Institutional stickiness and Afghanistan’s unending revolution

Abstract

Analysis of revolutions typically focuses on de jure constitutions and how their elite- or mass-led character influences their consequences. De facto constitutions are political and economic rules that people use to govern themselves which may or may not be recognized in the evolving de jure constitution. We argue that the nature of change resulting from revolutions depends on whether the emergent constitutional order recognizes the autonomy of de facto constitutions. We theorize neglect, disregard, and hostility toward de facto constitutions contributes to cycles of constitutional instability. We use this theory to explain Afghanistan’s unending revolution. Neither elite-led nor mass-led revolutions in Afghanistan produced a lasting constitutional order because they share a disregard for the de facto constitution.

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Vol.:(0123456789)
Public Choice (2024) 200:403–422
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-023-01119-z
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Institutional stickiness andAfghanistan’s unending
revolution
TariqBasir1· IliaMurtazashvili1 · JenniferBrickMurtazashvili1
Received: 31 January 2023 / Accepted: 29 September 2023 / Published online: 9 November 2023
© The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2023
Abstract
Analysis of revolutions typically focuses on de jure constitutions and how their elite- or
mass-led character influences their consequences. De facto constitutions are political and
economic rules that people use to govern themselves which may or may not be recognized
in the evolving de jure constitution. We argue that the nature of change resulting from revo-
lutions depends on whether the emergent constitutional order recognizes the autonomy of
de facto constitutions. We theorize neglect, disregard, and hostility toward de facto con-
stitutions contributes to cycles of constitutional instability. We use this theory to explain
Afghanistan’s unending revolution. Neither elite-led nor mass-led revolutions in Afghani-
stan produced a lasting constitutional order because they share a disregard for the de facto
constitution.
Keywords Revolutions· De jure institutions· De facto institutions· Predation· Foreign
aid· Afghanistan
JEL Classification B52· D74· O19· P30
1 Introduction
One of the great debates in the study of revolutions is whether elite- or mass-led revo-
lutions are more likely to produce positive institutional change. As Vahabi etal. (2020a)
explain, a defining feature of elite revolutions is that they maintain old institutional forms
while adding new content. These elites manage to improve institutions while avoiding the
chaos of mass revolutions by leading the revolution and giving themselves a place in the
emergent constitutional order. An example is England’s Glorious Revolution of 1688/89
which largely avoided violence and established rules generally considered institutional
improvements. Mass revolutions, which are characterized by active involvement of the
masses in politics, are thought to contribute to de-institutionalization. Elites may lead the
revolt, but the emphasis is on organic and spontaneous change, despite the role of revo-
lutionary leaders. Both Lenin and Mao, for example, led revolutions but maintained an
* Ilia Murtazashvili
ilia.murtazashvili@pitt.edu
1 University ofPittsburgh, Pittsburgh, USA
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