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687
F.Najmedin,M.R.Moghanipour
УДК 7, 004.855.6
ББК 85.72
DOI 10.18688/aa2313-7-55
F.Najmedin, M.R.Moghanipour
Examining the Capabilities and Challenges
of AARON (Painter Software)
Introduction
Whether the result of the random or trained activity of animals such as chimpanzees, el-
ephants, dogs, etc., or events that create phenomena in nature according to human aesthetic
taste is art is the pivotal point in the denition of art and aesthetic articles. Needless to say,
however, if we overlooked the art of more than a century ago, that is, from about 1900 A.D., or
did not experience it, perhaps such issues would not be raised at all. But here and now is the
point where we stand and face such questions. We also sometimes face other challenges that
manifest themselves in new forms of art: what is computer art? What is its boundary with digi-
tal art and what is its relation with internet art? Finally, can computer art be inherently new art?
ese two categories of questions are both important and inuential and can be an impor-
tant part of theoretical research in contemporary art. However, this article focuses on a col-
lection of works that can be called a relatively new and unfamiliar title “Articial Intelligence
Art”. Also, according to the authors of the article, linking these two categories of questions and
seeking answers to them are yet unexplored territories: aesthetics and inhuman art.
Various attitudes have existed toward articial intelligence since its introduction in the
1950s, ranging from a rosy future to a cataclysmic apocalypse [28, p.5]. AI has rapidly devel-
oped, opening up new research areas into its potential applications in a wide range of elds.
However, serious concerns have been raised regarding its inexplicability, limitations, potential
risks, and social implications. e incorporation of articial intelligence into the process of
creating and perceiving works of art is currently one of the most intriguing and, at the same
time, controversial issues [4, p.1].
In parallel with the emergence of articial intelligence, a number of artists made computer
programs to create artworks. In many cases, these programs contain intelligent components.
Harold Cohen was a pioneering gure in this eld. Aaron is an art soware designed to gener-
ate paintings based on the rules that Cohen had coded into it. Several forms of articial intelli-
gence-based art have emerged in the years following Cohen’s groundbreaking work. Machine
learning algorithms are perhaps the most signicant evolution in this eld. An important
distinction between traditional algorithmic art and machine learning algorithms is that rather
than the artist writing detailed code in advance and specifying the desired aesthetic rules, the
artist can now create algorithms capable of learning aesthetics by studying many images. Gen-
erative Adversarial Network (GAN) is the most widely used tool in this category [12, p.2].
Nonetheless, as previously discussed, the development of various applications for articial
intelligence in a wide range of elds, particularly the strange concept of “articial intelligence
art,” raised serious philosophical and ontological challenges and questions. A major question
that was raised by the likes of Hertzmann and Coeckelbergh was, “Can machines produce
688 Искусство XX века и современности
art?” [5; 9]. Moreover, what are the characteristic(s) of works pro-
duced by programs such as Aaron that qualify them as works of art?
Of course, it is possible to formulate this question more precisely:
What occurs during the production of works (made by articial in-
telligence), including Aaron, so that the nal product can be con-
sidered artwork?
Regarding this category of questions, it is clear that the positive
role that articial intelligence plays in art has not been ignored; in
many cases, it has been positively evaluated [24; 15; 4; 2]. Howev-
er, artistry and creativity are still viewed as human activities. Some
restrict the creation of art to the realm of human activities [24; 15],
arguing that art is inextricably linked to the concept of creativity.
On the other hand, the topic of “creative articial intelligence” is
currently the subject of much technical discourse [4; 26]. While re-
searchers such as Boden have specically pointed out “Aaron’s cre-
ativity” [3, pp. 352‒353], they have argued that the scope of human
and machine creativity diers when considering their respective
concepts.
In their view, machine algorithms can be used to make exciting
changes to existing images, but an artist with an artistic background
is essential for presenting these images. Making creative decisions is
the essence of creativity in art making, an act that transcends current technologies [24, p.78].
Furthermore, Hertzmann contends that art is inherently the product of social factors, and thus
articial intelligence algorithms (as they are currently understood) cannot be considered art’s
authors [15, p. 19]. is perspective is founded on the notion that the existence and signi-
cance of art are inseparably linked to human-human interaction [4, p.1].
Many scholars and art critics have embraced articial intelligence due to its potential as
an artistic tool. Aaron Hertzmann, for instance, believes that technological advances, such as
articial intelligence, can positively impact the art world.
e advancement of technology has supplied art and artists with new tools and techniques
of expression, contributing to the ongoing vitality of art [15, p.2]. Meanwhile, some artists
who have employed articial intelligence in their work believe that the interplay between ar-
ticial intelligence and art and artists is not a new phenomenon. Overlaps between AI-based
artistic methods and the use of technology in previous periods of art history have been iden-
tied. In general, there have been no dramatic changes in the relationship between artists
and their “medium” [24, p. 78]. However, some researchers believe articial intelligence has a
broader role than merely acting as a tool for creating artwork (even though they are unwill-
ing to use the terms creator and artist). In their opinion, articial intelligence can execute
considerably more sophisticated tasks than basic tools like paintbrushes when it comes to
creating art. e brush lacks the ability to “change,” it does not “decide” based on past painting
experiences, and it is not “trained” to learn from data. In contrast, algorithms cover all these
possibilities [21, p. 8].
