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JOURNAL OF INDOPACIFIC AFFAIRS JANUARYFEBRUARY 2024 97
FEATURE
Can Thailand’s Military Evolve?
Moving Beyond Domestic Interference,
Institutional Corruption, and Personal Gain
Mark S. Cogan
Abstract
e ai military maintains a close interdependence with the monarchy and a history of recurrent
extra- constitutional interventions in domestic politics, marked by numerous successful coups
throughout ailand’s modern history. A culture of greed, corruption, and self- enrichment
pervades the armed services, often sidelining professionalism and institutional integrity in favor
of personal ambitions. ailand’s military faces continuous and unaddressed challenges, with
security- sector reform and modernization efforts frequently disrupted by influential elites seeking
to assert control. High- ranking military officers exceed their authority, engaging in activities that
are ostensibly exploitative and detrimental to ailand’s external relations. is article critically
assesses efforts to implement security- sector reforms and foster a military aligned with its in-
tended purpose, examining three distinct eras in ailand’s military development. It extrapolates
insights from each era to the context of a new semi- democratic Pheu ai- led government.
***
The ai military has played a significant role in shaping ai society for
many decades. From its development under the reign of King Chul-
alongkorn in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to the era of
Phibun Songkhram, who played a central role in the 1932 Khana Ratsadon
revolution, the military initiated a period of ai- style nationalism and central-
ized control.1 e military’s influence has persisted through various regime types,
including military- dominated regimes like those of Sarit anarat and anom
Kittikachorn, democratic administrations, and contemporary junta rule from
2014 to 2023.
1 Stithorn ananithichot, “Understanding ai Nationalism and Ethnic Identity,” Journal of Asian and
African Studies 46, no. 3 (1 June 2011): 250–63, https://doi.org/; Jack Fong, “Sacred Nationalism: e ai
Monarchy and Primordial Nation Construction,” Journal of Contemporary Asia 39, no. 4 (1 November 2009):
673–96, https://doi.org/; ongchai Winichakul, “Nationalism and the Radical Intelligentsia in ailand,” in
Developmental and Cultural Nationalisms, ed. Radhika Desai, 176–92 (Oxon: Routledge, 2009), https://doi.
org/; and Daniel M. Fineman, A Special Relationship: e United States and Military Government in ailand,
1947-1958 (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2020), 77.
98 JOURNAL OF INDOPACIFIC AFFAIRS JANUARYFEBRUARY 2024
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e ai military’s close association with political power is partly due to its
pragmatic relationship with the monarchy.
2
Military- dominated institutions, often
described as a “parallel state” or “deep state,” have hindered democratization and
peaceful transfers of political power.
3
Military- aligned political parties and
semi- democratic parliamentary bodies have played a key role in legitimizing
military control, facilitating military elites’ influence, and allocating resources for
military purposes.
Measuring progress in any military involves assessing modernization, adapt-
ability to evolving threats, and the professionalization of the armed forces, which
can be defined as security- sector reform (SSR). Civil- military relations have been
influenced by Samuel Huntington’s concept of the professional soldier and civilian
control, while the idea of SSR is more of a post- Cold War concept, particularly
in Southeast Asia.4 According to a joint US agency briefing, SSR encompasses a
“set of policies, plans, programs, and activities that a government undertakes to
improve the way it provides safety, security, and justice. e overall objective is to
provide these services in a way that promotes an effective and legitimate public
service that is transparent, accountable to civilian authority, and responsive to the
needs of the public.”5
However, reform is primarily the goal of democratic nations. Southeast Asia
lacks comparable democracies, and comparable SSR reform efforts following the
downfall of authoritarian regimes have seen limited success. is is evident in
the cases of the Philippines in 1986 after the fall of the Ferdinand Marcos regime
and in 1998 with the collapse of the Suharto dictatorship in Indonesia. Although
Marcos significantly expanded the Armed Forces of the Philippines during his
rule, a nonviolent “People Power” revolution, with the support of General Fidel
Ramos declaring allegiance to Corazon Aquino, eroded loyalty to the Marcos
regime.6 Nonetheless, this did not create a conducive environment for SSR, as
2 Duncan McCargo, “Network Monarchy and Legitimacy Crises in ailand,” Pacific Review 18, no. 4
(2005): 499–519, https://doi.org/; Paul Chambers, “Military ‘Shadows’ in ailand Since the 2006 Coup,”
Asian Affairs: An American Review 40, no. 2 (1 April 2013): 67–82, https://doi.org/.
3 Ivan Briscoe, “e Proliferation of the ‘Parallel State,’” Fundación Para Las Relaciones Internacionales y El
Diálogo Exterior, no. Working Paper 71 (October 2008); and Eugénie Mérieau, “ailand’s Deep State, Royal
Power and the Constitutional Court (1997–2015),” Journal of Contemporary Asia 46, no. 3 (2 July 2016): 445–
66.
4 Samuel P. Huntington, e Soldier and the State: e eory and Politics of Civil–Military Relations (Cam-
bridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1981).
5 USAID, “Security Sector Reform: USAID, DOD, DOS Policy Statement,” US Department of State,
February 2009, 3.
6
Hedman, Eva- Lotta, and John Sidel, eds. Philippine Politics and Society in the Twentieth Century: Colonial
Legacies, Post- Colonial Trajectories (London: Routledge, 2000), 26, https://doi.org/; and Mark S. Cogan, “Dic-
JOURNAL OF INDOPACIFIC AFFAIRS JANUARYFEBRUARY 2024 99
Can ailand’s Military Evolve?
Aquino faced multiple coup attempts, and subsequent governments grappled
with corruption issues. Maintaining control over the military has been a politi-
cal imperative for administrations such as Rodrigo Duterte and Ferdinand
“BongBong” Marcos, Jr.
Similarly, following the Suharto regime’s fall, Indonesia made substantial efforts
to reform the Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI) with the aim of professionalizing
the military and reducing its influence in domestic politics.7 However, this has
proven challenging, as the TNI’s composition largely remained unchanged. Recent
efforts by the Indonesian military to connect with the public, particularly at the
village level to enhance local conditions, have shown promise.8 Yet, the economic
aftermath of COVID-19 has hindered this progress and strained Indonesia’s le-
gitimate modernization endeavors for its armed services.9
Opportunities for democracy in ailand are infrequent, and when they do oc-
cur, they are often short- lived. e rise of aksin Shinawatra in 2001, with his
populist support base, dominated legitimate elections in 2001 and 2005. However,
the chance for military reform during his tenure was missed due to elite competi-
tion for control of the military, power consolidation, and a rivalry with former
Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanonda.
e growth and evolution of ailand’s military have been shaped by an endur-
ing culture of self- preservation, characterized by persistent efforts to exert influ-
ence over domestic political affairs and internal elite interference, rather than
being driven by the presence of emerging internal or external threats. is article
explores these dynamics through an examination of three distinct eras of military
development in ailand.
It assesses the extent to which SSR has been implemented, focusing on its sig-
nificance for civil- military relations, the interplay between development and de-
mocratization, and the impact of defense measures on these processes. Additionally,
it scrutinizes the modernization efforts of the ai military in response to relevant
and emerging security challenges.10
tatorships and Authoritarian Regimes, Insurrections Against,” in Encyclopedia of Violence, Peace, & Conflict 3rd
ed., ed. Lester R. Kurtz (Oxford: Academic Press, 2022), 425, https://doi.org/10.1016/.
