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Current Approaches in
Social Sciences
Editors
Assoc. Prof. Ali Turan Bayram
Asst. Prof. Andi Asrifan
Asst. Prof. Neha Sharma
Asst. Prof. Muthmainnah
ISBN (PDF): 978-975-447-664-4
DOI: https://do.org/10.58830/ozgur.pub167
Language: Englsh
Publcaton Date: 2023
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Current Approaches in Social Sciences
Editors:
Assoc. Prof. Ali Turan Bayram • Asst. Prof. Andi Asrifan
Asst. Prof. Neha Sharma • Asst. Prof. Muthmainnah
iii
Preface
Technological developments and globalization has changed human
nature. This change directly affects all stages of human life. At this point,
it becomes inevitable to carry out research on people and human life. All
studies carried out in the field of Social Sciences aim to understand human,
human life and human nature. In this work, which was put forward in order
to understand the human, different studies from different disciplines were
discussed and a step was tried to be built in order to reach this goal, albeit
to some extent.
v
Contenst
Preface iii
Chapter 1
The Usage of Emotional Intelligence in Workplaces: Research on a
Telecommunications Company 1
Asra Babayiğit
Hüseyin Aras Babayiğit
Chapter 2
Impacts of Digital Transformation Caused by the Growth in Online Trade
Volume on Accounting Processes 19
Salahattin Altundağ
Chapter 3
Sociology of Artificial Intelligence: How AI Will Transform Work,
Unemployment and Our Future 45
Ulaş Başar Gezgin
Chapter 4
The Influence of Religion on the Dominant Party System in Turkey and
Russia 61
Abdulkadir Cesur
vi
Chapter 5
Roman Period Glass Unguentariums at the Hacibektas Veli Archeology
Museum 81
Barış Emre Sönmez
Chapter 6
Archaeology of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis: Islam, Turkishness, and
Westernization as the Pillars of the Modern Ottoman Identity 103
Ali Babahan
Chapter 7
İsmet İnönü Era: Assessing the Challenges of Democracy in Turkey 131
İbrahim Yorgun
Chapter 8
The Political Psychology of ‘China Threat’: Perceptions and Emotions 157
Ulaş Başar Gezgin
Chapter 9
Usage of Local Foods in Regional Restaurants: Sinop Example 191
Hasibe Yazıt
Tuğçe Sivri
Chapter 10
From Happy Country to Happy City: The Case of Bhutan for Sinop
Tourism 199
Ali Turan Bayram
Yavuz Çetin
vii
Chapter 11
A Wetland Management Planning: Problems and Threats Affecting Gökçeada
(Aydıncık-Salt Lake) Lagoon 205
Mehtap Bayrak
Chapter 12
6 Trends over Management Theory: Decolonization, Sinification,
Empowerment/Precarization, Degendering, Transdisciplinarity, and
Environmental/Natural Challenges 241
Ulaş Başar Gezgin
1
Chapter 1
The Usage of Emotional Intelligence in
Workplaces: Research on a Telecommunications
Company
Asra Babayiğit1
Hüseyin Aras Babayiğit2
Abstract
The aim of this study is to investigate the relationship between the demographic
characteristics, seniority and profession at workplace. Emotional Intelligence
is an important factor in people’s lives in modern society. This type of
intelligence, which is a means of achieving success in workplaces, was applied
to employees of Telecommunication Company with an emotional intelligence
test prepared according to five criteria determined by Goleman in 1998. Data
was collected between February-May 2019 in Nicosia. The sample consists
of 150 Turkish speaking adults. Statistical analysis of the data was conducted
by T-test and correlation analysis in order to determine the effect of the 5
subscales of emotional Intelligence and demographic variables. The findings
show that there is a statistically significant correlation between relationship
management and in-service programs, between marital status and emotional
control, between the participants’ motivation and emotional control attitudes
and between the participants’ empathy and emotional control attitudes. As
Emotional Intelligence becomes a wider concept, it will be understood and
applied more and more in the works to be done.
1. Introduction
People accomplish different results when performing assigned tasks or
things they want to achieve, because everyone has a reaction to their own
perceptions and events. The tasks undertaken or things accomplished are
1 Assist Prof. Dr., Faculty of Economics, Administrative and Social Sciences, Department of
Psychology, Cyprus Science University, Kyrenia, Cyprus. ORCID: 0000-0003-2102-3175
2 PhD, Institute for Social Sciences, Department of Innovation and Knowledge Management
Near East University, Nicosia, Cyprus.
https://doi.org/10.58830/ozgur.pub167.c869
2 | The Usage of Emotional Intelligence in Workplaces: Research on a Telecommunications...
related to many aspects. Working hard has an important role to play in the
selection of a career or career journeys that experience or innate intelligence
skills will face in everyday life, or lifelong career challenges (Lam &Kirby,
2002, p. 142).
Hardworking, experience, or analytical thinking can give concrete
information about how measurably finite power can be successfully achieved
in people’s daily work or business lives. Tests measuring analytical thinking
ability, hours of work or years of experience on a job can be easily performed.
However, a new concept has been added to these factors in recent years.
A concept that measures how information is used as the most important
source of our day has begun to receive increased attention in the literature.
This concept, which is defined as emotional intelligence, shows how
people decide what they think and what they do about it (Doğan, 2005,
p. 111).EI is the a field of study which is also connected to theknowledge
management discipline. According to Sağsan (2009), EI could be evaluated
within the humanist paradigm, which is one of the most important factors
in the knowledge management paradigms. As a result of research conducted
in recent years, the tests that can applied to measure people’s intelligence
levels have started to be used in the business world. Intelligence levels were
initially measured byIQ tests and the analytical intellectual abilities of the
individuals were expressed in a number of ways. However, it was found that
the success of the people working at the workplace was not accurate with
this test (Adiloğulları, 2011, p. 14).
Candidates who are called for an interview during the recruitment
process have been investigated in recent years by measuring their level with
emotional intelligence tests, because a higher EQ is perceived to be related
to organizational success (Cumming, 2005,p. 3).Emotional intelligence
tests are difficult to express in numbers, unlike IQ tests. In an IQ test, a
score can be obtained according to the exact number of incorrect answers
by asking the questions of the people who can test analytical ideas. (Law,
Wong & Song, 2004, p. 485). However, in an emotional intelligence test,
the correct result may not always be obtained. The responses of people’s
feelings and behaviors to the questions they are asked on paper may not be
the same as the reactions they encounter in their daily lives.
1.1. Emotional Intelligence Concept
Emotional intelligence is a kind of intelligence. It refers to the skill
of people as emotional intelligence (EQ) or emotional intelligence (EI)
in English, as well as their own emotions and thoughts, and the ability
Asra Babayiğit / Hüseyin Aras Babayiğit | 3
of respondents to understand, deduce, and shape their movements and
behaviors according to their meanings (Demir, 2010,p. 202 ).
According to Mayer & Salovey(1990, p. 189), “Emotional intelligence
is a sub-form of social intelligence that pertains to the individual’s ability to
monitor and use his or her feelings and emotions, to distinguish between
them, and to use them in their knowledge, thoughts and behavior”.Daniel
Goleman (1995), the author of the first book about emotional intelligence,
describes emotional intelligence as decision making with empathy rather
than personal satisfaction.
Emotional intelligence tests are a term that is revealed by the purpose of
calculating thewhole level of behavior that occurs according to the reactions
that people in response to certain events.Describes the level of emotional
intelligence in understanding and responding to situations and emotions that
we experience in the face of an event, reacting in such a way as to empathize
and make the most of us to events (Arıcıoğlu, 2002, p. 28; Anamur-Perek,
2002; Konrad; Poskey, 2006; Maboçoğlu, 2006).It has also been determined
that the success of individuals in their workplaces is not only related to IQ
levels, but also to their level of emotional intelligence (Doğan & Demiral,
2007, p. 209). Having a high level of IQ is not sufficient for someone to be
successful in the workplace. In fact, people with high emotional intelligence
are found to be more successful at work(Bridge, 2003; Anamur-Perek,
2002).
Emotional intelligence tests are difficult to quantify in numbers, unlike
IQ tests. In an IQ test, a score can be obtained according to the exact
number of incorrect answers by asking the questions of the people who
can test analytical ideas. But in the emotional intelligence test, the correct
result may not always be obtained. The responses of people’s feelings and
behaviors to the questions they are asked on paper may not be the same as
the reactions they encounter in their daily lives. Emotional intelligence is a
species that can be developed and plays a role in determining the emotional
intelligence in the seasons as well as the most important genetic factor
(Tuğrul, 1999, p. 17). In this development, the age of the individual can
be a factor. As people become older, they gain experience and can improve
their emotional intelligence because they will act by taking lessons in the
movements they will make. At the same time, infants perceive what they
see around them and respond accordingly. In this case, each infant may
differ. The family environment also influences emotional intelligence. An
infant’s personality developed according to their growing background, and
at the same time, they can contribute to negative or positive development
4 | The Usage of Emotional Intelligence in Workplaces: Research on a Telecommunications...
of this emotional intelligence in the nearby environment (Yüksel, 2006, p.
19). Additionally, gender is also a factor in the development of emotional
intelligence. Individuals may experience emotional intelligence if they have a
period of education and social life based on their gender.
1.2. Emotional Intelligence Features
As it is considered, the concept of emotional intelligence, the most
important researchers of this concept summed up the five items that
Goleman, Salovey and Mayer have in their characters to be successful in
order to be successful (Deniz, 2011, p. 48). These are the people who
are aware of themselves (Goleman, 1995,p. 78).This is the first and the
most important feature of emotional intelligence. If people can objectively
evaluate their own boundaries, areas of strength or weaknesses, then their
reactions to events would be more appropriate (Goleman, 2000, p. 393).
The self-awareness of individuals has a profound effect on the emergence of
the concept of emotional intelligence (Marshall, 2001, p. 93). Because they
can affect other people with their actions, they will be more effective and
productive in their workplaces because they know better where they need
help and where they will support it in a complex way (Goleman, 1995, p.
78).
Secondly, another important feature of EIis to manage itself. The ability
to control this emotional state ensures that sudden decisions, which can be
given as reflexes, are made to work in a calmer and more accurate manner.
In an unexpected situation, people can react afterwards, which they may
regret. In these situations, the brain releases a chemical reaction, and control
of the emotional state of this chemical component is very important for the
concept of emotional intelligence (Goleman, 1995, p.81).
The next feature is motivation (Goleman, 1995, p. 101). Those with
higher emotional intelligence focus strongly on what they want to do, and
they focus on themselves and on the successes of their surroundings in
order to achieve their goals; in this way, they increase their effectiveness by
supporting them (Gürsoy, 2005, p. 59). Since people with higher emotional
intelligence are more likely to be more confident in their work than others,
they are able to make more accurate and successful choices because they
are more focused on the behaviors they will perform or situations they will
react to. In addition, those with higher emotional intelligence will succeed
in increasing their work.
The fourth most important feature of researchers’ emotional intelligence
is empathy (Goleman, 1995, p. 137). Empathy today has become a very
Asra Babayiğit / Hüseyin Aras Babayiğit | 5
important factor, both in social life and in the workplace. It is also influential
in their decisions to analyze how the opponents think and perceive the
events before giving up their actions (Vural, 2010, p. 973). In particular,
the concept of teamwork that develops in the workplace increases the
importance of empathy (Ural, 2001, p. 210). Considering the emotional
changes, cultures or personal characteristics of ourselves is necessary to
reduce both the satisfaction of the other person, the productivity, and the
emergence of conflict situations. When all this is thought of, empathy is the
prospect of the place in emotional intelligence (Goleman, 1995, p. 144).
The last feature of emotional intelligence is the way in which
relationships management (Goleman, 1995, p. 155). This last feature is
the result of a whole that arises when other features are revealed. Those
who know themselves and their capacity, those who express empathy, who
make decisions by perceiving other people, and who can control their own
feelings, have no problem in managing these associations as a result (Hogan
& Roberts, 2000). With these abilities, they achieve success in their work
and personal lives by providing the necessary both on their own and on the
way to success.
1.3. Comparison of the IQ and EQ Concepts
Although EI is an important core element for success in workplaces, the
concept of IQ has already been proposed and studied more than the concept
of emotional intelligence. IQ is a concept that describes an individual’s ability
to think analytically, the ability to solve given problems, and the functionality
to understand mixed situations. For many years, it was thought that this
was an indicator of success (Maboçoğlu, 2006).All well-known scientists or
those who have been successful in their field have drawn attention with their
high IQ scores. Today, however, this concept has proved to be inadequate.
Entering a job can be an easy process for an individual who has a higher IQ.
However, many people with high IQ scores have not been successful in their
work and social lives. An important reason for this is the lack of emotional
intelligence.
While IQ calculates an individual’s mental sufficiency, EQ (emotional
intelligence) is an intelligence type that measures the emotional awareness
and control of individuals (Doğan, 2005, p. 111). A person with a high IQ
score may be able to better analyze the assigned tasks and develop methods
that can achieve better results, while if there is an inadequacy in emotional
intelligence, it may be difficult to take them to the conclusion. The
emotional intelligence of those who are able to control their emotions, who
6 | The Usage of Emotional Intelligence in Workplaces: Research on a Telecommunications...
are aware of them, who are mentally prepared to overcome the difficulties
they encounter, and who can act on the basis of long-term goals rather than
individual satisfaction, is high. These individuals, particularly if they have
a high level of IQ, will have an advantage in terms of achieving success in
business and social life (Maboçoğlu, 2006).
The IQ level is more of a genetic type that passes on to individuals as
genetic. Developments can be made with necessary training, but this does
not provide any significant improvement. On the contrary, the situation that
emotional intelligence can learn and develop with the reactions given to the
effects is more than the other intelligence type IQ (Yüksel, 2006, p. 19).
1.4. Emotional Intelligence and Knowledge Management
By competing on a global platform, companies no longer have profit
margins. As a result, companies began to work in this direction to start using
their internal resources, especially their jobs, efficiently and effectively. When
departments are organized as a team, the communication between the people
increases with the distribution of tasks, and the emotional intelligence also
appeared as a precaution (Güllüce, Çağlar & İşcan, 2010, p. 10). Businesses
are now starting to look at how their employees control their emotions,
not just their level of education and intelligence, and how they assess their
relationships at work. Sectors with high competition have begun to control
their emotional intelligence (Ashkanasy & Daus, 2002), particularly when
choosing the work force to capture maximum yield, even in the smallest
units. The fact that this technique begins to take place in business talks is also
a sign that this concept will become more important in the coming years.
Knowledge has been known as a vital consider all fields of discipline
(Sivakumar & Lourthuraj, 2017). Besides implicit knowledge additionally
emotional intelligence encompasses a huge operate in economic life (Stifter,
2013). Knowledge management is at the centre of all strategic designing
on the way to increase the worth of human resources whereas making an
attempt to conduct the foremost effective type of stimulating their potential.
From a manager’s perspective,5 knowledge, it’s effective use, and integration
altogether pores of the work method indicate a corporal worth that has
to be nurtured and revered (Lazovic, 2012). Knowledge Management as a
structural procedure for making, acquiring, portion, change and using the
subjective and target learning as an authoritative resource for empowering
development and EI (Esfahani, Ordibehesht & Zolfaghari, 2013).Knowledge
Management could be considered as learning creation, exchange, sharing
and upkeep with the goal that it can be utilized as a compelling strategy in
Asra Babayiğit / Hüseyin Aras Babayiğit | 7
the organization (Mirzagholi et al., 2013). EI had a major positive effect on
the measurements of learning organization, clarity of mission and vision,
effective exchange of information and cooperation, and gathering critical
thinking (Labbaf et al., 2011). Mundra et al., (2011). outlined knowledge
management as a variety of practices utilized by associations to recognize,
create, represent, and circulate knowledge for mindfulness, learning and
apply across organizations.
1.5. Hypothesis
H1: There is a significant relationship between the Marital Status of
Employees and Emotional Intelligence.
H2: There is a significant relationship between Employee Learning
Situations and Emotional Intelligence.
H1: There is a significant relationship between Employee’s Seniority
Status and Emotional Intelligence.
H4: There is a significant relationship between the position of the
employees and the Relationship between Marital Status and Emotional
Intelligence.
The aim of this study is to examine the relationship between the
demographic characteristics, seniorityand profession in the workplace.
2. Methodology
This research was conducted with employees working in different districts
of a telecommunications company in Nicosia. The questionnaires designed
to measure emotional intelligence in the study were prepared in association
with Goleman’s emotional intelligence and a Likert-type scale was used. The
people surveyed were classified according to the year.
2.1. Sample Selection
The study participants were between the ages of 20-45. The intervals
were determined as 20-25, 25-30, 30-35, 40-45. The aim of this research
is to determine the effect of the relationship between the level of genetic
intelligence and the socio-demographic characteristics of people working
in a telecommunications company located in North Cyprus, as well as
their seniority at work and profession. The first part, socio-demographic
characteristics, was prepared by the researchers. In this section, questions were
asked about the age, gender, marital status, education level, seniority status
at the workplace and profession. In the second part, the aim was to collect
8 | The Usage of Emotional Intelligence in Workplaces: Research on a Telecommunications...
information about the psychological intelligence of the persons by using
the emotional intelligence test prepared by the researchers. Establishing the
relationship between the level of emotional intelligence of in-service training
programs in recruitment processes at the workplace is another purpose.
2.2. Data Collection
This research was conducted with employees working in different
districts of a telecommunications company in Nicosia. Data was collected
between February-May 2019. Questionnaires designed to measure
emotional intelligence in the study were prepared by associating with 5
parts of Goleman’s emotional intelligence and a Likert scale was used. The
people surveyed were classified according to the year. This scale consists of
26 items. The Turkish version of the scale was prepared by the researchers.
2.3. Gathering Data and Reliability of Emotional Intelligence
Sub-Dimensions
The self-awareness Cronbach’s alpha coefficient, which is described as
part of the questionnaire, was found to be moderately reliable with 60%.
In the second part of the questionnaire which assesses emotional control
(B), the Cronbach’s alpha coefficient is acceptable at 72%. The next part is
related to motivation (C) and the Cronbach’s alpha coefficient is good with
80.7%. (D) includes questions about empathy, and the Cronbach’s alpha
coefficient is acceptable at 70.4%. Finally, relationship management in part
E is good at 80.6%.
In the first part of the questionnaire, demographic questions were asked.
At the beginning of these demographic questions, the questions were
designed to obtain information about the respondent’s marital status. Then
the participants were asked to give their age. After the question about their
level of education, participants were asked about the institutions and their
questions. These are primarily referred to their position in the workplace,
the department in which they work, their seniority at work, and their
seniority. In the final part of the demographic questions, the goal was gather
information on whether the current jobs are the first jobs and whether
they has participated in an in-service program or training. In the second
part of the questionnaire, questions were asked with the aim of measuring
emotional intelligence.
This section consists of five different parts according to Goleman’s
Emotional Intelligence model. In the first part, 6 questions were asked about
the people to know themselves. In the second part, 6 sourns were used with
Asra Babayiğit / Hüseyin Aras Babayiğit | 9
the aim of measuring emotional control. In the third part, it is also desired
to get information about the motivation sensation of the participants with
6 questions. Subsequently, through the 4 questions about empathy in the
fourth part, it was asked to reach a conviction about the empathy sentiment
of the participants. The last part is the management of relations and it is
aimed to get information about how participants manage their relations
with 4 questions in this section.
Statistical analysis of the data are made by T-test and correlation analysis
inorder to determine the effect of the 5 subscales of Emotional Intelligence
and the demographic variables (Büyüköztürk, 2018).
3. Results
In the present study, 36% of the participants were single and 64% were
married. The age range of participants was between 20 and 45. The majority
of the sample (72%) was between 20 and 35 years old.
When the education levels are examined, 82% are university graduates
and 18% are high school graduates. According to their position within the
company, 39% are experts, 14% are managers, 12% are in marketing, 10%
are engineers, 8% are team members, 6% work in the call center, 6% are
customer representatives, 6% are managers, 4% are technicians and 4% are
in reporting positions.
In addition, the participants are also classified according to the units they are
studying. The results revealed that 32% of respondents were in the sales unit,
16% were in the center, 16% were in customer relations, 12% were in quality
management, 8% in customer service, 6% in segment management, 4% in
information technology, jobs, operations and distributors are divided into 2%
units.In terms of seniority, 40% of the participants had worked for 5-10 years
and 35% for less than 5 years, which constitutes a majority of the participants.
On the other hand, a smaller proportion of the sample had been employed
in the workplace for 20 to 20 years, 11 to 15 years, and only 4 to 16 to 20
years. 54% of the respondents reported that the workplace they are currently
working with is not the first place to work, with 46% reporting that the first
place of work is the workplace they are currently working at. Finally, 72%
stated that there is an in-service program.
4. Results and Discussion
This research examines the relationship between emotional intelligence,
which is an increasingly evolving concept, and the success, productivity and
10 | The Usage of Emotional Intelligence in Workplaces: Research on a Telecommunications...
demographic characteristics of people at work. Since emotional intelligence
is a new concept and it is difficult to measure, the number of researches
conducted on this subject is limited.
A statistically significant difference was found between management
and in-service programs. There was also a statistically significant difference
between marital status and emotional control (Table 1).
Table 1. Comparison of Emotional Control and Marital Status Score Average among
Individuals Working in Telecommunications
Marital Status m ± sd
(n)
f
t
(p)
Single 3.92 ± 0.68
(n=18)
5.224
0.027*
(0.546)
Married 4.03 ± 0.46
(n=32)
*p<0.05 ** p<0.01
A statistically significant relationship was found between participants’
motivation and emotional control attitudes. The direction of this relationship
is positively determined. One variable increases while the other variable
increases, while the other variable decreases (Table 2).
Table 2. Comparison of the Average Motivation and Emotion Control Scores among
Individuals Working in Telecommunications
Emotional Control
Motivation
R P
0.392 0.005
*p<0.05 ** p<0.01
Moreover, a meaningful relationship was found between the participants’
empathy and emotional control attitudes. The direction of this relationship
is positively determined. One variable increases while the other variable
increases, one variable decreases while the other variable decreases (Table 3).
Asra Babayiğit / Hüseyin Aras Babayiğit | 11
Table 3. Comparison of the Average Empathy and Emotion Control Scores in
Individuals Working in Telecommunications
Emotional Control
Empathy
R P
0.385 0.006
Participants’ empathy and motivation attitudes were found to be
significant. The direction of this relationship is positively determined. One
variable increases while the other variable increases, while the other variable
decreases (Table 4)
Table 4. Comparison of the Average Empathy and Motivational Scores in Individuals
Working in Telecommunications
Empathy
Motivation
R P
0.499 0.000
A meaningful relationship was found between participants’ method
and motivation attitude. The direction of this relationship is positively
determined. One variable increases while the other variable increases, while
the other variable decreases (Table 4).
Table 5.Comparison of the Average Methodology and Motivational Scores in
Individuals Working in Telecommunications
Method
Motivation
R P
0.481 0.000
A meaningful relationship was found between occupational affairs of
participants and emotional control attitude. The direction of this relationship
is negative. One variable increases while the other decreases (Table 5).
12 | The Usage of Emotional Intelligence in Workplaces: Research on a Telecommunications...
Table 6. Comparison of Average Emotional Control and Emotional Control Score
Average in Individuals Working in Telecommunications
Emotional Control
Occupational affair
r P
-0.322 0.023
In addition, intellectual intelligence (IQ), which is the means of measuring
people’s intelligence, is slowly leaving its emotional intelligence (EQ) in the
new century (Adiloğulları, 2011, p. 14). The key to success in the workplace
is that both IQ and EQ levels are high.
Another issue that emphasizes the importance of emotional intelligence
is the establishment of teams that are dependent on each other in the
workplace, as well as the qualities of leadership required in each position
and the development of interpersonal skills. If emotional intelligence can
be improved through learning, it is a promising feature. The ability to cope
and adapt, a feature of Emotional Intelligence, is being used in all phases of
life. Success is influential in many different areas such as education and social
relations. This effect is positive.
In today’s organizations, with the increased importance given on the
human beings the transition to human sources and the differentiation of the
new management understandings appeared and witnessing to that emotions
are grasping more and more of their place and business in business life.
Emotional intelligence traits are used as decisive and important criteria in the
process of human resource management, such as recruitment, performance
management, career development, and education (Lazovic, 2012). The
concept of emotional intelligence is used by managers, can fulfill expectations,
and is considered as a performance criterion. Managerial tension, affecting
environmental factors, emotional perception performances and customer-
friendliness are important in this respect (Arıcıoğlu, 2002). Emotional
intelligence, with vital presets for individual and managerial performance, is
an intelligence that can be improved by learning at all times and at all ages
(Ciarrochi & Blackledge, 2007).
The decisions that business people make are very important in terms of
their efficiency and efficiency in business life in terms of individuals who are
aware of and are able to manage their mutual relations and movements with
their colleagues or clients in the working environment. If dynastic control
Asra Babayiğit / Hüseyin Aras Babayiğit | 13
cannot be achieved, people may be dissatisfied at the workplace and this can
lead them to the process of leaving work. All this shows why this research is
important. In addition, the importance of emotional intelligence continues
to increase in today’s society. The work on this subject is limited due to the
fact that the concept is relatively new.
As mentioned above, it is possible to develop emotional intelligence.
There are some points to be aware in this context. In everyday life, one can
endeavor to better define self and emotional reactions. For the development
of effective communication skills, interpersonal relationships should focus
on clarity / honesty, tolerance to criticism and the development of problem
solving skills. In this way, the individual will have taken steps to improve
their emotional intelligence. Additionally, since emotional intelligence is
a new common term, the organization of seminars and congresses that
will inform people about this topic and reach many people will increase
the importance given to emotional intelligence and more people will gain
this grip. In particular, it will explain this concept in detail at workplaces
and organizing monthly meetings in the light of informative PowerPoint
presentations about the steps that can be taken to improve will make the
working people more conscious.
5. Conclusion
Consequently, Emotional Intelligence, which is necessary in every stage
of life and in all fields, is very important. Compared to the past, this concept
continues to be used more frequently. On the other hand, Emotional
Intelligence is still not given the necessary attention. The spread of this
concept will increase as the volume of research in the field continues to
grow. Emotional Intelligence must be recognized and developed in order to
be more functional and effective in many areas of life.
Individuals need to be aware of their strengths and developments, to
manage their emotions and behaviors, and to try to understand the feelings
and thoughts of their family, friends, and the people they work with so that
they can be more content at every step of their lives. Emotional qualities such
as expressing feelings, empathy, independence, adaptability, appreciation,
solving individual problems, persistence, compassion, courtesy, and respect
are the essential qualities that must be possessed by individuals today, which
can only be achieved with high emotional intelligence. The high emotional
intelligence that institutions have, as they are in the individual, will be the
most effective tool to improve their performance. In organizations with
high emotional intelligence, their desires and expectations for employee,
14 | The Usage of Emotional Intelligence in Workplaces: Research on a Telecommunications...
customer, supplier, and shareholder engagement will be better understood
and met. Thus, the institution will be able to connect its employees and
customers to itself.
5.1. Recommendations and Research for Further Studies
Correct measurement of emotional intelligence may be useful for
leadership choice and education. In particular, the ability-based methods
of emotional intelligence should be examined. Self-reporting, performance
evaluation and observer evaluation (multiple assessment) methods should be
examined in the future to determine which method is the most appropriate for
measuring emotional intelligence. Some researchers suggest that emotional
intelligence can be used by organizations to select effective leaders. Effective
leadership with emotional intelligence measurement behavior should be
examined more empirically. The current literature suggests that there is a
conceptual connection between emotional intelligence and transformative
leadership. This bond; ability-based emotional intelligence model emotional
perception, emotional integration, emotional comprehension, and emotional
management are important to be indicative of transformative leadership
behaviors. Future research needs to test these proposals, both in different
organizations and at different levels of organizations.
It is clear that managers and employees who possess high degree of EI are
more effective at their jobs, perform well and this enhances the productivity
of the organization. The emotion´s knowledge promotes the performance of
organization. The patterns of Emotional Intelligence are not fixed; therefore,
by affecting the behavior of workers, managers can accomplish their
organizational goals. However, the appliance of Knowledge Management
will lead to innovative efforts by the organization will improve its profitability
and can advance the human resource management in the organization. In
addition to this, once the knowledge of workers is improved, such excessive
resource can create the background for organizational learning to achieve the
structure targets more additional, prolificacy of organization can accelerate.
Present study ensures the insight to the managers a way to maintain their
degree of emotional intelligence and information to reach the competitive
gains.
Asra Babayiğit / Hüseyin Aras Babayiğit | 15
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19
Chapter 2
Impacts of Digital Transformation Caused by the
Growth in Online Trade Volume on Accounting
Processes
Salahattin Altundağ1
Abstract
In this study, the impacts of the growth in online trade volume caused by
digital transformation on accounting processes, records within accounting
processes, and the tracking of these records are thoroughly examined. As
digital transformation accelerates and online trade becomes more prevalent,
the need for businesses to transition to digital methods in accounting practices
is increasingly growing.
The aim of the study is to uncover the effects of rapid growth in online trade
on accounting processes and to evaluate these changes. In this context, the
transition processes of businesses from traditional accounting methods to
digital accounting and the effects of digital transformation on accounting
processes are discussed.
Through an extensive literature review, a knowledge base is established on
the effects of online trade on accounting processes, the impacts of digital
transformation on accounting processes, and digital accounting practices.
The numerical data obtained are evaluated with regression analysis, and the
results reveal the effects of digital transformation on accounting processes.
The study indicates that the effects of digital transformation on accounting
processes will increase with the rapid growth of online trade. To adapt to
these changes, businesses must adopt digital technologies in their accounting
processes and maintain accurate and reliable financial records.
This study can be considered an important resource for understanding
the effects of online trade on accounting processes and helping businesses
adapt to digital transformation. To prepare businesses for future digital
1 Assist. Prof., Dicle University, salahattinaltundag@gmail.com,
Orcid: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6198-7959
https://doi.org/10.58830/ozgur.pub167.c870
20 | Impacts of Digital Transformation Caused by the Growth in Online Trade Volume...
transformations, further examination of the effects of digital transformation
on accounting processes caused by the growth in online trade volume is
necessary.
INTRODUCTION
This study investigates the impacts of the digital transformation triggered
by the growth in online commerce volume on the accounting process, and
discusses the effects of digital transformation on the accounting process as
businesses transition to a digital environment due to the increase in online
commerce volume.
The aim of this study is to reveal the impact of the rapid growth of online
commerce on transactions within the accounting process and to examine the
changes caused by these effects. With the rapid spread of online commerce,
awareness has been formed those businesses need to use digital accounting
methods instead of traditional accounting methods to keep their financial
records. This study aims to explore the effects of this transformation process
on the accounting process.
Understanding the effects of online commerce on the accounting process
is crucial for businesses to adapt to digital transformation. The problems
encountered by businesses in the digital transformation process with the
rapid growth of online commerce and the impacts of these problems on the
accounting process highlight the importance of this study.
An extensive literature review was conducted in this study. This review
includes studies on the effects of online commerce on the accounting process,
the effects of digital transformation on the accounting process, and digital
accounting practices. This information from the literature forms the primary
data of the study.
The numerical data obtained were analyzed through regression analysis.
The results of the regression analysis have clarified the impacts of the digital
transformation caused by the growth in online commerce volume on the
accounting process. The effects of the digital transformation caused by the
growth in online commerce volume on the accounting process, including
the impacts on the preparation and collection of transaction documents,
recording and tracking of stocks, recording and tracking of accounts receivable
and payable, recording and tracking of orders, daily records, recording and
tracking of financial statements, and end-of-period transactions, have been
extensively addressed.
The results of this study clearly reveal the impacts of the growth in online
commerce volume on the digital transformation of the accounting process.
Salahattin Altundağ | 21
With the digitization of businesses’ financial records, significant changes
have occurred in transactions within the accounting process. These changes
affect the preparation and collection of transaction documents, recording
and tracking of stocks, recording and tracking of accounts receivable and
payable, recording and tracking of orders, daily records, recording and
tracking of financial statements, and end-of-period transactions.
Many businesses are transitioning from traditional accounting methods
to digital accounting methods and are feeling the effects of online commerce
in their accounting process. The data obtained in this study shows that the
effects of digital transformation on the accounting process will increase with
the growth in online commerce volume.
This study is important to establish an understanding of new accounting
processes and the digitalization process that arise with the rapid growth
of online commerce. Businesses should adopt digital technologies in their
accounting processes to adapt to these changes and to keep their financial
records accurately and reliably.
In conclusion, this study can be used as a guide to understanding the
effects of online commerce on the accounting process. By understanding
these effects, businesses can adapt to the digital transformation process and
keep their financial records accurately. Further study of the impacts of the
digital transformation caused by the growth in online commerce volume on
the accounting process will help businesses to be prepared for future digital
transformations.
1. METHOD AND METHODOLOGY:
This study investigates the impacts of the digital transformation caused
by the growth in the volume of online commerce on the accounting process.
The study examines the effects of the increasing volume of online commerce,
both globally and specifically in Turkey, on accounting processes, accounting
records, and their tracking. The methods and techniques used are as follows:
• A comprehensive literature review has been conducted. This review
includes the effects of online commerce on accounting processes,
changes occurring in accounting processes with digital transformation,
and digital accounting applications.
• Numerical data obtained have been evaluated with regression analysis.
This analysis reveals the impacts of the digital transformation caused
by the growth in online commerce volume on the accounting process.
22 | Impacts of Digital Transformation Caused by the Growth in Online Trade Volume...
• The study emphasizes the necessity for businesses to use digital
accounting methods instead of traditional accounting methods to
keep their financial records.
• The study is aimed at understanding the effects of online commerce
on the accounting process to assist businesses in adapting to digital
transformation.
• The impacts of the digital transformation caused by the growth
in online commerce volume on the accounting process have been
addressed by focusing on the preparation and collection of transaction
documents, the recording and tracking of stocks, receivables, orders,
daily records, financial statements, and end-of-period transactions.
• The study emphasizes that businesses need to adopt digital
technologies in their accounting processes and keep their financial
records accurately and reliably.
2. TRENDS IN THE GROWTH OF ONLINE COMMERCE
VOLUME GLOBALLY AND SPECIFICALLY IN TURKEY
In today’s world, with the rapid development of internet technologies,
the volume of online commerce is also rapidly increasing. This increase has
significant implications, particularly in the financial sector. The increase in
online commerce volume significantly impacts payment systems and financial
institutions in the financial sector. This impact can be better understood by
comparing the situations of the volume of online commerce globally and in
Turkey (McKinsey and Company, n.d.).
The rapid increase in the volume of online commerce globally has a
significant impact on financial institutions and payment systems. Especially
during the pandemic period, when people were unable to leave their
homes, the volume of online commerce increased rapidly. This increase
has necessitated the development of online payment systems by financial
institutions. Moreover, the security of payment systems and transaction
speed have also gained importance. In this context, it is necessary to examine
the impacts of the volume of online commerce on the financial sector in
detail (United Nations Conference on Trade & Development, 2020).
In Turkey, too, the volume of online commerce is rapidly increasing.
This increase seems to be parallel with the digitalization process that has
taken place in recent years. Comparing Turkey’s share in the volume of
online commerce with the global situation also reveals Turkey’s position
in the digitalization process. In this context, examining Turkey’s share in
Salahattin Altundağ | 23
the volume of online commerce helps measure Turkey’s progress in the
digitalization process (eCommerce Foundation, 2020).
Table-1 presents numerical data showing the increases in the volume of
online commerce globally and specifically in Turkey:
Table-1: Change in the Volume of Online Commerce Globally and Specifically in Turkey
Between 2015-2022.
Years Global (Trillion $) Turkey Specific (Trillion $)
2015 1,55 0,00833
2016 1,86 0,008176
2017 2,3 0,011227
2018 2,84 0,011585
2019 3,46 0,013883
2020 4,28 0,030999
2021 4,92 0,027548
2022 6,4 0,065125*
** 2022 data is estimated.
(Made using the annual averages of the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey.
Therefore, there may be differences from real exchange rate values.)
Source: (World Bank, 2023) and prepared by me.
With the rise in global online trade volume, a regression analysis will be
conducted using the global and Turkey-specific data specified in Table: 1, to
determine which factors are influencing the growth of Turkey’s online trade
volume. Regression analysis is a statistical method used to measure the effect
of one variable on another.
Our data display the global and Turkey-specific online trade volumes
between the years 2015 and 2022. Globally, the online trade volume, which
was 1.55 trillion dollars in 2015, has risen to 6.4 trillion dollars in 2022. In
Turkey-specific data, the online trade volume, which was 0.00833 trillion
dollars (8.33 billion dollars) in 2015, has increased to 0.065125 trillion
dollars (65.125 billion dollars) in 2022.
In our regression analysis, the Turkey-specific online trade volume
variable will be selected as the dependent variable, while the global online
trade volume variable will be used as the independent variable. Through this
analysis, the effect of the increase in global online trade volume on Turkey’s
online trade volume will be determined.
Furthermore, the coefficients obtained from the regression analysis will
also determine the growth rate of Turkey’s online trade volume relative to
24 | Impacts of Digital Transformation Caused by the Growth in Online Trade Volume...
the global online trade volume. This will enable the calculation of how much
more or less the increase in Turkey’s online trade volume is compared to the
increase in global online trade volume.
The regression analysis to be conducted on the global and Turkey-specific
online trade volume data specified in Table-1 will determine the effect of
global online trade volume on Turkey’s online trade volume. This analysis
plays a significant role in identifying the factors that trigger the growth in
Turkey’s online trade volume.
Table-2: Regression Analysis of the Growth in Turkey’s Online Trade Volume in
Conjunction with the Increase in Global Online Trade Volume
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0,925918
R Square 0,857325
Adjusted R Square 0,833546
Standard Error 0,678941
Observation 8
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 16,61932 16,61932 36,05364 0,000961
Residual 6 2,765766 0,460961
Total 7 19,38509
Coefficients Standard
Error t Stat P-value Lower
%95
Upper
%95
Lower
95.0%
Upper
95.0%
Intercept 1,697002 0,378122 4,487979 0,004157 0,771772 2,622232 0,771772 2,622232
X
Variable 1 79,34499 13,21432 6,004468 0,000961 47,0107 111,6793 47,0107 111,6793
Source: (World Bank, 2023) and prepared by me.
The data in Table-2 were obtained using regression analysis to examine
the relationship between Turkey’s online trade volume and global online
trade volume. The regression statistics obtained as a result of the analysis are
highly significant:
Salahattin Altundağ | 25
• The Multiple R coefficient has been calculated as 0.926: “This
indicates a strong positive correlation between Turkey’s online trade
volume and the global online trade volume.”
• R Square has been calculated as 0.857: “This demonstrates that
85.7% of the variance between Turkey’s online trade volume and the
global online trade volume is explained.”
• The Adjusted R Square has been calculated as 0.834: “This indicates
that the model is in an improved form and shows a high level of
reliability in the relationship between Turkey’s online trade volume
and the global online trade volume.”
• The Standard Error has been calculated as 0.679: “This reflects the
accuracy of the model.”
• According to the ANOVA results, the F-value for the regression has
been calculated as 36.054, and the significance level (p-value) is less
than 0.001: “This indicates that the regression model is significant,
and the relationship between Turkey’s online trade volume and the
global online trade volume is statistically meaningful.”
• In the coefficients table, the coefficient calculated for the intercept
is 1.697, and the coefficient calculated for the X variable is 79.345:
“These are the coefficients in the equation used to explain the
relationship between Turkey’s online trade volume and the global
online trade volume. The coefficients table also includes the standard
errors, t-statistics, p-values, and 95% confidence intervals for both
coefficients. The coefficient calculated for the intercept, 1.697, suggests
that other factors not included in the model may also affect Turkey’s
online trade volume. The coefficient calculated for the X variable,
79.345, suggests that every 1 billion dollars increase in Turkey’s
online trade volume will lead to a 79.345 trillion dollar increase in the
global online trade volume. The standard errors for both coefficients
are quite low, indicating the reliability of the coefficients.”
From this analysis, it is concluded that there is a strong positive relationship
between Turkey’s online trade volume and the global online trade volume,
that increases in Turkey’s online trade volume cause increases in global online
trade volume, and that this relationship is statistically significant. This data
shows that Turkey’s growth in the field of online trade is effective on a global
scale and that this trend could continue in the future.
26 | Impacts of Digital Transformation Caused by the Growth in Online Trade Volume...
3. THE IMPACT OF GROWTH IN ONLINE TRADE
VOLUME GLOBALLY AND SPECIFICALLY IN TURKEY ON
ACCOUNTING PROCESSES
The growth experienced in online trade volume leads to significant
changes in accounting processes. This study aims to analyze the effects of
growth in online trade volume worldwide and specifically in Turkey on
various accounting processes from 2015 to 2021. These analyses have been
handled through a comparative method:
3.1. Effects on the Preparation and Collection of Transaction
Documents in the Accounting Process:
Today, online trade volume is growing rapidly, and this growth has
various effects on accounting processes. The preparation and collection
of transaction documents is one of these affected processes. In this study,
the effects of the growth in online trade volume worldwide and specifically
in Turkey on the preparation and collection of transaction documents in
accounting processes have been examined comparatively.
Global research indicates that the increase in online trade volume
complicates the preparation and collection of transaction documents (Jansen
& Karaman, 2018). This situation could affect the accuracy and reliability
of accounting records. However, digital tools used in recording online sales
transactions can facilitate the process of preparing and collecting transaction
documents, thereby enhancing the accuracy of records (Li & Su, 2019).
Studies in Turkey examine the effects of the growth in online trade volume
on the preparation and collection of transaction documents. These studies
suggest that the increase in online trade volume complicates the preparation
and collection of transaction documents and could decrease the reliability of
accounting records (Özdemir & Türker, 2017). However, the rapid progress
of companies in Turkey in digitization allows for the increased use of digital
tools that facilitate the preparation and collection of transaction documents,
thereby enhancing the accuracy of accounting records (Erdoğan & Durmuş,
2020).
However, the effects of the growth in online trade volume worldwide
and specifically in Turkey on the preparation and collection of transaction
documents vary. The global growth complicates the preparation and
collection of transaction documents even further, whereas the digitization
process in Turkey facilitates the preparation and collection of transaction
documents.
Salahattin Altundağ | 27
In this context, the rapid progress of companies in Turkey in digitization
should ensure the more widespread use of digital tools in the preparation and
collection of transaction documents to enhance the accuracy and reliability
of accounting records. Also, companies worldwide should increase the use
of digital tools to facilitate the preparation and collection of transaction
documents. In this way, the difficulties in preparing and collecting transaction
documents can be reduced, and the accuracy of accounting records can be
enhanced.
3.2. Effects on the Recording and Tracking of Stocks:
In recent years, online trade volume has grown rapidly worldwide and in
Turkey. This growth has significant impacts on accounting processes in terms
of recording and tracking stocks. In this study, the effects of the growth in
online trade volume on the recording and tracking of stocks in accounting
processes will be compared worldwide and specifically in Turkey.
The online trade volume worldwide has rapidly increased in recent years.
E-commerce companies use automated systems for recording and tracking
stocks. These systems provide faster and more accurate results compared
to manual operations. The recording and tracking of stocks carry great
importance in accounting processes. The use of automated systems enhances
the efficiency of accounting processes (Öztürk, 2017, p.10; Azmi et al.,
2019, p.80).
Online trade volume in Turkey has also grown rapidly in recent years.
However, e-commerce companies in Turkey still prefer manual operations
for recording and tracking stocks. This situation could reduce efficiency in
accounting processes and lead to errors. Companies in Turkey could enhance
the efficiency of accounting processes by using automated stock tracking
systems (Aytekin et al., 2020, p.230; Köseoğlu & Hacıoğlu, 2017, p.19).
E-commerce companies worldwide have begun to use artificial
intelligence and machine learning-based automated accounting software
for recording and tracking stocks. This software enhances the efficiency of
accounting processes by enabling the automatic recording and tracking of
stocks. E-commerce companies in Turkey can also adopt a similar approach
and improve their accounting processes by using automated stock tracking
systems. This way, errors stemming from manual operations can be reduced,
and accounting processes can be made more accurate and faster. Moreover,
the use of technological advancements like artificial intelligence and machine
learning in the stock tracking process can further increase efficiency in
accounting processes. The adoption of these advancements by e-commerce
28 | Impacts of Digital Transformation Caused by the Growth in Online Trade Volume...
companies in Turkey is important in terms of implementing change in
accounting processes (Bilge et al., 2021, p.56; Yılmaz, 2020, p.15).
However, the use of technological advancements in the process of
recording and tracking stocks also creates some challenges. Specifically, there
are concerns about data security and privacy. The use of artificial intelligence
and machine learning-based systems requires companies to be more
cautious about the security of customer data. Moreover, the installation and
maintenance of these systems can also be costly. E-commerce companies
in Turkey can use automated stock tracking systems by considering these
challenges and making appropriate budget and resource planning (Kara &
Çolak, 2019, p.245; Özdemir & Şimşek, 2018, p.192).
3.3. Impacts on the Recording and Tracking of Accounts
Receivable:
In recent years, the volume of online trade has increased significantly
worldwide and in Turkey. This growth has many effects on accounting
processes. In this study, the effects of the growth in online trade volume on
the recording and tracking of accounts receivable in accounting processes
will be compared globally and specifically in Turkey.
The volume of online trade worldwide has increased rapidly in recent
years. E-commerce companies use automatic systems to maintain and track
the records of customers’ accounts receivable. These systems provide faster
and more accurate results compared to manual operations. The recording
and tracking of accounts receivable is of great importance in accounting
processes. Therefore, the use of automated systems increases the efficiency
of accounting processes (Sözbilir & Şanlı, 2016, p. 438; Aktaş & Öztürk,
2018, p. 165).
The volume of online trade in Turkey has also increased significantly in
recent years. However, the systems used for accounting processes in Turkey
are less developed compared to the technological advancements worldwide.
Therefore, e-commerce companies in Turkey still prefer manual operations
for the recording and tracking of accounts receivable. This situation can
reduce efficiency in accounting processes and lead to errors (Kaya & Atay,
2018, p. 85; Şahin & Alver, 2019, p. 110).
E-commerce companies worldwide have started using artificial intelligence
and machine learning-based automated accounting software for the recording
and tracking of accounts receivable. These software applications increase the
efficiency of accounting processes by enabling the automatic recording and
tracking of accounts receivable. E-commerce companies in Turkey can also
Salahattin Altundağ | 29
adopt a similar approach and improve the process of recording and tracking
accounts receivable using automated accounting software. This can reduce
errors resulting from manual operations and make accounting processes
more accurate and faster.
With the increase in digitization, e-commerce companies worldwide
have started adopting digitization in the process of recording and tracking
accounts receivable. For instance, with the use of artificial intelligence and
machine learning technologies, the recording and tracking of accounts
receivable has become automated, mitigating human errors. Additionally,
customers making payments using digital payment systems like credit cards
ensure the fast and accurate recording of accounts receivable.
E-commerce companies in Turkey have also started adopting digitization
for the recording and tracking of accounts receivable. However, due to reasons
such as insufficient technological infrastructure and cultural differences, this
process is progressing more slowly. Therefore, the adoption of digitization
by e-commerce companies in Turkey and the use of automated accounting
software can speed up and increase the accuracy of the recording and tracking
process of accounts receivable.
3.4. Impacts on the Recording and Tracking of Orders:
In recent years, the volume of online trade has increased significantly
worldwide and in Turkey. This growth has many effects on accounting
processes. In this study, the effects of the growth in online trade volume
on the recording and tracking of orders in accounting processes will be
compared globally and specifically in Turkey.
The volume of online trade worldwide has increased rapidly in recent
years. E-commerce companies use automatic systems to maintain and track
the records of customers’ orders. These systems provide faster and more
accurate results compared to manual operations. The recording and tracking
of orders is of great importance in accounting processes. Therefore, the
use of automated systems increases the efficiency of accounting processes
(Sözbilir & Şanlı, 2016, p. 438; Aktaş & Öztürk, 2018, p. 165).
The volume of online commerce in Turkey has also significantly increased
in recent years. However, the systems used for accounting processes in Turkey
are less advanced when compared with global technological developments.
Therefore, e-commerce companies in Turkey still prefer manual operations
for recording and tracking orders. This situation can reduce efficiency in
accounting processes and lead to errors (Kaya & Atay, 2018, p. 85; Şahin &
Alver, 2019, p. 110).
30 | Impacts of Digital Transformation Caused by the Growth in Online Trade Volume...
