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Running head: TRAIT VICTIMHOOD AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE
Perceived victimhood shapes support for inter-partisan political violence in the United
States
Boaz Hameiri1,*, Samantha L. Moore-Berg2, Celia Guillard3, Emily Falk4,5,6, and Emile
Bruneau4,7
1The Program in Conflict Resolution and Mediation, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel.
2Department of Psychology, University of Utah, UT, USA.
3Department of Psychology, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, USA.
4Annenberg School for Communication, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, USA.
5Department of Psychology, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, USA.
6Wharton Marketing Department, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, USA.
7Beyond Conflict Innovation Lab, Boston, MA, USA.
* Corresponding author: Boaz Hameiri, The Program in Conflict Resolution and Mediation,
Tel Aviv University. Email: bhameiri@tauex.tau.ac.il
Acknowledgements: We thank Rebecca Littman and Roman Gallardo for helpful feedback on
earlier versions of this article. We would also like to thank Yumeka Hirayama, Noa
Rubinstein, Noy Calif, and Yasmeen Shamshoum for their help with the coding process.
Title page with All Author Information
© 2024, American Psychological Association. This paper is not the copy of record
and may not exactly replicate the final, authoritative version of the article. Please
do not copy or cite without authors' permission. The final article will be available,
upon publication, via its DOI: 10.1037/vio0000503
Psychology of Violence
Paper in press in
Declarations
Funding: The research was funded by internal funding provided by the Annenberg School for
Communication, University of Pennsylvania.
Competing interests Statement: The authors have no competing interests to declare that are
relevant to the content of this article.
Ethics approval: The research was approved by the University of Pennsylvania Institutional
Review Board (IRB Protocol #823959).
Consent Statement: Informed consent was obtained from all participants at the beginning of
each of the studies.
Data and materials availability Statement: All data for Studies 1-3 can be accessed here:
https://doi.org/10.17605/osf.io/Q9PWD
Author Contributions: B.H. developed the study concept. All authors contributed to the study
design. Data collection was performed by B.H., S.L.M.-B., C.G., and E.B. B.H. performed
the data analysis and interpretation. B.H. drafted the manuscript, and S.L.M.-B., C.G., E.F.,
and E.B. provided critical revisions.
Trait victimhood and political violence
2
Abstract
Objective: Understanding the drivers of political violence is critical, given the destructive
consequences it has on the fabric of society. Prior work has established the importance of
situational and dispositional predictors of political violence, such as search for significance and
meaning and experiencing trauma. However, these predictors do not fully account for one of
its most worrisome ingredients—the tendency to feel aggrieved and to express that grievance
violently. Here, we examine how trait victimhood undergirds individuals’ support for, and
engagement with, political violence among Democrats and Republicans in the U.S.
Method: In Study 1 (N = 393), we examined the predictive power of trait victimhood on support
for political violence. In Study 2 (N = 1,000), we tested the same model among a nationally
representative sample of U.S. partisans with (self-reported) real-world participation in political
violence. In Study 3 (N = 824), we experimentally examined whether inducing intergroup
competitive victimhood increases support for political violence, as a function of trait
victimhood.
Results: In Studies 1-2 trait victimhood strongly predicted support for political violence—an
association mediated through intergroup competitive victimhood beliefs. The association
between search for meaning and support for violence was also moderated by trait victimhood.
In Study 3, the intergroup competitive victimhood manipulation significantly increased support
for political violence only among high trait victimhood participants.
Conclusion: These results illustrate the importance of trait victimhood—a psychological
mechanism that has been under-valued in this context—as a critical psychological force
underlying political violence.
Keywords: Political violence; radicalization; political polarization; competitive victimhood;
trait victimhood.
Trait victimhood and political violence
3
Perceived victimhood shapes support for inter-partisan political violence in the United
States
On January 6, 2021, a large crowd of Donald Trump supporters, some heavily armed,
stormed the U.S. Capitol with the goal of disrupting the congressional certification of what
they perceived as a stolen victory by Joe Biden in the 2020 presidential elections. Attacking
the police and security forces, the rioters broke into the Capitol, while making threatening
comments about members of congress, including Vice President Pence by chanting, “Hang
Mike Pence!” This attack—one which could have had a disastrous and destabilizing effect on
the country and whose reverberations are still strongly felt—was led by a false perception
that Trump and his supporters were treated unfairly, which was also fueled by other
grievances (e.g., Feuer, 2021). Over the past decade, political violence (i.e., the use of
physical force to generate or resist political change; della Porta, 2018) has had a detrimental
effect on countries around the world, including the deaths of hundreds of thousands of people
worldwide (Miller, 2019). One fundamental challenge facing scholars, practitioners, and the
world community in general, is understanding the situational and dispositional factors that
drive people to engage in political violence, and how these factors might interact. Thus, the
main purpose of this research is to advance our knowledge of political violence drivers, by
examining the hypothesized role of individuals’ tendency to feel victimized in daily life (i.e.,
trait victimhood; Gabay et al., 2020) as a critical predictor in support for political violence.
Prior research highlights various predictors of support for, and engagement in,
political violence, such as searching for significance and meaning (e.g., Kruglanski et al.,
2022), experiencing trauma or abuse (e.g., McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008), relative
deprivation (i.e., the perception that the ingroup is undeservedly worse off than other groups;
e.g., Obaidi et al., 2019; van den Bos, 2019), or grievance-based explanations for political
violence. For example, the Significance Quest Theory (SQT; Kruglanski et al., 2022) shows
Trait victimhood and political violence
4
that when the need to feel significant or meaningful is thwarted (through, e.g., loss of status,
feelings of humiliation, and disrespect), people become strongly motivated to restore it by
resorting to political violence (see e.g., Schumpe et al., 2020). Yet, although some people
who are high in (situational or dispositional) search for significance may be more disposed
towards political violence, others appear to be unattracted to violence (and might find
significance and meaning through benevolent means, such as by helping others, even at great
risk to themselves; Kinsella et al., 2019).