Obviously, the purpose of this study is not to investigate these issues and, in particular, the
role of articial intelligence in art in its broadest sense (as a creator, tool, or medium). How-
ever, we sought to delineate “Aaron” and the works it has generated as one of the “oldest” and
Fig.1.Themonk’sinitial
impressionofthekangaroo,
1990[6,g.1]
Fig.2.Themonk’s
newconceptionofthe
kangaroo,1990[6,g.2]
689
F.Najmedin,M.R.Moghanipour
“most lasting” collaborations between
articial intelligence and humans to cre-
ate works of art. Additionally, Aaron’s
unique characteristics are highlighted,
which may contribute to its closer align-
ment with the denition of “human cre-
ativity.”
Harold Cohen and AARON
e young Harold Cohen was a rela-
tively prominent painter in the British art
scene during the 1950s and 1960s, and
he was lucky to become a lasting name
in the London art scene. However, from
the time he became acquainted with the computer, he posed the main question that occupied
his mind for the rest of his life and changed his artistic experience: Can this device in front of
me produce art? He cites a fascinating example from the time he rst entered the University of
California, San Diego, and heard music playing from a computer at the Center for Computer
and Art Studies. e sound of music fascinated him, and at the end of that piece of music, he
asked if there was another piece he could hear from the computer. e disappointing response
he heard made him realize that the computer, with all its complexity, required the input of the
original human musical notes and could not play without it. erefore, we can state that all
his extensive eorts in three decades of activity focused on the creation of a program that can
produce images and works of art independently of humans. AARON was the result of thirty
years of eort [9, pp. 2–3].
AARON’s (metaphorically) works are massive images (usually 2.3 meters or even larger mu-
rals) in a style and context close to the expressionist literature of the early 20
th
century (Ill.150).
Although features such as linear value and especially coloring were gradually embedded in
dierent versions of AARON, we are mostly faced with linear images (so-called design) in the
initial versions. In some versions, Cohen, aer nishing the work, gives himself the right to add
color to it. In later versions, he started to learn illustration, and progressed to the know about
forms of nature, including gures and leaves and trees, and made internal or external combi-
nations of humans with pots, owers and trees in some periods. In the early years of the 21
st
century, he returned to more abstract forms and experienced dening forms, especially more
independent coloring. So, it was Cohen’s process of continuous training and his empiricism
that made this AI mysterious, fascinating, and exciting at the same time.
e artistic works created by AARON are not very impressive in terms of illustration, and
perhaps, along with the works of their contemporaries, they may be able to catch the eyes of
critics less frequently and may attract enough attention when the audience is aware of the
process of creating or producing the work. However, it seems that the issue of the quality level
of these works is of lower importance and the most important point of the study should be
the issue of creation or non-creation by computer or program. More interestingly, the col-
lection of works of this program from the rst years, i.e., the 1970s, was displayed in some
important museums and galleries of the world, such as Los Angeles County, San Francisco,
Brooklyn, Amsterdam and Japan, and the remarkable collection of works by AARON now
Fig.3.Anatomicalstudy,1988[5,g.4]
690 Искусство XX века и современности
housed in the Victoria & Albert Muse-
um (Ill.151). In the following, various
aspects and consequences of accepting
AARON paintings as artistic works will
be explored and the issue of selection
will be raised as the main condition and
criterion for accepting creative action in
this soware.
From the late 1960’s [19, p. 6] and
post-minimalist works, multimedia ti-
tles, videos, etc. appear in books on the
history of contemporary art or title tags
in galleries [1, pp. 585–586]. From this
period, media such as screens, printers,
projectors and the like have been used
in the works of modern artists. With
the advent of computers, especially the
deep and sometimes inherent connec-
tion of media and these gadgets with
computers, the title “computer art” is
simply used for these kinds of digital
works. Hence, especially until the mid-
1990s, there was no clear distinction be-
tween digital and computer art. But as
the analysis of concepts and meanings
progresses, the distinction between the
two arts becomes clearer.
e rst questions are: what is digital
art? Should we consider it a new kind
of art? For example, in some works of video art, an act is originally performed by a person or
persons, and then by recording this action or event, the audience can replay it. In such works,
the dierence between the original act and its replay is more oen called a “Remediation”. In
this sense, digital cannot be considered an independent medium or art tool; because it seems
that an artistic action has been reproduced in a new format with classical tools (such as show
and body) [20, pp.16–19]. erefore, the title of digital art in this sense will not be an accu-
rate title, at least for the above-mentioned works. Probably the same criticism can be applied
to some works that are basically related to computers. For example, suppose in an interactive
work, whatever the audience depicts on the paper in front of them is depicted in sizeable di-
mensions on a giant tower. In this work, the computer plays the role of a mediator of image
transfer and its existence cannot be considered vital in the formation of the work. For exam-
ple, the same work may (albeit with a troublesome mechanism) be implemented through the
usual optical laws, namely lenses and mirrors.