E-commerce companies globally have started to use automated
accounting software based on artificial intelligence and machine learning
for recording and tracking orders. These software applications facilitate the
automatic recording and tracking of orders, thereby enhancing the efficiency
of accounting processes. E-commerce companies in Turkey could adopt a
similar approach and improve the processes of recording and tracking orders
by using automated accounting software. This could reduce errors stemming
from manual operations and render accounting processes more accurate and
faster.
Furthermore, the proliferation of digital payment systems can play a
significant role in the processes of recording and tracking orders. Digital
payment systems enable faster and safer payments and minimize errors in the
order recording and tracking process. Therefore, e-commerce companies in
Turkey could make their accounting processes more efficient by promoting
the use of digital payment systems (Gupta et al., 2017, p. 118; Wang &
Wang, 2016, p. 745).
3.5. Impacts on Daily Records in Accounting Process:
In recent years, the volume of online commerce has been rapidly increasing
globally. This increase has significant impacts on accounting processes and
particularly yields various outcomes in the management of daily records.
This paper will comparatively examine the effects of the growth in global
and Turkish online commerce volume on accounting processes and daily
records between 2015 and 2022.
The increase in global online commerce volume has caused significant
changes in the management of accounting processes and daily records. This
increase impacts daily records due to reasons such as the growth in transaction
volume, diversification of data sources, and increased variability in sources
(Chen, Zhang, & Wang, 2016). Therefore, many companies worldwide are
using ERP software to better manage their accounting processes and daily
records (Mintz & Chen, 2015). ERP software plays a significant role in
recording transactions, managing data storage, and reporting processes.
The growth in online commerce volume in Turkey also affects accounting
processes and daily records. However, a majority of companies in Turkey
still face challenges in managing accounting processes and organizing daily
records using traditional methods (Aksoylu & Unal, 2016). Companies in
Turkey need to manage their accounting processes and daily records more
effectively along with the increase in online commerce volume.
Salahattin Altundağ | 31
Most companies globally are managing their accounting processes and
organizing daily records using ERP software with the increase in online
commerce volume. However, more research is needed for companies in
Turkey to adopt this method (Chen et al., 2016). Chen and others (2016)
indicate that a large part of SMEs in Turkey still use traditional methods with
the increase in online commerce volume. This situation leads to challenges
in organizing daily records and managing accounting processes specifically
in Turkey.
It could be suggested that companies in Turkey use ERP software to
manage their accounting processes and daily records more effectively along
with the growth in online commerce volume. ERP software provides many
advantages such as the automation of transaction processes, accurate and
reliable recording of financial data, data analysis, and reporting (Mintz &
Chen, 2015). However, it seems there are some obstacles for SMEs in Turkey
to adopt ERP software. These obstacles may include the lack of adequate
technological infrastructure, limited financial resources, and staff training
(Aksoylu & Unal, 2016).
As the volume of online commerce increases globally, the impacts on
accounting processes and daily records also escalate. To counteract this surge,
companies need to leverage advanced technologies to make their accounting
processes and daily records more efficient. This is particularly important in
Turkey, where small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) need to adapt to
evolving business practices. In this context, it is advisable to provide support
and training to SMEs in Turkey on ERP software to better manage their
accounting processes and daily records. This way, SMEs in Turkey can keep
pace with the growth in online commerce volume. Moreover, enhancing
accounting education in Turkey and raising the value of the accounting
profession can contribute to better management of accounting processes.
3.6. Impacts on the Recording and Tracking of Financial
Statements:
The volume of online commerce is rapidly increasing worldwide, affecting
accounting processes, and the recording and tracking of financial statements.
In this paper, the impacts of the growth in online commerce volume on
accounting processes, and the recording and tracking of financial statements
worldwide and specifically in Turkey, will be examined and compared.
The increase in global online commerce volume leads to changes in
accounting processes and the recording of financial statements. Chen,
Zhang, and Wang (2016) suggest that these changes affect the recording
32 | Impacts of Digital Transformation Caused by the Growth in Online Trade Volume...
and tracking of financial statements due to factors such as the growth in
transaction volume, diversification of data sources, and increased variability
in these sources. Hence, many companies worldwide are using ERP software
to better manage the recording and tracking of financial statements (Mintz
& Chen, 2015).
The growth of online commerce volume in Turkey also affects the
recording and tracking of financial statements. However, a significant
majority of companies in Turkey still face challenges managing the recording
and tracking of financial statements using traditional methods (Aksoylu &
Ünal, 2016). This situation leads to difficulties in the recording and tracking
of financial statements in Turkey.
As the volume of online commerce increases globally, the impacts on
accounting processes and the records of financial statements also escalate.
This is particularly important for SMEs in Turkey to adapt to evolving
business practices. In this context, it is advisable to organize training for
SMEs in Turkey and implement financial reporting standards more rigorously
to better manage the recording and tracking of financial statements.
Additionally, encouraging Turkish companies to use more ERP software,
apply data analysis techniques, and transition to digital accounting practices
can aid them in managing the recording and tracking of financial statements
more effectively (Atak, 2020).
3.7. Impacts on Period-End Transactions of the Accounting
Process:
The rapid growth of online commerce has been a significant topic of
discussion regarding its impacts on period-end transactions of accounting
processes worldwide and specifically in Turkey. This paper will compare the
impacts of the growth in online commerce volume between 2015-2022 on
period-end transactions of accounting processes worldwide and specifically
in Turkey.
Globally, as the volume of online commerce grows rapidly, accounting
processes also strive to keep pace. Especially large companies are digitizing
their period-end transactions in the accounting process due to the increase in
online sales, thus accelerating transactions and making them more efficient
(Akkaya, 2019).
In Turkey, however, despite the rapid growth in online commerce
volume, period-end transactions in accounting processes are still conducted
using traditional methods. This slows down companies’ operations and
leads to erroneous results (Altay & Aydın, 2021). Small and medium-sized
Salahattin Altundağ | 33
enterprises (SMEs) in Turkey are struggling to keep up with the increase in
online commerce volume due to these traditional methods in period-end
transactions of accounting processes (Akkaya, 2018).
Globally, the increasing digitalization of companies, particularly
accelerating their end-of-period transactions in accounting processes and
enhancing their efficiency, also boosts the application of data analysis
techniques (Koç & Türk, 2018). Big data analysis methods facilitate better
management of data in accounting processes, optimize corporate decision-
making processes, and make the records of financial statements more accurate
(Yılmaz & Şahin, USA).
In Turkey, delays in the digitalization processes related to end-of-
period transactions in accounting processes necessitate Turkish accounting
professionals to be more knowledgeable about digital transformation (Akgün
& Taş, 2021). This requirement, which necessitates Turkish accounting
professionals to be more knowledgeable about digital transformation, also
highlights the importance of training (Akkaya, 2018). Training for SMEs
can assist them in keeping up with the increase in online trade volume,
thereby enhancing their efficiency in end-of-period transactions (Akkaya,
2018). Therefore, it is essential for companies and accounting professionals
in Turkey to be more aware of digitalization and data analysis and receive
training on these topics (Altay & Aydın, 2021).
The utilization of digitalization and data analysis techniques in end-
of-period transactions by companies worldwide contributes to making
accounting processes faster and more efficient. This, in turn, enables
companies to keep records of their financial statements more accurately
and base their financial decisions on more reliable information (Koç &
Türk, 2018). Companies in Turkey need to expedite their end-of-period
transactions, enhance the accuracy of their financial statements, and become
more efficient by utilizing digitalization and data analysis techniques (Altay
& Aydın, 2021).
CONCLUSION:
Online trade has rapidly grown in recent years, both globally and
specifically in Turkey. The growth in online trade volume is rapidly increasing
in recent years, both globally and specifically in Turkey. This growth has
significant impacts on accounting processes. This study examines the impact
of the growth in online trade volume on accounting processes comparatively,
globally, and specifically in Turkey, and investigates the impact of online
trade volume on accounting processes.
34 | Impacts of Digital Transformation Caused by the Growth in Online Trade Volume...
Our study demonstrated a strong positive correlation between Turkey’s
online trade volume and the global online trade volume, as calculated by the
multiple R coefficient. The R-square indicates that 85.7% of the variance
between Turkey’s online trade volume and the global online trade volume can
be explained. The adjusted R-square shows that the model is in an improved
form and that the relationship between Turkey’s online trade volume and the
global online trade volume is highly reliable. According to Anova results,
the significance level of the regression model is high, and the relationship
between Turkey’s online trade volume and the global online trade volume is
statistically significant.
The coefficients table includes the coefficients and standard errors of
the equation used to explain the relationship between Turkey’s online trade
volume and the global online trade volume. These coefficients are reliable
and have shown that every 1 billion dollar increase results in a 79.345
trillion dollar increase in the global online trade volume in Turkey’s online
trade volume. These results indicate that there is a high correlation between
Turkey’s online trade volume and the global online trade volume, and the
impact of the online trade volume on accounting processes is significant.
Primarily, we examined the effects of the growth in online trade volume on
the preparation and collection of transaction documents from accounting
processes and compared them globally and specifically in Turkey.
Between the years 2015 and 2022, research conducted worldwide
has shown that the increase in online trade volume has complicated the
preparation and collection of transaction documents, potentially affecting
the accuracy and reliability of accounting records (Jansen & Karaman,
2018). Another study has noted the negative impacts of online trade on the
quality of accounting information (Li & Su, 2019).
Similar results have been observed in Turkey. Özdemir and Türker
(2017) pointed out that the increase in online trade volume has made it
more difficult to prepare and gather transaction documents, potentially
undermining the reliability of accounting records. However, another
study in Turkey indicated that the increase in online trade volume has
eased the preparation and collection of transaction documents for Turkish
companies rapidly advancing in digitalization (Erdoğan & Durmuş,
2020). Thus, while the global growth in online trade volume complicates
the preparation and collection of transaction documents, the digitalization
process in Turkey eases it. Companies worldwide should enhance the use
of digital tools to facilitate the preparation and collection of transaction
documents.
Salahattin Altundağ | 35
The growth in online trade significantly affects accounting processes,
particularly the recording and tracking of inventory. The increase in global
online trade volume has made the processes related to inventory recording
and tracking even more critical. Therefore, online shopping sites strive to
perform accurate inventory tracking, inventory management, and financial
reporting by using suitable accounting software. In Turkey, the growth in
online trade volume has had positive effects on the processes related to
inventory recording and tracking. Online shopping sites in Turkey continually
follow technological advancements to make the recording and tracking of
orders more efficient (Ercan, 2017). However, online trade brings some
challenges. Tracking inventory can become more difficult when multiple
sales channels are used (Cheng & Cheng, 2016).
The impact of the growth in online trade volume on accounting processes
has made the processes related to inventory recording and tracking even
more critical. Therefore, the use of appropriate accounting software is vital
to accurately perform inventory tracking, inventory management, and
financial reporting.
In our study, we also compared and discussed the effects of the growth
in online trade volume from 2015 to 2022 on the recording and tracking
of receivables in accounting processes worldwide and specifically in Turkey.
The volume of online trade globally has grown rapidly in recent years and
has accelerated with the pandemic. As the number of customers of online
shopping sites worldwide increases, problems may arise in the recording
and tracking of receivables. This issue is one of the biggest challenges faced
in the accounting processes of online shopping sites (Wang & Wang, 2016,
p. 398).
In Turkey as well, the volume of online trade has been growing rapidly
in recent years. The increase in online shopping during the pandemic has
accelerated this growth even further. However, the volume of online trade
in Turkey is still low compared to the rest of the world. Therefore, the
accounting processes of online shopping sites in Turkey are less complex
compared to the rest of the world. However, as the number of customers
of online shopping sites increases, problems may arise in the recording and
tracking of receivables (Çalışkan & Ersoy, 2017, p. 146).
The problems encountered in the recording and tracking of receivables
hold a significant place in accounting processes. These issues complicate
the accurate recording and reporting of financial data of online shopping
sites. Therefore, online shopping sites need to increase the use of suitable
36 | Impacts of Digital Transformation Caused by the Growth in Online Trade Volume...
accounting software for receivable account tracking, recommend the use of
automated inventory tracking systems, and increase the use of technologies
such as artificial intelligence and machine learning (Al-Mudimigh & Zawawi,
2019, p. 97; Cheng & Cheng, 2016, p. 157).
Upon examination, it has been observed that the increase in the volume
of online trade has a significant impact on accounting processes, especially
in terms of recording and tracking orders; this impact has increased the use
of automated systems for recording and tracking orders due to the growth
in the volume of online trade worldwide. These systems produce faster and
more accurate results compared to manual processes. Therefore, the use of
automated systems enhances the efficiency of accounting processes (Sözbilir
& Şanlı, 2016; Aktaş & Öztürk, 2018).
However, in Turkey, the growth in online trade volume often leads to
a preference for manual processes for order recording and tracking due
to the less developed systems used for accounting processes compared to
global technological advancements. This situation may decrease efficiency in
accounting processes and cause errors (Kaya & Atay, 2018; Şahin & Alver,
2019).
E-commerce companies worldwide have started to use artificial
intelligence and machine learning-based automated accounting software for
recording and tracking orders. These softwares ensure automatic recording
and tracking of orders. E-commerce companies in Turkey can adopt a similar
approach and improve the process of recording and tracking orders by using
automated accounting software. This can reduce errors originating from
manual processes and make accounting processes more accurate and faster
(Aktaş & Öztürk, 2018; Kaya & Atay, 2018).
The study comparatively analyzes the effects of the growth in online trade
volume on accounting processes and daily records between 2015 and 2022,
both globally and specifically in Turkey. Globally, the increase in online trade
volume has led to changes in daily records of accounting. Chen, Zhang, and
Wang (2016) suggest that these changes affect daily records due to reasons
such as growth in transaction volume, diversification of data sources, and
increased variability in sources. Hence, many companies worldwide utilize
ERP software to manage their accounting processes and daily records more
effectively (Mintz & Chen, 2015).
In Turkey, however, a large majority of companies are still using traditional
methods and facing challenges in managing accounting processes and
organizing daily records (Aksoylu & Unal, 2016). This situation leads to
Salahattin Altundağ | 37
difficulties in managing accounting processes and organizing daily records
specifically in Turkey. In this context, it may be advisable to provide SMEs
in Turkey with support and training on ERP software to manage accounting
processes and daily records more effectively. This could help Turkish SMEs
keep up with the growth in online trade volume.
The increase in online trade volume both globally and specifically in
Turkey is causing changes in accounting processes and in the records of
financial statements. The growth of online transaction volume worldwide,
the diversification of data sources, and the increased variability in these
sources affect the records and tracking of financial statements (Chen, Zhang
& Wang, 2016). Hence, many companies are using ERP software to manage
the records and tracking of financial statements more effectively (Mintz &
Chen, 2015).
The growth of online trade volume in Turkey also affects the records
and tracking of financial statements. However, a majority of companies in
Turkey are still facing challenges in managing the records and tracking of
financial statements using traditional methods (Aksoylu & Ünal, 2016).
Greater use of ERP software by Turkish companies, applying data analysis
techniques, and transitioning to digital accounting applications could assist
in managing the records and tracking of financial statements more effectively
(Özcan, 2021).
In addition to changes in accounting processes, the growth in the volume
of online commerce is affecting financial reporting standards. Financial
reporting standards, such as the International Financial Reporting Standards
(IFRS) and Turkish Accounting Standards (TAS), are constantly being
updated due to the growth in the volume of online commerce (Gürbulak
& Bozkurt, 2019). Hence, it is crucial for companies to keep up with and
implement these updates in financial reporting standards.
Our study has examined and compared the impacts of the growth in
the volume of online commerce between 2015 and 2022 on accounting
processes, including end-of-period transactions, globally and specifically in
Turkey.
As the volume of online commerce grows rapidly worldwide, accounting
processes are striving to adapt. Large corporations, due to the increase in
online sales, are digitizing their end-of-period transactions in accounting
processes, accelerating their operations, and making them more efficient
(Akkaya, 2019). This digitization also increases the use of data analysis
techniques. Big data analysis methods are improving the management of data
38 | Impacts of Digital Transformation Caused by the Growth in Online Trade Volume...
in accounting processes, enhancing companies’ decision-making processes,
and making the recording of financial statements more accurate (Yılmaz &
Şahin, USA).
In Turkey, however, despite the rapid growth in the volume of online
commerce, end-of-period transactions in accounting processes are still
conducted using traditional methods. This slows down companies’ operations
and leads to erroneous results (Altay & Aydın, 2021). Small and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs) in Turkey are struggling to keep up with the growth
in the volume of online commerce due to these traditional methods used in
end-of-period transactions in accounting processes (Akkaya, 2018).
In conclusion, the growth in the volume of online commerce worldwide
necessitates companies to digitize their accounting processes. This
digitization increases efficiency in accounting processes and allows for more
accurate information to be used in financial decisions. However, in Turkey,
accounting processes are still conducted using traditional methods, making it
difficult for small and medium-sized enterprises to keep up with the growth
in online commerce. Therefore, it is essential for companies and accounting
professionals in Turkey to be aware of digitization and data analysis, and to
receive training in these areas. In the process of digitization, data security
is also a crucial issue, and companies need to take appropriate measures to
minimize risks.
The impact of the growth in online commerce on inventory records and
tracking in accounting processes is a significant issue. To mitigate these
impacts and to make the processes more efficient, future works could include
the following:
• It is recommended to increase the accuracy and reliability of transaction
documents by automating their preparation and collection.
• The growth in online commerce could lead to issues with the quality
of information affecting the accuracy and reliability of accounting
records. Therefore, stricter control measures and updates to regulations
are suggested.
• Recommendations include increasing the use of appropriate
accounting software for inventory tracking and records, automating
inventory tracking systems, enhancing the use of artificial intelligence
and machine learning, improving business processes, increasing
employee training and awareness, and conducting data analysis.
• Suggestions such as automating daily records, wider use of ERP
software, standardizing daily records, using data analysis techniques,
Salahattin Altundağ | 39
and organizing accounting trainings could help manage accounting
processes more efficiently and effectively.
• Measures recommended also include automating end-of-period
transactions, accelerating digitization processes, raising awareness of
digitization among SMEs in Turkey, taking measures for data security,
conducting more research, and preparing training programs for
accounting professionals.
• The standardization of financial statement records has become even
more important due to the growth in online commerce.
• Due to the difficulties faced by SMEs in Turkey in the recording and
tracking of financial statements, training could be organized for SMEs.
• It is recommended for companies in Turkey to transition to digital
accounting applications, utilize data analysis techniques, employ
expert personnel, and standardize accounting processes.
• The use of big data analysis methods is becoming increasingly crucial.
These measures will simplify the accurate recording and reporting of
financial data from online shopping sites and minimize issues related
to the recording and tracking of receivables in accounting processes.
• The need for companies in Turkey to adhere to International Financial
Reporting Standards has gained even more importance. In this regard,
it is necessary to ensure that companies’ financial reports are prepared
in compliance with international accounting standards.
• There is a need for more comprehensive research on the impact
of online commerce on accounting processes, keeping abreast of
innovations in the sector, and constantly updating practices. This way,
a more effective and efficient working environment can be achieved in
the fields of accounting processes and financial reporting.
• Lastly, it is important to raise the level of awareness about the
impact of online commerce on accounting processes and to provide
regular training for accounting professionals to adapt to the digital
transformation process. In doing so, adaptability to changes in
accounting processes can be ensured, and a more efficient working
environment can be created.
In summary, there are many measures that can be taken regarding the
impact of online commerce on accounting processes. Suggestions such as
the automation of transaction documents, the use of suitable accounting
software for inventory tracking and records, the acceleration of digitalization
40 | Impacts of Digital Transformation Caused by the Growth in Online Trade Volume...
processes, and compliance with International Financial Reporting Standards
can minimize the impact of online commerce on accounting processes.
Additionally, by increasing the level of awareness through regular training,
accounting professionals can be enabled to adapt to the digital transformation
process.”
In conclusion; the worldwide increase in online trading volume is
affecting accounting processes and daily records. In order to minimize
this impact and increase the accuracy and reliability of accounting records,
companies need to adapt rapidly to the digitization process. Suggestions
such as the use of appropriate accounting software, the use of automated
inventory tracking systems, the use of artificial intelligence and machine
learning, the improvement of work processes, the training of employees,
and the enhancement of awareness levels can assist in managing accounting
processes in a more efficient and effective manner. However, data security
is an important issue in the digitization process, and companies need to
take appropriate measures to minimize risks. Training should be organized
for SMEs in Turkey to adapt to changing business practices, and financial
reporting standards need to be applied more strictly. Thus, the accuracy and
reliability of accounting records can be increased, financial reporting can be
improved, and companies can operate more efficiently by avoiding data loss,
errors, time loss, and costs.
Salahattin Altundağ | 41
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45
Chapter 3
Sociology of Artificial Intelligence: How AI
Will Transform Work, Unemployment and Our
Future
Ulaş Başar Gezgin1
Abstract
Artificial intelligence is one of the hot themes of the current public discussion
with accounts associating it with transformations in especially manufacturing
sectors which is usually expected to lead to massive unemployment. The
public is keen on speculating about which jobs will be made redundant by
the rise of AI and ultimately disappear. In addition to factories, the health
sector is one of the sites of contestations as many medical tasks are getting
automated. Some other scholars do not agree with this panic atmosphere.
They claim that like any other industrial transformation, the rise of AI
will also create new jobs. Although social implications of the rise of AI
are under the spot, it is hard to come up with a single view among various
views shared by scholars of various disciplines and strands of research. This
article summarizes and elaborates on various positions on the topic, with a
sociologically critical perspective, keeping an eye on AI’s highly likely role in
exacerbating the already biting social inequalities and injustice. The sociology
of artificial intelligence is delineated along with the ethical issues raised by the
expansion of artificial intelligence in our daily lives, keeping the possibility of
a humane artificial intelligence in mind.
Introduction
The mainstream idea on social impact of AI is that it will lead to massive
unemployment (e.g. Marwala, 2015). Another less common, but
more realistic view with a twist is that although it will lead to massive
unemployment, it will open up new job opportunities; humans will always
be needed (Tse, Esposito & Goh, 2017). As stated by Fogel & Kvedar
1 Ulaş Başar Gezgin, Istanbul Galata University, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, Department
of Psychology, ulas.gezgin@galata.edu.tr, ORCID ID: 0000-0002-6075-3501
https://doi.org/10.58830/ozgur.pub167.c749
46 | Sociology of Artificial Intelligence: How AI Will Transform Work, Unemployment...
(2018), “each generation for the last 100 years has had a visceral fear that
automation would replace jobs. And yet, as it does so, new jobs emerge”
(p.3). Thus, according to this account, machines (AI) and humans will not
be in competition in the future, they will rather complement each other (Tse,
Esposito & Goh, 2017). Thus, in this article, we present and discuss various
scholars’ views on how AI will influence our jobs, unemployment and in the
most general sense, our future. We start our discussion with introductory
explanations about what AI means. This is followed by a review of scholars’
views.
Rigla et al. (2018) define AI as “the ability to make computers do things
that would require intelligence if done by humans” (p.303). An earlier and
shorter definition is “the intelligence exhibited by machines or software”
(Pannu, 2015, p.79), but this begs the question. With such a definition, non-
intelligent operations of machines or software cannot always be demarcated
easily. Mahanty & Mahanti (2019) state that “artificial Intelligence deals
with the study and development of software and machines that can imitate
human-like intelligence” (p.2100). However, philosophically speaking,
such a definition implies that AI cannot do more than just imitating human
intelligence, and thus it can’t be a substitute nor an equivalent to it.
A more elaborate definition which correctly stresses unpredictability and
flexibility is the following:
“AI is a general term that currently refers to a cluster of technologies
and approaches to computing focused on the ability of computers to make
flexible rational decisions in response to often unpredictable environmental
conditions” (Tredinnick, 2017, p.37).
Additionally, the way AI, machine learning and deep learning are
connected can be summarized as follows:
“AI might be defined as a computer performing tasks in a rational human-
like manner. Machine learning comprises a subset of AI, in which software
algorithms attempt to predict future events, after being trained in rule-based
logic, pattern recognition and reinforcement techniques. Deep learning,
a sub-type of machine learning, utilizes artificial neural networks, loosely
modeled after webs of neurons and synapses in the human brain” (Craft III,
pp.406-407).
Finally, we need to briefly outline the notion of Industry 4.0 before our
main discussion. Industry 1.0 was characterized by “mechanization, steam
power and water power”, 2.0 by “mass production, assembly line and
Ulaş Başar Gezgin | 47
productivity”, 3.0 by “computer and automation” and finally 4.0 by “cyber
physical systems” (Stăncioiu, 2017, p.74).
Artificial Intelligence models and applications are put in practice in diverse
settings such as production management (e.g. Burggräf, Wagner & Koke,
2018), medicine (e.g. Adhikari, 2018; Buch, Varughese & Maruthappu,
2018; Mamoshina et al., 2018; Pacis, Subido Jr & Bugtai, 2018; Shrestha
& Sengupta, 2018; Tajmir et al., 2018; Tang et al., 2018; Tian, 2018),
pharmacy (Vyas et al., 2018), law (e.g. Alarie, Niblett & Yoon, 2018),
environmental sciences (e.g. Vieira et al., 2018), energy efficiency (Poola,
2017), urban planning (e.g. Chui, Lytras & Visvizi, 2018; Khan et al.,
2018), journalism (Broussard, 2014; Latar, 2015), education (Alberola et
al., 2016; Belpaeme et al., 2018; Edwards & Cheok, 2017; Popenici & Kerr,
2017; Sora & Sora, 2012; Timms, 2016) etc.. These give the misleading
impression that AI can do anything that our species can do. Despite of the
exaggerated accounts common in media, so far we don’t have successful
general AI applications, but specific ones (Tredinnick, 2017). The latter are
called as weak AI or narrow AI, while general ones that are yet to exist are
called as strong AI or artificial general intelligence (Yadav et al., 2017).
Automation and Unemployment
To proceed further, we need to distinguish AI and automation. Mehta &
Devarakonda (2018) state that
“the invention of the printing press and the development of the conveyor
belt assembly line are good examples of how humans break down complex
mechanical tasks into simpler well-defined steps that can then be automated.
However, automating cognitive tasks has been a bigger challenge because
it is not known precisely how human brains work. But is it necessary for
humans to decode cognitive tasks for automation to work? Recent advances
in artificial intelligence (AI) suggest otherwise, and the implications for
health care are tantalizing” (p.2019).
That is a key point often missed in popular discussions of AI. In fact,
what the public discusses is not really AI, but automation. Automation is
the imitation of repetitive tasks that do not require intelligence. In that
sense, even the pessimistic view on AI as to unemployment is misplaced
from the very beginning. It is not AI which is expected to make workers in
some tasks redundant, but automation. On the other hand, there are cases
in the intersection of both AI and automation. Hengstler, Enkel & Duelli
(2016) uses the term ‘intelligent automation’ to refer to a combination
of both. A common example for this is driverless cars as will be discussed
48 | Sociology of Artificial Intelligence: How AI Will Transform Work, Unemployment...
later. They involve both repetitive and well-defined tasks that don’t
involve higher cognitive processing and unpredictable and risky tasks that
involve intelligence. However, these combination of both automation and
intelligence is uncommon. In many other examples, it is easy to differentiate
automation and AI. For instance, the chess programs beating human masters
are considered to exhibit AI, however a search engine or the manufacturing
system in a factory are considered to be a matter of automation.
The confusion about AI and automation has parallels in robotics. To
exemplify, Chand et al. (2018) point out that
“‘Robotic Surgery’ is increasingly debated in surgical circles. The reality
is, however, that we are nowhere near the era of true robotic surgery, and
what we are actually debating are advanced laparoscopic devices or ‘tele-
manipulators’. Whichever English definition one chooses for the term
‘robot’, the consistent qualification is a machine that is able to undertake
tasks ‘automatically’, whether this be programmed or independently. The
current iterations are robotic platforms which do not fulfil this most basic of
criteria to be called robots” (p.645).
After mentioning the distinction between AI and automation, we can
move to the unemployment discussions. The way mainstream thinkers
approach the expected unemployment due to AI is in the mode of a crisis.
They claim that with extremely high unemployment rates, the system will
collapse (cf. Harari, 2016). However, they don’t think about the possibility
that we can have shorter work weeks (even 2 work days per week for
instance), so that people can have more time to enjoy with their family and
social connections. With such a wonderful free time, they can develop their
personality through art, sports, philosophy and other humane activities.
Others proposed a universal wage for these unemployed, but they forget
that this (i.e. enormous transfer payments, in other words payments not
based on production) may lead to hyper-inflation. With wrong assumptions
firmly believed, these mainstream thinkers don’t see any way other than
collapse. In fact there are many other possibilities.
As to the economic discussions of the effects of AI on work and
employment, a key point is which school of economic thought the debaters
belong to. For instance, Acemoglu and his colleagues assume the self-
correcting power of the markets (cf. Acemoglu & Restrepo, 2018a, 2018b)
which is obviously a mainstream neo-liberal understanding of economics
not necessarily shared by other economists such as Stiglitz, and many other
Keynesian and Marxist thinkers. The truth is that economics is not a rocket
science; it is mostly ideological than scientific, confusing basic facts and
Ulaş Başar Gezgin | 49
opinions, and sometimes even distorting historical facts. For example, these
mainstream neo-liberal thinkers are fond of linking economic development
with the so-called ‘democracy’ which is not really a democracy in its true sense;
often ignoring the economic success of ‘neo-liberal’ fascist dictatorships such
Pinochet’s Chile and that of non-Western powers such as China.
Whereas for Harari (2016, 2015), another best-selling debater, the markets
are not self-correcting, but his economic understanding is mainstream and
neo-liberal in other ways. These popular figures often propose their ideas
as scientific facts rather than opinions, not allowing questioning of their
quite subjective and ideological assumptions (cf. Gezgin, in press). Let us
also note that Nobel Prizes in economics are awarded to economists that are
both pro- and anti-government in their economic models which one more
time shows that economics is not a science, or not a tough science that it
pretends to be. Furthermore, if economics would not have been ideological,
if it would have been as tough as rocket science, economists would be the
wealthiest, which is obviously not the case. To sum up, economic discussions
of AI needs further analysis due to the ideological nature of economics as a
research area and a profession.
Let us also note another theme in economic discussions of AI which
views AI as a cure for market inefficiency: If market inefficiency would be
attributed to lack of or insufficient information of the market actors, then
the expansion of AI would be considered as a cure for this efficiency as
proposed by Marwala (2015). However this is a neo-liberal position open
to criticism. In fact, market inefficiency has a number of other factors such as
the profit motive itself which leads to overproduction of profitable products
and services on the one hand, and underproduction of goods and services
that are for public benefit rather than private profit by the private sector, the
role of the state, the priorities of the government policies and relevant laws
and regulations. Thus, AI can’t fix capitalism’s problems, as these problems
are inherent to capitalism itself.
Artificial Intelligence, Automation and New Jobs
Our next topic is how AI (in fact, automation) is expected to transform
our careers. Baldassari & Roux (2017) remind us that new jobs have
been popularized that were not very well known 10 years ago such as app
developers, data scientists, cloud computing experts etc., and brand new
jobs appeared such as driverless car engineers, drone operators etc.. They
believe that the rise of Industry 4.0 will not lead to fewer jobs or massive
unemployment. As the jobs based on repetitive tasks will disappear, new
50 | Sociology of Artificial Intelligence: How AI Will Transform Work, Unemployment...
jobs to maintain the Industry 4.0 systems will emerge. They disagree with
Industry 4.0 fanatics who claim that the human factor will disappear in
factory production just like the case for driverless cars:
“An automated factory left alone cannot stay competitive for long. Just
as we have seen dramatic improvement in the functionality of smartphones
over the past decade, it is expected that factory hardware will continue
to improve. This still requires skilled labor to assess, install, and maintain
the hardware. The software that powers a factory will also continue to
improve as today’s algorithm will not meet tomorrow’s needs. Therefore, an
increasing supply of skilled labor is needed to develop software, improve it,
and monitor the information. A single factory may need fewer people to run
it; however, as with past industrial revolutions, the increases in productivity
should create new markets, new businesses, and new factories that increase
demand for skilled labor” (Baldassari & Roux, 2017, p.21).
Herzfeld (2017) is in the opinion that “AI has begun to shake the
foundation of Western capitalism” (p.3); in contrast to this opinion, in fact,
AI will reinforce capitalism as explained above. Sikdar (2018) is among
the scholars who don’t expect massive unemployment converging with
Baldassari & Roux (2017): “In the past we saw the effects of vanishing
horse-drawn carriages, and computers doing our accounting and finances,
etc. Instead of massive unemployment widely predicted, many more new
jobs were created than jobs that disappeared” (p.2). Wilson, Daugherty &
Bianzino (2017), another group of scholars proposing that AI will create
new jobs, presents and discusses three new job categories that are not
replacing the old ones. The first category is that of trainers which refers
to people who are tasked with training AI systems. The second category is
that of explainers. Explainers will serve as bridges between technologically
savvy experts and non-technical people including business leaders and
politicians. This task is expected to be even more vital, as AI systems get
more complicated. With more complications, it will be hard for non-experts
to grasp the inner workings of AI. These explainers will also be central for
the cases where algorithms appear to be wrong or counter-intuitive. They
will be the ones to judge whether it is a system error or not. Finally the
sustainers will ensure that the AI systems will continue their operations
smoothly (Wilson, Daugherty & Bianzino, 2017).
For the medical settings, Fogel & Kvedar (2018) state that “while many
fear that AI will disrupt jobs and the physician - patient relationship, we
believe that AI can eliminate many repetitive tasks to clear the way for
human-to-human bonding and the application of emotional intelligence and
Ulaş Başar Gezgin | 51
judgment” (p.1). Naylor (2018) agrees with Fogel & Kvedar (2018) in case
of deep learning:
“Deep learning shows promise for streamlining routine work by health
care professionals and empowering patients, thereby promoting a safer, more
humane, and participatory paradigm for health care. Different sources offer
varying estimates of the amount of time wasted by health care professionals
on tasks amenable to some automation (e.g., high-quality image screening)
that could then be rededicated to more or better care” (Naylor, 2018, p.
1100). In this context, Jarrahi (2018) proposes ‘the idea of intelligence
augmentation’ that means “AI systems should be designed with the intention
of augmenting, not replacing, human contributions” (p.1).
A similar view is pronounced by Jha & Topol (2016):
“Jobs are not lost; rather, roles are redefined; humans are displaced to
tasks needing a human element. Radiologists and pathologists need not
fear artificial intelligence but rather must adapt incrementally to artificial
intelligence, retaining their own services for cognitively challenging tasks”
(p. 2354).
Fogel & Kvedar (2018) add the following:
“Given the time limitations of a physician’s, as the time demands for rote
tasks increase, the time for physicians to apply truly human skills decreases.
By embracing AI, we believe that humans in healthcare can increase time
spent on uniquely human skills: building relationships, exercising empathy,
and using human judgment to guide and advice” (p.1).
In other words, automation, rather than making doctors redundant, is
expected to assist them to save time with routine, tedious tasks that don’t
require creativity, empathy or care. This accordingly will pave the way for
more space for humane tasks that doctors don’t have time to perform in
the current situation. Obviously, as common in popular discussions, AI and
automation are confused here. Nevertheless, Fogel & Kvedar (2018) are
clear about the most likely consequences: “Rather than take over, we believe
that these systems may take on much of the unpleasant work of healthcare”
(p.2).
Sociology of Artificial Intelligence
From a human rights perspective, it is clear that there will be winners and
losers of the rise and expansion of AI (Raso et al., 2018). With the current
capitalist thinking over the future, AI will worsen the current economic
and social unfairness. Health applications of AI can worsen the social and
52 | Sociology of Artificial Intelligence: How AI Will Transform Work, Unemployment...
economic gaps due to the costs (Russell et al., 2015). Raso et al. (2018) note
that privacy will be the most affected, but with regard to other human rights,
we will see differentiated effects rather than overall impact over everybody.
For Lloyd (2018), the biggest threat of AI is not about unemployment,
but amplification of social biases to the detriment of already marginalized
populations. E.g. “many algorithms learn from and perpetuate treatments
that are best suited to white males’ but may not be the best remedy for other
groups” (Lloyd, 2018, p.3). The alternative would be a socially inclusive AI
or discrimination-aware machine learning.
Likewise, for Crawford (2016), there is a more serious problem than the
panic atmosphere that is due to the possibility of a future AI being smarter
than human beings and getting out of control:
“Sexism, racism and other forms of discrimination are being built into
the machine-learning algorithms that underlie the technology behind many
“intelligent” systems that shape how we are categorized and advertised to”
(p.1).
(...)
“Like all technologies before it, artificial intelligence will reflect the
values of its creators. So inclusivity matters — from who designs it to who
sits on the company boards and which ethical perspectives are included.
Otherwise, we risk constructing machine intelligence that mirrors a narrow
and privileged vision of society, with its old, familiar biases and stereotypes”
(p.3).
In the same vein, Brundage (2015) predicts that
“The accessibility, transparency, affordability, and usability of AI
innovations may influence the extent to which they tend to empower
disenfranchised people or to entrench existing inequalities. If AI innovations
are largely patented and fiercely protected by corporate interests,
incomprehensible to non-experts, and draw on data or other resources that
are only in private hands, different social consequences may result than if all
AI innovations are immediately available to everyone (...)” (p.29).
Hamaguchi & Kondo (2018) identify sociologically differentiated effects
of automation as a result of the more widespread mobilization of AI models
in work settings: There are regional differences in the rate automation
causes unemployment, and secondly, female workers are the most affected
(Hamaguchi & Kondo, 2018). We can explain the basis of this finding and
expand it sociologically: Under capitalism, the most oppressed are usually
engaged in the most repetitive, boring tasks. Patriarchy oppresses females
Ulaş Başar Gezgin | 53
and young workers (both girls and boys). Capitalism is usually characterized
by racial and cultural discrimination despite of progressive policies in various
countries. That means racial and cultural minorities along with females and
youth will be the most affected by automation, losing their jobs. On the
other hand, not all repetitive jobs are replaceable by AI. For instance, tasks
involving care such as nursing is not expected to be affected by automation
negatively. In contrast, they may rise as islands in the seas of automation. As
patriarchy associates care with women, women at care professions can be the
winners of the rise of AI. Of course, this is just one of the possible futures.
Ethics of Artificial Intelligence and Humane AI
A humane use of AI for industry would be in areas where workplace
deaths are common such as mining (Nadimpalli, 2017) or shipyards. In fact,
what is usually called as ‘workplace accidents’ (which are alternatively called
as ‘workplace murders’ by labor activists) are endemic to capitalism. Labor
safety has no universally accepted standard. Nevertheless, it is true that some
of the work areas are more lethal than others, as a comparison of working as
a miner vs. as a waiter would reveal.
For Fogel & Kvedar (2018), in discussions of health applications of AI,
the most important criterion should be the patient care. If a new technology
will add to patient welfare, making his/her life healthier and longer, it should
be adopted. This is another way to formulate a humane AI. Although AI
outperforms human doctors by a computational brute force approach in
certain cases, what they lack is an understanding of the ethical and moral
dimensions of human decision making (Brush, 2018).
One of the most serious ethical problem associated with AI would
concern the AI weapons (Russell et al., 2015). Their destructive capacity
is feared to be out of control in the future. It is risky to leave life and death
decisions as such to machines. Aside from the weapons, for all AI systems
we have the legal and ethical liability problem, in other words who will be
responsible for AI’s acts that violate the norms (Asaro, 2016), as exemplified
by the case of driverless cars.
Driverless cars are expected to be more efficient than human drivers, as
they are immune to road rage, distractions, and driving under the influence
of alcohol and drugs. Furthermore, they are hoped to provide assistance to
old-aged and handicapped people that are physically unable to drive (Arkin,
2016) and reduce traffic-related pollution (Zhao et al., 2016). However
they pose ethical and legal problems, in case of accidents involving dilemmas
(Deng, 2015) and human drivers’ frustration as a result of the driverless cars’
54 | Sociology of Artificial Intelligence: How AI Will Transform Work, Unemployment...
exact compliance to the traffic law (Arkin, 2016). Human drivers sometimes
break the laws on reasonable grounds (let us remember the notion of
flexibility in the AI definition above), and that is not the case for driverless
cars. Another example that involves ethics concerns the robots that remind
the patients to take medicine. What if the patient refuses to take it? In this
case, patient’s well-being and autonomy will be in conflict (Deng, 2015).
It is usually claimed that radiology will be one of the first areas to go
extinct by the rise and expansion of AI. However, Tridandapani (2018) thinks
otherwise: “Current AI efforts have achieved limited success in narrowly
focused image interpretation problems, and there is no indication that an AI
system can practice general radiology” (p.965). Kahn Jr (2017) agrees with
Tridandapani (2018) from another direction: “Although radiology is ready
to benefit from AI technologies, the specialty entails more than identifying
findings on images” (p.719). For Yasaka & Abe (2018), radiologists will still
be needed for rare diseases, incidental findings and multimorbidity common
among the elderly.
Thus, it appears that public opinion and celebrity figures with science
backgrounds (such as TV futurists and pop scientists) exaggerate the success
in narrow fields, but ignoring the failure in more general stuff. Furthermore,
Tridandapani (2018) adds, medical professions require care with empathy
which can’t be imitated and replaced by AI. Another researcher, Zhang
(2016), converges with this position stating that doctor’s role is not only
healing the body, but comforting the soul which involves emotions. In other
words, doctors have another role which is to make the patient feel better,
in addition to make him/her healthier. Thus, it is better to view AI not as a
threat or substitute to human doctors, but as assistants to support patient
welfare. Likewise, Sharma & Carter (2017) claim that AI can’t replace
human pathologists. They propose that in these discussions, activities
involving high-level cognition and high-level computation are mistaken.
They are not identical. For them the question is no longer about human
versus computer, but “human versus human with the computer” (p.623),
a view shared by Chen & Asch (2017) in different words. The best health
performance according to Chen & Asch (2017) can’t be achieved by neither
alone, but by both. Ultimately the decision maker will be the human based
on the findings and suggestions provided by the machines (Albu & Stanciu,
2015).
Ulaş Başar Gezgin | 55
Conclusion
In this article, we first presented various definitions of artificial intelligence
before proceeding to our main discussion on the social impacts of the rise
of AI. We inferred that flexibility and unpredictability are the keys to both
human and artificial intelligence. We proposed that public discussions on
AI and unemployment are based on a theoretical misconception as AI and
automation are not identical. Our next topic was the mainstream thinking on
the link between automation and unemployment. We identified two major
positions: The first one viewed the rise of AI as a social crisis due to the
expected massive unemployment, while the second one argued that just like
the similar historical cases, the rise of AI will also open up new jobs. In both
accounts, mostly repetitive, routine work tasks are expected to be automated
and accordingly disappear. As the last issue of our article, we reflected on
the future of AI and its social impacts with a sociological perspective. It is
highly likely that AI in its current forms will aggravate the already existing
social inequalities and unfairness. Instead, a humane AI hugging not only
advantaged but also disadvantaged social groups is necessary. Finally, it is
proposed that at least in the short term and mid-term, AI and automation
would be unable to substitute human empathy, care and related emotions,
which will boost the significance of what is humane about our species. To
conclude, rather than replacing human beings, AI and automation will assist
our species to open more space for higher cognitive tasks. But ethical and
sociological dimensions of AI should be kept in mind. A fanatic admiration
for the rise of AI is out of touch with the social realities.
56 | Sociology of Artificial Intelligence: How AI Will Transform Work, Unemployment...
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61
Chapter 4
The Influence of Religion on the Dominant
Party System in Turkey and Russia
Abdulkadir Cesur1
Abstract
This paper examines whether the phenomenon of religion can be a
determining dynamic in the emergence of the dominant-party system. To
explain this, I take hand Turkey and Russia, which have been governed
by a dominant party for more than 20 years. Accordingly, I analyze the
importance of religion from the standpoint of the electorate of these two
countries since the dominant parties emerge based on voter preferences. The
findings of this study reveal that religion can be very effective in creating a
dominant party in non-secularised countries such as Turkey. However, when
the case of Russia is considered, it demonstrates that religious phenomenon
remains the emergence of the dominant-party system remains far from being
a determinant and generalizable dynamic.
1. INTRODUCTION
In the political science literature, debates on the dominant-party system
continue with increasing interest. However, the relationship between the
dominant party system and democracy is at the center of these debates
generally. Notwithstanding, the issue of the determining dynamics that
lead to the emergence of a dominant-party or dominant-party system in
countries has been neglected. In this context, we can say that the dynamics
of the dominant-party system are a puzzle waiting to be solved.
On the other hand, we should also say that the dominant party system
is a phenomenon that should be questioned by different disciplines.
Insomuch, many researchers point out that almost all countries with this
system have pathological cases that contradict liberal democracies, that the
dominant party system exhibits a hybrid regime type between democracy
1 Dr. Öğr. Gör. Kocaeli Üniversitesi (Kandıra MYO), abdulkadir.cesur@kocaeli.edu.tr,
ORCID: 0000-0002-2697-0430
https://doi.org/10.58830/ozgur.pub167.c751
62 | The Influence of Religion on the Dominant Party System in Turkey and Russia
and authoritarianism, and this is a disturbing abnormality for democracy
(Schedler, 2002; Carothers, 2002: 5-21; Linz, 2000: 33-34; Collier &
Levitsky, 1997: 430-451).
Considering the countries that have had or are experiencing the dominant
party experience, these criticisms have some justification. However, at this
point, it should be emphasized that all dominant parties come to power
through elections and maintain their government through elections.
Voters are the ones who have the final say in this context. Therefore, the
dominant-party system is ultimately shaped by voter preferences. On the
other hand, the phenomenon of religion is also one of the factors affecting
voter preferences. As it is known, religion influences the political behaviors
in many countries and even can become a determining factor in coming to
power in some countries.
Therefore, based on all these motives, this study examines the impact
of religion to the dominant-party system through voter preferences on the
axis of the Turkey-Russia comparison. The selection of Turkey and Russia
from the universe of dominant-party countries in the study is based on the
following reasons: The dominant-party system in both countries emerged
around the same time. The geographical locations of the two countries are
close to each other. Both are neither entirely European nor Asian. In addition
to all these, it is frequently mentioned in the literature that Orthodox
Christianity in Russia and Islam in Turkey has a critical place in the political
and social sphere.
The method used in the study is the comparative method, which has
recently been frequently used in the field of political science as well as
sociology. The comparative method, which also refers to a perspective and
orientation, is a research method that aims to identify and explain the factors
that are effective in the emergence and development of certain events.
Within this method, the data needed for the study were obtained
through a literature review. The general framework of the study in terms
of presentation is as follows: First of all, following the introduction, the
conceptual framework of the dominant-party system is presented. Then, the
relationship between the dominant-party system and religion is discussed.
Then, the data that will enable us to analyze whether religion has influenced
the dominant-party system in Turkey and Russia through voter tendencies
were presented. In the conclusion section, the quantitative and qualitative
qualified data presented in the study were discussed, and predictions were
made based on them.
Abdulkadir Cesur | 63
2. WHAT IS THE DOMINANT PARTY SYSTEM?
There is a great diversity in the literature regarding the definition and
characteristics of the dominant-party system. In a sense, this diversity can be
considered the product of the intense efforts of political scientists to come
up with an inclusive definition. However, it is also possible to say that the
descriptions put forward by political scientists are not very different, or at
least they do not differ from each other in fundamental points.
For example, according to Sartori (1990: 345-46), one of the leading
researchers on party systems, the dominant-party system corresponds to a
system in which one party has a solid majority of seats in parliament, governs
the state for a long time and the level of competition is low. Duverger’s (1986:
398-99) definition is similar to Sartori’s. According to him, if there is a party
in the political system that is larger than all other parties and has outlasted
its rivals for a long time, and if the people, including those who do not vote
for it, believe in the dominance of this party, this system is a dominant-party
system. While Cox (1997: 238) defines the dominant-party system, just like
Duverger, he acts from the concept of the dominant party and puts forward
a definition like this: The dominant-party system is one in which one of the
parties sits uninterruptedly in government for a long time, either alone or as
a senior partner in a coalition. On the other hand, Ware (1996: 159) follows
Sartori’s criteria and defines the dominant-party system as follows: The
dominant-party system is a system in which a party regularly wins enough
parliamentary seats to control the government on its own. Perhaps the most
comprehensive definition characterizing the dominant-party system in the
literature is provided by O’Leary (1994: 4). According to him, a dominant-
party system is a system in which a political party regularly wins more seats
than its rivals in elections. In this system, the dominant party, thanks to its
ideology and bargaining power, regularly stays in government or becomes a
key actor and governs the state for more than a decade.
