documented, such frontier is dominated by few global (US and
Chinese) platforms (see, among others, Kemmerling and Trampusch, 2022). The latter monopolize key
assets (i.e., servers, cloud infrastructures, submarine cables) (Gjesvik, 2023), hold the majoritarian
share of digital patents (Fanti et al., 2022; Maslej et al., 2023) and are the locus where most of the
formal and tacit knowledge, essential to move forward along technological trajectories (Dosi, 1982), is
developed (Rikap et al., 2021). In this context, the state-platform mutual dependence is explained by both
physical, formal, and tacit elements. First, the quasi-monopolistic control of technologies and
infrastructures vital to the pursuit of military objectives makes platforms indispensable partners of
their governments. The class of devices that goes by the name ‘Internet of Military Things’, comprising
hardware and software technologies that can be deployed in military scenarios, is increasingly crucial
in both physical and virtual battlefields.12 Military operations involving the creation of a new
surveillance system, access to sensitive information, protection from (or the perpetration of) a cyber-
attack, or the deployment of a satellite system in remote, high-risk areas can hardly be realised without
the cooperation of platforms. For the military, platforms’ idiosyncratic competencies are particularly
valuable and hard to reproduce, given their tacit and cumulative nature (Ietto-Gillies and Trentini,
2023). By the same token, as a digital infrastructure (e.g., cloud servers) grows in terms of size and
relevance (e.g., increasing the mass of information stored and processed), the efficiency of embedded
technologies (e.g., machine learning (ML) algorithms) and the uniqueness (‘black-boxishness’) of
corporation-specific competencies increase too. This may strengthen platforms’ position vis-à-vis both
potential competitors as well as governments (Coveri et al., 2022).
Another element strengthening the state-platform mutual dependency is the pivotal role that the
latter play in both civil and military innovation ecosystems (Rikap et al., 2021; Gawer, 2022; Jacobides
et al., 2024). By governing knowledge co-creation processes and exploiting the modular structure of
digital ecosystems, platforms benefit from the decentralized nature of digital innovation while preserving
their economic and technological power. Similar dynamics apply to military-related supply chains. To
digitize processes and products (including weapons), traditional suppliers (e.g., in the US case,
Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, and Halliburton) cannot operate without the technologies, components, and
related services provided (often under monopoly conditions) by platforms (on this point, see Wong and
Younossi, 2023, and the next Section).
A third driver of dependence concerns skills and training activities. In high-tech industries,
competencies tend to be complex, idiosyncratic, technology- and organization-specific (Dosi et al.,
1994). As a result, attracting and developing the best skills is vital to preserve innovative capacity.
However, in frontier fields such as Big Data, AI, or Quantum Computing there is no match in the
competition between key digital corporations, on the one hand, other firms, and the government, on the
other. This is due to the career prospects the former can offer and incomparable economic levers (e.g.,
stellar salaries and stock options) they can rely on (Rikap, 2023). As a result, the government may face a
substantial dependence on key digital platforms, particularly when it comes to the introduction of new
technological solutions and related training activities, as the latter tend to monopolize the skills needed to
pursue such activities. No less relevant, sector-specific managerial competencies and relational networks
make the top management of platforms essential partners in the digital transformation process,
including that of the military apparatus. Given the urgency of the challenge, nation states, starting
with the US
and China, have no choice but to involve platforms’ top managers in developing the most
12See: https://aws.amazon.com/it/blogs/iot/increase-military-readiness-with-aws-iot-for-defense-and-national-security/
9
strategic projects. As documented by Lundvall and Rikap (2022), such a role is often formalized in
public bodies of acknowledged importance, including those aimed at designing military-related frontier
technologies (e.g., AI).
Digital platforms as ‘eyes and ears’ of governments
Since the early days of the
East India Company
, the intermingling of the economic interests of TNCs, on
the one hand, with diplomatic, intelligence and military activities of nation-states, on the other, used to
be commonplace (Hobson, 1902). The overseas presence of corporations provides a unique tool for
seizing sensitive information and managing relationships with local government and elites. Military
and intelligence apparatuses, in turn, are often key partners of domestic corporations looking for foreign
expansion: protecting assets and personnel, ensuring the security of logistics, and providing support in
case of conflicts with local authorities and organizations. This convergence of expansionary strategies
may be another key driver of mutual dependence, even at the time of digital platforms.
Instabilities in the government-corporation relationship, conflicts and contradictions are always in
order, though. Corporations’ expansionary strategies may clash with their home government’s contingent
geopolitical orientations. This can occur when companies forge close relationships with the foreign local
government, despite the tensions that might exist between the latter and the companies’ home country.
Foreign policy, in turn, can be subject to sudden shocks and shifts, the latter being ill-matched with the
fixed costs and long-term investments required by TNCs to penetrate foreign markets. In this respect,
worsening (or, even more so, the impairment) relationships with a particular foreign country can
represent a serious dry loss for the most exposed corporations (Rolf and Schindler, 2023). As a result,
TNCs may activate their resources, e.g., lobbying (Culpepper, 2010), retaliatory power (Ietto-Gillies, 2012)
or trying to influence politics through media control (Culpepper and Thelen, 2020), to avert the disruption
of their economic activities in specific regions.
With the advent of digital platforms, the degree of mutual dependence increases substantially. At
home, platforms are a fundamental ‘arm’ of their government’s security, intelligence and law enforcement
activities. On the one side, they play a key role in collecting data and information, which is crucial to
prevent (and conduce) hacking, misinformation as well as digital attacks and threats to national security.
For example, Microsoft has repeatedly shared threat assessments and reports of cyberattacks with the US
government,13 while Facebook and Twitter have intervened to stop disinformation campaigns by
taking down networks of hijacked computer devices used to perform cyberattacks.14 This inevitably leads
these private corporations to assume a prominent role in assuring the national security, providing them
with a responsibility which goes far beyond their core business while strengthening their bargaining and
blackmail power vis-à-vis governments.