The findings of political violence research, albeit somewhat mixed, suggest that
psychological factors may orient people towards political violence, even when these factors
are not inherently violent and do not, individually, drive people to violence (e.g., Dyrstad &
Hillesund, 2020; van den Bos, 2019). Indeed, in some cases, individuals become more
extreme and engage in political violence even if objectively they or their group have not
suffered severe injustices, as can be seen for example, in the cases of individuals who endorse
white supremacy views (see Forscher & Kteily, 2020). Yet, in other cases, even individuals
or their groups who have, genuinely, experienced victimization and unfair treatment do not
all support and engage in political violence (cf. the specificity problem; Kruglanski &
Fishman, 2009; Smith et al., 2020).
We argue that due to these complicated dynamics, there is a need for both studies that
focus on situational (e.g., social context), and studies that focus on dispositional factors to
better predict who will engage in and support political violence. Much of the prior literature
has focused on the former, while relatively less has focused on the latter. Thus, extending
these ideas, we argue that trait victimhood (Gabay et al., 2020) is a critical predictor in
support for political violence. As we will elaborate below, trait victimhood is tied to violent
behavior and has the potential to complement past theorizing on political violence. Indeed,
personal accounts of former White Supremacists often describe a sense of individual and
Trait victimhood and political violence
5
collective victimhood as one of the motivations to join a violent extremist organization (e.g.,
Picciolini, 2017). These anecdotal accounts are consistent with qualitative research conducted
in several European countries, suggesting that victimhood may help drive radicalization
(Argomaniz & Lynch, 2018). Despite this, trait victimhood has largely been neglected by
social and political scientists as a potential driver of support for and willingness to engage in
political violence (for related work on justice sensitivity and radicalization, see Baumert et
al., 2022).
Trait victimhood
In the present research, we tested our prediction that one crucial psychological
variable that can lead individuals to political violence is the degree to which people tend to
feel victimized in their daily lives (Gabay et al., 2020). The tendency for perceived
victimhood (i.e., trait victimhood), is a phenomenon defined as “an ongoing feeling that the
self is a victim, which is generalized across many kinds of relationships. People who have
higher [trait victimhood] feel victimized more often, more intensely, and for longer
durations...” (Gabay et al., 2020, p. 1). Recently, Gabay et al. found that trait victimhood is a
stable tendency, that can develop based on context, socialization and, in particular, anxious
attachment individuals had with their main caregivers in early childhood, and is not
necessarily the result of past victimization or trauma. Furthermore, it fundamentally affects
individuals’ emotions, cognitions, and behavior; such that, individuals with high levels of
trait victimhood think and feel that what defines their identity—who they are as individuals—
is that they are perpetual victims (Gabay et al., 2020).
In addition, individuals with high levels of trait victimhood were more likely to
interpret ambiguous situations as black-and-white, and tend to see themselves as the victims
of intentional harm committed by malevolent others who have malicious intent and negative
personality characteristics (Gabay et al., 2020; see also Gollwitzer et al., 2013). Furthermore,
Trait victimhood and political violence
6
people with high levels of trait victimhood have a stronger need for their suffering to be
acknowledged and empathized with by others; and a tendency to ruminate over the
symptoms, causes, and consequences of perceived offences, which yields more intense
feelings of hurt and negative emotions that also last for a longer period of time. Finally, they
tend to see themselves as moral and those who harmed them as immoral. Ultimately, the
effects of perceived victimhood manifest in less willingness to forgive and empathize with
the perceived offenders, more entitlement for aggressive behavior, and a stronger desire for
revenge for their perceived victimization (Gabay et al., 2020).
In cases when an individual identifies with their group (e.g., a political party),
engaging in political violence, even if against a single member of the outgroup, becomes
inherently an intergroup action. In such cases, individuals process information and act on it as
part and on behalf of their ingroup and perceive outgroup members as representatives of the
outgroup (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Group identities become more salient when groups are in
conflict or competition and people strongly identify with their ingroup, as is the case of
political polarization in the U.S. (Iyengar et al., 2019). Although the majority of research
conducted on trait victimhood examines its influence on interpersonal relations, since trait
victimhood impacts basic processes of meaning making of social behavior and relationships,
we argue that similar processes could also exert their influence on intergroup emotions,
cognitions, and behavior (Gabay et al., 2020; see also Baumert et al., 2022).
Specifically, we posit that high trait victimhood individuals will be more likely to
interpret ambiguous situations on the intergroup level as perceived offenses conducted by the
outgroup (in our case, the other political party) to intentionally harm their ingroup. For
example, if Republicans decided to enforce a strict immigration policy in the U.S., fellow
Republicans might attribute this decision to a genuine concern about the job security of hard-
working Americans who live in poverty. However, it might also be perceived by some
Trait victimhood and political violence
7
Democrats as an affront to American values, as a nation of immigrants. Additionally,
individuals who are high in trait victimhood will be more likely to ruminate over the
symptoms, causes, and consequences of perceived offenses to their ingroup, yielding more
intense and long-lasting negative feelings; and to view their ingroup as moral while
perceiving the outgroup to be immoral with malevolent intentions. This, combined with the
tendency of high trait victimhood individuals to want their (perceived) suffering be
acknowledged and empathized with by others, and their perception that they are moral, while
those who hurt them are immoral (Gabay et al., 2020), has the potential to result in intergroup
competitive victimhood (i.e., the motivation of individuals to establish that their group has
suffered more than their adversary).
Intergroup competitive victimhood has been associated with belligerent attitudes
toward adversaries, and support for intergroup violence and aggression (e.g., Bar-Tal et al.,
2009). This research was mostly conducted in contexts of prolonged and violent conflicts,
such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; or in contexts of structural inequality, in particular,
racial relations in the U.S. (Young & Sullivan, 2016). To the best of our knowledge,
intergroup competitive victimhood has not been directly linked to inter-partisan political
violence between Democrats and Republicans. Nevertheless, one can argue that intergroup
competitive victimhood is closely related to the perception that one’s group is relatively
deprived, which is argued to be a prominent predictor of political violence generally (van den
Bos, 2019) and among Democrats and Republicans, in particular (Kunst et al., 2019).