In short, according to Lopes, a work can be called a computer art when the computer me-
dia, rather than as a tool for transfer and remediation, acts mainly as a vital tool for creating
the work [20, p.18]. Successful examples of such works can be found in the relatively minor
Fig.4.Thesystem’sorganizationishierarchical,inthe
sensethatthehigherlevelsareresponsiblefordecisions
thatconstrainthedomainofactionforthelowerlevels
[6,g.5]
691
F.Najmedin,M.R.Moghanipour
subset of Internet art, especially works that are created
based on public interaction. For example, in a work ti-
tled “9”, nine groups of audiences are allowed to share
their text and images, and nally a random combina-
tion of these materials is displayed on their screen [13,
pp.171–174].
Regarding AARON, at least according to the so-
ware manufacturer’s claim, which will be investigated
in more detail below, the computer plays a key role in
creating works, and according to Lopez, AARON can
be easily included in the scope of computer art. How-
ever, there are other examples with a mechanism close
to AARON, in which the computer plays a vital role.
PINDAR is a live and ongoing project called Robot art [22]. In this project, images such as
portraits of famous people are analyzed by a computer and then reproduced in a pop art style
through a transformation based on special soware command. At this stage, the image execu-
tion command is transferred to a robotic arm (similar to the AARON project until the 1990s),
and the arm carefully dips the brush into the dye tank and slides on the bottom plate with con-
trollable pressure. Finally, the image is drawn step by step like a man-made painting (Ill. 152).
us, it can be concluded that even based on Lopez’s relatively [20] strict denition, both
AARON and PINDAR fall into the category of computer artwork. In the following, the dis-
tinctions between AARON and other examples are elaborated to dene a new and sparsely
populated AI artwork.
At the beginning of the discussion, chimpanzee painting was mentioned, which somehow
creates art of non-human origin. Congo is perhaps the most famous example of an artist an-
imal. As an intelligent chimpanzee, he practiced the art of painting, and the works recorded
under his name match the works of abstract expressionists [17].
We are confronted with a pattern of animal behavior in such works, which is called “con-
ditioning,” and it is claimed that the animal, in the form of a set of controlled actions in the
reward and punishment system, has learned that if he takes the brush and pulls it like this, he
will receive a reward or will not be punished anymore and thus:
1. Congo is not aware of the meaning of his behavior.
2. His artistic action is not based on free will.
Basically, these two conditions are the basis of our evaluation and even our enjoyment as an
art audience. For example, if we encounter a scene where objects happen to be juxtaposed at-
tractively, we will immediately look for these two features. Any audience will probably be able
to nd objecting and environmental references by observing a large number of dead salmons
gathered on the surface of the shallow pond. But when someone makes him aware of the fact
that this is not the result of a specic human conscious action, and goes back to the nature
of this sh and its death aer spawning, these references will disappear immediately and he
will no longer have any denition of protest or warning against environmental damage. Until
this time, as an artist, he somehow conveys the desired situation or report it to a museum or
exhibition, and then the audience will be ensured that, regardless of the high or low quality
of the work, the conscious, meaningful and voluntary action of the artist as the creator of the
work lies behind it.
Fig.5.Turtle,1979[4,g.10]
692 Искусство XX века и современности
In many examples similar to the PINDAR project, the same two conditions strongly re-
sist the acceptance of the artistic aspect of the project: e behavior of this program is a set
of complex computational patterns that include image analysis, image metamorphosis, new
image analysis based on execution order and complex calculations to control the robotic arm.
erefore, the program begins with the simple command “Turn Image A into a work of art”.
e program receives the image and delivers image B at the appropriate time. In this set of
patterns, there is no sign of free will and meaning. Although the calculations are quite com-
plex, the process is completely involuntary, meaning that ideally it is expected that if the image
input of Paul McCartney’s face is consecutive twice, both output works will be of the same
quality. However, some production features can be manipulated to solve this problem:
For example, the article authors programmed PINDAR to convert an image into a work of
analytical cubism. is process involves transforming image A with a crystalline pattern. But
the degree or number of pieces of this crystal that will ultimately control the output image
features is adjustable. is degree can be assigned to the program selection in an acceptable
range, or even the program can be forced to prevent the repetition of a certain number and
degree twice. erefore, we will be sure that two consecutive images of Paul McCartney’s face
will not be similar, and PINDAR will be free to choose the output image. Yet, the process of
image metamorphosis seems to be a process similar to mathematical functions. ere is still
a range of degrees of crystallization between image A (McCartney) and the range of output
possibilities, and it may be a time-consuming process for the PINDAR to return, but it is pos-
sible. Analogizing PINDAR to simpler models of popular image restoration soware lters,
such as Photoshop, makes this meaning more tangible to the users of this soware. Each lter
based on pre-adjusted numbers may provide innite possibility. But aer repeating previous
settings, in the ideal form, the same result is obtained each time. For this reason, the concept
of free will is still not achieved as expected, and at the same time, the other condition, which
is the acquisition of meaning, is not met for this program. In fact, the PINDAR program exe-
cutes the “analyze” command and does not understand the meaning of creation.