It is possible to summarize the features that characterize the dominant
party and the dominant-party system either in the light of these definitions
or line with the opinions of other political scientists, as follows: (Boucek,
1998: 103-107; Cox, 1997: 238; Arian & Barnes, 1974: 613; Blondel,
1968: 196; Bogaards, 2004: 175; Greene, 2010: 809-11; Pempel, 2018:
352-53):
• Dominant parties come to power through elections.
• Opposition forces are allowed to form political parties within the
system. All political parties in the system are legal and legitimate.
64 | The Influence of Religion on the Dominant Party System in Turkey and Russia
• The dominant party is the party that has more influence than other
parties in the system. Not only voters of the power party but also the
opposition voters believe in its dominance.
• All parties struggle in real terms to seize the government. However,
the competitiveness of other political parties is relatively low in the
face of the dominant party.
• Elections hold legitimately. The parties participating in the race have
more or less a chance of accession to power. Despite this, the dominant
party maintains its dominance regularly for a long time (at least three
electoral periods) by gaining the upper hand in the elections.
• The dominant parties obtain the parliamentary majority to form the
government.
• The tendency of dominant parties is high to protect their reputation
in the eye of the voters and not fall from the government. Therefore, it
is possible to observe that the dominant party sometimes makes legal
arrangements to guarantee elections.
Even from a bird’s eye view, it is clear that these characteristics of the
dominant-party system make it a phenomenon that needs to be questioned
and discussed in detail. However, it is not only its defining features that
make the dominant-party system worthy of discussion. The main reason is
the plethora of pathological cases encountered in dominant-party countries
that poke a hole in the heart of liberal democracies. In this context, many
researchers note that dominant parties consolidate their dominance through
undemocratic means, distorting the partisan playing field in their favor,
gaining advantages that render elections grossly unfair, and resorting to
electoral manipulation, and this is how they maintain their dominance. (see.
Boucek, 1998: 4; Greene, 2010: 807; Schedler, 2002: 36; Bogaards, 2004:
178; Diamond, 2002: 24).
But does religion have any role or influence in the emergence of the
dominant-party system, which is submitted to have poked a hole in the
heart of liberal democracies? To what scope should the relationship between
religion and the dominant-party system be addressed? What conditions are
necessary for religion to influence the emergence of the dominant-party
system? These questions and similar ones are discussed in the following
section.
Abdulkadir Cesur | 65
3. ABOUT DOMINANT PARTY SYSTEM – RELIGION
RELATIONSHIP
As mentioned earlier, the dominant-party system is a system that
incarnates within the multi-party system and in which the opposition has a
chance to come to power. Therefore, the emergence of this system and its
continuation basis on voter preference. For this reason, it seems considerably
rational to consider the relationship between the dominant-party system
and religion within the scope of the effect of religion on voter preferences.
However, at this point, it should be noted that voters in countries where
elections are held for a show, the opposition is only for show, or religion
is heavily institutionalized in state administration should not be taken as a
sample. Because in such states, it is more logical to talk about the hegemonic
party system rather than a dominant-party system.
After this brief reminder and information, it would be truthful to seek
an answer to the following two crucial questions on behalf of to return
to the essence of the subject: Religious phenomenon, which is one of the
significant socio-psychological factors in forming voter preferences, can
lead to the emergence of the dominant-party system? In this context, what
minimum conditions need for religion to be an effective dynamic?
When we look at the countries in the world that have experienced
dominant parties, at first glance, it is possible to think that religion cannot
be very influential in the emergence of the dominant-party. Because when
we examine the universe of countries with dominant parties, we come
across wars of national independence, severe economic and political crises,
critical changes and transformations in the social structure, apartheid
regime, establishment of a new state, and social turmoil as the fundamental
dynamics, and that brought the dominant party to power. However, this
should not mean that religion cannot have no influence. In the Republic
of South Africa, for example, the ANC’s (African National Congress) rule
since 1994 has been based on ethnic and religious polarization. On the other
hand, in some countries where Catholicism is powerfull and influential, it is
claimed that religion is decisive in shaping voter preferences. Similarly, it is
mentioned that religion plays an important role in the political preferences
of the voters who brought Christian democratic parties to power in Europe.
In short, the phenomenon of religion, which continues to influence politics
and the power process regardless of developed or underdeveloped countries,
has the potential to influence the emergence of a dominant-party system
based on voter preference.
66 | The Influence of Religion on the Dominant Party System in Turkey and Russia
Of course, the level of influence of religion may vary from country to
country and from society to society. In this context, it seems illogical to think
that religion can influence the formation of the dominant party in a highly
secularized society. On the other hand, if the degree of secularization of the
majority of the population is low, the religious factor can play a very influential
role in the emergence and maintenance of the dominant-party system. Similarly,
if the majority of the population has a strong connection with religion, the
religion factor may influence the emergence of the dominant-party system. If
the majority of the population is close to the idea that the government may be
ruled with religious references, the religious factor can be an influential dynamic
in the emergence of a dominant-party system. In addition, the presence of a
powerful political party that aspires to the votes of the majority of the electorate
and prioritizes religious references can also make the religion factor very
effective. However, there should not be strict constitutional and institutional
obstacles to the political activities of such a party. Otherwise, it should not be
ignored that religion cannot have much influence on the emergence of the
dominant-party system and the continuation of the dominance.
Within the framework outlined so far on the relationship between the
dominant-party system and religion, Turkey and Russia are discussed below.
However, due to the essence of the study, an in-depth analysis of the religion-
state-politics relationship in both countries was naturally not attempted.
Instead, the data that will enable us to see that the power of religion in
creating a dominant party in both countries has been revealed by focusing
more on voters and voter preferences. Because as stated before, just as the
voters have the final say in two-party and multi-party systems, the voters
have the final say in the dominant-party system.
4. DOMINANT PARTY SYSTEM-RELIGION RELATIONSHIP
IN TURKEY
Religion has been critical in Turkey’s political and social life for centuries.
Especially in the Ottoman Empire, religion regulated beliefs and worship in
social life but also influenced all the state mechanisms and the administrative
mentality up to the private law relations. On the other hand, the religious
phenomenon, which penetrated as far as the capillaries of society, gained a
political tool and an ideological identity in the last century of the Ottoman
Empire. In this sense, Sultans II. Abdulhamit’s practices and the İslamism
Movement are the best examples of this.
Subject to at the same time, the fact that it gained a political tool and
ideological identity has made religious phenomenon and its advocates one
Abdulkadir Cesur | 67
of the biggest obstacles to Ottoman modernization. This situation has not
changed much also in the period of the Republic of Turkey too. Because
the Republic of Turkey, which was come out from inside the Ottoman,
has taken over many heritages from it in the political, social, and cultural
spheres (Ortaylı, 2003: 114-16). However, the most significant inheritance
to Turkey from the Ottoman has been the center-periphery duality and tense
relationship between the two, which shaped the Turkish political culture and
political structure (Mardin, 1973: 169-90).
In this context, republicans, secularists, and supporters of the official
ideology formed the center, while the religious-conservative population
with high religious sensitivities and their political representatives formed the
periphery. In the tense relationship between these two sides shaped around
the themes of secularism and reaction, the center maintained its dominance
over the periphery consisting of traditionalist, conservative and Islamic
segments until 1950. However, the center’s dominance started to become
indistinct from the 1950s.
For this reason, when we look at the general elections held in Turkey
since 1950, we see the overwhelming superiority of the total votes of the
parties representing the periphery over the center in almost all of them. We
may say due to this superiority, political parties representing the periphery
have always governed Turkey with a few exceptions. However, on the other
hand it is possible to say that the penetration of the center on the state
bureaucracy continued until the AKP power.
Of course, at this point, it is necessary to underline the following: Among
the parties that came to power as the representatives of the periphery, the
Welfare Party (Refah Partisi, RP) and the Justice and Development Party
(Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) have a different position from other
periphery parties. This is because the parties other than these two are parties
with religious references, compatible with the fabric of the periphery but
not in conflict with the official ideology. However, it is impossible to say the
same for AKP and RP. In short, it is not wrong to say that AKP and RP in
Turkey have always conflicted with the republic values.
Of these parties, the RP received the most votes in 1996 and formed the
government. It has its roots in the National Order Party (Milli Nizam Partisi,
MNP) and the National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi, MSP), the
representatives of the Islamic Movement and the National Outlook (Millî
Görüş) Movement in Turkey. All three of these parties were closed down
by the constitutional court (Yavuz, 1997: 63-66). The Virtue Party (Fazilet
Partisi, FP), the successor to the RP, was also closed down. The AKP was
68 | The Influence of Religion on the Dominant Party System in Turkey and Russia
founded by a group of deputies who left the party during the process of FP’s
closure by the court (Mecham, 2004: 344-45).
The AKP, which emerged from the FP, looks like a party at odds with
the republic, like its predecessors. With its words and actions, it shows that
it nurture enmity towards the values of the republic at every opportunity.
Leaving aside the issue of why it was not or could not be closed by the
Constitutional Court, which is a separate topic of discussion, this political
party has been governing the Republic of Turkey uninterruptedly since
2002.
Well, to what extent has the religious factor affected the 20-year
government of the AKP, which emerged based on voter preference, and the
emergence of the dominant-party system? To what extent does the political
parties’ prioritization of religious references find a response to the electorate
in Turkey? The data in Figure 1, Figure 2, Figure 3, Figure 4, and Figure 5
below sufficiently clues to make inferences regarding these questions.
Figure 1. Level of religiousness in Turkey in general and AKP voters (2017)
*The data in the figure are compiled from the findings of the research titled
“Voter Clusters - Ak Parti, May’18” conducted by KONDA public opinion
research company in 2017. Available online: https://konda.com.tr/uploads/
konda-secmenkumeleri-akparti-secmenleri-mayis2018-
According to 2017 averages, 69% of AKP voters consider themselves
religious, and 18% are very religious/religionists. In this sense, the percentage
of those who describe them as religious and very religious is around 87% in
total. In Turkey as a whole, the rate of religious is %60, and very religious is
Abdulkadir Cesur | 69
12%. Therefore, both in Turkey and among AKP voters, those who describe
themselves as religious or very religious seem to be high. In addition, the rate
of AKP voters in the religious and very religious categories is above the Turkey
average.
Figure 2 below presents data on the veiling rates among AKP voters
and in Turkey. Veiling is a behavior that religious people see as a religious
requirement. As seen, the rate of people who cover themselves in Turkey is
67% as of 2018. This rate rises even more among AKP voters and reaches
87%. Figure 2 below presents data on the veiling rates among AKP voters
and in Turkey.
Figure 2. The veiling situation among AKP voters and throughout Turkey (2017)
*The data in the figure are compiled from the findings of the research titled
“Voter Clusters - Ak Parti, May’18” conducted by KONDA public opinion
research company in 2017. Available online : http://konda.com.tr/tr/rapor/
gundelik-yasamda-din-laiklik-ve-turban-arastirmasi/
One of the behaviors that religious people in Turkey consider most
important and feel obliged to perform is praying. In many scientific studies,
prayer is a criterion used to measure religiosity in Muslim countries. Figure
3 below shows the prayer habits of men in Turkey. Looking at 2008 and
2018 data, it seems that the majority of Turkish men pray with varying
frequency.
70 | The Influence of Religion on the Dominant Party System in Turkey and Russia
Figure 3. The habit of praying in Turkish people
*The data in the figure are compiled from the data in the “2018 Research On Socıal
Gender Report And Lıfe Styles
In Turkey” report of KONDA public opinion research company. Available online:
https://konda.com.tr/raporlar/1
Figure 4 below shows the importance that the voters in Turkey attach to
religious education. According to this, 51% of the people in Turkey find the
compulsory religion course in schools right, while 31% find it wrong. On
the other hand, 81% of the people think that religion should play a role in a
child’s education, while only 8% think that is wrong.
Figure 4. Voters’ perception of the relationship between education and religion (2018)
Available online: https://konda.com.tr/raporlar/1
(gündelik-yaşamda-din-laiklik-ve-türban-araştırması)
Based on the data presented so far, it is possible to predict that Turkish
voters can tend to support political parties that prioritize religious references.
Abdulkadir Cesur | 71
AKP is a party that has powerful Islamic discourses. In this context, it is also
observed that the AKP frequently exploits religious sentiments. Therefore,
the Sunni-religious voters could continue to be engaged in this party unless
emerging extreme negativities in other factors affecting voter preferences
can be said. In Figure 5 below, the findings obtained by the Social Research
Center (TEAM) confirm it.
Figure 5. Political party preferences of Sunni religious voters (2021)
Source: http://www.teamarastirma.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/
TEAMDindarSecmenler_Rapor.pdf
Among the political parties in Figure 5, CHP is on the left of the
ideological spectrum. As can be seen, only 16% of Sunni religious people
vote for this party, while the remaining votes are shared among right-wing
parties, but the AKP gets the lion’s share of this high support given to right-
wing parties.
5. DOMINANT PARTY SYSTEM-RELIGION RELATIONSHIP
IN RUSSIA
It is stated in the literature that religion has had an important place in
Russia’s political and social life from the Tsarist period to the present. (Grishin
& Stepuro, 2016: 113; Slobozhnikova, 2016: 19-20). The traditional
religious belief is Orthodox Christianity, which was accepted by Kyiv Kniaz
Vladimir in 988 and supported as the state religion during the Tsarist period
(Şahin, 2016: 27; Onay, 2002: 16). Although it preserves its importance
in the belief system of the society, the support of Orthodox Christianity by
the state was interrupted significantly during the Soviet Union period after
Tsarist Russia (Upadhyay, 2018: 196). After the collapse of the USSR in
1991, Russian society began to feel freer to express their religious identities,
72 | The Influence of Religion on the Dominant Party System in Turkey and Russia
which they had kept silent about during the Soviet period. In this free
environment that emerged at the point of expression of religious identities,
there has been a significant increase in the number of people who define
themselves as believers (Frezee, 2017: 2; Tomka, 2010: 2-4).
When we look at today’s Russia, it is seen the dominant religious belief is
Orthodox Christianity. In addition to Orthodoxy, Buddhism, Judaism, and
Islam are also recognized as official religions. Apart from these, it is possible
to come across unofficial religions (Bernstein, 2011: 623; Upadhvay, 2018:
207). In this context, Table 1 below shows the data on religion and belief
groups in Russia for some years.
Table 1. Religion and belief groups in Russia
1991 1998 2008 2022
Atheists / no religion 61 33 18 19
Catholicism 0 < 1 < 1 1
Protestantism 0 < 1 < 1 1
Orthodoxy 31 53 72 71
Islam < 1 2 5 5
Buddhism 0 < 1 < 1 1
Other < 1 < 1 < 1 1
The data in the figure are compiled. Available online: https://www.pewresearch.org/
religion/2014/02/10/russians-return-to-religion-but-not-to-church/; https://www.
levada.ru/en/2022/05/18/religiosity/
The proportion of atheists was approximately 61% in 1991. This rate is
quite high. It can be said that this is due to the influence of the Soviet regime
and the uncertainties of the period. As can be seen, this rate decreased to
33% in 1998 and to 18% in 2008. In contrast, the proportion of Orthodox
Christians increased significantly, reaching over 70 percent in 2008 and
2022.
As can see in these data, Orthodox Christianity continues to dominate
the belief system of the people to a great extent. For this reason, there are
scholarly studies in the literature that claim that Putin has maintained his
ties with the Orthodox Church and has made significant political gains as
a result (Blitt 2011, p. 457; Sotnichenko 2009, p. 266-67; Ascher 2020,
p. 323-24). Also, the data in Table 1 show that Putin is likely to benefit
politically from religion. However, while this view is partly true, it is often
Abdulkadir Cesur | 73
argued that religious influence on voter preferences in Russia is uncertain
or minimal (Grishin & Stepuro 2016, p. 113; White & McAllister 2003).
Therefore, different data are needed to understand which view is more
rational. In this context, it is also necessary to analyze the anatomy of Russian
political parties, the faith groups from which they draw their votes, and
Russian political culture. However, the data in Table 2, Table 3, and Figure
6 provide sufficient evidence to determine which of the two views expressed
in the literature is more rational.
Table 2. Level of religiousness in Russian people
2008 2014 2018 2022
Very religious 5 4 7 9
Religious to some extent 19 31 43 44
Not too religious 56 37 28 30
Completely non-religious 16 26 17 16
Can’t say 2 3 3 1
Source is available online: https://www.levada.ru/en/2022/05/18/religiosity/; (Russian
Public Opinion – 2018).
When the average of the years is taken, the ratio of those who are very
religious and somewhat religious is approximately 40%. On the other hand,
the total ratio of not very religious and not religious at all is about 57%. These
rates roughly coincide with the levels of participation in religious services in
Figure 6 below.
Figure 6. Participation in religious services of Russian people
Available online: https://www.levada.ru/en/2022/05/18/religiosity/
The data in Table 3 below regarding the role of religion in the life of
the Russian people are similar to the data in Figure 6 and Table 2. When
74 | The Influence of Religion on the Dominant Party System in Turkey and Russia
averaged over the years, 35% of respondents say that religion plays a more
or less important role in their lives. On the other hand, the rate of those
who say that religion is not very important or not important in their lives is
around 62%.
Table 3. What role does religion play in your life?
2005 2007 2012 2016 2020
A very important one 11 6 6 6 12
A fairly important one 27 26 24 28 28
Not a very important one 39 41 45 40 35
No role at all 20 24 20 22 24
It is difficult to say 2 3 5 4 2
Available online: https://www.levada.ru/en/2020/03/19/attitudes-to-religion/
In light of all these data, it is possible to say the following: The view
expressed in the literature on Russia that the influence of religion on voter
preferences is uncertain or limited seems to be more rational. Therefore, it
would be appropriate to think that the religious factor was not influential in
the emergence of the dominant-party system in Russia and the continuation
of its dominance or that this influence remained at a minimum level. Other
parameters that reinforce this view are mentioned in the conclusion section
below.
6. CONCLUSION
Religion appears as an effective and powerful dynamic in the formation of
the dominant party system in Turkey. It can be said that it derives its power
from the tense relationship between the center and the periphery inherited
from the Ottoman Empire and the overwhelming superiority of the religious-
conservative mass constituting the periphery over the reformist-modernist center.
For this reason, many political parties with religious-conservative discourses
have been established in Turkey since the transition to a multi-party period.
However, among these parties, those that highly emphasized religious
references and clashed with secularism and official ideology were closed either
by military intervention or by the decision of the Constitutional Court.
The only party that has not been closed despite its conflict with the
official ideology is the Justice and Development Party, which has been in
power since 2002. It alone shows that religion has the potential to create a
dominant party in Turkey if parties that emphasize religious references and
Abdulkadir Cesur | 75
conflict with the official ideology are not closed. While the data in Figure
2, Figure 3, and Figure 4 show the importance of religion in Turkey and
among AKP voters, the data in Figure 5 reveals the extent of the influence
of religion in creating a dominant-party system.
These data also shed light on the level of secularization in Turkey. In this
context, the fact that religion has such an extensive place in the social sphere,
parties with strong religious references appear in the political arena, and
these parties receive significant support from the voters indicating the low
level of secularization in Turkey. Considering that religion may have a high
impact on political preferences in societies that have not yet completed the
secularization process, it would be reasonable to assume that it may have a
high impact on the emergence of the dominant party system in Turkey.
Regarding Turkey, the following can be said in the context of the conclusion:
The phenomenon of religion is an influential factor in the political preferences
of voters. Therefore religion is one of the actors that will play a role in a party
that prioritizes religious references to come to power as the dominant party.
In this sense, it has a high potential. However, although it is effective in the
process of formation and consolidation of dominance, it is debatable whether
it is a decisive factor. Because the dynamics that bring a party to power are
different from the dynamics that ensure the long-term dominance of that
party. For example, in recent studies on this issue, researchers draw attention
to the especially economic performance factor for the long-term power. (See.
Feldman, 1982: 446-66; Kramer, 1983:238; Becher & Donnelly, 2013: 974;
Harrington, 1993: 39; Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier, 2000: 183-219). Therefore,
religion is in a somewhat controversial position in this context. But as in
Turkey, it may have the power to cover up the government’s economic failures
until they become intolerable.
At this point connected with this subject, I would like to draw attention
to the following issue: For several years, Turkey has been in an intolerable
economic bottleneck based on inflation that has deeply affected people’s lives.
Inflation in Turkey is around 40%, according to official figures, and over 100%,
according to unofficial. When I did this study, there were about two months
before the elections in Turkey. In this context, the results of the parliamentary
and presidential elections on 14 May 2023 will tell us to what extent religion
is influencing the continuation of the dominant-party system in Turkey and
whether its strength will be enough to mask intolerable economic problems.
Regarding the influence of religion on the dominant-party system, we can
say the following about Russia: As seen in Table 1, Orthodox Christianity
dominates the belief system of the people in Russia, but the data in Table
76 | The Influence of Religion on the Dominant Party System in Turkey and Russia
3 shows that, religion is not significant in social life of Russian people. In
addition, as shown in Table 2 and Figure 6, the level of religious affiliation
among Orthodox Christians is not as high as in Turkey. Therefore, considering
that religion may have a lower impact on voter preferences the lower the level
of commitment, it seems impossible that religion has a remarkable effect on
voters’ political preferences in Russia. Moreover, the religious-very religious
crowd in Russia does not correspond to the population’s majority, unlike in
Turkey. In addition to this, there is no extreme polarization in society on the
axis of religion and secularism.
Apart from that, an analysis of political parties in Russia and their
anatomy shows that there do not seem to be any powerful parties that put
religious references in the foreground. One can attribute this situation to the
strong will to protect the secular system in Russia and to the fact that voters
do not prefer parties based on religious sectarianism. In the context of all
these motives, it seems far from rational to assume that religion could be an
influential factor in the emergence and continuation of the dominant-party
system in Russia.
Therefore, in the context of the general conclusion of the study, in which
I address the role of religion in the emergence of the dominant-party system
on the axis of Turkey-Russia comparison, it is possible to say the following:
As seen in the examples of Turkey and Russia, religion can be an influential
dynamic in the shaping of the party system and especially the dominant-
party system in some countries, but not in others. It may be due to different
levels of secularization in countries, political cultures, and the strength of
constitutional-institutional barriers to religious parties. Therefore, it does
not seem possible to consider the phenomenon of religion as a generalizable
dynamic in theorizing the dynamics that lead to the emergence of the
dominant-party system and ensure its long-term dominance of power. In
short, the determinant dynamics of the dominant-party system and long-
term government dominance should be sought in other areas.
In this context, ideology-partisanship, ethnopolitical polarisation, and
leader and government performance, which are among the factors affecting
voter preferences, can be examined. In addition to this, the electoral
system and legal legislation should also be considered institutional factors.
Opposition parties and conditions for opposing should not be neglected as
one of the areas to be analyzed. On the other hand, since prolonged periods
of power may present the dominant parties with the opportunity to establish
a hegemonic structure at the state and its institutions, this area should also
be examined. Apart from these, the factor of political culture, which I think
may be the fundamental dynamic, should never be ignored.
Abdulkadir Cesur | 77
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81
Chapter 5
Roman Period Glass Unguentariums at the
Hacibektas Veli Archeology Museum1
Barış Emre Sönmez2
Abstract
The aim of this study is to examine the glass unguentariums from the Roman
Period in Hacibektas Veli Archeology Museum in terms of technique and
form. The glass unguentariums in Hacibektas Veli Archeology Museum
are classified as tube, bulbous, conical and candelabra. There are 12 glass
unguentariums from the Roman Period in total in the museum. 11 of them
were brought to the museum by purchasing; One of them was found around
Suluca Karahöyük and brought to the museum. Of the glass unguentarium,
6 are tubular in shape, 1 are candelabra in shape, 3 are bulbous in shape and
2 are conical in shape. The lengths of tubular unguentariums vary between
9.1 cm and 13.4 cm; The length of the candelabra-shaped unguentarium is
13 cm, the length of the bulbous-shaped unguentarium is between 10.3 cm
and 17.6 cm, and the length of the conical unguentarium is 9.3 cm. Glass
unguentariums consist of dark green, colorless transparent, pale green, light
green, light blue-green, blue-green colors. The earliest glass unguentarium
belongs to the middle of the 1st century AD, and the latest glass unguentarium
is dated to the 3rd century AD.
INTRODUCTION
Unguentariums, which are generally used as burial gifts, were used in a
wide area starting from the end of the 4th century BC until the 7th century
AD. Although unguentariums have been used to store various materials,
they are frequently encountered in necropolis areas. It is thought that
unguentariums were used for this purpose and the tears were collected and
1 This work, Hacibektas District Governorate, Hacibektas Museum Directorate Number:
E-21645913-155.99-3610552 prepared under the permission. I would like to thank the
Deputy Director of the Museum, Mr. Cemil ÖZDAĞ, and Archaeologist Mr. Taylan SÜMER,
the expert in charge of the museum, for their contributions.
2 Lect. PhD., Nevsehir Haci Bektas Veli University, Avanos Vocational School of Fine Arts,
Architectural Restoration Program, besonmez@nevsehir.edu.tr, ORCID: 0000-0002-9273-8920.
https://doi.org/10.58830/ozgur.pub167.c752
82 | Roman Period Glass Unguentariums at the Hacibektas Veli Archeology Museum
left in the grave to show how much sadness was felt for the deceased after
the death of the deceased as a tribute to those who died in the necropolis
areas. Glass is a substance that has been used in different forms and
techniques for thousands of years. The earliest glass forming technique was
the inner mold technique, which was later developed with the free blowing
technique. While glass was a material used by the rich class until the
Hellenistic Period, glass became a cheaper material with the new inventions
of glass masters in this period. In the Roman Period, both the addition of
experience and the invention of the free blowing technique made progress
in glass in every sense. With the discovery of the free blowing technique,
glass ceased to be a luxury product and has now been widely used in daily
life. With the invention of the free blowing technique, the popularity of
glass vessels began to be used everywhere within the borders of the Roman
Empire. The earliest form are tubular unguentariums produced by the
free blowing technique. Tubular unguentariums have been seen since the
middle of the 1st century AD. Along with the free blowing technique,
another form seen after the 1st century AD is the candelabra-shaped
unguentariums. Apart from these forms, there are also bulbous, conical
and pear-shaped unguentariums. There are 12 glass unguentariums from
the Roman Period in Hacibektas Veli Archeology Museum, of which 6 are
tubular in shape, 1 are candelabra in shape, 3 are bulbous in shape and 2
are conical in shape.
Unguentarium Terminology and Usage
Unguentariums, which emerged in daily use as well as grave gifts,
represent an important ceramic group of the ancient world. It is a ceramic
group that is frequently encountered in archaeological excavations and helps
in the dating of the studied area. Since they are frequently found as grave
finds; While defining the unguentarium, a definition is made by taking into
account the find place. The term Unguentarium began to be used by the
French archaeologists3 who had excavated in Carthage in the early 20th
century4. Unguentarium is also called the tear bottle as well as the scented oil
containers5. It can also be called unguentarium lacrymaria or lacrymatorium,
balsamaria, olfactorium6.
3 Gaucker 1915, 514.
4 Baldıran 1998, 335.
5 Stern 2008, 291; Thompson 1934, 473.
6 Anderson-Stojanovic 1987, 106.
Barış Emre Sönmez | 83
Unguentariums were used to store various perfumes7 and oils8; However,
despite the differentiation of usage areas9, it is frequently encountered
in necropolis areas10. The fact that the find places are necropolis places
belonging to the Hellenistic and Roman Periods gives us information about
the unguentariums. It is thought that tears were collected and left in the
grave to show how much sadness was felt for the deceased after the deceased
as a tribute to those who died in the necropolis areas and used for this
purpose11.
Emergence and Spread of the Unguentarium Form
Unguentariums, which are generally found in burial areas, albeit few
in residential areas, are found in archaeological excavations12. We do not
have certain information about the exact place and time of emergence of
unguentariums, which we encounter so frequently. Since it is frequently
encountered in many necropolis areas in the Aegean and Mediterranean, it
is difficult to determine where and how they emerged13. Although it is not
known exactly from which form it developed14, it is thought to have emerged
as a continuation of the dwarf lekythos15. It is known that unguentariums
emerged in the 4th century BC and continued to exist in different forms
until the 7th century AD16. As the origin of the Unguentariums, L. Forti
reveals Ampurias, the 5th century BC settlement in Spain17. The burial finds
at Ampurias include the early and classical form of the unguentariums;
however, the fact that it is found in these examples and not seen outside of
this settlement makes the situation a bit difficult18. H. Thompson suggests
that it may be east-centered19; he argued that this center could be the
origin of the settlement of Alexandria in Egypt; but there is no evidence
to support Thompson’s suggestion20. Another person who claims that the
7 Daremberg and Saglio 1963, 591.
8 Thompson 1934, 335.
9 Türker 2005, 311-312.
10 Saraçoğlu 2011, 3.
11 Young 1951, 268-269.
12 Baldıran 1998, 335-336.
13 Saraçoğlu 2011, 4; Hayes 1971, 246.
14 Khairy 1980, 85.
15 Camilli 1999, 24 et. al.
16 Özahanlı and Fırat 2011, 9.
17 Forti 1962, 143 et. al.
18 Baldıran 1998, 336; Anderson-Stojanovic 1987, 105.
19 Thompson 1934, 473.
20 Baldıran 1998, 336.
84 | Roman Period Glass Unguentariums at the Hacibektas Veli Archeology Museum
unguentariums originated in Egypt is Westholm. Made of terracotta and
various materials in Egypt; he claimed that there were vessels similar in form
to the unguentarium21. Hayes is the person who claims that the place of
emergence of unguentariums may be in Jordan geography. Although Hayes
suggested that it may have emerged in this region due to the preservation
and transportation of oils and the transportation of holy waters22, he stated
that the origin in his later studies was Western Anatolia23. Guz-Zilberstein,
originating from the Aegean Region24; Talcott, on the other hand, claimed
that the place of origin was Cyprus25. Åström, on the other hand, claimed
that the origin was Continental Greece26. Although the exact place of their
emergence is not known, we see very well that unguentariums originated
from Syria to Spain; From Egypt to Greece; It is located in a very wide spread
area from Anatolia to Cyprus27. Unguentariums have been found in many
ancient settlements in Anatolia, such as Ephesos28, Knidos29, Stratonikeia30,
Tralleis31, Labraunda32, Kelenderis33, Klaros’ta34, Patara35.
Definition and Historical Development of Glass
Glass is a transparent and homogeneous substance shaped by human
hands and formed by molten raw materials found in nature36. Glass, when
defined broadly, is an inorganic substance in a state of continuous transition
with the liquid state and of a similar composition, but with such a high
viscosity as a result of cooling in the molten state that it can practically be
considered hard37.
21 Vessberg 1956, 74 et. al.
22 Hayes 1971, 246.
23 Hayes 1992, 209.
24 Guz-Zilberstein 1995, 304.
25 Sparkers and Talcott 1970, 191.
26 Åström 1964, 187 et. al.
27 Saraçoğlu 2011, 4.
28 Gassner 1997, 99.
29 Dottwerweich 1999, 89 et. al.
30 Baldıran 1998, 337-341.
31 Ölmez 2000, 27 et. al.
32 Hellström 1965.
33 Zoroğlu 1986.
34 Taştemür 2007, 60.
35 Baybo 2003, Drawing 10, no. 53.
36 Tavukçu 2007, 146.
37 Kılıç 1995, 4.
Barış Emre Sönmez | 85
Glass is formed by melting basic materials such as silicon dioxide,
potassium carbonate, sodium carbonate and calcium carbonate at high
temperature. In the production of the glass we use today, approximately
72% silica, 15% soda or potash, 13% lime; in crystal glass, it consists
of approximately 48% silica, 24% soda and potash, 28% lead oxide38.
Approximately the same materials and ratios were used in glass productions
made in the ancient period.
It has long been accepted that the first glass vases were made in Egypt;
however, studies have shown that glass making originated in Mesopotamia39.
When the first glass finds were examined, they appeared in Sumerian cities
such as Eshuna and Eridu40. The beginning of glass art in Egypt is thought
to be during the Thutmosis III Period41. It is determined that the glass
vessels were made in the Hurri-Mitanni region of Mesopotamia in the
middle of the 2nd millennium BC42. It has been determined that glass beads
and cast small ornaments are produced in Mycenae, Chios and Crete other
than Mesopotamia and Egypt43. Many empires and states were destroyed
by the great migration movements that took place at the end of the Bronze
Age44. With this great activity and destruction, glass production and trade
declined45. The progress of glass continued to decline until the 8th century
BC46. After the 8th century BC, glass production and trade started to revive
again. Cold cutting, molding and molding techniques continued to evolve47.
Glass produced by the molding method dating to these centuries, the earliest
examples found in the Gordion P. Tumulus are given, and this tradition
shows that it lasted until the Achaemenid (6th century BC) Dynasty Period.
Cast glass works can be observed in all lands under Persian influence48.
In the 6th century BC Greece became an important center for glass
vessels produced by the internal molding technique49. Rhodes became the
production center of glass containers produced with the inner molding
38 Yağcı 1993, 12-13; Özgümüş 2000, 4.
39 Çakmakçı 2008, 40.
40 Öztürk 2003, 69; Barag 1985, 35; Yağcı 1998, 29.
41 Atik 2004, 51.
42 Barag 1985, 36; Özet 1998, 11.
43 Atik 2004, 51; Yağcı 1998, 31.
44 Çakmakçı 2008, 41.
45 Atik 2004, 51.
46 Öztürk 2013, 19.
47 Öztürk 2003, 70.
48 Yağcı 1998, 40; Atik 2004, 52.
49 Küçükpazarlı 2006, 7.
86 | Roman Period Glass Unguentariums at the Hacibektas Veli Archeology Museum
technique50. It is thought that the East has an influence on Rhodes being
an important center. Rhodes may have exported these glass vessels from
Mesopotamia, or Mesopotamian craftsmen may have worked in Rhodes51.
Alabastron, aryballos, oinochoe and amphoriskos vessels were produced
with the internal molding technique52.
With the destruction of Persepolis by Alexander the Great in 331 BC, the
glass works in the treasury of the palace were seized53. With the acquisition
of glass works, a revival and renewal process has begun in glass art54.
During this period, the internal molding technique continued55. Important
glass production centers in the Hellenistic Period are Syria’s coastline and
Alexandria56. During this period, Alexandria glassmakers had the skill and
knowledge to produce mosaics and to put a gold plate “sandwich gold-
glass” between two layers of glass.57 The most important representatives
of the Hellenistic Period glass art are the tomb finds called “Canosa Group
Artifacts”58. The Canosa Group are glass vessels next to metal, terracotta
and stone artifacts found during excavations in the Canosa (Canusium)
Necropolis on the Adriatic Sea coast in southeastern Italy59. Beginning from
this period, glass began to gain importance as a more attractive and colorful
alternative, especially against silver dinnerware and goblets. It is seen that
the glassware allegedly produced in Syria and Alexandria is spread over a
wide area that includes Italy, Southern Russia and Asia Minor60.
Glass in the Roman Period
In the 1st century BC, glass art began to gain importance in Rome.
The Roman Period glass industry was established with the experience of
Hellenistic Period Glass manufacturers61. In the middle of the 1st century
BC, an important step was taken in glass production and the blowing
50 Çakmakçı 2008, 41; Öztürk 2003, 70.
51 Atik 2004, 52.
52 Yağcı 1993, 40-41.
53 Öztürk 2003, 70; Atik 2004, 53.
54 Yağcı 1993, 43.
55 Atik 2004, 54.
56 Çakmaçı 2008, 41.
57 Atik 2004, 54.
58 Yağcı 1993, 43.
59 Dal 2009, 45.
60 Atik 2004, 54; Özet 1998, 12.
61 Atik 2004, 55.
Barış Emre Sönmez | 87
technique was discovered62. By applying this method, the glass pellet taken
to the tip of the blowing rod is blown into the mold or freely, and a great
progress has been made in glass production63. After this age, glass containers
were made more easily and quickly64. Roman glass is simple and functional.
Early specimens are vibrantly colored, late specimens are less colorful and
more transparent65. Productions of Roman glassware included luxury items,
tableware, and perfume bottles66. Apart from the production of daily goods,
the Romans also used glass in mosaics, panels and exterior decorations67.
With Rome dominating many parts of Europe, glass art and production
spread to the farthest corners of the Empire68.
Roman glass art, which reached its peak in glass art, entered a stagnation
period with the collapse of Western Rome in the 5th century AD; but later
on, the glass industry started to revive and continued in the Byzantine
Period69.
Glass unguentariums produced during the Roman Period are divided
into various forms such as tube, candlestick, bulbous, conical, pear-shaped
and reel-shaped70.
Tubular Glass Unguentariums
The simplest form among Roman glass vessels are the tubular
unguentariums. This form has been found in many centers of the Roman
Empire71. They have wide rims formed by folding, cylindrical necks and
pyriform bodies, and the bottoms can be flat, slightly concave or round-
convex enough to allow the unguentarium to stand72. The shape of the rim
of the tube-shaped unguentariums differs locally73. Tubular unguentariums
have an average height of 10-15 cm and74 are made of untinted glass in
62 Özgümüş 2000, 13; Öztürk 2003, 70.
63 Lightfoot and Arslan 1992, 5 et. al.; Küçükerman 1985, 54.
64 Atik 2004, 55.
65 Çakmakçı 2008, 42.
66 Atik 2004, 56-57.
67 Lightfoot and Arslan 1992, 6.
68 Haggard 1962, 14; Yağcı 1993, 50.
69 Öztürk 2013, 23; Yağcı 1993, 56-57.
70 Öztürk 2003, 71.
71 Öztürk 2003, 72.
72 Vessberg 1952, 140
73 Yağcı 1993, 132.
74 Taştemür 2007, 60.
88 | Roman Period Glass Unguentariums at the Hacibektas Veli Archeology Museum
natural green and blue tones75. Isings, states that the earliest examples of
tube-shaped unguentariums came from Ventimiglia during the Julius-
Claudian Period and that such unguentariums were seen in many centers
after the middle of the 1st century AD76.
When we look at the artifacts U1-U5, it is seen that they have wide
rims, cylindrical necks and piriform bodies formed by folding, and their
bottoms are flat, slightly concave or rounded convex enough to not allow the
unguentarium to stand. Similar works of art can be found in Tire Museum77,
Karanis78, Royal Ontario Museum79, Yüksel Erimtan Collection80, Bodrum
Underwater Archeology Museum81, Sinop Museum82 and Klaros’ta83. In the
light of similar examples, tube-shaped unguentariums numbered U1-U5
were examined within the Isings form 8 group and this form was dated to
the 1st century AD.
When we look at the works numbered U6, the everted rim is folded
inwards. It has a long neck with tool notch marks, a small conical body and
a small concave bottom with noble marks. Similar works of art can be found
in Tire Museum84, Royal Ontario Museum85 and Bodrum Underwater
Archeology Museum86. In the light of similar examples, the tube-shaped
unguentarium Isings was examined within the form 8 group and this form
was dated to the end of the 1st century AD and the beginning of the 2nd
century.
Candlestick Shaped Glass Unguentariums
Candlestick-shaped unguentariums have flattened rims, long and
cylindrical necks after being folded inwards. The most prominent feature
is that it is longer than the body87. In some specimens, the cylindrical
neck expands slightly from top to bottom, or the neck and body meet at a
75 Yağcı 1993, 132.
76 Isings 1957, 24.
77 Gürler 2000, 32, Pic. 18.
78 Harden 1936, 278.
79 Hayes 1975, 161.
80 Lightfoot and Arslan 1992, 172, Cat. No.107.
81 Özet 1996, 73, No. 39a.
82 Temür and Eker 2019, 17, Cat. No.3.
83 Taştemür 2007,,60.
84 Gürler 2000, 29, Pic. 12.
85 Hayes 1975, Fig. 20, No.263.
86 Özet 1996, 135, No.90.
87 Taştemür 2007, 62.
Barış Emre Sönmez | 89
knuckle. Candlestick-shaped unguentariums are divided into sub-headings
as: 1- Convex spherical bodies 2- Triangular bodies 3- Disc-bodied 4- Bell-
bodied 5- Pear-shaped bodies 6- Cylindrical bodies 7- Concave bodies88. The
bottoms of candlestick-shaped unguentariums are mostly concave. They are
made of uncoloured, natural greenish or bluish glass. They are unadorned,
with a height of about 10 cm to 20 cm. They are made in the free blowing
technique89.
Candlestick shaped unguentariums are one of the most common types
in Roman glassmaking. Candlestick shaped unguentariums are assumed to
be used in homes because they are not suitable for carrying. With its long
neck structures, it provides less spillage of various oils and cosmetic liquids;
It is also believed that with this structure, it prevents the evaporation of the
substance inside. These glass vessels were used extensively between 1st-3th
centuries AD90.
When we look at the works numbered U7, the smooth mouth is folded
inwards and outwards and is shaped with a tool. It has a long cylindrical neck,
a bell-shaped body and a concave bottom. Similar works of art can be found
in Tire Museum91, Royal Ontario Museum92, Karanis93, Sinop Museum94,
Bodrum Underwater Archeology Museum95, Labranda96, Limburg97, Sivas
Museum98 and Yüksel Erimtan Collection99. In the light of similar examples,
the candelabra-shaped unguentarium Isings form 82 U7 was studied in the
A1 group and this form was dated to the between 2nd-3th centuries AD.
Bulbous Shaped Glass Unguentariums
This type of unguentarium is called “bulbous” in the literature because its
body shape resembles that of an onion. It has a protruding mouth, a thin
and long cylindrical neck, a bulbous body and a flat bottom. Unguentariums
88 Vessberg 1956, 163-164.
89 Yağcı 1993, 143.
90 Yağcı 1993, 143-144.
91 Gürler 2000, 53, Pic. 59.
92 Hayes 1975, Fig. 18, No. 577.
93 Harden 1936, Pl. XX, No. 799.
94 Temür and Eker 2019, 90, Cat. No.76.
95 Özet 1996, 126, No.83.
96 Hellström 1971, 53, Pl.29/2.
97 Ising1971, 64-66.
98 Atilla 2015, 176, Fig. 5, No.15.
99 Lightfoot and Arslan 1992, 87, Cat. No.43.
90 | Roman Period Glass Unguentariums at the Hacibektas Veli Archeology Museum
with this form have slightly protruding lips, cylindrical form, long neck, bag
belly and flat base without base.
When we look at the works numbered U8-U10, they have wide
rims formed by folding, cylindrical necks, onion-shaped body and flat
bottom. Similar works of art can be found in Sinop Museum100, Bodrum
Underwater Archeology Museum101, Yüksel Erimtan Collection102, Royal
Ontario Museum103, Patara104, Labraunda105, Elaiussa Sebaste106 and Uşak
Museum107. In the light of similar examples, artifacts numbered U8-U10
were examined in the literature under the name “bulbous” in the Isings form
26 A group due to their resemblance to the onion form, and this form was
dated to the between 1st-2nd centuries AD.
Conical Body Glass Unguentariums
These types of unguentariums are among the vessel forms commonly
seen in the Eastern and Western lands of the Roman Empire in the 1st
century AD. These vessels, which are widely produced and used in the Syria-
Palestine Region; Cyprus is also known for its examples108. It is included in
the Isings Form 28a group, as the body heights are half of the entire height
of the container. The form takes shape with the combination of folded
mouth structures and cylindrical necks to the body with a knot.
When we look at the artifacts U11-U12, they have folded mouth structures,
a cylindrical neck, a conical body and a flat base. Similar works of art can
be found in Sinop Museum109, Yüksel Erimtan Collection110, Neapolis111,
British Museum112, Bodrum Underwater Archeology Museum113, Tire
100 Temür and Eker 2019, 28-33, Cat. No.14, 18, 19.
101 Özet 1996, 57, No.24.
102 Lightfoot and Arslan 1992, 41, Cat. No.8.
103 Hayes 1975,129.
104 Baybo 2003, Drawing 10, no. 53.
105 Helström 1971, pl. 29, no. 2.
106 Güray 2011, 264, Fig.6. 1,8.
107 Çakmaklı 2007, 92, No.15.
108 Aydın Tavukçu and Avli 2022, 573.
109 Temür and Eker 2019, 51-61, Cat. No.37-47.
110 Lightfoot and Arslan 1992, 81, Cat. No.37.
111 Aydın Tavukçu and Avli 2022,584, Img.1, Cat. No. 2-5.
112 Barag 1985, 95, Pl. 15, no. 125.
113 Özet 1998, 113-117, No.73a-75b.
Barış Emre Sönmez | 91
Museum114 and Bergama Museum115. Works in the light of similar examples
was dated to the between 1st-3th centuries AD.
Conclusion
After its discovery, glass has been used in the construction of various
objects and has evolved continuously based on thousands of years of
tradition. Roman glass art spread over a wide geography from east to
west. The diversity of forms in Roman glass is remarkable. Unguentariums
constitute the densest group in this diversity. With the invention of the
blowing technique, glass was produced in different forms and cheaply. With
the facilitation of production, there has been an intense increase in Roman
glass. The main subject of the research is the glass unguentariums in the
Hacibektas Veli Archeology Museum. The choice of glass unguentariums as
the subject of study is that glass, like other objects, has an intense usage area
from the past to the present. The aim is to identify the glass unguentariums
belonging to the Roman Period in the Hacibektas Veli Archeology Museum
and to group these artifacts according to their forms and place each group
in its own chronological order. While making this arrangement, a detailed
description was made in the catalog and a proper chronology was tried to be
created by comparing with similar works. Since the glass unguentariums in
the Hacibektas Veli Archeology Museum were brought to the museum by
purchasing in various years, a chronological dating was made by comparing
these artifacts with their similar ones. For this reason, the works discussed in
the study were evaluated within the general periods.
The form of the unguentariums in the Hacibektas Veli Archeology
Museum and the diversity of these forms will enable us to have an idea about
the glass unguentariums of the Cappadocia Region and their interaction
with other regions, albeit partially, with the typology we have created
chronologically.
CATALOG
Cat. No. U1
Museum Inv. No: 1394
Arrival at the Museum: Purchase
Dimensions: H. 13.4 cm D. M. 3.5 cm D. B. 1.3 cm
114 Gürler 2000, 34-35.
115 Atila and Gürler 2009, 40, Cat. No. 48.
92 | Roman Period Glass Unguentariums at the Hacibektas Veli Archeology Museum
Colour: Dark green
Description: Mouth part is broken. Cylindrical neck and round convex
bottom.
Date: 1st century AD
Similar: Gürler 2000, 32, Pic. 18; Harden 1936, 278; Hayes 1975, 161;
Lightfoot and Arslan 1992, 172, Cat. No.107; Özet 1996, 73, No. 39a;
Temür and Eker 2019, 17, Cat. No.3; Taştemür 2007, 60.
Cat. No. U2
Museum Inv. No: 1406
Arrival at the Museum: Purchase
Dimensions: H. 9.1 cm D. M. 1.3 cm D. B. 0.5 cm
Colour: Colorless transparent
Description: It has a folded wide rim, a cylindrical neck and a rounded
convex bottom.
Date: 1st century AD
Similar: Gürler 2000, 32, Pic. 18; Harden 1936, 278; Hayes 1975, 161;
Lightfoot and Arslan 1992, 172, Cat. No.107; Özet 1996, 73, No. 39a;
Temür and Eker 2019, 17, Cat. No.3; Taştemür 2007, 60.
Cat. No. U3
Museum Inv. No: 1341
Arrival at the Museum: Purchase
Dimensions: H. 11.3 cm D. M. 2 cm D. B. 4 cm
Colour: Pale green
Description: It has a wide rim formed by folding, a cylindrical neck and
a rounded convex bottom.
Date: 1st century AD
Similar: Gürler 2000, 32, Pic. 18; Harden 1936, 278; Hayes 1975, 161;
Lightfoot and Arslan 1992, 172, Cat. No.107; Özet 1996, 73, No. 39a;
Temür and Eker 2019, 17, Cat. No.3; Taştemür 2007, 60.
Cat. No. U4
Museum Inv. No: 1338
Arrival at the Museum: Purchase
Barış Emre Sönmez | 93
Dimensions: H. 12 cm D. M. 2 cm D. B. 1 cm
Colour: Pale green
Description: It has a wide rim formed by folding, a cylindrical neck and
a rounded convex bottom.
Date: 1st century AD
Similar: Gürler 2000, 32, Pic. 18; Harden 1936, 278; Hayes 1975, 161;
Lightfoot and Arslan 1992, 172, Cat. No.107; Özet 1996, 73, No. 39a;
Temür and Eker 2019, 17, Cat. No.3; Taştemür 2007, 60.
Cat. No. U5
Museum Inv. No: 1435
Arrival at the Museum: Purchase
Dimensions: H. 10.5 cm D. M. 1.6 cm D. B. 1.4 cm
Colour: Light green
Description: It has a folded wide rim, a cylindrical neck, a transitional
knot from the neck to the body, and a rounded convex bottom.