7 Jun Honna, Military Politics and Democratization in Indonesia (New York: Routledge, 2005).
8 “Indonesian Politicians Are Giving the Armed Forces a Big Role in Government,” e Economist, 31
October 2019, https://www.economist.com/.
9 Andi Raihanah Ashar and Muhammad Fauzan Malufti, “Indonesian Military Modernization: A Race
Against Time,” e Diplomat, 23 June 2022, https://thediplomat.com/.
10 Alex J. Bellamy, “Security Sector Reform: Prospects and Problems,” Global Change, Peace & Security 15,
no. 2 (1 June 2003), 102, https://doi.org/.
100 JOURNAL OF INDOPACIFIC AFFAIRS JANUARYFEBRUARY 2024
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Finally, the article evaluates the potential for reform under a new semi- democratic
government led by Srettha avisin, a former real estate businessman who has
transitioned into the realm of Pheu ai politics.
US Development of the Thai Military: 1950–1980
e early development of the ai military became intertwined with ailand’s
national economic growth, monarchical influence, and robust support from the
United States. As Daniel Fineman details, both American pragmatism and geo-
strategic considerations were key factors in the “special relationship that was cul-
tivated under the military regimes of Phibun Songkhram and Field Marshal Sarit
anarat between 1947–1958. For the ai government and its military, described
by Fineman as both “corrupt, undemocratic” and “brutal,” the rationale for the close
relationship with the United States was based on finding allies to fight communism,
and for Washington, the prevailing belief was that ailand needed strong leader-
ship to accomplish that task.11 Pragmatism, coupled with ailand’s central loca-
tion in a region marked by conflict, has long been a driving force behind US foreign
policy in Southeast Asia. ailand emerged as a stronghold against communist
influence and, subsequently, as a pivotal base for both overt and covert military
operations. is significance remains critical, despite the regime’s lack of commit-
ment to democratization and its clear repression of the population.
Sarit fostered a mutually beneficial relationship with the young King Bhumibol
Adulyadej, marking a period in ailand’s history when the military collaborated
harmoniously with the monarchy to legitimize what is now referred to as a “monar-
chized military” or a “parallel state.”12 Sarit, an autocrat often described as a “cin-
ematic picture of the ird World generalissimo,” enjoyed the backing of the ai
monarchy, which had grown disenchanted with the concept of democracy.
13
ough
the term security- sector reform did not gain common usage until after the Cold War,
Washington held major concerns about the professionalism of ai military lead-
ership and its commitment to democracy and the rule of law. ese concerns were
later validated by the arbitrary arrests of journalists, politicians, and regime critics
in November 1952.14
11 Fineman, “A Special Relationship”, 1–5.
12
Paul Chambers and Napisa Waitoolkiat, “e Resilience of Monarchised Military in ailand,” Journal
of Contemporary Asia 46, no. 3 (July 2, 2016), 425, https://doi.org/.
13 Paul Handley, e King Never Smiles (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006), 139.
14 Craig J. Reynolds, ai Radical Discourse: e Real Face of ai Feudalism Today, Studies on Southeast
Asia (Ithaca, NY: SEAP Publications, 1987), 27.
JOURNAL OF INDOPACIFIC AFFAIRS JANUARYFEBRUARY 2024 101
Can ailand’s Military Evolve?
However, the United States prioritized its need for a client state and an ally
against a resurgent China over normative considerations.15 Sarit’s 1958 coup also
raised worries in Washington, as they feared that their long- term investment in
ailand under Phibun might go to waste.16 Pragmatically, the Eisenhower ad-
ministration downplayed the ai coup, characterizing it as an “orderly attempt by
the present ruling group to solidify its position.”17 Washington needed assurances
of ailand’s support, particularly as US efforts to establish a stable Laos against
communist influence encountered political divisions in Vientiane. In response, the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) initiated a covert war to disrupt supply lines
between Laos and Vietnam.18
Balancing the potential for crises in their neighborhood, ailand reaffirmed its
commitment to consecutive American administrations. It hosted American troops
and, in return, received substantial military assistance packages totaling over USD
1 billion between 1950 and 1971.19 Convinced of ailand’s role in creating an
“anticommunist bastion,” the United States initiated the development and mod-
ernization of the ai military. By 1951, 28 arms shipments had arrived, sufficient
to equip nine Royal ai Army battalions, with US aid exceeding 2.5 times the
size of the ai military budget. An early CIA program also bolstered the police
under Phao Siyanon.20
e presence of the US military also directly benefited the emerging ai
economy. ousands of ais found employment in connection with the construc-
tion of military facilities, along with substantial economic assistance packages
during this early period. For example, in the mid-1960s, more than 200 Ameri-
can combat aircraft were based in ailand, with 9,000 US Air Force personnel.
e construction of the B-52 air base at Utapao employed more than 2,000
ais.21 Total US economic assistance amounted to USD 500 million through
the end of 1970, with an additional USD 800 million in direct military assistance
15
Chris Baker and Pasuk Phongpaichit, A History of ailand, 3rd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2014), 147, https://doi.org/.
16 Handley, e King Never Smiles, 139.
17 Baker and Pasuk, A History of ailand, 147.
18 Fredrik Logevall, “Laos: America’s Lesser Known Human and Political Disaster in Southeast Asia,”
Washington Post, 2 February 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/.
19 Bjorn Hagelin, “Military Dependency: ailand and the Philippines,” Journal of Peace Research 25, no.
4 (December 1, 1988), 433, https://doi.org/.
20 Baker and Pasuk, A History of ailand, 145.
21 Arne Kislenko, “A Not So Silent Partner: ailand’s Role in Covert Operations, Counter- Insurgency,
and the Wars in Indochina,” Journal of Conflict Studies 24, no. 1 (2004), 73, https://journals.lib.unb.ca/.
102 JOURNAL OF INDOPACIFIC AFFAIRS JANUARYFEBRUARY 2024
Cogan
during the same period.22 e United States was the sole foreign supplier of arms
to ailand during this era.23
e scope of American involvement in professionalization and modernization
efforts is extensively documented in the 1974 CIA National Intelligence Survey
on the ai Armed Forces. To start, ailand had meticulously patterned its
service schools after those of the United States, incorporating instruction and
direct translations of materials delivered by US- trained instructors. By January
1974, over 9,000 ai military personnel had undergone training in US military
schools, with many subsequently assuming instructional roles in ai- led training
institutions.24 Washington initially equipped the Royal ai Army with weaponry
from the Korean War era, including 155mm, 105mm, and 75mm howitzers,
40mm anti aircraft guns, 4.2-inch mortars, and .50 caliber machine guns. Arma-
ments included M41A3 Walker Bulldog tanks and M-113 personnel carriers.
rough 1974, the United States was the source of 90 percent of the ai Army’s
materiel requirements.25
A pivotal development during this phase of ailand’s military evolution revolved
around the recognition of both internal and external threats. ese threats encom-
passed subversion from within and an externally mobilized and aggressive threat
emanating from communism. While ailand initially had limited concerns about
its internal security until 1965, the emergence of Southeast Asia as a new theater
in the Cold War brought ailand’s foreign policy into closer alignment with
Washington.
26
e US Department of State and the CIA collaborated to forge an
anti- communist partnership, with the United States, during the Johnson admin-
istration, authorizing a comprehensive counterinsurgency (COIN) program. is
program shifted its focus away from central or urban areas to ailand’s northeast.