AARON has a dierent function in both conditions. Basically, Cohen seems to have been
aware of this point and has tried to avoid it as much as possible. PINDAR and similar programs
are written primarily based on the analysis of human behavior algorithms (artists of a particular
style or movement) and its transformation into soware behavioral patterns. erefore, they
create something similar to human creation, and it seems that the same originality of the hu-
man product is interpreted exactly as the opposite of machine creativity. Cohen contends that
he developed this program to realize machine creativity possibilities. AARON gives things their
physical and visual relationship, and, in turn, teaches how machines create new possibilities
with this tool. Cohen also mentions elsewhere that he does not seek to teach images to AARON,
but rather to teach drawing to machines [6, p.1]. He describes his work with an interesting ex-
ample: Imagine a monk in the 14
th
century heard a denition of a kangaroo from an Australian
tourist. A friend told him that a kangaroo is an enormous mouse with a bag on the front of its
body. With these descriptions, the monk will draw something like this (Fig.1).
But aer showing the picture to another Australian friend, he realizes that the kangaroo has
a bag in the abdomen area rather than in her hands. It is also upright and has much larger hind
legs. With these descriptions, his new picture of a kangaroo is as follows: (Fig. 2).
Although this picture does not quite look like a kangaroo, it is enough to describe its ap-
pearance [6, p.1]. Cohen says that this process of describing form in human language and
693
F.Najmedin,M.R.Moghanipour
experience, as mentioned, is based on simile and metaphor, and the humans use this network
of similes and metaphors to explain concepts. However, he has to explain each object or phe-
nomenon separately to AARON with great diculty [10, pp.1–5]. In this way, he provides
AARON with three types of information:
1. Encyclopedic information that reveals objects as a network of concepts;
2. Visual information of each phenomenon. For example, the human body and each of
the organs and physical / physical characteristics, including joints and movement restrictions
(Fig.3);
3. Information and physical rules, such as depth, overlap, color, and shadow [10, pp.6–7].
e design process is also described as Fig.4.
Clearly, of all these steps, the only step is the lines, where for the rst time something is
really drawn, and before that, everything was imagined, calculated or machine-coded.
erefore, we are faced with soware that has a relatively coherent imagination of the uni-
verse components, without having any visual experience. It also recognizes the appearance of
objects and has a semantic connection between a name and an image, and its components.
erefore, the meaning of orchard, in a simple form, is a set of plants and trees, and has both
linguistic and visual meaning. On the other hand, the linguistic and visual meaning of people
is dened for it. It also knows the rules of drawing a set of plants for each time. So, it can create
(or at least combine) meaningful images for the rst time in the event of the Command “Draw
people in the garden” (Ill. 153). Notable, the most humane and, at the same time, creative
part of this process is the decision to choose the right combination (both volume and type) of
human and plant and arrange it in space. is process seems to occur between mapping and
planning [7, p.6]. e program repeatedly prepares a map of its imaginary scene and arranges
its objects in accordance with the rules of composition, and again evaluates and corrects its
values and arrangement in mapping, and this process happens many times. is process can
be compared to the works of all classical painters (in the general sense), each of whom created
several sketch designs of their desired space. According to the authors of this article, the so-
ware manifests its free will at this stage. It has the general components and rules, but by coinci-
dence and based on calculation, it oen chooses between possible and probable combinations,
until it is satised with the nal composition and enters the coloring and execution stage. On
the other hand, the concept of meaning is also quite true here. AARON seems to dominate
its performance in a way that deserves to be called the “awareness of creation.” e question
raised for authors is: what is le? AARON does not even depend solely on the subject matter,
and there are many examples of abstract and non-objective works (quite competitive with the
works of painters such as Joan Miro and Kandinsky) in the early versions.
We do not intend to discuss the complex philosophical analysis of the denition of the art
concept. e history of the last few decades has taught us that the general process and the
macro innovation / reception system make more appropriate judgments than our philosoph-
ical and logical predictions. If, for any reason, we do not consider AARON’s works to be art,
would it make any dierence if it is now housed in the treasures of the Victoria & Albert Mu-
seum in Britain and has the same nancial value as other contemporary works of art?
