Balance of Power and Deterrence in Global Politics

Abstract

The international arena is made up of state-actors with varying degrees of interests, which is encapsulated as the goals of the country’s national interest. These interests may be variable, permanent, long-range, etc. The divergent nature of these interests among state-actors and the determination for their pursuit often degenerate into inter-state conflicts. In both pre-modern and modern societies, human nature is restrained and contained through the legal system and the enforcement of the legal codes by the government. However, with the absence of a “world government” in the international system to regulate and curtail the action of states, the international system is presumed to be anarchic, because even with the existence of international law, the international system lacks the capacity to work as a government. In effect, the balance of power and deterrence mechanisms exist on the belief that order can be ensured, assured and maintained through collaboration of power by countries of like-mind or fear of unforeseen and disastrous retaliation. This study is divided into two; the Balance of Power will be treated first, then, followed by Deterrence.

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Balance of Power and Deterrence in Global Politics
NURA UMAR MANYA –MANYA MPhil/PhD
Department of Political Science, Defence and Security Studies
Nigerian Defence Academy, Kaduna
umarmanyamanyanura@gmail.com
DOI:10.13140/RG.2.2.10124.90243 URL: hps://www.researchgate.net/publicaon/374944015
October 2023
Abstract
The international arena is made up of state-actors with varying degrees of interests, which is
encapsulated as the goals of the country’s national interest. These interests may be variable,
permanent, long-range, etc. The divergent nature of these interests among state-actors and
the determination for their pursuit often degenerate into inter-state conflicts. In both pre-
modern and modern societies, human nature is restrained and contained through the legal
system and the enforcement of the legal codes by the government. However, with the absence
of a “world government” in the international system to regulate and curtail the action of
states, the international system is presumed to be anarchic, because even with the existence
of international law, the international system lacks the capacity to work as a government. In
effect, the balance of power and deterrence mechanisms exist on the belief that order can be
ensured, assured and maintained through collaboration of power by countries of like-mind or
fear of unforeseen and disastrous retaliation. This study is divided into two; the Balance of
Power will be treated first, then, followed by Deterrence.
Keywords: Balance of Power, Deterrence, Equilibrium, Alliance, Neutralization.
Introduction
Balance of power is a mechanism devised to check the tendency towards armed hostilities
between and among nations through the balancing of capabilities that may be available to a
single state or a group of states. In effect, it is a coalition of minds that deter or ward-off
intending aggressors so that the possibilities of conflict can be countered or nipped in the bud
(Frankel, 2007).
The term “Balance of Power” (BOP) therefore refers to the distribution of power capabilities
of various states through the creation of alliances. The BOP theory operates on the
assumption that “when one state or alliance increases power or uses it more aggressively,
threatened states will increase their own power in response thus, forming a counter-balancing
force” (Akinboye, 2009)
Origin of Balance of Power
Mearsheimer (2001) opined that one may wonder how the balance of power system may
resolve or act as a deterrent to conflicts. A good example of the balance of power theory in
operation was during the Cold War (which pitched the East against the Western bloc of
States), where the combination of powers available to both the United States and its allies;
and the Soviet Union and its allies had parity both in terms of conventional weapons and
nuclear arms. Both group of states had the capability for “overkill”, and this acted as