Abroad, platforms become ‘eyes and ears’ of their home state intelligence and military apparatuses.
Platform-controlled information networks, including social media, are now a resource that governments
cannot do without, even in pursuing security/military tasks. For example, in late 2022 it was reported
that Twitter provided direct approval and internal protection to a vast network of online US military
social media accounts by whitelisting a government bunch of social profiles. This network has been
used by the DoD to directly influence public opinion in countries involved in war conflicts such as
Yemen, Syria, Iraq, Kuwait and beyond.
15
On the other hand, once platforms have access to sensitive
information, it is difficult for foreign governments to know what use will be made of it and to what
extent this information will be transmitted and leveraged by platforms’ home governments for security
purposes.
13
See
https://www.nytimes.com/2023/07/11/us/politics/china-hack-us-government-microsoft.html;
see
also
https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/business/security-intelligence-report
14See https://www.npr.org/2022/09/27/1125217316/facebook-takes-down-russian-network-impersonating-european-news-
outlets; https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/os-jdorsey-090518.pdf
15See
https://theintercept.com/2022/12/20/twitter-dod-us-military-accounts/
10
The limits to such a techno-infrastructural dependence, if any, are geopolitical. To avoid subjugation
to US corporations (and, thus, to the partially integrated US intelligence and military apparatuses),
countries such as China, Russia, or Iran have banned the former from accessing their domestic market,
while supporting the growth of national platforms (e.g., the Chinese Alibaba, Tencent or JD) within
their own national innovation network (Li and Qi, 2022). This strategy allowed China to develop its
own platform ecosystem which, as in the US, is substantially integrated with the state and its civil and
military apparatuses (Lundvall and Rikap, 2022; Rolf and Schindler, 2023).
More broadly, by partnering with digital corporations that control critical technologies and
infrastructures e.g., cloud (Rikap and Lundvall, 2022), AI (Fanti et al., 2022), blockchain (Beaumier and
Kalomeni, 2022), 5G technology standard (Wu, 2020) and undersea cables (Gjesvik, 2023) nation states
(i.e., China and the US) can strengthen their grip on economies belonging to their ‘sphere of influence’,
gain advantage over enemies or enact what Kwet (2019, p. 4) called ‘digital colonialism’. The latter is
described as a novel form of ’structural domination’ based on the alliance between key digital
corporations and the US government. Such domination is exercised through “the centralised ownership
and control of the three core pillars of the digital ecosystem: software, hardware, and network connectivity,
which vests the United States with immense political, economic, and social power. As such, GAFAM
(Google/Alphabet, Amazon, Facebook, Apple, and Microsoft) and other corporate giants, as well as state
intelligence agencies like the National Security Agency (NSA), are the new imperialists in the international
community. Assimilation into the tech products, models, and ideologies of foreign powers led by the United
States constitutes a twenty-first century form of colonisation.
In other words, being the exclusive suppliers of services for both business growth as well as for the
strengthening of key public services (such as education and health), digital corporations become the
‘tool’ for ensuring economic and geopolitical subordination, particularly where digital penetration occurs
in a pervasive manner (as in developing countries lacking substantial infrastructures, technologies and
competences). Similar dynamics to the one documented by Kwet (2019), who focuses on the South African
case, can be observed in the economies that have entered China’s sphere of influence (Rolf and Schindler,
2023), which are increasingly subject to the strategies of the Chinese government and the technological
dominance of its home-grown digital platforms such as Alibaba and Tencent (Keane and Yu, 2019).
4
The digital platforms-military nexus: an empirical assessment
This section provides a quali-quantitative assessment of the digital platforms-military nexus in the
US. In particular, we first analyze the evolution of the US Department of Defense (DoD) procurement
contracts, showing the growing relevance of platforms as DoD contractors. Second, we delve into a set
of
major long-term contracts documenting the role of platforms as dominus of infrastructure and
technolo
gies (e.g., cloud, AI, satellites) that are not only critical to the achievement of military-related
objectives (Shull et al., 2020), but also characterized by high complexity, cumulativeness and strong
complementarity with their idiosyncratic capabilities (Mowery, 2010). Third, we document the
‘revolving door’ activity of former board members of US-based platforms moving to the military and
security apparatuses (and vice versa), highlighting a further dimension of the integration between
digital companies and government defence agencies. Finally, we analyze the available evidence on the
active participation of key US-based platforms in the Russia-Ukraine war.
DoD procurement goes digital
To put the analysis in context, we begin by documenting the structural relevance of military-related
R&D in the US. Figure 1 reports the government budget allocations for R&D (GBARD) for Defence from
1995 to 2021, focusing on the US and a set of selected Western economies. The figure shows that the
share (%) of GBARD for defence over total GBARD for the US is much higher over the whole period
than for all the other countries considered (France, Germany, Japan, South Korea and Japan), with the
11
former hovering around 55% in the second half of the 1990s and fluctuating around 45% in the first two
decades of the 2000s (Mowery, 2009, 2010).
Figure 1. GBARD for Defence (% of total GBARD), selected countries, 1995-2021.
Source: authors’ elaboration based on OECD data.
Further confirming this pattern, the US DoD’s weapon systems acquisition funds requested for fiscal
year (FY) 2024 are $315.0 billion of which $170.0 billion is for Public Procurement and $145.0 billion for
Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation , up from $276.0 billion in the previous year. This increase
is largely due to growing funding for cyberspace, spectrum, AI, 5G, and other emerging technologies in
recent years, e.g., the DoD budget requests for the ‘Command, Control, Communications, Computers,
and Intelligence (C4I) Systems’ mission almost doubled between 2017 and 2023, moving from $7.4 to
$12.8 billion (DoD, 2023).