Apart from the philosophical research, we need to see the quality of AARON’s works in
a long line, preceded by Piero Manzoni’s Shit’ cans and John Cage’s 4’33’’. Taking the future
of this art as the ‘AI art’, there are some objections to these works that should be briey
investigated:
694 Искусство XX века и современности
Low quality of works; If we assume that the audience or critic is not aware of the process of
creating the work by AARON, does the detailed description in the previous section still make
sense? is question can be answered from two perspectives: a. e aesthetics of computer art
is fundamentally dierent from visual aesthetics. Lopez has rightly described the dierence:
when the specic features of a tool are among the limitations and thus the advantages of a
work of art, we call it the meaningful (or important) features of the tool. Paying attention to
these features has transformed the criticism and evaluation of the works of modern art; b. It
may be better to separate the two issues of art and non-art from good and bad art. Perhaps the
most important point in this article was an investigation of the reasons why we are allowed
to consider AARON a creative artist. Although we believe that the addition of an audience
feedback system can easily match AARON’s work with the collective taste of critics, Cohen’s
initial thought pattern still encourages us to embrace the machine’s free will. Perhaps, the
long-term results of Cohen’s work will teach us a new and perhaps “machine-friendly” system
of aesthetics.
e Question of the aesthetic value; ere are some unique properties in the works and
creation process of AARON which makes a vast plot to scrutinize its dierent aspects; Study-
ing project AARON, we came to a moderate understanding of the concept of creativity which
proves to be more inclusive to embrace the algorithm of the machine. By the same token, there
emerges the question of aesthetic or artistic value in this process. Although there are many
representational and expressive properties unique to the program which have been previously
discussed, its own main problems should be discussed:
e issue of predestination and free will; Why is this machine not free to take on a dif-
ferent style from expressionism? To answer this question, we draw attention to the xed and
dominant paradigms of several thousand years in the art of Egypt, India, Mesopotamia, and
even the art of cavemen, all of which, incidentally, is considered as art. It is not yet clear to
what extent Cohen could reinforce the self-learning and deconstructive aspect of representa-
tion in AARON. It seems convincing that this innovation has continued its progress.
Harold Cohen, the designer and project manager of AARON, passed away in 2016, and we
never imagined that as a follower, we would soon be faced with the question “what will happen
now?” e destiny issue is complex for Cohen and his AARON. Basically, when does each
work start? When will it end and what is its relationship with other works in the collection?
Are we talking about AARON as a single work? In other words, is AARON a work or a path
for the formation of several works? Is their code a work, a printed version, or a robot that, until
the 1990s, did not cross the surface, between the paper and the canvas in Cohen’s words, like a
‘turtle’ and engrave an image on it? ese are all questions that change our perception the work
and its destiny in this project. erefore, in the following sections we will investigate each issue.
e ontological question; Yak Hui dedicates a whole chapter of his book, On the Existence
of Digital Objects, to discuss the ontological origins of the digital. Aer an extensive review
of the ongoing accounts of the subject, he prefers to make his more original account, referring
to the phenomenological background and its subtractions, namely Husserl’s and Heidegger’s.
Especially based on Heidegger, He tries to build a separation between the primary ontic con-
ception of being, and an ontological analysis of the concept and notes that a more eective
account of the mode of being we are looking for, should be synthesized from both aspects [16,
pp.104]. Yet, Hui’s main concern is how to nd an ontological framework for the relations of
digital objects to the one’s of the real world; erefor the author choses to establish a bi-exis-
695
F.Najmedin,M.R.Moghanipour
tential framework to include the semantic and syntactic aspect of the object and fails to meet
the subject in terms of its mode of being.
In the 1960s, Richard Wollheim [27] and Nelson Goodman & Catherine Elgin [14] almost
simultaneously addressed the ontological issue of the relationship between the work of art and
reproduced version works. Each with their approach attempted to dene “Single and origi-
nal-based” works, such as Ulysses novel, Rosenkavalier opera, and others, not as a work, but in
the form of a type or species. Ulysses does not belong to James Joyce in any manifestation in-
cluding the (handwritten) manuscript, edition, translation, or printing (lm and zinc). It seems
that, according to Wollheim [27, pp.119–123], we should consider it an ontological type and
consider everything that is inferred from it as a reproduced version or example of that type. Ba-
sically, how Wollheim and Goodman treat reproducible images and artworks, can be discussed
under the Type–Token relation mode [18, p.16]. Crowther as well admits the Type–Token rela-
tion may fairly prove to be valid in discussing digital artworks [11]. In Type–Token relationship,
the main idea of the works which here proves to be a mental content, is the type of which a set of
instances of the artwork are executed or reproduced. Yet it should be noted that since AARON is
not an interactive one, here the interactivity of the works has been ignored; Perhaps that is why
omson- Jones and Moser prefer to discuss the mode in terms of “Displays” [25]. Here as we
pick the Type–Token relationship to discuss the work, we come to a twofold situation:
AARON’s single works which have a recorded code system notation, held by the project
owners, is supposed to be the Type; and all physical versions can be called the Tokens. But on
the other side:
AARON as a unique coded project with its continuity, is as well supposed to be the type,
then all the works produced as AARON’s oeuvre, can be dened as the tokens which could be
reproduces as second-hand tokens perhaps.