The current research
Based on the reviewed literature, we aimed to assess whether trait victimhood was
associated with greater support for and willingness to engage in political violence (Studies 1-
3), and whether intergroup competitive victimhood serves as a psychological mechanism that
explains this association (Studies 2 and 3). We reason that the higher an individual is on trait
Trait victimhood and political violence
8
victimhood, the more likely they will be to perceive that they experience intergroup offenses.
Furthermore, they will be more likely to blame their state on an external offender with
malevolent intentions, engage in intergroup competitive victimhood, and therefore feel
motivated, and even entitled, to restore the deprived sense of significance and address their
perceived victimhood through violent means (e.g., Chen et al., 2022; Bar-Tal et al., 2009).
We examine the hypothesized role of victimhood in political violence in the U.S. in three
studies. Specifically, across this line of studies, we had two main hypotheses:
H1: There will be a positive association between trait victimhood and support for and
willingness to engage in political violence.
H2: Intergroup competitive victimhood will be positively associated with, and
mediate the relationship between, trait victimhood and support for and willingness to
engage in political violence.
In each study that follows, we provide more detailed descriptions of the more specific
hypotheses tested in each study, and how our main constructs are operationalized.
Study 1
In Study 1, we examined the association between trait victimhood and support for and
willingness to engage in abstract political violence, as well as the moderating effect of trait
victimhood on the association between search for meaning and political violence (e.g.,
Schumpe et al., 2020). For Study 1, we had the following hypotheses:
S1H1: Trait victimhood would be positively associated with political violence (here,
operationalized as support for abstract political violence).
S1H2: Previously established positive association between search for meaning and
political violence would be replicated.
S1H3: However, we hypothesized that the association between search for meaning
and political violence would emerge only among those with high levels of trait
Trait victimhood and political violence
9
victimhood; in other words, we hypothesize a significant interaction between trait
victimhood and search for meaning on political violence. Broken down, we expected
a positive simple effect of search for meaning on political violence for those high in
trait victimhood, and no relationship for those low in trait victimhood.
Method
Participants. Prior to data collection, we relied on effect sizes that were obtained in
previous research (Schumpe et al., 2020) to assess the needed sample size as this was the first
study of the current research program. Thus, we conducted a power analysis to determine the
sample size needed to replicate the mediation model developed by Schumpe et al. (2020).
Using a tool developed by Schoemann et al. (2017), and assuming a small to medium effect
size, with power of .80, the power analysis indicated that 300 participants would be required.
Since we intended to introduce a moderator into the model (i.e., trait victimhood), we
increased the sample size, and recruited 400 participants through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk
(MTurk) during the last week of December 2018. This provided us with a sample that is
sufficiently powered to detect correlations of r = .10 with 95% power. Seven participants
failed the attention check question (i.e., ‘This is an attention check question. Please respond
“Strongly Agree (5)”’), and were removed from the final analysis, as we preregistered,
resulting in a final sample of 393 participants (Mage = 36.13, SDage = 11.07; 38.4% women,
61.6% men; 73.8% White, 10.2% African American, 5.6% Asian, 5.6% Hispanic, 4.8%
other; 65.4% Democrat, 34.4% Republican, 0.2% missing). In exchange for participation,
participants received US$1.50. In all studies in which we recruited participants through
MTurk, we used CloudResearch, limited our sample to U.S. MTurk workers, sampled only
CloudResearch approved participants, with 95% Human Intelligence Tasks (HITs) approval
rating, and at least 100 of HITs approved.
Trait victimhood and political violence
10
Procedure and materials. In all studies, informed consent was obtained after the
nature and possible consequences of the studies were explained to participants. Participants
responded to a questionnaire that assessed trait victimhood (Gabay et al., 2020), search for
meaning (Steger et al. 2006), and support for abstract political violence (Bélanger et al.,
2017), among other measures (for more information on the methods, see supplementary
materials; for complete materials, data, and preregistration for Studies 1-3, see:
https://osf.io/q9pwd/?view_only=393709421c5c4a4cb40ea9d8743ac1a2).
Measures.
Trait victimhood (α = .95) was measured with a 22-item scale developed and
validated by Gabay et al. (2020), which assesses (from 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly
agree) people’s personality tendency to feel like victims in their interpersonal relationships
(e.g., “It makes me angry that people don’t believe that I was hurt”). We note that the trait
victimhood scale consists of four dimensions, i.e., need for recognition, lack of empathy,
moral elitism, and rumination. However, in accordance with the original validation of the
scale (Gabay et al., 2020), here we also created a single composite of the trait victimhood
scale (see also Chen et al., 2022).
Search for meaning (α = .97) was measured using a five-item scale developed and
validated by Steger et al. (2006), which assesses (from 1 = absolutely untrue to 7 = absolutely
true) the extent to which people search for meaning in their lives (e.g., “I am always
searching for something that makes my life feel significant”).
Support for abstract political violence (α = .95) was measured using a 21-item scale,
developed and validated by Bélanger et al. (2017; in Schumpe et al., 2020), which assesses
(from 1 = strongly disagree to 6 = strongly agree) people’s willingness to support and
participate in abstract political violence (e.g., “Violence is permissible when conducted by a
group fighting for a just cause”).
Trait victimhood and political violence
11
Results and Discussion
For means, standard deviations and correlations across all measured variables, see
Table S1. First, as predicted, and corroborating S1H1, we found that trait victimhood was
strongly correlated with support for political violence (r = .52, p < .001). Second, replicating
previous studies conducted under the SQT framework (e.g., Schumpe et al., 2020), we found
support for S1H2, such that search for meaning was positively correlated with support for
political violence (r = .25, p < .001). Importantly, we also found that trait victimhood
moderated this association between search for meaning and support for political violence (b =
.07, 95% Confidence Interval (CI) [.03, .11], SE = .02, t = 3.75, p < .001; see Figure S1). As
we hypothesized in S1H3, search for meaning significantly predicted support for political
violence for the high trait victimhood (i.e., 1 SD above the mean) participants (b = .16, 95%
CI [.09, .24], SE = .04, t = 4.15, p < .001), but not for the low trait victimhood (i.e., 1 SD
below the mean) participants (b = -.02, 95% CI [-.08, .05], SE = .03, t = -.58, p = .561).