In 1964, 64 percent of grant aid was directed at ailand’s borders with Cambodia
and Laos, a figure that rose to more than 68 percent by 1967. e USAID program
encompassed two primary categories: COIN and nation building, with the former
designated as the higher priority.27
22 George J. Viksnins, “United States Military Spending and the Economy of ailand, 1967-1972,” Asian
Survey 13, no. 5 (1973), 441, https://doi.org/.
23 Hagelin, “Military Dependency: ailand and the Philippines,” 435.
24 “ailand: National Intelligence Survey” (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, April 1974), 3.
25 “CIA, “National Intelligence Survey,” 14.
26 Bob Bergin, “Defeating an Insurgency—e ai Effort against the Communist Party of ailand,
1965–ca. 1982,” Studies in Intelligence 60, no. 2 (June 2016), 26.
27 R. Sean Randolph, “e Limits of Influence: American Aid to ailand, 1965-70,” Asian Affairs: An
American Review 6, no. 4 (1979), 247.
JOURNAL OF INDOPACIFIC AFFAIRS JANUARYFEBRUARY 2024 103
Can ailand’s Military Evolve?
Later, in August 1965, the Communist Party of ailand (CPT) announced its
intention to overthrow the military government and establish a Marxist- inspired
regime.28 is sense of urgency prompted the first- ever visit by a US president to
ailand, as Lyndon Johnson toured the newly- constructed USD 75-million
naval base in the Gulf of Siam.29 e substantial US presence in ailand was not
only highly visible but also raised concerns that due to the volume of ordnance
dropped on Vietnam from ai- based facilities, American bases might inadvertently
foster a local insurgency.30
However, from the American perspective, as outlined in a Contemporary His-
torical Evaluation of Combat Operation (CHECO) Division report on COIN in
ailand from January 1967 to December 1968, the origins and rationale of the
insurgency remained speculative at first. e number of clashes along border areas
was difficult to confirm and did not clearly indicate the extent of activities such as
clandestine operations, propaganda, or recruiting. e ai government categorized
all criminal activities as “subversive” without distinguishing their nature. In fact, it
was challenging for the US Air Force to ascertain the existence of a communist
insurgency threat.31
e CHECO Report highlighted similar views held by scholars of that era,
suggesting that ailand was not an ideal recruiting ground. e population, despite
being economically disadvantaged, was neither malnourished nor prone to violence
or militancy.32 According to a US Department of Agriculture report from January
1968, ailand’s rice crop for 1967 was approximately 10 million metric tons, which
was close to Burma’s annual output.33
However, as US operations continued in Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam, the
American military began to perceive an insurgent threat. is threat did not arise
from the conversion or recruitment of ais, but rather from the destabilization
of Laos and significant military offensives, such as the Tet Offensive by the Viet
Cong (VC) in January 1968. During this period, US Ambassador Leonard Seid-
man Unger noted, “[even] though we have no solid information regarding [plans
28 Jeffrey M. Moore, “e ai Way of Counterinsurgency” (dissertation, University of Exeter, 2010), 65,
https://ore.exeter.ac.uk/.
29 Frank C. Darling, “America and ailand,” Asian Survey 7, no. 4 (1967), 213, https://doi.org/.
30 Al McCoy, “Subcontracting Counterinsurgency,” Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars 3, no. 2 (February
1971), 57, https://doi.org/10.1080/.
31 “COIN in ailand: January 1967–December 1968” (San Francisco: HQ PACAF Directorate, Tactical
Evaluation CHECO Division, 1969), 1–2, https://apps.dtic.mil/.
32 “COIN in ailand: January 1967–December 1968,” 6.
33 “Rice Situation,” RS-12 (Washington, DC: Economic Research Service, US Department of Agriculture,
1968), 7.
104 JOURNAL OF INDOPACIFIC AFFAIRS JANUARYFEBRUARY 2024
Cogan
to attack installations in ailand by air, mortar, or other means] we cannot afford
to take any unnecessary risk.”34 While only minor incidents occurred, the United
States grew concerned that its military presence in ailand was reaching a critical
point, especially among those labeled as subversives by the ai government.35
Taking a broader view, the establishment of a joint COIN effort provided a
renewed sense of purpose for the ai military. Its primary objective was to safe-
guard newly- constructed American bases against potential, yet unforeseen adver-
saries. e COIN strategy comprised three major components: administration,
rural development, and rural security. Notably, the rural security aspect constituted
the largest element of the USAID- funded program.36 Arguably, the provision of
training, equipment, and logistical support to new segments of the security ap-
paratus, including the ai Border Patrol Police, institutionalized a lasting presence
of both military and paramilitary elements within the fabric of ai society. is
also reinforced the concept that the military should play a central role in the de-
velopment of the ai state, driven by an insular vision in which it held responsi-
bility for safeguarding national security and preserving the ai monarchy.37
e COIN effort redefined the boundaries of military involvement, exemplified
by the formation of the Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC), a po-
litical arm of the ai military. ISOC not only supervised the conflict with the
CPT but engaged in paramilitary activities aimed at suppressing dissent, leading
to widespread political violence in 1973 and 1976.38 e military and the monar-
chy collaborated on various fronts, disseminating pro- monarchy, ideology- driven
propaganda to counter CPT efforts in the northeast and establishing village- oriented
groups and paramilitary organizations to identify and curb subversive elements
within ai society.39
34 “COIN in ailand: January 1967–December 1968,” 16.
35 Jayakrishna Baral, “U.S. Involvement in ai Security,” China Report 9, no. 4 (1973): 16–28, https://
journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/000944557300900403.
36
Ralph axton, “Modernization and Counter- Revolution in ailand,” Bulletin of Concerned Asian Schol-
ars 5, no. 4 (1 December 1973), 32, https://doi.org/.
37 Napisa Waitoolkiat and Paul Chambers, “Khaki Veto Power: e Organization of ailand’s Armed
Forces,” in Knights of the Realm: ailand’s Military and Police, en and Now, ed. Paul Chambers (Bangkok:
White Lotus, 2013), 82.
38
Siwach Sripokangkul and Mark S. Cogan, “Political Demonology, Dehumanization, and Contemporary
ai Politics,” Asia- Pacific Social Science Review 19, no. 2 ( June 2019): 115–30.
39 Katherine A. Bowie, Rituals of National Loyalty: An Anthropology of the State and the Village Scout Move-
ment in ailand (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997); and Prajak Kongkirati, “Counter- Movements
in Democratic Transition: ai Right- Wing Movements after the 1973 Popular Uprising,” Asian Review 19,
no. 1 (2006): 101–34.
JOURNAL OF INDOPACIFIC AFFAIRS JANUARYFEBRUARY 2024 105
Can ailand’s Military Evolve?
However, despite the substantial support provided to the ai military by the
United States, encompassing firearms, weapons training, administration, psycho-
logical operations, and intelligence, the kingdom’s victory over the CPT in the
early 1980s did not result from superior military capacity. Rather, it stemmed from
the fact that the young students who had joined the CPT ranks exhibited little
inclination for guerrilla warfare and were receptive to the amnesty proposals pre-
sented by the ai government.40 Additionally, the CPT’s diminishing ability to
secure support from foreign entities like China and Vietnam sealed its demise.41
Nonetheless, despite the reported success of the counterinsurgency campaign,
the CIA’s 1974 assessment identified two pivotal developments concerning the
achievements in building the ai military. Firstly, while acknowledging the ai
military’s capability to withstand an independent attack from countries such as
Malaysia, Laos, Cambodia, or Burma (Myanmar), it highlighted that confront-
ing a joint “invasion” by North Vietnam and/or China would necessitate foreign
assistance and materiel.42
Secondly, the CIA expressed apprehension over persisting weaknesses among
senior military officers. ese weaknesses encompassed negligence in supervising
command and training units beyond the battalion level. Furthermore, there was a
prevalent “preoccupation of senior officers with politics and their personal economic
interests.”43 is early recognition sets the stage for the second section of this
article, delving into ailand’s failure to implement necessary security reforms and
modernization after a shift in foreign policy resulted in enhanced relations with
neighboring states. It also explores the extent to which high- ranking elites vied
for increased control and personal gain.