To shed light on the growing reliance of the US military apparatuses on technologies developed by
digital platforms, we now dig into the official source of US public procurement data, i.e., USAspending.gov.
Figure 2 shows the number of Alphabet (Google’s parent company), Amazon, Facebook and Microsoft’s
contracts stipulated with US federal agencies (including the DoD) over the period 2000-2022. These
figures highlight that a major acceleration in the total number of contracts awarded to digital corporations
occurred since 2008. From then to 2018, digital platforms have been awarded more than 200 contracts
per year, while a decreasing trend has been observed since 2019. The figure also shows that the lion’s
share of contracts was awarded to Microsoft and, to a lesser extent, Amazon. Finally, and consistently
with the evidence provided by Maaser and Verlaan (2022), Alphabet and Facebook seem to be far less
involved in military procurement.
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
France Germany Japan Korea United Kingdom United States
12
Figure 2: Number of Amazon, Google, Facebook and Microsoft’s contracts with all US federal
agencies, 2000-2022.
Source: authors’ elaboration based on USAspending.gov data. Data updated to 18 January 2023.
Figure 3 reports the overall value of contracts awarded to digital platforms in monetary terms,
distinguishing between those stipulated with the DoD and other US federal agencies. Overall, the
figure shows that the monetary value of military (and security) procurement contracts has grown rather
steadily from 2008 to 2021. Microsoft reports by far the greater value of both contracts with DoD and
other US federal agencies: more than $4.4 billion over the whole period, of which about $3.2 billion was
awarded by the DoD. This means that about 75% of the value of all US agencies’ contracts stipulated
with Microsoft were awarded by the DoD. Amazon follows at a distance: the value of contracts for
this corporation is about $128 million over the whole period, of which about $50 million awarded by
the DoD (equal to little less than 40% of the value of all contracts awarded to Amazon by US federal
agencies).
16
Consistently with Figure 2, we find that the value of the contracts awarded to Alphabet and
Facebook is relatively small (Maaser and Verlaan, 2022).
16If one includes the value of subcontracts, i.e., contracts awarded by US federal agencies to recipients that subcontracted part
of the service to a platform, the situation does not change much. The value of the overall subcontracts awarded to Microsoft by
all US federal agencies is equal to $1.7 billion over the whole period, of which about $1.4 billion (indirectly) was awarded by the
DoD (82% of the overall value of subcontracts). As for Amazon, the value of the overall subcontracts awarded to this platform
by all US federal agencies is equal to about 450 million over the whole period, of which slightly more than 200 million (indi rectly
awarded) by the DoD (45% of the overall value of subcontracts).
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
Microsoft Amazon Google Facebook
13
Figure 3: Total value of Amazon, Google, Facebook and Microsoft’s contracts with the Department
of Defense and other US federal agencies, 2008-2022.
Source: authors’ elaboration based on USAspending.gov data. Data updated to 22 May 2023.
Critical technologies, infrastructures and services
The analysis of Federal procurement data lends support to the hypothesis of a growing reliance of the
US military apparatuses on technologies controlled by large digital platforms. However, the share of
US military procurement targeting such corporations appears to be negligible in absolute monetary terms,
especially when compared to their revenues (e.g., Amazon reported total revenues of US$ 514 billion in
2022 and Microsoft US$ 198 billion in the same year). There are good reasons to believe that these data
underestimate the role of platforms as relevant suppliers of the military apparatus (for a thorough
investigation, see Maaser and Verlaan, 2022; Gonzales, 2023). In fact, USAspending.gov data do not
include major contracts, mostly stipulated in recent years, according to which platforms are entrusted to
develop (and often to directly manage) technologies and infrastructure related to security and military
activities. This might be due to governments withholding disclosure of large contracts because of national
security reasons; unclassified government contracts that are not included in the official US spending
database; as well as the multi-year nature of such large awards, whose accounting allocation might make
them less detectable (Paulson, 2021, 2022).
Building on several different sources (i.e., technical reports, companies’ official documents and
websites, and press articles), in what follows we thus document major publicly disclosed multi-year
federal contracts entrusting platforms to develop and manage key technologies and infrastructures for
military purposes (a systematic summary is provided by Table 1). According to these sources, the first
deal between a leading digital platform and military apparatuses took place in early 2013, when the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) awarded Amazon Web Services (AWS) with a contract worth up to $600
million over up to 10 years for providing computing cloud services to all 17 agencies that make up the
intelligence community with the aim, inter alia, to prevent terrorist attacks.17 Afterwards, in 2014, AWS
launched its first “Top Secret Region”, called “Top Secret-East”, designed to host the US government’s
top-secret classified information. In 2017, this was followed by the launch of a second “Top Secret
Region’, called “Top Secret-West”, providing additional cloud capacity for US intelligence and defence
agencies, including the CIA and NSA.
18
17See: https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2014/07/the-details-about-the-cias-deal-with-amazon/374632/.
Last access: July 15 2023.
18See https://www.nextgov.com/emerging-tech/2021/12/amazon-web-services-announces-second-top-secret-cloud-
region/187303/; see also: https://aws.amazon.com/it/blogs/publicsector/announcing-the-new-aws-secret-region/. Last
access: Last access: July 15 2023.