Date: 1st century AD
Similar: Gürler 2000, 32, Pic. 18; Harden 1936, 278; Hayes 1975, 161;
Lightfoot and Arslan 1992, 172, Cat. No.107; Özet 1996, 73, No. 39a;
Temür and Eker 2019, 17, Cat. No.3; Taştemür 2007, 60.
Cat. No. U6
Museum Inv. No: 1390
Arrival at the Museum: Purchase
Dimensions: H. 9.8 cm D. M. 1.6 cm D. B. 1.4 cm
Colour: Pale green
Description: It has a wide rim formed by folding, a cylindrical neck, a
transition from the neck to the body, and a flat bottom.
Date: End of 1st century AD, beginning of 2nd century AD
Similar: Gürler 2000, 29, Pic. 12; Hayes 1975, Fig. 20, No.263; Özet
1996, 135, No.90.
Cat. No. U7
Museum Inv. No: 1392
94 | Roman Period Glass Unguentariums at the Hacibektas Veli Archeology Museum
Arrival at the Museum: Purchase
Dimensions: H. 13 cm D. M.3.2 cm D. B.7 cm
Colour: Pale green
Description: The smooth mouth structure is folded inward and outward
and shaped with tools. It has a long cylindrical neck, a bell-shaped body and
a concave bottom.
Date: 2nd-3th centuries AD
Similar: Gürler 2000, 53, Pic. 59; Hayes 1975, Fig. 18, No. 577; Harden
1936, Pl. XX, No. 799; Temür and Eker 2019, 90, Cat. No.76; Özet 1996,
126, No.83; Hellström 1971, 53, Lev.29/2; Ising 1971, 64-66; Atilla 2015,
176, Fig. 5, No.15; Lightfoot and Arslan 1992, 87, Cat. No.43.
Cat. No. U8
Museum Inv. No: 1373
Arrival at the Museum: Purchase
Dimensions: H. 17 cm D. M. 3 cm D. B. 4 cm
Colour: Light blue-green
Description: It has a folded wide rim, cylindrical neck, bulbous body
and flat bottom.
Date: 1st-2nd centuries AD
Similar: Temür ve Eker 2019, 28-33, Cat. No.14, 18, 19; Özet 1996,
57, No.24; Lightfoot and Arslan 1992, 41, Cat. No.8; Hayes 1975,129;
Baybo 2003, Drawing 10, no. 53; Helström 1971, pl. 29, no. 2; Güray
2011, 264, Fig.6. 1,8; Çakmaklı 2007, 92, No.15.
Cat. No. U9
Museum Inv. No: 1373
Arrival at the Museum: Purchase
Dimensions: H. 17,6 cm D. M. 4 cm D. B. 3,5 cm
Colour: Light blue-green
Description: It has a folded wide rim, cylindrical neck, bulbous body
and flat bottom.
Date: 1st-2nd centuries AD
Barış Emre Sönmez | 95
Similar: Temür and Eker 2019, 28-33, Cat. No.14, 18, 19; Özet 1996,
57, No.24; Lightfoot and Arslan 1992, 41, Cat. No.8; Hayes 1975,129;
Baybo 2003, Drawing 10, no. 53; Helström 1971, pl. 29, no. 2; Güray
2011, 264, Fig.6. 1,8; Çakmaklı 2007, 92, No.15.
Cat. No. U10
Museum Inv. No: 1377
Arrival at the Museum: Purchase
Dimensions: H. 10.3 cm D. M.2.8 cm D. B. 2.8 cm
Colour: Pale green
Description: It has a folded wide rim, cylindrical neck, bulbous body
and flat bottom.
Date: 1st-2nd centuries AD
Similar: Temür and Eker 2019, 28-33, Cat. No.14, 18, 19; Özet 1996,
57, No.24; Lightfoot and Arslan 1992, 41, Cat. No.8; Hayes 1975,129;
Baybo 2003, Drawing 10, no. 53; Helström 1971, pl. 29, no. 2; Güray
2011, 264, Fig.6. 1,8; Çakmaklı 2007, 92, No.15.
Cat. No. U11
Museum Inv. No: 1336
Arrival at the Museum: Suluca Karahöyük
Dimensions: H. 9.3 cm D. M. 3.6 cm D. B. 5.4 cm
Colour: Light blue-green
Description: It has a folded mouth structure, a cylindrical neck, a conical
body and a flat base.
Date: 1st-3th centuries AD
Similar: Temür and Eker 2019, 51-61, Cat. No.37-47; Lightfoot and
Arslan 1992, 81, Cat. No.37; Aydın Tavukçu and Avli 2022, 584, Img.1,
Cat. No. 2-5; Barag 1985, 95, Pl. 15, no. 125; Özet 1996, 113-117, No.73a-
75b; Gürler 2000, 34-35; Atila and Gürler 2009, 40, Cat. No. 48.
Cat. No. U12
Museum Inv. No: 1391
Arrival at the Museum: Purchase
Dimensions: H. 9.3 cm D. M. - D. B. 2.9 cm
96 | Roman Period Glass Unguentariums at the Hacibektas Veli Archeology Museum
Colour: Blue-green
Description: Part of the mouth is broken. It has a folded mouth structure,
a cylindrical neck, a conical body and a flat base.
Date: 1st-3th centuries AD
Similar: Temür and Eker 2019, 51-61, Cat. No.37-47; Lightfoot and
Arslan 1992, 81, Cat. No.37; Aydın Tavukçu and Avli 2022,584, Img.1,
Cat. No. 2-5; Barag 1985, 95, Pl. 15, no. 125; Özet 1996, 113-117,
No.73a-75b; Gürler 2000, 34-35; Atila and Gürler 2009, 40, Cat. No. 48.
Abbreviations
Cat. No.: Catalog Number
Cm: Centimeter
H.: Height
D. R.: Diameter of Rim
D. M.: Diameter of Mouth
Ed.: Editor
Fig.: Figur
Pl.: Plate
Pic.: Picture
Img.: Image
Museum Inv. No.: Museum Inventory Number
Barış Emre Sönmez | 97
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Barış Emre Sönmez | 101
103
Chapter 6
Archaeology of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis:
Islam, Turkishness, and Westernization as the
Pillars of the Modern Ottoman Identity1
Ali Babahan2
Abstract
This study investigates the historical foundations of the Turkish-Islamic
synthesis, a threefold discourse combining religion, nationalism, and
modernization in the form of Westernization, which was systematically
indoctrinated by nationalist intellectuals in Turkey during the 1970s. The
argument of the study is that Young Ottomans were the first voices of the
discursive orientation to unite and synthesize all three elements, as part of the
quest to construct a modern Ottoman identity to save the state in the last period
of the Ottoman Empire. At the official level, this discourse gradually became
institutionalized and officialized during the reign of Sultan Abdul Hamid II
with the expansion of modernization policies aimed at transforming society
and the state and formed the basis for state policies in many areas. To this
end, the writings and statements of Young Ottomans are analyzed in detail,
followed by a comprehensive evaluation of the policy implementations in the
Ottoman Empire during the reign of Abdül Hamid II and their reflections on
education, also including the Sultan’s own expressions, in terms of ideological
attempts to articulate Islam, Turkishness, and Westernization.
1. Introduction
“Turkish-Islamic Synthesis” is the name of an (ideological) discourse3 that
was indoctrinated in the 1970s under the roof of an organization known
1 This article is a revised and extended version of one of the sections of my Phd dissertation
(Babahan 2014).
2 Dr. Öğr. Üyesi, Bolu Abant İzzet Baysal Üniversitesi Sosyoloji Bölümü, babahan_a@ibu.edu.
tr, 0000-0002-9282-911X
3 In the study, I use the concept of “ideology” as “a form of a social cognition, shared by the
members of a group, class, or other social formations” (Van Dijk 1989: 24); and “discourse”
as “a specific ‘textual’ form of language use in the social context” to correspond to the linguistic
https://doi.org/10.58830/ozgur.pub167.c871
104 | Archaeology of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis: Islam, Turkishness, and Westernization...
in Turkey as the Intellectuals’ Hearth (Aydınlar Ocağı), comprising an
intelligentsia from Muslim Turkish nationalists. Shortly after its emergence,
it received a collective interest and widespread recognition after becoming
the state’s official discourse following the military coup in 1980 (Güvenç
et al., 1994; Dursun, 2002). The founding argument of this discourse,
which considers ethnicity and religion to be indispensable components
of national identity and official ideology, is that Turkishness and (Sunni)
Islam complement each other (Bora et al., 2000: 161). Accordingly, Turks
are assumed to have an essential contribution to Islam’s prevalence and
the development of the Islamic civilization. At the same time, Islam, as a
religion, refers to an adhesive force that unites Turks (Copeaux, 2000: 56).
Still decisive at the official level in Turkey, this discourse also recognizes
“modernization,”4 or “Westernization,”5 to the extent that it involves a
modern economic, legal, social, and organizational model with industrial-
technological progress. Thus, modernization (or Westernization), which
officially never existed in the celebrated title of the synthesis possibly due to
nationalist concerns, always remains implicitly as one of the three founding
dimensions of this discourse with Islam and Turkishness (Güvenç et al.,
1994; Dursun, 2002).
Although Turkish-Islamic Synthesis has been indoctrinated recently,
several researchers claim that the ideas and attempts to articulate Turkishness,
Islam, and Westernization within the same discourse may be dated back to
the 19th century. (See İnalcık, 2016: 189; Özdalga, 2009; Turan, 1993;
Toprak, 1981; Bora, 2008; Zubadia, 1996; Çetinsaya, 1999; Parla, 2002).
expression of ideologies (Van Dijk 1989: 19, 22). Therefore, pursuant with this approach, the
discourse layer which is related to what a person says and how it is said consists of the “overt
or covert” ideological traces that enable understanding of what this person believes in, thinks
of and how he perceives/interprets the world. (Van Dijk 1989)
4 Modernization originally refers to the new form of social life and organization that emerged
in Europe from the 18th century onwards. (Tekeli, 2005: 137). In this sense, the concept
defines to follow the radical transformation process that lasted for centuries in the Western
world and brought about the change of the entire social structure. This process, briefly, is
identified with the emergence of the concepts and institutions including “social mobility,
modern state, bureaucratization and centralization, industrialization or capitalism and
secularism [and nationalism]” (Greenfeld, 2006: 160). Tekeli (2005: 138) stated that the
modernization process, which was born in Europe, tended to spread all over the world due
to both its claim of universality in the field of thought and the structural nature of capitalism,
one of its components. Accordingly, the non-Western world could not remain unresponsive to
this process and, over time, modernization has become a global model for transformation and
it has influenced the whole world..
5 Westernization (Tr. Batılılaşma; Garplılaşma) is usually considered in Turkey to be the Western
way of modernization; thus used as a synonym of modernization (Çiğdem, 2001; Göle,
2001). Since the concept of Westernization, rather than modernization, was widely used in
the historical period covered by this study, I prefer to use the latter in this study.
Ali Babahan | 105
Nevertheless, since it was not the main concern of their work, they did
not provide a comprehensive analysis of such discursive formations in this
period. In this study, I intend to comprehensively conduct the historical
archaeology of this discourse and systematically figure out the historical
foundations of this synthesis by evaluating the documented statements of
the late Ottoman elites.
My basic assumption at this point is that the orientation that is addressed,
as it combines Turkishness and Islam in addition to Westernization within
a collective identity6 discourse, requires the emergence of modernization
policies in the Empire and, more decisively, even if not at the level of
political nationalism, at least the appearance of an ethnic awareness on
Turkishness, among the Ottoman elites. Therefore, I take the second half
of the 19th century, particularly as the starting point within the scope
of the modernization process which took place in the late period of the
Ottoman Empire when Islam and Turkishness started to be discussed among
some of the Ottoman power elites7 as the basis of the (modern) Ottoman
socio-cultural identity to keep the society together. Karpat (2001: 356)
also considers this period the first stage of “the evolution of Turkish ethnic
consciousness and the crystallization of Turkish identity.”
In this context, I argue that, in the history of Turkey, Young Ottomans,
the leading intellectual group of the period, were the pioneering voices of
a discursive orientation that is contemporarily entitled as Turkish-Islamic
synthesis. Besides, institutional adoption of their ideas took place in the
era of Abdul Hamid II, who was significantly influenced by the Young
6 “‘Identity’ denotes the ways in which individuals and collectivities are distinguished in their
relations with other individuals and collectivities.” (Jenkins, 2008: 18) Identity, first and
foremost, related with a private search about the position of individual in this world, which is
generally pursued by considering his/her qualities, resources and objectives in terms of their
similarities and differences with other individuals. (Brubaker, 2012: 4; Jenkins, 2008:17-18)
However, this search is also a social quest in nature, as it inevitably requires the determination
of the position of the individual in the social context he/she lives in. Therefore, the question,
“Who am I?”, initially asked at the individual level, tends to turn into “Who are we?” in the
next step, by taking a collective quality (Smith, 1991: 3-4; Jenkins, 2008: 12-13, 16). In this
level, the self-identification is usually made on the basis of a mixture of genealogy, kinship,
spoken language, belief, the tradition followed, the place of residence, or the community in
which individual lives. On the other hand, collective identities could also become the base of
political claims and perform a constitutive function in terms of providing the very foundation
of political sovereignty and organization. Thus, at this level, the cultural and the political are
intertwined (Brubaker, 2012: 5)
7 The reason for focusing on “power elites” in the study is that this group is accepted to be the
agents of dominant social discourses (See. Van Dijk, 1989). These groups who are accepted to
consist of political, military, economic and socio-cultural power circles in a certain society are
defined as “the manufacturers of public knowledge, beliefs, attitudes, norms, values, morals,
and ideologies” due to their powers on the society (Van Dijk, 1989: 22).
106 | Archaeology of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis: Islam, Turkishness, and Westernization...
Ottomans’ ideas despite his apparent conflict with them. For this purpose, a
detailed analysis of the statements of Young Ottomans, Sultan Abdul Hamid
II, and some other ruling elites of the period is carried out regarding their
thoughts on Turkishness, Islam, and Westernization. As a supportive source
for stating the characteristics of the official discourse, I also use Alkan’s
(2000; 2009) analyses of the textbooks of the period.
2. Religion, Ethnicity, and Nationalism as the Pillars of Collective
Identity
Religion can be defined as a socio-cultural institution through which the
social values, rules, and interactions (and therefore beliefs, thoughts, and
activities) of a community of believers are systematically arranged concerning
a (supposed) superhuman source (Spiro, 2004: 96-98). Ethnicity, on the
other hand, is related to human collectivities in which members mostly have
a (subjective) sense of possessing lineage ties, sharing a common history,
land, culture, religion, tradition, institution, lifestyle, and/or livelihood
activity (Smith, 1991: 20). Both of these served as the traditional sources
of social order and collective identity to some extent (Brubaker, 2012: 4).
However, since pre-modern states were based on multi-religious and multi-
ethnic social formations, and there were explicit and well-protected socio-
cultural divisions between the governing classes and their subjects, neither
religion nor ethnicity could be the ideological ground for a claim of political
integration and sovereignty till modern times (Gellner, 1983, Hobsbawm,
1992, Anderson, 1991).
Nationalism, as one of the by-products of modernization, however, is
commonly defined as a political doctrine suggesting a congruence between
the cultural and the political units (Gellner, 1983: 1-5). According to this
understanding of nationalism, “[it] consists of political activities that aim
to make the boundaries of the nation -a culturally distinctive collectivity
aspiring to self-governance- coterminous with those of the state… [which is]
refer[ed] to the set of specialized institutions that is responsible for producing
order, justice, social welfare, and defense in a territorially bounded society”
(Hechter, 2000:7).
As a modern phenomenon, nationalism first appeared in the Western
part of Europe in the 18th century, but over time it has become an ideology-
social movement influencing almost all parts of the world (Greenfeld, 2006).
Some authors, such as Kohn (1946), distinguished between different types
of nationalism, taking into account the political varieties due to different
economic and socio-political settings in other parts of the world. In this
Ali Babahan | 107
context, the most widely accepted distinction is between political or civic
nationalism, which emphasizes political and legal aspects, and ethnic or
cultural nationalism, which emphasizes culture and lineage.
Still, modernists like Gellner (1983), as mentioned above, take “the
existence of political demand for self-determination in a distinct territorial
unit” as the crucial criterion to separate nations from other kinds of social
collectivities including ethnic groups. Hobsbawm (1992: 46-47), for
this reason, distinguishes other modes of collectivities that lack politically
oriented pursuits, including pre-modern religious and ethnic formations,
as “proto-nationalist” orientations. He also emphasizes this doesn’t mean
that all of these modes of ethnic awareness will ultimately bring nationalist
desire and endeavor. In this study, I adopt this approach to differentiate
between nationalism and other forms of collective identity and belonging;
and consider the discursive integration of Islam and Turkishness with
Westernization as the basis of collective identity rather than taking this as
a political-ideological formation. For this aim, in the following sections, I
first examine the specific role of religion and ethnicity in Ottoman society
and politics; and then explore the new forms and functions they acquired
in the discourses of the intellectuals of the period and state policy, with the
emergence of modernization.
3. The Emergence of the Ethnic Awareness of Turkishness as a
Collective Identity Discourse in the Ottoman Empire during the
19th century
Religion was the principal referential source in the traditional Ottoman
social life, state-society relations, and mutual affairs of different communities
in the society, until Empire’s late periods, like in the rest of the world. So, Islam,
both for the governing elite and the Muslim Ottoman subjects, was generally
before all other socio-cultural identities. Besides, the Imperial rule and law
were regulated and operated concerning religious congregational differences
among the subjects (İnalcık, 2005). Nevertheless, similar to the previous
Muslim Turkish states, the Ottoman Empire had a dual government and legal
system that combined religious law based on Islamic resources (Sharia) and
temporal law (Orf) consisting of customary rulings and practices. Within such
a framework, in politics, the weights of temporality and spirituality (mainly
in the form of Sunni Islam) varied regarding the changing context for six
centuries. And the researchers have a consensus that the Caliphate authority,
which is accepted to be transferred to the dynasty during the reign of Selim
I, rarely had a decisive effect on politics in the subsequent periods (İnalcık,
2005, 2016; Mardin, 2005; Ocak, 2011; Karpat, 2001).
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On the other hand, the significance of Turkishness in traditional Ottoman
society is more ambiguous than religion. Indeed, “Turkishness,” as the name
of an ethnic group, was not commonly used even by Turkish-speaking urban
and rural classes for defining themselves until the late Ottoman Empire
(Aydın, 2012: 156-159). There was a common tendency to limit Turkishness
mostly to the Qizilbash-Alevi Turkomans almost until the War of Liberation
(Aydemir, 1993: 113). And particularly the Ottoman elites, similar to
their counterparts in pre-modern European societies, viewed themselves as
different from the ordinary people so their ethnic and social identities could
be distinguished from the rest of the community. For Aydın (2012: 156),
“this made them culturally and mentally as well as actually a part of the
ruling class and enabled them to confirm the sharp distinction between the
identities of the people who ruled and who were ruled.”
However, in the second half of the 19th century, a particular interest
emerged among the Ottoman elites in Turkishness as an ethnic category and
Turkish language and history (Kushner, 1977). There are various reasons
underlying this development. The first reason is related to the effect of
other nationalist movements developing in both the Western world and
among the non-Muslim subjects of the Empire on several Ottoman elites
(Özdoğan, 2006: 41). Accordingly, the Christian population of the Empire,
also with the contribution of recent political and economic problems of the
state, “became aware of their national origins and started to riot against the
central authority represented by the Ottoman state” (Georgeon, 2006: 1-2).
This process was pioneered by the Greeks and Serbians and followed by the
Bulgarians, Macedonians, and Armenians with the support of the European
states. The ideas guiding these movements spread to the Muslim people of
the Empire over time and influenced Albanians, Arabs, Kurds, and finally,
Turks, respectively (Georgeon, 2006: 2).
The second reason behind the mentioned development could be the
emergence of a quest for a new identity as a (modern) social-cultural cement
in the eyes of the Ottoman elites, at least to keep the remaining peoples of
the Empire together. Indeed, this search can be dated back to the reign of
Mahmud II. However, the initial intention was to unite the subjects of the
Empire under the roof of “Ottomanism” rather than any ethnic or religious
emphasis. But, in parallel to severe territorial loss and the acquisition of
Turks as the majority within the Imperial population, it held on to the idea
of a new identity based on Turkishness as a uniting factor over time (Göçek,
2002; Erdoğdu, 2008; Somel, 2009; Alkan, 2009; Georgeon, 2006).
Ali Babahan | 109
From a third aspect, this interest can be evaluated as “a defense mechanism
against humiliation before Western expansionism”. The Ottomans, whose
military power had struck great fear into their rivals in the past, were indeed
losing the wars for a long time and even becoming economically dependent
on foreign debt (Özdoğan, 2006: 41).
Thus, various cultural and scientific studies of some European researchers
on Turks, notably those mostly having positive statements, gradually received
more and more attention and significantly impacted the emergence of self-
awareness among the Ottoman intelligentsia. Indeed, the works of Joseph
de Guignes, Arthur L. Davids, Kont Borzecki, Arminius Vambery, Léon
Cahun, A. I. De Sucy, W. Radloff, E. D. W. Gibb, and V. Thompson started
to flatter the pride of the Turkish readers due to their praising content about
Turks (Kushner, 1977: 9-11). These works paved the way to start using the
word “Turk,” which included less than positive evocations until then, with
more comprehensive content containing historical, racial, and socio-cultural
references to name certain people (Kushner, 1977: 20-26).
Nevertheless, as mentioned before, it has to be reminded that the ethnic
awareness shaped by the search for a socio-cultural identity developing
among some elites in this period cannot be taken as a nationalist movement
in the modern sense since it was not based on a systematic political agenda
aiming at combining the nation and the state. Therefore, it would be more
appropriate to define the steps in this period, which only consisted of an
identity discourse rather than arising from a systematic and consistent
political goal, to be a “proto-nationalist” movement (Poulton, 1997: 58-
64; Hanioğlu, 2012: 22; Bozarslan, 2015: 141; Bora, 2008: 16), in the
way Hobsbawm (1992: 46-79) defined. Designating the bases of collective
unity and identity, this discourse consisted of references to Turkish history,
culture/language, and ethnicity and even had racial implications to some
extent (Özdoğan, 2006: 41).
In this context, ethnic consciousness and emotions gradually developed in
the eyes of a group of Turkish intellectuals and bureaucrats. They assumed a
duty “to study their own history, to inquire into the affairs of their brothers
outside the Ottoman borders, and to develop the Turkish language and
culture” (Kushner, 1977: 26). Meanwhile, the writings and studies on pre-
Islamic Turkish history, which didn’t get much attention in the traditional
Ottoman historiography, started to proliferate in this period. The first
examples were written by Ahmed Cevdet Pasha, Ahmed Vefik Pasha, Ahmed
Hilmi, Süleyman Pasha, and Ali Suavi in the second half of the 19th century.
They mainly emphasized the positions and roles of the Turks in history
110 | Archaeology of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis: Islam, Turkishness, and Westernization...
(Kushner, 1977: 27-29). The increase of studies in this field allowed gradually
more inclusion of the ideas such as “Turks are a nation with a crucial place in
history,” “the ancestors of the Ottomans originated from the Turkish tribes
in Central Asia,” “Bulgarians and Crimeans are Turkish tribes in origin,” “the
Huns were the first Turkish people who migrated to Europe,” “Turks are
an old nation dating back to Prophet Abraham,” “Turks established great
states long before the emergence of Islam including the Oghuz Khan state,”
or “Turks and Mongols are relatives” in the history books of the period
(Kushner, 1977: 28-30). In this manner, new historical narratives generated
in this context included an emphasis on the naturalness and perenniality of
Turkishness and the frequent repetition of the expression that Turks were a
community with superior qualities (Kushner, 1977: 31-33).
Along with this, the religious and ethnic identities were intertwined in
this pioneering wave (Özdoğan, 2006: 42; Karpat, 2001: 21; Kushner,
1977: 40; Bora, 2008: 16), like in the nationalist movements of the non-
Muslim subjects of the Empire (Göçek, 2002). The characteristic feature of
such a tendency was that Islam, Turkishness, and even Westernization were
considered the essential elements of the remaining Ottoman population, as
complementing each other (Deringil, 2009: 263-296; Karpat, 2001: 353-
407). At this point, this process should be evaluated in detail.
4. Islam, Turkishness, and Westernization and the Search for an
Ottoman Identity
The formation of a modern Ottoman identity combining Islam with
Turkishness could be possible through the advocacy of Turkishness as one of
the leading elements of the Ottoman identity within the process mentioned
above. In this early period, those who defined (Sunni) Islam, Turkishness,
and some Western elements (peculiar to the capitalist/bourgeois societies) as
the essential components of the (new/modern) Ottoman identity were the
section among the power elites who had envisagement of a “conservative”
kind of modernism (Babahan, 2021). This conservative modernist group,
which can be positioned between the anti-modernist wing of the Ulema
(religious scholars and bureaucracy) and the pro-modernist elites, suggested
a synthesis between modernity and tradition as an alternative route in a
period of serious discussions about the question of “how to save the state?”
(Hanioğlu, 1995: 13-16; Ülken, 2014: 8-9; Tunaya, 2010: 25-34; İrem,
1999; Güngörmez, 2014; Babahan, 2021).
According to this group of conservatives, which regarded the power of
the West as consisting only of its technical, economic, and financial (i.e.,
Ali Babahan | 111
material) superiority and considered the co-existence of two separate worlds
(old and new) to be possible, the solution was “to equip oneself with the
attractive sides of the East and West” (Ülken, 2014: 276). This refers to the
expression of the “ideal to benefit from the technique/science of the West
and manage to remain to be Eastern in spirit” by separating civilization and
culture (more precisely, the material and moral elements of culture) (Ülken,
2014: 9, 26), which is still accepted by the present conservatives who
argue for the harmonization of traditional values and beliefs with modern
developments.
The importance of this ideological orientation concerning our subject
derives from the fact that Turkishness, Islam, and Westernization were
considered to be the elements supporting each other regarding their
political-social agendas of conservative modernists to save the state in the
late period of the Empire. The order of significance among these elements
involved variance even within conservative circles. However, it is noticed
that these “three elements that are used as the play blocks of children” were
found in all attempts of such a “synthesis” generated as a response to the
“250-year quest of the cultural identity of the Turkish society” (Parla, 2002:
206-208). In this regard, it wouldn’t be wrong to consider these attempts
of conservatives to unite Turkishness, Islam, and Westernization for their
cultural identity constructions as the archetypal form of the current “Turkish-
Islamic synthesis” discourse in history.
5. Young Ottomans and the Foundations of Turkish-Islamic
Synthesis
When we look at the founding fathers of the said synthesis attempt in
the history of the Ottoman Empire, we can include the members of the
“New/Young Ottomans” (Yeni/Genç Osmanlılar) who were the first voices
of conservative modernism, as well as Sultan Abdul Hamid II and several
ruling elites of his period within this cluster for their ideas and practices. I
assert that the nuances between them stem from the differences in attitudes
about which of the three elements discussed here should take primacy in
particular and how the relationship between the new and the old elements
of the synthesis would be structured in general.
As mentioned earlier, Young Ottomans were the pioneers of the
group of intellectuals who envisioned combining Islam, Turkishness, and
Westernization for a modern Ottoman identity during a time when ethnic
awareness unfolded among Turkish elites in this period (Mardin, 2000;
Findley, 1980; Karpat, 2001; Tunaya, 2010). This group, which came
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to the fore between 1867-1878 and led by names including Ziya Pasha,
Namık Kemal, Mustafa Fazıl Pasha, İbrahim Sinasi, and Ali Suavi were “at
one and the same time the first men to make the ideas of the Enlightenment
part of the intellectual equipment of the Turkish reading public and the
first thinkers to try to work out a synthesis between these ideas and Islam”
Mardin (2000: 4).
Young Ottomans, who had a modern education and most of whom
worked in various levels of bureaucracy, were the actual products of the
modernization process of the Empire. They had an opposing attitude against
the “cultural alienation” process caused by the pro-modernist Tanzimat
policies on the one hand and against the absolutist tendencies of the senior
administration (Mardin, 2000). Mardin (2000: 47) summarizes the political
goals embraced by the group as a response as follows: “the establishment of
a national representative body, the elimination of foreign interference in the
domestic affirs of Turkey, the solution of the problem of reform along with
Ottoman and Islamic lines.”
At this point, it should be stated that their significantly similar class
positions were decisive in the ideas they embraced. According to Tiftikçi
(2003: 83), Young Ottomans “were the first voices at the political stage
of the bourgeoisie of Turkey who would proclaim the constitution and the
republic.” With a similar argument, Karpat (2001: 96) also stated that the
emphasis on the “(proto-)nationalist-Islamic” theme in the discourse of
this group was directly related to the anger and discontent of the newly
developing Muslim bourgeoisie against the political-economic privileges
granted to the Christian subjects by the Reform Decree (1856).
According to Ülken (2014: 91), the person among Young Ottomans
who “first argued that a modernized Islam, Westernization, and Turkishness
are three views that complement each other” was Ali Suavi (1839-1878).
Suavi held offices in the bureaucracy of education and law following his
madrasah education, and then went to Europe and published various
newspapers like Ulûm (Eng. Sciences) and Muhbir (Eng. Informer). In the
foreign lands, on the one hand, he had the opportunity to be fed from many
different intellectual sources he could access, and on the other hand, he tried
to bring his own perspective on how the issues of Turkishness, Muslimness,
and Ottomanness should be treated (Çelik, 2021).
While evaluating Ali Suavi’s intellectual orientation, Çelik (2021: 389)
states that he, like the other members of Young Ottomans, prioritized Islam
in his solutions to the political and social problems of his time and addressed
many worldly issues within the framework of the principles of this religion.
Ali Babahan | 113
Therefore, even when he advocated Western concepts like “constitutionalism”,
“parliamentary government”, “liberalism”, or “rationalism”, or reforms in
social and political life, he sought to legitimize and validate them through
Islamic law and tradition. (Ülken, 2014; Çelik, 2021). For him, “Christians
have the tradition of preserving the old method and turning against the
new, not the Muslims” (Ülken, 2014: 112). In this regard, what needed
to be done was “to sort out the misinterpretations of Islam, what merged
into Islam afterward, and the loose [humanly] ideas that interrupt progress”
(Ülken, 2014: 112-113).
It should be noted that Ali Suavi also followed many writings (negative
or positive) about Turks, especially during his stay in Europe, and developed
a certain interest in this issue. In some of his writings, he used the term Turk
as a synonym for Ottoman or Muslim, rather than implying an ethnic or
racial belonging. For this, evidence can be found in his article titled “Osman”
(Eng. Ottoman) published in the Muhbir newspaper on June 12, 1868.
In this text, Ali Suavi (1869a) stated that the main difference between the
Ottomans and the Europeans was that the latter had racism, whereas in the
“Turkish State” (i.e. the Ottoman Empire), the main thing was “tawhid” (i.e.
unity), and for this purpose, Islam as a religious bond, not ethnic belonging,
was prioritized. In this context, he wrote, in the Ottomans, regardless of
their origins, talented people among Croats, Greeks, Franks, or Albanians
could reach high positions in bureaucracy or other circles (and are called
Turks) if they convert to Islam (Ali Suavi, 1868a). Therefore, here, Ali Suavi
gives the impression that it is not race or ethnicity but religious affiliation
that determines Turkishness. In support of this, the author identifies all the
two hundred million Muslims he assumes to be living in the world at that
time as Turks (Ali Suavi, 1868a).
However, in one of the other articles entitled “Turk” which was published
in the same issue of Muhbir, Ali Suavi (1868b), in particular, adopted an
ethnicist approach while responding to the claim of some contemporary
Europeans that “there was not as much Turkish population in Anatolia as
was thought, and that Ertugrul Gazi and the families who came to Anatolia
were assimilated by other tribes over time” (Çelik, 2021: 437-38). In this
context, with the information he obtained from various sources, the author
stated that Turks, Turkmens, Huns, Mongols, Tatars, Uighurs, Avars,
Hungarians, Uzbeks, and Yakuts are all from the same family and that they
are all descendants of Oz Khan (or Oguz Khan), whom he claimed lived
in the same period with the prophet Abraham at least 3200 years ago (Ali
Suavi, 1868b).
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Ali Suavi (1868b) then argued, citing Herodotus, that the Huns were
present in both Europe and Anatolia in the 4th century AD. He went on to
write that since the Seljuks, there had been an intense Turkish migration to
Anatolia from Central Asia and the Caucasus, which he called Turkistan, and
that Osman Bey had established his own principality as a successor to them
and expanded this population (Ali Suavi, 1868a).
Besides, Ali Suavi (1868a) argued that (ethnic) Turks made significant
contributions to civilization, especially after they became Muslims. According
to him, while Europeans considered the Turks as a community ignorant of
sciences because they mistook many Turkish scholars to be Arabs, “Turks
had universities in Nishapur when Europeans were in the age of ignorance”
(Ali Suavi, 1868a). In another article published in Ulum, the author listed
Farabi, Ibn Sina, Abu Mansur Maturidi, Bukhari, Mergivani, Jawhari, Ishaq,
Qazvini, Ulug Bey, Ilhani, Shamsettin Fenari, Qadizade, Ali Kuşçu, Ibni
Kemal, Kınalızade and some others as the outstanding Turkish scholars of
their time (Çelik, 2021: 442). And, that Ali Suavi did not intend to refer to
all Muslim scholars as Turk(ish) and he used it as an ethnic term is evident
from the fact that in the same article, he wrote: “It is difficult to prove that
scholars such as al-Ghazali, Tusi, Zamakhshari, Taftazani, and Jurjani were
Turks, but they wrote with the patronage and encouragement of Turkish
rulers” (Çelik, 2021: 442). Therefore, considering his ambivalent attitude,
it is possible to say that Ali Suavi, on the one hand, used the term “Turk” as
a broad expression to include the Muslim and even the Ottoman population
of his time, while on the other hand, with an ethnic awareness, he started to
see it as a racial-ethnic term.
In particular, one of the indicators of the increase in his awareness of
Turkishness is his efforts in the use and dissemination of the Turkish language.
He indeed made the first etymological comparison between Turkish and the
Indo-European languages (Ülken, 2014: 102) and defended plain Turkish
other than the eloquent Ottoman expression (Çelik, 2021: 447-8). He wrote,
Our aim in saying that it was necessary to write in Turkish was to write in the
writing style of early Turks like Mir Ali Shir [Nevai], instead of using vulgar
or obsolete words. Th[at] style… was to keep the speech short, that is, not
to… [lengthen the sentence] unless necessary. By writing in this style, the
subject can be very clearly expressed and utilized [by people of all levels]” (Ali
Suavi, 1869: 479 cit. Çelik, 2021: 449).
Nevertheless, even when Ali Suavi proposes the simplification and reform
of the language, he warns that to maintain cultural ties between the living
society and the past, this must be done with such care that individuals are not
Ali Babahan | 115
deprived of reading books written over many centuries (Ali Suavi, 1869: 1 cit.
Çelik, 2021: 450). Another critical element of his thoughts on language was
about the Turkification of the language of prayer and the Qur’an. he attempted
to bring evidence for this from the Islamic jurisprudence (Ülken, 2014: 94).
Another leading Young Ottoman intellectual was Namık Kemal (1840-
1888), who had a “modern” ideology shaped by Muslim-Turkish qualities in
the sense as it presented “as a means of mass mobilization and identification”
(Karpat, 2002: 55). Just like many of his contemporary intellectuals, he
held offices in bureaucracy in addition to being a poet, writer, and publisher.
Ülken (2014: 120) states that Kemal was initially closer to the traditional
Ottoman mentality, but his ideas developed particularly under the effect of
French romantics following his stay in Europe.
Namık Kemal saw the Turkification of all Ottoman Muslims as the recipe
for the salvation of the Empire (Karpat, 2001: 358). Mardin (2000: 286-
287, 293) mentions that Namık Kemal, whom he described as the name
creating the unique, remarkable political philosophy among the works of his
time, had two separate sources in political philosophy: Islamic and Western.
In fact, concerning the fundamental issues of political theory, in particular,
such as power/authority, sovereignty, legitimacy, and representation, his
thinking contains traces from traditional Islamic law and political philosophy
on the one hand, like Ali Suavi, but also from the Western enlightenment
ideas of the time on the other (Mardin, 2000: 287-336; Karpat, 2002: 55).
A typical example of this matter is the combined use of concepts from
different political-intellectual traditions in his statements about patriotism,
including “homeland,” “Ottoman,” “ummah” (Islamic community),
“nation,” “Turk,” “race,” and “sect” (Mardin, 2000: 327-329). Therefore,
the articles of Namık Kemal primarily address Ottomanness, Turkishness,
and Islam as indispensable components of collective identity like in his
statement that asks “Are not the Turks that nation… in whose medresses
[(Eng. Islamic schools)] Farabis, Ibn Sinas, Gazalis, Zemahşeris propagated
knowledge?” (Namık Kemal, 1868 cit. Mardin, 2000: 328). Mardin (2000:
331) and Karpat (2001: 330-335) agreed on the fact that the author’s
play Vatan yahut Silistre (1873) (Eng. Homeland or Silistra) is an example
with historical value as it is a pioneer work that combines various themes,
particularly on Turkishness and Islam. According to Karpat (2001: 333),
this play was propaganda done for the idea of an Ottoman homeland to root
among Muslims and mainly Turks. Like Ali Suavi, for him, “‘Ottoman,’ in
Namık Kemal’s thinking, was already synonymous with ‘Muslim’ and ‘Turk’
and excluded the non-Muslims” (Karpat, 2001: 332).
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On the other hand, it is significant for our subject that Ibrahim Sinasi
(1826-1871), a journalist, and a member of the same group, was the first
person to use the concept of nation, which used to describe different religious
congregations according to the Islamic terminology until then, as “the
Ottoman nation” in a manner corresponding to its modern use in the West
(Lewis, 1969: 336). Yet, the Ottoman intellectuals used the concept mainly
at least until the beginning of the 20th century, in a dual sense, including
both religious and ethnic references (Karpat, 2001: 126).
At this stage, it would be appropriate to mention the concrete examples of
the approach that combined Turkishness with Islamic themes, which started
to develop among some elites of the time, particularly in the works of Young
Ottomans. In this respect, one of the patterns that are most frequently seen
in various articles is the pride that Turks are Muslims and have contributed
to Islam. A detailed quote from Kushner (1977: 33-36) can be given as an
example on this subject:
Great as the Turkish contribution to ancient civilization was, so were the
services rendered by the Turks to Islam. The Turks, according to the writers,
are to be credited with the spread and defense of Islam, as well as its internal
revival, especially since decadence and disintegration began to threaten the
Islamic world in the later centuries of Abbasid rule… The Arabs, says an
article in Basiret [newspaper], were, with all their virtues, prone to internal
strife, disregard of law and order, and hasty action. The Turks, on the other
hand, were characterized by organizational ability, concern for law, and calm
consideration before acting, and it was in these traits that their contribution
to strength and unity in Islam lay….
The writer Ebuzziya Tevfik (1848-1913) who, in his views on language
and language reform was accused of striking at Arabism, argues that…:
“Moreover, the ones to protect the Arab nation, whose national power
suffered weakness and injury for many reasons, were Turks. No Arab poems
were recited in the wars about these soldiers, but rather Turkish poems.
Those who waved the Ottoman banner on the Indian Seas were not Arabs
but Turks. Those who bound hundreds of different peoples to the Ottoman
sultanate were not Arabs, but Turks. Those who revived justice and virtue
turned into corruption and feud with the emergence of the Umayyads, were
not Arabs, but Turks…”
The Turkish role in Islamic history was not confined to their contribution to
re-establishing Islamic political power in the world but included their part
in Islamic civilization. As in pre-Islamic Turkish history, the authors try to
discard the notion of the Turks as nomads or warriors and to stress their
cultural and religious achievements...
Ali Babahan | 117
Given the service of Islam to the world, and given the place of the Turks in
the creation of Islamic civilization, it was clear to the Turkists that the Turks
were among the founders of modern civilization. This notion is brought out
in an article on the contribution of the Turks to medicine, written by the head
physician of a hospital: “The Turks, who for centuries ruled in Transcaspia and
Trans-oxania, spread the light of science from Asia, the cradle of civilization,
to the four continents of the world. Those who produced Muslim scholars
such as the Ibn Sinas, al-Farabis, Muhammad Ibn Abi Bakr al-Razis, and
others… and helped to establish the foundations of modern civilization are
the Turks… Those who for six hundred years lived under the wing of justice of
the eternal Ottoman State… and rendered outstanding service to civilization
and medical progress are, again, the children and descendants of the Turks.”
Mehmet Emin (Yurdakul) (1869-1944), holding offices at various
levels of bureaucracy in addition to his poetry, may also be included in the
names that adopt the idea that defines Turkishness and Islam as the critical
components of Ottoman identity (Karpat, 2001: 361). Ülken (2014: 295)
states that this orientation of Mehmet Emin was significantly influenced by
his close friend Jemaleddin Afghani (1836-1897), who was hosted in Turkey
at the invitation of Abdul Hamid II. Afghani, one of the leading names of
Islamic modernism, considers religious and linguistic unity to be founding
elements that connect people. For him, “each Muslim nation needs to wake
up and gain national awareness separately to realize Islamic union” (Ülken,
2014: 295). The poem Anadolu’dan Bir Ses yahut Cenge Giderken (A Voice
from Anatolia or on the Way to Battle), which Mehmet Emin wrote in 1897
under this influence, is a poetic piece that is still one of the foremost recited
among the contemporary Muslim nationalist groups. Two stanzas of this
poem, where the word “Turk” was also used for the first time as the name of
the nation according to Yıldız (2001: 67), can be given as an example as it
includes a concrete expression of these thoughts:
I am a Turk; my religion and race are supreme;
My chest (and) my essence are full of fire,
Who is human is the servant of his homeland.
Turk’s child doesn’t stay home; I go!
I won’t let the book of the Creator be removed,
I won’t let the flag of little Osman be taken,
I won’t let my homeland be attacked by the enemy.
House of God won’t be ruined; I go! (Tevetoğlu, 1988: 142)
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6. The Reign of Abdul Hamid II and the Institutionalisation
of the Official Discourse Combining Islam, Turkishness, and
Westernization
The era of Abdul Hamid II (1876-1909) was the period when the
discourse combining Islam, Turkishness, and Westernization was officially
institutionalized and officialized under the umbrella of the collective
Ottoman identity. During this period, mass broadcasting and educational
services, which were rapidly expanding especially in large cities as part of
the comprehensive modernization program, became the most prominent
instruments of institutional activity to disseminate this discourse. Thus, with
the modernization of society and the state, it can be argued that there was
a shift from a process of awakening the ethnic consciousness of Turkishness
to a political process in which the Muslim Turkish population, which was
to become the majority of the population, gradually began to be identified
with the state.
To begin with the characterization of the ideological orientation of the
era of Abdul Hamid II, it is striking that a kind of conservative modernism
was adopted in state affairs (Koloğlu, 2009: 276). In this context, according
to Irem (2011: 30), the modernization policies during this period had two
aspects. They included the aspect of administrative-technical innovation and
technology transfer that would allow controlling the economy and society,
while excluding the liberating aspect of the Western version of modernity,
which was based on the principles of political liberalism and parliamentary
democracy, as well as the cultural aspect, which was seen as indoctrinating
values.
The Sultan himself was described to be a person, concerning his
personality and lifestyle, who was both “religious” on the one hand, and
“modern-minded” and “attaching great importance to progress and science”
on the other hand (Karpat, 2001: 175; Alkan, 2009: 386). According to
Karpat (2001: 155-156), “he appears to be conservative from the religious
point of view, but he was the most European Sultan about his daily life,
lifestyle, and habits. His reforms in the fields of education, administration,
communication, and transportation had a deeper effect on the internal
texture of the Ottoman society than the reforms of Tanzimat.” Therefore,
it seems reasonable to claim that the political and intellectual orientation of
the Sultan was much different from the newly emerging middle-class elites
of the Empire, for instance, from Young Ottomans, despite the difference
in their social ranks. Essentially, as noted by Akçura (2007: 22), one of the
prominent intellectuals of the time, “although Abdülhamid II mercilessly
Ali Babahan | 119
opposed Young Ottomans, he was a student of their politics to some extent
[…] His politics showed considerable similarities with the ideas of Young
Ottomans.”
In this context, the Islamism of the period was a discourse maintaining
the new Ottoman identity and the idea that the Muslim Turks were the
dominant element (Landau, 2001; Karpat, 2001; Kara, 2011; Tunaya,
1998; Mardin, 2005). Similarly, Karpat (2001: 229) states that Abdul
Hamid II “subtly nationalized, idealized and Turkified” history and therefore
state apparatus and society through a series of Islamic and Turkic-originated
traditions that were re-shaped in this period. For him, the Sultan began to
describe himself, especially in the late period of his reign, “to be both Turkish
and Muslim” (Karpat, 2001: 29). Still, accepting that religious and ethnical
references were intertwined in this discourse, Alkan (2000) underlines that
the emphasis on Islam was more dominant/decisive than Turkishness. For
him, this synthesis, as the general characteristics of the official discourse of
the era of Abdul Hamid II, was based on the idea that Turkishness, as an
ethnic identity, bears a reserved, secondary emphasis that finds meaning with
Islam (Alkan, 2000: 76).
Nevertheless, such a political initiation could seem paradoxical at a time
when the legal status of non-Muslims was being equalized with that of
Muslims through various official regulations and implementations, notably
the Constitution (Kanun-i Esasi) (1876), in this period. In practice, however,
Bozarslan (2018: 169) claims that an official Ottoman identity based on
the Turkish-Islamic synthesis, which already had historical roots, would
henceforth be expressed and recognized in legal terms, also taking advantage
of the changing domestic and international conjuncture. His perspective on
this issue allows us to see how official attitudes that have remained at the
level of ethnic consciousness to this day began to be politicized henceforth:
The policy of integrating Muslim communities into the empire through
oppression and privileges was not only a response to the politicization of
identities of the Christian faith but also provides the means for the construction
of a Turkish or Turkish-Muslim political majority that is recognized as the real
sovereign of the state, the sole holder of the legitimate ownership over its
history and territory, and the sole owner of the right to self-determination.
In this sense, the Abdülhamid regime cannot be regarded as a simple re-
centralization of the post-Tanzimat state in a conservative sense. This regime,
by drawing a distinction between Muslims and non-Muslims, especially
Christians, gradually turned this distinction into a fundamental basis of
hostility. [Thus] [b]eyond being a symbolic template, the “Turkish-Islam”
essence of the state was something that was being actively mobilized against
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non-Muslims, expressed in political and then military terms (Bozarslan,
2018: 169).
Still, it has to be noted that those steps taken in this direction would
gradually become more obvious and systematic beginning from the
government of the Party of Union and Progress (İttihat ve Terakki Fırkası),
the leading political actor after the fall of Abdül Hamid II, and would be
further embodied with the ideal of a nation-state that recognized Muslim
Turks as the main element during the establishment of the Turkish Republic.
At this point, it would be appropriate to evaluate some of Sultan’s
writings and statements to support the previous assessments of the dominant
discourse of the era of Abdül Hamid II. In this context, we can quote from
the memorandum of the Sultan himself as one of the concrete examples of
such a discourse where Islam and Turkishness were combined to form the
Ottoman identity at the official level:
The great Ottoman State was founded on faith after Yavuz Selim absorbed
the Caliphate. But since the original state was established by Turks, in reality,
this is a Turkish state… Since the exalted Osman established this sublime
state, it has stood on four principles: the ruler [dynasty] is Ottoman, the
administration is Turkish, the faith is Islam, and the capital is Istanbul. The
weakening or dismissal of any of these principles will affect the foundation of
the state (Abdul Hamid II, 1900 cit. Karpat, 2001: 336).
The political memoirs of the Sultan also include important hints on this
matter. For example, in one part of his memoirs, Abdul Hamid II (1975:
179-180) stated that the Ottoman Empire consisted of different millets
(Eng. nations), and that was Islam, which matters, not the element of the
nation. However, in the same memoirs, in another statement he made in
1893, possibly after territorial losses and an intense wave of migration, he
developed an exceeding tendency that revealed Turkishness, as well as Islam,
as a vital determinant:
It is no longer the period to put those from other religions into ourselves,
our own flesh like a splinter. Within our state’s borders, we can only accept
those from our nation and those who share the same beliefs as ours (Muslim
Turk, i.e., Ottoman). We should pay attention to strengthening the Turkish
element. We need to bring the exceeding ones of the Muslim population
in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Bulgaria and let them settle here regularly… It
is a must to strengthen the Turkish element in Rumelia and particularly in
Anatolia, and before everything else, we need to cast the Kurds among us in
the same mold and arrogate ourselves. The biggest mistake of my predecessors
on the Turkish throne was that they failed to Ottomanize the Slav element.