Given that any surviving AARON work is in the form of a collection of codes which can be
stored, transferred, and reproduced, any view of these works, and neglecting the possibility
of reproducing them with the same details at any other time and place, will be an unbalanced
and non-technical view of these works. On the other hand, one can think of the fact that, like
any other reproducible version work, such as a molded sculpture or a single hand-printed
manuscript whose stereotypes are preserved, the work itself, created in agreement with and
under the control of the artist, has its unique value. Also, approached legally, the reproduced
version works will have a dierent value from the custom of the art market under the dened
supervision and process; even if it is not technically and aesthetically signicantly dierent
from the original work. However, in the case of digitally replicable works, reproducible ver-
sions will also have their economic denition. Currently, out of the 41 works kept in this so-
ware at the Tate Modern Museum London, their replicable works are sold like other works,
with their denition, and the project website also directly reproduces, publishes, and sells
some of the works. In this sense, according to the conditions dened for a work, the soul of
an original work will have an independent and unique existential status, and its reproduced
versions, according to predened conditions by Cohen, will have a dierent status. is dier-
ence is obvious in the price of the work and its place in the economic market of art.
Certainly, if the original work is lost for any reason, it can no longer be replaced; it cannot
be assumed that the work has vanished, nor can the reproduced version work be considered
in the same position. erefore:
696 Искусство XX века и современности
— “A” is the original work if it was created with the intention of the artist and under the
conditions of “H”.
— And the work (s) “A1” are the reproduced version of work “A” if they are created under
“H2” conditions.
Importantly, although the AARON’s work in question has emerged under certain circum-
stances, it can be considered a “single and original-based” work. On the other hand, the work
created by AARON depends on a set of recorded and documented coding. He may decide
to reproduce or print the work by simply accessing a standard predened printer. It should
not be forgotten that Cohen has attempted in various situations to divert the attention of the
audience and critics from the centrality of the visual output and attract it to the process of its
formation. In his interview [7], he says that since the mid-1990s, he has been frustrated by
the audience’s over-attention and surprise at the image-implementing robot, and since then
‘Turtle’ (Fig.5) has taken the same eld-print robot out of the demonstration path to avoid
distracting the audience.
is retrospective view can be evidence of the claim that the artist is not bound so much
by the set of reproduction conditions and thus does not pay much attention to the nal image
product and, therefore, has little sensitivity to the ontological status of the objective work. But
if he is less sensitive to the objective product, what is he more sensitive to?
In various reports on the development of the project over the decades, Cohen has shown
that he entirely focused on the behavior that he has taught to AARON itself and that he is
fascinated with this soware and does not hesitate to regard it as an algorithm. He regards
it as a child that creates an image in a humane way and in a machine way in another stage.
us, his denition of the centrality of artistic action in the AARON project relies on AAR-
ON itself; and if we want to give an ontological description of his interpretation of the work,
he has turned the process of work formation into a product and oered a process-product
interpretation. In this perspective, basically, if the destiny is deemed for his work, it is the end
of the AARON project and not the destiny of the works. e survival of the AARON project
determines the lifespan of the work.
Many of AARON’s works have been displayed and purchased by major collections over
the past four decades; for example, if we look at the data of the Victoria & Albert Museum
in London, despite all that Cohen was interested in, AARON (1979), which is also one of his
earliest works, is all registered under the name Harold Cohen and the name AARON does not
appear next to the artist’s name. In this sense, AARON is regarded as a part of the production
tool in this database and there is no appropriate denition in the production or creation of
the work. e same is true of other collections, including the Tate Modern Museum London.
According to this denition and from the perspective of collectors, the works produced by
AARON are directly the Cohen’s works, and although terms such as “Computer-Made” are
used to describe the technique, the works are neither “Articial Intelligence”, as Cohen himself
wanted to regard it as such. It is clear that from an economic point of view, knowing these
works as unique and single works will bring more benets to these institutions. In addition, it
should be noted that as much as the works are directly related to and completely dependent on
Harold Cohen from the outside, Harold Cohen’s artistic character, aer drawing his attention
to soware art and the AARON project, did not turn to the production of art works outside
this path at all. Also, the factors that shaped Cohen’s artistic identity in these four decades,
from the 1970s until 2016 and his death, was the collection of works that emerged from the
697
F.Najmedin,M.R.Moghanipour
AARON path. Accordingly, the artist’s death markes the end of the current series of the AAR-
ON project, and this makes the issue challenging.