$0
$100
$200
$300
$400
$500
$600
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
MILLION USD
Department of Defense All other US federal agencies
Year and
Department / Agency
Value ($)
Nature of service
Declared aim
2013 CIA
600
million
Cloud
Data management aimed at
pre
venting terrorist attacks
2019 DoD
50 million
Drones
Acquisition of AI technologies
to improve image recognition
in
military
drones
“Project
Maven”
2020 CIA
“Tens of billions”
Cloud
Cloud services centralized for
17 intelligence agencies
“Commercial Cloud Enterprise”
(C2E) project
2021 DoD
21.9 billion
Augmented reality
sors
vi-
‘HoloLens augmented reality
headset’ for military activities in
highly complex contexts
2022 NSA
10 billion
Cloud
Cloud infrastructures for NSA
(“Wild and Stormy” project)
2022 DoD Microsoft NA Stryker armoured Digital devices to be
vehicles incorporated into armed vehicles
2022 DoD
NA
Google workspace
Provision of Google Workspace
to 250,000 DoD employees
2022 DoD
9 billion
Cloud
Cloud infrastructure for the
“Joint Warfighting Cloud
Capa
bility” (JWCC)
2022 DoD
NA
Satellites
Space- and ground-based
in
frastructure for national
security
“Hybrid Space
Architecture” program
Table 1:
Selection of multi-year military and security contracts signed by main US digital platforms
15
16
Such services are part of the AWS “Cloud Computing for U.S. Intelligence Community” project,
which is aimed at providing federal agencies with technologies such as AI, ML and data analytics to
save time and resources for warfighters and analysts. Notably, Microsoft launched similar cloud
infrastructures for US national security missions, specifically aimed at speeding up the delivery of
defence and security workloads classified as “top secret”, i.e., the “Azure Government Top Secret” in 2021,
following the announcement of “Azure Government Secret” in 2017.19 Moreover, in November 2020,
the CIA awarded AWS, Alphabet, IBM, Microsoft, and Oracle with its ‘Commercial Cloud Enterprise’ (C2E)
contract to roll out new cloud hosting capabilities for the 17 federal intelligence agencies. These five
digital corporations will compete for specific task orders over the next 15 years under a contract that
could be worth “tens of billions” of dollars.20 In April 2022, the NSA awarded a $10 billion cloud
computing contract to AWS. This contract, called ‘Wild and Stormy’ (WaS), is a cloud computing
services contract in support of the NSA’s Hybrid Compute Initiative (HCI) aimed at addressing the NSA’s
significant and delicate processing and analytical requirements. Accordingly, AWS is the HCI cloud
provider managing the process of moving the NSA’s global intelligence and surveillance data from
internal servers to the cloud.21
In June 2022, Alphabet announced the creation of ‘Google Public Sector’ (GPS), a new division aimed
at helping US public sector entities accelerate their digital transformations. Few months later, GPS
announced the provision of Google’s workspace to 250.000 personnel of the U.S. Army. Then, in
December 2022, Amazon, Google, Microsoft and Oracle were awarded a $ 9 billion contract under the Joint
Warfighting Cloud Capability (JWCC), the latter first announced by the DoD in July 2021.22 This project
is designed to allow the Pentagon to fully leverage cloud capabilities developed by private
corporations for military and defence-related activities, to foster “the nation’s ability to stay a step ahead
of adversaries."23
Under the JWCC contract, Google announced the “Google Cloud for the Department of Defense”
and Amazon launched its “Cloud Computing for U.S. Defense”, both aimed at providing warfighters
with advanced technologies to be deployable in critical national security missions. For example, AWS
was involved in a technical demonstration held in 2021 aimed at testing computing capabilities based
on artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) technologies for the Air Force’s Advanced
Battle Management System (ABMS), the latter being the Air Force’s contribution to the Department of
Defense’s (DoD’s) strategy to connect all branches of military forces in an “Internet of Military Things
(IoMT).”
24
This follows the inclusion of AWS among the companies allowed to compete for “Indefinite
Delivery/Indefinite Quantity” contracts, which give to these firms the opportunity to be awarded up
with $950 million over five years for developing new digital capabilities for ABMS.
25
Another example
regards the support provided by AWS to the development of the first enduring tactical cloud presence”
for the US Army’s XVIII Airborne Corps, namely a US tactical force designed for rapid activities
anywhere in the world.
26
Furthermore, AWS recently disclosed the availability for the US DoD
customers of the AWS Modular Data Center aimed at enabling the DoD to deploy self-contained
data centers with built-in AWS infrastructure to store and analyze data in real-time to gain military
19
See:
https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/blog/announcing-new-azure-government-capabilities-for-classified-mission-
critical-workloads/; see also https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/blog/azure-government-top-secret-now-generally-available-
for-us-national-security-missions/. Last access: July 15 2023.
20See: https://gcn.com/cloud-infrastructure/2020/11/cia-awards-massive-cloud-contract/315771/. Last access: July 15 2023.
21
The WaS contract, once classified as secret, became public knowledge due to the legal dispute between Microsoft, which
contended the attribution of the same, and the NSA. See https://www.crn.com/news/cloud/aws-wins-out-over-microsoft-for-
10b-nsa-cloud-contract
22See: https://edition.cnn.com/2022/12/08/tech/pentagon-cloud-contract-big-tech/index.html
23
For a description, see https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/publicsector/aws-selected-for-u-s-department-of-defense-joint-
warfighting-cloud-capability-contract/.