Therefore, Study 1 provides initial evidence that trait victimhood is directly and
strongly related to support for abstract political violence. We also found that trait victimhood
can illuminate established findings, as it moderated the association between search for
meaning and support for political violence. That is, only among those with higher trait
victimhood, search for meaning was associated with a greater desire to address those
grievances through politically violent means.
However, it should be noted that Study 1 utilized a convenience sample of MTurk
participants. Thus, in Study 2 we aimed to replicate the results we obtained in Study 1 among
a representative sample of Democrats and Republicans. Furthermore, our aim in Study 2 was
to extend the results from Study 1 in several ways. First, we shifted from examining support
for abstract political violence to a new operationalization of our main outcome measure,
Trait victimhood and political violence
12
namely, support for a specific, ostensibly real-world, group engaging in political violence;
and, second, we included our hypothesized mediator, i.e., intergroup competitive victimhood.
Study 2
In Study 2, our goal was to replicate and extend the findings from Study 1. We had
the following hypotheses:
S2H1: We hypothesized that trait victimhood would be positively associated with
political violence (as a replication of Study 1). Here, we operationalized political
violence as support for a violent group.
S2H2: We hypothesized that the intergroup competitive victimhood of the
participants’ political group will be positively associated with (S2H2a) trait
victimhood and (S2H2b) support for political violence; and (S2H2c) that it will serve
as a mediator between trait victimhood and support for political violence.
1
Additionally, to fully utilize the nationally representative sample, we included an
exploratory measure assessing (self-reported) previous participation in real behaviors related
to political violence as another operationalization for political violence. We explored whether
this measure was associated with trait victimhood and intergroup competitive victimhood.
Method
Participants. To obtain a nationally representative sample and taking budgetary
constraints into consideration, we recruited 1,000 participants, 500 Democrats and 500
Republicans, through YouGov web-based panel in December 2019 (Mage = 48.95, SDage =
17.47; 51.4% women, 48.6% men; 64.1% White, 15.5% Hispanic, 11.6% African American,
3.5% Asian, 5.3% other). This provided us with a sample that was sufficiently powered to
detect correlations of r = .06 with 95% power. The final sample approximated the census
1
Prior to conducting Study 2, we examined, and indeed found our hypothesized model in an additional,
preregistered study, reported in the supplementary materials (Study S1), with a sample of MTurk participants,
which also included a preliminary version of the support for a violent political group outcome measure.
Trait victimhood and political violence
13
proportion in the U.S. (United States Census Bureau, 2018) on age, gender, race, education,
and region for Democrats and Republicans. For additional details on sampling and
comparisons to established benchmarks, see the supplementary materials and Table S2.
Procedure and materials. Participants were given the following brief description of
the situation on the U.S. southern border: “Many people who do not currently have
immigration documentation to enter the U.S. (‘undocumented migrants’) are trying to gain
entry into the U.S. by crossing the southern border. There are at least three reasons why
people may seek to gain entry. They might be: (1) economic migrants who are trying to find
work; (2) gang members who intend to extend their criminal influence; or (3) asylum seekers
who are trying to flee violence and oppression and save themselves and their families. As a
response, the Trump administration enforced a zero-tolerance policy that included, most
notably, building a wall across the southern border of the U.S. and persecuting all individuals
who illegally enter the U.S. This has led to the separation of these individuals from their
children when they entered the country together.”
2
Participants then completed in a randomized order our main DV, namely, support for
a violent political group that either supports (Democrats) or impedes (Republicans) the influx
of undocumented migrants into the U.S. at the southern border; our main predictor, namely,
an abridged trait victimhood scale; our proposed mediator, namely, intergroup competitive
victimhood tailored to the participants’ political group; and, for exploratory purposes,
participation in real behaviors related to political violence, as a second operationalization of
support for and willingness to engage in political violence (for more information on the
methods, see supplementary materials).
Measures.
2
To examine the validity of this scenario, we asked participants to indicate the degree to which they agreed
(from 1 = disagree completely to 6 = agree completely) with the “Trump administration zero tolerance border
security policy.” As expected, we found that Republicans more strongly agreed with the zero-tolerance border
policy (M = 5.12, SD = 1.27) than Democrats (M = 2.09, SD = 1.53; t(963) = 34.09, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 2.16).
Trait victimhood and political violence
14
Support for a violent group included the following description, tailored for Democrats
and Republicans. For Democrats: “As a response to the situation on the U.S. southern border,
two groups of Americans have formed down at the border. One group, which could be called
‘Keep America Safe’, has been engaged in a number of actions to stop undocumented
migrants from entering the U.S., and to prevent other Americans from helping migrants
crossing into the U.S. The other group, which could be called the ‘Migrant Protectors’, has
been engaged in a number of actions to provide safe passage across the border to
undocumented migrants, and to prevent other Americans from preventing migrants from
trying to cross into the U.S. In some cases, these actions included destroying equipment that
belonged to members of the ‘Keep America Safe’, and use of violence to stop members of
‘Keep America Safe’ who tried to prevent undocumented migrants from crossing the border.”
For Republicans: “As a response to the situation on the U.S. southern border, two
groups of Americans have formed down at the border. One group, which could be called the
‘Migrant Protectors’, has been engaged in a number of actions to provide safe passage across
the border to migrants, and to prevent other Americans from preventing migrants from trying
to cross into the U.S. The other group, which could be called ‘Keep America Safe’, has been
engaged in a number of actions to stop undocumented migrants from entering the U.S., and to
prevent other Americans from helping undocumented migrants crossing into the U.S. In some
cases, these actions included destroying equipment that belonged to members of the ‘Migrant
Protectors’, and use of violence to stop members of the ‘Migrant Protectors’ from bringing
undocumented migrant into the U.S.”
