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81
Estudios Internacionales 206 (2023)–ISSN 0719-3769 • 81–109
Instituto de Estudios Internacionales–Universidad de Chile
The Inner Circle of Presidents
Ignacio Arana Araya*
Who belongs to the inner circle of presidents remains unders-
tudied. Preceding research has mostly focused on advisors and
ministers separately, and has not integrated other groups who also
influence presidents. I argue that families, advisors, and ministers
are members of the inner circle of presidents and support the lea-
ders’ aective, intellectual, and political needs, respectively. I also
propose that the inner circle becomes more functional when its
three component groups work with a clear division of labor, are
diverse, and combine hierarchical and horizontal relations with
presidents. Semi-structured interviews conducted with former
Latin American presidents support that inner circles are compo-
sed of family, advisors, and ministers, although more evidence is
needed to assess what constitutes a functional inner circle.
Keywords: Presidents – inner circle – presidential families –
advisors – ministers.
Quién pertenece al círculo íntimo de los presidentes ha sido
poco estudiado. Las investigaciones precedentes se han centrado
Assistant Professor at the Carnegie Mellon Institute for Strategy and Technology at Car-
negie Mellon Uni versity. iarana@andrew.cmu.edu ORCID: 0000-0002-8251-5598..
Enviado: 20 de octubre de 2023. Aceptado: 15 de diciembre de 2023.
*
82
Estudios Internacionales 206 (2023) • Universidad de Chile
principalmente en asesores y ministros por separado, y no han
integrado otros grupos que también inuyen en los presiden tes.
Argumento que las familias, los asesores y los ministros son
miembros del círculo íntimo de los presidentes y apoyan las
necesidades afectivas, intelectuales y políticas de los líderes, res-
pectivamente. También propongo que el círculo íntimo se vuelve
más funcional cuando los tres grupos que lo componen trabajan
con una clara división del trabajo, son diversos y combinan
relaciones jerárquicas y horizontales con los presidentes. Las
entrevistas semiestructuradas realizadas con 24 ex presidentes
latinoamericanos respaldan que los círculos íntimos están com-
puestos por familiares, asesores y ministros, aunque se necesita
más evidencia para evaluar qué constituye un círculo íntimo
funcional.
Palabras clave: Presidentes – círculo íntimo – familias presiden-
ciales – asesores – ministros.
83
I A A
The Inner Circle of Presidents
.- I
Who belongs to the presidents’ in-
ner circle, and what functions do they
serve? The role of presidential advi-
sors has been prolifically studied, yet
we lack a thorough conceptualization
of which individuals most closely in-
fluence presidents despite presiden-
tialism being present in more than
fiy countries and almost years
old. This paper attempts to advance
the study of the presidents’ inner cir-
cle by examining its main component
groups. I argue that the inner circle
is composed of family members (ro-
mantic partners and relatives), advisors,
and ministers, who primarily support
the aective, intellectual, and political
needs of presidents, respectively. Fur-
thermore, I propose that the presidents’
inner circle is more functional when
families, advisors, and ministers have
a high division of labor among them,
leaders choose diverse subordinates,
and have a combination of hierarchi-
cal and horizontal relations with them.
“The buck stops here,” read Ameri-
can President Harry S. Truman’s sign
on his desk, alluding to his role as the
ultimate decision-maker in his admi-
nistration. Presidential power is exerci-
sed through decisions, and the primary
function of the inner circle is to in-
fluence presidential decision-making.
Therefore, it is necessary to understand
presidential performance to unpack
the inner circle.
Presidents avoid common challen-
ges that average citizens face, yet they
experience unique pressures. Presi-
dents rarely have to worry about their
finances, and they count on assistants
to avoid chores like paying bills, bu-
ying groceries, cooking, cleaning, dri-
ving cars, and maintaining homes.
Presidents receive help in planning
their agenda and the logistics of their
schedule. However, their days are
spent navigating an array of unique
challenges. Presidents face numerous
demands from voters, political parties,
the media, and organized domestic
and international actors. Furthermo-
re, presidents serve several challenging
functions, including being heads of
state and government, party and bu-
reaucracy leaders, legislators, comman-
ders in chief, and top diplomats. Presi-
dents must regularly speak publicly on
a diverse range of subjects, and their
actions and omissions are thoroughly
scrutinized.
The inner circle can exacerbate
the challenges presidents face by pus-
hing them to make wrong decisions,
and by draining their time, mental
energy, and physical resources when
they could be more eciently used
elsewhere. At the same time, a func-
tional inner circle can mitigate the
numerous diculties presidents have
to deal with by providing them subs-
tantial support for the decisions they
must make.
84
Estudios Internacionales 206 (2023) • Universidad de Chile
The prevailing literature about the
inner circle has centered chiefly on
advisors (e.g., Preston ; Link ;
Dickinson ; Hess and Pfiner
). Significant research has been
conducted about presidential cabinets
(e.g., Amorim Neto ; Chasquetti
; Martínez-Gallardo ; Gonzá-
lez-Bustamante and Olivares ), but
few works have examined ministers
as members of the inner circle and
their interaction with other inner cir-
cle groups (exceptions are Arana Ara-
ya and Jofré & Villar Mena ).
Similarly, except for case studies, few
works have examined the influence of
presidential families on presidents. Al-
though there is active research on first
ladies (e.g., Balcácer , Guerrero
Valencia and Arana Araya , ),
how families influence presidential
decision-making remains unclear. In
sum, at varying speeds and depths, the
literature on presidential advisors, mi-
nisters, and families has grown mostly
independently of each other—certain-
ly not as part of an integrated research
agenda on the inner circle.
This paper proposes that we can
clearly distinguish three groups of in-
ner circle members. While presidents
can surround themselves with a variety
of people, three groups should be stan-
dard across time and space: family, ad-
visors, and ministers. Families are the
closest group to presidents and inclu-
de romantic partners (if any) and re-
latives (friends akin to being relatives
can also fall in this group). Presidents
have a family that knows them inti-
mately and supports their emotional
needs. A second group is composed of
advisors. Presidents routinely rely on
interdisciplinary groups of advisors
who provide counsel on general and
specialized matters. Although advisors
support presidents as politicians, their
advice transcends politics. I define the
input of advisors as mainly intellectual
because their contributions to presi-
dents oen cover dierent fields of
knowledge and combine strategic and
tactical support. Presidents oen select
this group based on a mix of technical
expertise and personal relationships.
Some advisors can be friends or rela-
tives of presidents, but leaders rely on
them mainly due to their intellectual
support. The third group is the most
political and personally distant from
presidents: ministers. While ministers
can also be friends of presidents or
provide intellectual advice, their pri-
mary function is to implement the
policies that represent the presidents’
preferences. Among the three groups,
ministers are in the most vulnerable
position. They are not connected by
blood or love to presidents as families
are and are not insulated from public
scrutiny as advisors frequently are. Fur-
thermore, ministers are more exposed
than families and advisors to political
pressures and public scrutiny.