24See: https://aws.amazon.com/it/blogs/publicsector/bringing-cloud-air-force-speed-of-mission-need/
25See: https://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/2359938/abms-signs-more-companies-post-onramp/
26
See: https://aws.amazon.com/it/blogs/publicsector/aws-supports-development-u-s-armys-first-enduring-tactical-cloud-
environment/
17
advantage in
the most isolated environments”27 and of the AWS Snowblade, a device designed to
compute, storage, and handle data for enabling defence warfighters to complete missions in highly
risky locations.28
Besides providing cloud-based technologies and infrastructures for military purposes, platforms
have also been major providers of cutting-hedge technology devices to be deployed in warfare
scenarios. For example, in March 2021 Microsoft won a DoD contract for augmented reality headsets,
worth up to $21.9 billion over 10 years. This includes 120,000 devices based on Microsoft’s HoloLens
augmented reality headset, enabling soldiers to fight, rehearse, and train in a single system. This
contract follows a $480 million contract Microsoft received to give the Army prototypes of the Integrated
Visual Augmented System (IVAS) in 2018.29 Later that year, Amazon and Microsoft picked up $50 million
contracts to develop AI surveillance software for US military drones after Google dropped Project
Maven. The latter is a DoD programme launched in 2017 and designed to process full-motion images and
video from drones to automatically detect potential targets. In 2018, more than 3,000 Google employees
signed a petition expressing concern about the military use of AI, asking the company to abandon the
project.30 Following this protest, Google effectively abandoned the Maven project in early 2019,31
being replaced by Microsoft, which started a $30 million contract in 2019, and AWS, which was
awarded a $20 million in 2020.32 However, both Google and its venture capital wing (i.e., Google
Ventures) have maintained minority stakes in at least two companies supplying military surveillance
tools, namely Orbital Insight and Planet. By the end of 2020, these companies had been awarded
contracts worth more than $30 million with the DoD, alongside deals with the National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency (NGA), to which the Project Maven project was handed over by the DoD in
2022.33
As for Microsoft, in August 2022 the US Army integrated the breakthrough technology that
it designed into Stryker armoured vehicles in order to provide warfighters with enhanced capabilities to
regain and maintain the upper hand in multi-domain battlefield operations.
Finally, it is worth reporting that, in May 2022, Amazon launched its first “AWS Defence Accelerator
for startups, in partnership with a UK government technology firm. The main goal of the programme
was to select start-up participants to foster their military and defence-related technological capabilities,
such as cyber-defence solutions, data discovery and optimisation, and space exploitation, using cloud
technologies. In early 2023, AWS broadened this project by launching the “AWS European Defence
Accelerator”, in partnership with another UK Government-supported innovation technology firm.
Similar to the previous one, this project is aimed to train and support selected startups with AWS
cloud tech
nologies for developing defence-related technologies and capabilities for national security
organizations
across Europe.
34
The provided evidence displays the growing importance of digital platforms as security and defence
technology providers for federal agencies, especially the DoD (Maaser and Verlaan, 2022; Gonzales,
2023). This is in line with the more general Pentagon’s long-term commitment to accelerate the
adoption of commercially developed AI and cloud technologies for military use. In 1999, the CIA
founded In-Q-Tel, a venture capital entity aimed at transferring the private sector’s critical
innovations into US intelligence and military apparatuses. More recently, in 2015, the DoD set up the
Defense Innovation
Unit Experimental (DIUx), later renamed Defense Innovation Unit (DIU), to
promote a far stronger inte
gration of US defence agencies with Silicon Valley’s technological
corporations by recruiting top talent
and speed up the military procurement. The goal was to create a
27
See https://aws.amazon.com/it/blogs/publicsector/announcing-aws-modular-data-center-u-s-department-defense-joint-
warfighting-cloud-capability/
28See https://aws.amazon.com/about-aws/whats-new/2023/06/aws-snowblade-us-defense-jwcc-customers/
29See https://www.cnbc.com/2021/03/31/microsoft-wins-contract-to-make-modified-hololens-for-us-army.html.
30See https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/04/technology/google-letter-ceo-pentagon-project.html)
31See https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/01/technology/google-pentagon-project-maven.html)
32See https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2021/09/08/project-maven-amazon-and-microsoft-get-50-million-in-
pentagon-drone-surveillance-contracts-after-google/
33
“Google Promised Not To Use Its AI In Weapons, So Why Is It Investing In Startups Straight Out Of ‘Star Wars’?”,
Forbes, https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2020/12/22/google-promised-not-to-use-its-ai-in-weapons-so-why-is-
alphabet-investing-in-ai-satellite-startups-with-military-contracts/. Last access: 8 September 2023
34See https://aws.amazon.com/it/blogs/publicsector/aws-launches-2023-european-defence-accelerator-for-startups/
18
sort of “start-up accelerator” in cutting-
edge technologies like AI, robotic systems, and cybersecurity, to
build a more direct bridge linking the DoD and private corporations developing innovations with
military applications.
35
Notably, the DIU also leads the US military’s Hybrid Space Architecture
(HSA), which in November 2022 awarded Microsoft Azure Space, AWS and Amazon’s Project Kuiper
together with other defence tech start-ups with contracts to improve space and ground-based
communication infrastructures for national security.
36
Revolving doors
Another sign of the platforms-military mutual dependence concerns the old-fashioned “revolving
doors” mechanism. This pattern involves former top managers and executives of platforms becoming
members of various government bodies linked to defence agencies and regulating commissions (and
vice versa). On the one side, this is likely due to the imperative for governments to leverage the
knowledge and networks maintained by former high-level platform executives to advance cutting-edge
technologies for military-related initiatives (Lundvall and Rikap, 2022). One example is given by former
vice-president of Apple, Doug Beck, recently appointed as the new director of the DIU.
37
Even more
emblematic is the case of Eric Schmidt, former CEO of Alphabet. Together with former Secretary of
State Henry Kissinger and ex-Deputy of Defense Secretary Robert Work,
38
Schmidt was a member of
two government advisory boards i.e., the Defense Innovation Advisory (DIA) Board and the National
Security Commission on AI (NSCAI) aimed at jump-starting technological innovation at the DoD to
counter the emerging technological power of China. Nonetheless, Schmidt relied on his own venture
capital to invest in defence start-ups, thus becoming a relevant actor on ‘both sides of the table at the
same time.
