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Everyday life in the shadow of the border: the Polish-Russian borderland since the war in Ukraine – recognizing the phenomenon
Abstract
The local community in the Polish-Russian border area has been experiencing constant closures and openings since the delimitation of the border. Despite that, the residents used the border as a resource until the outbreak of war in Ukraine. All actions of the central authorities restricting cross-border mobility in the Polish-Russian borderland were treated by the residents as a temporary impediment, to which they were, to some extent, accustomed as they lived in a region with strong exposure to geopolitical risks. With the outbreak of war, the Polish-Russian border area became an isolated border region. Residents of the Polish-Russian borderland face the challenge of reorganizing their daily lives and counteracting the negative effects of permanent isolation. This article seeks to investigate how the Russian-Ukrainian conflict affects the daily lives of these residents through a series of expert interviews.
... The same border also became the borders of the European Union and the Schengen zone. In last years (2020)(2021)(2022)(2023)(2024), new events have led to rapid changes in borders: an unexpected pandemic in 2020 provoked closure of borders (Janczak, 2020;Opiłowska, 2021), in 2021 the Poland-Belarus border again serving as an "arena" in which illegal movements of migrants came into play (Filipec, 2022), early 2022 brought new aggression, with an invasive attack of the Russian Federation mounted against Ukraine, with the immediate effect of mobilising vast numbers of Ukrainians into fleeing for their lives into a safer place, inter alia and first and foremost across the border with Poland (Kotus & Adams, 2024;Moise et al., 2024;Studzińska, 2023). ...
... It was relationships involving work or other contacts in Poland already in existence (Górny & Śleszyński, 2019) that at first facilitated moves of refugees into Poland, and the finding of safe accommodation and living conditions (Kotus & Adams, 2024). However, an entirely new era of contacts and cooperation was also ushered in, with immediate opening of assistance points on the Polish side at border crossings, with the core NGOs, local authorities and even private individuals all playing their part (Kotus & Adams, 2024;Studzińska, 2023). The border areas involved thus became places of observation, assistance and rescue in equal measure. ...
The paper develops a conceptual framework for interpreting the process of border changes in Poland since 1945. In this article, the author presents directions of change, and the functions, characterising Poland’s borders. A synthesis of relevant literature on borders shows how the specific functions of borderlands can be categorised into at least four overarching types, including by reference to barriers, peripherality and isolation, line of differentiation, and axis of integration. This then gains verification through empirical analysis of processes actually taking place along the borders of Poland. It proves possible to identify and take account of periods of isolation, transformation and European integration. However, the analysis also takes account of the most recent phenomena characterising the last few years (2020–2024), during which the Polish borders have moved back in a “rebordering” direction. The Author proposes the new concept of dynamic (cyclical) change of border function types after using Polish borders as an example of empirical analysis.
The objective of this paper is to identify the effects of cross-border cooperation undertaken within the framework of the 2014–2020 Poland-Russia Program, implemented in times of geopolitical instability. The analysis is based on a survey conducted with the beneficiaries of the program. The study was carried out in the Polish border area located in the immediate vicinity of the Kaliningrad Oblast (a militarized Russian exclave). The authors prove that the CBC in peripheral border areas along the external borders of the European Union is one of the key factors enabling their socio-economic stabilization, which determines the stakeholders’ efforts to cooperate with non-EU partners. In addition, the study shows that the new geopolitical paradigm (triggered by the outbreak of full-scale war in Ukraine), together with a sense of insecurity, are factors that end cooperation in peripheral border regions with an unsafe neighbourhood.
Whether we talk about the global scale of the threat or focus on the disruption and potential reversal of processes and realities that we assumed immutable, the epochal significance of the COVI-19 pandemic is indisputable. Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, no other event has revived territorial borders and sent territorialist shockwaves across the world as COVID-19. The wave of contagion and fear that shadowed the discovery of the coronavirus at the end of 2019 was followed by a wave of bordering in the spring of 2020 when borders were broadly closed as a kneejerk reaction to a threat perceived largely as external. With a focus on Europe, North America and Africa, this special issue aims to advance our knowledge of the multiscalar and multidimensional dynamics triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic in various border contexts. The articles in this special issue investigate the response of institutional structures and the agency of regional actors in the face of rebordering, the securitización of the pandemic, the essentialization of fear, the disruption of daily life and livelihoods, the contestation of border closures vis-à-vis questions of survival, and the re/deconstruction of borders dictated by shifting power balances supporting contested border regimes. In the aggregate, this collection of articles reminds us that territory and territoriality remain vigorous and fitting instruments in the toolbox of nation states as demonstrated by the rebordering shocks triggered by the coronavirus pandemic across the world.
