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CONNECTIVITY
and CREATIVITY
in times of CONFLICT Handle with care/
Inclusivity
Beyond empathy:
how curiosity romotes greater care
Cassini Nazir, Meah Lin
University of North Texas Ucassini@unt.edu chienlinunteduAbstract
Empathy is widely revered as an essential mindset among
designers. While beneficial to design practice, empathy has
its problems. Consider studies that show: (1) We easily con-
fuse and conflate empathy, sympathy, and compassion. The
differences between these capacities are critically impor-
tant. (2) Empathic resonance in the brain is highly biased. We
find it hard to empathize with people unlike ourselves. (3)
Having too much empathy may also be problematic and can
be weaponized by bad actors. (4) We feel empathy only for
humans and some animals — not for objects, spaces, places,
or our planet.
If we can empathize with humans and only in limited ways,
perhaps designers could benefit from an assemblage of emo-
tive capacities beyond just empathy. This paper will trace the
“edges of empathy” and argue that designers should cultivate
two additional emotive capacities that complement empa-
thy: curiosity and care. Because care is a linguistic ancestor
to the English word curiosity, the paper will briefly trace the
etymological roots of curiosity. It will argue that care and cu-
riosity are inextricable: developing one can foster the other.
The paper concludes that, unlike empathy, care and curiosity
broadly apply to people, objects, places, systems, and ecolo-
gies situated around that which we build.
Author keywords
Curiosity; empathy; interaction design; designing for care
Introduction
Empathy is widely revered as an essential mindset for design
practice. For good reasons: Empathy helps us take the per-
spective of other people (Maibom, 2022), identify with them
(Spaulding, 2019), understand their emotional states, and build
rapport (Maibom, 2019). Philosophers propose it as the basis
for morality (Kauppinen, 2019) and one way we can actualize
care and concern (Zaki, 2020). Design practitioners and aca-
demics have placed increasing importance on empathy. Cross
(1982) listed empathy as one of the values that distinguished
design from the long-established cultures of the sciences and
humanities. IDEO and the Stanford d.school helped popularize
design thinking as a way for organizations to scale design prac-
tices, beginning with an empathize phase. Dave Gray’s original
(May, 2021) and updated Empathy Map (2017) provide a tem-
plate to capture empathy in design research.
While valuable to design practice, empathy has its prob-
lems. Having empathy does not necessarily make us better
people. Empathy is not necessarily bad, but neither is it all
good. Empathy has come under scrutiny recently. Psycholo-
gists, cognitive scientists, and philosophers are re-examining
its place as a singular force for only good.
Designers are too. Heylighen and Dong’s academic article
in Design Studies (2019) stressed the importance of recog-
nizing the limits of knowing the experiences of others. Anthro-
pologist and design researcher Sekai Farai (2020) addressed
design practitioners in her User Experience Researchers Con-
ference (UXRC) talk by saying, “I’m here to call bullshit on em-
pathy in user experience with love,” noting that “there is less
empathy in user research today than there should be.” Even
renowned, influential design icons are questioning the limits
of empathy. Donald Norman’s Why I Don’t Believe in Empa-
thetic Design (2019) challenges the notion that empathy can
make us think we can comprehend how others feel and what
they think.
In this paper, we will define empathy and explain its im-
portance. We will then identify sixteen “edges” or limitations
of empathy that extend from the individual to those with
similar characteristics, those with dissimilar characteristics,
and society. We will investigate how these limitations can be
enhanced by two additional emotive capacities: care and cu-
riosity. In short, this paper will address the question: Is empa-
thy enough?
What is Empathy?
Coined over 100 years ago by Edward B. Titchener, the term
“empathy” is used to refer to a range of feelings and phenom-
ena. It is worth noting that there is no consensus on the term’s
definition in psychology and neuroscience. Cuff et al. (2014)
list 43 discrete definitions of empathy. This definition diversi-
ty is not necessarily a problem, but a mismatch between the
way empathy is researched and the way it is being practiced
may lead to overall confusion about its efficacy. All defini-
tions of empathy confirm the idea that it is other-oriented.