Toward an Exploitative Military: 1980–2006
Following its development and buildup, the ai military did not adopt a mod
-
ernization strategy for several decades. Instead, the ai armed services, laden with
high- ranking military officials and politically- connected elites wielding influence,
pursued a strategy of self- enrichment. Rather than seeking a distinct or broader
regional role, the military immersed itself in domestic political affairs. is persis-
40 Puangthong Pawakapan, Infiltrating Society: e ai Military’s Internal Security Affairs (Singapore: IS-
EAS Publishing, 2021), 22; and Duncan McCargo, “Security, Development and Political Participation in
ailand: Alternative Currencies of Legitimacy,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 24, no. 1 (2002), 52.
41 Kevin Hewison, “ailand: An Old Relationship Renewed,” Pacific Review 31, no. 1 (2 January 2018),
118, https://doi.org/.
42 “CIA, “National Intelligence Survey,” 12.
43 “CIA, “National Intelligence Survey,” 11.
106 JOURNAL OF INDOPACIFIC AFFAIRS JANUARYFEBRUARY 2024
Cogan
tent interference in civilian politics perpetuated a pattern of striving for greater
control over ai society. A substantial body of literature addresses this issue, with
ailand ensnared in a recurring “coup trap,” as the military has intervened in
numerous coups and coup attempts since the 1932 Revolution. ese interventions
are consistently rationalized and justified by the perceived need to defend the
monarchy as an institution.44
In 1972, David Morell identified some of the factors in ai society that le-
gitimized military interference. ese included bureaucrats seeking to expedite the
passage of their legislative proposals, cliques advocating for new or established
foreign policies, officers aiming to accelerate communist suppression, and compe-
tition for political power among military leaders and Cabinet members.45 In the
post- CPT era, the military entered a phase of rapid monarchization under Prem,
with pro- monarchy military factions becoming dominant.
However, it is overly simplistic to suggest that this symbiotic relationship be-
tween the military and monarchy was the sole significant development post-1980.
As Paul Chambers later argued, the ai military evolved into a “praetorian state”
and a “khakistocracy,” characterized by extensive collusion among “tycoons, royals,
and religious leaders.”
46
e shift toward a self- serving, predatory military was not
a strategic choice but rather the outcome of internal struggles among various
military factions vying for increased control, not only over political affairs in ai-
land but also over the military itself. An illustration of this stagnation in ailand’s
military modernization and professionalism was the change in ailand’s foreign
policy initiated during General Chatichai Choonhavan’s premiership. He pledged
to “turn battlefields into marketplaces” and pursued a policy of greater regional
cooperation, as well as a degree of appeasement and accommodation with the
Burmese regime of the time.47
David Morell’s argument regarding various “cliques” pursuing distinct foreign
policies finds relevance here, particularly in the context of Myanmar. e ai
security apparatus, including the military, veered away from Western pressures and,
44 John B. Londregan and Keith T. Poole, “Poverty, e Coup Trap, and the Seizure of Executive Power,”
World Politics 42, no. 2 (1990): 151–83, https://doi.org/; and Nicholas Farrelly, “Why Democracy Struggles:
ailand’s Elite Coup Culture,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 67, no. 3 (1 June 2013), 281, https://
doi.org/.
45 David Morell, “ailand: Military Checkmate,” Asian Survey 12, no. 2 (1972), 162–63.
46 Paul Chambers, “Assessing the Monarchized Military and Khakistocracy,” in Coup, King, Crisis: A Crit-
ical Interregnum in ailand, ed. Pavin Chachavalpongpun, Yale Southeast Asia Studies (New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press, 2020), 170.
47 Mark S. Cogan and Vivek Mishra, “India–ailand Security Cooperation: Strengthening the Indo-
Pacific Resolve,” Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs 7, no. 1 (April 2020), 38, https://doi.org/.
JOURNAL OF INDOPACIFIC AFFAIRS JANUARYFEBRUARY 2024 107
Can ailand’s Military Evolve?
through a new policy of “constructive engagement,” brokered a series of security
and economic agreements with Myanmar’s State Law and Order Restoration
Council (SLORC).
48
Concurrently, a series of clandestine, black- market exchanges
emerged in tandem with ailand’s military arrangements with Myanmar. is
was exemplified, in part, by SLORC’s attempts in the early 1990s to order 20 mil-
lion rounds of small arms ammunition through ai intermediaries.49
Certain branches of the military have been caught undermining ailand’s gun
control legislation. In 2001, a senior Royal ai Air Force (RTAF) officer was ap-
prehended after armed military personnel pilfered 30 Glock semi- automatic pistols
from a warehouse at Don Mueang Airport in Bangkok. ailand’s Interior Min-
istry uncovered that the military was being utilized as a conduit to circumvent
restrictions on the number of weapons that could be sold to private gun shops.
Although the law provided a tax- free import of weapons as a “welfare benefit” for
officers, the ai judiciary compelled the RTAF to reimburse fraudulently avoided
import duties during this period.50
As Duncan McCargo highlighted in a similar context, the ai military seemed
to avoid “potentially hazardous situations,” as military officers “devote their energies
to referred to devote their energies to the more interesting and satisfying profes-
sions of business and politics,” some of which involved smuggling and exploitative
natural resource extraction.51 For example, in the interest of its own national se-
curity, the military knowingly allowed a black- market opium trade to flourish in
Myanmar, deliberately neglecting narcotics control, even as opium production
surged significantly.
52
Between 1987 and 1995, opium levels in Myanmar escalated
from 836 tons to 2,340 tons, with cultivation areas expanding from 93,200 hectares
to 154,000 over the same period, coinciding with a substantial increase in the
number of heroin refineries.53 Military- controlled governments, given that ai
prime ministers often emerge from high- ranking military ranks, demonstrated a
48 Leszek Buszynski, “ailand and Myanmar: e Perils of ‘Constructive Engagement,’” Pacific Review
11, no. 2 (1 January 1998), 290–91, https://doi.org/.
49
Martin Smith, “e Burmese Way to Rack and Ruin,” Index on Censorship 20, no. 10 (1 November 1991),
45, https://doi.org/.
50 David Capie, Small Arms Production and Transfers in Southeast Asia, Canberra Papers on Strategy &
Defence 146 (Canberra: Australia National University, 2002).
51 McCargo, “Security, Development and Political Participation in ailand,” 51.
52 Ronald Cima, Narcotics and the Police and Military Forces of South and Southeast Asia (Washington, DC:
Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, August 1986), 6, https://apps.dtic.mil/.
53 Patrick Meehan, “Drugs, Insurgency and State- Building in Burma: Why the Drugs Trade Is Central
to Burma’s Changing Political Order,” Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 42, no. 3 (2011), 382, https://www.
jstor.org/.
