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Competitive authoritarianism, informational authoritarianism, and the development of dictatorship: a case study of Belarus

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Anthony J. Evans at ESCP Business School
Anthony J. Evans
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This article explores the dynamics of modern authoritarian regimes, using Belarus under Alexander Lukashenko as a case study. By examining Belarus’s transition from a “competitive authoritarian” regime to a “hegemonic authoritarian” one from 1994 to 1996 and its further shift from a spin dictatorship to a fear dictatorship in 2020, the study offers insights into the multifaceted nature of dictatorships. The main findings are that using elections as a means to classify regimes does not fully explain their effect on authoritarian vulnerability and that different classifications of dictatorship, such as spin versus fear, are not necessarily mutually exclusive.
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Vol.:(0123456789)
Public Choice (2024) 198:343–360
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-023-01132-2
1 3
Competitive authoritarianism, informational
authoritarianism, andthedevelopment ofdictatorship:
acase study ofBelarus
AnthonyJ.Evans1
Received: 17 February 2023 / Accepted: 15 November 2023 / Published online: 13 December 2023
© The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2023
Abstract
This article explores the dynamics of modern authoritarian regimes, using Belarus under
Alexander Lukashenko as a case study. By examining Belarus’s transition from a “competi-
tive authoritarian” regime to a “hegemonic authoritarian” one from 1994 to 1996 and its
further shift from a spin dictatorship to a fear dictatorship in 2020, the study offers insights
into the multifaceted nature of dictatorships. The main findings are that using elections as a
means to classify regimes does not fully explain their effect on authoritarian vulnerability
and that different classifications of dictatorship, such as spin versus fear, are not necessarily
mutually exclusive.
Keywords Authoritarianism· Belarus· Competitive authoritarianism· Electoral
authoritarianism· Informational authoritarianism· Spin dictatorship
JEL Classification D72· D74· N14· P20
1 Introduction
In 2005, Condoleezza Rice, then secretary of state of the United States, famously referred
to Belarus as “the last remaining true dictatorship in the heart of Europe” even though
President Alexander Lukashenko was a democratically elected leader (see Doherty, 2005).
Lukashenko enjoyed a commanding victory in the first election of the new republic, in
1994, and followed that with re-election in 2001, 2006, 2010, 2015, and 2020. Few com-
mentators doubted that the initial campaign was reasonably free and fair, and reflected
the democratic will of the people. Indeed, the 1996 constitutional amendments that gave
Lukashenko authority to extend his time in office were passed through a referendum. This
has led some to refer to the system as an “elected dictatorship” (Ioffe, 2008, p. 147), which
appears oxymoronic but in fact anticipates a subsequent trend for populist authoritarians,
and so-called hybrid alternatives to traditional democracies or autocracies. While more
* Anthony J. Evans
anthonyjevans@gmail.com
1 ESCP Business School, London, UK
Content courtesy of Springer Nature, terms of use apply. Rights reserved.
... Secondly, a large body of research focuses on explaining how different types of hybrid regimes have emerged and prevailed (Cianetti et al., 2018;Diamond, 2021;Evans, 2024;Guriev & Treisman, 2019Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018;McCoy et al., 2018). The majority of contributions in this vein "focus on regime strategies and tend to neglect the attitudes of citizens" (Lavrič & Bieber, 2021, p. 18). ...
... In line with previous findings from democratic (Lewis-Beck & Nadeau, 2011;Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier, 2019) and autocratic countries (Guriev & Treisman, 2020), the results supported the sociotropic economic voting hypothesis. The strong effect of perceived economic performance on political preferences can also explain why authoritarian populists' rhetoric typically emphasizes economic performance (Evans, 2024;Guriev & Treisman, 2019). The results also corroborated positional voting theory, as a higher preference for redistribution was found to decrease support for the government. ...
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