Designers colloquially use the phrase “stepping into another’s
shoes” to describe it. This paper uses Goleman and Ekman’s
definition of empathy (2008), which delineates three types
of empathy. Other researchers have adopted the Goleman
and Ekman triadic model, such as Zaki (2020), who uses sim-
ilar terms, as shown in Table 1.
1
Table 1. Three kinds of empathy
Goleman and
Ekman (2008)
Zaki (2020) Definition
Cognitive
empathy
Cognitive
empathy
Identifying what others feel and
what they might be thinking
Affective
empathy
Emotional
empathy
Physically feeling what others feel
Compassionate
empathy
Empathic
concern
Understanding the situation and
feeling of others and are moved
to assist
Other kinds of empathies outside of these three may exist.
Literature on autism, for example, describe motor empathy,
where we mirror facial expressions, body language or speech
of another (Silvertant, 2018). Depending on the situation, our
past experiences, how well we know the person we are di-
recting our empathy towards, and other factors, our empa-
thy can take on different forms. Cognitive empathy, affective
empathy, compassionate empathy, or some combination of
all three are possible. This makes empathy elastic, as our ca-
pacity to empathize can stretch to any of these components.
The Influence of Proximity to Self on Empathy
Empathy is widely accepted as the basis of morality and
moral values (Hoffman, 2001). Peter Singer (1981) intro-
duced the concept of the moral circle to explore differences
in moral judgments. The moral circle has the self at its center,
with progressively larger circles for family, tribe, etc. Graham
et al. (2017) adapted Singer’s circle to propose the concept
of centripetal and centrifugal forces within this moral circle
(Figure 1).
Centrifugal Force Empathy pushes attention and con-
cern away from the self. Centrifugal forces (centrum + fugio
= “center-fleeing”) push from the center of the moral circle
(family, community) to the outermost circles (all humans, all
living things). Graham et al. describe this force as in conflict
with another powerful force in the moral circle, a centripetal
(centrum + petere = “center-seeking”) pulling inward to the
concern of family and self.
We adapt Graham et al.’s forces on Singer’s circle (Figure 2),
simplifying their effects into four main categories: the self at
the center, people familiar or similar to us (our in-group), oth-
ers (out-group), and society. These concentric circles influ-
ence how we respond to the people we design for and with.
We categorize these sixteen limitations of empathy into four
categories. If mapped, they would form the boundaries of the
empathy territory. This is not an exhaustive list and some items
may fit into multiple categories. Many are situation dependent.
Some limitations have a disproportionate impact, depending
on the individual, situation, or context. How each limitation
manifests is determined by the designer, as well as the pro-
cesses and collective design decisions made. Where possible,
attention is given to how each limitation is relevant to design-
ers. More research is needed to better understand the effects
and externalities of these limitations in design practice.
Limitations of Empathy Concerning the Self
Zaki (2020) argues that, rather than being an immutable and
unchanging trait, empathy is a skill that can be improved
over time. Empathy can thus be conceived of as a capacity,
something that can be filled, expanded, or diminished. The
following six items are a function of the designer’s emotive
capacity.
1.1 Empathy is often confused with other emotions. It can
be challenging to define what empathy entails. The popular-
ization of design thinking methods has caused empathy to
become more elastic, taking on connotations and meanings
beyond its scope. Designer Jason Mesut has created a map
(2018) of concepts that are often mistaken for empathy, such
as sympathy, pity, compassion, and ignorance. This map is a
tool to explore which emotion should be expressed to whom
(users, colleagues, stakeholders, the wider system). Mesut
also points out that designers focus on empathizing with us-
ers while neglecting other actors and stakeholders. One could
argue that this confusion has little effect, if a general effort
is made to understand the emotions of others. However, it is
important to note that understanding the feelings of others
(sympathy) is quite different from being aware but detached
from another’s thoughts and feelings (pity) and leads to dif-
ferent understandings and insights.