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deterrent for going to war. Going to war between both blocs would have resulted in mutually
assured destruction. Under such circumstances, the possibilities of war become very remote,
as such, peace is maintained.
The theory therefore provides the justification for the application of alliance networks and
collaborations in deterring aggressor states in the international system. The theory is
premised on the assumption that the coalition of forces would be presumed to be more
powerful than the military strength and possession of a single aggressive force or a coalition
of forces (Pirenne, 2011)
The Workings of the Balance of Power System
In clear terms, balance of power refers to the conglomeration of states devolved into two or
more groups whose combination of military, economic and diplomatic weights and capacity
for action are more or less the same (Spanier, 2007). Since each group of states possesses
similar capabilities, none would have the capacity to effectively dominate the others. This
greatly reduces the possibility of aggression and conflict because there is much to lose in
going to war with an equal power. This is in contrast to a situation in which a very powerful
country deals with a very weak one, victory is more assured to the more powerful country
and as a result, aggressive action is more attractive as a means to protect a country’s national
interests. According to Sheehan (2000), as a result of the high level of actual risks; states are
necessarily forced to deal with one another through other means when a situation of balance
of power is achieved and maintained. The balance of power took its roots from Europe and
for centuries was applied as a tool for maintaining the peace. It was prominent in Europe
between the end of the 30 years’ war and the subsequent Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 till the
outbreak of the First World War I 1914. Essentially, the major initiators and participants in
the mechanism were European nations, because all international power resided in Europe,
and there were no states outside Europe that was capable of exerting the required influence
on the balancing process. (Spanier 2007)
State of Equilibrium
According to Stephen (1996), a state of equilibrium connotes the condition of a system in
competing influences and balanced forces. The equilibrium state indicates symmetry or
balance, such that an addiction or subtraction from either side of the spectrum would result in
a tilt. It is essential to attain and maintain balance in the international system; it remains the
most assured guarantee of global peace and harmony.
Theoretically, a state of equilibrium is one in which there is an even distribution of power
among groups of states that have formed one form of alliance or the other. This ensures that
no one group of states is perceived as the singular dominating entity in the global arena. It
should be noted that a state of equilibrium is not static but rather constantly being adjusted by
the relative changing fortunes of nations so that new equilibriums are always in the process of
being created, or old states restored (Walt 2007).
State of Disequilibrium
A state of disequilibrium is when there is a preponderance or one-sided shift of power to a
single nation-state or existing alliance. What this implies is that, there are no counter-
balancing force(s) to the maneuverings of the dominant state. A recent event as the Libya

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crisis of 2011 should drive home this point. While the Western allies under the aegis of North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) assisted the civil society in Libya to topple the Gaddafi
regime, it must be made clear that the system was in a state of disequilibrium as it concerned
the Libyan case. If Libya had its own allies commanding similar power and capabilities
commensurate with that possessed by NATO, the possibility of the Libyan invasion would
have been very remote. Indeed, some other methods and means would have been employed to
resolve the Libyan imbroglio. Thus, a state of disequilibrium provides the opportunity for the
powerful states or alliances to dominate the less powerful ones (Akinboye 2009).
Major Techniques of Balancing Power in the International System
The major techniques of balancing power in the international system are:
1. Alliance
2. Armament
3. Divide and Rule
4. Neutralization
Alliance
According to Spanier (2007), this is a technique of balance of power whereby a state seeking
to curb a potential hegemony before it becomes too strong, therefore enters into a security
cooperation of two or more states so as to ally against the prevailing threat. A good example
of this occurred during the Second World War when the Allied Nations united against
Germany and her allies. States will woo alliance partners by adapting to them. For example:
France and Russia attempting to appear more alike; in order to form their alliance in 1894.
For security, states are willing to align with anyone. The weaker partner in an alliance will
determine policy in a moment of crisis; international competition will tend to force states in a
multi-polar order into two blocs. Having two blocs does not mean that the system is bi-polar,
because alliance shifts and defections can still occur. These alliance shifts and defections
make the multi-polar order dangerous. The flexibility of alliances makes for rigidity in
strategy.
For bi-polar alliances; alliance leaders do not need to worry much about the faithfulness of
followers. In bi-polar systems, the will be unequal burden-sharing between the major and
minor powers in an alliance. The major powers in a bi-polar system do not need to make
themselves attractive to alliance partners. For example: the Soviet Union and the U.S. did not
alter their strategies to accommodate allies. The rigidity of bi-polar alliances makes for
flexible strategy (Wenddt, 2007)
Wenddt (2007) further explains that for its parsimony and theoretical rigor, neorealist has
been the baseline for most of international relations theory over the last 20 years. It has
prompted a rich literature critiquing it on a number of fronts: for instance, neoliberals say that
it does not take seriously enough the possibility that states may choose absolute over relative
gains, particularly in situations where institutions can alter payoffs; constructivists argue that
it fails to recognize the manner in which agents and structures are mutually constitutive; and
people from all over the map say that it is too generalized and yields little in the way of
testable implications. Nevertheless, the theory has been hugely influential.