108 JOURNAL OF INDOPACIFIC AFFAIRS JANUARYFEBRUARY 2024
Cogan
willingness to be pragmatic in pursuit of their political and economic objectives
through a policy of constructive engagement.
ese trends persisted, despite domestic upheavals, as seen in 1991 when other
high- ranking members of the ai military, including Royal ai Army General
Sunthorn Kongsompong and members of Class Five of the prestigious Chula-
chomklao Military Academy, General Deputy Army Chief Gen. Issarapong
Noonpakdi, and Commander- in- Chief of the Royal ai Army General Suchinda
Kraprayoon, ousted Prime Minister Chatichai from power in a February coup. e
official justification for the coup was unexplained wealth. However, the so- called
“Kra- pakdee clique,” led by Suchinda, had held senior roles in state enterprises,
including the Port Authority of ailand, the State Railway of ailand, and ai
Airways International.54
e 1991 coup and the subsequent 1992 “Black May” street violence tempo-
rarily loosened the military’s influence and control over ai society. e ai
monarchy remained undiminished due to a royal intervention by King Bhumibol
and the workings of a “network monarchy.”55 Prem, under the control of the
Privy Council, increased monarchical influence over the armed services. After
the Black May violence, General Suchinda was publicly admonished and replaced
by more senior statesmen, including senior diplomat Anand Panyarachun and
later Chuan Leekpai.
Chuan won a closely- monitored election, with his Democrat Party earning 79
parliamentary seats and forming a coalition government with four other political
parties. It was during Prime Minister Chuan’s tenure that ailand began to curb
the military’s influence and initiate the process of embracing military moderniza-
tion. While this policy direction would resurface after the 2006 coup d’état, two
important documents, a “Master Plan for Regional Cooperation or the Creation
of a New Equilibrium” in 1993 and a 1994 White Paper issued by the Defense
Ministry, suggested that the military should no longer merely safeguard its inter-
ests but promote political cooperation between neighboring Association of South-
east Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries and China.56 is shift required a depar-
ture from an exploitative foreign policy.
Unfortunately, the successive premierships of Banharn Silpa- archa and General
Chavalit Yongchaiyudh, marked by systemic corruption and inattention to ai-
land’s economic vulnerabilities, contributed to the 1997 Asian economic crisis. is
54 John McKinnon, “Can the Military Be Sidelined?” Pacific Viewpoint 33, no. 2 (1992), 130, https://doi.
org/.
55 McCargo, “Network Monarchy,” 508.
56 McCargo, “Security, Development and Political Participation in ailand,” 53.
JOURNAL OF INDOPACIFIC AFFAIRS JANUARYFEBRUARY 2024 109
Can ailand’s Military Evolve?
crisis opened the door to the populist aksin Shinawatra era, which brought
significant changes to ailand’s foreign policy and the composition of its military.
Instead of pursuing demilitarization or SSR, aksin prioritized personalized
control. A clear example of this strategy was his formation of a clique of aksin
loyalists within the military. is was evident early on through his appointments,
such as his cousins General Uthai Shinawatra as deputy director of the Defense
Ministry’s Planning and Policy Office and Lieutenant General Chaisit Shinawa-
tra as deputy commander of the Armed Forces Development Headquarters.
57
Many senior positions in the Royal ai Navy, Army, and Air Force were filled by
members of aksin’s Class 10 of the Armed Forces Academies Preparatory School.
ese appointments included Admiral Werayut Uttamot as Deputy Commander- in-
Chief of the ird Fleet, Major General Chatchai awonbudtra as Army Advisor,
and Captain Siripong Wanuntrakul as Chief of the Air Staff, among others.58
aksin also acquiesced to substantial budgetary requests for the military, a
departure from the previous administration under Chuan.59 As McCargo noted,
“[ties] between aksin and the Army [undermined] principles of military profes-
sionalism and neutrality, a potentially dangerous state of affairs,” suggesting that
the separation between the executive and the military had never been complete
and that aksin was repeating the mistakes of the past.60
During the aksin era, there was a shift in military priorities. Initially, aksin
hesitated to become involved, in part due to the large Muslim population in ai-
land’s southernmost provinces. However, the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks
and the subsequent pressure on US allies to contribute to the global war on terror
(GWOT), along with concerns about international terrorist groups using South-
east Asia as a staging area for attacks, prompted some action by the aksin gov-
ernment.
61
aksin’s approach to the southern insurgency, while seen as heavy- handed
and damaging to human rights and internal security, was driven by a perspective
of maintaining law and order rather than countering terrorism.62
57 Duncan McCargo and Ukrist Pathmanand, e aksinization of ailand, NIAS Studies in Contem-
porary Asian History 4 (Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2005), 135–36.
58 McCargo and Ukrist, e aksinization of ailand, 138–39.
59 McCargo and Ukrist, e aksinization of ailand, 151.
60 McCargo and Ukrist, e aksinization of ailand, 155–57.
61 Kavi Chongkittavorn, “ailand: International Terrorism and the Muslim South,” in Southeast Asian
Affairs 2004, ed. Daljit Singh and Kin Wah Chin (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2004) 267–76, https://doi.
org/.
62 Mark S.Cogan and Vivek Mishra, “Regionalism and Bilateral Counter- Terrorism Cooperation: e
Case of India and ailand,” Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism 16, no. 3 (2 September 2021),
249, https://doi.org/10.1080/.
110 JOURNAL OF INDOPACIFIC AFFAIRS JANUARYFEBRUARY 2024
Cogan
Under internal and external pressure, aksin eventually pledged ailand’s
support for the GWOT, deploying troops to Iraq and aiding in the capture of
Nujraman Riduan bin Isomuddin, a top leader of Jemaah Islamiyah ( JI) with close
ties to al- Qaeda. It was reported that JI planned the Bali bombings in Indonesia
from safehouses in Bangkok.63 American SSR efforts during that period, mainly
through the Cobra Gold joint military exercises, began to incorporate more coun-
terterrorism components.
64
ese joint exercises, along with similar exercises with
Australia and Japan, helped professionalize the military by imparting transferable
skills to personnel of different ranks.
The Post- Coup Thai Military: 2006–2023
e 2006 and 2014 coups, which removed both aksin and his sister, Yingluck
Shinawatra, were driven by elite distrust and suspicion of the power structures that
aksin had established both during his time in office and while in exile. As noted
by Kevin Hewison, the prevailing opinion about the 2006 coup was that it was a
“justified coup” necessary to remove the corrupt elements of the aksin era and
“restore democracy” through military intervention.
65
Similar justifications were put
forth after the May 2014 coup, with the Prayut- led military junta claiming it was
“returning happiness to the ai people.” Many ais welcomed the military’s
presence in the streets and at junta- sponsored public events.66
e justification for ailand’s multiple military coups often revolves around
the issue of systemic corruption. Arguments put forth by both the military and
civilian factions, particularly the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD), were
centered on allegations of corruption involving aksin and his tendency to derive
personal gains from public office.67 In a broader sense, as pointed out by Pavin
Chachavalpongpun, the ai military saw itself as the “moral compass” of the na-
tion, which legitimized the coup against aksin as the only means to save democ-
racy, cleanse politics of corruption, remove corrupt politicians, and restore stability.
68
63 Cogan and Mishra, “Regionalism and Bilateral Counter- Terrorism Cooperation,” 249.
64 Seth Robson, “Troops Leave Cobra Gold Exercise with Understanding of Role in Regional Security
— and Maybe a Few Tattoos,” Stars and Stripes, 1 June 2004, https://www.stripes.com/.
65 Kevin Hewison, “ailand after the ‘Good’ Coup,” Brown Journal of World Affairs 14, no. 1 (2008), 237,
https://bjwa.brown.edu/.