1.2 Empathy can have negative consequences for those who
experience it, such as burnout. Maslach and Jackson (1981)
defined burnout as a psychological syndrome involving phys-
ical depletion, feelings of helplessness, negative self-con-
cept, and negative attitudes towards work, life, and oth-
ers. The Maslach Burnout Inventory (MBI) is considered the
“gold standard” for measuring burnout in empirical research
(Bradham, 2008; Lee & Ashforth, 1990) and has been applied
to settings beyond healthcare. Burnout can significantly re-
duce the quality of care in professional medical settings.
Likewise, it may make designers less likely to show concern
in certain situations. However, more academic research is
needed into the relationship between empathy and burnout
for design professionals.
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beyond empathy: how curiosity promotes to greater care
Figure 1. Graham et al.’s (2017) notion of centripetal
and centrifugal forces in the moral circle
Figure 2. Sixteen limitations of empathy
1.3 Exercising empathy exposes us to manipulation. Bre-
ithaupt (2012) notes that in the legal system, empathy can
cloud judgment and cause jury members to side not with the
morally correct party but with the one more adept at elicit-
ing empathy. Similarly, designers who are not knowledgeable
about the wider contexts of their products or services may
be unaware of similar manipulative forces. Managers, stake-
holders, consumers, or others involved in the design process
may exert some form of manipulation through empathy. It is
worth noting that designers may, conversely, use empathy to
manipulate others.
1.4 We are unreliable narrators of our own situations. Nor-
man (2019) strikes at the idea that empathy can lead us to
believe that we are in another person’s head and can under-
stand how people feel and what they think. This is a fallacy:
we often do not know or understand what we are feeling or
why, let alone what those around us might be feeling. The nar-
ratives we create often portray our actions in a favorable light
and can thus be inaccurate or incomplete.
1.5 Empathy can trap us in the emotions of others. According
to Stern and Divecha (2017), when trying to understand the
perspective of others, it is important to maintain a balance be-
tween our own emotions and those of the other person. With-
out this balance, we may feel like we are being held hostage by
the emotions of others. They refer to this phenomenon as the
“Empathy Trap”, which works like a contagion, causing us to
become overly invested in the feelings of others and neglect-
ing our own. This is often seen in close personal relationships
(such as between partners or spouses), but it can also occur in
work relationships or during design research.
1.6 Recognizing the emotions of others may lead us to be-
lieve we understand when, we do not. This is one of the most
dangerous limitations of empathy. Designers cannot be sure
that they are feeling the same emotion as those with whom
they empathize or that they understand or experience the
emotion the same way. Even if designers correctly identify
the emotions of others, they may not interpret the meaning,
context, or implications accurately. Saying or thinking “I un-
derstand” too quickly can prevent further questioning in de-
sign research. Approaching the situation with the mindset of
“I don’t understand” or “I don’t fully understand” can lead to a
more thorough exploration.
Limitations of Empathy Concerning Similars
We tend to show the most empathy to those who are similar
to us or familiar. This can lead to a series of biases that we
may not be aware of on a conscious level.
2.1 The spotlight nature of empathy narrows, rather than wid-
ens, our view. Bloom (2016) describes empathy as a spotlight
that allows us to focus on certain people in the present. This
can be beneficial in fostering care for those under the spot-
light, but it can also lead to insensitivity towards those outside
of it. This myopic nature of empathy can have long-term con-
sequences, such as designers neglecting certain types of user
groups, stakeholders, or agents that are unlike themselves.
2.2 The snapshot effect of empathy locks people into a time
and place. Bloom’s spotlight only concerns the present mo-
ment. Brown and Kulik (1977) introduced the term “flashbulb
memory,” which describes highly vivid or salient moments
that are “snapshotted” in time. This effect can be applied to
how we experience people. Designers often create perso-
nas, journey maps, and other artifacts that snapshot individ-
uals without also identifying ways that people will naturally
change over time. Empathy has a limited lifespan.
2.3 Empathic reasoning is biased. We are not psychologically
wired to feel the same way toward a stranger as we do toward
someone we love (Scarry, 1998). We choose whom we want
to show empathy toward, which reflects our biases. It is dif-
ficult for us to empathize with people who are very different
from us. We tend to feel more empathy towards people who
are attractive than those who are not. For those who disgust
us, we generally feel no empathy at all. Designers may uncon-
sciously select individuals who are similar to them to show
empathy towards or implicitly extend empathy to those
most like them. This phenomenon is more widely studied in
the legal system than it is in design.