I also propose that the inner circle
is functional when these three groups
85
have a high division of labor, are diver-
se, and have a combination of hierar-
chical and horizontal relations with
presidents. This means that the aec-
tive, intellectual, and political boun-
daries among the groups remain clear;
that inner group conflict tends to re-
main minimal; that presidents are ex-
posed to dierent viewpoints; that the
groups oer presidents general and
specialized advice and a combination
of holistic support with internal criti-
cism and disagreements.
To examine the plausibility of the
argument, I systematically examined
the answers that former Latin Ame-
rican presidents from ten countries
gave in semi-structured interviews I
conducted in nine countries. Presi-
dents were asked about numerous
subjects, but in this case, I focused my
analysis on the questions related to
their inner circle. In particular, I asked
presidents about their decision-ma-
king process, the potential influence
of their civil status on their performan-
ce, and whether they could name life
events that changed their understan-
ding of politics. The responses stron-
gly support the proposition about the
composition of the inner circle but
leave further room for study on its
ideal organization.
. I P
According to Neustadt (), the
president’s actual influence on go-
vernment outcomes is exerted predo-
minantly through negotiations. The
system of checks and balances forces
presidents to negotiate with institu-
tions (e.g., Congress) and organized
actors (e.g., the press and interest
groups) to achieve their goals. The-
refore, examining the influences on
presidential decision-making is impor-
tant to understand presidential nego-
tiation skills.
Previous studies centered in Latin
America have associated executive de-
cision-making with factors such as the
presidents’ leadership style (White-
head ), relation to the ruling party
(Corrales ), parties’ characteristics
(Levitsky ), patterns of legislati-
ve careers (Ames ), constitutional
powers (Arana Araya ), and public
opinion polls (Stokes ).
There has also been a prolifera-
tion of works centered on dierent
groups that influence presidential de-
cisions, such as advisors and minis-
ters. These works have examined how
advisors and ministers relate to pre-
sidents, but neither group has been
studied as part of the inner circle of
presidents (see Arana Araya and
I A A
The Inner Circle of Presidents
86
Estudios Internacionales 206 (2023) • Universidad de Chile
Jofré & Villar Mena for excep-
tions). In this section, I briefly describe
what is known about the groups that
surround presidents.
Family
Curiously, despite presidential fa-
milies being the closest group to pre-
sidents, their influence on leaders re-
mains largely a mystery. Research on
the relatives of presidents remains pri-
marily based on case studies (Keller-
man is an exception). The depth
and details of case studies are excellent
for exploring and understanding com-
plex processes and generating hypo-
theses. However, they tend to lack ge-
neralizability due to their focus on
specific contexts. A larger sample must
be examined to identify cross-national
trends and achieve generalizability.
Recent years have seen a substantial
increase in Large-N research on first
ladies, likely due to their increasing
campaign participation. For example,
Arana Araya and Guerrero Valencia
() documented that between
and , former first ladies ran twen-
ty-six times for the presidency, vice pre-
sidency, or Congress in Latin America.
The candidates were highly successful;
they were elected nineteen times. As
the authors claim, former first ladies
are unique candidates because they
receive significant media coverage and
have substantial public recognition;
they enjoy privileges that allow them
to expand their political capital; and
their personas are always tied to a for-
mer president. These characteristics
allow them to become highly compe-
titive candidates.
Some first ladies have held poli-
tical oces before and aer serving
in the executive, and have also exerci-
sed active influence in governments.
Guerrero Valencia and Arana Araya
() documented that among the
eighty-eight first ladies who served in
Latin America between and ,
sixty-six actively worked on public
policies. In sum, it is clear that first
ladies are “much more than compa-
nions” to sitting presidents (Guerrero
Valencia & Arana Araya, ). Howe-
ver, how exactly first ladies influence
presidential decision-making remains
underexplored.
Advisors
Thus far, most literature about the
presidents’ inner circle has centered
on presidential advisors. For example,
Preston’s () book The President and
His Inner Circle only examines the ad-
visory group of six American presi-
dents to understand foreign policy
decision-making.
Presidents have relied on a close
group of aides since the inception
of presidentialism. Perhaps the first
time that advisors received thorou-
gh public attention was during the
87
administration of American President
Andrew Jackson (-). Contem-
porary politicians named Jackson’s
unocial advisors the “kitchen ca-
binet,” alluding to the influence the
group was believed to exert on the
president instead of his formal cabinet.
Presidential advisors can be of va-
rious kinds: friends, academics, tech-
nicians, political operatives, former
bureaucrats, or a combination of the-
se roles. Advisors hardly hold formal
charges or make public statements. In
contrast to legislators or ministers, ad-
visors avoid public controversies be-
cause their role demands discretion to
perform eectively. Most of the time,
presidential advisors are unknown to
the public, and therefore, the rights
or wrongs of their proposals and tas-
ks do not transcend the threshold for
public scrutiny.
Preceding research suggests that
presidents can organize their sta of
advisors in hierarchical, competitive,
or collegial ways (Johnson ). In a
hierarchical structure, chief advisors
coordinate with subordinate advisors
and decide what information reaches
the president. In the competitive style,
presidents position themselves as re-
ferees and allow the duplication of
duties among advisors, who compete
for the leaders’ attention. Finally, in the
collegial style, the president leads a dis-
cussion group, encouraging collective
decision-making.
Progress has also been made in exa-
mining the composition, number, and
rotation of advisors. Dickinson (,
p. -) found that if the advisory
team is highly technical, it will tend
to underestimate the political implica-
tions of the president’s decisions. Simi-
larly, advisors with more political than
technical expertise tend to undervalue
technical challenges.
Presidential studies have also docu-
mented a systematic expansion in the
number of presidential advisors (Hess
& Pfiner ). For some authors, the
expansion responds to the growing
demands placed on presidents due to
a larger and more complex govern-
ment. Inácio and Llanos () found
that since the s, the Argentinian
and Brazilian presidential oces have
tended to grow as presidents face in-
creasing political challenges. Others,
such as Dickinson (), propose that
presidents have increased their advi-
sory groups to reduce the uncertainty
surrounding political negotiations via
more specialized and accurate infor-
mation. Lewis () provides another
perspective, claiming that presidents
attempt to expand their control over
specific policy areas through personal
counselors.
The rotation of the presidential
advisory group causes discontinuity
in a team that needs to be routinely
coordinated to assist the president.
Research on the American presiden-
cy has revealed at least two causes of
I A A
The Inner Circle of Presidents
88
Estudios Internacionales 206 (2023) • Universidad de Chile
advisors’ rotations. Before elections,
presidential candidates need a group
of specialists in candidate-centered,
highly mediated campaigns who are
not necessarily versed in state admi-
nistration. Therefore, once elected,
presidents tend to replace their cam-
paign advisors (Dickinson & Tenpas
). Another rotation oen occurs
near the end of presidential terms, as
presidents need to resolve more issues,
leading leaders to interact with a na-
rrower group of advisors (Link ).