The purpose of the paper is to show how the national border closures within the EU-27 have an impact on changes in potential accessibility in individual transport at the NUTS3 level. We are referring to the situation that occurred during the COVID-19 pandemic outbreak in Europe in March 2020. The study distinguishes between long and short trips, comparing the situation before the pandemic with that after the complete closure of national borders by all EU countries, thus showing which areas of the EU will suffer from accessibility losses for both long and short trips. We conclude that the spatial pattern of regions at risk of peripheralisation for short trips well defines the zones in which a serious crisis threatens local cross-border commuting. The threat of peripheralisation for long trips mainly concerns those parts of countries which are closer to the demographic and economic core of the European Union. Nevertheless, it is also compounded by other factors: including the national settlement and road networks.
To what ends do allies employ military exercises? In order to further our understanding regarding the logic and utility of military drills, this paper focuses on NATO's eastern flank. Specifically, with the help of newly compiled data, we tracked two decades of exercises in the Baltic states. Our analysis speaks to the fact that the size, tempo, and character of military training events in this region have manifestly changed. In the early 2000s, military drills were primarily conceived as a mechanism to modernize Baltic armed forces and ensure their adequacy to NATO membership standards. The 2014 Crimea crises, however, dealt a serious blow to the regional order. This event was the primary driver behind a considerable spike in the overall exercise numbers. At the same time, we observe that it was not only a mere quantitative shift that transpired. From parachute drops into remote areas, rehearsals of river crossings to moving of combat power via narrow land corridors, the staging of military exercises after 2014 were overhauled into events that accentuated NATO's reinforcement capabilities. In this context, military exercises can be seen as a crucial element to credibly signal capacity and resolve within the concept of deterrence by reinforcement.
Since February 24, 2022, we have been witnessing the next stage of what began in the 2014 Russo-Ukrainian War: a full-scale military invasion of Ukraine. For the first time in the history of the European Union, the intensive armed conflict is now approaching the border of the EU and Schengen Zone. The consequences of war: the refugee crisis, humanitarian aid, and economic problems have affected EU countries both immediately and directly. While keeping in mind the human tragedy and the tragedy of Ukraine, we would like to address a few important questions from the perspective of regional and border scholars. From this perspective, the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine is another stage of the new political order in Europe, preceded by the war in Ukraine that started in 2014, the 2015 migration crisis, 2021 Belarus-EU border crisis, which altogether – from the perspective of the border studies – could be described as re-bordering and securitization of borderlands. In this joint editorial, we address four main questions. Firstly, how we can interpret the Russian invasion in the wider, historical context, taking the frontier thesis as an explanatory category developed by Turner (1994). Secondly, the Ukrainian refugee crisis, in the context of the previous Belarusian-EU border crisis, is a multi-layered issue, where religion, gender, geopolitics, and rationales meet. Thirdly, apart from the military and political actions, war and refugee flux could be seen from the perspective of a grassroots movement of aid. Fourthly, the war in Ukraine brings uncertainty and questions about democracy and peace in Western Europe.
This study examines the role of international borders in the era of the Covid-19 pandemic, which led to unprecedented national decisions to close borders in order to contain the domestic contagion. The idea that borders act as shields conflicts with the needs of cross-border regions, as they rely on networks straddling the borders for goods and services’ provisions. This paper explores different approaches at individual, local, and regional policy levels used to counterbalance such impacts. As evidenced by North American border closures to most non-citizens seeking entry (shield effects), it is important to understand how professionals, firms, and their networks exercised various forms of agency (sieve effects) to negotiate the border and its policies during this most unusual time. Drawing from a comparative study between two North American border regions distinguished for their thriving innovative business ecosystems – Cascadia (Seattle-Vancouver) along the Canada-U.S. border and Calibaja (San Diego-Tijuana) along the Mexico-U.S. border – we seek to understand how COVID-19 measures have influenced cross-border economies through unprecedented responses to crisis management
The Covid-19 pandemic has sparked numerous unintended social and political consequences, especially for border regions as many European states decided to temporarily close their borders. This decision had a tremendous effect not only on the work of various actors in border towns, but also on the lives of borderlanders, whose daily practices are embedded in cross-border spaces. By applying a strategic-relational approach (Jessop [2001]. Institutional Re(Turns) and the Strategic-Relational Approach. Environment and Planning A: Economy and Space 33, no. 7: 1213-35. doi:10.1068/a32183), our article aims to explore the impact of the pandemic on institutional structures and the agency of various actors in two selected twin towns-Frankfurt an der Oder-Słubice and Cieszyn-Český Těšín. Based on both expert, semi-structured interviews with representatives of the above-mentioned towns and a document analysis, it elaborates on the coping strategies deployed to counteract the challenges caused by the border closure, the factors impacting cross-border cooperation, as well as the similarities and differences between the selected cases .