Following the above description, participants rated 9 items (α = .93) we developed for
the purposes of the present research, based on previous work by Hogg et al. (2010) and
Schumpe et al. (2020), which assessed the extent (from 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly
agree) participants identify with the group (e.g., “I can identify with members of [the
Trait victimhood and political violence
15
‘Migrant Protectors’/’Keep America Safe’]”), and support and willingness to engage in their
violent actions (e.g., “I would engage in violent behavior, if it assisted [the ‘Migrant
Protectors’/’Keep America Safe’] with its goals”). This measure was not previously
validated; however, it directly measures several aspects of supporting a violent group (i.e.,
identifying with it, supporting it and willingness to take part in their violent actions). As such,
we argue that it has good face and content validity.
Intergroup competitive victimhood (α = .80) was measured with an adapted 4-item
scale, developed by Noor et al. (2008), which assessed (from 1 = strongly disagree to 7 =
strongly agree) participants’ sense of intergroup competitive victimhood as “conservatives,”
(for Republicans), or “liberals” (for Democrats) (e.g., “Throughout the history of the U.S.,
[conservatives/liberals] experienced more injustice than [liberals/conservatives]”). To the
best of our knowledge, the measure was not previously validated, but different versions of it
have been used in various contexts (e.g., Adelman et al., 2016) and it has good face validity.
Participation in real behaviors related to political violence was measured with 15
items that we developed for the purposes of the present research, based on Tausch et al.
(2011). This measure assesses how often (from 1 = never to 5 = very often) participants took
part in different behaviors to support what they perceived as an important cause. Maximum
likelihood factor analysis with Oblimin rotation indicated that these items reflected two broad
categories of collective action, i.e., normative (eigenvalue = 6.18, 41.17% of variance; α =
.84; e.g., signing petitions, attending demonstrations, posting politically themed content
online) and violent (eigenvalue = 2.20, 14.64% of variance; α = .94; e.g., vandalizing
property, threatening individuals, or physically attacking those who opposed their cause)
behaviors. To the best of our knowledge, the measure was not previously validated, albeit
used extensively. Here, we used it to directly measure previous engagement in different types
Trait victimhood and political violence
16
of real behaviors that pertain to political violence. As such, we argue that it has good face
validity.
Finally, trait victimhood was measured with an abridged 9-item scale (α = .80). This
abridged version of the scale was previously used in research in Israel and consistently
showed adequate levels of reliability (ranging from .73 to .82; Maaravi et al., 2020, 2022).
3
Results and Discussion
For means, standard deviations and correlations across Study’s variables, see Table
S3. First, we replicated the results from Study 1, including most notably, a significant
correlation (albeit, not as strong) between trait victimhood and support for political violence
(r = .16, p < .001), corroborating S2H1. We also obtained correlations between trait
victimhood and intergroup competitive victimhood (r = .23, p < .001) corroborating S2H2a,
and between intergroup competitive victimhood and support for political violence (r = .36, p
< .001), corroborating S2H2b.
Next, to gain more insight into the psychological mechanism, we tested a
correlational indirect effect model with Hayes’s (2018) PROCESS macro that uses
bootstrapping method to estimate CIs for indirect effects (here, we used 5,000 iterations). We
found that intergroup competitive victimhood mediated the association between trait
victimhood and support for political violence (indirect effect = .12, 95% CI [.08, .16], SE =
.03), partially explaining the association between trait victimhood and support for political
violence, and corroborating S2H2c.
4
3
To examine the equivalence of the 22-item and 9-item versions of the trait victimhood scale, we randomly
divided our Study 1 participants to two groups. In one group (n = 203), we examined the correlation between the
22-item trait victimhood scale and political violence; and in the second group (n = 190), we examined the
correlation between the 9-item trait victimhood scale and political violence. We found correlations of similar
strength across the two groups (r = .50 and r = .53, respectively; both ps < .001), attesting to the similarity of the
two trait victimhood scale versions.
4
Notwithstanding the concerns about the value of reversing mediation arrows in distinguishing between
plausible models (Rohrer et al., 2022), the reverse model in which trait victimhood served as a mediator
between intergroup competitive victimhood and support for political violence yielded a considerably smaller
indirect effect (indirect effect = .03, 95% CI [.01, .05], SE = .01).
Trait victimhood and political violence
17
Next, we conducted additional exploratory analysis of the new exploratory measures
of participation in past real violent and normative behaviors. We found that trait victimhood
was significantly correlated with participation in violent behaviors (r = .19, p < .001), but not
with participation with normative behaviors (r = .02, p = .521). In contrast, we found that
intergroup competitive victimhood was significantly correlated with normative collective
action (r = .22, p < .001), but not with violent collective action (r = .04, p = .176). As
expected, the measure of participation in violent behaviors was highly skewed, as 82.3% of
the participants reported that they had never participated in any of the violent behaviors.
Thus, as a robustness check, we examined the same correlations using a dichotomized
variable (with 0 = never and 1 = all else)—an approach that has been argued to be
appropriate in cases of count variables with extremely highly skewed distribution
(MacCallum et al., 2002)—and found that the correlations held. Specifically, trait victimhood
was still significantly correlated with the dichotomized violent behaviors (r = .10, p = .002),
while intergroup competitive victimhood was not (r = .01, p = .781).
5
Study 2 provided additional evidence with a nationally representative sample of U.S.
partisans that trait victimhood is a predictor of support for political violence, operationalized
as both support for a violent group and real-world participation in violent behaviors (S1H1)
and that intergroup competitive victimhood mediates this relationship (S2H2), conceptually
replicating the Study 1 effects obtained with a convenience sample of U.S. MTurk workers
(see also Study S1). Exploratory models testing alternative possible configurations (i.e., trait
victimhood as a mediator of the relationship between intergroup competitive victimhood and
violent behaviors) do not support these alternative model specifications. Interestingly, our
additional exploratory analyses indicated that while trait victimhood significantly predicted
5
As a second robustness check, we repeated the same analysis using bootstrap technique, which does not
assume normal distribution, with 5,000 iterations, and found that the results did not meaningfully change.