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Armament
According to Spanier (2007), this is where two nations in their struggle for power build up
arms or engage in arms’ race in preparation for war or in a bid to overwhelm the others. An
example of this scenario played out during the Cold War, between the Eastern and Western
blocs of states. The resultant effect of this is that, it creates tension and instability in the
international system. Also, the socio-economic development of citizens suffers as a large
chunk of budgetary expenditures go to acquiring military hardware. Balance of power uses
this technique to make sure that no single nation has monopoly over the weapons of mass
destruction. This system would deter either nation from resorting to war without first
exploring other means of resolving their conflicts.
Divide and Rule
This is where two nations are put against one another so as to take away the chances of them
combining forces. Divide and rule could also be seen as a situation in which a country is
divided among some powers so as to maintain equilibrium in their power base. A typical
example is the division of Poland, Austria and Ukraine from amidst Russia; this was used to
ensure balance in Europe at the time (Spanier 2007).
Neutralization
This is best explained by circumstances of Germany, France, Italy and Switzerland during the
First World War. Having confessed to neutrality, the position of Switzerland during the war
was fundamental to the effects of the war on its neighbors, namely; Germany, France and
Italy. Thus, in preserving the balance, none of Switzerland’s neighbours could agree on its
addition to one or both of the other states, because Switzerland was too strategically
important. In effect, the agreement was to accept the neutrality of Switzerland and to keep
hands off, thereby maintaining the country as a buffer zone between the three neighbours.
(Kegley 2005 and Mearsheimer 2010).
Balance of Power Today
Akinboye (2009) opines that the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 left the United States as
the world's sole superpower. Balance of power suggests that without the Soviet threat, the
United States, as the dominant world power will cause a disequilibrium in the global system.
For example, key countries such as China, France, Russia and Germany all opposed the
United States’ invasion of Iraq in 2003. Yet, this opposition did not stop the United States
from acting, thereby exposing a huge gap in military capability that now exists between the
United States and the rest of the world. Small states that fear the United States are no longer
able to join a counter balancing coalition to protect their security. Instead, many are
developing nuclear weapons in an attempt to dramatically expand their military capability.
For example, North Korea claimed in 2003 that it was developing nuclear weapons to balance
against United States power. Similarly, the intention of Iran in embarking on a nuclear
programme is still causing ripples among powerful countries of the world.
Walt (2002) further explained that the changing nature of power in today’s international
system further complicates the operation of the global balance of power. Globalization, the
internet, weapons of mass destruction and other technological advancements have made it
possible for small states and even non-state groups to acquire significant power. In the future,

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the balance of power may continue to operate among states engaged in prolonged disputes,
but it is less applicable to conflicts involving terrorists and non-state groups.
Weakness of the Balance of Power
Spanier (2007) pointed out that the balance of power system has been very useful in
curtailing the excesses of states, but it has also received some criticisms. One of such is that,
even with the balance of power in place, the Second World War still broke out. What this
implies is that balance of power as an instrument of preventing war was unable to prevent the
anarchy that engulfed the world as a result of that war.
Also, critics have argued that the collapse of the Soviet Union has created hegemony in the
United States and this poses a challenge for the balance of power system. The challenge to
the balance of power in international relations is how to correct the present power
configuration in the international arena without disturbing the present balance which tilts in
favour of the United States. However, despite the shortcomings of balance of power, it
remains a useful system for stabilizing the international arena (Pirenne, 2011).
Lastly, balance of power is one of the fundamental mechanisms for maintaining peace and
harmony in the international system. The features of the contemporary state system allows for
the use of the balance of power system to maintain global peace and security.
DETERRENCE
According to Miller (2011), the word “deterrence” is derived from the Latin word de +
terrene, literally, “to frighten from” or “frighten away”. Thus, fear is central to the original
meaning of deterrence. The idea that vast, indiscriminate and unacceptable damage would be
inflicted in retaliation for aggression, as the employment of nuclear weapons since World
War II, has long been central to the popular opinion or understanding of the term deterrence.
Deterrence means preventing war either through fear of punishment or fear of defeat, or
sometimes even through fear of undefined negative consequences. This would have informed
Sterling Haydon’s definition of deterrence as the art of producing in the mind of the enemy,
the fear to attack. Beaufre (1965) defined nuclear deterrence as the only kind of deterrence
that produces the effect – seeks to avoid or to end war – as the Cold War demonstrated. The
following confirm Beaufre’s assertion.
Deterrence in its simplest form means to deter, that is, to inhibit or prevent someone from
doing something. Military force used in some form and to some degree underpins all types of
deterrence. In the context of an overall policy, however, military force is likely to be only one
tool among many diplomatic, economic, political and military response or anticipatory
actions designed to guide the development of an international interaction I directions that will
prevent an outcome inimical to the interest of the state.
Covarrubias (2004) reiterated that the concept of deterrence can be defined as the use of
threats by one party to convince another party to refrain from initiating some course of action.
A threat serves as a deterrent to the extent that it convinces its target not to carry out the
intended action because of the costs and losses that target would incur. In international
security, a policy of deterrence generally refers to threats of military retaliation directed by