Limitations of Empathy Concerning Dissimilars
Empathy’s weakest point is when it is extended to those too
much unlike us. Because the products, services, and systems
designers influence may have large or worldwide audiences
(in the case of social media systems or applications), this can
cause deleterious effects on users.
3.1 We are likely to take sides when observing conflict be-
tween two or more people. Unlike psychologists and counse-
lors, who have received extensive training in remaining neu-
tral and objective, most designers have not had this kind of
training. Nevertheless, we often extend empathy to one side
in a conflict to justify our own actions. Ethnographic research
has demonstrated that taking a first-person-like perspective
on other people’s behavior is rarely seen as beneficial, as it
can be prone to errors and can be used to both harm and help
(Hollan, 2019).
3.2 Empathy can be filtered through mediators or helpers.
Human beings often help each other in situations of need,
and empathy is often cited as the likely motivator for this be-
havior (Brown, 2009). Breithaupt (2017) suggests an alterna-
tive explanation. Instead of direct empathy with the person
in need, another mental act may motivate behavior: identifi-
cation with the (real or imaginary) helper. Through identifica-
tion (that is, seeing oneself as oneself in the situation of the
other), the empathizer participates in the positive aura of the
helper. Breithaupt refers to this form of empathy as filtered,
which is indirect and mediated.
However, filtered empathy has its drawbacks. Additional-
ly, when filtered empathy is used, the target of empathy only
matters insofar as they fit the image of the filter. In the case
of humanitarian aid, the target of empathy only matters as
the victim, which can lead to a tendency to maintain or pro-
long the victim status.
3.3 Our imagination of those dissimilar to us is extremely
limited. We have tremendous difficulty imagining and under-
standing the reasons and rationales behind the behaviors of
those who are too dissimilar to us. Scarry (1998) argues that
human imagination is relatively weak as a tool to offset our
3
beyond empathy: how curiosity promotes to greater care
immediate perceptions. We may instead rely on dangerous
stereotypes or facile explanations without truly understand-
ing individuals.
3.4 Empathy is often manifested differently between neuro-
typical and neurodiverse individuals. Milton’s “double empa-
thy problem” (2012) suggests that a mismatch between two
people can lead to faulty communication. Milton argues that
neurotypicals demonstrate empathy in ways that are distinct
from those of neurodiverse individuals, such as those who
identify on the autism spectrum. This disconnect can occur
at many levels, from conversation styles to how people view
the world. The greater the disconnect, the more difficulty the
two will have interacting, leading to misunderstandings of
reciprocity and mutuality.
For example, a study by Sheppard et al. (2016) reveals that
non-autistic individuals struggle to accurately interpret the
facial expressions of autistic people. Non-autistic individuals
show difficulty in deciphering the mental states of those on
the spectrum (Sasson, 2017). Empathy, as practiced by De-
sign Thinking as popularized by IDEO, is generally presented
as neurotypical.
Limitations of Empathy Concerning Society
4.1 Empathy tends to be human-centered. Gregory Currie
(2011) makes the case that we may be able to empathize
with objects, but his argument centers primarily around aes-
thetics, works of arts intended to elicit emotional response.
We do not generally feel emotions for objects or mentally
simulate emotions in our minds for human-made objects. For
example, we do not, as a general rule, apologize to the chair
before we sit in it.
Neither do we generally empathize with nature. We may
be more likely to empathize with animals but in unequal
ways. We have empathy for animals likely to be pets, such as
dogs, cats, and birds. We have little to no empathy or concern
for animals we consider nuisances, unwelcome predators, or
spreaders of diseases.
In the Anthropocene, where human activity has a pro-
found negative effect on the environment (Lewis & Maslin,
2015), empathy for the environment may make us more like-
ly to consider the effects of collective human action upon it.
Designers who create products do not often consider the ef-
fect of their products on the environment or understand how
their creation may destabilize ecosystems.