Of course, this was not an easy job. Nevertheless, blood relations with the
Ali Babahan | 121
Anatolian Greeks and Armenians took place easier. But, thank God, our
blood maintained its superiority (Abdul Hamid, 1975: 73-74)
Mainly based on the last quote, it is understood that only Muslim Turks
were considered Ottoman, and a cultural assimilation process was necessitated
for Kurds and Slavs to be taken as an Ottoman since Kurds were Muslims
but not Turks, and Slavs were neither Muslims nor Turks. In addition, taking
into account the emphasis on “blood” at the end of the quote, it can be
noted that the word nation began to exceed a cultural meaning and expand
gradually to include a reference based on race.
In a memorandum (1885), Osman Nuri Pasha, the governor of Hejaz
and one of the leading bureaucrats of the same period, likened the Ottoman
population to a tree. According to him, the Muslims were the principal
element and Turks were the “root and trunk of the tree,” while other Muslims
like Arabs, Kurds, and Albanians were the “branches and knobs” (Deringil,
2009: 99).
The complementary component of configuring and disseminating the
official discourse combining Islam and Turkishness was the reforms that
were implemented to re-structure, even partly, the state and society within
the framework of a Western social organization. Indeed, Abdul Hamid II
“accepted several Western originated implementations from the education
system to the modern state structures in return for its contribution for
the increase of supervision and control capacity of the state on society and
economy” (İrem, 2011: 29). At this point, it would be appropriate to discuss
the contribution of the reforms, which are the yield of the modernism of
Abdul Hamid II, regarding our topic.
In the Ottoman Empire, “[t]raditionally, all the state territory, all the
objects, and living creatures on it were considered to be the property of
the dynasty, with all rights embodied to the incumbent sultan” (Karpat,
2001: 224). However, Karpat (2001: 168-172, 223-233, 239-240) argues
that, during the reign of Abdul Hamid II, the state achieved autonomy by
acquiring an institutional entity separate from the sultanate/dynasty and
even from the religious authority and was redefined based on territory (i.e.,
within the framework of a particular idea of the homeland). This became
possible through the reforms that transformed the institutional structure of
the state with the bureaucracy and secularized it to some extent, such as the
limitation of the power areas of the clergy, revision of judicial institution, and
professionalization of civil-military bureaucracy, together with the invention
of various authority symbols and rituals such as arms, anthems, and medals.
This, following the record of the state as an authority per se, also enabled the
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subjugation of (even) the Sultan and dynasty to the state on the one hand and
allocation of the state as an institutional organization that performs various
public services that it didn’t embrace before within its area of sovereignty on
the other (Karpat, 2001: 225). As a result, the word “Ottoman” started to
represent the country, people, and collective political identity, rather than the
state being the Ottoman family’s property like before (Karpat, 2001: 239).
In this period, education was one of the leading areas affected by the
transformation in the institutional structure and functions of the state. As
can be understood by the remarkable increase in the schooling ratio in this
period, Abdul Hamid II expanded and strengthened the modernization and
dissemination of education, which started to be institutionalized during
the period of Tanzimat (Alkan, 2000: 68). Education was the primary
instrument for the Sultan, “to create a modern society through a cultural
pattern that still was based on traditional values” (Alkan, 2000: 76). Newly
emerging Muslim middle classes, who discovered that education was an
essential tool of class-based mobility (and of wealth increase), also pressured
the administration of Abdul Hamid II to open intermediate and high-level
modern schools and send teachers (Karpat, 2001: 98). Therefore, said
groups didn’t refrain from providing financial support and land to build and
maintain schools when necessary (Karpat, 2001: 98).
Another critical step in the field of education taken by Abdul Hamid
II’s regime was “the compulsory use of demotic Turkish” to generate a
population mostly sharing a common culture (Poulton, 1997: 61). For
this purpose, an official initiative promoted to make Turkish compulsory in
the schools of the Empire in 1894; and the schools were required to use a
clear and straightforward language purged from the uncommon Arabic and
Persian words (Poulton, 1997: 61).
The importance of these developments, particularly for our subject, is
related to the remarkable transformation that they brought to the cultural
and intellectual life of the Empire. There was a rapid increase in the number
of printed materials like it was in the West, together with the standardization
of Turkish in the field of literature and the possibility for more accessible
and cheaper access to printed material, also in parallel to the increase of
the educated population (Karpat, 2001: 117-119). This, in addition to the
reforms in education, paved the way for the emancipation of information
and ideas from the monopoly of the religious field and the clergy and
dissemination to a broader population (Karpat, 2001: 133). As a result of
this development, a public community in modern terms started to appear,
at least in Istanbul. This community consisted of individuals who indeed
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imagined the soil where they lived as a homeland, the people who lived in
this homeland as a nation (Karpat, 2001: 136, 149-153).
Perceiving the public composed of subjects with their own identities
and different political choices who were autonomous (even partly) from
the Sultan, instead of a passive mass who were unconditionally tied to
him, caused the power circles of the period to start attempts to provide
the control of the cultural/intellectual field to pull the public opinion to
their sides (Karpat, 2001: 119). Another complementary component of
this process, in particular concerning our subject, was the structuring of an
official discourse on collective identity that was designed to be reproduced
through mass education and textbooks, in particular within the framework
of an official understanding of history for the first time in the Ottoman
history (Alkan, 2000: 52).
This way, various religious-ethnic themes with the above examples from
the conservative modernist intellectuals of the time were seen to become
prominent in the “textbooks that were published for the first time and drafted
according to the curriculum determined by the relevant authorities” (Alkan,
2009: 391). Alkan (2000: 76), who started to examine the textbooks of
the period, determined that a version of Turkish-Islamic synthesis became
dominant, particularly in the history of Islam, Ottoman history, and
general history textbooks, with religion being more prominent than ethnic
references. One of the two remarkable themes in the textbooks based on this
discourse, which was based on “a loose and pragmatic ideology,” is that “the
Ottomans are attributed to Turkish race,” and the other theme is the primary
function the Ottomans assumed as “the bearer of Islam” Alkan (2000: 76,
83). The findings of the author are as follows:
[The books on the history of Islam]… began with the mythological and the
religious sources of the political regime’s in the “Turk’s descent from Noah via
Yafes, then indicated that the Ottoman state began with Islam and narrated
the state’s foundation with emphasis on the Turkic roots of Ottomans. In
this account based on Islam, The Turks were a rebellious disloyal tribe in
the pre-Islamic period but became civilized with the adoption of Islam. The
Ottoman conquest of Constantinople and the assumption of the Caliphate
and thus the leadership of Islam were attributed to religious motives (Alkan,
2000: 76).
Alkan (2000: 53, 86) adds that the emphasis on nationalist themes in
general and Turkishness, in particular, was more frequent in the textbooks at
the military schools than those in the civilian schools. For him, that was the
main reason why ethnic awareness spread more and faster among the youth
of military schools rather than the students of the other schools.
124 | Archaeology of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis: Islam, Turkishness, and Westernization...
As a final note on the dominant discourses in the textbooks of this
period, the social identity that brought Turkishness and Islam together
under the roof of Ottomanism involved Sunnism, in conformity with the
official understanding of Islam in the classical period. According to Deringil
(2009: 96), Hanafism, as the official religion of the state, was highlighted
as a dominant component of the official discourse during the reign of Abdul
Hamid II. Alkan also states that the Islamic themes in the textbooks of the
periods included mainly Hanafi-Sunni references. For him, the “cleansing”
of Shiites in Anatolia by Sultan Selim the Grim via sword is presented as a
“sacred war” against “ ‘demonic’ Sufis,” which is appraised and deemed to
be done “to eliminate the divisions among Muslims and permit control of
the Muslims from one center” (Alkan, 2000: 84).
7. Conclusion
The doctrine of the “Turkish-Islamic Synthesis” emerged in the 1970s
as an ideological discourse in Turkey. It became the official discourse of the
state after the 1980 military coup. The synthesis argues that Turkishness
and Sunni Islam are essential components of national identity and ideology,
with Islam serving as a unifying force for Turks. While not explicitly stated,
modernization or Westernization is also recognized as part of the discourse.
Although the Turkish-Islamic synthesis has recently gained prominence,
some scholars argue that the foundations of those discursive initiations
linking Turkishness, Islam, and Westernization date back to the 19th century.
However, none of those scholars provide a comprehensive analysis of those
discursive formations during that period as it was not the main focus of
their works. In an attempt to fill this gap in the literature, this study analyzes
the historical foundations of this synthesis, focusing on the debates in the
leading intellectual and bureaucratic circles of the late Ottoman Empire,
especially during the second half of the nineteenth century, when the politics
of modernization came to the fore.
This period was an era of intense debates within the elite circles for how
the state could be saved due to the problems the Ottoman Empire was facing,
and how the remaining Ottoman population could be kept together. Islam
was still a principal source of reference for many of them in their socio-cultural
and political pursuits while some had a growing interest in Turkishness as
an ethnic category with Turkish language and history. In addition to these,
in an environment where the implications of modernization had reached all
spheres of society, it could be noted that Western-originated institutions,
concepts, ideas, and ideologies also began to adorn these debates.
Ali Babahan | 125
In this context, a group of conservative modernists advocated a form
of synthesis between tradition and modernity. This group mostly saw the
power of the West primarily in its technical and material aspects and aimed
to adopt attractive elements from both Eastern and Western cultures. So,
Turkishness, Islam, and Westernization were considered interrelated and
supporting elements within their political and social agendas. These attempts
to combine these three elements can be seen as the historical archetype of the
current “Turkish-Islamic synthesis” discourse.
The Young Ottomans are the first generation of those conservative
modernists who offered a modern Ottoman identity that combined Islam,
Turkishness, and elements of Westernization. Educated in modern schools
and holding positions in the bureaucracy, they opposed both the cultural
alienation caused by pro-modernist policies and the absolutist tendencies of
the Imperial administration. They sought to establish a national representative
body, eliminate foreign interference, and pursue reform within an Ottoman
and Islamic framework. Among the Young Ottomans, Ali Suavi played
a significant role in advocating for a modernized Islam, Turkishness, and
Westernization as complementary views. He emphasized the importance
of Islamic law and tradition in legitimizing Western concepts and reforms.
While he used the term “Turk” broadly to include Muslims and even the
Ottoman population, he also showed an ethnic awareness, considering
Turkishness as a racial-ethnic term. Namık Kemal, another prominent figure
among the Young Ottomans, had a modern ideology shaped by Muslim-
Turkish qualities. He saw the Turkification of all Ottoman Muslims as crucial
for the Empire’s salvation. Kemal’s thinking incorporated elements from
both traditional Islamic law and Western Enlightenment ideas, particularly
regarding power, sovereignty, legitimacy, and representation. His writings
emphasized Ottomanness, Turkishness, and Islam as essential components
of collective identity.
Moreover, it was during the reign of Abdul Hamid II (1876-1909) that
the discourse combining Islam, Turkishness, and Westernization gradually
became institutionalized and officialized. The Sultan embraced a form of
conservative modernism that focused on administrative-technical innovation
and technology transfer while downplaying Western concepts of political
liberalism and cultural values. Although he was conservative in religious
matters, he adopted European habits and lifestyle and implemented reforms
in administration, education, communication, and transportation that had a
profound impact on Ottoman society.
126 | Archaeology of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis: Islam, Turkishness, and Westernization...
As a result of these reforms, the state politically gained autonomy, separate
from the sultanate and religious authority, and became defined by territory
and a particular idea of the homeland. The cultural and intellectual life of
the Empire also underwent significant changes during this period, with a
rise in printed materials, standardization of Turkish in printed materials and
education, and the emergence of a public community. Education played a
crucial role in this transformation, with an expansion of schools and the
promotion of initiatives to make Turkish the compulsory language, fostering
a shared public culture and a more accessible dissemination of information
and ideas.
Power elites sought to control the cultural and intellectual field and
shape public opinion, leading to the development of an official discourse on
collective identity which combined Islam, Turkishness, and Westernization
as the founding dimensions of the Ottoman identity. The official promotion
of such a discourse was expressed and recognized especially in legal terms,
distinguishing Muslims, especially Muslim Turks from non-Muslims by
identifying the Muslim Turkish population with the state. Nevertheless,
while religious and ethnic references were intertwined, the emphasis on
Islam was more significant than Turkishness. This synthesis was based on
the belief that Turkishness, as an ethnic identity, was secondary to and found
meaning within Islam. As a consequence, this distinction also gradually
became a basis of hostility and a means to construct a Turkish-Muslim
political majority that saw itself as the rightful sovereign of the state.
Ali Babahan | 127
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131
Chapter 7
İsmet İnönü Era: Assessing the Challenges of
Democracy in Turkey
İbrahim Yorgun1
Abstract
The aim of study is to analyze the İsmet İnönü era in Turkey during his
tenure while concentrating on the challenges and shortcomings of
democracy. The study will focus on various dimensions, including political
restrictions, limitations on freedom of expression, one-party rule, electoral
systems, socio-cultural factors as well as economic policies in order to offer a
detailed examination of the complex dynamics which shaped the democratic
landscape of Turkey of the time. Studying the mentioned dimensions is
expected to uncover the factors which led to the inadequacy of democracy
during the İnönü era and eventually to evaluate their implications for
Turkey’s democratic development, which on the one hand encompasses the
succession from Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and the Republican People’s Party’s
(CHP) dominant role and on the other hand emphasizes the consolidation of
power and the challenges to political representation. Particularly, the analysis
of electoral practices can provide insights into the limitations of democratic
processes, such as restrictive laws, voter intimidation, and limited political
pluralism. Moreover, the study will examine the impact of these challenges
on democratic decision-making which would include but not limited to the
centralization of power, the marginalization of opposition voices and their
meanings for citizen participation. The study will also try to evaluate the
restrictions on freedom of speech and the media landscape, discussing the
limitations imposed on critical voices, media control, and its consequences
on public discourse and democratic participation. In addition to these, the
study is expected to assess the socio-cultural dynamics which would focus on
İnönü’s modernization policies and their impact on social transformation.
The study will explore the tensions between traditional values and cultural
constraints, too. This will be carried out by highlighting the challenges faced
by less represented groups and the inclusiveness of the political system.
1 Dr. Öğretim Görevlisi, METU, iyorgun@metu.edu.tr, ORCID: 0000-0003-4716-4187
https://doi.org/10.58830/ozgur.pub167.c753
132 | İsmet İnönü Era: Assessing the Challenges of Democracy in Turkey
The economic policies of the İnönü era, including the economic vision and
development strategies will be scrutinized, with particular attention given to
the socio-economic disparities and their effects on democratic participation
as well as political power dynamics. Furthermore, the study will attempt to
examine the international relations and foreign policy approach of İsmet
İnönü. This examination will be through the consideration of the implications
for democracy and Turkey’s international standing. The influence of external
factors on democracy in Turkey during the mentioned timeline will also
be assessed. Finally, the study will be concluded with the evaluation of the
legacy of the İnönü’s era, weighing the democratic gains and losses while
drawing lessons for Turkey’s democratic development and considering the
implications for the post-İnönü era. This comprehensive analysis is expected
to contribute to a nuanced understanding of the İsmet İnönü era’s impact on
democracy in Turkey which could highlight the complexities and challenges
faced during his tenure. The critical examination of the various dimensions,
the study will provide valuable insights for scholars, policymakers as well as
for any expert who is interested in Turkey’s democratic history and in the
ongoing democratic journey.
I. Introduction
İnönü’s era has some shortcomings of democracy and this deficiency can be
attributed to a variety of factors. On the top of the list comes the legacy of
single party regime, which had established a strong and centralized state but
had also suppressed its political opposition and dissent. This legacy shaped
the Turkish politics even after the establishment of multi-party system in 1946
while Republican People’s Party (CHP) remained the dominant political
force in the country. As second comes the challenges of nation-building
in a diverse and fragmented society in which various ethnic and religious
groups competed for political representation and resources. Moreover, other
factors usually have been external elements such as the World War II and the
Cold War which had exerted significant influence on Turkish politics. This
exertion often led to İnönü government to attribute prioritity on security
and stability rather than democracy.
The lack of democratic competence and tradition coupled with the
economic and financial conditions in Turkey of the time as well as the
conjuncture of international and domestic politics contributed a lot to the
deterioration of image of İnönü and his administration in the minds the
Turkish society, which is still not recovered today. Such perception may arise
from many reasons but it can be claimed that İnönü and his administration
paid little attention to the heavy burden on the masses created by the negative
effects of the World War II. The problems on the Turks’ shoulder had been
İbrahim Yorgun | 133
accumulated due to the long-standing economic, political and socio-cultural
dynamics since the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, İnönü
administration failed to communicate its political agenda to the critical mass
in the society which was more concerned about the household matters than
İnönü’s grand but ambivalent international political tactics that aimed to
protect their beloved country from the imperialists’ games during the World
War II.
This era marked a crucial period in Turkish history characterized by
political, social, and economic transformations. İsmet İnönü, the second
President of Turkey and the leader of the Republican People’s Party (CHP),
played a central role in shaping Turkey future of the time. Although on the
one hand, İnönü is often glorified for his efforts in consolidating the young
Turkish Republic and promoting modernization, but on the other hand, it
is essential to critically examine the democratic shortcomings that emerged
during his tenure. For such an examination, the study will seek to provide
an in-depth analysis of the factors hindering the development of democracy
during İnönü’s tenure.
Therefore, the political landscape of the time is called attention as being
one of the key elements; so, the study tries to explore the political restrictions
that were in place, limiting the participation of opposition parties and
curtailing political pluralism (Karpat, 1959). The dominance of the CHP
and its suppression of alternative political voices significantly impacted
democratic representation by diminishing chances of citizens to engage
in a diverse and inclusive political process (Akşin, 2007). The study also
examines the various mechanisms used to stifle dissenting voices, including
restrictive laws and regulations, censorship, and the control of media outlets
(Karpat, 1996 & Arabacı, 2014).
Furthermore, the study brings forth the issue of one-party rule during the
İnönü era. Despite the establishment of a multi-party system after 1945, the
CHP continued its domination over the political landscape, often hindering
the development of a truly competitive and pluralistic democracy (Karpat,
1959 & Özdemir, 2014 & Bayır, 2011). The concentration of power and the
absence of a robust opposition (Çaylak & Nişancı, 2010) had far-reaching
implications for democratic decision-making and the accountability of the
CHP of the time.
The analysis also encompasses the electoral practices employed during
İnönü’s era while examining the fairness and transparency of elections,
assessing the extent to which democratic principles were upheld. The study
will touch upon the socio-cultural dynamics which played a significant
134 | İsmet İnönü Era: Assessing the Challenges of Democracy in Turkey
role in understanding the democratic landscape of the İnönü era. To
critically comprehend the era, the modernization policies pursued under
İnönü’s leadership and their impact on social transformation should also
be examined. The analysis of social transformation helps us to delve into
the tensions that arose between traditional values and cultural constraints
by shedding light on the challenges faced by the less represented groups
and the inclusiveness of the political system. Furthermore, such analysis
would be less comprehensive without the investigation of the economic
policies implemented during the İnönü era. Thus, the study assesses İnönü’s
economic vision and development strategies, analyzing their implications
for socio-economic disparities and democratic participation. The assessment
also includes the distribution of wealth, access to resources, and the
concentration of economic power in relation to their effects on political
power dynamics and on the overall democratic landscape.
At the final stage, international relations and foreign policy approach of
the time are analysed by pointing out how İnönü’s foreign policy stance
impacted democracy in Turkey and therefore, influenced the country’s
international standing. This is carried out through an examination outlining
the role of external factors in shaping Turkey’s democratic development.
To conclude, the study will attempt to provide a comprehensive analysis
of the İsmet İnönü era in Turkey. To reach this aim, it will critically examine
the challenges and shortcomings faced by democracy of the time. This study
aims to put forth a multifaceted understanding of the lack of democracy
during the İnönü era thanks to the exploration of various dimensions such
as political restrictions, limitations on freedom, one-party rule, electoral
systems, socio-cultural dynamics, economic policies and foreign relations. A
comprehensive assessment of the historical, political, social, and economic
contexts, the study tries to shed light on the complex interplay of factors
which influenced democratic practices at that time. Ultimately, this
particular method and analysis aim to contribute to a nuanced understanding
of the era’s impact on democracy in Turkey and to provide insights and
recommendations for future of democracy in Turkey.
1.1. Historical Background
Spanning from 1938 to 1950, the İsmet İnönü era represented a
critical period in the early years of the Turkish Republic. After the years
under Mustafa Kemal Atatürk during when the fundamental principles of
secularism, nationalism, and republicanism were established, İnönü assumed
the presidency after Atatürk’s death in 1938. His term and tenure presented
İbrahim Yorgun | 135
a formidable task of upholding and furthering the nation-building project
(Shaw & Shaw,2006) while maneuvering though the intricate web of
domestic and international politics.
The core aim of İnönü’s administration was to consolidate the gains
obtained during Atatürk’s time and to propel the country through
significant socio-political transformations (Karpat, 1959). This grand
agenda encompassed various characteristics such as the modernization
of infrastructure, the expansion of educational opportunities, the
industrialization of the economy and the promotion of a secular society
(Selek, 2020). İnönü’s efforts intended to position Turkey as a modern
country with a progressive nation on the global stage.
Despite these advancements, the era was also recalled with certain
democratic deficiencies and limitations. How hard İnönü government
attempted some significant efforts in order to establish and to maintain a
stable political system, an overarching dominance of the Republican People’s
Party (CHP) observed during that time which hindered the development of
a vibrant multi-party democracy (Ahmad, 2007) in Turkey. The dominance
of CHP led the emergence of an environment where alternative political
voices met significant obstacles hindering a gain of representation and an
influence on policy decisions.
To comprehensively understand the mentioned challenges of the time,
the political, social, economic, and cultural dynamics of the İnönü era
should be assessed concerning their implications for democratic governance.
Through an examination of both the achievements and shortcomings
of İnönü’s leadership in fostering a democratic society, multiple valuable
insights can be gained regarding the complexities and intricacies of
democratic development during this period which may pave the way for a
more informed understanding of Turkey’s political landscape.
1.2. Research Objective and Scope
The primary aim of this academic work is to assess the challenges of
Turkish democracy during the İnönü’s era. Thanks to an examination of
multiple dimensions, the study will attempt to provide a comprehensive
analysis of the democratic deficiencies and limitations which characterized
İnönü’s tenure. The research also aims to point out the implications of these
challenges for Turkey’s democratic development.
The time frame of this study is primarily concentrated on the İsmet İnönü
era stretching from 1938 to 1950. It tries to analyze the key events, policies,
and socio-political dynamics during the mentioned time period. The study
136 | İsmet İnönü Era: Assessing the Challenges of Democracy in Turkey
attempts a depiction the time by drawing on historical records, academic
research, and scholarly analyses so as to present a thorough examination
of the challenges to democracy and their broader implications for Turkey’s
democratic trajectory.
II. Political Landscape during the İsmet İnönü Era
2.1 Succession from Mustafa Kemal Atatürk
The İsmet İnönü era commenced with the transition of power from
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founding father of modern Turkey. Atatürk’s
visionary leadership (Yangıl & Başpınar, 2022) had set the foundation for a
democratic and secular state. He concentrated on principles like nationalism,
republicanism, and secularism. Being the general commander of the Turkish
War of Independence, he successfully led the country through a period of
intense transformation resembling European renaissance (Akgün, 2006)
and established the Republic of Turkey in 1923.
Apparently, this transition of power has marked a critical turning point
in Turkey’s political history. In spite of the similarities of Atatürk and İnönü
concerning the leadership styles in the establishment and early years of the
Turkish Republic, their approaches to governance differed in significant
ways (Aydemir, 1967).
On the one hand Atatürk was known for his firm commitment to
democratic ideals and a vision of a modern, Western-oriented state while
emphasizing the importance of pluralism, public participation, and the
rule of law. He also aimed to create a secular and progressive society
(Karal, 1998) which would distance themselves from the constraints of
the Ottoman Empire and would choose to align with European values.
On the other hand, İnönü followed a more centralized and authoritative
style of leadership. As the second president of the Turkish Republic, he
faced the challenge of sustaining the nation-building project which started
during Atatürk’s time. İnönü found himself navigating the complexities
of domestic and international politics (Aydemir, 1967). At this point, it
should be accepted that İnönü’s approach to governance was shaped by
the political context of the time, including the challenges of maintaining
stability in a volatile region and protecting the gains obtained under
Atatürk’s leadership. Therefore, İsmet İnönü prioritized the preservation
of national unity and security against the external threats such as the World
War II and the rise of fascism in Europe (Hale, 2002). Moreover, İnönü’s
tenure indicated a departure from Atatürk’s more pluralistic and inclusive
vision of democracy (Aydemir, 1967 & Karpat, 2004 & Hür, 2015). On
İbrahim Yorgun | 137
the issues like the pursuit of secularism and modernization, İnönü rather
tended towards centralization of power within the state apparatus. Such
concentration of power required for quick decision-making and effective
implementation of policies. However, this method led more restricted
political pluralism and the space for alternative voices and perspectives
(Karpat, 2004).
In other words, the mentioned transition also stood for a shift from
the charismatic and transformative leadership to a more pragmatic and
managerial style of governance (Karpat, 2004 & Hür, 2015). İnönü’s
leadership signified a focus on stability and consensus-building as well as
a priority over the stability of the newly established republic in contrast to
rapid and radical changes (Aydemir, 1967). By doing so, İnönü aimed to
solidify the gains obtained during Atatürk’s time and guide Turkey through
some significant socio-political transformations (Karpat, 2004).
Furthermore, the centralization of power and the consolidation of
authority under CHP limited the checks and balances which would be
required for a more vibrant and pluralistic democracy (Karpat, 1996). Albeit
the İnönü’s relative success in terms of economic development, infrastructure
and social reforms, the democratic deficiencies and limitations during his
tenure cannot be overlooked.
In brief, İnönü’s era was categorized as a more centralized and
authoritative style of governance (Akşin, 2007). Therefore, it is crucial
to understanding the transition and its implications when assessing the
challenges of democracy during the İnönü era and shaping the trajectory of
democratic governance in Turkey.
2.2 The Role of the Republican People’s Party (CHP)
It should be once more emphasized that CHP had a key role during the
İnönü era since it exerted a significant influence over Turkish politics of the
time. It had been the leading force in the struggle for independence and the
establishment of the Turkish Republic during Atatürk’s time. When İnönü
assumed presidency, the CHP also maintained its dominance in Turkish
politics, effectively becoming the ruling party. However, during İnönü’s
rule, he served not only the president of the country but also the leader
of the CHP, which was a sort of consolidation of power within a single
political entity. Interestingly, the CHP’s influence extended beyond the
political realm. It exerted its control over the military, the judiciary and the
bureaucracy (Karpat, 1996 & Yılmaz et al., 2013). This power concentration
had significant implications for democratic governance in Turkey.
138 | İsmet İnönü Era: Assessing the Challenges of Democracy in Turkey
On the top of the list comes the restrictive effect of the dominance
of the CHP on the political pluralism and the development of a vibrant
multiparty system. CHP’s firm control over the space for opposition parties
to thrive and effectively challenge the status quo was much restricted
(Yılmaz et al., 2013). This inhibited political competition and provided
very limited choices available to voters; eventually hindered the democratic
representation (VanderLippe, 2005). Second comes the influence of the
CHP over state institutions. This raised concerns about accountability and
transparency (VanderLippe, 2005) on the government rule in Turkey. It
would be claimed that the strong ties between the ruling party and the
bureaucracy, the military as well as the judiciary deteriorated the checks and
balances necessary for a healthy democratic system (Karpat, 1996). This
weakness also limited the ability of these institutions to act independently
and undermined their role as impartial arbiters in the political process
(VanderLippe, 2005).
Furthermore, the CHP’s control over state resources and its patronage
networks created a conducive environment so that it would maintain its grip
on power (Karpat, 1959). This situation also had implications for the fair
representation of diverse interests. Additionally, it hindered the development
of a responsive and inclusive political system (Karpat, 1959 & Hür, 2015)
until 1946. The dominance of the CHP also had repercussions for the
democratic rights of opposition parties and individuals critical of the ruling
party. Opposition and alternative political voices were often suppressed. This
suppression cultivated only a handful of political pluralism and thus resulted
in a curtailment of civil liberties (Karpat, 2004 & Arabacı, 2014).
Nevertheless, it is important to pinpoint that the CHP’s influence was
not entirely negative during the İnönü era. The party assumed a crucial
role in preserving the secular and nationalist principles established by
Atatürk (Selek, 2020). It also launched social and economic reforms aimed
at modernizing the country and improving living standards of the Turks.
These included many initiatives and programs in education such as Village
Institutes (Köy Enstitüleri), halkevleri (community houses), etc, women’s
rights and infrastructure development (Aydemir,1967 & Ahmad, 2007 &
Selek, 2020). No matter how good some policies and reform programs were,
the concentration of power within the CHP as well as the limited space for
political competition presented significant challenges to democracy during
the İnönü era (Karpat, 1959). It restricted the ability of citizens to freely
express their political preferences, participate in decision-making processes,
and hold the government accountable.
İbrahim Yorgun | 139
In other words, CHP maintained its dominance in Turkish politics and
exerting significant influence over state institutions while the party’s role
in preserving the principles of secularism and nationalism and its efforts in
social and economic development were noteworthy. Yet, its concentrated
power restricted political pluralism, accountability and the fair representation
of diverse interests (Karpat, 1959 & Karpat, 2004). Understanding the role
of the CHP is crucial for assessing the challenges of democracy during the
İnönü era and shaping the trajectory of democratic governance in Turkey.
2.3 One-Party Rule and Consolidation of Power
One-party rule under the CHP was the characteristics of the period.
Led by İsmet İnönü, the CHP had a dominant position in Turkish politics,
which allowed for the consolidation of power within a single political entity
(Karpat, 1959). This consolidation had also significant implications for
democratic governance during the mentioned period. The space for political
pluralism and the development of a competitive multiparty system was
much limited (VanderLippe, 2005). Thus, a vigorous opposition lacked
which weakened the checks and balances of a healthy democratic system.
More so, it gave an opportunity to the CHP to exercise its authority with
minimal accountability and oversight (Karpat, 2004 & VanderLippe, 2005).
Such a conduct resulted in concerns about transparency, accountability, and
the protection of civil liberties and hindered the development of a culture
of political competition due to the lack of dissenting voices and alternative
political perspectives which were often suppressed (Karpat, 2004 &
VanderLippe, 2005) until the establishment of Democrat Party (DP) in
1946. This situation meant the existence of deprived citizens of meaningful
choices in the political process (Karpat, 1959 & Özdemir, 2014). But it also
had more implications for the functioning of state institutions where and
which close alignment between the party and the bureaucracy, military, and
judiciary (Karpat, 1996 & Yılmaz et al., 2013) existed during the İnönü era.
III. Electoral System and Political Participation
3.1 Analysis of Electoral Practices
An analysis of the electoral practices during the İsmet İnönü era would
provide valuable insights concerning the level and the state of democracy
as well as the challenges it faced in Turkey. Although the elections were
held at regular period and intervals, the nature of these elections as well
as their political context created some controversy regarding their fairness,
competitiveness, and representativeness (Karpat, 1959).
140 | İsmet İnönü Era: Assessing the Challenges of Democracy in Turkey
The valid electoral system of the period was a sort of proportional
representation system. Its aim, based on the percentage of votes received
by each political party, was to ensure a fair distribution of seats in the
parliament. Albeit this proportional representation system, the dominance
of the CHP put barriers to the effectiveness of electoral competition and
political pluralism (Sayarı & Esmer, 2002) to a certain extent.
Among the key challenges of the electoral practice analysis during this
era was the limited space for opposition parties to operate and effectively
challenge the ruling party (Karpat, 1959 & VanderLippe, 2005). The CHP’s
stronghold on political power which coupled with restrictions on political
freedoms and the suppression of dissent eventually created an uneven play
field for opposition parties (VanderLippe, 2005 & Arabacı, 2014). This
imbalance apparently disrupted their ability and capacity to gain significant
traction and thus, it undermined the democratic principle of political
competition particularly during 1946 elections (Sayarı & Esmer, 2002).
Furthermore, the political climate during the elections was not a smooth,
flexible and conducive one. On the contrary, it was packed by restrictions
on freedom of expression and limitations on the activities of opposition
parties. Over and above the independent media circles faced censorship and
repression (Arabacı, 2014 & Hür, 2015) which resulted in a lack of diverse
voices and perspectives in the public sphere. Additionally, the opposition
parties often encountered obstacles while they carried out their campaign
efforts. The dissent voices had very limited access to state resources, met
with biased media coverage as well as faced with restrictions on public
gatherings and rallies (Sayarı & Esmer, 2002 & Arabacı, 2014). All these
negative outlooks raised concerns about the fairness of electoral processes
and the ability of opposition parties to compete on equal footing (Sayarı &
Esmer, 2002 & VanderLippe, 2005).
Moreover, there emerged reports of electoral irregularities and allegations
of voter intimidation during this period (Çelebi, 2015). Such situations
and practices further undermined the credibility and legitimacy of the
electoral outcomes and finally eroded public trust in the democratic process
(VanderLippe, 2005). The lack of reliable mechanisms to investigate and to
address such allegations contributed, to a certain degree, to the emergence
of a sense of disillusionment and frustration among opposition parties and
the community which supports them (Karpat, 2004 & Hür, 2015). It is
very important to state that despite all the challenges and limitations faced
by the opposition parties, they did participate in elections during the İnönü
era. Yet still, their success in the elections was often limited when the CHP
İbrahim Yorgun | 141
continually maintained a substantial majority in the Turkish parliament. This
hegemony was further strengthened the image of the CHP as the one-party
rule and it hindered the development of a more pluralistic and competitive
political landscape (Sayarı & Esmer, 2002).
3.2 Challenges to Political Representation
One should also examine the challenges to political representation
during the İsmet İnönü era which would shed light on the complexities of
democratic governance in Turkey. Despite the regular elections, granting a
meaningful political representation was a significant hurdle due to various
factors which limited the voice and participation of diverse groups and
perspectives (Sayarı & Esmer, 2002).
Among the significant challenges was the dominance of the CHP, which
hindered the representation of alternative political ideologies and one way
or another led the marginalization of dissent voices (VanderLippe, 2005).
The CHP firmly controlled the state institutions and its resources which, in
return, provided it with a significant advantage. This relative advantage of
CHP made it inconvenient for opposition parties to gain significant traction;
let alone to effectively represent the interests of their constituents (Sayarı &
Esmer, 2002 & Arabacı, 2014). Therefore, voters met with very constrained
choices as a result of the limited political pluralism and the absence of an
adequate multiparty system until 1946. Furthermore, this lack of viable
opposition entity in the form of a political party resulted in a reduction
of the diversity of political options. This also limited the ability of citizens
to express their preferences and have their voices heard (Sayarı & Esmer,
2002). Interestingly, even after 1946, opposition parties faced hurdles in
their campaign efforts, had very limited access to state resources and met
with biased media coverage (Arabacı, 2014 & Hür, 2015). As a result of
these challenges, their ability to engage with constituents weakened, they
were not able convey their policy proposals, and would not mobilize support
at the levels they sought for.
The limited inclusion of less represented groups in the political process
would be another challenge. Not only women and ethnic minorities but also
other marginalized communities faced barriers to political participation and
representation (Karpat, 1996 & Karpat, 2004). Apparently, the patriarchal
norms of the society and some structural barriers prevented women from
fully engaging in politics. This situation resulted in their underrepresentation
in elected positions (Caporal, 1982 & Yeşilorman, 2010). Similarly, ethnic
minorities both struggled to gain worthwhile representation (Bali, 1998)
142 | İsmet İnönü Era: Assessing the Challenges of Democracy in Turkey
and faced challenges during when sought ways in which their specific needs
and interests adequately addressed (Zürcher, 2003 & Vanderlippe, 2005).
What’s more, the concentration of power within the CHP also limited
the influence of individual members of parliament. Besides, decision-
making processes often centered around party elites (Sayarı, 2014 &
VanderLippe,2005) leaving little room for individual MPs so as to voice
issues related to their constituents and thus, for the contribution to policy-
making. Eventually, such practice influenced the patronage networks
and clientelism, which triggered further complication on the political
representation. Depending on the loyalty to the CHP, access to resources
and opportunities would be granted (Sayarı, 2011) which undermined
meritocracy and fair representation.
3.3 Impact on Democratic Decision-Making
The İsmet İnönü era had a substantial impact on democratic decision-
making processes. Although the decisions were made thanks to the formal
institutions, the concentration of power, limited political pluralism as well as
the hegemony of the CHP over the politics and policy-making had significant
implications for the inclusiveness, transparency and accountability of the
decision-making process. CHP under İnönü administration implemented
a centralized decision-making structure. İsmet İnönü held two strategic
positions at once, as the president of Turkey and as the leader of the CHP
(Aydemir, 1967). İnönü’s choice consolidated power in his hands and limited
the influence of other political actors, which resulted in a top-down approach
to decision-making. Within the boundaries of such an implementation, key
policies and reforms were often driven by party elites in contrast to some
extensive consultation and consensus-building processes (Karpat, 2004
& VanderLippe, 2005 & Arabacı, 2014). The lack of effective opposition
and limited political competition further hindered democratic decision-
making. Instead of a sound checks and balances system, there existed a lack
of rigorous scrutiny and debate over policies and initiatives which were
put forth by the ruling party. This understanding eventually limited the
diversity of perspectives and alternative policy options which were closely
related to the decision-making processes. This method indispensably led to
suboptimal outcomes and reduced a meaningful responsiveness to citizen
needs (Arabacı, 2014).
Finally, the lack of transparency in decision-making processes further
eroded public trust in the government and democratic institutions. Due to
the deficiency in adequate mechanisms for public participation and in access
İbrahim Yorgun | 143
to information, citizens were often informed very little about the rationale
behind decisions (Karpat, 1996 & Hür, 2015) and the interests being
served. Such unawareness contributed to a sense of disenfranchisement and
undermined the legitimacy of the decision-making process (Karpat, 1959).
IV. Freedom of Expression and Media Landscape
4.1 Limitations on Freedom of Speech:
One of the controversial issues during the İsmet İnönü era was the
limitations imposed on freedom of speech. Even though, the Turkish
Constitution guaranteed freedom of expression, restrictions and practices
initiated by the CHP curtailed this fundamental democratic right. The İnönü
government, in an effort to maintain control and prevent dissent, enforced
laws which restricted freedom of speech, particularly when it came to
criticizing state policies and officials (Hür, 2015). Criticism of government
actions, political ideologies, and even of the CHP often brought censorship,
persecution and legal repercussions (Arabacı, 2014).
Furthermore, limitations on freedom of speech were reinforced by the
government’s influence over the judiciary and state institutions. Cases
involving alleged insults against state officials or contentious political
opinions were often prosecuted. This led to self-censorship in the society
and among the media entities (Çelikiz & Kuzucanlı, 2019). Such a climate
bearing fear and self-censorship had a chilling impact on the open public
discourse and the free exchange of ideas.
4.2 Media Restrictions and State Control:
The media during the İsmet İnönü era, particularly before the transition
to multi-party period was under a significant state control and was imposed
some restrictions. The CHP firmly exerted influence over media entities so
as to shape the narrative and to control the dissemination of information
(Arabacı, 2014). On the one hand, the İnönü government had and did
not hesitate to use the power to grant or revoke broadcasting licenses. This
power allowed the İnönü government to control the media landscape and
limit the diversity of voices. On the other hand, state-controlled media
entities, such as radio stations or newspapers served as mouthpieces for the
government and propagated the CHP’s ideology (Yeşilçayır, 2011). The
dominance of state-controlled media inevitably diminished the availability
of diverse perspectives and critical analysis. Additionally, independent media
entities faced considerable challenges such as censorship, harassment, and
legal obstacles. Interestingly, journalists and media organizations which
144 | İsmet İnönü Era: Assessing the Challenges of Democracy in Turkey
criticized the government often ended up with intimidation, arrests and even
imprisonment (Yeşilçayır, 2011). Related laws and legislation, particularly
during the years before 1946, when the multi-party decision was announced,
were made use of in order to suppress independent journalism and to limit
the ability of media entities which otherwise would operate freely (Arabacı,
2014 & Çelikiz & Kuzucanlı, 2019).
4.3 Implications for Public Discourse and Democratic
Participation:
The restrictions on freedom of expression as well as on media entities had
profound implications for public discourse and democratic participation.
The deficiency of diverse perspectives and the suppression of opposing views
undermined the free ideas required in a vibrant democracy. The controlled
media environment and restrictions on freedom of speech deprived the
citizens of access to unbiased information and critical analysis which
hindered their capacity to make informed decisions. It would be claimed at
this point that the lack of open public discourse and the absence of a vigorous
exchange of ideas can potentially leave citizens in the dark without proper
opportunities to engage in meaningful political discussions and shape public
opinion (U.S. Agency for International Development, 1999). Regrettably,
the limitations on freedom of expression and media restrictions supressed
democratic participation during İnönü era. Ability to express the opinions
belonging to the members of the Turkish society and their right to criticize
policies were constrained to a certain degree while it was expected that
society would hold their leaders accountable (Arabacı, 2014). The absence
of democratic participation eroded the citizen engagement and weakened
the responsiveness of the government to the needs and aspirations of the
people (VanderLippe, 2005 & Tikveş, 1979).
V. Socio-Cultural Dynamics and Democracy
5.1 Modernization Policies and Social Transformation:
The modernization policies during the İsmet İnönü era aimed to bring
about social transformation and align the country with Western norms and
values. These policies encompassed various issues of the society, including
education, women’s rights and urban development (Zürcher, 2003).
When it comes to education, İnönü administration concentrated on
expanding access to education services and on improving the literacy rates.
His government made efforts in order to establish more schools, particularly
in rural areas, and to enhance the quality of education provided to the local
İbrahim Yorgun | 145
community. The objective of the modernization of the education system
was to equip citizens with the knowledge and skills required for economic
development and social progress (Karpat, 1996).
Moreover, women’s rights and gender equality also received attention
during İnönü’s tenure. His government eagerly initiated policies so as to
improve women’s access to education, healthcare as well as to the employment
opportunities. Legal reforms introduced during Atatürk’s presidency such as
granting women the right to vote and run for public office in 1934 were
deeply rooted and exercised during the İnönü’s presidency. The reforms
launched by both presidents represented important steps towards gender
equality, although challenges remained in terms of addressing deep-rooted
social norms and cultural constraints that hindered the full realization of
women’s rights (Caporal, 1982).
In line with women’s rights and gender equality, the urban development
projects were among the other significant modernization efforts of the time.
The İnönü government initiated various projects to improve infrastructure,
enhance living conditions and foster economic growth in cities. Urban
planning aimed to create modern and organized urban environments which
would cater to the needs of a rapidly changing society. However, these
projects, too were not without challenges, as they sometimes resulted in
the displacement of underprivileged members of the community and the
erosion of cultural heritage (Yılmaz, 2022).
5.2 Traditional Values and Cultural Constraints:
Despite the existence of the modernization efforts, traditional values and
cultural constraints continued to be enforced during the İsmet İnönü era.
Turkey’s cultural construction was deeply rooted in long-standing norms,
practices as well as values, which often created barriers to democratic
ideals and individual freedoms (Karpat, 1996). Likewise, conservative
social attitudes and religious values had a significant role in shaping
societal expectations and in limiting the scope of social change (Mardin,
2006). Traditional norms around gender roles, family structures and social
hierarchies restricted the autonomy and agency of individuals and even
particularly of women and the less represented groups. It was understood
that these cultural constraints restricted full participation in public life and
delayed the realization of democratic values (Mardin, 2006).
Moreover, the influence of religious institutions and conservative forces
remained strong during İnönü’s presidency. This situation further limited
the recognition of diverse identities and obstructed the progress towards
146 | İsmet İnönü Era: Assessing the Challenges of Democracy in Turkey
a more inclusive democracy. The conservative values sometimes clashed
with the ideals of individual freedoms, pluralism, and the rights of minority
groups (Karpat, 2004 & VanderLippe, 2005).
5.3 Inclusiveness and Less Represented Groups:
The İsmet İnönü era also witnessed varying degrees of inclusiveness
for less represented groups in Turkish society. While efforts were made
to promote equality and social justice, certain groups, such as ethnic and
religious minorities, faced discrimination and marginalization (Bali, 1998).
Ethnic groups such as Kurds and minorities like Armenians time to time
encountered challenges related to cultural recognition (Uçar, 2018), language
rights, and political representation. Certain degree of discrimination, limited
access to opportunities and cultural policies caused their demoralization and
reluctance for full participation in political and social spheres. The struggles
experienced by these groups underlined the importance of eliminating
structural inequalities and promoting inclusive policies which would
recognize and respect their rights (Serter, 2017). Similarly, religious minority
groups faced limitations in terms of religious freedom and the preservation
of their cultural heritage (Bakan, Selahattin & Levent, Ramazan, 2018).
Orthodox Christians, for example, confronted restrictions on the operation
of their religious institutions and the preservation of their religious practices.
Such applications negatively influenced their ability to freely practice their
faith and fully participate in society.
VI. Economic Policies and their Democratic Implications
6.1 İnönü’s Economic Vision and Development Strategies:
Significant economic policies and development strategies which aim
to foster economic growth and modernization were observed during the
İsmet İnönü era (Karpat, 1996). The Turhish government’s economic
vision was the result of the principles of state intervention and planned
economic development (Şeker, 2011). The emphasis on import substitution
industrialization (ISI), one of the key elements of economic policies was
extensively implemented. This method aimed to reduce dependency on
foreign goods by promoting domestic production and self-sufficiency. The
government also used protective measures such as import tariffs, quotas and
subsidies to support domestic industries. By doing so, İnönü administration
planned to stimulate industrialization, create employment opportunities and
eventually and enhance economic independence (Aydemir, 1967 &. Pala,
2010)
İbrahim Yorgun | 147
Furthermore, İnönü’s government followed some specific economic
policies to strengthen the agricultural sector as it was recognized as one
of the strategic sectors for the country’s overall development (Pala, 2010).
Additionally, land reforms, particularly under Çiftçiyi Topraklandırma
Kanunu (Law of Providing Land to Farmer) of 1945, were introduced to
redistribute land and promote equity in landownership (Aydemir, 1967).
Besides, agricultural cooperatives were established aiming to improve
productivity and support rural communities.
6.2 Socio-economic Disparities and Democratic Participation:
On the one hand while İnönü’s economic policies planned to foster
economic development, they also supported socio-economic disparities
within Turkish society. The particular emphasis on industrialization and
urbanization gave way to a concentration of economic opportunities in urban
areas which exacerbated the rural-urban regions (Pala, 2010). Nonetheless,
this disparity intensified challenges in the form of resources, infrastructure,
and public services for rural populations.
Furthermore, economic power was concentrated in the hands of a few
industrialists and landowners which led to perpetuation of socio-economic
inequalities (Metinsoy, 2007). Besides, the elite class kept enjoying privileges
and influence over the state and the economy while groups with fewer
opportunities and workers ended up with limited economic prospects and
struggled to have their voices heard. This situation meant that concentration
of wealth and power in the hands of a few would undermine the principles
of political equality and would abolish the ability of ordinary citizens to
participate meaningfully in political decision-making processes (Metinsoy,
2007). Economic inequalities inevitably led to unequal access to education,
healthcare and some other essential services (Pala, 2010), which would put
barriers to full democratic participation.
6.3 Impact on Political Power Dynamics:
İnönü’s economic policies also influenced political power dynamics
in Turkey. The extensive use of state intervention in the economy and
the establishment of state-led development institutions (Uluatam, 2023)
created an environment where the power in the hands of the state and its
bureaucratic apparatus (Metinsoy, 2007). This centralized power structure
gave way to political decision-making processes and limited the autonomy
of local governments and civil society organizations.
148 | İsmet İnönü Era: Assessing the Challenges of Democracy in Turkey
This situation allowed for the manipulation of economic opportunities
for political purposes. Political elites received an opportunity to use
economic incentives or constraints to influence political outcomes and
maintain their grip on power. These dynamics created challenges related
to political pluralism and democratic governance (Karpat, 1959 & Karpat,
1996), because it hindered different political actors to compete on an equal
footing.