Trait victimhood and political violence
18
participation in real-world political violence, intergroup competitive victimhood did not.
However, it should be noted that all of the previous studies showed correlational models, and
therefore it is possible that intergroup competitive victimhood could causally increase trait
victimhood (rather than the reverse), which in turn leads to higher levels of support for and
willingness to engage in political violence. We take up this question in study 3.
Study 3
In Study 3, we experimentally manipulated intergroup competitive victimhood by
having participants recall instances of intergroup competitive victimhood. We had the
following hypotheses:
S3H1: Trait victimhood would be positively associated with political violence (as a
replication of Studies 1 and 2). Here, we operationalized political violence as support
for a violent group, similar to Study 2.
S3H2: Manipulated recall of intergroup competitive victimhood would increase
support for political violence, but only for those who are high in trait victimhood; in
other words, we hypothesize a significant interaction between trait victimhood and
manipulated intergroup competitive victimhood on political violence. Broken down,
we expected a positive simple effect of the manipulation on political violence for
those high in trait victimhood, and no relationship for those low in trait victimhood.
These hypotheses complement our findings from Study 2 and add more nuance by
illustrating boundary conditions. First, it will establish the causal effect of intergroup
competitive victimhood on our outcome variable, i.e., support for and willingness to engage
in political violence. Second, since research shows that trait victimhood is hard to manipulate
(e.g., Gabay et al., 2020), Study 3 will also provide preliminary and indirect support to our
argument that it is more likely that trait victimhood predisposes intergroup competitive
victimhood beliefs. We argue that it will provide such support as it will show, first, that
Trait victimhood and political violence
19
intergroup competitive victimhood does not affect trait victimhood. Instead, examining the
conditions under which competitive victimhood predicts support for political violence, we
will show that its effects are particularly strong for those who are also high in trait
victimhood (for a similar approach, see Ge, 2023).
6
Taken together, these findings provide
additional support for the importance of accounting for trait victimhood.
Method
Participants. Eight hundred and fifty-one participants completed a survey through
MTurk in December 2019. Twenty-seven participants failed any of the two attention check
questions, as in the previous studies, and were removed from the final analysis, as we
preregistered, resulting in a final sample of 824 participants (Mage = 39.05, SDage = 12.25;
52.5% men, 47.1% women, 3% missing; 74.6% White, 10.1% African American, 7.9%
Asian, 4.5% Hispanic, 2.8% other; 48.7% Democrat, 51.3% Republican). In exchange for
participation, participants received US$2.
7
Procedure and materials. First, participants were asked to complete several
demographic questions, including their political affiliation (from -3 = Strong Democrat to 3 =
Strong Republican). Then participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions,
developed based on Kunst et al. (2019). In the intergroup competitive victimhood condition
6
In two additional studies, reported in the supplementary materials, we attempted to examine the causal effect
of search for meaning (Study S2) and experiencing interpersonal victimization (Study S3) on support for
political violence. However, in both cases we did not find it possible to effectively manipulate the key variables,
and hence were unable to show evidence of a causal effect of our manipulation on our focal dependent
variables. In both studies, we did find the same correlational model as in Study 1.
7
It should be noted that we preregistered that we would recruit 600 participants, determined based on a priori
power analysis that was based on the effect size (R2 = .029) of the interaction between trait victimhood and
intergroup competitive victimhood obtained in Study S2 (see supplementary materials). However, a coding error
yielded highly skewed conditions in terms of the sample size, and participants’ political affiliation with
approximately equal number of Republicans and Democrats in the experimental condition, but only seven
Republicans, compared to 189 Democrats, in the control condition. Thus, we decided to recruit 250 additional
Republicans. This considerably improved the distribution of Democrats and Republicans within each condition
but left us with unbalanced conditions nonetheless, with 61.4% Republicans to 38.6% Democrats in the
experimental condition, and 37.5% Republicans to 62.5% Democrats in the control condition (χ2(1) = 46.17, p <
.001). Thus, we controlled for participants’ political affiliation throughout the statistical analysis (removing
political affiliation as a covariate had no effect on the analysis, apart from the analysis assessing the effect of the
manipulation on agreement with the border policy, outlined below; see supplementary materials).
Trait victimhood and political violence
20
(n = 477), participants were asked to share their experiences with the following four issues
presented in random order using an open-response format, that were tailored to Republican
(conservative) or Democrat (liberal) participants, such that each participant reflected on how
their own group is treated unfairly: (1) “Some people say that, compared to [conservatives /
liberals], [liberals / conservatives] are being treated more unfairly. Please describe your
experience and thoughts on the issue”; (2) “Some people say that political actions made by
the government [(such as blocking Justices to the supreme court, voter suppression) / (such as
trying to push restrictions on gun ownership, blocking pro-life bills that would restrict access
to abortions)] cause more harm to [liberals / conservatives] than to [conservatives / liberals].
Please describe your experience and thoughts on the issue”; (3) “Some people say that
political events (such as President Trump’s impeachment hearings) are proof that [liberals /
conservatives] are being harmed more than [conservatives / liberals]. Please describe your
experience and thoughts on the issue”; and (4) “Some people say that throughout the history
of the United States, [liberals / conservatives] experienced more injustice compared to
[conservatives / liberals]. Please describe your thoughts on the issue.” In the control condition
(n = 347), participants instead described their recent experiences with (1) shopping, (2)
driving, (3) the weather and (4) dining.
Following the completion of the intergroup competitive victimhood manipulation,
participants were then given the same brief description of the situation with undocumented
migrants on the U.S. southern border, as in Study 2.