39
On the other side, the experience and contacts retrieved from working in governmental security
apparatuses and the in-depth knowledge of evolving legislation make former members of government
agencies key assets for digital corporations introducing technologies for which a regulatory framework
has not yet been introduced; as well as for detecting strategies to elude or hamper legal procedures that
may limit the applicability of their own technologies. Not surprisingly, several cases of former
members of defence agencies transitioning into digital platforms’ boards can be documented. For
example, the former executive director of the Defense Innovation Advisory (DIA) Board, Josh Marcuse, in
2020 assumed the role of head of strategy and innovation for Google Public Sector, namely the department
of Google developing technologies for public agencies, including the military apparatus. It is worth noting
that, as executive director of the DIA since 2016, Marcuse was responsible for providing suggestions to
the DoD, stood as an early supporter of the Joint Enterprise Defense Infrastructure (JEDI) cloud
35See: Kaplan, F., “The Pentagon’s Innovation Experiment", MIT Technology Review, 19 December 2016, available at:
https://www.technologyreview.com/2016/12/19/155246/the-pentagons-innovation-experiment/. Last access: 8 September
2023.
36
See: Boyle, A., “Microsoft and Amazon take on new roles in Pentagon’s space communication plans",
GeekWire
, 2 Novem-
ber 2022, available at: https://www.geekwire.com/2022/microsoft-amazon-pentagon-space-communication/. Last access: 8
September 2023.
37
See: “DOD Announces Apple’s Doug Beck as New Defense Innovation Unit Director",
Defense Innovation Unit
official website,
4 April 2023, available at: https://www.diu.mil/latest/dod-announces-apples-doug-beck-as-new-diu-director. Last access: 29
November 2023.
38
As Deputy Secretary of Defense, in office from 2014 to mid-2017, Robert Work was also the major proponent and advocate of
the so-called ‘Third Offset’, namely the competitive strategy aimed to leverage U.S. advanced technologies to offset China’s and
Russia’s technological advances (Gentile et al., 2021).
39
See: Conger, K., and Metz, C., ‘I Could Solve Most of Your Problems’: Eric Schmidt’s Pentagon Offensive",
The New York Times
,
May 2, 2020 (Updated Nov. 3, 2021), available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/02/technology/eric-schmidt-pentagon-
google.html. See also Javers, E., “How Google’s former CEO Eric Schmidt helped write A.I. laws in Washington without publicly
disclosing investments in A.I. startups", CNBC, 24 October 2022, available at: https://www.cnbc.com/2022/10/24/how-googles-
former-ceo-eric-schmidt-helped-write-ai-laws-in-washington-without-publicly-disclosing-investments-in-ai-start-ups.html. Last
access: 8 September 2023.
19
procurement, and played a key role in formulating the ethical principles for the Joint Artificial Intelligence
Center.40
Another example concerns retired US General Keith Alexander, former director of the National
Security Agency (NSA) from August 2005 to March 2014 and commander of the U.S. Cyber Command
from May 2010 to March 2014. In September 2020, it was disclosed that Alexander had assumed a
position on Amazon’s Board of Directors. Alexander’s arrival was significant for Amazon, as it came
amid the dispute with Microsoft over the $10 billion worth JEDI (Joint Enterprise Defense
Infrastructure) contract with the DoD (later repealed and replaced in late 2021 by the JWCC
documented above). Notably, Alexander’s tenure at the NSA gained widespread attention due to the
disclosure of classified documents by whistleblower Edward Snowden, unveiling extensive
surveillance on both domestic and international communications conducted under Alexander
oversight.
41
A final case worth documenting concerns the revolving door between defence-related government
agencies and Google divisions, in particular Google Public Sector. The board was established in June
2022 and includes, among others, retired generals from the US Air Force and Army, a former governor,
and a CIA engineer who previously headed the CIA’s Science and Technology Directorate.42 This may
not come as a surprise, since Google has hired dozens of CIA professionals in recent years. According
to the Tech Transparency Project, from 2006 to 2016 there were 258 cases of “revolving door" activity
between Google (or subsidiaries) and US federal agencies, including the CIA and other security
agencies.43
Digital platforms go to war
Further evidence is provided focusing on the active participation of platforms into warfare activities.
A
case in point is the dreadful war in Ukraine, where major US-based platforms have assumed, since its very
early stages, a direct role concerning the deployment of critical information-related infrastructures and
technologies (Coveri et al., 2023). The archetype is SpaceX, the corporation providing a private satellite
system used by the Ukrainian army (as well as by foreign military and intelligence personnel operating in
the area) to carry out its operations.44 Notably, in September 2022 the sudden shutdown of Starlink
jeopardized a decisive military operation targeting Russian warships near the coast of Crimea. Musk
recently stated that the shutdown was his deliberate decision, due to the fear that Russia might respond
with nuclear weapons to the Ukraine attack. Shortly after these events, Elon Musk, the owner of
SpaceX, finalized the acquisition of another key digital corporation i.e., Twitter and entered
into negotiations with the US government (as well as its European allies) regarding the financing of
Starlink.45 A month later, Musk was reported (although he denied it) to hold a direct channel with Putin
discussing his own ‘peace plan’ for Ukraine.46
Two elements stand out here. First, the crucial role played by a private corporation, whose activity is
theoretically intended for the civil sphere, into a war, providing SpaceX with a stronger bargaining
40
See Barnett, J., “Defense Innovation Board’s Josh Marcuse heads to Google",
Fedscoop
, available at
https://fedscoop.com/defense-innovation-board-google-josh-marcuse/. Last access: 29 November 2023.
41
See Perez, M., “General Who Oversaw NSA Surveillance Collection Joins Amazon’s Board Of Directors",
Forbes
, 9
September 2020, available at: https://www.forbes.com/sites/mattperez/2020/09/09/general-who-oversaw-nsa-surveillance-
collection-joins-amazons-board-of-directors/. Last access 29 November 2023.