In Cohen’s simple literature, AARON is a complex algorithm and is derived from the visual
equivalent of objects, creates novel compositions, and forms and independent coloring. us,
if we are faced with a variety of visual and stylistic periods in AARON visual expression, it
is equivalent to reprogramming, enhancing or changing AARON’s view, and understanding
the visual world not equivalent to innovation in image creation by the soware. In simple
terms, contrary to what has become especially prevalent in the painting tradition since mod-
ern times, the artist, who in this case is AARON, has not chosen one of the possible styles and
expressions before it, based on its desires or circumstances. erefore, despite AARON being
free to combine forms and themes to shape the work, the style in the works of this soware
is not an optional, creative and thus artistic action. erefore, our interpretation of it as aes-
thetical is largely a matter of our choice. Yet, its connection to a world of wider choices, such
as Cohen’s upstream intelligence and willpower, will give Cohen’s aesthetic credibility. In this
sense, we are not dealing with the AARON with dierent styles, works and many manuscripts,
but with several AARON’s manuscripts, each of which has a signicant number of unique
works only in its expressive range, which are similar in expression, as well as distinct and
unique in visual features, and at the same time, each of which can be reproduced many times.
erefore, for example:
1. ree periods or collections of works made by AARON are discussed;
2. Each period has the members who do not have the same identity;
3. ey have common features that make us consider a single style and expression in our
mind.
Nevertheless, Cohen’s causal inuence is removed from the end of the rst proposition, and
logically Cohen’s presence or absence or death will not aect the quality or characteristics of
the members of the existing collections. Cohen is only present in dening or redening col-
lections, and from that stage onwards, the production of works will not aect him in any way.
However, the experience and history have shown that despite the ability to create a new work,
no new work with this interpretation has been created by AARON since 2016.
In an interview in 2011, Cohen reiterated that the AARON project for him was not even a
collection of coding written rst in C programming language and then in the more specialized
Lips language.
... AARON is not the set of code I compiled and written in twenty minutes; rather, it is the
result of years of thinking and experience to nally teach the humanistic behavior of produc-
ing a painter’s image to articial intelligence [7].
us, for Cohen, an idealistic interpretation of AARON’s work can even be oered. e
basis of the work production is not the existence and the objective soul of the images; even in
this perspective, it is not a process of formation. e work before us is the idea of AARON. It
is AARON that is the work, and other imagined or made things are instances of it. Cohen has
made his best eort to bring all the senses closer to AARON itself. erefore, according to this
interpretation, the beginning of the work is Cohen’s unique will to create this soware, and
of course, the end of the work occurs when AARON stops moving and operating. e simple
question here is this: Is AARON still active?
Briey, the AARON project has come to a standstill with Cohen’s death. Cohen did not have
a personal website and linked his name to the AARON project. e website www.aaronshome.
698 Искусство XX века и современности
com contains all the joint works of the artist and his soware in its heart, and no artistic pres-
tige can be found in Cohen apart from this project. Two types of data can be obtained from
this website: the documents about the project based on Cohen’s writings, and the visit plan and
displaying the projects ahead of AARON. e documents which entirely depend on Cohen and
have not changed since 2016, advancing as far as Russia, ceased in early 2017. It also seems that
only the commitments, which were made before the death of the great artist, have continued
until then, remaining unchanged. It also seems that while AARON is a dynamic system with the
ability to produce in a collection with its latest style, it practically lost its dynamics.
ere is no doubt that Cohen’s identity was entirely linked to AARON and his work. Lev
Manovich made this clear at a criticism session in 2011, and Cohen accepted it without hesi-
tation. He dedicated his artistic life to acquire this identity. It seems that the AARON project,
even legally, owes part of its identity to the Computer and Art Research Center at the Univer-
sity of San Diego. However, in all these years, it is always the name of Cohen, which is listed
next to the name of AARON, and the name of this center is only in the section of Cohen’s
academic resume and biography of the project website. While one can learn from the breadth
of the university in allowing the artist to form an independent legal identity, it should be noted
that although all AARON project activities have the characteristics of a cultural and artistic
foundation, their link is so personal that caused the foundation to dissolve immediately aer
the death of the artist, despite the existing capacity.
Conclusion
According to the above discussion, it can be stated that the question of what AARON is and
which of these components can assume the role of artist and work is challenging and contro-
versial, and that the role assignment can be illustrated from dierent perspectives. Here, the
soware has a relatively coherent view of the universe components, recognizes the appearance of
objects, and has a semantic connection between the name, image, and components. In the mean-
time, the most humane and yet creative part of AARON performance is the decision to choose
the right combination of the components of the universe and arrange them in space so that
AARON’s mastery of its performance can be considered awareness of creation by this soware.
Although the AARON project had the potential for the production of new works and for
the reproduction of earlier works, as well as the provision of live and active services, with the
tragic death of Cohen and the lack of organizational will to keep the project alive have pre-
vented this from happening. As a result, all the existing capacities in this project are reduced
to a traditional artist-work relationship, which prevented the ourishing and realization of the
project’s idea, that is, the desire to approach an independent articial intelligence of the artist.