8
Then, participants were presented in a
random order our main DV, namely support for a violent political group that either support
(Democrats) or impede (Republicans) the influx of undocumented migrants into the U.S. at
the southern border; or perceived intergroup competitive victimhood of each participant’s
8
Replicating Study 2, Republicans more strongly agreed with the zero-tolerance border policy (M = 4.68, SD =
1.35) than Democrats (M = 2.43, SD = 1.59; t(785) = 21.91, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 1.53).
Trait victimhood and political violence
21
political group, with the same measure we used in Study 2, which served as our manipulation
check. Participants then completed in a randomized order the nine-item abridged trait
victimhood scale, among other measures (Gabay et al., 2020) (see supplemental materials for
a complete list of measures). As a second manipulation check, that we did not preregister,
similar to Kunst et al. (2019), two judges in the U.S., a current and a former student in the
social sciences, coded the competitive victimhood condition open-ended texts; and two
judges in Israel, both master’s students in psychology, coded the control condition texts (for
more information on the methods and text responses coding, see supplementary materials).
Measures.
Intergroup competitive victimhood (α = .98), trait victimhood (α = .85) and support
for a violent group (α = .96) were all measured with the same items as in Study 2.
Results and Discussion
For means, standard deviations and correlations across Study’s variables, see Table
S4. As expected, compared to the control, the intergroup competitive victimhood condition
did not have a significant effect on participants’ trait victimhood (M = 3.96, SD = 1.08 vs. M
= 4.04, SD = 1.24; F(1, 821) = .78, p = .378, Cohen’s d = .07).
Manipulation Check. First, it seemed that the order of appearance played a
meaningful role in our ability to use intergroup competitive victimhood as our manipulation
check. Specifically, following the manipulation, for low trait victimhood participants, levels
of self-reported intergroup competitive victimhood were significantly higher when the scale
was measured immediately after the manipulation, compared to when it was measured after a
scale measuring support for a violent group. For high trait victimhood participants, levels of
intergroup competitive victimhood were generally high regardless of the condition and order
of appearance (for more information, see supplementary materials). Therefore, we examined
the text responses analysis in the intergroup competitive victimhood condition. Of the 1,908
Trait victimhood and political violence
22
text responses, depending on the coder, 963 (50.5%; coder 1) and 952 (49.9%; coder 2)
included some content indicating that the participants think that their partisan ingroup was
treated unfairly (coded as 1; all other responses were coded as 0), and the inter-rater
reliability was high (K = .80, SE = .02). We summed the coded responses of the four
questions, yielding a score ranging from 0 to 4 for each participant, and then averaged the
score across coders. The average score across both coders was 1.89 (SD = 1.43) for
Democrats and 2.09 (SD = 1.54) for Republicans (this difference was not significant; t(474) =
1.36, p = .175). Furthermore, this score was positively correlated with the measure of
competitive victimhood for both Democrats and Republicans (rs = .35 and .34, respectively;
ps < .001). This suggests that the intergroup competitive victimhood manipulation was at
least somewhat successful according to the original criteria.
Support for a violent group was predicted by trait victimhood (b = .50, 95% CI [.42,
.57], SE = .04, t = 12.50, p < .001), corroborating S3H1; but not predicted by the
manipulation (b = .06, 95% CI [-.13, .25], SE = .10, t = .65, p = .519). Moreover,
corroborating S3H2, the manipulation × trait victimhood interaction was significant (b = .21,
95% CI [.05, .37], SE = .08, t = 2.54, p = .011; see Figure 1), such that the manipulation had a
significant effect on support for a violent group for the high trait victimhood participants (b =
.31, 95% CI [.04, .58], SE = .14, t = 2.23, p = .026); but not for the low trait victimhood
participants (b = -.18, 95% CI [-.45, .08], SE = .13, t = -1.38, p = .169).
Results of Study 3 provided additional evidence for the important role trait
victimhood plays as a predictor of support for political violence. Specifically, the study
shows that trait victimhood is a significant predictor of support for violence. In addition, the
intergroup competitive victimhood manipulation does not impact trait victimhood. Finally,
we add nuance to our understanding of the causal effect of intergroup competitive
victimhood, which is dependent upon participants’ levels of trait victimhood, such that this
Trait victimhood and political violence
23
effect emerged only among high trait victimhood participants. This finding adds nuance to
the correlational mediation models we found in Study 2. It provides additional support to our
argument that trait victimhood is a crucial factor in the interpretation of the partisan outgroup
actions as offenses, done by a malevolent adversary to a victimized ingroup that is entitled to
resort to violent means to promote their political goals.
General Discussion
Results from three studies show that trait victimhood is strongly and consistently
associated with political violence directly, corroborating H1,
9
and indirectly through
intergroup competitive victimhood beliefs, corroborating H2. In addition, it moderates the
relationship between intergroup competitive victimhood beliefs and political violence, adding
nuance to H2. This was found to be the case amongst both Democrats and Republicans in the
U.S., using several operationalizations of support for political violence, including support for
abstract political violence (Study 1), support for a (ostensibly real) violent group (Studies 2
and 3), and (self-reported) engagement in real-world violent collective action (Study 2).
Importantly, although trait victimhood was correlated with (self-reported) engagement in
real-world violent behaviors, it was not correlated with (self-reported) engagement in real-
world normative behaviors (Study 2).
10
Finally, in an experimental study (Study 3) in which
we manipulated intergroup competitive victimhood, we found that our manipulation did not
impact trait victimhood and led to more support for political violence only among those with
high levels of trait victimhood. This suggests that intergroup competitive victimhood beliefs
can lead to support for political violence but that, at least to some extent, this relationship is
dependent upon interpersonal differences in trait victimhood. Our work, thus, highlights the
9
A mini meta-analysis (Goh et al., 2016) yielded an effect size of medium strength (mean r = .32, 95% CI =
[.28, .36], Z = 15.61, p < .001) of the association between trait victimhood and political violence across studies.