The COVID-19 pandemic brought many changes to social behaviours in Europe. One of its major consequences was the temporary closure of borders, which was introduced as a measure to prevent the uncontrolled pandemic spreading and involved internal Schengen borders. This has had a major impact in the way in which cross-border cooperation has been conducted in Europe, including the Czech-Polish borderland, as it dramatically restrained all flows across borders. In this paper, we evaluate the impact of the pandemic on five roles of cross-border cooperation: 1) as a multi-level governance form; 2) as a regional development tool; 3) as a para-diplomacy form; 4) as a post-conflict reconciliation tool; and 5) as Europe-building. We argue that the impacts of the pandemic complicated regional development and the Europe-building role of cross-border cooperation in the Czech-Polish borderland. The article envisages re-bordering processes also in the Czech-Polish borderland, but with important exceptions in the regions with a high level of cross-border integration, mainly in the Euroregion Těšínské Slezsko/Śląsk Cieszyński. The paper also calls for the elaboration of the guidelines for possible repeated (Schengen) border closures and proposes modifications of the INTERREG microprojects schemes, to keep them attractive also in times of expected cuts in public finances.
What was the impact of the 2014–2016 refugee crisis on immigration attitudes and national identification in Europe? Several studies show that radical right parties benefitted electorally from the refugee crisis, but research also shows that anti-immigration attitudes did not increase. We hypothesize that the refugee crisis affected right-wing citizens differently than left-wing citizens. We test this hypothesis by combining individual level survey data (from five Eurobarometer waves in the 2014–2016 period) with country level statistics on the asylum applications in 28 EU member states. In Western Europe, we find that increases in the number of asylum applications lead to a polarization of attitudes towards immigrants between left- and right-leaning citizens. In the Southern European ‘arrival countries’ and in Central-Eastern Europe we find no significant effects. Nationalistic attitudes are also not affected significantly.
This article reflects on the impact of the coronavirus pandemic and border control measures on the narratives and experience of territorial borders and the social construction of boundaries. The Covid-19 crisis has revealed how strong and durable territorial borders still are and how rapidly the idea of a borderless Europe might change in divided Europe. The imposition of border controls and the temporary closure of borders in order to prevent the spread of the coronavirus was particularly problematic for border region residents who live transnational lives and who share a common space by working, shopping and having friends and family on both sides of a border. The revival of territorial borders has demonstrated not only the power of national states, but also how interwoven the border regions have become. Hence, the article sheds light on the potential consequences of re-bordering processes for borderlands, presents public and ontological narratives that have emerged as a reaction to border closure and outlines new research fields.
An exclave position makes the economic security problems of the Kaliningrad region more complex as compared with other Russian territories. Deteriorating relations between Russia and the West compound the situation. This has been especially so since 2014 when economic sanctions were imposed against Russia, and the country retaliated. Global geopolitical instability adds to the conundrum. This study aims to assess the economic security of the Kaliningrad region. Its objectives include defining the concept of regional economic security and measuring its level in the Russian Baltic exclave. Possible ways to improve the economic security of the region are considered as well. Official statistics on the dynamics of industrial production and GRP and 28 other socio-economic indicators are used to assess the level of economic security. The region performs well on nine indicators and much worse on 19. Proposals for economic restructuring aimed at more intensive exploitation of regional natural and labour resources are examined along with the region’s prospects as part of the Great Eurasia (Bolshaya Eurasia) project and as an ‘international development corridor’.
This issue of Belgéo is drawn from the 6th Eugeo’s congress held in Brussels during the first days of September of 2017 (“Geography for Europe”). It brings together six contributions to the analysis of the ambivalent and multiscalar nature of borders in Europe. It is focused on Central and Eastern Europe and Balkans, i.e. on countries marked by intense and dramatic experiences in defining and changing borders, with a very recent memory of the last modifications. The authors of these articles have different points of view, but all of them demonstrate to what extent borders - present or past, administrative or mental - are not a secondary fact in the social construction of space; to what extent they are or can be determining elements of the present and the future, although they are neither natural, fixed nor permanent.
Poland's accession to NATO in 1999 undermined Russian-NATO relations. A similar contestation occurred before the EU's eastern enlargement when the transit of Russians to and from Kaliningrad was a contentious topic in EU-Russian diplomacy. Currently Russia's deployment of missiles in Kaliningrad has become a security concern. This article argues that NATO's security concerns replaced EU-Russian contestation about visa liberalisation as the main source of conflict in their relationship. It demonstrates that the case of Kaliningrad reflects a dual shift from a contested to a fluid boundary in EU-Russian relations, and from a contested to a solid boundary in NATO-Russian relations.