Light () also claims that conflicts
among the American president’s advi-
sors usually intensify when presidents
begin to focus on reelection or near
the end of their terms. Similarly, Wal-
cott and Hult () found that presi-
dents replace organizational types that
promote more sources of information
and advice when they deal with poli-
tical uncertainty.
Certainly, more research should
be conducted to uncover the compo-
sition and internal dynamics of the
presidents’ advisory group. Although
studies have examined diaries and pre-
sidential agendas to try to unravel the
real influence of advisors on presidents,
it is dicult to estimate the advisors’
eect because the available data about
their characteristics and performance
tends to be limited (Link , -).
There is much to learn about the ad-
visors’ demographic and professional
characteristics, routines, and patterns
of interaction with leaders.
Ministers
Ministers have traditionally not
been studied as part of the inner cir-
cle, but research on cabinets has been
prolific. For example, there is evidence
that in multiparty systems, presidents
tend to appoint ministers from other
parties to maximize their legislative su-
pport (Amorim Neto ; Chasquetti,
Buquet, & Cardarello ). Amorim
Neto () also showed that presi-
dents appoint ministers considering
variables such as the relative strength
of parties in Congress and the formal
legislative powers of presidents.
Mejía-Guinand, Botero, and Solano
() examined the strategies presi-
dents follow to minimize the agency
loss that happens when they appoint
ministers from other parties. The au-
thors find that the percentage of minis-
ters who do not belong to the ruling
party is a good predictor of the num-
ber of changes that presidents will in-
troduce to their executive oces to
monitor the work of their ministers.
A meaningful subject has been
cabinet rotation. Martínez-Gallardo
() proposed and found suppor-
tive evidence that Latin American
presidents change ministers to deal
with unanticipated shocks and to ad-
just their administrations to changes
in the political and policy environ-
ment. She also found that weak pre-
sidents (i.e., those with limited for-
mal powers and low political support
89
and popularity) are more inclined to
change ministers strategically. Gon-
zález-Bustamante and Olivares ()
analyzed the survival of ministers
in Chile between and . The
authors found that critical events such
as corruption scandals and economic
crises explain cabinet turnover and
that particular individual characteris-
tics of leaders, such as profession and
sex, also explain their survival rate, al-
though it varied by decade.
Researchers have also addressed the
relative importance of ministries over
time. Camerlo and Martínez-Gallardo
() claimed that ministries gain re-
levance when they are allowed to exe-
cute public policies relevant to gover-
nments, influence the political agenda,
allocate discretionary funds, and in-
tervene in the performance of other
ministries. Tumeglero () recently
used social network analysis tools to
examine interactions recorded in
the Brazilian President’s Daily Diary
to examine whom President Jair Bolso-
naro relied on in the first four months
of the COVID- pandemic outbreak.
She found that Bolsonaro bypassed
the Ministry of Health despite the mi-
nistry’s formal management of the pu-
blic health emergency. Instead, Bolso-
naro relied heavily on ministry-level
oces that support the presidency,
such as the Civil House, to acquire
information.
Finally, there has been a consis-
tent trend in studying the individual
characteristics of ministers in dierent
countries, such as Argentina (Camerlo
), Brazil (Amorim Neto ), and
Uruguay (Chasquetti, Buquet, & Car-
darello ). These works have exami-
ned the formation and change of presi-
dential cabinets considering variables
such as party aliation, previous po-
litical experience, and the technical
expertise of ministers. This research
shed light on who is appointed to ca-
binets and their performance in them.
However, an area that remains un-
derexplored is the relationship minis-
ters have with advisors (Arana Araya
). There are plenty of opportuni-
ties for direct conflict between both
groups. Ministers have reasons to dis-
trust advisors because they enjoy pre-
sidents’ trust and have frequent and
direct access to the leaders. From their
privileged position, advisors can oppo-
se ministers’ preferences and policies.
As Mejía-Guinand, Botero, and Solano
() showed, presidents are tempted
to use advisors to minimize the infor-
mation asymmetry that ministers have
due to their superior knowledge of the
departments they lead. Presidents may
request advisors to oversee and asses
what ministers do, and may replace
them for specific tasks when ministers
underperform. Although advisors may
also have preferences that deviate from
the leaders’, they have strong incentives
to follow presidential agendas because
they can be dismissed at will.
I A A
The Inner Circle of Presidents
90
Estudios Internacionales 206 (2023) • Universidad de Chile
Despite limited research on the in-
teraction between ministers and ad-
visors, recent research has started to
examine both groups jointly. Jofré
and Villar Mena () studied the
trajectories and personal characteris-
tics of seventy-seven ministers and
forty-six advisors of five Chilean pre-
sidents between and . The
authors found that ministers tend to
have stronger political capital than ad-
visors and that their profiles are also
more similar to those of the leaders.
. A C L I C
The previous section showed that
presidential advisors and ministers
have been prolifically studied by re-
searchers of the presidency, and that
there is a growing research stream on
first ladies. However, these bodies of
knowledge have not been suciently
integrated as part of a research agenda
centered on the inner circle of presi-
dents. In this section, I propose that
presidential families, advisors, and mi-
nisters should be jointly studied as
members of the presidents’ inner circle.
Then I propose how these three groups
that support presidents can maximize
presidential decision-making.
Table summarizes similarities and
dierences among families, advisors,
and ministers. The personal closeness
to presidents is a relevant variable. Ce-
teris paribus, individuals closest to pre-
sidents have the potential to influence
them the most and are less likely to be
removed. Family members should be
closer to presidents than advisors, and
advisors closer than ministers. Family
links tend to be intimate because they
are based on familial bonds and love.
Presidents do not need to be close to
all their relatives, but all relatives in
the inner circle should be loyally com-
mitted to the well-being of the leaders
and receive their attention, trust, and
personal esteem.
Presidents choose advisors based on
their trust in their expertise, but per-
sonal trust is also relevant. Therefore,
presidents oen choose advisors that
are moderately to highly close to them,
including friends, relatives, colleagues,
and scholars who they knew before
taking oce. The personal closeness
of ministers to presidents tend to ran-
ge from none to moderate. Althou-
gh presidents may appoint relatives
or friends as ministers, in multiparty
systems, presidents tend to appoint
ministers from pro-government par-
ties to gain or maintain legislative su-
pport (Amorim Neto ; Chasquetti,
Buquet, & Cardarello ). It is not
uncommon for presidents to appoint
ministers they know little about or do
not even trust.
91
A second relevant dierence among
the three groups is the nature of the
support they give to presidents. While
each group can provide aective, inte-
llectual, and political support, families
mostly serve the first, advisors the se-
cond, and ministers the third function.
Presidents regularly make decisions
under pressure and that significantly
impact the lives of citizens. They also
face numerous unforeseeable crises
and undesirable situations. All of this
is emotionally draining on the presi-
dents. Families can provide much-nee-
ded emotional support, but can also
worsen the toll. Family disputes, scan-
dals, and divorces have destabilized
presidencies. For example, aer Susana
Higuchi distanced herself from Peru-
vian President Alberto Fujimori, she
accused his relatives (and later, the pre-
sident himself) of corruption. She also
claimed intelligence agencies tortu-
red her, and created her own political
party with the aim of running for the
presidency to compete against Fuji-
mori. The public disputes between the
two lasted several years (Godoy ).