4.2 In-group empathy can fuel division. While empathy cre-
ates connections with others, it can also fuel division. Bloom
(2016) cites the Israel-Palestine conflict to show how individ-
uals feel deeply about crimes done toward them or their fam-
ilies. Breithaupt (2018) notes that terrorists may feel such
strong empathy for people in a conflict that they act violently
against the other side.
Adam Smith’s words, as cited by Bloom, are particularly
poignant: “When we see one man oppressed or injured by
another, the sympathy which we feel with the distress of the
sufferer seems to serve only to animate our fellow-feeling
with his resentment against the offender. We are rejoiced to
see him attack his adversary in his turn, and are eager and
ready to assist him.” This encourages us to protect our in-
group.
4.3 Empathy is culturally embedded. Empathy is a capacity
that is shaped by and responsive to the cultural, moral, and
political contexts in which it is embedded. Hollan (2019)
points out that while recent ethnographic research suggests
that many people around the world share concepts or termi-
nology that may overlap with the Western notion of empathy,
far fewer have ones that are identical to it. The vocabulary and
conceptualization of empathic-like processes vary consider-
ably through space and time. There seem to be many places in
the world, for example in the Pacific region (Hollan & Throop,
2011a), where empathic-like sentiments shade much more
closely, both semantically and behaviorally, to what English
speakers would refer to as love, compassion, sympathy, con-
cern, pity, or some hyphenated combination of these terms.
In the eastern Indonesian society of Toraja, terms suggesting
empathic-like awareness but translating more literally into
English as “love-compassion-pity” often imply a strong sense
of identification or merger with the subject of attention, such
that one feels compelled to reach out and help, as if one had
no other choice (Hollan, 2011).
The limitations of empathy identified above underscore
the need for diverse design teams with varied backgrounds,
ages, experiences, and perspectives.
Conclusion: The Case for Care and Curiosity
If we can empathize with only humans, and as demonstrat-
ed above, only in limited or biased ways, perhaps designers
could benefit from an assemblage of emotive capacities
beyond just empathy. Two of those emotive capacities are
curiosity and care. Mayeroff (1971) defines caring as acting
on empathy. Rodgers and Bremner (2016) identify care as an
important part of the concept of the design discipline that
points us toward larger contexts and concerns: “care refers
to designing with the macro and micro social, technological,
economic, environmental and political effects of design de-
cision-making well in mind.” Like empathy, care is other-cen-
tered but when used in design practice, care can attune us to
the effects of design in the way we live.
Stepping into the shoes of others and understanding
them requires an abiding curiosity about what life may be like
outside of our own experiences. Voss (2013) describes curi-
osity as simply motivation to explore. Empathy can have the
effect of shutting off question-asking. The explorative nature
of curiosity opens us up to question-asking and necessitates
further exploration.
The English word curiosity traces roots from Latin (cūra,
meaning care, concern, or a means of healing) to early me-
dieval Latin (cūriōsus, meaning full of care or pains, careful,
assiduous) through Italian, French, and Middle English before
entering our modern language (“Curiosity”, n.d.). That curiosi-
ty is linguistically rooted in care has profound implications. It
can be argued that demonstrating genuine curiosity toward
someone is also a form of demonstrating that care. Both care
and curiosity widen the circle of understanding in ways that
empathy cannot. Empathy is primarily centered around hu-
mans (see Limitation 4.1 above). Wakkary (2021) argues for
a rethinking of design that displaces humans at the center of
thought and action.
Curiosity about the effects of what we design—not just
to users, stakeholders, or other humans, but also to the envi-
ronment, planet, and ecological systems—can also be a way
of extending care beyond humans. Operationalizing curiosi-
4
beyond empathy: how curiosity promotes to greater care
ty in design requires designers to ask more questions, leave
time to explore the answers, and engage more frequently in
reflection. The cross-disciplinary, emerging field of curiosity
studies, pioneered by Perry Zurn and Arjun Shankar (2020),
may find contributions from designers valuable.
5
beyond empathy: how curiosity promotes to greater care
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