66 Kate Hodal, “ai junta ‘brings happiness to the people’ with parties and selfies,” e Guardian, 4 June
2014, https://www.theguardian.com/.
67 Aim Sinpeng, “Corruption, Morality, and the Politics of Reform in ailand,” Asian Politics & Policy 6,
no. 4 (2014), 525, https://doi.org/.
68 Pavin Chachavalpongpun, “aksin, the Military, and ailand’s Protracted Political Crisis,” in e Po-
litical Resurgence of the Military in Southeast Asia, ed. Marcus Mietzner, Contemporary Southeast Asia Series
JOURNAL OF INDOPACIFIC AFFAIRS JANUARYFEBRUARY 2024 111
Can ailand’s Military Evolve?
However, corruption isn’t the sole motivator, as evidenced by both the coups
against Chatchai and aksin. While aksin had garnered attention for his con-
flicts with Prem’s monarchist establishment and his attempts to shape the military
for personal gain, Chatchai was ostensibly ousted for similar reasons—his clash
with the financial interests of the military and the personal interests of its elite
members.69 Following the pattern of the justifications for the aksin coup, the
2014 coup against Yingluck aimed to excise the political influence of aksin.70
e coups against aksin and Yingluck represented significant challenges to
the efforts to professionalize and bring the ai military under civilian control.
e 2007 Constitution, which replaced the People’s Constitution of 1998, char-
acterized by democratic processes and public input, established a culture of im-
punity.71 It offered amnesty for those involved in the 2006 coup and empowered
the military to allocate funds for the “protection and upholding of its independence,
sovereignty, security of State, institution of kingship, national interests and the
democratic regime of government with the King as Head of State, and for national
development.”72 As noted by Aurel Croissant and others, the military sought to
prevent the rise of a aksin- like figure by disbanding the ai Rak ai (TRT)
Party. e Constitutional Court, originally established to foster judicial indepen-
dence, was granted the authority to investigate and prosecute political parties,
Members of Parliament, and other independent institutions.73
Both coups had some consequences for SSR efforts and modernization, but
primarily in the context of US concerns about the state of ai democratization.
In both cases, there were impacts on US weapons sales, particularly in 2014 when
US Foreign Military Financing (FMF), which supports defense equipment, train-
ing, and services, was reduced. Additionally, USD 1.3 million in funding under the
(New York: Routledge, 2011), 47.
69 Miron Mushkat, “Policy Implications of ailand’s Unexpected Coup,” International Studies 29, no. 2
(1992), 163, https://doi.org/.
70 Chris Baker, “e 2014 ai Coup and Some Roots of Authoritarianism,” Journal of Contemporary Asia
46, no. 3 (2016), 389, https://doi.org/.
71 Somchai Preechasinlapakun, “Dynamics and Institutionalization of Coups in the ai Constitution,”
VRF 483 (Chiba: Institute for Developing Economies - Japan External Trade Organization, 2013), 30, https://
www.ide.go.jp/.
72 Aurel Croissant et al., “ailand: Civilian Control Deterred,” in Democratization and Civilian Control
in Asia, ed. Aurel Croissant et al., Critical Studies of the Asia Pacific Series (London: Palgrave Macmillan
UK, 2013), https://doi.org/.
73 Croissant, et. al., “ailand: Civilian Control Deterred,” 170.
112 JOURNAL OF INDOPACIFIC AFFAIRS JANUARYFEBRUARY 2024
Cogan
International Military Education and Training (IMET) program, which allows
ai officers to attend US military institutions, was terminated.74
e pressure for democratization exerted by the Obama Administration proved
ineffective due to ailand’s deepening relationship with China. As nurtured over
the years, Michael Chambers suggested that the growing closeness between China
and ailand represents a mutually beneficial relationship that drove them towards
stronger ties, which was particularly advantageous for ailand as it gained a ma-
jor trading partner.75 According to World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) data,
China has become one of ailand’s largest trading partners, with USD 66 billion
worth of Chinese goods imported into ailand and USD 36.5 billion exported
to China in 2021.76
However, this was not the sole reason for the expanded ties. ai foreign policy
adjusted after the US withdrawal from the region in the mid-1970s, leading to a
significant improvement in Sino- ai relations. Beijing offered Bangkok protection
from Vietnamese aggression through the provision of weaponry and deals at
“friendship” prices.77 It became evident that China viewed ailand not only as a
potential partner but also as a reliable buyer of Chinese arms. ailand had been
procuring weapons from foreign manufacturers since a significant foreign policy
shift following the Vietnam conflict. During this period, arms acquisitions from
China’s state- owned industries notably increased, especially when US restrictions
limited Bangkok’s options.
Starting in 2015, ailand entered into multiple defense agreements with China,
including the purchase of NORINCO- made VT4 battle tanks, the procurement
of three S26T diesel submarines, and a proposal by Defense Minister and Deputy
Prime Minister Prawit Wongsuwan to establish a joint military facility for manu-
facturing Chinese small arms and drones.78
Furthermore, in the post- coup era, ailand expanded joint military drills, in-
cluding the Falcon Strike exercise held at Udorn Royal ai Air Force Base, which
originated in 2015.79 Joint Strike, an Army exercise, and the Blue Strike naval
74 Emma Chanlett- Avery, Ben Dolven, and Kirt Smith, ailand: Background and U.S. Relations (Wash-
ington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 11 September 2019), 2, https://crsreports.congress.gov/.
75 Michael R. Chambers, “‘e Chinese and the ais Are Brothers’: e Evolution of the Sino–ai
Friendship,” Journal of Contemporary China 14, no. 45 (2005): 599–629, https://doi.org/.
76 “ailand Monthly Trade Data,” World Integrated Trade Solution, 2023, https://wits.worldbank.org/.
77 Chambers, “‘e Chinese and the ais Are Brothers’,” 616.
78 Mark S. Cogan, “Is ailand Accommodating China?,” Southeast Asian Social Science Review 4, no. 2 (1
December 2019), 39, https://papers.ssrn.com/.
79 “China- ailand Joint Air Force Training Exercise ‘Falcon Strike 2022’ to Kick off,” Ministry of Na-
tional Defense of the People’s Republic of China, 12 August 2022, http://eng.mod.gov.cn/.
JOURNAL OF INDOPACIFIC AFFAIRS JANUARYFEBRUARY 2024 113
Can ailand’s Military Evolve?
exercise, which began in 2010 but expanded under Prayut in 2016 to include more
than 1,000 ai and Chinese participants, now encompass a wide range of arma-
ments, including helicopters, tanks, guns, and speedboats.80
Subsequent US administrations saw a return to greater cooperation, including
access to IMET and FMF programs. Cobra Gold activities also resumed at nor-
mal capacity, although the focus of each training exercise varied, encompassing
counterterrorism, humanitarian relief, interoperability, maritime security, and
disaster response.
e most significant and problematic development during this era was the on-
going interference in domestic political affairs, highlighted by the enactment of
the 2017 ai Constitution. is constitution imposed significant restrictions on
normal democratic processes by introducing junta- selected senators.
81
e process
was predominantly internal within the Prayut government, with final approval and
some additions authorized by King Vajiralongkorn. is, however, led to some
tensions between the two institutions.
82
In 2019, King Vajiralongkorn took control
over two Army units through a royal decree, the 1st and 11th Infantry Regiments,
which were directly assigned to the Royal Security Command.