In current times, the coronavirus is spreading and taking its toll all over the world. Inspite of having developed into a global pandemic, COVID-19 is oftentimes met with local national(ist) reactions. Many states pursue isolationist politics by closing and enforcing borders and by focusing entirely on their own functioning in this moment of crisis. This nationalist/nationally-oriented rebordering politics goes hand in hand with what might be termed ‘linguistic rebordering,’ i.e. the attempts of constructing the disease as something foreign-grown and by apportioning the blame to ‘the other.’ This paper aims at laying bare the interconnectedness of these geopolitical and linguistic/discursive rebordering politics. It questions their efficacy and makes a plea for cross-border solidarity.
Borders have recently attracted a lot of academic scrutiny. Two very distinct types of literature have attempted to capture the current evolution of borders. The first one, leaning more toward the field of security studies, puts the emphasis on the rampant securitization, the coercive dimension of borders, and their divisive consequences. The second, looks at the rich environment surrounding borders, where boundaries are seen as the meeting point of a variety of cultures and communities. Those social spaces, known as borderlands, are the cradle of hybrid identities and transnational networks that contest the State’s claim to ultimate sovereignty over its territory. Against this backdrop, the ambition of this special issue lies in its aim to fill theoretically and empirically this gap by looking at securitized borderlands. This introductory article delineates the contours of and puts together the main findings of both security studies on borders and borderlands studies. It announces the objectives of the subsequent articles, which together look into the interaction between the securitized borders and the social spaces they both obstruct and dynamize. In spite of and within this peculiarly adverse environment of “securitized borderlands,” cross border societies remain in existence, resist, comply, and adjust.
There are different levels of territorial identity perceived as a sense of belonging to a particular social and territorial community. People residing in any region identify themselves with these levels to a different degree. Since 2001, the authors have been doing sociological research into the territorial identity of the population of the Kaliningrad region, which became a Russia’s exclave after the demise the USSR. The research shows that residents of the Kaliningrad region associate themselves with different territorial communities to a varying degree starting with an ever strengthening sense of national identity, followed by the regional and local identity. The sense of macro-regional (European) and global identity is significantly lower.
The main objective of this article is to offer an answer to the question whether introducing local border traffic (LBT) on the external frontiers of the EU is an effective tool for cross-border integration and development of marginalised border areas. The analysis was carried out in an area of particular strategic importance for the European Community and Russia, which is the Polish-Russian borderland. The study includes the analysis of political discourse supplied with the findings from the original survey revealing mutual perception of Polish and Russian partners. The authors drew special attention to the significance of delimitation of areas included in the visa-free traffic. The success of the four-year period of LBT zone’s functioning on the Polish-Kaliningrad border came as a result of modification of the regulations concerning the scope of the zone and the inclusionof economic regions otherwise heavily affected by the split in the functional dimension. The analysed region had the chance to become a model of national and local policies’ cooperation in border areas. The decision to shut down the LBT has proved yet again that socio-economic initiatives in border regions are deterministically dependent on the decisions of central governments.
The main aim of the paper is to analyse the system of cross-border tourism between Poland and Russia. In order to study the system, interviews and surveys were conducted; statistical data, legal documents and other sources were analysed and interpreted. A model of cross-border tourism was used in this article. The key stakeholders of tourism organisational system were specified and links among them were discussed. In relation to the development of cross-border tourism, five types of cross-border areas were distinguished (frontier zone, cross-border administrative area, Euroregions, eligible area of the European Neighbourhood Instrument, local border traffic). This article presents the functioning of the border, an analysis of border traffic in the years 2002-2014 was performed and the causes of fluctuations in such traffic were given. Also the relation between border formalities and the volume of border traffic was discussed. Cross-border cooperation and the introduction of “small border traffic” were proven to increase significantly the volume of cross-border tourism.