VII. International Relations and Foreign Policy
7.1 İnönü’s Foreign Policy Approach:
The foreign policy approach during İnönü’s tenure indicated a commitment
to neutrality, non-alignment and maintaining peaceful relations with other
countries (Aydemir, 1967). İnönü’s foreign policy aimed to protect and
advance Turkish interests while avoiding entanglement when conflicts of the
global powers were concerned (Aydemir, 1967 & Selek, 2020).
İnönü’s government kept following a policy of balance and pragmatism.
They sought to navigate the complex international landscape and secure
Turkey’s sovereignty and territorial integrity (Karpat, 2004). In this
approach establishing strong diplomatic ties with a diverse range of
countries, maintaining relations with both Western powers and neighboring
states were prioritized.
However, this approach also faced with many challenges and attempted
to navigate through the aftermath of World War II and the emerging Cold
War dynamics (Hale, 2002). Yet still the country met with pressures from
both Western and Eastern blocs requesting Turkey to align its foreign
policy accordingly. İnönü had an extensive experience in his past; therefore,
carefully maneuvered between these competing pressures so as to safeguard
Turkey’s national interests while avoiding direct involvement in the Cold
War confrontation (Zürcher, 2003 & Ahmad, 2007).
7.2 Democracy and International Standing:
President İnönü made efforts to enhance Turkey’s international standing
and desired to create an image of a modern and democratic country in the eye
of the western world. He was well aware of the importance of international
perception and worked to strengthen Turkey’s ties with other nations,
particularly in Europe and in North America. For example, Turkey’s accession
to the Council of Europe in 1949 was one of the significant cornerstones of
İnönü’s foreign policy. It was believed that this membership gave a signal
İbrahim Yorgun | 149
to the democratic world that Turkey was committed to democratic values
and would eagerly align the country with the principles of the European
community. Membership to the Council of Europe provided an opportunity
for Turkey to engage in intergovernmental cooperation, fostered cultural
exchange and promoted democratic norms (Oran, 2009).
In parallel to the Council of Europe, Turkey’s membership in international
organizations, such as the United Nations, was significant as these indicated its
international standing. Therefore, İnönü’s government actively participated
in multilateral forums and attempted to advocate for peace, stability, and the
protection of human rights on the global stage (Oran, 2009).
Nonetheless, it is important at this stage to note that the perception of
Turkey’s democracy varied among international actors (Hale, 2002). While
some countries recognized Turkey’s efforts in democratization, others,
such as the Soviet Russia fearing to lose Turkey to the western camp or
some others regarding Turkey as non-western, raised concerns about
the limitations on civil liberties and political freedoms during the İnönü
era. These contradictory perceptions influenced Turkey’s standing in the
international community and shaped its foreign relations (Tuncer, 2023).
7.3 External Influences on Democracy in Turkey:
Geopolitical situation and location of Turkey as well as its interactions
with other countries had influenced the country’s domestic politics and
democratic development. Particularly, the geopolitical dynamics of the Cold
War era had a significant effect on Turkey’s democracy journey. Especially,
The United States and other Western powers wished and worked to
maintain Turkey as a reliable ally against the Soviet Union, which often
prioritized Turkey’s stability over democratic reforms (Armaoğlu, 2017).
This understanding inevitably paved the way for instances where democratic
shortcomings were overlooked or tolerated in the interest of preserving
the strategic alliance; interestingly enough, this even continued during the
Democrat Party (DP) period under Adnan Menderes’ period. Furthermore,
the geopolitical rivalry between the Eastern and Western blocs also affected
Turkey’s internal dynamics. For example, the Soviet Union and its socialist
ideology influenced some segments of Turkish society which gave way to
political polarization and challenges to democratic governance. Additionally,
regional conflicts and tensions, such as the Cyprus issue, were not very
much in favor of Turkey’s democracy (Karpat, 2004 & Oran, 2009). These
conflicts and Turkey’s reactions had some degree of complicated results for
civil liberties, human rights, and the rule of law.
150 | İsmet İnönü Era: Assessing the Challenges of Democracy in Turkey
VIII. Assessing the Legacy of the İsmet İnönü Era
8.1 Evaluation of Democratic Gains and Losses:
The İnönü’s tenure had an indication of a mixed legacy in terms of
democratic gains and losses. On one hand, İnönü’s government attempted
and worked extensively to establish a modern and secular state, promoted
economic development and positioned Turkey on the international
stage. A particular emphasis on education, healthcare, and social welfare
programs was observed; and these initiatives and programs contributed to
improvements in the quality of life for many Turks (Karpat, 1996 & Karpat,
2004 & VanderLippe, 2005). Nevertheless, one should acknowledge the
limitations on political freedoms and civil liberties during this period.
Moreover, the suppression of opposition parties, restrictions on freedom
of expression and limitations on democratic participation barricaded the
full realization of democratic ideals. These hardships led the creation of an
environment where opposing views were suppressed and political power
was concentrated in the hands of the ruling party, if not in the hands of
few elites.
8.2 Lessons Learned for Turkey’s Democratic Development:
The era of this comprehensive study offers valuable lessons for Turkey’s
democratic development. First of all, the significance of a reliable and viable
multiparty system and political pluralism for the functioning of a healthy
democracy should be highlighted. On the other hand, the concentration of
power in a single party bears a shortcoming. It may lead to the erosion of
democratic institutions and hinder the checks and balances system which is
required for accountability and transparency.
Finally, the İnönü era emphasizes the importance of protecting civil
liberties, freedom of expression as well as the right to dissent. It should
be pinpointed that is essential for democratic discourse and the protection
of individual rights to have a vibrant and inclusive public sphere in which
diverse voices can be heard. The İnönü era also demonstrated the requirement
for continuous efforts to strengthen democratic institutions so as to ensure
the rule of law and to promote transparent and accountable governance. A
democratic system needs a strong foundation which was built on respect for
human rights, equality before the law as well as sound checks and balances
system.
İbrahim Yorgun | 151
8.3 Implications for the Post-İnönü Era:
The İsmet İnönü era had left a legacy for the post-İnönü era of Turkey.
Apparently, the issues and achievements of this period shaped the political
landscape and influenced subsequent governments’ policies and approaches
to democracy. The İnönü administration’s limitations on political freedoms
and the concentration of power within the CHP tolled the alarm bells for
democratic reforms and a more inclusive political system. The struggles of
democracy gained momentum in the following years which paved the way
to significant political and constitutional changes.
The experiences and the lessons of the İsmet İnönü era helped us to
serve as a reminder of the complexities and trade-offs inherent in democratic
transitions, which also highlighted the need for a continuous commitment
to democratic values, the protection of human rights as well as the inclusion
of less represented groups in the political process.
Finally, the era studied in this comprehensive work left significant
marks in terms of democratic gains and losses. On the one hand, it offered
important lessons for Turkey’s democratic development but on the other
hand it also emphasized the importance of political pluralism, safeguarding
civil liberties and strengthening democratic institutions. The experiences of
this era will continue to shape Turkey’s political landscape in the future in
order to contribute to the ongoing efforts to build and sustain a vibrant and
inclusive democracy.
IX. Conclusion
9.1 Recapitulation of Key Findings:
Stretching from 1938 to 1950, the İsmet İnönü era was a period with
significant socio-political changes and challenges to democracy. Throughout
this study, we have attempted to analyze various aspects of democratic
governance by examining both the achievements and limitations.
Section 2 attempted to explore the succession from Mustafa Kemal
Atatürk and İnönü’s role in shaping the political landscape. The smooth
transition of power from Atatürk to İnönü demonstrated the institutional
strength of the Turkish Republic and set a precedent for the peaceful transfer
of leadership. This transition laid the foundation for İnönü’s policies and
provided him with the mandate to continue Atatürk’s vision of a modern,
secular and democratic Turkey.
152 | İsmet İnönü Era: Assessing the Challenges of Democracy in Turkey
Section 3 examined the consolidation of power and the dominance of the
CHP during the İnönü’s tenure. The CHP, under İnönü’s leadership, aimed
to establish a single-party rule, which led to limited political pluralism and
hindered the development of a sound and sustaianle democratic system. The
suppression of opposition parties, such as the Democrat Party, through legal
and political means further constrained the democratic space.
Sections 4 and 5 tried to put forth the limitations on freedom of
expression, media restrictions and socio-cultural dynamics. During the
mentioned period, there were notable limitations on freedom of speech.
Opposing views which were critical of the government were often silenced
or persecuted. This included journalists, intellectuals and political activists
who faced censorship, imprisonment or exile.
The media landscape was heavily regulated and controlled by the state.
There was a limitation of the plurality of voices and suppression of the
critical reporting. State-controlled newspapers and radio broadcasting served
as propaganda tools to promote the ruling party’s narrative and suppress
alternative viewpoints.
Human rights conditions during the İnönü era were mixed. While
there were efforts to promote education, healthcare and social welfare
programs, certain civil liberties and individual freedoms were restricted. The
government’s focus on modernization sometimes came at the expense of
traditional values. This led to tensions between social transformation and
cultural constraints.
Inclusiveness and the rights of less represented groups were also areas
where the İnönü era faced challenges. While there were some advancements
in education in the forms of Village Institute, community houses, women’s
rights and gender equality, progress remained limited. Other marginalized
groups, such as ethnic minorities, faced cultural restrictions on their rights
to preserve their distinct identities.
Section 6 focused on economic policies and their implications for
democracy. İnönü’s economic vision aimed to modernize Turkey and promote
development. This included industrialization, infrastructure projects as
well as social welfare programs. While these policies contributed to the
overall improvement in the quality of life for many Turks, socio-economic
disparities persisted and democratic participation was influenced by unequal
access to resources and opportunities. In Section 7, we discussed how Turkey
integrated with the western block and used membership mechanisms to
improve her democracy and open its regime to a multi-party system.
İbrahim Yorgun | 153
9.2 Final Thoughts on the İsmet İnönü Era and Democracy in
Turkey:
The İnönü era left some legacy with lessons to be utilized for democracy
in Turkey. In spite of the notable achievements in terms of modernization,
economic development and international standing, there existed significant
limitations on political freedoms, civil liberties and inclusive democratic
practices.
It is expected to learn from the experiences of the era and draw lessons for
Turkey’s democratic development. The importance of a vibrant and inclusive
public sphere, where diverse voices can freely express their opinions and
contribute to democratic discourse, is needed to avoid the limitations on
political pluralism, to foster freedom of expression and civil liberties.
This era also reminds one the requirement to continuously strengthen
democratic institutions, ensure the rule of law and promote transparent and
accountable governance. It should also be pointed out that a democratic
system needs a sound checks and balances mechanism, the protection of
human rights and equal opportunities for all citizens.
With the passage of decades and time since Turkey moves forward, it is
crucial to address the challenges that persist and work towards building a
more inclusive and established and viable democracy. It should always be
remembered that fostering political pluralism, safeguarding civil liberties,
promoting human rights, and ensuring transparent and accountable
governance are fundamental pillars for the advancement of democracy in
Turkey.
To conclude, the İsmet İnönü era was a period which had both
the democratic achievements and the limitations. By reflecting on the
experiences of this era and striving for continuous improvement, Turkey is
expected to navigate the complexities of democratic governance and work
towards a more inclusive and vibrant democracy that upholds the rights and
aspirations of its citizens.
154 | İsmet İnönü Era: Assessing the Challenges of Democracy in Turkey
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157
Chapter 8
The Political Psychology of ‘China Threat’:
Perceptions and Emotions
Ulaş Başar Gezgin1
Abstract
In this study we first briefly introduced political psychology of international
relations, and moved to the notion of threat perceptions in political
psychology which extends from national threats to group threats. Thirdly,
we focused on the so-called ‘China threat’ which is mostly considered as a
theory, a perception, a discourse or a thesis, but also as an issue, a theme, a
hypothesis, a notion, a charge, a narrative, a debate, an image, a coverage,
a topic, a school of thought, a public discourse, a story, a perspective, a
proposition, a specter, a view, a syndrome, a school, a fear, a sentiment, an
idea, a terminology, a rhetoric, a possibility, a mentality, and an atmosphere,
in the order of frequency. We also see other scholars preferring to use
‘the so-called China threat’ as they don’t believe it. The notion of ‘China
threat’ is mostly associated with China’s military build-up which is visible
in South China / East Vietnam Sea territorial disputes. China is at odd
with most of its neighbors due to its revisionist moves. Emotions play a
role in all parties to the conflict including the Asian neighbors and U.S..
Chinese government, reminiscent of the past humiliations, wants to be
respected; but China’s military moves are viewed with fear, mistrust and
suspicion among other parties. National threat perceptions are updated
accordingly. As a response to China’s rise, conservatives and Republicans
support containment policies, while the liberal and Democrat response is
engagement. This division is also related to the attitudes towards Chinese
people and Chinese government. China has its own logic in its moves,
but to what extent it is rational is to be disputed. The study concludes
with further discussions about China’s rise, considering the possibility of
peaceful rise or confrontation.
1 Ulaş Başar Gezgin, Istanbul Galata University, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, Department
of Psychology, ulas.gezgin@galata.edu.tr, ORCID ID: 0000-0002-6075-3501
https://doi.org/10.58830/ozgur.pub167.c748
158 | The Political Psychology of ‘China Threat’: Perceptions and Emotions
Introduction
Views on ‘International Relations’ from the perspective of political
psychology are not new. Even in the past, such views were put to work in the
Cold War era to maintain peace, or at least non-aggression. Nevertheless, we
need to be careful: Not everything can be explained by psychology. Goldgeier
and Tetlock (2001) rightly argue that the application of psychology to
‘International Relations’ is not necessarily reductionist. Instead, it is possible
to discuss the issue by uncovering the hidden psychological assumptions
of ‘International Relations’ theories and frameworks (Kertzer & Tingley,
2018). From a psychological point of view, as listed in Ripley (1993), the
primary actors of ‘International Relations’ are foreign policy elites rather
than states; these elites have their own interpretation of situations (Larson,
1988); ‘International Relations’, then, is a matter of problem solving; and
information is the key to ‘International Relations’ (Ripley, 1993). On the
other hand, Mercer (2005) correctly argues that psychology in ‘International
Relations’ is not only about prejudices and errors, but also about making the
right decisions.
According to Gildea (2020), the biggest problem in applying the political
psychological understanding to ‘International Relations’ is the problem
of aggregates, since psychology includes individuals and ‘International
Relations’ includes the state and others (Stein, 2017). On the other hand,
Gildea (2020) considers this to be a minor issue on a deeper analysis.
Also, social psychology is more relevant because of its analysis of decision-
making within the group. Another perspective would be to classify states
psychologically, for example by personality traits.
A potential avenue for a psychological understanding of ‘International
Relations’ goes to game theory; however, this theory has been criticized for not
including the interpretations of competitors (Larson, 1988). Prospect theory
is another candidate for applying psychological knowledge to ‘International
Relations’ (see Berejikian, 2002; Boettcher III, 1995, 2004; Farnham,
1992; Levy, 1992a, 1992b, 1997; McDermott, 1992, 2004; Schaub Jr,
2004; Shafir, 1992; Vis, 2011); however, the risks, gains and losses in policy
making are rarely measurable, unlike in laboratory settings (Gildea, 2020).
In this context, there is a practical dilemma: While political psychology-
inspired empirical research is increasing in ‘International Relations’ (see
Hyde, 2015; Mintz, Yang, & McDermott, 2011), their validity in real life
is a big problem. In a study, different results can be obtained depending on
whether the research is conducted before and after events such as September
11 (see Bourne Jr, Healy, & Beer, 2003). It is also debatable to what extent
Ulaş Başar Gezgin | 159
experiments with average people, and students in particular, can be applied
to the elite in foreign policy decision-making positions.
Recently, there has been a movement from cold cognition to hot cognition
and emotions in ‘International Relations’ and political psychology (Erişen,
2013a, 2013b; Kertzer & Tingley, 2018). Emotions emerge as a new set of
variables that need to be investigated in the political psychology of the field
of ‘International Relations’ (Erişen, 2012; Gries, 2005). In this context,
Rathbun (2009) defines fear as a generalized lack of trust under social
uncertainty; this means a lack of information that includes the intentions of
others in the context of ‘International Relations’.
As a result, many clues await to look at ‘International Relations’ from the
perspective of political psychology. More research needs to be done, and a
blend of scientific knowledge and current politics is needed.
The Political Psychology of Threat Perceptions
The concept of threat perception is one of the concepts that connects
political psychology and ‘International Relations’ (Stein, 2013; 1988). In
the example of the Iraq War, it can be said that the White House exaggerated
the threat posed by the Saddam regime, while Saddam underestimated the
American threat (Stein, 2013). Both autocratic and democratic states often
exaggerate external threats, as they serve political functions such as building
unity (Larson, 1997) or making people forget the real problems of society.
Enemies are dehumanized in a political psychological sense, they are not
considered human (Herrmann, 2013). Military overconfidence is also a
common mistake in foreign policy decision-making (Levy, 2013). Wars
are expected to be short-lived, but this rarely happens. The White House
had thought that in the invasion of Iraq, the Iraqi people would embrace
the American soldiers as the bringers of democracy. This is an example of
military optimism…
The perception of threat is actually a situation that makes it difficult
to distinguish the real from the unreal in many respects. Politicians may
deliberately scratch the threat. The Iran-Iraq War can be given as an example
from both sides. On the other hand, sometimes politicians mistakenly
exaggerate or underestimate the threat. The basis of some regimes is the
perception of threat. The first to come to mind would be North Korea and
Cuba. In these countries, the perception of threat is justified.
Traditionally, national threat perceptions are salient in threat perceptions
literature (see Blank, 2008; Chourchoulis, 2012; Darwich, 2016; Farnham,
2003; Fordham, 1998; Gries et al., 2009; Jung, 2010; Kemmelmeier,
160 | The Political Psychology of ‘China Threat’: Perceptions and Emotions
& Winter, 2000; Minkina, 2011; Ridout, Grosse, & Appleton, 2008;
Sinkkonen, & Elovainio, 2020; Tamaki, 2012; Vinayaraj, 2009; Zhu, 2002).
Threat of nuclear war had been added to this during the Cold War (see
Lebovic, 2009; Mayton II, 1986; Schatz, & Fiske, 1992). However, recently,
for many societies, threat perceptions moved from the Cold War mentality
towards terrorism (Goodwin, Willson, & Stanley Jr, 2005; Leventhal, &
Chellaney, 1988; Malhotra & Popp, 2012; Nissen et al., 2015; Pelletier, &
Drozda-Senkowska, 2016; Stevens et al., 2011), foreigners (Watts, 1996),
minorities (Canetti-Nisim, Ariely, & Halperin, 2008; Tahir, Kunst, & Sam,
2019; Verkuyten, 2009), refugees (Thomsen, & Rafiqi, 2020), immigrants
and/or immigration (Araújo et al., 2019; Badea, Bender, & Korda, 2020;
Ben-Nun Bloom, Arikan, & Lahav, 2015; Bianco, Kosic, & Pierro, 2022;
Blinder, & Lundgren, 2019; Canetti et al., 2016; Erisen, & Kentmen-Cin,
2017; Escandell, & Ceobanu, 2009; Ha & Jang, 2015; Kiehne, & Cadenas,
2021; Kustov, 2019; Larsen et al., 2009; McLaren, 2003; Paxton & Mughan,
2006; Pereira, Vala, & Costa‐Lopes, 2010; Thomsen, & Rafiqi, 2020; Vala,
Pereira, & Ramos, 2006; Woods, & Marciniak, 2017), climate change
(Carmi & Kimhi, 2015; Davydova et al., 2018; Schwaller et al., 2020),
disasters (Bodas et al., 2019; Losee, Smith, & Webster, 2021; Tønnessen,
Mårdberg, & Weisæth, 2002) and more recently disease (Covid 19) (Adam-
Troian, & Bagci, 2021; Bonetto et al., 2021; Calvillo et al., 2020; Clarke,
Klas, & Dyos, 2021; Maftei, & Holman, 2021; Paredes et al., 2021).
Threat perception increases Right Wing Authoritarian (RWA) attitudes
and support for authoritarian systems with a vicious cycle from the other
direction (Russo, Roccato, & Merlone, 2020). Political conservatism and
racial prejudice predict the threat perceptions (Vala, Pereira, & Ramos,
2006). RWA is associated with negative views of asylum seekers (Onraet
et al., 2021), while contact with the immigrants reduces threat perceptions
(McLaren, 2003). On the other hand, terror threat perception moves the
public opinion towards hawkish foreign policy (Gadarian, 2010), restriction
of civil liberties (Sekerdej, & Kossowska, 2011), and even in favor of torture
(Conrad et al., 2018). Additionally, higher education level is found to be
associated with less support for hawkish policies (Kim, 2015). Against terror
threat, partisan divisions are overcome (Malhotra & Popp, 2012). Threat
perception and political conservatism are correlated, although definitions
broadly matter (Crawford, 2017). People under terrorism threat vote more
for right wing parties (Getmansky, & Zeitzoff, 2014). Threat perception is
also related with prejudice levels (Sari, 2007).
In the international relations literature, a number of works can be
mentioned as examples of interstate threat perceptions (e.g. Almomani,
Ulaş Başar Gezgin | 161
2019; Balakrishnan, & Varkkey, 2017; Ballard, 2008; Behera, 2021; Fathir,
Johan, & Ab Raman, 2018; Gause III, 2003; He, 2012; Katagiri, 2018; Kim,
2013; Lee, 2018; Liao, & Whiting, 1973; Matonytė, & Morkevičius, 2009;
Peleo, 2015; Russo, 2016; Sasaki, 2010; Seongji, 2009; Staniland, Mir, &
Lalwani, 2018; Viraphol, 1985; Yuan, 1998). The notion of ‘Russian threat’
is a popular subject in the relevant literature (see Thornton, & Karagiannis,
2016). After Ukraine’s invasion, this notion is no longer believed to be a
myth (Gezgin, 2022). It appears as a realistic threat in a number of country’s
policy considerations (for instance, Lithuania (Nevinskaitė, 2017)) as
well as NATO’s (Kendall-Taylor, & Edmonds, 2019). On the other hand,
Russia feels threatened by America’s new weapons (Bartles, 2017). Fears
and anxieties are bidirectional (Gezgin, 2022). American view of Russia
drastically changed after Ukraine invasion in 2014 (Ambrosio, 2017). The
United States started to consider Russia as a threat and as a future violator
of international norms (Ambrosio, 2017). As early as 1997, Alexandrova
(1997) asks “The Russian Threat—Real or Imaginary?” As of 2022, the
answer is clear. On the other hand, according to Simons (2019), ‘Russia
threat’ is just a narrative seen in Western media, and Russia, in these
portrayals is scapegoated. Obviously, there are different sides to the conflict
with their own particular views. Tsygankov (2013) reminds us that NATO-
Russia mistrust is grounded in the Cold War, so it is hard to fix it.
China’s rise mostly fueled fear and anxiety among world powers and
neighboring states. Shifrinson (2018), for instance, asks “Should the United
States fear China’s rise?” Likewise, Zhou (2008) asks “Does China’s rise
threaten the United States?” Abe (2003) asks “Is “China Fear” Warranted?”
Jiang (2002) asks: “Will China be a “Threat” to Its Neighbors and the
World in the Twenty First Century?” Other notable questions in this context
are “Will China’s rise be peaceful?” (Toje, 2017), “Will China’s rise lead to
war?” (Glaser, 2011), and “Can China’s Rise Continue without Conflict?”
(van der Pijl, 2017).
Khoo (2011) notes that key actors in Northeast Asia respond to China’s
rise with fear. Chubb, & McAllister (2021), Jain & McCarthy (2016) and
Zhixin (2018) argue that Australia views China’s rise with fear and anxiety.
Pan (2014) is among those noting anxieties of Indo-Pacific Alliance powers
vis-à-vis China’s rise. Zhang Y. (2013) even calls those emotions as ‘China
anxiety’. On the other hand, China is also anxious of U.S. military power
(Riqiang, 2013).
Pillsbury (2012) lists 16 basic fears of China which are:
“Fear of an island blockade
162 | The Political Psychology of ‘China Threat’: Perceptions and Emotions
Fear of a loss of maritime resources
Fear of the choking-off of sea lines of communication
Fear of a land invasion or territorial dismemberment
Fear of an armoured or airborne attack
Fear of internal instability, riots, civil war or terrorism
Fear of attacks on pipelines
Fear of aircraft-carrier strikes
Fear of major air-strikes
Fear of Taiwanese independence
Fear of insufficient forces to ‘liberate’ Taiwan
Fear of attacks on strategic missile forces by commandos, jamming or
precision strikes
Fear of escalation and loss of control
Fear of cyber attack
Fear of attacks on anti-satellite capabilities
Fear of regional neighbours India, Japan, Vietnam and Russia” (pp.152-
160).
The Political Psychology of ‘China Threat’
Now is the time to ask the key questions of the paper: Is China a threat?
To whom? Objectively or subjectively? Psychologically or economically?
What are the emotions and perceptions involved in viewing China as a
threat? These questions await comprehensive answers.
Before all, what is China threat? Goodman (2017) briefly defines ‘China
threat’ as “the fear of being taken over by China and the Chinese” (p.2). For
researchers, ‘China threat’ is
a theory (Arif, 2021; Aukia, 2017; Broomfield, 2003; Chansoria, 2011;
Christensen, 2006; Ding & Huang, 2011; Hsu, 2009; Jain, 2019; Kim,
2016; Kristensen, 2014; Lai, 2021; Larson, 2015; Larson, & Shevchenko,
2010; Lee, 2016, 2010; Liao, 2012; Liff & Ikenberry, 2014; Liu, 2020;
Lu, 2011; Okuda, 2016; Oren, 2019; Saalman, 2011a, 2011b; Sun, 2015;
Turner, 2013; Wang, 2010; Wang & Shoemaker, 2011; Wei‐cheng, 2015;
Yang & Liu, 2012; Yeremia, 2020; Zhang, 2015, 2013, 2013 October),
Ulaş Başar Gezgin | 163
a perception (Ambrosio, Schram, & Heopfner, 2020; Chengqiu, 2020;
Ding & Huang, 2011; Fitriani, 2018; Gao, 2021; Ikegami, 2009; Jung &
Jeong, 2016; Larson, 2015; Liao, 2012; Liff & Ikenberry, 2014; Machida,
2010; Mirilovic & Kim, 2016; Okuda, 2016; Peng, 2009; Saalman, 2011;
Sun, 2015; Wang, 2021; Wei‐cheng, 2015; Zaffran & Erwes, 2015),
an argument (Chu, 1994; Foot, 2009; Liao, 2012; Machida, 2010; Tsai
& Liu, 2019; Yang & Liu, 2012; Zhu & Lu, 2013),
a discourse (Gao, 2021; Goh, 2005; Gries, 2006; Gries, Crowson, &
Sandel, 2010; Johnson, 2018; Kim, 2021; Pintado Lobato, 2015),
a thesis (Kim, 2016; Ling, 2013; Machida, 2010; Pintado Lobato, 2015;
Zhai, 2019),
an issue (Broomfield, 2003; Oren, 2019; Yeoh, 2019),
a theme (Lee, 2010; Song, 2015),
a hypothesis (Kim, 2016, 2021),
a notion (Jerden, 2014; Liao, 2012),
a charge (Liao, 2019; Shih, 2005),
a narrative (Ambrosio, Schram, & Heopfner, 2020; Oren, 2019)
a debate (Yeoh, 2019; Zhang, 2001),
an image (Szilágyi, 2015; Xiang, 2013),
a coverage (Aukia, 2017; Yang & Liu, 2012)
a topic (Song, 2015),
a school of thought (Broomfield, 2003),
a public discourse (Goodman, 2017),
a story (Goodman, 2017),
a perspective (Machida, 2010),
a proposition (Machida, 2010),
a specter (Zaffran & Erwes, 2015),
a view (Okuda, 2016),
a syndrome (Liao, 2012),
a school (Foot, 2001),
a fear (Lee, 2010),
164 | The Political Psychology of ‘China Threat’: Perceptions and Emotions
a sentiment (Lu, 2011),
an idea (Foot, 2009),
a terminology (Oren & Brummer, 2020),
a rhetoric (Pintado Lobato, 2015),
a possibility (Brittingham, 2007)
a mentality (Goh, 2005), and
an atmosphere (Tsai & Liu, 2019).
Thus, China threat is mostly considered as a theory, perception,
argument, discourse and thesis which are mostly subjective and psychological
characterizations. Other than these, some other researchers such as Abe
(1996), Baginda (2021), Bhattacharya (2007), Chen (2021, 2012),
Cheng, & Zhang (1999), Chunlai (2002), Das (2013a, 2013b), Gross
(2007), Guang (2008), Ikenberry, Parmar, & Stokes (2018), Jung-seung
(2012), Kim (2009, 1998), Korolev (2019), Kwan (2003), Lai To (1997),
Lam (2005), Lee (2008), Lee, & Haupt (2020), Li (2013), Liu (2016),
Machida (2010), Marton, & Matura (2011), McDewitt (2014), Miranda
(2017), Nagy (2017), Ondriaš (2018), Qingguo (1996), Rawnsley
(2012), Richardson (2010), Sato (1998), Schneider, 2014; Scobell (2009),
Shambaugh (1996), Shee (2004), Shichor (1996), Shih (2011), Shih
& Huang (2015), Sismanidis (1994), Song (2015), Sukma (1994), Tan
(2011), Tarrósy (2017), Tungkeunkunt & Phuphakdi (2018), Turner (2013,
2009), Vuori (2018), Wang (2012, 2011, 2008, 2005, 2000), Wang, &
French (2013), Wang, & Rosenau (2009), Yang (2004), Yee & Storey
(2013), Yeophantong, & Shih (2021), Yuan (2001), Yuliantoro (2017),
Yunling (2016), Zhao (2020), Zhou (2009) don’t believe in truth of the
statement, thus they say ‘the so-called China threat’.
The rise of China is considered to be “a threat to the national interests
of the United States and Asian–Pacific security” (Broomfield, 2003, p.265).
U.S. media is the carrier of the ‘China threat’ perceptions as reflected in
changes in coverage of China-related news (Yang & Liu, 2012). Zhang
(2015) finds that American students do not have negative stereotypes about
Chinese, but nevertheless consider ‘China threat’ as serious. Okuda (2016)
discovers that English print media makes the audiences anxious about
China’s rise and America’s decline. Lai (2021) analyzes U.S. media coverage
on China and views U.S. media as ethnocentric in this context. However,
this study can be considered as incomplete without a comparative study
with Chinese media’s coverage of U.S. Wang & Shoemaker (2011), in this
Ulaş Başar Gezgin | 165
context, suggests that more cultural, social, human interest news should
be placed in American media about China, instead of political news only,
to promote a better understanding of China and a more favorable attitude
toward China.
Goodman (2017) proposes that ‘China threat’ perceptions are rooted
in early 20th century in Australia, but does not make any sense as the two
countries are important economic partners. On the other hand, China’s
military rise leads to unfavorable attitudes among its neighbors (Jung &
Jeong, 2016). Military modernization is at odds with the claims of peaceful
rise (Chansoria, 2011). China’s military build-up is viewed as an excuse
for more military spending in U.S., Japan and Australia (Zaffran & Erwes,
2015). This leads to a form of escalation very much reminiscent of the Cold
War era. China points out that American military involvement around China
increased (Liu, 2020). From Chinese side, U.S. appears to act arrogantly,
not respecting China (Liu, 2020; Zhang, 2013). For China, the Cold War
mentality continues in American foreign policy thinking (Liu, 2020). China
claims that U.S. wishes for the collapse of Chinese Communist Party through
a color revolution (Liu, 2020).
Arif (2021) “shows how threat assessment could trigger a spiral of
conflict through state’s tendency to overestimate threat level and its failure
to perceive that defensive behavior can be interpreted as offensive by the
belligerent” (p.120). Convergingly, Sun (2015) states that “If the US holds
that China’s growing military power threatens US vital interests, it may adopt
overly competitive military and foreign policies, which will in turn threaten
China and overall bilateral security” (p.94). Nevertheless, Arif (2021) is
optimistic: If the communication channels will be opened, misperceptions
will be corrected and accordingly, no Sino-American confrontation would
take place. Lai To (1997) note that lack of transparency in Chinese security
considerations contributes to the conflict through anxieties. On the other
hand, Zhang (2013) notes that “But the United States should avoid the
conceit that a given mode of behavior can be wrong for every other country
in the world but still right for the United States because of the purity of its
motives” (p.508).
In this context, Chinese defensive position is more or less the following:
“China has increased its military strength steadily due to its booming
economy. However, Chinese military modernization has been modest
compared with other countries in the region and its rapidly growing
economy. China focuses on economic development; it is not filling the
166 | The Political Psychology of ‘China Threat’: Perceptions and Emotions
“power vacuum” because there is no such vacuum left in the Asia-Pacific
region” (Chu, 1994, p.77).
Another defense is the following:
“Some people may claim that there is clear evidence of the real “China
threat,” such as the ever-increasing Chinese military might, persistent
nationalist indoctrination, global hunt for energy, and a market economy.
(…) These same events can be represented in a significantly different ways.
For example, China has strong reason to increase its national power, for
national self-defense and unification and to pursue social and economic
development” (Song, 2015, p.164).
Richardson (2010) warns that the so-called ‘China threat’ discussions
do not serve American interests, converging with Kim (2016). One should
consider looking ahead and try to influence Chinese policies. This can avoid
worst outcomes such as open confrontation. In an empirical study, Gries
& Crowson (2010) find that American conservatives, Republicans and
older respondents feel a higher level of ‘China threat’ and more anti-China.
Lowest educated respondents are found to be more negative about China
(Gries & Crowson, 2010). Liberals support engagement with China, while
conservatives are in favor of containment (Lee, 2016). The personality
variable of openness to new experience is found to be negatively correlated
with prejudice towards China and positively correlated with negative
attitudes towards Chinese government (Gries, Crowson, & Sandel, 2010).
Right wing authoritarianism (RWA) and social dominance orientation
(SDO) are also found to follow the same pattern (Gries, Crowson, &
Sandel, 2010). Obviously, there is a distinction between Chinese people
and Chinese government as attitude objects. Additionally, Crowson & Gries
(2010) find that RWA and SDO are correlated with the idea of containment.
Zhang (2013), on the other hand, argue that those in favor of containment
overestimate military strength of China, and underestimate their own. With
all its military bases in the region and fast-developing weapons technology,
U.S. is much superior than China (Zhang, 2013).
Al-Rodhan (2007) states that “Proponents of the “China threat” theory
argue that it is inconceivable for China to have a peaceful rise; a superpower
China will inevitably be a threat to the United States” (p.41), and argues that
such threat perceptions are exaggeration for various reasons. Jiang (2002)
adds that “(…) in terms of China’s low per capita GDP, its comparatively low
military budget, and the serious challenges in its domestic affairs, China’s
national power has not been increased to such an extent that it will threaten
the security of the region (…)” (p.55). Soeya (2002) argues that ‘China
Ulaş Başar Gezgin | 167
threat’ is a myth hiding other developments in the region. Ding (2000)
thinks that China can’t be a threat to U.S., as the former does not have
strong domestic defense industries. For Powles (2010), China can’t be a
security threat as it focuses on economic development. Xu (2011) does not
see China as an expansionist power; and Jalil (2019) views China as a status
quo power, not a revisionist one.
Yuan & Fu (2020) analyze U.S. threat perceptions with regard to
the Cold War USSR, wartime Japan, and current ‘foe’ China, and finds
continuities in the way American threat perceptions are framed. Additionally,
misperceptions lead to mistrust and further insecurity in Sino-American
relations (Gries, 2009; Gries & Jing, 2019). Uncertainty about China’s plans
lead to negative views (Kim, 2019). Furthermore, fundamental attribution
error is at play (cf. Beukel, 1992; Markedonov, & Suchkov, 2020; Reynolds,
2015): U.S. attributes China’s military build-up to hostile intentions rather
than circumstances (Moore, 2010). Same holds for Indonesian officials
(Yeremia, 2020). China’s military modernization makes U.S. and Taiwanese
anxious (Arif, 2021; Ding, & Huang, 2011). In turn, China fears a possible
declaration of Taiwanese independence (Lai To, 1997). However, Gries
(2005) contends that “Like all peoples, Chinese are neither innately pacifist
nor hardwired for conflict. Instead, history and culture shape how individual
Chinese will construe the events of world politics” (p.257).
Past terms to characterize the public opinion was ‘Yellow Peril’ and ‘Red
Menace’ (Chen, 2012), while a relatively new currency is ‘Sinophobia’ which
is shortly defined as “discrimination against Chinese” (Gao, 2021, np).
Sinophobia involves hatred which is another emotion that plays a role in
international relations. The notion of ‘China Threat’ is considered to be just
reframing of the past expressions (Chen, 2012).
Song (2015) reminds that ‘China threat’ can be a self-fulfilling prophecy.
For Broomfield (2003), Machida (2010), Zaffran & Erwes (2015), and
Zhou (2011), it is an exaggeration. For Ling (2013), it is old colonialism.
For Turner (2013), it is “contingent upon subjective interpretation” (p.21).
Turner (2013) notes that “throughout history ‘threats’ from China towards
the United States, rather than objectively verifiable phenomena, have always
been social constructions of American design and thus more than calculations
of material forces.” (p.1)
Zhai (2018) conducts surveys with Asian youth in 7 societies (Japan, the
Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, and Vietnam) and
finds that they are highly negative about China’s rise with the exception of
Thailand. Vietnamese, Japanese and Taiwanese youth hold most unfavorable
168 | The Political Psychology of ‘China Threat’: Perceptions and Emotions
attitudes towards China (Zhai, 2018). It is predicted that such a public
opinion will bring about more military spending among China’s neighbors.
Interestingly, listening to Chinese music is associated with more favorable
attitudes, while no such relationship exists between watching Chinese drama
and the attitudes. Zhai (2018) proposes that “China’s foreign policymaking
should take greater consideration of Asian public opinion rather than be
dominated by wishful thinking” (p.1). Likewise, Chu, Kang, & Huang
(2015) find that people from China’s neighboring countries hold less
positive views about China. In another study, Sonoda (2021) finds Vietnam
to be the most negative, Singapore and Indonesia more positive, and Japan
and South Korea were in-between.
China’s rise makes the country more self-confident (Wang, & Cui, 2011).
From a social psychological perspective, Lee (2016) argues that China’s
rise will be peaceful, unlike ‘China threat’ narratives. Also from a social
psychological view, Gries (2005) proposes that Sino-American relations
will not necessarily be competitive. Miller and Taylor (2016), Broomfield
(2003), He (2017), Kim (2016), and Machida (2010) agree with this
position noting the economic interdependence relations. Zhang (2013)
converges with Lee (2016) and Miller and Taylor (2016) stating that Sino-
American relations have been stable for the last three decades. In the same
vein, Jerden (2014) think that assertive China narrative is flawed.
Of course, the perceptions are not unilateral. China feels threatened with
America’s rebalancing strategy in the region which makes U.S. a revisionist
state from Chinese perspective (Arif, 2021). Abbasi, & Khalid (2021) argue
that Chinese nuclear program is a direct response to threat posed by American
nuclear arsenal. China has its own hardliners (hawks) and moderates (doves)
(Zaffran & Erwes, 2015). Lee (2016) provides an emotional description of
China’s behavior:
“For China, as greatly sensitized it still is to the painful memories of the
Century of Humiliation, the feeling of disrespect is likely to encourage a level
of anger that negatively biases perceptions, reduces demand for information,
and shortens decision times, consequently increasing both the degree and
probability of risk prone and aggressive behavior on its part” (p.45).
In that sense, it appears that Chinese state behavior is more emotional
and less rational than that of other great powers, comparable to Russia
whose Ukraine invasion is viewed as irrational, but emotionally predictable
considering the threat level, anxieties and fears (Gezgin, 2022). Lee (2016)
adds that “At the same time, however, China is likely to resort to violence when
others (especially the United States) show disrespect toward its sovereignty,
Ulaş Başar Gezgin | 169
even if rational calculations would suggest otherwise” (p.45). China feels to
be humiliated in the past (Kim, 2016) which color its judgements.
One point to be pessimistic about China’s rise is South China / East
Vietnam Sea dispute (Kim, 2019, 2016). Another is observed in Sino-
Indian border clashes (cf. Saalman, 2011). Thirdly, Sino-Japanese territorial
dispute is to be noted (cf. Nakano, 2015). Contrary to Broomfield (2003)’s
position, these all show that China is a revisionist power as to its borders,
although internationally speaking military involvement plays a minor role
in its economic investments in foreign countries. China stands as the new
regional hegemon, if not a global one yet (Jain, 2019). On the other hand,
South China / East Vietnam Sea dispute becomes an excuse for American
presence in the region (Kim, 2016). In fact, considering NATO’s expansion,
U.S. should also be considered as a revisionist power. Two revisionist powers
are more than enough to cause conflict in Asia-Pacific.
Conclusion
In this paper, we introduced political psychology of international
relations in short, and presented the notion of threat perceptions in political
psychology including national threats and group threats involving not only
states, but also immigrants. Then, we moved to the so-called ‘China threat’
which is viewed from different lenses by various scholars. Through providing
an overview, we showed how emotions are involved in interstate relations.
Further research is needed to learn more about the Chinese position referring
to sources in Chinese language.
How can China’s rise be peaceful? Ding, & Huang (2011), in the context
of Taiwan-PCR relations, recommends “cooperation with the mainland
in the field of non-traditional security, including combating transnational
crime, terrorism, drug trafficking, pandemic disease, disaster relief, and
humanitarian rescue” as “these areas are less politically sensitive” (p.50).
Same can be said for other parties to the conflict.
For the future of China’s rise, emotions and perceptions will continue to
influence the politics, as Chinese state is an emotional state doing everything
in order not to return to the era of humiliation. Taiwan policy will be the
key to other movements. Taiwan is also significant as it reminds China of
the past weaknesses of the colonial times. South China / East Vietnam Sea
will continue to boil, as China will continue to militarize the islands. On
the other hand, we will hear more about China not due to military build-
up but Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) (see Gezgin, 2020a, 2020b, 2021,
in pressa, inpressb, inpressc, inpressd). BRI has the potential to convince
170 | The Political Psychology of ‘China Threat’: Perceptions and Emotions
all powers that China’s rise will be peaceful. Although securitization of
some of the projects such as China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is
problematic, overall Chinese influence will be more visible in infrastructure
projects. Especially CPEC will make a big difference, as China’s South China
/East Vietnam Sea route-dependence will no longer be applicable (Gezgin
in pressa).
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) which is an ambitious set of international
infrastructure projects may shift Chinese activity away from China’s South
China /East Vietnam Sea, as the state will be busy in other regions of Asia
and the world. Contrary to this expectation, BRI can exacerbate the current
conflict at South China /East Vietnam Sea, as the Maritime Silk Road passes
through this territory. We will see which expectation will come true.
To sum up, China is expected to be known with international
infrastructural projects rather than military confrontations if U.S. would not
wage war against China. For China, all out confrontation will be detrimental
to economic interests, but as an emotional state, this risk can be taken to
avoid humiliation as previously explained.
Ulaş Başar Gezgin | 171
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191
Chapter 9
Usage of Local Foods in Regional Restaurants:
Sinop Example
Hasibe Yazıt1
Tuğçe Sivri2
Abstract
In recent years, it has been seen that tourists are curious about the local
foods in the regions they travel to and want to taste, as well as sightseeing,
seeing and entertainment activities. With the concept of gastronomy gaining
importance in recent years, it is understood that there has been an increase in
the interest of both local and foreign tourists for local foods. At this point,
especially accommodation and food and beverage businesses are trying to
meet this demand of both domestic and foreign tourists. For this reason, it
is seen that businesses tend to give more place to local tastes in their menus
recently. As a result of the literature review, no study was found on the use of
local dishes in the regional restaurants in Sinop Province. At this point, the
study was considered important and it was thought that it should be done.
The main purpose of this study; The aim is to determine the extent to which
the local dishes of the cuisine of Sinop are included in the menus of the food
and beverage businesses operating in Sinop and to reveal the forgetfulness
of the local dishes. The research was carried out by examining the menus
of 16 food and beverage companies located in the city center of Sinop. The
study was carried out using content analysis, one of the qualitative research
methods.
Introduction
Because people are social beings; In addition to being a phenomenon where
biological needs are met throughout history, eating has been a social tool
1 Assistant Professor, Sinop University, School of Tourism and Hotel Management, Department
of Gastronomy and Culinary Arts, hyazit@sinop.edu.tr, ORCID ID: 0000-0003-1055-5192
2 Sinop University, School of Tourism and Hotel Management, Department of Gastronomy
and Culinary Arts, tugcesivri3@gmail.com, ORCID ID: 0009-0008-5296-7703
https://doi.org/10.58830/ozgur.pub167.c754
192 | Usage of Local Foods in Regional Restaurants: Sinop Example
where individuals mingle with each other, share their joys and sorrows, and
carry out celebration and entertainment activities (Ciğerim, 2001).
Every society has a different cultural structure. The biggest factor in the
formation of this cultural structure is tradition, geographical feature, cuisine,
cooking techniques and eating and drinking habits. Eating habits, which
have continued since ancient times, since the existence of man, have the
same mentality, no matter how much they have changed today. Today, the
reason why local dishes are not preferred less than world cuisines is that local
dishes are not known and old recipes are not accessible.
Within the scope of this study, it is aimed to recognize and know the food
and beverage businesses operating in Sinop, how much Sinop includes local
dishes in their menus and to what extent the local dishes of the region are
recognized.
The Concept of Local Cuisine and Its Features
The word kitchen has passed into the Turkish language from the
Arabic word “matbah”, it means “the place where food is cooked, stored
and preserved”. Turkish cuisine has unique characteristics with its kitchen
structure-architecture, tools used, types of food, cooking styles, table setting,
serving styles, and foods prepared for winter (Çölbay and Sormaz, 2015:
1730).
The Turkish food culture, which was formed as a result of the blending of
the grains of Mesopotamia, the vegetables and fruits of the Mediterranean,
the spices of South Asia, and the use of meat and fermented dairy products
by the Central Asian nomadic people, has led to the formation of a rich
culinary culture due to the historical process (Güler, 2010: 25).
“The concept of local cuisine; We can define it as all of the foods and
beverages that are created as a result of combining local products and local
customs, cooked in their own ways by the local people, and designed with
religious or national feelings” (Şengül & Türkay, 2015:600). The concept
of local cuisine; Since it is a concept that includes local food and local food,
it cannot be considered separately from each other. Therefore, it would be
right to talk about the concept of local wherever there is a kitchen.
In the formation of local cuisines (Şengül and Türkay, 2015: 600);
• Traditions,
• Seasonal conditions,
• Geographical conditions,
Hasibe Yazıt / Tuğçe Sivri | 193
• National effects,
• Religious influences,
• Local food and beverage products
• The accumulation gained in the historical process can be effective.
Importance of Local Cuisine for Gastronomy Tourism
One of the most important factors that encourage people to travel is
that they want to know and experience the culinary culture of that country
(Pekyaman, 2008; Aslan et al., 2014). As a matter of fact, Pekyaman (2008)
states that most of the tourists visiting Turkey want to get to know and try
the foods of Turkish Culinary Culture. The fact that our country’s local food
culture offers rich options with regional differences creates an important
attraction point for foreign tourists as well as domestic tourists (Soner,
2013).
Sinop Culinary Culture
Sinop province is located between the Eastern and Western Black Sea
regions. It was founded on a peninsula surrounded by seas on three sides
at the northernmost tip of Turkey extending to the Black Sea (Provincial
Directorate of Tourism, 1992: 1). Due to the fact that different cultures live
in Sinop, the nutrition structure is basically based on grain products. It is
known that together with winter vegetables, quince and chestnut fruits are
also used in meals. In addition, it is seen that local dishes such as stewing,
spoon stickers, nokul, corn cake, islama, folding in Sinop cuisine are loved
and consumed in the region (Karaçar, Doğancili and Ak, 2018: 439).
The traces of Black Sea Cuisine and Marmara Cuisine can be seen among
the factors that make up the dishes of Sinop. Varieties of vegetable and
pastry dishes are dominant in Sinop region. However, meat dishes and fish
dishes are also prominent due to the fact that it is on the coast of the Black
Sea. At the same time, mountain herbs in the Sinop region are often used to
sweeten dishes.
Making and storing for the winter still continues in the Sinop kitchen.
For the winter, tomato paste, tomato juice and pickles are commonly made.
Generally, canned products are not used in Sinop cuisine.
When it comes to Sinop local dishes, the first things that come to mind
are; Sinop ravioli, Sinop Nuklu, Princess dessert are not limited to these. In
the tables below, there is a local menu and regional dishes / foods that have
geographical indication.