83
Both the military
and the monarchy made substantial efforts to shape ai society, including the
approval of a controversial national development plan that granted the military
significant control over ailand’s national development for the next two decades.84
e 2017 Constitution, which ai voters approved in a 2016 referendum, ac-
celerated military control at the expense of established political parties. Similar to
what would happen in the aftermath of the May 2023 election, the new charter
reduced the likelihood of any one political party securing an outright majority
government. is was because the 250 senators, handpicked by the junta, were
granted the authority to select the next prime minister. Furthermore, the require-
ments for the office of prime minister were modified, eliminating the need for a
potential candidate to be an elected member of the ai Parliament. is change
favored then- Prime Minister Prayut Chan- ocha, who had assumed power through
80
Prashanth Parameswaran, “China, ailand Kick Off Military Exercise Blue Strike 2016,” e Diplomat,
23 May 2016, https://thediplomat.com/.
81 Hiroshi Kotani and Yukako Ono, “ailand’s New Constitution Favors the Monarchy and Military,”
Nikkei Asia, 13 April 2017, https://asia.nikkei.com/.
82 Eugénie Mérieau, “Seeking More Power, ailand’s New King Is Moving the Country Away from Be-
ing a Constitutional Monarchy,” e Conversation, 3 February 2017, http://theconversation.com/.
83 “ailand’s King Takes Personal Control of Two Key Army Units,” Reuters, 1 October 2019, https://
www.reuters.com/.
84 Marwaan Macan- Markar, “ai Military Draws up 20-Year National Political Blueprint,” Nikkei Asia,
19 July 2018, https://asia.nikkei.com/.
114 JOURNAL OF INDOPACIFIC AFFAIRS JANUARYFEBRUARY 2024
Cogan
nonconstitutional means and had never been elected as a Member of Parliament
(MP). e appointed senators included ex officio military commanders and former
members of the now- defunct National Legislative Assembly (NLA).85
Evidenced by recurrent political crises stemming from dysfunctional political
institutions, the revised electoral system, a mixed- member proportional represen-
tation (MMP) regime, also heightened the likelihood of instability within ailand’s
legislative branch. is, in turn, created an environment conducive to fragile coali-
tions and obstacles in passing reform- oriented legislation.86 e combination of
fragility and a perceived sense of crisis has historically been used to justify military
intervention in domestic affairs.
During this same period, ailand actively pursued military modernization,
particularly through a 2017 act aligning defense strategy with its National Stra-
tegic Development Plan (2017-2036) and its National Strategic Defence Plan
(2017–2036). However, this approach appeared haphazard and somewhat irratio
-
nal. While the COVID-19 pandemic disrupted crucial training and interoperabil-
ity efforts, ailand’s plans for local defense manufacturing were also interrupted.
ere was an increased focus on security relations with both Russia and India,
partly due to strained relations with the United States. is was evident in Mos-
cow’s interest in the ai arms market and New Delhi’s broader security interests
in the region following the 2008 Mumbai attacks and the evolving security crisis
along its shared border with Myanmar.87 Furthermore, the local manufacturing
base in Kanchanaburi faced challenges such as a lack of innovation, weak local
governance, and a shortage of skills at the local level required to make a local
defense industry competitive.88
Moreover, there are questions regarding the alignment of purchases from both
China and the United States, as well as other foreign suppliers, with the proposed
modernization plan. e lack of attention to SSR has compromised ailand’s
ability to develop weapons that effectively meet the military’s needs in response to
external threats. For instance, the acquisition of Chinese- made S26T diesel sub-
marines, totaling over USD 1 billion, drew criticism due to the scale of the pro-
85 Khemthong Tonsakulrungruang, “ailand’s National Legislative Assembly,” New Mandala (blog), 24
August 2014, https://www.newmandala.org/.
86 Enze Han and Sirada Khemanitthathai, “ailand: e Baffling Mathematics at Helps to Keep the
Junta in Power,” e Conversation, 17 April 2019, http://theconversation.com/.
87 Dmitry Gorenburg and Paul Schwartz, “Russia’s Relations with Southeast Asia,” Russie.NEI.Reports
(Paris: IFRI, March 2019), 39 https://www.ifri.org/; and Cogan and Mishra, “India–ailand Security Co-
operation,” 39–40.
88 Hadrien Saperstein, “A Reckoning for ailand’s Indigenous Defence Industry,” e Interpreter, 9 De-
cember 2020, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/.
JOURNAL OF INDOPACIFIC AFFAIRS JANUARYFEBRUARY 2024 115
Can ailand’s Military Evolve?
curement. Additionally, a German engine supplier declined to provide engines for
these submarines, citing a long- standing embargo with China related to the Ti-
ananmen Square massacre.
89
e Prayut government faced significant criticism for
the procurement of GT200 fake bomb detectors, which raised alarm as various
military units and other agencies spent over 1.4 billion baht on nearly 1,400 coun-
terfeit detection devices. is prompted concerns that the ai military had not
taken sufficient measures to ensure transparency, accountability, and quality control
in its acquisitions.90
Furthermore, the attempted purchase of US- made F-35 fighter jets, at an esti-
mated cost of approximately USD 408 million, was denied due to issues related to
training and technical requirements. is occurred despite ailand being designated
as a Major Non- NATO Ally in 2003.
91
e deepening relations between ailand
and China have also raised significant concerns among analysts.92
During Prayut’s more than nine years of military rule, elite exploitation and
corruption within the ai military escalated. Personal relationships with foreign
militaries not only affected the professionalism of higher- ranking military person-
nel but also amplified military influence and private profit motives in shaping
foreign policy decisions.
For instance, when Myanmar experienced a coup in February 2021, General
Min Aung Hlaing sought counsel from ailand’s military. Many of these personal
relationships date back to 2012 when General Hlaing was named the “adopted
son” of Prem Tinsulanonda.93 ese interpersonal ties raise concerns about ongo-
ing corruption and a significant departure from ailand’s prior constructive en-
gagement policy, which, while exploitative, was lucrative and extended support to
an isolated Tatmadaw regime in Myanmar.
An example of this concerning trend is a 2019 deal with the junta- run Myanmar
Economic Corporation, which allocated over USD 1 million to construct a fuel
terminal on land seized from rural farmers.94 e implications of these personal
89 Mike Yeo, “ai Submarine Purchase Hits Rough Seas,” Defense News, 28 August 2020, https://www.
defensenews.com/.
90
Nopporn Wong- Anan, “GT200 Scam Tests Regime’s Mettle,” Bangkok Post, 23 June 2016, https://www.
bangkokpost.com/.
91 “ailand Air Force Says U.S. Has Denied Request to Buy F-35 Jets,” Reuters, 25 May 2023, https://
www.reuters.com/.
92 “ai Plan to Acquire F-35 Fighter Jets Poses Dilemma for Washington,” Radio Free Asia, 16 February
2022, https://www.rfa.org/.
93 “Former ai Army Chief Is ‘Godfather’ to Burma’s Top General,” e Irrawaddy, 16 July 2014, https://
www.irrawaddy.com/.
94 “Myanmar: ai State- Owned Company Funds Junta,” Human Rights Watch, 25 May 2021, https://
www.hrw.org/.
116 JOURNAL OF INDOPACIFIC AFFAIRS JANUARYFEBRUARY 2024
Cogan
ties have prompted criticism regarding the depth of ailand’s relationships with
the Myanmar junta and their impact on the broader ASEAN effort to address the
regional crisis. While some ASEAN states like Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore
have pursued a policy of isolation, ailand remains among a select few, including
Cambodia and Laos, that have chosen to engage with the junta. is has caused a
division within ASEAN, with some states prioritizing security interests and prag-
matic national security considerations.