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the leaders of one state to the leaders of another in an attempt to prevent the other state from
resorting to the threat of the use of military force in pursuit of its foreign policy goals.
As outlined by Huth, a policy of deterrence and fits into two broad categories being:
(i) Preventing an armed attack against a states’ own territory, known as direct
deterrence
(ii) Preventing an armed attack against another state known as extended deterrence.
Situations of direct deterrence often occur when there is territorial dispute between
neighboring states in which major powers like the United States do not directly intervene. On
the other hand, situations of extended deterrence often occur when a great power becomes
involved. It is the latter that has generated the majority of interest in academic literature.
Building on these two broad categories, Huth goes on outline that deterrence policy may be
implemented in response to a pressing short-term threat known as that immediate deterrence
or as a strategy to prevent a military conflict or short term threat from arising known as
general deterrence (Covarrubias 2004).
A successful deterrence policy must be considered in not only military terms, but also in
political terms. In military terms, deterrence success refers to preventing state leaders from
issuing military threats and actions that escalate peacetime diplomatic and military
cooperation into a crisis or militarized confrontation which threatens armed conflict and
possibly war. The prevention of wars or crises however is not the only aim of deterrence. In
addition, defending states must be able to resist the political and military demands of a
potential attacking nation under the threat of war, then it cannot be claimed that deterrence
has succeeded.
Furthermore, Freedman (2004) argues that two key set of factors for successful deterrence are
important, being:
(i) A defending state strategy that firstly balances credible coercion and deft diplomacy
consistent with the three criteria of proportionality, reciprocity, and coercive
credibility; and secondly minimizes international and domestic constraints.
(ii) The extent of an attacking state’s vulnerability as shaped by its domestic political and
economic conditions.
In broad terms, a state wishing to implement the strategy of deterrence is most likely to
succeed if the costs of noncompliance it can offer to another state are greater than the benefits
of noncompliance and the costs of compliance.
Deterrence theory holds that nuclear weapons are intended to deter other states from
attacking with the nuclear weapons, through the promise of retaliation and possibly Mutually
Assured Destruction (MAD). Nuclear deterrence can also applied to an attack by
conventional forces; for example, the doctrine of massive retaliation threatened to launch
United States nuclear weapons in response to Soviet attacks (Jervis 2011).
Deterrence Theory

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Deterrence theory has its conceptual roots from a theory of human behaviour. Assuming that
the primary danger is that of a war arising from deliberate calculation, the theory posits that a
countervailing threat displayed with sufficient destructive potential can dominate any
aggressive calculation that might be made, no matter how pervade or myopic it might be
(Morgan 2003).
The existence of a threat causes a psychological result and prevents adversaries from taking
up arms. An adversary must measure the risk he runs if he unleashes a crisis, because the
response will produce political, economical, social and moral damage from which recovery
will not be easy; material damage and psychological factors play a decisive role in deterrence
(Covarrubias, 2004).
According to Paul (2009), deterrence theory is a military strategy developed after World War
II and used throughout the Cold War era. It is especially relevant with regards to the use of
nuclear weapons, and has featured prominently on current United States foreign policy
regarding the development of nuclear technology in North Korea and Iran.
The United States destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki with two atomic bombs, which led to
Japan’s surrender. Atomic weapons were outlawed, but the use of conventional arms
continued. Nuclear proliferation has been slow, but the phenomenon of global terrorism and
nuclear development in countries like North Korea could end this situation. Wars have
continued throughout the world despite conventional deterrence (Covarrubias, 2004)
Understanding the theory of deterrence is therefore, complicated. Deterrence is often
confused with the desire to avoid aggression, which is the natural attitude of a country that
feels equal or inferior to another. Not having experienced war for a long time complicates the
issue; these attitudes are themselves the consequences of deterrence. Nevertheless, deterrence
as a methodology to achieve peace succeeds to the degree that a country has a sound strategic
political model. Thus, deterrence is not random or casual; it is the result of concrete actions.
Some fundamental requirements of deterrence are the physical capability to inflict damage,
the ability to demonstrate power and credibility. A country only obtains credibility through
the political will to employ force. The political will to use force is the breath of life of
deterrence. If the will does not exist, a potential adversary will perceive this and render the
other two requirements – the ability to demonstrate power and the capability to inflict damage
– inert. Deterrence is therefore an effect. Its result depends on the opinion the opponent has of
his adversary’s capability to win. This explains why it is difficult to deter those who have
different culture or lifestyles, especially terrorists (Shelling, 2013).
Forms of Deterrence
There are two forms of deterrence. They are:
1. Deterrence by punishment
2. Deterrence by denial
Deterrence by Punishment
This is a strategy by which governments threaten an imminent retaliation if attacked.
Aggressors are deterred if they do not wish to suffer such damage because of an aggressive