10
These results held in additional exploratory analysis, in which we controlled for background variables,
including age, gender, race, income level, and political affiliation in all studies; as well as when controlling for
intergroup competitive victimhood and agreement with the Trump administration border policy in Studies 2 and
3 (see supplementary materials).
Trait victimhood and political violence
24
ways that trait victimhood undergirds support for and willingness to engage in political
violence.
The current research provides new evidence about the predictive role that trait
victimhood plays in processes of endorsement of political violence. Two main constructs
related to trait victimhood have been examined in the past as potential drivers of violent
political extremism: trauma/abuse (e.g., McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008) and relative
deprivation (e.g., Obaidi et al., 2019; van den Bos, 2019), which both were associated with
political violence. We argue, based on Gabay et al. (2020), that trait victimhood might serve
as a strong predictor for whether offenses individuals experience are encoded or remembered
as abuse or trauma, or whether one’s ingroup was victimized or deprived independent of the
actual severity of these perceived injustices. Indeed, the results from Study 3 are consistent
with this hypothesis. In our manipulation, we asked participants to think about their group’s
competitive victimization, which led to more support for political violence only among the
high trait victimhood participants.
The current research has important theoretical implications. First, by introducing the
concept of trait victimhood to the literature on political violence, we can have a better
understanding of its underlying psychological processes, and the role that trait victimhood
serves as crucial predictor of political violence that also determines when individuals choose
violent behavior, rather than normative courses of action. Furthermore, the current research
opens up a new avenue for future research on the hypothesized psychological mechanisms
that explain what makes trait victimhood such a potent predictor of political violence. In
particular, recent research highlights how trait victimhood tends to be associated with
dichotomous thinking and entitlement for aggressive behavior (Gabay et al., 2020; Schori-
Eyal et al., 2017). In a recent conceptualization by van Prooijen and Krouwel (2019), the
authors argue that political extremism is the result of psychological distress, and is
Trait victimhood and political violence
25
characterized by a simplistic, black-and-white, dichotomous worldview, which then renders
over-confidence in extremists’ judgements, and less tolerance of different groups and
alternative views. Trait victimhood fits well into this conceptualization, helping further
explain the relationships we observed between trait victimhood and support for political
violence. As trait victimhood increases, we argue that it feeds feelings of psychological
distress and intensifies a dichotomous worldview. Theoretically, the combination of the
above with the tendency of individuals who harbor a victimized worldview to feel entitled to
use aggressive behavior (e.g., Chen et al., 2022; Gabay et al., 2020), provides clear indication
as to why trait victimhood serves as such a potent predictor for political violence. Future
research could examine these as well as additional psychological mechanisms underlying the
role of trait victimhood in people’s support for and willingness to engage in political
violence.
Limitations
However, we note that, first, the current studies examined our research question using
samples of U.S. participants, mostly MTurk workers (and one nationally representative
sample). Second, in the current studies we mostly showed correlational models. This partly
stems from the fact that we examine the hypothesized effect of a dispositional trait, i.e., trait
victimhood, on political violence. As such, similar to previous research (Gabay et al., 2020),
it has proven hard to effectively manipulate trait victimhood in the current research (see
Study S3). Third, as mentioned above, a coding error in Study 3 yielded unbalanced
condition in terms of participants’ political affiliation. Although we controlled for political
affiliation throughout the statistical analysis, we cannot completely rule out that at least part
of the results that we obtained were driven by the difference in political affiliation across
conditions, though this concern is mitigated by the consistency of findings across Studies 1
and 2. Fourth, in all studies, all variables were assessed in a single occasion, which can
Trait victimhood and political violence
26
inflate shared variances (e.g., Lindell & Whitney, 2001). Finally, in all studies we relied on
self-report measures.
Future Research Directions
In addition to research that aims to extend the theoretical model, as suggested above,
future research should aim, most notably, to extend the external validity of this model, and
assess the effects of trait victimhood on political violence in other contexts and with other
populations, such as with low power minorities in the U.S. or in Europe (e.g., Obaidi et al.,
2019) or samples in other parts of the world. Preliminary evidence suggests that similar
processes also take place among Christians and Muslims in Kaduna, a region of Nigeria with
a history of inter-religious tension and violence, such that the higher Christian and Muslim
participants were in trait victimhood, the more they were supportive of inter-religious
violence (Littman et al., 2023). Finally, future research should also aim to use behavioral
measures. For example, future research could assess whether participants are willing to
donate a bonus payment to support the work of politically violent groups.
Prevention and Policy Implications
In terms of applied implications, the present research lays foundations for testing
deradicalization or preventive programs that address a sense of individual or group level
victimhood as potential levers that can be changed. On top of identifying potential levers that
can inform the content of future interventions, the current research also helps researchers and
practitioners to better identify segments of the society that are more likely to choose a violent
path (Smith et al., 2020). Specifically, the current studies showed that the established effects
found under the framework of the SQT were stronger for some people than others. In fact, in
our research, for low trait victimhood participants, search for meaning did not significantly
predict support for political violence. Thus, coupled with the findings in Study 3 that the
effect of the intergroup competitive victimhood manipulation emerged only among high trait
Trait victimhood and political violence
27
victimhood participants, this indicated that high trait victimhood individuals should be
considered as the main beneficiaries of future deradicalization or preventive programs.
Conclusion
To conclude, across three studies, we found trait victimhood to be a strong predictor
of support for and willingness to engage in political violence, directly and indirectly through
intergroup competitive victimhood, as well as an important moderator for the association
between search for meaning on political violence. These studies demonstrate that trait
victimhood is an important factor involved in the processes of political violence, that should
be taken into account in future theoretical work, and also when designing deradicalization
and conflict prevention programs.
Trait victimhood and political violence
28
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Figure 1. The interaction between the intergroup competitive victimhood manipulation and
trait victimhood on support for a violent group in Study 3.
Note: Shaded areas reflect 95% confidence intervals. Dots represent individual data points
with the darker (vs. lighter) shade representing the intergroup competitive victimhood (vs.
control) condition.
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