42See “Google Public Sector Appoints Its First Board of Directors", govtech.com, 17 May 2023, available at:
https://www.govtech.com/biz/google-public-sector-appoints-its-first-board-of-directors. Last access: 29 November 2023.
43See “Google’s US Revolving Door", Tech Transparency Project, 26 April 2016, available at:
https://www.techtransparencyproject.org/articles/googles-revolving-door-us. Last access: 29 November 2023.
44
See Srivastava, M., Olearchyk, R., Schwartz, F., & Miller, C. “Ukrainian forces report Starlink outages during push against
Russia”, Financial Times, 8 October 2022. Last access: 21 December 2023.
45
On 1 June 2023, it was disclosed that Elon Musk’s SpaceX was awarded a contract by Pentagon for the provision of the
Starlink satellite system to be deployed in Ukraine. See “Elon Musk ordered Starlink to be turned off during Ukraine offensive,
book says", The Guardian, 23 September 2023, available at: https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2023/sep/07/elon-musk-
ordered-starlink-turned-off-ukraine-offensive-biography; “Elon Musk’s SpaceX wins Pentagon contract for satellite in Ukraine",
Financial Times, 1 June 2023, available at: https://www.ft.com/content/8503ed5a-5ca2-4d34-8c69-66ae92fa80dd).
46See
https://fortune.com/2022/10/11/elon-musk-ian-bremmer-putin-russia-ukraine/
20
position vis-à-vis the government. Second, the military apparatus’ heavy reliance on SpaceX
technologies to pursue key battlefield objectives. Among other things, the latter may help explain the
US government’s
overall malleability towards Musk’s strategies, including those such as the acquisition
of Twitter that
could intensify the mutual dependence.
SpaceX is not alone in playing an active role in the Ukraine war, tough. AWS disclosed that, as early
as February 24 2022, the day of the invasion, “members of the AWS public sector team met with members
of the Ukrainian government. The discussion focused on bringing AWS Snowball devices (...) into Ukraine
to help secure, store, and transfer data to the cloud."47 Ukraine’s largest private bank, PrivatBank, which
serves 40 per cent of the Ukrainian population, has moved all its operations to the AWS cloud and stated
that once the war is over, there will be no reason to go back anyway.48 Since 6 October 2022, Amazon
has also removed referral fees for Ukrainian small and medium enterprises selling their products on its
European marketplace. And the same goes for Microsoft, Apple, Alphabet, and Meta. The former has
committed to provide $100 million worth technology “to ensure that government agencies, critical
infrastructure and other sectors in Ukraine can continue to serve citizens through the Microsoft Cloud".49
Apple took the field by blocking Apple Pay electronic payments and stopping sales of its products in
Russia, while Alphabet banned access to advertising and distribution of Russian state media and increased
security measures for user access in Ukraine. Alphabet also blocked Russian state media channels RT and
Sputnik from the Youtube platform, while Facebook (Meta) opted for excluding from Facebook and
Instagram content stemming from media that are close to the Kremlin.
Overall, platforms’ active participation in warfare activities is another element that may help explain
the mutual dependence. As platforms become essential partners in pursuing a large number of military
activities, the DoD is induced to seek stable and effective alliances with them. In this respect, the
bargaining power of platforms may grow as they increase the amount of critical information under their
control and the exclusivity of the technology-specific capabilities they develop. On the other hand, being
involved in close relationships with military apparatuses, which operate with logics that differ from that
of standard market relationships, exposes to risks and may reduce platforms’ strategic and operational
flexibility (Pianta, 1989). No less relevant, the integration between platforms and the military agencies
could be threatened by the conflict between top managers, aimed at meeting DoD’s demand, and highly
skilled personnel e.g., engineers and software developers which may consider the development of
war-related technologies ethically unacceptable (Gonzales, 2023).
5
Conclusions
According to imperialism studies and Monopoly Capital tradition, military expenditure and warfare
are the result of governments’ active role in supporting the capital accumulation of monopolistic
corporations. Although with important differences among them, authors belonging to these schools
have highlighted the convergence of interests and strategies on the part of the state, on the one hand,
and monopoly capital, on the other, as an intrinsic feature of capitalist accumulation and the driving
force of inter-imperialist conflicts.
Building on these theories, in this work we attempted to show how digital platforms present both
similarities and discontinuities in the state-corporations relationship, ‘blurring’ its boundaries and giving
rise to a form of ‘mutual dependence’. In particular, three main elements lying at the basis of the state-
platforms mutual dependence were detected: an ‘originary linkage’ binding the development of giant
privately-owned platforms with governments’ R&D military efforts, the critical nature of
infrastructures and technologies controlled by digital platforms, and their role as their government’s
47https://www.aboutamazon.com/news/aws/safeguarding-ukraines-data-to-preserve-its-present-and-build-its-future
48Ibidem.
49See:
“Microsoft
extends
free
tech
support
for
Ukraine
through
2023, Reuters, 3
November
2022, available
at:
https://www.reuters.com/technology/microsoft-extends-free-tech-support-ukraine-through-2023-2022-11-03/. Last access: 29
November 2023.
21
‘eyes and ears’ (both at home and abroad). In addition to their systemic relevance allowing platforms to
activate effective ‘retaliatory power’ vis-à-vis public authorities (Ietto-Gillies, 2012) , the state-platforms
dependence is fundamentally related to the complex, cumulative and idiosyncratic nature of the productive
and technological capabilities developed and mastered by digital corporations. We contended that this is
especially true in the security and military sector, where technological dependence is magnified, and the
state-platforms overlap turns out to be substantial. On the other hand, we showed that the resources and
support that the State provides to platforms are of utmost importance as an accumulation mean, demand-
pull innovation driver as well as a tool to break down barriers to domestic and foreign expansion.