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action. This has informed the strategy adopted by the United States and the Soviet Union
during the Cold War; both countries adopted the strategy of Mutually Assured Destruction
(MAD) (Covarrubias 2014).
Deterrence by Denial
This refers to the strategy whereby a government builds up or maintains defence and
intelligence systems with the purported aim of neutralizing or mitigating attacks. Aggressors
are deterred if they choose not to act, perceiving the cost of their action to be too high in
relation to the likely success (Covarrubias 2014).
Evolution of the Concept of Deterrence
According to Freedman (2004), he explained that the concept of deterrence is traceable to the
military writings of the classical periods; it is however the Cold War that has developed the
concept to puberty. This development was because of the United States efforts to deter the
Soviet Union.
The early stages of the Cold War were generally characterized by the ideology of
containment, an aggressive posture on behalf of the United States especially regarding
developing nations under their sphere of influence. This period was characterized by
numerous proxy wars throughout most of the world; particularly Africa, Asia, Central
America, and South America. One of such conflicts was the Korean War. With US pullout
from Vietnam after it suffered a great defeat, the normalization of US relations with China,
and the Sino-Soviet split, the policy of containment was abandoned and a new policy of
détente was established whereby peaceful coexistence was sought between the United States
and the Soviet Union. Although the aforementioned factors contributed to the shift, the most
prominent factor was the rough parity achieved in stockpiling nuclear weapons with the clear
capability of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). Fundamentally therefore, the period of
détente was characterized by a general reduction in the tension between the Soviet Union and
the United States and a thawing of the Cold War, lasting from the late 1960s until the start of
the 1980s. The doctrine of Mutual Nuclear Deterrence characterized relations between the US
and the Soviet Union during this period and present relations with Russia (Jervis 2008).
Another shift identified was the arms build-up by the American President Ronald Reagan
during the 1980s. Reagan attempted to justify his policy in part due to the concerns of
growing Soviet influence in Latin America and the new Republic of Iran, established after the
Iranian Revolution of 1997. Similar to the old policy of containment, the US funded several
proxy wars, including support for Saddam Hussein of Iraq during the Iran–Iraq War, support
for the Mujahideen in Afghanistan, who were fighting for independence from the Soviet
Union, and several anti-communist movements in Latin America such as the overthrow of the
Sandinista government of Nicaragua (Miller 2014).
On another level, while the army was dealing with the breakup of the Soviet Union and the
spread of nuclear technology to other nations beyond the United States and Russia, the
concept of deterrence took a broad multinational dimension. The US policy on Post-Cold
War deterrence was outlined in 1995 in a document entitled; “ Essentials of post Cold War
Deterrence”. As noted by Jervis (2011), this document explains that while relations with
Russia continue to follow the traditional characteristics of Mutual Nuclear Deterrence, due to