After a long period of oblivion that lasted for much of the second half of the 20th century, border studies over the past 20 years have once again become a fertile topic of discussion and debate, as national and international politics have brought them to the forefront of our news media. While knowledge about borders is growing steadily, their constant evolution invites scholars and practitioners alike to continue to revise ideas about what they represent for us and what they do to our lives. Following historical attempts to draw a universal understanding of the international border (Ancel, 1938; Foucher, 1986; Guichonnet & Raffestin, 1974; Martinez, 1994; Prescott, 1978), the focus has been on border dynamics, essentially that of debordering and rebordering (Amilhat Szary & Fourny, 2006; Kaplan & Häkli, 2002; Newman & Paasi, 1998; Popescu, 2011). However, the multiplication of borders seems to induce a shift from fixity to multi-location (Balibar, 2009; Squire, 2011; Vaughan-Williams, 2008). Through these processes, what appeared to be a linear divide loses its traditional topography, symbolic power and function as it disseminates in a reticular and relational manner that is always renegotiated in a way that could lead us to envision the border as ‘mobile’. We have been calling for a research agenda on the mobile border since one of our research projects bore this expression in its title in 2008, which was soon followed by preparations for an important international conference, the XIth meeting of the ‘Border Regions in Transition’ (BRIT) network (Amilhat Szary & Giraut, 2011).
The present geopolitical situation has made the debate on borders and their functions, significance, and symbolism more prominent than at any time since the end of the Cold War. While the various processes of globalisation have challenged the traditional border concept, the scalar model of identity and society remains primarily anchored in national space. The understanding of the state as a multiscalar construction, constantly negotiated and reconfigured by its actors at different levels, allows us to broaden the scope of our analysis and rethink and transform the spatial formations previously taken for granted in assessing the impacts of globalisation more regionally. State borders continue to have considerable relevance today, yet as the articles brought together in this special section will demonstrate, borders must be understood as complex, multiscalar, multidimensional, yet dynamic entities that have different symbolic and material forms, functions, and locations. With examples from Europe, Southeast Asia and the global south, this section aims to advance our knowledge of the multiscalar dynamics of border politics. The articles investigate how borders are negotiated vis-à-vis questions of identity, belonging, political conflict, and societal transformation, and how they are re- and deconstructed through various institutional and discursive practices at different levels and by different actors.
Signing the agreement on local border traffic (LBT) between the Republic of Poland and the Russian Federation was welcomed by experts as an important step towards the future visa-free regime between the European Union and the Russian Federation often discussed in the international dialogue. The three years of LBT mechanism have shown its practical significance for the development of research and cultural contacts, cooperation between municipalities and NGOs of the Kaliningrad region and the borderland (Pomeranian and Warmian-Masurian) voivodeships of Poland. When considering retail trade as a structural element of economy, it is important to address the differences in the effect LBT has had on the development of this sector in the Kaliningrad region and the neighbouring Polish voivodeships. According to Russian experts, LBT results in 7-20% losses in the Kaliningrad region’s retail sales, whereas in Poland LBT stimulates retail trade (accounting for 12% of sales in the border voivodeships). This article analyses the role of LBT in the development of retail trade in the Kaliningrad region and the Polish border voivodeships as well as prospects of its development in view of the changing geopolitical situation and adjustment of the currency exchange rates at the end of 2014. Based on statistics and analytical data, the authors arrive at the conclusion that the positive effect of LBT outdoes its negative impact on various sectors of the border regions’ economies, including retail trade.
The tourist industry in different regions of the Russian Federation changed significantly in 2000-2015. All these changes are typical of the Kaliningrad region as one of its most profitable tourism directions, an inbound international one, started developing only in the middle of the 1990-s. This research is aimed at studying shifts in the region’s tourism industry in the frameworks of its major sectors: accommodation sector, intermediary services’ sector (tourist companies) and HoReCa sector. The research results reflecting the dynamics of these tourism components are presented in tables and diagrams. The region has not reached the Soviet-period level of health resort tourism yet; peak of foreign tourists number was in the end of 1990-s- beginning of 2000-s. The biggest number of Russian tourists was observed in 2014. Analyses of impacting factors is provided along with elaborated recommendations.
DOI: 10.5901/mjss.2015.v6n6s7p165
This paper draws on the work of Michel Foucault in order to analyze the constellation of political strategies and power at the US/Mexico border wall. These strategies, however, are incredibly diverse and often directly antagonistic of one another. Thus, this paper argues that in order to make sense of the seemingly multiple and contradictory political strategies deployed in the operation of the US/Mexico border wall, we have to understand the coexistence and intertwinement of at least three distinct types of power at work there: the sovereign exclusion of illegal life, the disciplinary detention of surveilled life, and the biopolitical circulation of migratory life. By doing so this paper offers an original contribution to two major areas of study: in Foucault studies this paper expands the existing literature on Foucault by analyzing the crossroads of power particular to the US/Mexico border wall, which has not yet been done, and in border studies this Foucauldian approach offers a unique political analysis that goes beyond the critique of sovereignty and toward an analysis of coexisting strategies of power.