Presidents choose advisors to su-
pport their decision-making in areas
they feel have a deficit or need parti-
cular attention. Although advisors su-
pport presidents as politicians, their
function extends beyond the day-to-
day political support. I propose that
advisors serve as intellectual comple-
ments that help presidents with their
overall strategy—what they want to
achieve in their terms—and tactics—
the specific steps presidents must take
to achieve their long-term goals. Al-
though political considerations are a
permanent concern for advisors, they
also tend to support a wide spectrum
of presidential decision-making. Advi-
sors can aid with abstract reasoning to
develop logical, eective, and ecient
I A A
The Inner Circle of Presidents
Table 1. Inner Circle’s Characteristics
Personal
Closeness
Nature of
Support
Diversity Type of
relationship
General
input
Specia-
lized
input
Family Very high
to intimate
Aective Low Horizontal High Low
Advisors Moderate
to high
Intellectual Unclear Horizontal or
hierarchical
High Moderate
Ministers None to
moderate
Political Moderate
to high
Hierarchical Moderate High
92
Estudios Internacionales 206 (2023) • Universidad de Chile
solutions to unforeseen problems. Ad-
ditionally, they can aid leaders with
moral, philosophical, and ideological
reflections they must consider. Advi-
sors oen have a technical expertise in
areas such as the economy, law, com-
munications, security, military, and
diplomatic matters, that they perma-
nently work on—sometimes aided by
other sta members— to support pre-
sidential decision-making.
Ministers’ support for presidents
is largely political because their main
mission is to execute the leaders’ vi-
sion in the departments they oversee.
Ministers should be experts on the
ministries’ focus areas, have an acute
sense of how to navigate the political
context, and strong negotiation and
management skills. Ministers’ tasks are
varied and challenging. They formula-
te, implement, and oversee the execu-
tion of government policies; negotiate
with multiple actors, from unions to
legislators to other ministries; manage
budgets; distribute resources; and lead
a large number of civil servants.
A relevant challenge for presidents
is to appoint ministers committed to
their goals. Ministers are oen inves-
ted in expanding their own political
capital; several aspire to the presiden-
cy, and many reach it. Furthermore,
ministers may have competing prin-
cipals: the president and their parties.
The ministers’ parties may have poli-
cy views that dier from those of the
president, and thus push ministers to
deviate from presidential orders.
The diversity of the three groups
in the inner circle also diers. Fami-
ly in the inner circle tends to be ho-
mogeneous. Presidents choose their
romantic partners and the relatives
that surround them. Assortative ma-
ting theory suggests that people oen
choose as partners individuals simi-
lar to them (Schwartz ). Presu-
mably, presidential partners and clo-
se relatives share the leaders’ political
worldview.
Whether advisors represent diver-
se viewpoints depends on how pre-
sidents select them. Advisors surely
represent homogeneous views when
leaders choose “yes-men,” but they may
also lack diversity when they share si-
milar backgrounds. Presidents oen
need to make a conscious eort to suc-
cessfully build diverse teams. Thus, the
diversity of advisors remains unclear.
The diversity of cabinets tends to be
moderate to high. Presidents are under
strong pressures to select a diversified
cabinet. In multiparty systems, presi-
dents typically have to accept minis-
ters from other parties due to their coa-
litions’ requests. This guarantees some
ideological diversity. Furthermore, the
specialization and size of ministries
(e.g., Brazil has thirty-one ministries)
demands professional and technical
diversity. Finally, the cabinet is under
the permanent scrutiny of the public
93
and the media, which sometimes crea-
tes pressure to align the cabinet with
the national demographics in terms
of gender, ethnicity, religion, age, and
socio-economic background.
Research has shown that the perso-
nality of presidents strongly explains
their behavior (Arana Araya ).
Personality traits may determine, to
a large extent, whether leaders relate
to others hierarchically or horizon-
tally. Hierarchical relations are ver-
tically oriented, with authority and
autonomy concentrated at the top.
Power and decision-making are cen-
tralized, and communication and de-
cision-making follow a top-down flow.
In contrast, when presidents choose
to have more horizontal relations
with subordinates, they promote an
egalitarian approach that encourages
cooperation, shared decision-making,
informal relations, and organic lea-
dership. Dierent views are regarded
as complementarian rather than com-
petitive, encouraging innovation. The
flow of information is more fluid and
decentralized.
Due to the familial or romantic na-
ture of their relationships, family rela-
tions tend to be horizontal. Because
several advisors tend to be personally
close to presidents, their relationships
may also be horizontal. However, this
depends on the leaders, who can choo-
se to keep a strictly hierarchical rela-
tionship. In contrast, the relationship
between presidents and their cabinet
tends to be hierarchical, even if some
ministers may be personal friends of
presidents. Ministers are legally subor-
dinated to the president and if they do
not perform their duties, they can be
easily dismissed.
I also distinguish between the ge-
neral and specialized input leaders are
likely to receive from their inner cir-
cles. Family members are more likely
to share their views over general to-
pics based on their values, ideas, and
emotions. The bases of their input will
most likely come from their critical
thinking applied to their personal ex-
perience and anecdotal evidence. Ad-
visors should have access to the same
information as presidents, including
private polls, focus groups, and pri-
vate information, to which they can
apply their expert knowledge. Thus,
their unique position allows them to
provide general and specialized input.
Finally, ministers must provide detai-
led input about the departments they
lead to presidents. However, because
ministers are also politicians that par-
ticipate in their governments’ general
strategies, they may occasionally pro-
vide general input to presidents. This
likely varies by ministry and throu-
ghout the term, as not all ministries
are equally relevant and specialized
(Camerlo & Martínez-Gallardo ).
For example, the ministry of interior
or internal aairs has a much broader
scope than the ministry of sports. Also,
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since the relative importance of minis-
tries varies over time (Tumeglero ),
the value of ministries’ input ebbs and
flows throughout presidential terms.
I propose that the combined cha-
racteristics of presidential families,
advisors, and ministers can explain
whether presidents will count on a
functional inner circle. More specifi-
cally, I argue that a functional inner
circle is one where families, advisors,
and ministers have a high division of
labor, presidents choose diverse subor-
dinates, and presidents have a mix of
hierarchical and horizontal relations
with them.
By a high division of labor, I refer
to families providing mostly aective
support, advisors providing mostly in-
tellectual support, and ministers pro-
viding mostly political support. This
division of labor allows presidents to
increase the eciency and producti-
vity of their output. The eciency in-
creases because each group provides
support relating to its own set of tas-
ks and thus do not deviate resources
to meddle in other areas. Working in
their respective areas without major
disruptions allow families, advisors,
and ministers to improve their pro-
ductivity by gaining knowledge, speed,
and accuracy.