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both nations continuing mutually assured destruction, US policy of deterrence towards
nations with minor nuclear capabilities should ensure through threats of immense retaliation
(or even pre-emptive action) that they do not threaten the United States, its interests and its
allies. The document further extrapolates that such threats must also be used to ensure that
nations without nuclear technology refrain from developing nuclear weapons and that a
universal ban precludes any nation from maintaining chemical or biological weapons. The
current tensions with Iran and North Korea over their nuclear programmes are part due to the
continuation of this policy of deterrence (Morgan 2003, Paul 2009).
The Changing Context of Deterrence
According to Paul (2009), he explains that the central doctrine of deterrence holds that
nuclear weapons are maintained to prevent their use, and by extension, any large scale form
of warfare by threatening retaliation destructive enough to override any rational motive of
aggression. The concept has been widely accepted as a summary statement of the most
fundamental national security objectives and indeed as the centre pillar of foreign policy.
Shelling (2013) says that in the United States, is it perhaps the most solidly established
element of political consensus – the least disputed function that a national government should
perform. Moreover, within the military establishments that deploy nuclear weapons, the
conceptual elaboration of deterrence provides the main guidelines for practical decisions on
the size and composition of forces and for the daily management of their operations.
The entrenched practice of deterrence has survived the declared ending of the Cold War
essentially unaltered – a fact that is hardly surprising given the critical function that the
concept has come to perform. However, the rhetoric or confrontation that originally
accompanied this doctrine has been replaced with more polite forms of political discourse
and overall nuclear weapons deployment are being reduced to less than a quarter of their peak
levels. Nevertheless, the main forces still continuously preserve the ability to initiate deterrent
retaliation within 30 minutes, being the nominal intercontinental flight time of ballistic
missile. Moreover, even with their scheduled reductions fully accomplished, the residual
capabilities of the United States and Russia will be virtually lethal to each other as they were
at the height of mutual antagonism (Schultz 2015).
Schelling (2013) opined that deterrence theory therefore largely worked during the Cold War
period as neither nuclear war nor major Soviet/US aggression took place. This may in part be
based on what was concluded that the “theory is based on the assumption that the participants
coolly and ‘rationally’ calculate their advantages according to a consistent value system”.
However, post September 11 (9/11) conception of the ‘war on terror’ has changed the
demands on deterrence and its applicability radically in several ways; the notion that
terrorists ‘coolly’ and ‘rationally’ calculate their advantages according to a consistent value
system is an implausible one. Additionally, Cold War nuclear deterrence was a two-player
game (US – USSR). The French nuclear force ‘de frappe’, which president Charles de Gaulle
insisted was necessary for strategic independence, and the Chinese nuclear force complicated
matters, but not very much (Schultz 2015).

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It may however be seen by way of contrast that; extremist Muslim terrorism is diffused, with
no central decision making focus like Moscow in the Cold War. Rhetoric frequently
characterizes Islamic terrorism as “Al-Qaeda”, or even personalizes it down to Osama bin
Laden and/or his supposed associate in Iraq, Abu Musad Al-Zarkawi, but in fact, Al-Qaeda is
at most a loose network, not a command structure in which the central decision influenced by
deterrence can be transmitted down to branches. Capturing or killing bin Laden or Al-
Zarkawi would be a setback but far from a death knell for the organization. Moreover, while
Al-Qaeda is probably the largest terrorist network, it is far from the only one. Deterrence of
terrorists must therefore cope with the multitude of independent or autonomous centres. This
is certainly the context of deterrence in the post-Cold War era.
Persuasion as a concept has therefore emerged as a new post-Cold War interpretation of
deterrence in a globalized world. Persuasion supersedes bilateralism or even multilateralism
of traditional deterrence in all azimuths (Covarrubias 2004). Maisonneuve (1977) defines
persuasion in ‘The Coming Violence: Essay on Modern Warfare’ thus; “Persuasion is
simultaneously the expression of a universal potentiality without the designation of an
adversary, and a posture of neutrality that guarantees the absence of war between powers of
the same level. Potentiality and Neutrality; that will lead to intervening in one way or
another; to prevent a disturbance provoked by third parties.
For Maisonneuve, the deterrence of persuasion is the foundation for a future strategy (and
perhaps the context of deterrence in post-Cold War era) and the first argument for a renewal
of collective security. The protection of security replaces the protection of force.
Maisonneuve has therefore proclaimed a strategy of prevention.
Criticisms against Deterrence Theory
Deterrence theory has received a dosage of criticism. The theory has been criticized for its
assumptions about opponent rationales. First, it is argued that either forms of deterrence may
not deter suicidal or psychopathic opponents. The risk of irrational response, of the evolution
of circumstance which even rational leadership cannot control, can never be ruled out.
Second, diplomatic misunderstanding, misrepresentation and misinterpretation and/or
opposing ideologies may lead to exalting mutual perceptions of threat and a subsequent arms
race, which elevates the risk of actual war. An arms race is inefficient in its optimal output as
all countries involved expend resources on armaments and create a military industrial
complex. This leads to misallocation and wastage of resources on armaments, which would
not have been expended if others had not expended.
Third, the threat of nuclear terrorism by sub-national groups, with or without acknowledged
encouragement by the leadership of the “rogue” nation, is another matter. A clear response
against such threats may not be feasible – the home base of the potential attacker may not be
known. The threat of nuclear weapons in the hands of suicidal fanatics, such as the Japanese
cultists who released poisonous nerve gas in the Tokyo Subway, can clearly not be countered
by deterrence in any form. Only worldwide vigilance and an unrelenting effort to prevent
possession of nuclear weapons by such groups can limit the risk.