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Title. Examining the Capabilities and Challenges of AARON (Painter Soware)
Authors. Najmedin, Foad — Ph.D., assistant professor. University of Science and Culture,
Bahar st, Shahid Qamushi st, Ashra Esfahani Bulvar, Tehran, Iran; f.najmedin@gmail.com;
ORCID: 0009-0000-4413-5933
Moghanipour, Majid Reza — Ph.D., associate professor. Shiraz University, Goldasht 3 St.,
Moaliabad Av., Shiraz, Iran; moghanipour@shirazu.ac.ir; ORCID: 0000-0001-9806-6953 (re-
sponsible author)
Abstract. e present article probes Harold Cohen’s AARON soware and its unique fea-
tures which brings it closer to the denition of “human creativity:, making it distinct from
700 Искусство XX века и современности
other computer soware or basic computer artworks. AARON’s (metaphorically) works are
massive images (usually 2.3 meters or even larger murals) in a style and context close to the
expressionist literature of the early 20th century. Although features such as linear value and
especially coloring were gradually embedded in dierent versions of AARON, we are mostly
faced with linear images (so-called design) in the initial versions. In the early years of the 21st
century, he returned to more abstract forms and experienced dening forms, especially more
independent coloring. So, it was Cohen’s process of continuous training and his empiricism
that made this AI mysterious, fascinating, and exciting at the same time.
Here, rst, a description of digital and computer art is presented and its characteristics are
discussed. Aerward, the articial intelligence (AI) art and its similarities and dierences
with human art are addressed using AARON soware, and its distinguishing feature, that is
the selection in the process of forming the artistic work, is described. Finally, some challenges
to this type of art, including the lower quality of the works created by this soware, the issue
of predestination and free will in its performance, and especially the issue of AARON destiny
will be discussed.
Keywords: AARON, Harold Cohen, Articial Intelligence, AI, computer art
Название статьи. Изучение возможностей и проблем AARON (программного обе-
спечения для живописи)
Сведения об авторах. Наджмеддин, Фоад — Ph.D., доцент. Тегеранский универси-
тет науки и культуры, Bahar st, Shahid Qamushi st, Ashra Esfahani Bulvar, Тегеран, Иран;
f.najmedin@gmail.com; ORCID: 0009-0000-4413-5933
Мугханипур, Маджидреза — Ph.D., доцент. Ширазский университет. Goldasht 3 St.,
Moaliabad Av., Шираз, Иран; moghanipour@shirazu.ac.ir; ORCID: 0000-0001-9806-6953
Аннотация. В статье рассматривается специфика программного обеспечения автомата
AARON, сконструированного художником Гарольдом Коэном в начале 1970-х гг. Изобра-
жения, сгенерированные при помощи AARON, напоминают полотна, созданные живым
человеком: именно эта черта отличает эту программу от других. Работы AARON пред-
ставляют собой экспрессионистские по стилистике фигуративные произведения большо-
го формата (в среднем 2,3м в высоту). В современной модификации AARON внедрены
линейные алгоритмы и похожая на ручную работа с цветом, однако в более ранних вер-
сиях эти параметры отсутствуют. На это указывает тот факт, что первыми произведени-
ями AARON были монохромные композиции (так называемые «чертежи») и абстракции.
Именно благодаря непрерывному процессу обучения искусственного интеллекта AARON
Г. Коэну удалось существенно обогатить спектр возможностей данного устройства.
Статью открывает описание цифрового искусства, после чего обсуждаются его осо-
бенности. На примере AARON изображения, сгенерированные искусственным интеллек-
том (ИИ), сопоставляются с произведениями реальных художников. Также в статье дана
характеристика отличительной особенности AARON — принципу «выбора», лежащему
в основе алгоритма формообразования. На примере AARON рассмотрены две ключевые
проблемы генеративного искусства: это, с одной стороны, более низкий уровень качества
работ относительно произведений, созданных человеком, а с другой — проблема «сво-
боды воли» программного обеспечения, действующего по заранее заданному алгоритму.
Ключевые слова: AARON, Гарольд Коэн, искусственный интеллект, ИИ, генератив-
ное искусство
906 Иллюстрации
Ill.153.MeetingonGauguin’sBeach.Oiloncanvas,
1988.90×68.Source:CohenH.MakingArtfor
aChangingWorld.2002,ill.6.Availableat:http://
www.aaronshome.com/aaron/publications/index.html
(accessed2April2022)
Ill.150.TwoMenonTheEdge.OilonCanvas,
1988.80×97.Source:CohenH.MakingArtfora
ChangingWorld.2002,ill.5.Availableat:http://
www.aaronshome.com/aaron/publications/index.
html(accessed2April2022)
Ill.151.FourSeasonalNarratives,MuralforDigital
EquipmentCorporation,1986(Le“Winter,”Right
“Spring”)Source:CohenH.MakingArtfora
ChangingWorld.2002,ill.3.Availableat:http://
www.aaronshome.com/aaron/publications/index.
html(accessed2April2022)
Ill.152.PindarProject.Source:Galleryofpaintings
byartistswithPindarrobot.Availableat:
https://www.cloudpainter.com/gallery
(accessed2May2022)