By rationalizing resources, the divi-
sion of labor also minimizes conflict
within the inner circle. As Arana Araya
() proposed, the level of potential
conflict increases when presidents pro-
mote competition and appoint minis-
ters who do not belong to the leaders’
party. When partisan ministers and ad-
visors overlap in their functions, the
government is more likely to design
and implement contradictory policies,
laws, and administrative rulings. The
government agenda loses clarity and
coherence, and presidential leadership
may be seen as incoherent and weak.
If presidents sideline partisan minis-
ters, they risk losing legislative support.
Moreover, if leaders fire their advisors,
they may lose much needed intellec-
tual support. Clearly, the lowest de-
gree of conflict between advisors and
ministers occurs when the president
promotes division of labor between
the two groups and freely choses mi-
nisters that will not have other parties
as principals.
When conflict is avoided, leaders
spend less time and energy resolving
internal battles. The division of labor
also results in presidents keeping fami-
ly very close, advisors somewhat clo-
se, and ministers further away. Family
members will be less likely to interfere
with policymaking, ministers will be
less focused in fighting advisors, and
advisors will not develop an exceptio-
nally close relationship with leaders.
An inner circle that enjoys division
of labor should also provide presidents
a balanced combination of general
95
and specialized support. Leaders need
to permanently align their tactics to
their strategies, associating their day-
to-day decisions to the main goals they
have established for their terms. This
means that presidents oen need to
make a multitude of tactical conces-
sions to achieve their strategic goals.
If presidents focus on their strategy
but do not spend enough resources
planning the paths needed to achieve
their governmental goals, they will un-
derperform. Similarly, a disconnection
between tactics and strategy can push
presidents to misspend their time on
an incoherent agenda and develop an
excessive focus on short-term victories
at the expense of their overall strategy.
Despite its advantages, the division
of labor among the three groups risks
falling into groupthinking. This con-
cept has been mostly developed by
psychologists and alludes to situations
in which group members attempt to
increase cohesion by prioritizing con-
sensus over critical thinking and avoi-
ding the examination of alternative
viewpoints. Groupthink risks subop-
timal and irrational decisions beco-
ming normal because group members
suppress their diering views.
To minimize this problem, presi-
dents should select diverse teams of
advisors and ministers willing to as-
sert their ideas (families, as discussed,
tend to be homogeneous). There are
dierent types of diversity. In this case,
the diversity I am referring to is varia-
tion in professional background and
expertise, although cultural, ethnic,
religious, age, gender, and sexual di-
versity also tend to bring an array of
worldviews. To maximize this diversity,
presidents need to promote the critical
evaluation of ideas and facts, encou-
rage direct and open communication,
and guarantee that dissenting views
will not be penalized. This proposition
aligns with the robust evidence that
increased workplace diversity impro-
ve outcomes (Gomez & Bernet, ).
Finally, presidents should combi-
ne a mix of hierarchical and horizon-
tal relations with their inner circle to
maximize functionality. Horizontal
relations may enhance the aective
support presidents need, but presiden-
tial leadership will likely be too fre-
quently challenged and ineective if
leaders maintain horizontal relations
with the entirety of their inner circle.
Similarly, strictly hierarchical relations
are likely to push toward groupthin-
king and a deficit of the internal disa-
greements and criticism necessary to
adapt presidential decision making to
challenging situations. Overly hierar-
chical relations will likely undermi-
ne the leaders’ aective, intellectual,
and political support that they need
by creating a false sense of agreement,
obedience, and loyalty.
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. T P P
To understand presidential beha-
vior, between and , I conduc-
ted semi-structured interviews with
twenty-four former Latin American
presidents from ten countries. Most
of the interviews were conducted in
, when I traveled by bus to conduct
field research in six Latin Central Ame-
rican countries: Guatemala, El Salva-
dor, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica,
and Panama.
I tried to interview as many former
presidents as possible. I identified fif-
ty-two Central American leaders ali-
ve, of which thirteen were unreacha-
ble because they were living in other
countries, in poor health, in prison, or
incumbents. I worked to obtain the
contact information for the remai-
ning thirty-nine leaders most oen
by calling national newspapers and
asking for the leaders’ contact infor-
mation. Some former presidents ne-
ver replied, were unavailable, or de-
clined to be interviewed. In the end,
I interviewed eighteen former presi-
dents. Then, between and ,
I interviewed three former Chilean
presidents during a trip to Chile, a Co-
lombian ex-president during a trip to
Bogotá in , and two former rulers
invited to deliver talks at Carnegie Me-
llon University in and .
The result was a diverse sample.
Most presidents were democratic but
I also interviewed a former dictator
(Efraín Ríos Montt of Guatemala).
The list also included one woman
(Laura Chinchilla of Costa Rica), one
impeached and exiled leader (Abda-
lá Bucaram of Ecuador), two puppet
presidents (Francisco Rodríguez and
Nicolás Barletta of Panama), one lea-
der overthrown (Manuel Zelaya of
Honduras), and one Nobel Prize win-
ner (Óscar Arias of Costa Rica; see the
list in the appendix).
In all cases, I attempted to ask twen-
ty-four questions that included topics
such as the leaders’ relation to the
constitution, their personal characte-
ristics, the relationship between the
presidency and the individual charac-
teristics of presidents, and the political
context in which they governed. The
questions were followed up by related
questions, conditional on the leaders’
answers. The length of the interviews
ranged from thirty to eight-eight mi-
nutes. For this study, I used the answers
to three question in which presidents
directly and indirectly discussed the
inner circle:
• “Would you mention any circum-
stances of your life that influenced
your understanding of politics?”
• “Suppose you want to make a de-
cision but do not have all the bac-
kground information you would
like to have to make an informed
decision. What would you do?
97
Would you follow your instincts,
ask for advice, or refrain from ma-
king a decision?
• “Did your marital status influen-
ce your performance as president?
If so, how?”
The interviews show that presidents
tend to feel over-demanded in their
roles as decision makers and rely hea-
vily on the support of others. Accor-
ding to several leaders, presidents have
very limited access to the information
they need. Miguel Ángel Rodríguez
of Costa Rica was categorical in his
response: “Every day I had to make
decisions with an information deficit.”
The problem is that presidents cannot
easily abstain from deciding; most for-
mer presidents agreed that avoiding
making decisions entailed very high
costs. Ricardo Lagos of Chile said that
being prudent when deciding is wise,
but that presidents need to make de-
cisions even when they have little in-
formation. “If I have to decide within
twenty-four hours because the world
may fall, I may try to ask for some
advice, but if it is not possible, well,
hell, presidents make decisions all day.
You try to get as much information
as you can, but sometimes the cost
that you pay for not making a deci-
sion is enormous.” Vinicio Cerezo of
Guatemala claimed that “one of the
fundamental problems of many Latin
American governments is that presi-
dents do not decide, or do it late or
unclearly. This leads to overwhelming
pressures.” Ernesto Pérez of Panama
agreed: “More time allows you to get
better information…[But] there co-
mes a point where the time [availa-
ble] has passed, and you have to make
the decision with the information you
have.”