Leveraging quantitative and qualitative data and focusing on the US case, we also documented the
growing prominence of platforms as DoD contractors, which goes hand in hand with their role as
developers and masters of key strategic information-related infrastructures. Finally, digital platforms
differ from more traditional TNCs insofar as they are not only critical suppliers to military agencies and
traditional military suppliers. Remarkably enough, these corporations develop and deploy the same dual
technologies that enable them to dominate the digital market to also play an active role in war scenarios,
such as the current war in Ukraine.
The relationship between the state and corporations (including platforms) is much more complex
than what has been conveyed here, making further research much needed. In this respect, three elements
are worth mentioning. Although we emphasized the convergence between corporate and state strategies,
the latter can easily clash to the extent that, for example, the expansion of the former leads to actions
contradicting the objectives of the latter (and vice versa). Additionally, we have not taken into
account the fragmented and conflictual nature of public authorities, including the political dimension. The
State and its apparatuses are not monolithic, as interest groups in perpetual conflict shape their
forms and orientation, including relationships with corporations. This can have significant effects on
the degree of State-platforms mutual dependence. Likewise, a stronger reliance on platforms by
government agencies can influence the forms and evolution of public institutions.
Finally, this work casts a sinister light on digital technologies, often naively considered as ‘neutral’
and capable of indiscriminately improving the human condition. On the contrary, if their development
is bound between the support of monopolistic interests and the design of technologies suitable for
effective surveillance and killing, social discontent could result in a brand new ‘luddism’. At this time,
not driven (or not solely) by the fear of mass unemployment, but by a more general desire to preserve
the human race from the perverse alliance of public and private sorcerer’s apprentices (assuming that
this distinction makes any sense). We believe, however, that this risk can be averted, provided that
one is willing to question the subordination of the production of knowledge and digital technologies to
the expansionist strategies of platforms and states, in favour of their radical reorientation towards the
satisfaction of social needs.
22
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6
Appendix
XX Century TNC
Digital platforms
Capitalistic phase
Managerial
Neo-liberal
Dominant sector
Manufacturing
Services
Strategic objectives
Controlling the economic space
by expanding physical assets
and (to a lower extent) intangible
ones (e.g., patents, trademarks)
Controlling (selectively) physical assets
and (extensively) intangibles, data and
data-related infrastructures
Growth drivers
Supply-side economies of scale
Supply
and
demand-side
economies
of
scale (e.g., two-side network effects)
Capital structure
Concentration and centralization
Centralization without concentration
Corporate governance
High profits and dividend pay-out
ratio
Relatively low profits/revenue ratio, share-
holder buyback, selective investments to
control data-related infrastructures
Internationalization
strategies
Massive FDIs, directly exercised
hierarchical control along the SC,
centralization of R&D
FDI lightness, externalization and indirect
control, dominance over the innovation
ecosystem
Control over the labor
force
Taylorism/Toyotism
Digital Taylorism
Control over demand
flows
Marketing and advertising
Targted ads, ’anticipation’ of demand
flows, induced behavior
State-corporation nexus
Lobbying activities and retaliatory
power
Lobbying, retaliatory power magnified by
the control of data and related
infrastruc
tures
Table A1:
XX Century TNCs vs digital platforms
27
... By the end of the millennium, the US current account deficit with the rest of the world skyrocketed, 1 which represented less available funds for long-term (military) R&D bets. Coveri et al. (2023) analyze data on government budget allocations for R&D (GBARD) for Defense from 1995 to 2021 as a percentage of total GBARD. The authors highlight that the share of US GBARD for Defense is much higher than for other core OECD economies. ...
... Microsoft, by far, concentrates most of the sharp increase in the number and specially the monetary value of military (and security) procurement contracts. Between 2008 and 2021, Microsoft received $3.2 billion from the US DoD followed by Amazon, which was awarded $50 million (Coveri et al. 2023). These are meaningful figures but for Microsoft and Amazon they represent pocket money. ...
... The US Congress rejected the Army request to fund 6,900 HoloLens goggles and also reduced the US Army funding request from $400 million to $40 million that was given to Microsoft, with an additional $125 million coming straight from the US Army, for continuing the gadget's development. 14 Featuring less prominently in the number and monetary value of awarded contracts (Coveri et al. 2023), Google's AI for military uses dates back, at least, to Project Maven. This was a Pentagon initiative that used Google's computer vision technologies to analyze drone surveillance footage. ...
Article
I analyze the relation between what Weiss (2014) dubbed the United States National Security State (US NSS) and US Big Tech focusing on artificial intelligence (AI). I argue that the US NSS was an innovation planner until the 1990s and advance the hypothesis that, amid that vacuum, this millennium has seen the emergence of AI planning by US Big Tech. This has resulted in tensions with the US NSS given the centrality of AI in the military–industrial complex and ultimately for buttressing American primacy, which has always been the US NSS’s main goal. Amid today’s global turbulence, this tension has leaned towards a strategic yet asymmetric alliance that I define as a frenemy relation. Beyond the tit-for-tat between the US NSS and Big Tech companies, their experiences as innovation planners open space for prefiguring an alternative, a democratic way of planning innovation for the common good.
... La prima ha svelato la fragilità di un sistema mondiale fondato su catene globali del valore tanto lunghe e articolate quanto fragili, soggette a shock idiosincratici capaci di mettere a rischio l'operatività di intere filiere produttive (Baldwin e Freeman, 2022;Coveri e Zanfei, 2022). La seconda ha ricordato che i fenomeni economici e quelli geopolitici sono irrimediabilmente intrecciati (Coveri e al., 2023). Le guerre combattute sul campo sono sempre il riflesso di conflitti economici, legati al controllo di mercati, tecnologie e materie prime strategiche (Edler e al., 2023). ...