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Also, it is argued that suicidal or psychotic opponents may not be deterred by either forms of
deterrence. Moreover, if two enemy states both possess nuclear weapons; Country X may try
to gain a first–strike advantage by suddenly launching weapons at Country Y, with a view to
destroying its enemy’s nuclear launch silos thereby rendering Country Y incapable of a
response. Furthermore, diplomatic misunderstandings and/or opposing political ideologies
may lead to escalating mutual perceptions of threat, and a subsequent arms race that elevates
the threat of actual war, a scenario illustrated in the movies; War Games (1983) and Dr.
Strangelove (1964). An arms race is inefficient in its optimal output, as all countries involved
expend resources on armaments that would not have been created if others had not done so; a
form of positive feedback. More so, escalation of perceived threat can make it easier for
certain measures to be inflicted on a population by its government, such as restrictions on
civil liberties, the creation of a military–industrial complex, and military expenditures
resulting in higher taxes and increasing budget deficits.
In recent years, many mainstream politicians, academic analysts, and retired military leaders
have also criticized deterrence and advocated nuclear disarmament. Sam Nunn, William
Perry, Henry Kissinger and George Schultz have all called upon governments to embrace the
vision of a world free of nuclear weapons, and in three Wall Street Journal proposed an
ambitious program of urgent steps to that end. The four have created the Nuclear Security
Project to advance this agenda. Organizations such as Global Zero, an international non-
partisan group of 300 world leaders dedicated to achieving nuclear disarmament, have also
been established. In 2010, the four were featured in a documentary film entitled Nuclear
Tipping Point. The film is a visual and historical depiction of the ideas laid forth in the Wall
Street Journal op-eds and reinforces their commitment to a world without nuclear weapons
and the steps that can be taken to reach that goal.
Former Secretary Kissinger puts the new danger, which cannot be addressed by deterrence,
this way: “The classical notion of deterrence was that there were some consequences before
which aggressors and evildoers would recoil. In a world of suicide bombers, that calculation
doesn’t operate in a comparable way”. Schultz has said, “If you think of the people who are
committing suicide attacks, and people like that get a nuclear weapon, they are almost by
definition not deterrable”. As opposed to extreme mutually assured destruction form of
deterrence, the concept of minimum deterrence in which a state possesses no more nuclear
weapons than necessary to deter an adversary from attacking is presently the most common
form of deterrence practiced by nuclear weapon states such as; China, India, Pakistan, Britain
and France. Pursuing minimal deterrence during arms negotiation between United States and
Russia allows each state to make nuclear stockpile reductions without the state becoming
vulnerable. However, it has been noted that there comes a point where further reductions may
be undesirable, once minimal deterrence is reached; as further reductions beyond this point
increase a state’s vulnerability and provide an incentive for an adversary to secretly expand
its nuclear arsenal.
In conclusion, “Senior European statesmen and women” called for further action in
addressing problems of nuclear weapons proliferation in 2010. They said “Nuclear deterrence
is a far less persuasive strategic response to a world of potential regional nuclear arms race
and nuclear terrorism than it was to the cold war”.

ResearchGate

ResearchGate
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ResearchGate
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