The permanent information deficit
in which presidents govern makes the
need to understand the inner circle a
pressing matter, given that the closest
groups to presidents influence their
decision-making through the informa-
tion they share with the leaders.
Family
Several interviewees remarked that
their early family socialization into po-
litics contributed to their performance
in oce. Many presidents belonged to
political families and entered politics
as minors. Such was the case for Ro-
berto Micheletti of Honduras, Nicolás
Barletta of Panama, Vinicio Cerezo of
Guatemala, Abdalá Bucaram of Ecua-
dor, Armando Calderón Sol of El Sal-
vador, Miguel Ángel Rodríguez and
Rafael Calderón of Costa Rica, and
Eduardo Frei of Chile. The latter two,
in fact, were sons of presidents.
Eduardo Frei recognized that his
father, who was president from
to , was vital for his engagement
in politics. “I was three years old when
my father was minister, seven when
I accompanied him in his first legis-
lative campaign, fourteen in his first
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presidential adventure. I lived in the
home of a great president, a great sta-
tesman, a great intellectual, and that
was a school for me that you do not
get anywhere else,” he said. Family ties
were also relevant for Abdalá Buca-
ram: “when I was four years old, I ca-
rried cans of paint and painted the
last name of my father and my uncles
on [public] walls [for campaigning].”
Miguel Ángel Rodríguez decided
to become president when he was
years old, aer his grandmother stron-
gly pushed him to become a politi-
cian. Rodríguez said he organized his
entire life to become head of govern-
ment. He studied law and economics
to have the necessary knowledge of a
statesman and worked as an entrepre-
neur to gain economic independence
to fund his political ambitions.
Presidents revealed important insi-
ghts when they were asked about their
civil status. Few presidents denied that
their civil status influenced their per-
formance in oce. That was the case
of Óscar Arias of Costa Rica, Ernesto
Pérez of Panama, and Manuel Zelaya
of Honduras.
However, most interviewees recog-
nized that their marriages—and to a
lesser extent, their families—were fun-
damental in their private and public
lives as presidents. The former presi-
dents claimed that marriages provi-
ded them with emotional stability, mo-
ral advice, and made their lives easier.
Even Arias and Zelaya contradicted
themselves right aer saying that civil
status does not influence presidential
decision making. Arias said that “my
wife in my first government helped
me a lot and it helped me that she was
a very intelligent and very determined
person.” Zelaya claimed, “I have a lot
of emotional stability, in my house, in
my family, in my personal life, with
my sons, daughters, wife… Of course,
stability helps to live in the presiden-
cy… My family was constantly infor-
med about what I did, we talked a lot
about it.”
Most leaders were more open in
acknowledging the contributions of
their romantic partners. Laura Chin-
chilla of Costa Rica acknowledged
her husband’s support as an advisor
in public security issues and in taking
care of their family. “He managed the
house, because I couldn’t. He was the
one who went to [school] meetings
with my son, took him to the doc-
tor, went shopping, in sum, all those
things.” Chinchilla added, “I was very
lucky with my family... It was a bles-
sing because they were very supportive.
I don’t remember a single day, a single
moment of complaining about why
I had gotten involved in what I had
gotten involved in. They were part of
the project in some way, even though
they played a very low profile. Emo-
tionally speaking, they gave me a lot...
You need, in the exercise of power, to
be very emotionally balanced... God
99
forbid someone unstable, right? It im-
pacts everything.”
Rafael Callejas of Honduras said
that he faced a challenging situation
during union strikes in , and that
in those moments he shared decisions
with his wife. “The woman has a sixth
sense, she influences,” he claimed.
Arnoldo Alemán of Nicaragua said
that “It would be a lie if I told you that
the person who sleeps with you, eats
with you, [and] communicates with
you has no impact on a politician…
Women oen have a sixth sense that
we men do not have.” Alemán said that
his wife advised him, accompanied
him, and told him not to let his emo-
tions get the best of him. “[One’s wife]
is your closest person,” he reasoned.
Abel Pacheco of Costa Rica, who
besides being a former president was
also a psychiatrist, stated that “for
anything in life, the civil status is very
important. I had a very unhappy first
marriage, and a second marriage in
which I have been deeply happy. I have
a woman who is wise, a companion, an
artist, who is my friend, my lover, my
advisor. She made it possible for me
to maintain serenity through the pre-
sidency and through all the things in
my life...The support of a good woman
is essential.”
Advisors
Almost all interviewees recognized
that they routinely relied upon advi-
sors to improve their decision-making.
“I had political, personal, legal, and
economic advisors. I also consulted
former presidents,” said Francisco Ro-
dríguez of Panama. Arnoldo Alemán
claimed, “Only dictators think that
they are omnipotent and omnipresent.
However, all democratic governments
rely on a net of social, economic and
interdisciplinary advisors.” Similarly,
Rafael Calderón noted, “I always liste-
ned to many people. One of the things
that you learn is not to rush your de-
cisions, and to meditate on them. Pa-
tience, patience… I permanently relied
on advisors.” Laura Chinchilla claimed
that “listening to someone with expe-
rience is of utmost importance. Espe-
cially if we are talking of subjects I
don’t know well.” Antonio Saca of El
Salvador said, “It is expected that you
trust the people you have close to you.
That I trust them means they are loyal,
something fundamental, and also that
they know the subject for which I have
taken them.”
Some presidents remarked on the
need for advisors to better understand
the scope of dierent subjects, but es-
pecially legal prerogatives and limits.
“Given that I am not well versed in law,
I had excellent advisors, who always
advised me very well and always with
the utmost respect for the law and, of
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course, for the constitution,” said Abel
Pacheco. “No one can rule a country
alone. You need advisors, people orien-
ting you to take the necessary steps. I
leaned on legal, economic and all sorts
of advisors,” stated Roberto Micheletti
of Honduras.
Some presidents like Miguel Ángel
Rodríguez and Ernesto Samper of Co-
lombia revealed a complex structure
of advisors. Ernesto Samper said that
he was very organized and personally
followed around to topics in
dierent areas. He reviewed develo-
pments in these areas every Sunday.
Then, he would meet every Monday
at : am with his group of advisors
to discuss all the topics of his concern.
“I had a group of about twelve or fif-
teen presidential advisors who were
actually the liaisons with the respec-
tive ministries,” he said. Miguel Ángel
Rodríguez said he “tried to set up so-
mething similar to the [United States
agency within the Executive Oce of
the President called] Council of Eco-
nomic Advisers. [I had a] small group
of advisors who were not involved in
the daily administration, nor had con-
tact with public opinion, nor were in-
volved in discussions, but who were
like a think tank to which I submit-
ted the topics [in which] I wanted to
get their support and opinions.” Ro-
dríguez said he met twice a week for
three to four hours with this group of
five to six members.
Although all former presidents ac-
knowledged having advisors, the res-
ponsibilities diered greatly depen-
ding on the president. Few presidents
felt that the contribution of their su-
bordinates was relatively marginal.