With its exclave status, the Kaliningrad region has been drawing attention of many researchers in different fields. Yet the prospects for cooperation between the region and neighbouring communities in Poland and Lithuania, which once constituted an integrated social, economic and political space, remain unclear. Media analysts and scholars alike tend to view the Kaliningrad region as “double periphery”, since it is excluded from major modernisation processes both in the European integration zone and in the Russian Federation. However, a detailed study involving polyscale socioeconomic indices, expert interviews, and surveys run contrary to this viewpoint. A look at the key indices of the Kaliningrad region and the neighbouring communities of Poland and Lithuania showed that both socioeconomic situation and standards of living are comparable in these areas, which indicates the prerequisites for mutually beneficial interregional cooperation. We have analysed factual information on socioeconomic development of cross-border regions and surveyed the students from the leading universities of Gdansk, Kaliningrad and Klaipeda. We were thus able to conclude that the reasons behind the delapidated cross-border relations are rather subjective and lie in the field of geopolitical orientation, information and institutional policy, as well as persistent stereotypes that shape public opinion. In this light, integration between the Kaliningrad region and mainland Russia is seen not only as an economic, but also as a sociocultural objective. An analysis of the stages of the region’s exclavisation, and policies of social support stemming from the uniqueness of the economic and geographical position of the region substantiate this conclusion.
Cross-border integration is a multifaceted as well as contextually contingent process. While various conceptualisations have been developed, the theoretical foundations of the concept appear insufficient in order to grasp the very significance of such a process of cross-border regionalism. In order to help make sense of the diversity of configurations observed, this article seeks to deconstruct the concept according to the role played by the border as a resource and to develop a theoretical framework based on two contrasted models of cross-border integration. The underlying hypothesis is that cross-border integration does not derive from the mere opening of national borders that it supposedly helps at the same time to remove, but stems from the strategic behaviour of actors who actively mobilise borders as resources. The first model, called ‘geo-economic’, is mainly based on the mobilisation of the border as a differential benefit and aims to generate value out of asymmetric cross-border interactions. In doing so, this process of functional integration is likely to increase cross-border socio-economic disparities and leads to cooperation oriented towards instrumental purposes such as increasing the economic utility of the border or regulating negative externalities. The second model, called ‘territorial project’, emphasises the border resources that involve a convergence of both sides of a border, either through a process of hybridisation/innovation or via the territorial and symbolic recognition borders entail. In this process of place-making that transcends the border, mutual understanding and trust between the actors is seen to be key and the willingness to cooperate essential. Conceived as ideal-types, the two models of cross-border integration are contrasted and to some extent contradictory. They are however not mutually exclusive and different kinds of combinations are examined based on concrete examples.
The study of borders has undergone a renaissance during the past decade. This is reflected in an impressive list of conferences, workshops and scholarly publications. This renaissance has been partly due to the emergence of a counternarrative to the borderless and deterritorialized world discourse which has accompanied much of globalization theory. The study of borders has moved beyond the limited confines of the political geography discourse, crossing its own disciplinary boundaries, to include sociologists, political scientists, historians, international lawyers and scholars of international relations. But this meeting of disciplines has not yet been successful in creating a common language or glossary of terms which is relevant to all scholars of borders. Central to the contemporary study of borders are notions such as `borders are institutions', the process of `bordering' as a dynamic in its own right, and the border terminologies which focus on the binary distinctions between the `us' and `them', the `included' and the `excluded'. Borders should be studied not only from a top-down perspective, but also from the bottom up, with a focus on the individual border narratives and experiences, reflecting the ways in which borders impact upon the daily life practices of people living in and around the borderland and transboundary transition zones. In positing an agenda for the next generation of border-related research, borders should be seen for their potential to constitute bridges and points of contact, as much as they have traditionally constituted barriers to movement and communication.
The paper analyzes the reasons for the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. It examines both the stated goals and the deeper reasons, noting that the invasion owes more to the imperialistic policies of the Russian leadership than a desire to remove a “neo-Nazi” government in Kyiv or to protect the quasi-states of Donetsk and Luhansk. It looks also at hostile Russian attitudes toward the European Union, NATO, and the United States and the importance of the capture of Mariupol as a pathway to Crimea. It observes that the attacks on civilians and atrocities that Russia has perpetrated to date reveal a desire to end Ukrainian statehood and expand further into territories of the former tsarist empire. The costs of the war and the economic limitations of Russia are likely to undermine such ambitions.