Conclusion: The Srettha Government and Military Relations
e progressive Move Forward Party (MFP), in coalition with the Pheu ai
Party, managed to defeat the military and monarchy- aligned conservative parties
in the 2019 election. However, the 2017 Constitution played a crucial role in the
post- May 2023 election crisis, where junta- appointed senators wielded significant
influence and power over the final outcome. Pragmatism on the part of Pheu ai
led to a deal to “make friends with the devil,” where a aksin- aligned party formed
a coalition with several conservative parties, including those that had previously
played a role in removing both aksin and Yingluck from political office.95 e
resulting semi- democratic government, led by real estate businessman turned Pheu
ai candidate Prime Minister Srettha avisin, complicates efforts to reform the
ai military and achieve modernization and professionalization objectives, which
had been a key campaign focus for MFP, its former coalition partner.
96
One of the
concessions made by Pheu ai to the military- aligned parties was allowing Pra-
yut to handpick the next generation of military leaders as part of the annual
military reshuffle.97
Srettha’s relationship with the military remains somewhat unpredictable, as he
has recently offered measured public praise for the armed services, acknowledging
that the military “has done many good things”, while also noting some unresolved
issues from the past.
98
Srettha has engaged in a series of meetings with the military
to “bridge the divide” between the public and armed forces. Changes are likely to
95 Koh Ewe, “How ailand Finally Got Its New Prime Minister,” TIME, 22 August 2023, https://time.
com/.
96
Bryan Pietsch, “Meet the Ivy- Educated Opposition Leader Who Could End ai Military Rule,” Wash-
ington Post, 15 May 2023, https://www.washingtonpost.com/.
97
Patpicha Tanakasempipat, “Prayuth Makes Key Military Appointments Before Leaving Office,” Bloom-
berg, News, 31 August 2023, https://www.bnnbloomberg.ca/; and Francesca Regalado, “ailand’s Pheu ai
Coalition Adds Largest pro- Military Party,” Nikkei Asia, 21 August 2023, https://asia.nikkei.com/.
98 Bloomberg, “ailand to Hold US Security Talks, PM Says as He Skips Asean,” Bangkok Post, 4 Sep-
tember 2023, https://www.bangkokpost.com/.
JOURNAL OF INDOPACIFIC AFFAIRS JANUARYFEBRUARY 2024 117
Can ailand’s Military Evolve?
be gradual, as indicated by a September announcement that military procurement
would involve economic benefits and deals to import products from ailand.99
Pheu ai has also consulted with former defense ministers, including General
ammarak Isarangkura na Ayudhaya, a former aksin defense minister turned
Palang Pracharath Party (PPRP) campaigner.100 Complicating matters was Pheu
ai’s selection of Sutin Klungsang as Defense Minister. While Sutin would be
only the second civilian to hold this position, his expertise has been in education
rather than defense matters.101
Recent developments between the end of the Prayut era and the start of the
Srettha government indicate that politics, rather than modernization efforts, are
shaping policy decisions. In October 2023, when Defense Minister Sutin visited
the Royal ai Navy Headquarters, he announced the government’s intention
to acquire a Chinese frigate instead of the previously planned submarine. is
change was attributed to external disagreements regarding the submarine’s
propulsion system.102
An internal document leaked from the China Shipbuilding and Offshore In-
ternational Co., Ltd (CSOC) revealed that the Chinese- manufactured engines
had a maximum output of 18 knots, but were sustainable for only 10 minutes,
which fell significantly short of the specifications offered by other bidders, such as
South Korea. is raised suggestions that both Prayut and Srettha prioritized
ailand’s ongoing relationship with Beijing over the submarine’s actual capabili
-
ties when evaluating potential bids.103
As noted by Termsak Chalermpalanupap, Srettha’s appointment of Sutin could
have presented an opportunity for the new government to hold the military ac-
countable by introducing transparency in the procurement process. However, given
that the critical information regarding the submarine bidding process is now over
eight years old, it appears unlikely that more accountable or transparent processes
are being considered, even though negotiations with China for the frigate are
still ongoing.104
99 Wassana Nanuam, “Srettha Lays out Defence Buy Plans,” Bangkok Post, 3 September 2023, https://www.
bangkokpost.com/.
100 Aekarach Sattaburuth, “PPRP Recruits ammarak to Lead Northeastern Assault,” Bangkok Post, 23
March 2023, https://www.bangkokpost.com/.
101 “e Military Policy of Srettha and the Civilian Defence Minister Is Closely Watched,” Khaosod Eng-
lish, 4 September 2023, https://www.khaosodenglish.com/.
102 Sebastian Strangio, “ailand Will Replace Chinese Sub With Frigate, Defense Minister Says,” e
Diplomat, 24 October 2023, https://thediplomat.com/.
103
Termsak Chalermpalanupap, “ailand’s Marooned Submarine Deal: Some Questions Need Answers,”
Fulcrum, 30 October 2023, https://fulcrum.sg/.
104 Termsak, “ailand’s Marooned Submarine Deal.”
118 JOURNAL OF INDOPACIFIC AFFAIRS JANUARYFEBRUARY 2024
Cogan
However, by forming a pragmatic coalition with military partners, Srettha’s
control over key line ministries and his ability to influence ad- hoc policies and
decisions created under the previous regime are limited. is represents a significant
departure from the MFP’s promises not only to demilitarize and decentralize power
in ailand but also to reverse ailand’s exploitative Myanmar policy. With ap-
pointments now secured and military parties in the coalition gaining more influence
over future annual appointments, it is likely that the political status quo will persist,
and reform efforts will be put on hold in the near term or until a coalition without
the support of military- backed political parties becomes viable.
is article has aimed to trace the development, professionalization, and mod-
ernization of the ai military, which has played a prominent role in ai society
since the 1932 Revolution. is historical review of three distinct eras of contem-
porary military history has brought to light long- standing concerns that continue
to affect the new Srettha government. Each era has demonstrated that the lack of
attention to professionalism and SSR has allowed successive generations of military
leaders to perpetuate a culture that prioritizes personal gain and ensures the survival
of both military and monarchical institutions, often at the expense of foreign policy,
corruption harming ai citizens, and the erosion of trust and confidence in the
ai body politic.
While the May 2023 election initially served as a referendum on Prayut’s nine- plus
years of authoritarian rule and prompted a long- overdue public discourse on the
role of the ai monarchy in society, continued nondemocratic interventions, such
as the coordinated abstentions of appointed senators during the prime ministerial
confirmation, reaffirmed a multigenerational belief that ruling elites find justifica-
tions for intervening in the political process, not just during national crises, but at
all- too- suspicious times.
Mark S. Coga n
Mr. Cogan is an Associate Professor of Peace and Conflict Studies at Kansai Gaidai University, Japan. His research
focuses primarily on Southeast Asia, particularly on authoritarian regimes in Thailand and Cambodia, with an
emphasis on foreign policy, diplomacy, security cooperation, and peacebuilding. His recent co- edited volume,
Alternative Perspective on Peacebuilding: Theories and Case Studies, was published by Palgrave MacMillan in 2022.
Disclaimer
e views and opinions expressed or implied in JIPA are those of the authors and should not be construed as carrying the
official sanction of the Department of Defense, Department of the Air Force, Air Education and Training Command, Air
University, or other agencies or departments of the US government or their international equivalents.