Óscar Arias of Costa Rica stressed, “I
did not rely much on advisors because
before winning the elections I knew
what I wanted to do.” In the same vein,
Abdalá Bucaram, stated that despite
having economic and juridical advi-
sors, “I basically made decisions ba-
sed on my political beliefs.” Armando
Calderón Sol had a negative view of
relying too much on advisors: “The
tragedy of the presidencies in Latin
America has been the new emerging
political class that, relying on politi-
cal scientists and polling firms, is all
the time centered on the results of
surveys and focus groups. Some presi-
dents have stopped governing for their
vision, for their people, and do it for
the survey.” However, the fact that most
of the presidents admitted to relying
substantially on advisors suggests that
the instances in which advisors were
not utilized was more the exception
than the rule.
Ministers
Some former presidents inter-
viewed revealed that the influence of
advisors on presidential decision-ma-
king was lower than that of the mi-
nisters. These statements reinforce the
influence that ministers have on the
executive. Eduardo Frei said, “[In my
101
government] we had various teams [of
presidential support] … But, essentia-
lly, I governed with my ministers.” Si-
milarly, Ernesto Pérez stated, “my ad-
visors were essentially my ministers.”
Rafael Calderón said he mostly relied
his decision-making on his Minister of
the Presidency and his two vice presi-
dents, who are elected in the same list
with presidents in accordance with
the constitution. “We had a very
strong team in the essentials... The
most important thing is to have very
strong people at your side,” he added.
As highlighted by the literature
(Amorim Neto ; Chasquetti, Bu-
quet, & Cardarello ), Latin Ame-
rican presidents regularly appoint
ministers in exchange for legislative
support in an attempt to build a le-
gislative majority. The interviewees
confirmed the need to include mem-
bers from parties other than the ruling
one in their cabinets, and remarked on
their need to bargain appointments
with their own parties or party coa-
litions. Abdalá Bucaram complained
that “if you give a ministry, you get
ten deputies… Legislative manipula-
tions always occur.” In more diploma-
tic terms, Roberto Micheletti said, “the
president should not ever forget that
he reaches the presidency thanks to a
political party. Presidents need to ba-
lance forces. I did it in my government.”
Presidents also discussed the di-
culties of appointing a cabinet with
ministers from diverse parties. Abel
Pacheco said that “since my election
was the product of a very curious
alliance,” he “had ministers from the
right and ministers from the le, and
that was the tower of Babel at times.
So people had to be fired, and I fired
people.” Pacheco faced the rebellion of
ministers who did not belong to his
party. He explained that “four minis-
ters tried to convince the rest of the
cabinet to resign” because he was not
moving fast enough to reach a free tra-
de agreement. Pacheco said that “the
four of them [the ministers] resigned,
and with that the press made a scandal
that the government was falling”. The
rebel ministers “were imposed. They
had been at least suggested by busi-
nessmen and by these newspapers… I
had no concern about dismissing mi-
nisters. I always said this is not football,
where I can only make three changes.”
Interestingly, all the interviewees
who led authoritarian governments
said that they appointed their cabinet
members trying to reflect the balance
of political forces in the country and
that they thoroughly relied on per-
sonal advisors. That was the case of
Efraín Ríos Montt of Guatemala and
Francisco Rodríguez and Nicolás Bar-
letta of Panama.
Division of Labor
A group of former presidents des-
cribed that they clearly divided the
roles between advisors and ministers
to minimize the tension between
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them. Miguel Ángel Rodríguez said,
“With my advisors I had a very clear
understanding from the outset that
they would not participate in public
opinion issues, they would not make
public statements and would not exer-
cise executive functions. Ministers pro-
vided me the technical information
of their ministries and defended their
positions, while advisors proposed so-
lutions to problems with their respec-
tive analysis of costs and consequences.
They glimpsed future situations and
did not get involved in operational
issues or things of the moment, as mi-
nisters did.”
Interestingly, Vinicio Cerezo clai-
med that tension between subordina-
tes emerges not only between groups,
but also within groups. In fact, he said
that when his cabinet was divided on
an issue, he oen went back to his
advisors to reach a solution: “In the
cabinet there were sometimes mixed,
conflictive views. To make a decision
based on the fundamental goals of my
government, it was useful to listen to
my advisor’s opinion.”
Presidents also discussed that, in
many situations, family members got
directly involved in presidential deci-
sions. Enrique Bolaños of Nicaragua
said, “I believe that in every marriage,
if there is a lot of harmony, both in-
fluence each other… My wife influen-
ced me a lot.” Then he discussed a si-
tuation in which his wife reversed his
presidential decision of firing the dau-
ghter of a political rival from an o-
ce in the executive. When he arrived
to his home, at night, his wife started
inquiring about the firing. When he
explained it was political retaliation,
she got angry. “She tells me, you saw
what you did was wrong? Tomorrow
you put her back in her place. No, that
can’t be done, I told her. How not?
You can [she replied]. You have to be
aware and act right.” Bolaños faced
internal opposition when he said he
wanted to rehire the fired worker the
next day. “I told them what Mrs. Lila
said.” Then, “I called a press conferen-
ce and restituted her [publicly]. And
I did it because she [his wife] had a
lot of moral influence on me.” Bola-
ños reasoned that “If I had been single,
drunk, a playboy, I would have been
a very dierent president. But I was a
family man, moral, firm, Catholic. I
have clear convictions.”
Miguel Ángel Rodríguez also re-
cognized the active involvement of
family members in executive politics.
“My wife helps me a lot… While in
the presidency, [she] had a vision of
social issues that I would hardly have
understood,” he said, alluding to his
wife’s knowledge of women, children,
and disability issues. Rodríguez ad-
ded that his son, an economist who
obtained a Ph.D. from Stanford, led
a team of presidential advisors, and
that his brother, a lawyer, also filled
an advisory position.
103
Ricardo Lagos said about his wife
that “we have a very similar view of the
world.” He added, “I think the most
successful things in this government
were the things she did and not the
things I did,” alluding to his wife Lui-
sa Durán’s involvement in public po-
licies. During Lagos’ term, Durán led
social and cultural aid foundations
and created and promoted numerous
social policies. “I believe that a well-co-
vered and functioning home front is
very important. If I’m worried becau-
se I have a second or third woman
out there or I’m worried because the
marriage is bad or I have problems
with the children, well, that part is very
complex,” he said.
Interestingly, the presidents who
discussed their wives' involvement in
the executive power did not describe
the first ladies’ political involvement as
problematic. However, presidents have
strong incentives to avoid exposing
sensitive information publicly.
Diversity
Several presidents—including Ar-
noldo Alemán, Rafael Calderón, Lau-
ra Chinchilla, Antonio Saca, Miguel
Ángel Rodríguez, and Enrique Bola-
ños—expressed they consciously deci-
ded to expose themselves to dierent
perspectives, especially before making
a relevant decision. Their main argu-
ment was to ensure they approached
the issues from the proper perspective.