The article focuses on the impact of the new re-bordering, caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, on the functional, ideational and institutional dimension of cross-border integration, as perceived by the Czech cross-border commuters employed on the German side of the Euroregion Elbe Labe. The interviews with forty cross-commuters showed that they were left alone in these times of re-bordering and became victims of non-coordination between Czechia and Germany. Yet, cross-border commuting seems to have survived the first pandemic waves and the German labour market will continue to attract the Czech workforce despite that fact the pandemic has introduced a major uncertainty associated with the border crossing. The pandemic has revealed the need for a functional system of the cross-border management in the period of crisis to protect cross-border commuters and provide them with better security.
The future of international passenger transport is largely determined by how the post-COVID border opening will proceed. The restoration of full-fledged work of transport enterprises and other sectors of the economy in the conditions of a new normality, as well as the life and health of people depend on this. On the example of Russia, it was found that post-COVID border opening is characterized by contradictory trends: opening borders is more difficult and longer than closing them; ensuring epidemiological security is imposed on the principles of reciprocity, proximity and poorly diagnosed political preferences. According to epidemiological indicators, the re-closing of borders may be hindered by the limited state budget for providing economic assistance to affected transport enterprises, the unwillingness of the authorities to ‘annoy’ the population with unpopular decisions. At the same time the widespread information coverage in the mass media of news related to the disease in other countries can contribute to border re-closing. In such conditions, transport policy balances between a choice in favor of epidemiological well-being and a decline in the economy, or in favor of economic recovery with a deterioration in the epidemiological situation. The presented results and identified trends can be used in the implementation of transport policy and ensuring epidemiological safety.
A framework for thinking about borders in post-globalization scaffolds insights of emerging theory exemplary of prevailing in-betweenness of the border world. Epistemological advances frame dissensus, power, belongingness, borderscapes and a-territoriality as ridges of knowledge above the collected and connected lore of border experience, yet this knowledge remains topographic and incomplete for understanding interstitial components of borders and bordering. At best, linked approaches employing multiple perspectives, engaging with borderlands, portraying borderscapes, and articulating agency and mobility have set the stage for recalibration of borders in globalization, and approximation of post-globalization borders. In a post-humanistic era, in which humans encountered limitations of nature and sparred with natural laws, states propped up borders and emphasized boundaries. The “border turn” is reactionary, and antithetical, a time when we need to be mindful of the branded border and anxious of our belongingness both within and beyond borders. New directions at the border are epitomized by the articles in this special issue: controlling “blue” (maritime) versus “green” (land) borders, border ethics, China’s energized borders, borders as magnets of activism and spectacle, seemingly distinct borders in dialogue, border approaches of effective temporality, and the re-engagement of borders and policy.
This article examines the mechanism of local border traffic (LBT) at external borders of the European Union (EU) and Schengen Area in the Baltic Sea region (BSR) from the point of view of the paradigm of constructivism. The LBT mechanism is an example of the practical application of constructivism: the goal of LBT is to stimulate cross-border cooperation (CBC) in its various dimensions. As a result, new interests and new identities may develop in border areas. This study proved that the greatest opportunities for shaping relations between societies and states in BSR are in the Polish–Russian, Norwegian–Russian, and Lithuanian–Belarusian borderlands.
The beginning of 2020 saw the global spreading of the COVID-19 pandemic, leading to a systematic closure of national borders across the world, which we refer to as the 'covidfencing' panorama. As expected, in Europe, where close to two million commuters cross national borders on a daily basis to work, this new reality has provoked significant setbacks to their lives. Based on evidence already available from several sources, this article presents some of the main impacts of the covidfencing process in the European cross-border (CB) areas. It does so by relating this process to the components of a proposed deterritorialism conceptual framework. In essence, it was possible to conclude that social related components like the sharing of health facilities and the need to work across borders show the existence of a high degree of deterritorialism in several parts of Europe. Nevertheless, more integration and deterritorialism is required everywhere, and simultaneously at the social, economic, physical and institutional levels. Crucially, covidfencing has highlighted the need for improving cross-border cooperation (CBC) with a view to mitigating persistent CB barriers and European integration processes. ARTICLE HISTORY
Kaliningrad’s post-Soviet economic interconnection with Europe is encountering obstacles due to specific Russian governmental idiosyncrasies as well as its particular regional challenges. In essence, the Kremlin’s direct control from afar and European misgivings have influenced the territory’s economic development in relation to Europe. The distance of the region from Russia, exclave status, large size for an exclave, and conflicted history subject the area to contradictory forces. On the one hand, it links Kaliningrad to Europe because of a shared history and geography. On the other, it promotes a sense of political instability and geographical isolation that discourages economic integration with Europe.
