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Modeling Multiple Response Processes in Judgment and Choice
Ulf Böckenholt
Northwestern University
In this article, I show how item response models can be used to capture multiple
response processes in psychological applications. Intuitive and analytical responses,
agree–disagree answers, response refusals, socially desirable responding, differential
item functioning, and choices among multiple options are considered. In each of these
cases, I show that the response processes can be measured via pseudoitems derived
from the observed responses. The estimation of these models via standard software
programs that allow for missing data is also discussed. The article concludes with two
detailed applications that illustrate the prevalence of multiple response processes.
Keywords: item response models, missing data, multiple-choice items
Supplemental materials: http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/2325-9965.1.S.83.supp
A key challenge in quantitative psychology is
to develop models that parsimoniously capture
how individuals differ in arriving at their judg-
ments or choices. Successful examples include
item response and discrete choice models
(Böckenholt, 2006; van der Linden & Hamble-
ton, 1997). Both classes of models have in com-
mon that they postulate a single response pro-
cess that leads to the observed judgments and
choices. In item response models, the probabil-
ity of a correct response to an item depends on
the difference between the test taker’s ability
and the item difficulty. In choice models, the
probability of a choice depends on the differ-
ences in utility between the choice options.
Thus, in both cases, a single response process,
formalized as a difference between ability and
difficulty for item response models or as a dif-
ference between utilities for choice models, is
postulated to hold for all respondents. In this
article, I go beyond the notion of a single re-
sponse process and consider applications in
which respondents may arrive at their answers
via multiple response processes.
Multiple response processes abound in psy-
chological research. For example, there are a
considerable number of dual-response theories
in judgment and choice applications that are
based on System 1 and System 2 distinctions
(Evans, 2008). System 1 processes are charac-
terized as unconscious, rapid, effortless, and
automatic, whereas System 2 processes are
characterized as conscious, slow, effortful, and
deliberative. Each system can lead to different
answers, as illustrated by the following test
item: “A bat and a ball cost $1.10. The bat costs
$1 more than the ball. How much does the ball
cost?” (Frederick, 2005, p. 26). A typical im-
mediate answer is “10 cents” because $1.10 can
be divided easily into $1 and 10 cents, and 10
cents seems to be a reasonable price for a ball.
However, after a moment of reflection and de-
liberation, a respondent may realize that the
difference between $1 and 10 cents is less than
$1 and give the correct answer instead.
Similarly, when asked questions about per-
sonal or sensitive issues, respondents may want
to give honest answers but also want to present
themselves in a favorable light, with the result
that items measure both the actual behaviors of
the respondents as well as the respondents’ ten-
dency to edit their responses. To identify which
response process gives rise to the observed an-
swer, social desirability scales (Paulhus, 1984)
have been developed that measure the degree to
which respondents tend to present themselves
favorably. However, success in using these
scales to correct for respondents’ response-
Ulf Böckenholt, Kellogg School of Management, North-
western University.
I am grateful to Carolyn Roux and Jacques Nantel for the
rating data presented in the Applications section of this
article.
Correspondence concerning this article should be ad-
dressed to Ulf Böckenholt, 2001 Sheridan Road, Evanston,
IL 60208. E-mail: u-bockenholt@kellogg.northwestern.edu
This article is reprinted from Psychological Methods,
2012, Vol. 17, No. 4, 665–678.
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
Decision © 2013 American Psychological Association
2013, Vol. 1(S), 83–103 2325-9965/13/$12.00 DOI: 10.1037/2325-9965.1.S.83
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