Saca claimed, “many people just tell
you what you want to hear. If you have
the ability to get out of the bubble of
the presidency, you will succeed. You
must be a good listener.”
Rodríguez said that the personal
attributes that help a politician to
win the presidency are not the same
as those needed to govern. Therefo-
re, presidents must know how to su-
rround themselves with the right type
of subordinates in the dierent stages
of their careers. “To win the election,
you must be a very good actor, and
to rule, you must be a very good au-
thor… The one who is more convinced
of himself and has more confidence
in what he says, who believes that he
has the whole truth in his head, con-
vinces more people. The one who is a
bit more scientific, and calmer knows
that he has many fields of ignorance,
recognizes the need to listen to others,
balance criteria, and seek knowledge
to make decisions… The first is very
good to win elections, but the second
is very good to govern,” he said.
Enrique Bolaños claimed that he
relied on three dierent groups to be
exposed to an array of views before
making relevant presidential decisions.
“In one group were the members of
my cabinet, a multisectoral group that
represented all points of view and ser-
ved as a strainer. I convened another
group formed by select friends. The
third group was a ‘kitchen cabinet,’
with which I met three times a month.
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With them I reviewed the big picture;
we discussed all subjects.”
Hierarchical and Horizontal
Relations
Certain former presidents inter-
viewed were more inclined to exerci-
se hierarchical relations with members
of their inner circle. Óscar Arias said,
“I never stopped making decisions, and
I did not care if they were popular or
not. I signed a free trade agreement
with China and never asked Costa Ri-
cans if they agreed. I did not rely much
on advisors because before winning
the elections I knew what I wanted to
do.” Arias believed in strong leadership,
including the capacity of politically
retaliating dissenting pro-government
politicians. “I believe I have been a
strong leader, that people trusted me,”
he said. “I have always exercised leader-
ship. Leadership is exercised knowing
that governing is educating, not plea-
sing,” he added.
Abdalá Bucaram stated that despite
having economic and legal advisors, “I
basically made decisions based on my
political beliefs, in accordance with
the law… Perhaps there was a bit of
pyramidism in my role.” He added
that “I do exactly what my conscien-
ce tells me, and in that sense, I do not
think about tomorrow... I am a man
who, when he believes in something,
he does it.” Along the same lines, Luis
Alberto Monge of Costa Rica said, “I
had a political instinct, and someti-
mes my advisors were not taking into
account some factors that I was con-
sidering.” Manuel Zelaya stated that
“there is only one person sitting in the
presidency and you allow yourself to
be influenced by whoever you want
to be influenced by.”
Other leaders were more inclined
towards horizontal relationships with
members of their inner circle. Antonio
Saca claimed that “to govern, you must
listen and let people tell you… I always
asked my advisors even when I was al-
most sure what I was going to do.” Ni-
colás Barletta stated that “I am of the
belief of consulting one’s own group,
listen them, absorb the suggestions
and persuade. It’s not that one makes
the decision and everyone follows.”
Other presidents, including Rafael
Calderón, relied on personal assistants
and on ministers interchangeably. “I
learned to meditate upon my deci-
sions and I consulted many people.
I permanently leaned on the recom-
mendations of the vice-presidents, the
minister of the Presidency and a very
good team (of advisors) that included
a former Supreme Court justice and
two other lawyers,” he said.
Ernesto Pérez stated that he pushed
toward collective decision-making to
develop a shared sense of responsibi-
lity, and that “in presidential regimes,
the easy decisions are made by the
105
ministers… The decisions that the pre-
sident has to make are those that have
some political cost or are not pleasant,
and [I] made them jointly with the ca-
binet so that there was at least an es-
prit de corps around what we decided.”
Eduardo Frei described a system
that combined hierarchical and hori-
zontal relations. He claimed that he
significantly worked one-on-one with
ministers, but he also had coordinated
teams of advisors. “I worked a lot with
the ministers when I made sectoral
decisions. I gave them all my trust…
And I relied a lot on this internal au-
dit team [too], which operated perma-
nently at the level of the presidency.
Through the Ministry of the Presiden-
cy, we had coordination teams in the
dierent ministries that also worked
very strongly, and we worked on seve-
ral important laws with them.”
C
This paper addressed the compo-
sition and functionality of the presi-
dents’ inner circle. While preceding
research mainly alludes to advisors as
inner circle members, I proposed that
family members and ministers also be-
long to this select group. Furthermore,
I proposed that to be functional, inner
circle groups should have a high divi-
sion of labor, be diverse, and combine
horizontal and hierarchical relations
with presidents.
The semi-structured interviews con-
ducted with former presidents stron-
gly supported the importance of fami-
lies—especially first ladies—, advisors,
and ministers as members of the pre-
sidents’ inner circle. The evidence for
the proposition of a functional inner
circle is weaker because presidents
only indirectly addressed the func-
tions of the inner circle during the
interviews. Semi-structured interviews
with family members, advisors, and
ministers should be conducted to fu-
lly assess the functionality of the inner
circle. Such an exercise should shed
light on the internal dynamics of the
inner circle, helping to generate data
to test my proposal further. Documen-
ting the interactions within the in-
ner group, member trajectories, and
demographic characteristics should
allow us to progress in solving the mys-
tery of how individuals close to the
most powerful politicians influence
the leaders’ decision-making.
Acknowledgements
The author thanks Ali Munden,
Graham Elder, and Joshua Schwartz
for their thoughtful comments and
valuable suggestions to improve this
article.
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Table 2. Presidents Interviewed
President Country Term Interview Date Place Length in
minutes
Efraín Ríos Montt Guatemala - // Guatemala
City
’
Vinicio Cerezo Guatemala - // Guatemala
City
’
Armando C. Sol El Salvador - // San
Salvador
’
Antonio Saca El Salvador - // San
Salvador
’
Rafael Callejas Honduras - // Tegucigalpa ’
Manuel Zelaya Honduras - // Tegucigalpa ’
Roberto Micheletti Honduras - // Tegucigalpa ’
Enrique Bolaños Nicaragua - // Managua ’
Arnoldo Alemán Nicaragua - // Managua ’
Óscar Arias Costa Rica -
-
// San José ’
A
109
I A A
The Inner Circle of Presidents
Luis Alberto
Monge
Costa Rica - // San José ’
Abel Pacheco Costa Rica - // San José ’
Rafael Calderón Costa Rica - // San José ’
Miguel A.
Rodríguez
Costa Rica - // San José ’
Ernesto P.
Balladares
Panama - // Panama
City
’
Francisco
Rodríguez
Panama // Panama
City
’
Abdalá Bucaram Ecuador - // Panama
City
’
Nicolás Barletta Panama - // Panama
City
’
Patricio Aylwin Chile - // Santiago ’
Ricardo Lagos Chile - // Santiago ’
Eduardo Frei Chile - // Santiago ’
Laura Chinchilla Costa Rica - // Pittsburgh ’
Ernesto Samper Colombia - // Bogotá ’
Jorge Quiroga Bolivia - // Pittsburgh ’