Cross-border shopping and tourism are worldwide phenomena, appearing at any border with at least some degree of permeability. The authors investigate the range of cross-border shopping and tourism activities practised by Russians at two of the EU’s external borders, one between Finland and the Leningrad Oblast, and the other between Poland and the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad Oblast. The study is based on research conducted in the Polish–Russian and Finnish–Russian border regions between 2013 and 2015, when the authors held interviews, administered survey questionnaires, and engaged in participant observation. The information was supplemented with data from the Finnish and Polish Border Guard services. Based on the results of the fieldwork, the authors argue that cross-border shopping and tourism are often combined during the same trip, and thus constitute a specific form of cross-border activity. Their study sheds light on how cross-border shopping tourism depends on and is interconnected with more than just the factor of the non-availability of goods and services. They conclude that cross-border shopping at the Polish–Russian border and the Finnish–Russian border has become more like a Western European practice, namely shopping for pleasure.
Obwód Kaliningradzki Federacji Rosyjskiej (FR) odgrywa istotną rolę dla bezpieczeństwa Polski, Litwy oraz państw regionu Morza Bałtyckiego. Ten najbardziej na zachód wysunięty obszar Rosji otoczony jest państwami UE i NATO i nie posiada bezpośredniej styczności z FR. Na obszarze obwodu zgromadzone są pokaźne siły zbrojne, w tym wyrzutnie rakiet średniego i dalekiego zasięgu, które mogą być uzbrojone w głowice atomowe. Władze w Moskwie traktują potencjał wojskowy zgromadzony w obwodzie jako element nacisku na opinię publiczną, tak by zniechęcić władze RP do budowy na terytorium Polski amerykańskiej tarczy antyrakietowej.
After Poland’s accession to the EU, the Polish-Russian border became the EU external border. This significantly changed its nature and started the new type of cross border relation. Since 2012, when the Small Border Traffic (SBT) zone came into force, the border has changed its blockade function and started instead to be treated as a resource. The fundamental loosening of the border crossing regime reduced the social and functional distance between Poland and Kaliningrad, and in a broader sense between EU and Kaliningrad. This paper will try to show how small but meaningful initiative, the SBT, has had an impact on cross-border region. The present paper will describe the relationship between larger geopolitical actors and how they affect local border relations. The aim of this paper is to present phenomenon of new visa regime at the Polish-Russian border. The paper likewise describes the impact of the SBT on local communities and their economies, as well as national relations between adjacent countries. The analysis is based on the interviews and surveys conducted in the Polish-Russian border region in late 2014.
Abstrakt
After the collapse of the USSR, the Kaliningrad Oblast, which currently constitutes a part of the Russian Federation, has become an exclave neighboring Poland and Lithuania. After these two countries joined the European Union in 2004 the Kaliningrad Oblast has become an ‘isle in the EU’. One of the outcomes of this situation involves regular statements issued by politicians from Moscow and Kaliningrad reassuring that on account of its geostrategy the region is a permanent part of Russia. A special name has even been coined to address this matter – the Kaliningrad issue. There are two main geopolitical concepts: the region is Russia’s westernmost military outpost; and a pilot region for collaboration with the European Union. Although, different concepts have emerged concerning the increased independence and autonomy of this region, its inclusion in Russia is beyond doubt.
Two U.S. political geographers examine a range of geopolitical issues associated with the shifting sovereignty of Russia's Kaliningrad Oblast (a part of the former German province of East Prussia) during the 20th century, as well as the region's evolving geopolitical status as a consequence of the European Union's enlargement to embrace Poland and Lithuania. They argue that Kaliningrad today can be considered a "double" borderland, situated simultaneously on the European Union's border with Russia as well as physically separated from Russia, its home country, by the surrounding land boundaries of EU states. Although technically neither an exclave nor an enclave, they posit that in many ways it resembles both, and as such presents a unique set of problems for economic development and interstate relations.
Kaliningrad/Königsberg, the westernmost exclave of Russia and its window on the Baltic, is emerging from its Cold War status as a closed military city to become an engine of growth and tourism especially for Germans who were removed from the city after WW II.
Kaliningrad is argued to raise profound questions regarding the role, power and influence of marginal actors in EU–Russian relations as well as international politics at large. Such entities may have to confine themselves to a totally subordinated position but they can also gain, as seems increasing to have been the case with Kaliningrad, considerable influence. As spaces in-between, or as potentially emergent third spaces that significantly problematise the idea of territorial sovereignty, they do not only influence – by blurring borders and various conceptual categories – the setting of local or regional agendas. They may also impact upon the very constitution of subjectivity, in the cases of both the EU and Russia. In this essay these processes are tackled, above all by scrutinising how margins are understood in both common and theoretical discourses with the departures unfolding then explored in the case of Kaliningrad.