194 | Usage of Local Foods in Regional Restaurants: Sinop Example
Table 1. Sinop Dishes / Foods With Geographical Indication
Local Dishes / Foods With Geographical Indication
Sinop Spotted (2017)
Boyabat Stick Kebab (2020)
Boyabat Gazidere Tomato (2020)
Sinop Ravioli (2021)
Sinop Chestnut Honey (2021)
Source: ci.turkpatent.gov.tr
Table 2. Sinop Local Dishes
Traditional foods
Folding
Islama
Stuffed Pan
Leek with Vinegar
Bonito Steak
Keşkek
Pumpkin Pie (Squash Pie)
Chestnut Stuffed Rice
Spoon Sticker (Mamalika)
Corn soup
Corn Tarhana
Passover Dessert
Squeezed Dessert
Corn Cake
Princess Dessert
Method
In this research, it was aimed to determine the levels of Sinop Cuisine
Local Dishes in the menus of businesses operating in the province of Sinop
that provide food and beverage services. The research was carried out by
examining the menus of 16 food and beverage companies located in the city
center of Sinop. The study was carried out using content analysis, one of the
qualitative research methods.
Hasibe Yazıt / Tuğçe Sivri | 195
Content analysis is the careful, detailed and systematic examination and
interpretation of data with the aim of identifying patterns, themes, biases
and meanings related to the core of the research. The purpose of content
analysis is to reach concepts and relationships that can explain the data
obtained through the views of the participants and the file and document
review. (Baltacı, 2017; Guba and Lincoln, 1994; Maxwell, 2008; Pope et
al., 2006).
In the method, whether the local dishes of Sinop from past to present are
included in the menus of food and beverage businesses in Sinop was made
by creating a table. These findings are stated in the conclusion part.
Results
A table was created to indicate whether the soups, main courses and
desserts of Sinop province are included in the restaurant menus. In this
context, 16 restaurants included in the sample are given in Table 3.
Table 3. Inclusion of local dishes in Sinop province in restaurant menus
It has been observed that most of the restaurants included in the research
have Sinop ravioli, which is the local dish of Sinop province. However,
Boyabat pole kebab, folding, soaking, leeks with vinegar, keskek, pumpkin
noodle, stuffed rice with chestnut, spoon stickers, corn soup, pastry dessert,
squeezed dessert, corn cake were not found in any restaurant included in the
study.
Conclusion and Recommendations
In this research, which aims to determine the level of the local dishes of
Sinop cuisine in the menus of the restaurants operating in the province of
196 | Usage of Local Foods in Regional Restaurants: Sinop Example
Sinop, it has been determined that most of the restaurants included in the
research have been operating for many years.
It was determined that in none of the restaurants included in the study,
there were no local dishes of Sinop province such as Boyabat stick kebab,
folding, soaking, leek with vinegar, keskek, zucchini mince, chestnut stuffed
rice, spoon stickers, corn cake, and Sinop ravioli was the most local dish in
the menus of the restaurants. However, it was concluded that the local soups
of Sinop province, corn soup and corn tarhana, were not found in any of the
restaurants included in the research. It has been determined that most of the
restaurants included in the research have princess dessert, one of the local
desserts of Sinop, but not doughless dessert and squeezed dessert.
As a result of the negotiations with the restaurants, the reason why local
dishes are not included in the restaurant menus:
• Businesses think that they can make more profit by serving meals such
as fast food, the customer profile is in the plurality of students, and these
products are at the forefront in the menus due to their low cost and high
profit margin,
• The fact that local dishes are made at home and restaurants want to
produce and sell dishes that are different from home-cooked meals,
• Due to the difficult process steps and production stages of local dishes,
• The fact that the original local food recipes are not accessible,
• Not knowing all the local dishes of Sinop province by the tourists can
be shown as a reason.
As a result of the interviews with the restaurants, the following suggestions
can be made to include local dishes in the restaurant menus:
• Local dishes can be promoted more, and their recognition by the public
and tourists can be increased.
• Authorized institutions and organizations may issue incentive
certificates to businesses that make local food.
• Local food festivals can be organized in Sinop province to promote
local dishes.
• Gastronomy and Culinary Arts Department at Sinop University can
organize a local food day in Sinop and make presentations in a public place.
• Geographical indication of all Sinop local dishes can be ensured.
• Efforts can be made to preserve the original recipes of the local dishes
of the province of Sinop and to remain faithful.
Hasibe Yazıt / Tuğçe Sivri | 197
References
Baltaci, A.; (2019). Qualitative Research Process: How to Conduct a Qualita-
tive Research, Ahi Evran University Journal of Social Sciences Institute,
2019, Vol 5, No 2, Page 368-388
Erdem, Ö.; Metin, M. and Kemer, K. (2018). Usage of Local Foods in Regio-
nal Restaurants: The Case of Mengen, International Journal of Turkish
World Tourism Research, July-2018 Volume: 3 No: 1
Karaçar, E. ; Doğancalı, O. and Ak, S. (2018). A Value Unique to Sinop Cuisine
within the Scope of Gastronomic Values: Nokul, VII. Eastern Mediterra-
nean Tourism Symposium.
Nebioglu, O. ; (2021) . A Meta-Synthesis Study on Local Literature Examining
Local Dishes in the Menus of Restaurant Businesses, Alanya Academic
Review Journal, C:5, P:2, pp.1031-1047
Özel, G; Yıldız, F. and Vulture, M. (2017). Determining the Level of Inclusion
of Local Foods in Restaurant Menus: The Example of Kilis, Section Aca-
demy Magazine, No.11, December 2017
Seçim, Y. ; (2019) . A Study on the Culinary Culture of Sinop, 1st Internatıonal
Gastronomy and Culture Congress At: Malatya
Şengul, S. ; Turkay, O. (2016) . The Role of Local Cuisine Elements in Selecting
a Tourism Destination: The Example of Mudurnu, International Journal
of Management, Economics and Business, Vol 12, No 29, 2016
https://ci.turkpatent.gov.tr/ ( Access date: 15.06.2022)
https://blog.biletbayi.com/sinopun-yoresel-yemekleri.html/ (Access date:
15.06.2022)
https://www.gezinomi.com/gezi-rehberi/sinop-un-meshur-yemekleri-ve-resto-
ranlari.html (Access date: 15.06.2022)
https://sinop.ktb.gov.tr/ (Access date: 03.07.2022)
199
Chapter 10
From Happy Country to Happy City: The Case
of Bhutan for Sinop Tourism1
Ali Turan Bayram2
Yavuz Çetin3
Abstract
This study aims to determine to Sinop tourism development from the
perspective of non-marketing approach, based on the example of Bhutan. The
efforts of Bhutan and Sinop to create a tourism brand from the perspective
of happiness provide an opportunity to compare these two destinations
and see the pros and cons. Within the scope of the study, the positive and
negative aspects of Bhutan tourism strategies were discussed, and which
applications should be used in terms of Sinop tourism development and
which applications should be avoided. In this context, the importance of
developing proposals restricting tourist movements to Sinop under certain
conditions was emphasized. The efforts of Bhutan and Sinop to create a
tourism brand from the perspective of happiness provide an opportunity to
compare these two destinations and see the pros and cons.
Introduction
Sinop is considered as one of the important destinations for tourism with
its cultural and natural beauties. Especially its natural beauties come to
the forefront as an issue that increases its preferability. The results of the
“Daily Visitor/Tourist Satisfaction Survey” conducted in 2019 by the local
authorities also show that visitors who prefer Sinop primarily aim for natural
beauties. For this reason, it can be said that ensuring the sustainability of
Sinop tourism depends on the preservation of existing attractions. In this
1 This study is an extended version of the study presented as a paper in the Sinop Culture and
Tourism Symposium.
2 Assoc. Prof., Sinop University, School of Tourism and Hotel Management, Department of
Tourism Guidance.
3 Researcher
https://doi.org/10.58830/ozgur.pub167.c755
200 | From Happy Country to Happy City: The Case of Bhutan for Sinop Tourism
context, taking measures, determining strategies and realizing tourism within
the framework of a model are seen as a necessity in order to sustain Sinop
tourism. This study offers suggestions from the perspective of demarketing,
based on the example of Bhutan, for the development of Sinop tourism.
Demarketing
When the concept of marketing is mentioned, the idea of making as much
sales as possible by reaching all consumers with an aggressive sales technique
is widely mentioned. Sometimes it is desirable to reduce or restrict the sale
and use of goods and services. The concept of demarketing, which was first
introduced to the literature by Kotler and Levy in 1971 with an article, is
defined as “the set of activities aimed at reducing the desire to buy, temporarily
or permanently removing a general customer mass or a certain group of
customers from demanding” (Altınay ve Sert, 2012: 70). Demarketing
is an approach that can be applied in different ways. Demarketing can be
used to reduce demand when a limited product is produced, or to focus on
customers that it can serve better, to create a perception of scarcity (Memiş,
2017: 772) or to prevent the sale of a harmful product. In general terms,
the concept of demarketing includes obtaining maximum benefit from the
sale of goods and services by using resources efficiently. When the concept
of non-marketing within the tourism industry is considered on a destination
basis, the issue of carrying capacity comes to the fore. Destinations may
impose restrictions on tourist entry to protect their resources. Sometimes,
they can take advantage of various tax and bureaucratic obstacles to prevent
the carrying capacity from being exceeded. Carrying capacity is not only
seen as a concept that includes the number of visitors, but also social,
psychological and economic carrying capacity is important for destinations
as well as environmental carrying capacity (Bayram and Erkol Bayram,
2016: 26). The concept of demarketing can also be seen as an approach that
will prevent the environmental, social, psychological or economic carrying
capacity from being exceeded. In this context, the demarketing approach
can be used in order to get rid of the tolerance level of the local people,
tourist satisfaction or economic dependency. At this point, more studies
and practical applications are required to determine the effectiveness and
impact of demarketing tools on tourism patterns, physical environment and
economic environment (Beeton ve Benfield, 2002: 512).
Bhutan Tourism Policy
In the case of Bhutan, which is considered as an example of Sinop tourism,
some activities for demarketing have taken place, but over time, there has
Ali Turan Bayram / Yavuz Çetin | 201
been a tendency towards mass tourism. Although there is a gradual move
away from demarketing activities, examining the Bhutan example has been
seen as a contributing subject to Sinop tourism. Bhutan is a small landlocked
Himalayan Buddhist kingdom, with a total land area of 38,394 square
kilometers, located between two giant and populous nations, China to the
north and India to the south. It is considered one of the most outstanding
travel destinations in the World, as there was no tourist activity in Bhutan
until it opened its doors to the outside World for the coronation of the
fourth King in 1974 (Bhutan National Bureau of Statistics, 2021). The first
tourism activity started with 287 tourists visiting Bhutan in 1974. The only
existing international airport was opened in 1983. (Bhutan Tourism Council,
2021). Due to Bhutan’s unique culture and pristine environment, and the
uncertainty of protecting it from tourism’s undesirable effects, the country’s
leaders have over the years been careful not to become too dependent on
tourism. Therefore, the Royal Government of Bhutan (RGOB) has not
approved the tourism policies and guidelines currently implemented in the
country to prevent mass tourism (Nyaupane and Timothy, 2010).
Bhutan has earned a tremendous reputation in international markets as
the happiest nation in the world. This is because Bhutan follows the unique
development philosophy known as Gross National Happiness (GNP) rather
than Gross Domestic Product (GDP). However, with this, a great expectation
has arisen for tourists who have heard of the GNP. The concept of GNP is
built on four key items that give the happiness of individual citizens a higher
priority than the material wealth of the country alone. Bhutan Tourism
Council now uses GNP in its marketing strategies by developing a destination
brand slogan around the GNH philosophy: “Happiness is a place” with the
slogan aiming to become a unique tourism destination (Bhutan Tourism
Council, 2021). With this effective slogan, Bhutan is trying to dispel the
perception that Bhutan is expensive to reach and entry is made only with an
authorized visa and is also tightly controlled as a tourism destination. The
basis of tourism policy is based on the overall development philosophy of
Gross National Happiness (GNI) and aims to promote sustainable tourism
that meets the needs of current visitors and destinations while increasing and
providing opportunities for the future. Bhutan strives to provide cautious
tourism development that is within its socio-cultural and environmental
carrying capacity. Fees such as the Minimum Daily Package Fee (MGP) and
the Sustainable Development Fee are charged to tourists visiting the country
in accordance with the Bhutan Tourism Tax Law 2020 (Bhutan Tourism
Council, 2021). National policies implemented in Bhutanese tourism have
been shaped by the active participation of the public. In this way, the fact that
202 | From Happy Country to Happy City: The Case of Bhutan for Sinop Tourism
the people have a say in tourism development will prevent the social carrying
capacity and, accordingly, the psychological carrying capacity from being
exceeded. Bhutan, which has a tourism understanding beyond sustainable
mass tourism, has succeeded in developing tourism by preserving its natural
and cultural tourism resources (Song, 2019: 9). Teoh (2013) reports in
the study that Bhutan’s unique ‘controlled tourism’ model is based on the
principles of Gross National Happiness (GNH) and states that Gross National
Happiness includes indicators of protection of the natural environment,
promotion and development of culture, good governance, sustainable and
equitable socio-economic development. According to Khamrang (2013),
the community-based approach supported by the development philosophy
of Gross National Happiness (GNH) remains important for the success
of the tourism industry in the country. The effective and understanding
planning policy of tourism, the principle of “high value low volume”, has
made the country one of the most successful countries in the world in the
tourism sector.
After 2019, and especially with the increase in the popularity of the
destination, the low impact started to give way to the high impact and
“guests and pilgrims turned into tourists”, so the change in the tourist profile
started to change the shape of the industry not only in terms of numbers but
also in terms of behavior. The fact that the tourist profile that respects the
destination, local people and local culture is replaced by the standard mass
tourist has started to make Bhutan a luxury destination. With the increasing
number of visitors, problems such as traffic, security problems, decrease in
service quality, income smuggling, illegal tourism facilities, environmental
pollution, unguided tours, unethical practices have begun to come to the
fore (A Deep Dive into Tourism in Bhutan, 2019:2; Dhradhul, 2019:7).
Conclusion and Recommendations
Considering the Bhutan example, the early periods contain positive
examples for tourism development, but the events experienced in recent
years contain the points that destinations should pay attention to. When
considered at the scale of Sinop, an approach that is compatible with the
carrying capacity expressed in the Bhutan example and that embraces the
local culture should be adopted for tourism development period and the
protection of natural and cultural riches. A plan for Sinop tourism should be
determined with visitor restrictions in some regions and a general demarketing
approach in order to protect natural resources. For the development of
Sinop tourism, together with the “high value low impact” philosophy
in the example of Bhutan, the number of tourists should be limited and
Ali Turan Bayram / Yavuz Çetin | 203
high economic, social and environmental gains should be obtained from
tourism movements. A general demarketing strategy is suggested for the
development of Sinop tourism. Within the framework of this strategy, it is
possible to achieve high value through issues such as entrance fees for certain
areas in the city, accommodation and travel taxes to be collected from visitors,
and visa application. However, at this point, issues such as finding solutions
to problems such as landscaping, cleaning, traffic, restoring and protecting
cultural structures in accordance with their originality, increasing the quality
of service, highlighting the local people and local culture, increasing the
satisfaction by increasing the tourist experience should be carried out. The
demarketing strategy, which will try to be implemented before these issues
are realized, may adversely affect the tourism movements in the destination
rather than giving the expected effect.
The happy city slogan may not have much meaning on its own. In a
happy city, the happiness of not only those who live but also those who work
and earn from tourism is important. The happiness of tourism employees,
as the segment that provides the most interaction with tourists, creates the
perception of tourists Then happiness is realized not only in local people but
also in all stakeholders. As in the case of Bhutan, GNH should be developed
for Sinop as well. In this regard, issues such as developing policies for
employees, improving working conditions, and providing trainings emerge
as a necessity.
As a result, the advantages and disadvantages of tourism planning,
which aims the economic development in Bhutan together with ecological
elements, constitute an important example for Sinop. The example of
Bhutan, a niche non-seaside destination, would be more fortunate to be
taken as a model for Sinop tourism, as it has more tourism diversity than
Bhutan, as its ecological, historical and local population allows. With the
correct and effective construction of these issues, Sinop tourism will have
the potential to gain as much as Bhutan’s gains from the tourism sector.
However, these potential demarketing applications can be turned into gains
by applying at least in the designated areas of the destination. At this stage, in
which areas restrictions will be made for the development of Sinop tourism,
and on which issues taxation systems will be built, the Ministry of Culture
and Tourism, academics, tourism entrepreneurs, local people and all other
stakeholders should participate and approve.
204 | From Happy Country to Happy City: The Case of Bhutan for Sinop Tourism
References
A Deep Dive into Tourism in Bhutan, 2019). Editörial, The Druk Journal, 5(2),
2-6.
Altınay, A., Sert, S. (2012). Pazarlasak Da Mı Satsak Pazarlamasak Da Mı Sat-
sak? Pazarlamada Yeni Bir Boyut: De-Marketing (Pazarlamama) Kavramı,
Sosyal Ve Beşeri Bilimler Dergisi Cilt 4, No 1.
Bayram, A.T. ve Erkol Bayram, G. (2016), Sürdürülebilir Turizm Politikası ve
Planlaması (Editörler: Yaylı, A. Sürücü, Ö.) Özel İlgi Turizmi içinde, De-
tay Yayıncılık: Ankara.
Beeton, S. ve Benfield, R. (2002). Demand Control: The Case for Demarketing
as a Visitor and Environmental Management Tool, Journal of Sustainable
Tourism, 10(6), 497-513.
Bhutan National Bureau of Statistics (2021). (Erişim tarihi: 25/07/2021),
https://www.nsb.gov.bt/
Bhutan Tourism Council. (2021). (Erişim tarihi: 27/07/2021), https://www.
tourism.gov.bt/
Dhradhul, D. (2019). Tourism Policy-The Way Forward, The Druk Journal,
5(2), 7-10.
Khamrang, L. (2013). Modernisation, Globalisation and Development in Bhu-
tan: Tourism as a Catalyst, Journal of Management & Public Policy Vol.
5, No. 1, December 2013, Pp. 5-11.
Kotler, P. and Levy, S.J. (1971) Demarketing? Yes, Demarketing! Harvard Busi-
ness Review 49 (6), 74–80.
Memiş, S. (2017). Demarketing Kavramı Ve Uygulamadaki Bazı Örnekler,
Uluslararası Sosyal Araştırmalar Dergisi, Cilt: 10 Sayı: 50.
Nyaupane, G, P., Timothy, D, J. (2010). Power, Regionalism And Tourism Pol-
icy in Bhutan, Annals of Tourism Research, Vol. 37, No. 4, pp. 969–988,
2010.
Song, K.B. (2019). The Bhutan Brand. The Druk Journal, 5(2), 11-14.
Teoh, S. (2013). The governmentality approach to the business of sustainable
tourism: Bhutan’s tourism governance, policy and planning, Curtin Uni-
versity, The Business of Sustainable Tourism Symposium, Avustralia,
2013.
205
Chapter 11
A Wetland Management Planning: Problems and
Threats Affecting Gökçeada (Aydıncık-Salt Lake)
Lagoon
Mehtap Bayrak1
Abstract
Gökçeada Lagoon is located in the southeast of Gökçeada, the largest island of
Turkey. The lake, which is also called Aydıncık Lake or Salt Lake, showing the
characteristics of a typical coastal lagoon with its fresh / salt water transition,
coastal cords and its ecosystem, was included in the list of “Wetlands of
National Importance” with 3.491 ha on 07/02/2019 and gained protection
status. Agricultural activities are carried out on fertile alluvial lands around
the lake, which was formed as a result of filling a depression area in the south
of the island, which has a generally defective structure, with materials carried
by waves, winds and rivers, and tourism activities are intensively carried out
in the summer months on the coastal coast and dunes. In the lake, which
is the centre of attention of local and foreign tourists, the salt layer that
emerges with the withdrawal of water due to drought and evaporation in
the summer season is used for health purposes by local and foreign tourists,
but the use of salt has not yet been introduced to health tourism with certain
laws. In the study, it is aimed to prepare a “lagoon management planning”
for the solution of environmental and ecological problems that arise despite
the protection status of the lake and the framework of coastal laws. It has
been determined that the greatest pressure on the ecological, biological
and morphological system around the lake is caused by intensive tourism
activities, agricultural activities, pollution from domestic wastes and recently
increasing construction works. In order to determine the use of the lagoon
and the surrounding area, a land use map was prepared using the data of
2022. For coastal change detection, 1985, 2004, 2012 and 2020 satellite
images were used to determine the shoreline change and it was determined
that there was no change in the lake level. The lack of level change indicates
that the lake is fed from different sources. For the management planning of
1
https://doi.org/10.58830/ozgur.pub167.c756
206 | A Wetland Management Planning: Problems and Threats Affecting Gökçeada...
the lagoon and its surroundings, SWOT analysis was applied, each land cover
and use types were analysed separately and a wetland management plan was
prepared.
1. Introductıon
Wetlands have an important ecological value with their plant and animal
species. They constitute an important resource potential such as providing
water environment for living organisms with fresh/salt water transitions,
feeding groundwater, protection from flooding, and creating economic value
with the surrounding land use types. Wetlands, which form a transition zone
between land and sea, consist of many morphological units such as marshes,
lakes, peatlands, rivers, flood plains, deltas, mangroves, salt flats, corals,
sea coastal areas with a depth not exceeding 6 metres. There are various
definitions about wetlands. Wetlands are defined according to the Regulation
on ‘Protection of Wetlands’ of the Presidency of Forestry and Water
Affairs dated 4.04. 2014 dated 4.04.2014, according to the communiqué
numbered 28962 of the Official Gazette dated 4.04.2014, in Article-4 (ü),
wetlands are defined as “all waters, marshes, reeds and peatlands, natural
or artificial, permanent or temporary, with still or flowing waters, fresh,
brackish or salty, covering depths not exceeding six metres during the ebb of
the tidal movements of the seas, which are important as a habitat for living
creatures, especially water birds, and the ecologically wetland areas of these
areas from the coastal edge line towards the land side”. In the 1971 Ramsar
Convention, the definition of wetland is defined as “all waters, marshes,
reeds and turbieries, natural or artificial, permanent or temporary, still or
flowing, fresh, brackish or salty, covering depths not exceeding six metres at
low tide, are wetlands” (Official Gazette, 1994, Article 1/1).
Many studies have been carried out in Turkey in recent years in order
to determine the shrinkage, disappearance and environmental problems in
wetlands and to develop solutions to the problems arising as a result of these
determinations.
In these studies, different plans and reports have been prepared and
put into practice by various institutions and organisations (ministries,
associations and foundations) in the creation and adoption of correct and
rational land use awareness in the sustainability and protection of wetlands,
in the preparation and implementation of wetland management plans. At
the same time, the problems experienced in wetlands have been constantly
on the agenda in different newspapers and news websites related to many
wetlands and meetings have been held with various official organisations.
However, despite all these efforts, the pressure of the rapidly increasing
Mehtap Bayrak | 207
population in our country, the rapid consumption of natural resources by
people, this consumption has attracted people to the coasts and wetlands,
especially for the purpose of creating natural landscape beauty and benefiting
from their economic values.
In this study, taking Gökçeada Lagoon, one of the important wetlands
of Turkey, which has been flooded by local and foreign tourists especially
after 1990s, as an example, the ecological, morphological and environmental
changes around it were tried to be determined, and the wrong land use
patterns in the context of environmental land use were identified and
mapped. It has been observed that the protection status and laws are
insufficient to eliminate the misuse and anthropogenic pressure on the lake
and its surroundings and that new plans and programmes are needed. In this
context, geographical field observations were made and a new management
plan was prepared for the lagoon and its surroundings. The boundary of the
area around the lake was tried to be examined within the framework of the
natural and archaeological protected area based on the buffer zone within
the scope of the Gökçeada Wetland Management Plan Project. The study is
important in terms of providing a geographical observation and perspective
to other management plans.
1.1. Current Wetland Management and Conservation Scope in
Turkey
Wetlands are divided into 3 classes among themselves: Saltwater
environments, freshwater environments and man-made wetlands. With their
habitats, biodiversity and productive ecosystems, wetlands are divided into
three classes: Saltwater environments include the sea, estuaries, lagoons and
saltwater lakes; freshwater environments include river banks, ponds, marshes
and peatlands; and man-made wetlands include salt enterprises, water
collection areas and dams (Dugan;1990:12). Wetlands are associated with
the coast and need to be protected in accordance with coastal laws. While
the first legal regulations and legislation related to the coast were published
in the Official Gazette on 04/04/1926, a special article was included in
Article 4 of the ‘Municipality, Roads and Building Law’ law on 10.06.1993
as “a 10 m wide area from the dock or the point where the dock can be built
on the waterfront will be left free for the benefit of the public.” (Turoğlu,
2017a:46). The legal regulations of the Coastal Law covering the sea, lakes
and rivers were determined by Articles 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14 of the
Land Registry Law No. 2644 adopted in 1934 (Turoğlu, 2017b.46). The
1982 coastal law was on public benefit and utilisation of the coast, and the
1990 and 1994 coastal laws were on legal regulations on the coast, definition
208 | A Wetland Management Planning: Problems and Threats Affecting Gökçeada...
of coastal terms and determination of the coastal edge line. According to the
amendments made in 1994, Article-8 is regulated as determination of land
on the coastal edge line and its transfer to maps, Article-14 is regulated
as land acquisition through filling and drying, Article-17 is regulated as
planning on the coast and coastline and annotation to the title deed (Coastal
Law, 1990: 3621 no-20495).
In Turkey, official regulations based on various laws and rules have been
made in order to ensure the protection and sustainability of wetlands.
The Ramsar Convention (Convention on Wetlands of International
Importance Especially as Waterfowl Habitats) is an important international
convention signed in Ramsar, Iran on 2 February 1971 for the protection
and sustainability of wetlands. Turkey’s accession to this convention was
announced in the Official Gazette dated 17 May 1994, Tuesday, 94/5434:
“Our accession to the annexed “Convention on Wetlands of International
Importance, especially as Waterfowl Habitats”, which was approved by
Law No. 3958 dated 28/12/1993, was decided by the Council of Ministers
on 15/3/1994, pursuant to Article 3 of Law No. 244 dated 31/5/1963,
upon the letter of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs dated 4/3/1994 and
numbered EIUK-1012-2189.” (Official Gazette, 1994). The Regulation on
the Protection of Wetlands was announced in the Official Gazette of the
Ministry of Environment and Forestry with ‘Wetlands Communiqués’ on
different dates. These communiqués are respectively according to years;
• 1. Wetlands Communiqué (Official Gazette dated 28. 05. 1994 and
numbered 21943)
• 2. Wetlands Communiqué (Official Gazette dated 05. 04. 1995 and
numbered 22249)
• 3. Wetlands Communiqué (Official Gazette dated 15. 04. 1998 and
numbered 23314)
• 4. Wetlands Communiqué (Official Gazette dated 09. 02. 2005 and
numbered 25722)
• 5. Wetlands Communiqué (Official Gazette dated 20. 06. 2009 and
numbered 27264)
• 6. Wetlands Communiqué (Official Gazette dated 31. 01. 2013 and
numbered 28545).
Based on the communiqués, in accordance with the Law No. 28962
published in the Official Gazette on 4 April 2014, the purpose of the protection
of wetlands is “to determine the principles of protection, management and
Mehtap Bayrak | 209
development of wetlands within the territorial borders and continental shelf
of Turkey and the principles of cooperation and coordination between the
institutions and organisations in charge in this regard.” According to the
Wetland Communiqués, different wetlands in our country are taken under
protection in each communiqué. According to the communiqués on the
protection of wetlands, while determining the procedures and principles
for protection in the communiqué numbered 1; according to Articles 2
and 3 of the Ramsar Convention, Articles 23 and 24 of the Regulation on
the Protection of Wetlands, and according to Communiqué numbered 2.
According to Articles 2 and 3 of the Ramsar Convention and Articles 23
and 24 of the Regulation on the Protection of Wetlands, Burdur Lake, Bird
(Manyas) Lake, Seyfe Lake, Göksu Delta and Sultan Reed wetlands were
included in the protection list in Communiqué No. 2; Yumurtalık Lagoon
(Annex-1), Meke Maarı (Annex-2) and Kızören Obruğu (Annex-3) were
included in the protection list in Communiqué No. 4; Kars Kuyucuk Lake
was taken under protection in Communiqué No. 5, and Nemrut Kalderası
Wetland was taken under protection in Communiqué No. 6. According
to the Regulation on the Protection of Wetlands (Official Gazette, dated
04.04.2014, No. 28962), the protection of wetlands other than the Ramsar
Convention is realised by the principles and laws of ‘Wetlands of National
Importance’ and ‘Wetlands of Local Importance’.
While determining these areas with Article-18, “Wetlands of national
importance: Wetlands having at least one of the “Wetland of International
Importance Criteria” adopted at the Meeting of the Parties to the Convention”
and wetlands of local importance include “wetlands not included in the list
of wetlands of national importance and Ramsar Sites”.
Limitations for the protection of wetlands are also defined in the Official
Gazette as follows: According to the Communiqué No. 28962 of the
Official Gazette dated 4.04.2014, Article-4 (v, y, z) of the Regulation on
‘Protection of Wetlands’ of the Presidency of Forestry and Water Affairs
defines the wetland boundary, wetland management plan, artificial wetland
and sustainable use zone.
Wetland boundary is defined as “the line passing through the buffer zone
boundary in wetlands of national importance, and the line passing through
the maximum point of the water surface for wetlands of local importance
or artificial wetlands, taking into account seasonal changes”, and wetland
management plan is defined as “the line passing through the maximum point
of the water surface in order to ensure the rational use of wetlands, plans that
define all activities and measures such as monitoring and supervision with
210 | A Wetland Management Planning: Problems and Threats Affecting Gökçeada...
a holistic approach”, as artificial wetland, “man-made water structures that
have at least one of the criteria of wetlands of international importance, such
as dams and ponds built for the purpose of drinking, using and irrigation
water supply and electricity generation, and the wetland ecosystem formed
around them”, Article-4 (aa) defines sustainable use zone as “natural or semi-
natural open water surfaces, lagoons, lagoons, estuaries, saltpans, temporary
and permanent fresh and salt water marshes, wet meadows, reeds and
peatlands, and dune ecologically supporting these ecosystems, the area in
which people are traditionally allowed to continue their economic activities
such as fishing, reed, peat extraction, forestry, gathering, agriculture and
animal husbandry in habitats such as beaches, scrub, woodland, floodplain
forests”.
The main Ramsar protected areas in Turkey are Adana Akyatan Lake
(14.700 ha, 1998), Burdur Burdur Lake (24.800 ha-1994), İzmir Gediz
Delta (14.900 ha-1998), Mersin Göksu Delta (15.000 ha-1994), Samsun
Kızılırmak Delta (21.700 ha-1998), Konya Kızören Obruğu (127 ha-2006),
Kars Kuyucuk Lake (416 ha-2009), Balıkesir Manyas Kuşgölü (20. 400 ha-
1994), Konya Meke Maar (202 ha-2005), Bitlis Nemrut Lake (4.589-2013),
Kırşehir Seyfe Lake (10.700 ha-1994), Kayseri Sultan Reed (17.200 ha-
1994), Bursa Ulubat Lake (19.900 ha-1998) and Adana Yumurtalık Lagoon
(19.853 ha-2005). The number of Wetlands of National Importance is 59
and the number of Wetlands of Local Importance is 32 (DKMP, 2022;
DKMP, 202).
2. Materials and Methods
The maps and literature review used in the preparation of the study
were used as the main material in the analysis and evaluation processes.
1985, 2004, 2012 and 2020 satellite images were used to determine the
lagoon shore and level change. Images were overlapped with the image
overlay method and the level difference was tried to be determined. While
preparing the land use map, the raw land (soil) data obtained from the
Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs were used and these data were
digitised using ArcGIS 10.3 software. In order to create the current land use
on the basis of the data, all land cover units were classified and the values
belonging to similar classes were combined. The classification of each land
cover was determined manually by using the “Image classification” tool
for controlled classification processes. Maximum likelihood classification
tool was used for controlled classification and colour assignments were
made for each land cover. The data were converted to vector for area and
numerical calculations.
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While preparing the wetland management plan, different wetland
management plans, especially the literature similar to the study area, were
utilised. With the management plan of Gökçeada Lagoon, it is aimed to
determine the basic strategies and action plans that offer solutions for the
future of the wetland, prevent threats and risks, and achieve these goals.
SWOT analysis was used as a method in the preparation of the management
plan. SWOT analysis is one of the most appropriate strategy methods that
makes internal and external analyses in determining the critical threats
and opportunities of the environment in any field, and examines and
addresses how opportunities and threats will develop mutually (Gürel and
Tat, 2017a:994). It consists of four components: strengths, weaknesses,
opportunities and threats (Sarsby, 2012a:6; Taş, 2010a:81) (Figure 1).
Based on this analysis, the strengths and weaknesses in Gökçeada Lagoon
were determined and the threats and opportunities in the wetland were
mutually evaluated with geographical recommendations. Some of the
figures used in the study were taken from Google Earth and arrangements
were made on them.
Figure 1. Swot analysis analytical components (revised; Sarsby, 2012b:6; Gürel and Tat,
2017b:994; Taş, 2010b:81).
3. Findings
3.1. General Characteristics of Gökçeada (Aydıncık-Tuz Lake)
Lagoon and Environment
Gökçeada Lagoon is located in the Aegean Sea in the southeast of
Gökçeada (Kahraman, 2006:25; Cengiz et al., 2009a:14), the largest island
of Turkey (285.5 km2) and the most extreme border in the northwest of
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Turkey (İnce-Avlaka) between 40° 05’ 12”- 40° 14’ 18” N, 25° 40′ 06′′-26°
01’ 05” E coordinates (Kahraman, 2006:25; Cengiz et al., 2009a:14), on
the coast of Aydıncık district. The lake is bordered by Aydıncık (Kefalos)
Bay to the northeast, Efelek district centre to the northwest, and Kefalos
coastal beach and the Aegean Sea to the south (Figure 2). According to the
data obtained from the 2020 satellite image, the lake area is 193 ha and the
lake perimeter length is 5.7 km. The lake is 2.2 km in the widest area on the
west-east axis and 1.3 km on the north-south axis.
Figure 2. Location map of Gökçeada Lagoon.
In and around the lagoon, Quaternary alluvial deposits and slope rubble
surfaced on the slopes of the domes, loose sandstone, claystone, siltstone,
mud, etc. belonging to the Upper Miocene aged Kirazlı Formation in the
limited area south of Aydıncık Bay, shallow marine deposits in the west
and north, and Middle Miocene aged Ayvacık Formation called Eşelek
volcanics, basaltic andesite, andesitic proclastics, agglomerates, etc. shallow
marine deposits, and to the west and north, the Middle Miocene aged
Ayvacik Formation, which consists of Eşelek volcanics, basaltic andesite,
andesitic proclastics, agglomerates and tuff (subvolcanic) and occasional
dark grey proxen andesitic lavas (Kesgin and Varol, 2003:50; Sarı et al,
2015:3; Temel and Çiftçi, 2002:22; Ündül and Aysal, 2016:129). While
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the north of Gökçeada rose, the south of Gökçeada descended due to
tectonic movements, and Gökçeada Lagoon, also known as Salt Lake,
completed its formation in this tectonic but shallow depression (Öner and
Vardar, 2017b:209).
The lagoon, which is located between 0-3 metres in elevation in a
plain between sea level and approximately 50 metres in the north, was
formed on a shallow, low coastal plain 3 metres deep from the bedrock.
Gökçeada Lake is located on Aydıncık Peninsula within the tombolo
formed as a result of the connection of an island formerly called Kefalo
to the land (Gökçeada) with a double cordon, and is surrounded by dune
plains located on two cords formed to the north and south (Öner and
Vardar, 2017a:206). According to Yücel (1966), the dune plain in the
north developed rapidly in Aydıncık Bay where Değirmen Stream reaches
the Aegean Sea (Photo 1) due to the alluvium carried by the stream, and
the marshes formed as a result of the disappearance of the old lagoons
thought to be located in the north along the coastal promenade were
filled in time and completed their development by forming and expanding
faster than the dune plain in the south (Yücel, 1966:68,69). In addition
to the detritic elements carried by Değirmen Stream, the prevailing wind
direction was also effective in the rapid development of the tombolon
in the north (Kurter, 1989a:59). Today, the width of the tombolon in
the north is 1.6 km at its widest point and 1.5 km from the easternmost
end of the lagoon to the shore of Aydıncık Bay. The width of the
coastal cordon in the south is 0.3 km at its widest point and its length
is approximately 1.8 km. The formation of the lake continued until the
end of the Pleistocene and the dead cliffs extend steeply on the shores of
Aydıncık Bay (Yalçınlar, 1980:251). The slope in the northeast-southwest
direction around the lagoon varies between 0-2°% and between 2-30°%
in the Aydıncık Peninsula and in the areas where the elevation increases in
the northwest (Cengiz et al., 2009b:20).
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Photo 1. Aydıncık Bay (yesilgazete.org).
In Aydıncık Peninsula, the land covered with sand dunes to the north of
Tuz Lake and reclaimed from the sea is called Ovacık, and this plain is used
for agricultural activities. Apart from the plain area, the plateau area in the
same peninsula gradually descends to the river bases with terraces, and the
river slits exceed 20 m in places (Kurter, 1989b: 49-50; Yaşar, 2006:10).
Gökçeada Lagoon is a coastal area with a special hydrological structure
that is a transition area between fresh and salt water inflow with its unique
ecosystem and is also an important wetland ecosystem (Çelik, 2021:70). On
the island, where the northeast-southwest sector winds are effective, salty
water enters the lagoon from the sea to the lagoon in winter months with
the effect of southwest winds, overcoming the dune wall in the south, and
fresh water enters the lagoon through the channel opened by DSİ. The lake
drainage area is 31.34 km2 and the total area of 4.13 km2 in the lagoon,
which is fed by precipitation, water from the sea and fresh water channel,
constitutes only the precipitation surface area (Aslan et al., 2021:3).
The island, which is under the influence of the Marmara transition regime,
is warm, dry and clear in summer and cold, rainy, windy and partly cloudy
in winter. According to Gökçeada Station data, the maximum amount of
precipitation falling in December, January and February is 6-21 mm, and
the dominant wind direction is northeast characterised by the northeastern
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characteristic, while the southwest characterised Lodos is effective in the
spring and autumn months (Acar et al., 2014a:190). The average annual
temperatures vary between 4°C and 29°C and rarely fall to -2°C or rise above
32°C. The highest temperature measured is 39.7°C in August and the lowest
temperature is -11.5°C in February (www.mgm.gov.tr).
Photo 2. Salt layer on the mud on the surface of Gökçeada Lagoon during the dry period.
The lagoon and its surroundings have important economic and socio-
cultural values on the island. While tourism activities are carried out at
Aydıncık Beach on the dune plain in the north and Kefalos Beach on the
dune in the south, agricultural activities are carried out in the plain area
between Eşelek in the northwest, Aydıncık Beach in the east and the lagoon
in the south. The salt that emerges with the evaporation of water in the
lagoon due to the summer drought meets the salt need of the people in
Gökçeada (Photo 2), and at the same time, the black mud (consisting of
quartz, sulphur, sodium, potassium, calcium, iron, barium, magnesium,
carbonate, sulphate, sulfate, quartz, sulphur, sodium, potassium, calcium,
iron, barium, magnesium, carbonate, sulphate) formed in the lake is used in
the mud cure treatment, which is thought to be good for some diseases, and
is interesting for tourists (gokceada.gov.tr).
3.2. Gökçeada (Aydıncık-Tuz Lake) Lagoon Land Cover/Use
According to the land use map prepared according to the data of the
Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, 10 classes of land cover types were
identified in and around the lagoon. According to the data obtained from
the lagoon lake water surface 2020 satellite image, 193 ha, non-irrigated
arable agricultural lands in the north 171.76 ha, mixed agricultural areas
in the south of Efelek settlement area cover an area of 52.46 ha. Mixed
agricultural areas are located together with fruit trees, vineyards and olive
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groves. Agricultural activities constitute the main economy on the island,
olive farming activities are carried out in the form of organic agriculture,
and there are olive oil producers with organic agriculture certificates. In
addition, vintage events are organised. The natural vegetation around the
lake is spread over a large area of 1162.9 ha and covers 75.5 % of the
land. Natural meadows extending in the east of the lake in the NW-SE
direction are also spread in large areas along the north of Efelek. The area
covered by natural grasslands is approximately 676 hectares in the vicinity
of the lake. Sparsely vegetated areas in the west and sclerophyll vegetation
in the northwest of the lake. The sclerophyllous vegetation is composed of
heathland and maquis vegetation in the form of evergreen shrubs (Figure
3, Table 1).
Table 1. Spatial distribution of land cover classes in Gökçeada (Aydıncık-Tuz Lake)
Lagoon.
Land Cover Classes Field (ha) (%)
Mixed agricultural areas 52,46 3.4
Non-irrigated arable land 171,76 11.1
Natural grasslands 675,98 43.9
Broad-leaved areas 14,39 0.9
Mixed forests 11,24 0.7
Low vegetation cover 230,69 15
Sclerophyll vegetation 178,07 11.6
Plant exchange areas 52,46 3.4
Coast and dunes 152,97 10
Total 1540,02 100
The total population in Eşelek settlement located in the north of the lagoon
is 186 people according to TURKSTAT 2022 data. The total population of
Gökçeada is 10.348. Agricultural activities and ovine breeding activities in
pastures are carried out in small village settlements with less population.
The alluvial soils with good drainage around the lagoon are fertile soils and
agricultural activities are carried out on these soils. According to Dönmez
1985, reeds grow on the soils where drainage is disturbed, where there is
no flow and which become swampy. It is not possible to grow plants in
alluvium where salt accumulates, that is, in hydromorphic salty alluvium, in
swampy areas (Dönmez, 1985:78). In the area where Tuz Lake is located and
the surrounding dunes, in the marshy areas remaining from the old lagoon
on the coastal cordon in the north, heathland and herbaceous plants grow,
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and no forest formation is encountered. Aptesbozan (Pimpinella saxisfrage,
Poterium spinosum), one of the herbaceous plants with a spiny structure,
which spreads in the areas where there are pastures, spreads in large areas in
and around the lagoon and even throughout the island. With the reduction
of goat breeding, which is thought to damage agricultural soils and pastures,
this plant has spread to wider areas, limiting the development area of other
herbaceous plants (Gökkuş, et al., 2013:68). Although the breeding of this
Imbros sheep breed, which belongs to the island, is not suitable for intensive
breeding due to the temperament of the sheep, it is carried out in almost
every part of the island in the form of breeding conditions defined as “wild”,
damaging herbaceous plants, pasture areas and agricultural areas (Konyalı et
al., 2004:2; Aktürk et al. 2005:229).
Although the tourism potential in Gökçeada is very high, its development
potential is limited due to certain factors (Yaşar, 2006b:3). In addition to
coastal tourism as sea tourism, the interest in water sports increases the
importance of the beaches on the coasts. Coastal tourism activities start in
June and end in September according to the sunbathing time. The average
sunbathing time in Gökçeada is approximately 10 hours in June and
approximately 11 hours in July and August (www.mgm.gov.tr). In addition,
amateur fishing activities are also carried out on the sea coasts. The coast and
dunes around Tuz Lake, where coastal tourism and water sports are carried
out, cover an area of approximately 152.97 ha and 10% (Figure 3, Table 1).
Kefalos Beach extends approximately 1.7 km along the coastal promenade
in the south, Aydıncık Beach extends 1 km along the coastal promenade in
the north and İncekum Beach extends approximately 1 km in the southeast.
Tourism activities are carried out at Aydıncık Beach, Kefalos and İncekum
Beach. Kefalos Beach is more active than Aydıncık and İncekum Beaches
due to the facilities, restaurants and the presence of Gökçeada Windsurfing
Training Centre (Photo 3).
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Figure 3. Land use map of Gökçeada Lagoon.
Every year, many local and foreign tourists come to the island from
different countries to see historical and natural beauties, surfing, and coastal
tourism. According to the data of the Ministry of Culture and Tourism, the
number of domestic tourists coming to the island in 2020 was 270,189
people and the number of tourists staying overnight was 446,09. While the
number of foreign tourists entering the island is 35,858 people, the number
of foreign tourists staying overnight is 47,321. In 2020, the total number of
domestic and foreign tourists arriving and staying on the island is 799,456.
There are 81 tourism business certified facilities on the island (canakkale.
ktb.gov.tr).
Photo 3. View of Kefalos Beach (sandy beach) and the facilities on it (Google Earth Pro,
Photo: Burak Ulukan and taken by İsmail Akpınar in 2016).
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3.3. Coastal Change in Gökçeada (Aydıncık-Tuz Lake) Lagoon
According to the data obtained from the images analysed using Google
Earth satellite images on the shores of Gökçeada Lagoon and overlapped by
applying the image overlay method, the perimeter length of the lake area,
which was approximately 1.83 km2 in 1985, was approximately 5.38 km;
in 2004, the lake area was 1.91 km2 and the perimeter length was 5.72 km;
in 2012, the lake area was 1.90 km2 and the perimeter length was 5.54
km; in 2020, the lake area was 1.90 km2 and the perimeter length was
5.66 km (Figure 4, Figure 5). Lake coastal areas and perimeter lengths are
approximately close to each other. The data obtained in the 35-year period
between 1985-2020 show that there are no major changes in the lake area
and perimeter length over the years. Considering the land use map, it was
determined that irrigated agricultural activities are not carried out in the
agricultural areas in the north of the lake. Agricultural areas in Gökçeada are
irrigated by rivers, dams and ponds. In addition, the continuous inflow of
salty water from the sea to the lake and the inflow of fresh water to the lake
through the canal constructed by DSİ ensure the protection of the water
surface of the lake area.
Figure 4. Spatial change in Gökçeada Lagoon over the years (between 1985-2020-Google
Earth).
The reason for the small-scale changes in the lake area and perimeter
length is the seasonal climatic changes. In the summer months, the surface
of the lake is covered with a layer of salt after the surface water evaporates
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due to drought, and in the rainy season (especially in winter months due to
rains) the lake is covered with water again. The depth of the lake is not much
(about 3 m on average) and high temperatures due to summer drought
are the main factors in the high evaporation. As the water recedes with the
drought, the land in the centre of the lake rises to the water surface in the
form of an island (Figure 5). The water surface area in the lake does not carry
any apparent pressure and risk. However, it is under the danger of unplanned
and irregular construction due to tourism and agricultural activities as well
as population density. Hundreds of unlicensed structures built around the
lagoon cause environmental pollution. The construction and existence of
these structures cause pollution in and around the lagoon waters.
Figure 5. Spatial change of Gökçeada Lagoon overlaid image (between
1985-2020-Google Earth).
3.4. Preparation of Management Plan for Wrong Field Utilisation
in Wetland and Surrounding Areas
3.4.1. Preparation of Wetland Management Plan by Applying
SWOT Analysis
Tuz Lake was declared a “Wetland of National Importance” in 2019 with
an area of 3491 hectares with the NUTS (1) - Level 3 SR(1) - Level 3, 222
code and Protected Area National Classification 06.02.02.0050 code (Ilgar,
2021:619). In 2014, it gained its national identity after its “Wetland of Local
Importance” status (Aslan, et al., 2021b:1) (Figure 6). The lagoon, which is
one of the 135 important wetlands in our country and hosts important bird
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species as a marine and coastal wetland, is brackish/salty (tarımorman.gov.
tr). The lake, which is an important bird nesting area as in all wetlands, is
especially a flamingo (Phoenicopterus roseus) accommodation and longfinch
(Himantopus himantopus himantopus) incubation area (tvk.csb.gov.tr).
Tuz Lagoon, one of the most important wetlands of Gökçeada, is one
of the coastal lagoons that provides biological production and has a high
socio-economic potential value. It is home to pelicans, wild ducks, geese and
migratory birds, especially flamingos. The increasing population in recent
years and the natural attractions and historical beauties of Gökçeada attract
local and foreign tourists to the island, but also create many problems. Misuse
of land in and around Salt Lake can be listed under certain headings: The
existence of new constructions that will create pollutants such as hotels or
andesite quarries, the existence of wild garbage storage areas and the mixing
of garbage into the water, the unconscious use of the sludge that emerges
on the surface area of the lagoon, and the lack of necessary management
and planning for its use in the field of health, pressures of local and foreign
tourists visiting the lagoon on the ecology of the lake, presence of illegal
and illegal wells around the lagoon, unplanned tourism activities, domestic,
chemical and sewage wastes, agricultural pollution (pesticides, insecticides and
unconscious irrigation activities), uncontrolled and irregular construction, air
pollution, privatisation of coastal areas, lack of infrastructure.
Figure 6. Gökçeada Lagoon Wetland Management Plan, Natural and Archaeological
Site Map.
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In Gökçeada Lagoon, which is under serious risks and threats in the
future despite its protection status, SWOT analysis was used to identify
and plan these risks and threats in advance and to create new opportunities.
SWOT analysis is a simple method that is easy to understand, has a strategic
method, and enables to reach the desired goal with fast and correct use.
Generally, the data prepared based on qualitative and subjective data are
more general and variable according to different interpretations since they
are based on the subject. Therefore, data collection, evaluation and decision-
making processes should be managed very well (Sarsby, 2012c:7).
While applying SWOT analysis, it was tried to find answers to the
following questions about the study area: where is the area to be planned, in
which way planning is needed in this area, what is the potential of the area
to be planned, and what are the criteria for success in planning (Mugabi,
Kayaga and Njiru, 2007:3; Taş, 2010c:81).Land use characteristics in and
around Gökçeada Lagoon are the basic material used in the development
of planning. Agricultural areas, forest, herbaceous areas, heathland and
pastures, tourism areas, coast, beach and beaches, water body, settlement
areas will be analysed separately within the scope of SWOT analysis and
then the lagoon and its surroundings will be considered as a general
planning.
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Figure 7. Adaptation of the components determined according to the “SWOT Analysis”
analytical method to Gökçeada Lagoon.
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3.4.1.1. Planning of Gökçeada Lagoon Wetland with SWOT Analysis and
Solution Suggestions
No significant areal change was detected in the determination of coastal
change on the water surface of the lagoon using satellite images (see Figure
4, Figure 5). The level changes in the lagoon are water withdrawals caused
by evaporation due to summer drought. The salt and the mud under the
salt that emerges with the withdrawal of water is an opportunity for the
economy of Gökçeada. Salt is produced from the lake and the mud is used for
health purposes. At the same time, there is a threat for the salt layer and mud
formed in the lake. The intense pressure of tourists coming in the summer
months on the lake surface causes pollution of the lake and disturbs the birds
in the lake. The lake surface is a nesting and accommodation centre for water
birds. The fresh water input canal opened to the lake by DSİ is a positive
direction to increase the lake water level. However, water inflow should be
under control. Excessive freshwater input will cause changes in the water
chemical parameters of the lagoon, which is in salty-fresh water interaction,
and will pose a threat especially for fish and other aquatic animals. Water
withdrawal for agricultural purposes does not seem to be serious. However,
if the construction of illegal wells is not taken under control, it will cause the
groundwater level to decrease. The lake drainage supply with groundwater
flow will be adversely affected by this situation. Water analyses should be
carried out regularly for the pollution of lake water and chemical parameters
should be measured continuously.
As recreational activities, water regulation, drinking water supply, use as
irrigation water, terrestrial drainage, tourism activities continue to be carried
out in and around the lagoon, the good condition of the water will gradually
deteriorate and pose a threat to the wetland. Therefore, it is necessary to
determine the water quality status as a priority. The initial and final state of
the water should be monitored. Supervised water treatment facilities should
be provided to remove chemical inputs, biological pollutants, solids and
gases from the water.
Another threat to the lake is the change in its morphological structure.
The coastal dunes in the coastal areas are the coastal cordon of the lagoon
lake. Under intense settlement and tourism pressures, if artificial wooden and
stone jetties and culverts are built around the coastal promenade and sand is
extracted from the sandy areas for construction purposes, the morphological
development of the lake will be adversely affected. Although there is no
such problem today, it is necessary to take precautions in advance for future
pressures and legal regulations should be taken into consideration.
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3.4.1.2. Planning and Solution Suggestions for Forests, Heaths, Pastures and
Grasslands around Gökçeada Lagoon with SWOT Analysis
The presence of vegetation has always been a positive aspect for
settlements, ecosystem, air cleanliness and wetlands. As you go up to higher
altitudes around the lagoon, you pass to forested areas due to the increase
in precipitation. Forested areas start after 50 metres in the south of Efelek.
However, in the northeast of the lagoon, where the elevation decreases and
the climate becomes more arid, sclerophilous vegetation (heathland and
pastures) and grass communities cover a large area in the sandy areas. The
wide distribution of heathland and pastures is also a favourable aspect for
animal husbandry activities. The heathland and pastures cover a wide area
between the lagoon and the area between Aydıncık Bay and the lagoon
between sea level and 5 m (see Figure 3). While the decrease in slope is a
negative aspect for the growth of forest areas, pastures and heathlands are an
opportunity for the spread of grass communities. In the south of the lagoon,
vegetation development is limited by agricultural areas. Fertile and wetlands
are very suitable for vegetation development. Although the geological
structure is composed of Quaternary alluvial deposits, the geomorphological
slope is low, and the flat plain area is extremely suitable for vegetation
development, vegetation development is affected by the adverse conditions
of climatic characteristics in the plain area.
Another favourable factor for vegetation is the wide distribution of the
herbaceous plant aptesbozan (Pimpinella saxisfrage, Poterium spinosum),
which has a spiny structure, in the areas where pastures are spread. The
reduction of goat breeding and Imroz sheep breed with the idea that it
damages agricultural lands and pastures has accelerated the spread of this
plant species and turned into an opportunity. However, the fact that it is
a limiting factor for the development of other plant species is a negative
aspect. The rubbish left in the environment by tourism activities is a threat
to vegetation.
When the SWOT analyses on forest, heathland, pasture and grassland are
evaluated, no serious planning is required for forest areas. The threat due to
ovine breeding activities on pasture and grassland areas has been reduced.
Only in order to prevent the increase in domestic and environmental wastes
due to tourism activities, it would be appropriate to establish garbage
collection units in and around the lake and to increase the frequency of this
activity, to prevent the burning of the collected garbage in the lake protection
area, and to build garbage storage and transformation areas on bare lands
that are not suitable for agriculture in terms of land capability.
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3.4.1.3. Planning of Agricultural Areas around Gökçeada Lagoon with
SWOT Analysis and Solution Suggestions
The issue to be considered in agricultural planning is spatial planning.
It is necessary to determine the areas suitable and unsuitable for cultivated
agriculture according to the land use capability class. The most important
economic activity around Gökçeada Lagoon is agriculture. In addition, the
island is called ‘organic agriculture island’ as one of the best examples of
organic agriculture. Agricultural activities are intensively carried out in and
around Gökçeada in the form of indiscriminate intensive agriculture. In the
study conducted by Cengiz et al. (2013), areas suitable for agricultural land
use for Gökçeada were identified by mapping. While the land in the eastern
part of the lagoon is moderately suitable for agriculture, the northern part
and fragmented areas are determined as very good for agriculture. The areas
suitable for agriculture are the alluvial floodplain carried by Büyükdere,
which flows towards the southeast and flows into the Aegean Sea from
Aydıncık Bay and is very fertile. The sandy areas where Kefalos Beach and
Incekum Beach are located, where shallow marine deposits such as loose
sandstone, claystone, siltstone, mud, etc. are spread, have been identified as
unsuitable areas for agriculture. The geological structure of the land forms a
strong direction in and around the lagoon.
Natural environmental conditions determined the distribution of
agricultural areas in Gökçeada lagoon. Gökçeada consists of hilly areas
with an average elevation above 650 metres above sea level, and areas
with high elevation limit agricultural activities. Agricultural activities are
carried out in the flooded alluvial deposits (Kaleköy and Aydıncık Bay)
where Büyükdere’s tributaries spread, in the southwestern coastal plain
where Ballı Stream flows into the sea and in flat areas on the slopes. The
diversity of the land and the limitation of hilly terrain affect the agricultural
planning and proposals.
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Figure 8. “Agricultural Land Use Suitability Status” (Cengiz et al., 2013c:155).
Agricultural activities are carried out as irrigated and dry agriculture on
the island. The purpose of irrigated agriculture is to increase the quality of
the yield. Agricultural activities in Ovacık in the north of Gökçeada Lagoon
are determined as dry agriculture area in the land use map (Figure 3). There
are non-irrigated arable agricultural lands in Ovacık. There are 100-150
wells with depths ranging between 3-18 m and spring waters with flow
rates ranging between 0.1-2.0 L/s (Oğuz and Beyribey, 1995:18). While
the positive aspect for cultivated and planted areas is irrigation resources, the
areas with high elevation seem to be the weak side for agricultural activities.
Gökçeada is rich in terms of water resources. Lagoon water surface and the
presence of Büyükdere are positive aspects for agricultural areas.
In agricultural areas, there may be floods in Büyükdere Basin.
Improvement works carried out in the Büyükdere beds, wrong positioning
of the meanders made to reduce the flow rates of the stream, wrong
engineering designs, inadequacy of culverts, narrowing of the stream flow
area with the constructions on the stream bed (Acar et al., 2014b:187) can be
seen as other weaknesses around the island and lagoon as they will facilitate
flooding. In addition to flooding, the high slope in Gökçeada increases the
erosion risk potential. With erosion, the top layer of soil is transported and
228 | A Wetland Management Planning: Problems and Threats Affecting Gökçeada...
the land becomes inefficient. For this reason, plans and recommendations
for the protection of soil for the planning to be made in agricultural areas
will be a positive direction for agricultural areas. Looking at the slope values
on the island, 64.72% of the land has slope values above 12% and 13.63%
of the land is flat to nearly flat (İlay and Kavdır, 2018:69; İlay, 2016:31).
The low slope in and around Gökçeada lagoon reduces the risk of erosion
and appears as an opportunity for soil protection.
In addition to the effects of geological and geomorphological elements on
agricultural areas, climatic characteristics also constitute a strong direction
for determining agricultural yield and potential. Summer drought in and
around the lagoon is a negative aspect as it increases the need for irrigation
in agriculture.
When the SWOT analysis on agricultural areas is evaluated, the following
suggestions are made for planning. The biggest problem in agricultural areas
is the illegal wells used for irrigation purposes and excessive consumption of
groundwater. These wells should be formalised and monitored and a quota
should be set for irrigation. In addition, more economical choices such as
drip irrigation technique should be made instead of indiscriminate irrigation
in agriculture. Artificial ponds can be created by DSİ close to agricultural
areas in order to utilise surface water during periods of high rainfall. In
addition, instead of only lowland plains, the productivity of the soils on the
slopes of the slopes can be increased and agricultural areas where products
suitable for the climate can be cultivated can be opened.
3.4.1.4. Planning of Coast, Beach and Beach Areas of Gökçeada Lagoon
with SWOT Analysis and Solution Suggestions
When we evaluate the dune areas in terms of geological, geomorphological
and climatic aspects, the sandy areas on Kefalos Beach and İncekum Beach
and Aydıncık Bay coastal beaches are areas where shallow marine deposits
such as loose sandstone, claystone, siltstone, mud etc. are spread and are
not suitable for agriculture. In addition, the beaches are on the plains
where the slope is low. Elevation values on the beaches are between 0-2
metres. There is no area that has been converted into agricultural land in
order to gain agricultural land from the dunes around the lagoon. This is a
favourable situation for the dunes. In addition, during the formation of the
lagoon, the filling of the swampy areas in the northeast was not caused by
human impact but by geomorphological developments. Currently, the most
important economic activity on the dunes is the tourism activities between
June and September. Although tourism activities are seen as an opportunity
Mehtap Bayrak | 229
in terms of contributing to the island economy, the danger that has started
now and the intense population pressure that will increase in the future pose
a serious threat to the beaches and sandy beaches. Hotels, restaurants and
other businesses established around the lagoon (Figure 9), especially illegal
and unlicensed structures not only spoil the natural appearance, but also
unplanned tourism activities in the dune areas and garbage thrown into the
environment (Photo 4) cause pollution and pose a threat by damaging the
lake ecosystem, especially flamingos.
Photo 4. The rubbish left behind the beach around Gökçeada Lagoon is a threat to the
beach and lagoon ecosystem as well as environmental pollution.
The fact that the beaches can be used for tourism activities and make a
significant contribution to the economy of Gökçeada can be considered as
opportunities created by the beaches and sandy beaches. The beaches around
the coastal lagoon are one of the few surfing areas in Turkey (Figure 9).
Figure 9. Gökçeada Lagoon, Kefalos beach, Surf Training Centre Application School
and other constructions on the beach in the vicinity.
230 | A Wetland Management Planning: Problems and Threats Affecting Gökçeada...
When the SWOT analysis made on the beaches and coasts is evaluated,
the coastal law should be observed very well in order not to fill the coasts
with unlicensed structures due to the increasing tourism activities in recent
years. Article-4 of the Coastal Law (1990) reads as follows: “Supplement:
(1/7/1992 - 3830/2 Art.) Structures to be built on the coastlines can approach
the coastal edge line by a maximum of 50 metres. Additional: (1/7/1992
- 3830/2 Art.) The areas between the approach distance and the coastal
edge line can only be arranged for pedestrian paths, promenade, recreation,
rest, cruise and recreactive purposes.” The lagoon and its surroundings
should be structured by taking into consideration the law, for this purpose,
a very good tourism master plan should be prepared for the lagoon and its
surroundings, and local administrations, especially geographers and urban
regional planners, geologists should be used in cooperation in this plan. As
seen in Figure 9, the constructions established before 50 metres should be
removed from the shore.
3.4.1.5. Planning of Settlement and Industrial Areas around Gökçeada
Lagoon with SWOT Analysis and Solution Suggestions
The closest settlement to the lagoon is Eşelek. Agriculture and animal
husbandry activities are carried out in the settlement which is 8 km from
the centre and 2 km from Aydıncık Bay. Due to its proximity to the beach
due to the development of tourism activities, low-rise houses used for
accommodation in the form of hotels and pensions in recent years, fruit
and vegetable stalls on the roadside, and two restaurants offer diversity in
economic activities. Tourism activities, agricultural activities and animal
husbandry are positive opportunities for Efelek settlement. The presence
of settlements, domestic and sewage wastes always cause environmental
pollution. In this sense, settlements are a risk for the beach and lagoon water
body. The settlements that do not comply with the law “settlements can
approach 50 m to the coastal edge line” as per the “Coastal Law” from the
coastal line on the beach edges are shown in Figure 10 and Figure 11. The
settlement in Figure 10 is located only 115 metres from the shoreline.
Mehtap Bayrak | 231
Figure 10. Gökçeada Lagoon, Kefalos beach is 115 metres inland from the shoreline.
In Figure 11, settlement number 1 is only 29 metres from the shoreline.
Settlement number 2 starts at 45 metres from the shoreline and continues
until approximately 200 metres. Settlement number 3 is located only
between 15-60 metres, settlement number 4 between 65-250 metres and
settlement number 5 between 270-300 metres. These structures are a threat
to coastal dunes. It is very likely that such structures will increase in the
future if no measures are taken.
Figure 11. Construction on the shore of Kefalos beach, Gökçeada Lagoon.
232 | A Wetland Management Planning: Problems and Threats Affecting Gökçeada...
The ‘Andesite Quarry’, which is planned to be built on an area of 20
thousand hectares a few hundred metres away from the lagoon, which has
been frequently reported in the news in recent years, is located within the
borders of the important nature area to the east of Gökçeada Lagoon (Photo
5). The construction of this quarry, which is wrong in terms of land use, is an
ecological and biological threat to the ecology of the lagoon, the agricultural
lands and health of the people living in the surrounding settlements, water
birds, especially falamingos, and fish in the lagoon.
Photo 5. Quarries and construction sites around Gökçeada Lagoon (Yeşil Gazete, 2022).
When the SWOT analysis on settlements and industrial areas is evaluated,
there are not many populated settlements in the immediate vicinity. The
population of Efelek settlement increases according to the number of local
and foreign tourists coming in summer months. Although the reason for the
establishment of Efelek settlement was agriculture and animal husbandry,
tourism activities contributed to the economy of the settlement. The
settlement centre is located at an elevation of 30 metres. It is very likely that
the settlement and the agricultural areas in the southeast of the settlement
will be affected by the possible flood risk of Büyükdere. In addition, there
is an erosion risk on the bare sloping surfaces to the west of the settlement,
as determined from satellite imagery. This area is devoid of vegetation cover.
Efelek settlement should not be allowed to spread over very large areas.
Mehtap Bayrak | 233
Illegal and unlicensed structures on the coast of Aydıncık Bay in the
south and northeast on Kefalos beach should be removed in accordance with
the ‘Coastal Law’. In addition, law amendments should not be allowed for
licence permission. As it is known, the beach areas are included in the lagoon
protection status.
In general, while the settlements around the lagoon have more strengths,
landscape and sea tourism are favourable for the settlements established
on the coast. However, the presence of settlements and the quarry to be
built pose a threat to natural morphological development and biodiversity.
The quarry should be built on bare land at higher elevations, or it should
be completely prevented. In addition to the environmental pollution, air
pollution and health problems caused by the quarry, the removal of the rocky
area will leave a large area of bare land. It is impossible to restore this land to
the natural process. Since the lagoon is located within the protected area, it is
unnecessary to make a separate planning for the development of settlements.
Conclusıon
Planning is important in terms of taking the necessary measures in a
timely manner, eliminating uncertainties, eliminating confusion and creating
a division of labour in the lagoon and its surroundings in order to look
into the future and ensure continuity. Strategic planning will contribute to
the success of public institutions and organisations by encouraging future-
oriented thinking. Management, on the other hand, is the coordination and
planning of the rules established for the organisation of the positive course
within the framework of the flow of affairs and making the right decisions.
The main geomorphological units in the lagoon and its immediate
vicinity consist of water body, shore, beach and beaches, hilly areas, river
valley and floodplain, plain area, cliffs, hilly areas and slopes. The geological
units are Quaternary and Miocene aged and mostly consist of Quaternary
aged alluvium. On the beaches, there are marine and terrestrial deposits,
sandstone, clay and silt sized elements. Volcanic elements are encountered in
the western and northwestern parts where the slope increases.
In the land use map prepared according to the data of the Ministry of
Agriculture and Forestry in and around the lagoon, 10 class land cover
types were identified. The water body covers 193 ha, non-irrigated arable
agricultural land covers 52.46 ha, natural vegetation covers 1162.9 ha,
natural meadows cover 676 ha. Sclerophyll plants spreading in the north-
west of the lake are heath and maquis in the form of evergreen shrubs.
234 | A Wetland Management Planning: Problems and Threats Affecting Gökçeada...
According to the coastal level change measurements obtained from the
images analysed by using Google Earth satellite images on the shores of
Gökçeada Lagoon and overlapped by applying the image overlay method,
the area of the lake area in 1985 was 1.83 km2 and the perimeter length of
the lake area was 5.38 km; in 2004 the area was 1.91 km2 and the perimeter
length was 5.72 km; in 2012 the area was 1.90 km2 and the perimeter length
was 5.54 km; in 2020 the area was 1.90 km2 and the perimeter length was
5.66 km. There are no major differences in coastal level change. In the study
area, which is under the influence of the Marmara transition climate, there
are recessions in the lake level due to evaporation due to summer drought.
Although there is no areal change of anthropogenic origin, there is a canal
that provides fresh water input to the lake by DSİ.
In the study, it is planned to prepare a management plan by utilising
the SWOT analysis method in and around Gökçeada Lagoon. It has been
determined that the problems in and around the lake are caused by tourism
activities, agricultural activities, settlement and industrial activities. Main
threat and risk factors;
The presence of new constructions such as hotels or andesite quarries
that will create pollutants,
Existence of wild landfill sites and mixing of garbage with water,
Unconscious use of the sludge generated in the lagoon surface area,
lack of necessary management and planning for its use in the field of
health,
The pressures of local and foreign tourists visiting the lagoon on the
ecology of the lake,
Presence of illegal, illegal wells around the lagoon,
Unplanned tourism activities,
Domestic, chemical and sewage waste,
Agricultural pollution (pesticides, insecticides and unconscious
irrigation activities),
Uncontrolled and irregular construction,
Air pollution,
Privatisation of coastal areas,
It can be listed as infrastructure inadequacy.
Mehtap Bayrak | 235
Tourism activities and agricultural activities are also the most important
economic activities in and around the lake. They constitute an opportunity
with their contribution to the economy. Since the amount of water required
for the quarry planned to be built on the island will be met from the water
potential of the area, it is not deemed appropriate to be established in and
around the lagoon.
The lagoon and its surroundings are extremely suitable to be recognised in
national and international status in terms of formation. While its promotion
and advertisement constitute a positive aspect for tourism activities, it will
pose a great threat to the lagoon and its surrounding area if proper tourism
planning is not made. This study is important as a source for the local
administration for the plans and suggestions developed.
236 | A Wetland Management Planning: Problems and Threats Affecting Gökçeada...
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241
Chapter 12
6 Trends over Management Theory:
Decolonization, Sinification, Empowerment/
Precarization, Degendering, Transdisciplinarity,
and Environmental/Natural Challenges
Ulaş Başar Gezgin1
Abstract
What would be the future of management theory? To answer this question,
we explain 3 factors behind the heterogeneity of management theory from a
sociology of science perspective. Then we present and discuss 6 trends that are
expected to be influential over management theory in our future estimation.
These are: Decolonization; Sinification; empowerment and precarization;
feminization, degendering and egalitarianism; transdisciplinarity; and
environmental and natural challenges and issues (including global warming,
increasing number of disasters, peak oil, energy crisis, renewable energy,
sustainability, green management etc.). We make the distinction between
risk-averse mainstream core academia and risk-accepting critical peripheral
academia. These 6 trends we claim are already gaining power in the periphery,
and it is highly like that they would be parts of the mainstream science
in 50-100 years. Firstly, although the old-fashioned colonialism is over,
decolonization of management theory is under progress. Secondly, the rise
of China and Chinese scholars will bring the wave of Sinification. Thirdly,
the industrial relations oscillate between empowerment and precarization.
Fourthly, with the rise of gender equality, degendering of management theory
will be visible. Fifthly, the sciences including management science will move
more and more towards transdisciplinarity. Finally, environmental and natural
challenges will be more influential.
1 Ulaş Başar Gezgin, Istanbul Galata University, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, Department
of Psychology, ulas.gezgin@galata.edu.tr, ORCID ID: 0000-0002-6075-3501
https://doi.org/10.58830/ozgur.pub167.c750
242 | 6 Trends over Management Theory: Decolonization, Sinification, Empowerment/Precarization...
1. Introduction
What would be the future of management theory? Before answering this
question, we need to set time limits for a discussion of future. It can range
from a few years to a millennium (e.g. Tonn, 2004) and even million years
from a cosmological, geological and evolutionary points of view by focusing
on inorganic and organic matter. However, in human sciences, the time limit
we set fatally determines our discussion: For example, if we would think
about language development in a century, we can identify a set of trends, but
if the scale is a millennium then we can’t even know whether our languages
English, Spanish or Russian will survive as they are or evolve into some other
languages and thus go extinct (as in the case of how European languages
evolved from Latin historically). So it is better to have narrow time limits for
precision, but wider enough to predict long-term possibilities. That is why,
in this article, we decided to concentrate on 50-100 years ahead.
2.3 Factors behind the heterogeneity of management theory
From a philosophy and sociology of science point of view, we need to
keep in mind that management theory is far from a heterogeneous monolith.
In fact, it is hard to agree with the singular characterization of the area
rather than a plural one. This heterogeneity can be due to 3 factors, when
management theory is reconceptualized with an onion model:
2.1. Normal, risk-averse core vs. revolutionary, risk-accepting
periphery
Management theory consists of a core and outer layers which can also be
called as periphery. The core is always more resistant to change compared
to the periphery. Since in our times, the change in everyday reality is the
norm, rather than exception; the core had to be more dynamic for higher
fidelity. But this is rarely the case. Analogous to the sticky prices and wages
of Keynesian economics, the core has its reasons to be more dogmatic and
resistant to the dynamic character of everyday reality. The core is in full
control of the funds, tenure, other key positions and other sources of prestige
and monetary returns. For the core, to think differently may be risky, as it
would easily be translated into loss of prestige and monetary returns through
getting rejections from the top journals, fund agencies and research institutes
of Kuhnian normal science which expect the contributor to be more or less
normal and similar to each other, rather than revolutionary and inherently
different. This can also mean loss of funds and in some cases even tenure.
Let us remember the story of Ignaz Semmelweis (1818-1865) who had
reasons to propose a relationship between childbirth deaths and dirty hands
Ulaş Başar Gezgin | 243
but no sufficient proof to convince his colleagues. He had lost his positions
and prestige (Best & Neuhauser, 2004). One can’t be in both the normal,
risk-averse core of scientific community and the marginalized periphery that
is more eager to recognize the facts. Of course we have more remarkable
cases of revolutionary science such as Galileo which corroborates our central
thesis here.
So when we think about the future of management theory, we need to
take note of the fact that there is no single scientific community producing
and re-producing management theory, but two: Normal, risk-averse core and
revolutionary, risk-seeking (or in better terms, risk-accepting) peripheries.
Their future responses to the changes in reality will be different.
2.2. The mainstream core vs. critical periphery: This distinction has
implications for critical and self-critical approaches to management theory.
The periphery can be more critical and self-critical, criticizing the theory as
well as their own role in, for example, social control. Management theory,
as critical and self-critical thinkers know very well, is never science alone;
it always involves values which open the gates for politics. Again critical
and self-critical thinkers are aware of the influences of the world wars in
particular and military motivations in general over the origins and history of
management theory. The aim of management theory, in that sense, is not only
maximizing efficiency and accordingly boosting financial indicators such as
profit, revenue, return of investment etc., but also pacifying resistance to
authorities, authoritarianisms and norms. Thus, the way the future dynamics
will be received and responded to will be different among the mainstream
core and the critical periphery.
2.3. The fields, sub-fields and overlaps: Another major source of
heterogeneity for management theory is due to the fact that there is no
management theory with capital ‘M’ and ‘T’ that has the explanatory and
predictive powers over all fields and sub-fields of management. A few
candidates for such a comprehensive theory making appeared such as systems
theory, chaos and complexity models, but so far they are far from full-fledged,
thus we don’t consider them as MT. Rather than a single theory explaining
everything in management, which is the case in, for example, physics, we
have tens of theories in management with differing scope, and explanatory
and predictive power, and considerable overlaps. So a question concerning
the future of management theory is based on the false assumption that there
is a single management theory. Contrary to this singular view, if we take it in
its plural, then we need to concentrate on each, to come up with satisfactory
responses.
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A way to stick to a singular management theory would be periodization
of the history of management theory on the basis of the most common
approach for each period. This typical textbook point of view, seen for
instance, in Pearson (2018) brings about 4 major periods of management
theory: Classical view which is characterized by “[e]mphasis on purpose,
formal structure, hierarchy of management, technical requirements, and
common principles of organisation” (p.43), human relations view which
can be summarized by “[a]ttention to social factors at work, groups,
leadership, the informal organisation, and behaviour of people” (p.43),
systems view which relies on “[t]he integration of the classical and human
relations approaches, [i]mportance of the socio-technical system, [and] [t]
he organisation within its external environment” (p.43), contingency view
which proposes that there is “[n]o best design of organisation. Form of
structure, management, and ‘success’ of the organisation [are] dependent
upon a range of situational variables” (p.43). However, this point of view is
not comprehensive enough. Its focus is only about organizational aspects,
but management theory covers many areas other than organizations such as
supply chain management, operations management, project management
etc. Secondly, we should keep in mind that historically speaking, overlaps are
likely. Thirdly, these are rather characterizations of the mainstream academic
core rather than marginalized peripheries, which lack the description of the
mechanisms that lead to transition to another approach, in other words, it
does not provide a dynamical account.
Nevertheless, a number of future studies of some of the management
theories can be noted in this context. Kessels (2001) states that the time for
traditional management theory is over, as we have been moving to knowledge
economy. The knowledge work needs to be up to date. That is why to survive
in the future, the companies have to be learning organizations. In the same
vein, Koski (2001) proposes companies to be intelligent organizations.
While these kinds of studies partially explain how the economy will be
transformed, it is not the case for management theory. As explained above,
there is no deterministic relation between everyday reality and management
theory. Management theory usually falters, and delays are typical of the
theory due to the resistance and risk-averseness of the core. At the same
time, we need to remind that this article was written in 2001 which means
well ahead of theory construction in this area, which makes it one of the
precursors of these idea but not that of the conclusive ones. This is the price
to be paid when you think earlier and faster than the mainstream academic
core.
Ulaş Başar Gezgin | 245
In fact, future-oriented discussions on structural changes of the economy
seem to be popular among the futures scholars: García-Olivares & Solé
(2015), for example, discusses how we would ultimately move “from
capitalism to a symbiotic economy”; while Cohen (2013) claims that we
have already moved from consumerism to post-consumerism “expressed
in terms of stagnating wages, persistently high unemployment, widening
income inequality, sluggish consumer demand, volatile financial markets,
contracting middle-class security, and general public malaise” (Cohen,
2013, p.42). Let us also note that this futurological interest in structural
changes of the economy is not recent; it dates back to 1970s and onwards
with discussions of the role of informal economy in post-industrial society
(Gershuny, 1979), “services in the new industrial economy” (Miles, 1993,
p.653), and the post-Fordist economy (Belussi & Garibaldo, 1996). But
even in these comprehensive accounts, how these changes will influence
management theory is missing. Likewise, another popular topic among
futures scholars appears to be innovation. These works cover diverse areas
such as entrepreneurial innovation (Colwell & Narayanan, 2010), corporate
innovation management (Gracht, Vennemann & Darkow, 2010), national
systems of innovation (Archibugi & Michie, 1997), how innovation would
affect human resource strategies (Johnson, Baldwin & Diverty, 1996),
innovation networks (Duin, Heger & Schlesinger, 2014) etc. Again, the
focus is on how to support innovation, but not about how management
theory would respond to these recommendations. Thus, we need to shift
our interest from future studies about management to research on theory
building in management.
In the case of theory building in management, converging with our
characterization of academic communities above, Trim & Lee (2004)
state that “[a] researcher may also need to adopt a rather “risky” research
strategy that encapsulates the critical theory approach, if they are to
achieve something unique” (p.473). On the other hand, they have a more
cognitivistic understanding of theory building:
“However, gaps in our knowledge do arise and prove challenging with
respect to motivating us to eradicate our deficiencies and at the same time
spur us to find new solutions. This implies that it is necessary to generate
new insights into management theory and at the same time broaden the
parameters of management development” (p.474).
Dent & Bozeman (2014), from a historical point of view provides a
more colored and realistic description of theory building in management.
They list “social Darwinism and religion, the rise of social science, the promise
246 | 6 Trends over Management Theory: Decolonization, Sinification, Empowerment/Precarization...
of the scientific method, and the perspectives of the business tycoons” as “the social
ideas and influences that created the conditions for modern management to be
formed and established” (p.145). Although this list is far from full-fledged
(for example it does not include funders) it is more social than the account
provided by Trim & Lee (2004) which was based on the widespread
assumption of ‘a curious individual scientist’ rather than aggressive needs
of the corporate interests. Theory building in management is not cognitive
only, social factors can be said to be stronger, as these theories serve a set of
vital social functions such as maintaining the status quo and social control.
Dent & Bozeman (2014) reminding us that in fact the first management
theories emerged during slavery period in the United States state that
“What was undecided in mid-nineteenth century America was whether
wage-earners would be treated more like partners, apprentices, slaves, or
in some other manner. Modern employment has largely forged a different
form, often providing health insurance, pensions, and other benefits.
Modern management, in its approach to the employed work force, is
primarily designed to operate objectively and instrumentally toward human
“resources”” (p.147).
3. Trends to influence the future of management theory
Before presenting and discussing the trends to influence the future of
management theory, let’s listen to what Scott (2007) says about peer review
which is the foundation of the modern science:
“[Peer review] is the main form of decision-making around grant
selection, academic publishing and the promotion of individual scientists
within universities and research institutions. It also underpins methods used
to evaluate scientific institutions. Yet, peer review as currently practiced can be
narrowly scientific, to the exclusion of other pressing quality criteria relating
to social relevance. It is often also controlled and practiced by scientists to the
exclusion of wider groups that might bring valuable perspectives” (p.827).
Furthermore,
“[p]eer review plays a significant role in many of the key moments in
science, as it is the main form of decision-making around: who receives
money to do what science; who gets to publish in the scientific literature;
and which individual scientists are selected and promoted within research
institutions” (Scott, 2007, p.828).
In fact, this is no longer completely true. Some of the functions usually
attributed to peer review are now assigned for non-academic actors of the neo-
Ulaş Başar Gezgin | 247
liberal model such as CEO of the university, Human Resource Departments
etc. Nevertheless, even in the ideal situation, peer review can’t be 100%
reliable. It is where some of the ideas are marginalized and underfunded
especially in social and administrative science fields.2 Recognizing this fact
and summarizing the relevant reports, Scott (2007) adds that
“other problems with peer review include fraud, bias (i.e., institutional bias,
bias in favour of positive results, bias against women or young researchers),
‘cloning’ (i.e., favouring topics and researchers with characteristics similar
to those of incumbent paradigms and researchers), and inefficiency”
(p.834).
Within this context of imperfect peer review systems, a set of trends are
expected to influence the future of management theory. Some of these have
been very-well recognized by futurologists while some others have rarely been
under the spotlights. Let us stress the fact that they are not only influential
over management and companies, but also management theory. The reason
is that there are already a reasonably high number of marginalized researchers
mostly in the academic peripheries that form a loose coalition of heterodox
voices in academic circles of management. In our next time horizon (i.e.
in half-century or in a century) they can be a part of the mainstream if the
conditions will be ripe for their academic revolutions. These trends are:
- Decolonization
- Sinification
- Empowerment and precarization
- Feminization, degendering and egalitarianism
- Transdisciplinarity
- Environmental and natural challenges and issues (including global
warming, increasing number of disasters, peak oil, energy crisis, sustainability,
green management)
2 As a reviewer for some other scholarly journals, of course I am not against peer review,
however I think we need to find better ways to do it. The reviewers in all the occasions
listed by Scott (2007) need to be aware of their own blind spots, biases and other forms of
subjectivities; and never think for a moment that they are infallible. Secondly, I feel lucky that
we have futures studies journals that are more receptive, if not accepting for heterodox views.
Finally, let us also note that in a considerably high number of countries, the endowers of
research funds are explicitly or implicitly ideologically-oriented in their funding decisions. This
is the case in almost all undemocratic countries which corresponds to more than half of the
world population. In those countries, in addition to reviewers’ blind spots, biases and other
forms of subjectivities, the researchers also need to tackle with discrimination, mobbing, threat
of unemployment and hunger, civil death, and other forms of social and political repression.
248 | 6 Trends over Management Theory: Decolonization, Sinification, Empowerment/Precarization...
Some of these are belated and some others are just-in-time responses to
the outdated model of the management theorist: This theorist is a Western
patriarchal, colonial, individualistic, anti-egalitarian, anti-democratic,
narrow-disciplinary male theorist which take natural and environmental
resources and conditions as granted. This model is challenged through these
trends to be presented and discussed below.
3.1. Decolonization
Management theory still has colonial relics in its workings. Usually we
have Western-origined theories which claim universality without considering
non-Western work settings. In fact, these theories can be applicable only if
its assumptions about society hold true. Western-origined theories are useful
in former colonies only if those distant lands were completely colonized not
in terms of military and economic relations, but also through sociological
and psychological dimensions. When non-Western people act as if they are
Westerners, and if they act so well that their act becomes the reality, then the
Western management theory is applicable for a former colony. This shows
the hidden connection of management theory and colonialism. Despite of
the enormous harm inflicted on colonized, subjugated subjects and countries
as a whole, with the rise of countries like BRICS, management theory
will be forced to question itself as a response to the challenges posed by
former colonies. Research viewing management theory from a post-colonial
perspective is rare (e.g. Banerjee & Prasad, 2008), but some other vocal
critiques using other terms are notable such as Fang (2010):
“Hofstede’s cross-cultural paradigm has stimulated academic interest in
value and behavioral variations across national borders and helped practitioners
to capture national cultural stereotypes in concrete and measurable terms.
Nevertheless, the Hofstede paradigm with its focus on cultural differences
can hardly capture today’s new cross-cultural management environment
characterized by change and paradox in borderless and wireless cultural
learning, knowledge transfer, and synchronized information sharing. In the
twenty-first century, management faces new challenges because people in the
twenty-first century are increasingly no longer bipolarized and isolated creatures
but of multicultural identities and multicultural minds. Asian management
researchers need to learn from the West but at the same time need to have self-
confidence and courage in using indigenous knowledge to make contributions
to theory building with global relevance” (Fang, 2010, p.155).
Likewise, Blunt & Jones (1997) compare and contrast ‘current Western
leadership ‘ideal’’ with leadership in East Asia and Africa on the basis of
Ulaş Başar Gezgin | 249
“influences on leadership practices”, authority, uncertainty and relationships
(p.19), and concludes that the differences are paradigmatic, in other words
the Western leadership theories largely diverge from the real situation in East
Asia and Africa.
Jack et al. (2013) ask a timely and useful question which will be relevant
for the next trend as well (i.e. Sinification):
“Is it possible and desirable to create a universal theory of management
and organization? Scholarship about the boundary conditions of endogenous
theory and the need for indigenous theories of management as well as
geopolitical changes in the world order have animated this debate” (p.148).
3.2. Sinification
The rise of China is discussed usually in international relations, politics,
economics, trade and military circles. But futurological discussions of the
implication of this Sino-rise is rare in the discipline of management. Chinese
management scholars are quite active. They have their own journals in which
the implicit, underlying discussion is the following: Should we fix the false
and self-proclaimed universality of Western-oriented management theory by
introducing Chinese inputs including concepts, methodologies, approaches,
facts, findings etc. or should we rather develop our own Chinese management
theory? This question will be even more meaningful as China will progress
in One Belt One Road project (also known as the New Silk Road) (see
State Council, 2018), merger and acquisitions operations directed towards
European and American companies (cf. Drahokoupil, 2017; Yang et al.,
2011), and investments elsewhere such as in Latin America and Africa (cf.
Narins, 2018). So Chinese management research (e.g. Cao, Zhang & Xi,
2011; Li & Peng, 2008; Qi, 2012; Stening & Zhang, 2007; Xi, Cao &
Xiangli, 2010; Xi, Zhang & Ge, 2012), following these economic trends
will stop being a matter of Chinese only. The first answer for the question
above will be the strongest challenge against Western-origined management
theory, as it will not only question its epistemology, but also cultural givens
and hidden motivations.
These discussions will be coupled with those asking whether China is the
new colonialist power considering its interest in buying raw materials from
low and middle income countries and selling processed products (Larmer,
2017; Mourdoukoutas, 2018).3 In this way, the argument goes, and with
3 A Forbes article was provocatively, unfairly and unrealistically entitled ‘China is treating Africa
the same way European colonists did’; however possibly due to world-wide reaction it was
revised as ‘What is China doing in Africa?’ after release. However, the extension of the article
250 | 6 Trends over Management Theory: Decolonization, Sinification, Empowerment/Precarization...
the infrastructure projects, China makes these needy countries economically
dependent on himself. However, Chinese would reply stating that the data
are distorted with a Western bias (Yafei, 2014), they have no military goals
to conquer the world and they committed no massacres among Africans in
the name of colonialism nor involved in slave trade, unlike what Western
colonialists did. So overall, this analogy is not applicable, but obviously it
serves ideological functions for Western and pro-Western commentators
through hiding the brutal history of Western colonialism. In summary, one
thing we can be sure of for the next century is that China will be more
powerful, Chinese will have larger share of media time, and Chinese
management scholars will publish more works that will be even more
influential in global management circles.
3.3. Empowerment and Precarization
Let us note that management theory was developed by managers and
employers without any participation of employees. Thus it needs to be
debunked to come up with a more democratic and egalitarian theory that
empowers employees. However, recent forms of capitalism is increasingly
getting more characterized by the notion of precarization, while struggle for
empowerment continues. Precarization means labors’ forced transformation
into becoming ‘copy-paste’ elements of insecure job conditions, usually
without a contract or with an unfavorable one (i.e. zero-hour contracts
or adjunct positions or sessional lecturing in academia). Precaria, as the
new proletariat has no job security, they can be fired any time without any
compensation. They are not offered permanent contracts which also mean
that neither social security nor health insurance are provided. This is the
best arrangement for the employers as the labor force will be docile, easily
replaced (i.e. made to function as a copy/paste element) and will not be
associated with costly payments such as social rights. Increasing number
and percentages of people are precarized all over the world with the obvious
example of higher education where adjuncts, part-timers and sessionals are
plenty and appear to constitute most of the academic staff in the future. From
a different perspective, but with a similar result, Williams & Windebank
(1999) discuss informalization and post-formalization of labor in our times
of high formal and informal unemployment and underemployment.
How did we come to these dire conditions for labor? We have mainly 3
interconnected reasons: The decline in trade union membership, the collapse
still reveals the original title: china-is-treating-africa-the-same-way-european-colonists-did/
(Mourdoukoutas, 2018).
Ulaş Başar Gezgin | 251
of Soviet Union and almost all of its ideological allies, and the implementation
of neo-liberal policies. With a higher number of ununionized labor, each
worker became more expendable. European bourgeoisie had been afraid
of a Soviet-like revolution in Europe, and by then labor and social rights
movements were strong, that is why European governments had granted
social rights to people. With the collapse of Soviet Union, this ‘red scare’
ended. Finally, neo-liberal policies cut government funds over schools and
hospitals which were supposed to operate for public benefit rather than
profit. They turned all sectors into profit-making companies, success of which
was evaluated on the basis of private profit rather than public benefit. As a
result of these 3 factors, precarization is fast approaching unexpectedly high
proportions. Let’s also add the fact that China’s inhumane work conditions
also dovetail with worldwide precarization. The rise of China will be the 4th
factor behind this process.
We can change its name, we can call it in another way, but it doesn’t
matter: Class struggle is a reality of life and it persists in different forms in
different centuries. A higher level approach to the notion of class struggle
would focus on the relations of hierarchy in work settings to cover not only
economic differences, but also social ones. Contrary to what the mainstream
human resource management discipline tries to convince us, the interests of
the employer, managers and employees are irreconcilable. With due respects
to exceptions, in most of the capitalist enterprises of the world, the workers
are made to believe that the company interest is identical with their own
interest. So if the company wins, they win. We incisively saw that that was
not the case considering the bonus schemes the CEOs were entitled to for
failing their companies in 2008 Economic and Financial Crisis.4 The notion
of class struggle will pop up again and again, and a future outlook without
considering this is far from reality. So we will see whether empowerment
and industrial/economic democracy movements which apply the notion of
political democracy to work settings will prevail or not (cf. Johanisova &
Wolf, 2012). The class struggle, as well as the trends towards precarization
vs. empowerment will be influential over management theory. A theory
aiming for precarization would focus on how to motivate staff although they
are stripped of all their rights, while another for empowerment will focus on
humane work conditions. That is a big difference.
4 Why are we insisting that the crisis was both economic and financial, why don’t we say financial
only? If a crisis is economic, we should be able to find the reasons in the real economy such as
oversupply of housing which was applicable for 2008 in addition to the financial reasons.
252 | 6 Trends over Management Theory: Decolonization, Sinification, Empowerment/Precarization...
3.4. Feminization, Degendering and Egalitarianism
The management theory was developed by predominantly male
theorists. A number of challenges posed by feminists are to be noted.
For example, under capitalism the low-paying jobs are mostly allotted to
women; support workers which are mostly women such as cleaners are
demeaned; house work is not counted as productive activity (but in fact it
helps labor to refresh for the next day) etc. Women’s studies scholars are
expected to come up with even more radical criticisms of the male theorist
behind the management theory. While currently, feminist and pro-feminist
future studies are rare (e.g. Milojević, 2008; Szalai, 1975), the disconnect
between women’s studies in general and feminist studies in particular and
future studies will likely be mended in the future through the collaboration
of scholars from both sides.
3.5. Transdisciplinarity
While the mainstream academia is getting more and more specialized,
transdisciplinarity is also recognized as a drawer of a more realistic picture.
In fact, in the future some of the management theories may go extinct as they
are too narrowly engaged with their subject forgetting to look at a greater
picture. This move towards transdisciplinarity is also visible in future studies
(e.g. Cilliers & Nicolescu, 2012; Darbellay, 2015; Jahn & Keil, 2015; Klein,
2014; Serrao-Neumann et al., 2015). Transdisciplinarity requires team work
as each individual scientists’ cognitive capacity is more limited than needed.
As a result, transdisciplinarity emerges as a way to refute the individual and
individualist theorist behind management theory.
3.6. Environmental and Natural Challenges and Issues
A number of environmental and natural challenges and responses such
as global warming, increasing number of disasters, peak oil, energy crisis,
sustainability, renewable energies, green management etc. are on the table,
and how these can transform the management theory should be discussed.
A high number of future studies articles address these issues (e.g. Abas,
Kalair & Khan, 2015; Almeida & Silva, 2011; Crivits et al., 2010; Eastin,
Grundmann & Prakash, 2011; Enserink, Kwakkel & Veenman, 2013;
Floyd & Zubevich, 2010; Heinonen, Jokinen & Kaivo-oja, 2001; Hjorth &
Bagheri, 2006; Hughes & Johnson, 2005; Jamison, 2003; Jokinen, Malaska
& Kaivo-oja, 1998; Kemp, 1994; Maiteny, 2000; Mathews, 2012, 2013;
Moriarty & Honnery, 2015; Newman, 2006; Roy, 2000), but discussions
about their implications for management theory is rare.
Ulaş Başar Gezgin | 253
Economically speaking, management theory is usually based on the
notion of homo economicus championed by classical economics. According
to this approach, human beings are rational, they pursue their self-interest
following a simple hedonistic algorithm: Pursue joy, avoid pain; or get
rewards, avoid punishment. This approach further assumes that markets are
naturally self-balancing. However we have seen on every occasion that these
two assumptions are not true. As Freud and many other psychodynamically
and cognitively oriented psychologists showed us, unconscious, subconscious
and preconscious processes are more important than publicly recognized in
decision making and human behavior. So irrationality can’t be discarded.
Furthermore, for numerous times, the so-called ‘free markets’ fail and their
failure may lead to even worse problems such as economic crisis. Despite
of these deficiencies peaked on 2008 Economic and Financial Crisis, the
homo economicus assumption of the management theory persists in the
mainstream academic core, but it may change in the future with increasing
pressure from the marginalized peripheries.
A statement closely tied with this outdated notion of homo economicus
was that “the resources are scarce”. But this scarcity was a relative and
conditional one: Our needs were infinite, thus we could never have sufficient
resources to meet our needs. This hedonistic assumption is also problematic.
The whole idea of Buddhism and the discussions of degrowth are based
on the idea that we can minimize our needs. The notion of needs is not a
universal and ahistorical given. Our needs depend on our times. However,
in the next century or so, this notion of scarcity will have another form with
the recognition of the fact that the scarcity is not relative or conditional, but
absolute and universal. Why? That is because the environmental and natural
resources that were taken for granted, for example clean air will be recognized
to be vulnerable to anthropogenic harms such as ozone depletion.
Other likely trends can be noted as well. For example, the exploding uses
of AI for production will be another trend for management theory to reckon.
To what extent the epistemic assumptions reserved for human workers
will be granted to AI would be one of the questions to consider. Let us
remember one of our discussions above which reminds us that management
theory emerged during slavery in the United States. This situation may have
its parallel in AI discussions.
One view is that in fact the prevalence of AI does not bring a categorical,
qualitative difference for capitalism: Machines are always used in capitalism,
and in fact they are the basis of capitalism. So use of more machines in
production does not make any difference. Whereas some others claim it
254 | 6 Trends over Management Theory: Decolonization, Sinification, Empowerment/Precarization...
to be a major difference (e.g. Makridakis, 2017). Whatever the conclusion
would be, this discussion will be one of the agenda items of management
theory in the future.
Other than Makridakis (2017) and AI as a trend, we can also mention
social media as another trend. Pang (2010), rather than talking about social
media use, propose to study social media contents to come up with new
information; while Kostakis et al. (2015)’s arguments revolve on ‘commons-
based peer production’ which is expected to take place in the post-capitalist
future.
4. Conclusion
In this article, we tried to reflect on the future of management theory.
We proposed that it is not homogeneous. We mentioned 3 factors behind
this situation. We proceeded to present and discuss 6 trends that have been
affecting management theory: Decolonization, Sinifacation, degendering,
empowerment and precarization, transdisciplinary, and environmental and
natural challenges and issues. Of course there may be other factors that
are not discussed here. However, as a starting point, the presentation of
these 6 trends would hopefully help the interested readers to reflect on their
implications for the future.
Ulaş Başar Gezgin | 255
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