No full-text available
To read the full-text of this research,
you can request a copy directly from the authors.
Cohort Differences in Occupational Retention among Computer Science Degree Holders: Reassessing the Role of Family
Abstract
Although women’s representation in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) employment has increased significantly over the past few decades, their presence remains low in fields like computer science. Using the National Science Foundation’s Scientists and Engineers Statistical Data System (SESTAT), this paper assesses the factors shaping employment in STEM and non-STEM occupations among men and women with bachelor’s degrees in computer science. Our results reveal that women with degrees in computer science are far less likely than their male counterparts to be employed in STEM occupations, particularly in computer science jobs. But family factors do not have the expected association with employment in computer science jobs. Men who are parents and childless women are more likely to work in non-STEM jobs versus computer science jobs, relative to childless men. Furthermore, the gender gap in employment in computer science jobs is larger among those graduating in the new millennium, suggesting that other factors are at play.
ResearchGate has not been able to resolve any citations for this publication.
Significance
Why are women still underrepresented in science, technology, engineering, and math (STEM) jobs? Social processes beyond individual preferences may shape the STEM employment trajectories of new mothers and new fathers differently. Using representative US longitudinal survey data, we followed full-time STEM professionals after the birth or adoption of their first child. We found substantial attrition of new parents; nearly one-half of new mothers and nearly one-quarter of new fathers leave full-time STEM employment after having children. Thus, parenthood is an important driver of gender imbalance in STEM employment, and both mothers and fathers appear to encounter difficulties reconciling caregiving with STEM careers. These findings have implications for the vitality of the US science and engineering workforce.
Many effects of interest to sociologists are nonlinear. Additionally, many effects of interest are interaction effects—that is, the effect of one independent variable is contingent on the level of another independent variable. The proper way to estimate, interpret, and present these two types of effects individually are well known. However, many analyses that combine these two—that is, tests of interaction when the effects of interest are nonlinear—are not properly interpreted or tested. The consequences of approaching nonlinear interaction effects the way one would approach a linear interaction effect are severe and can often result in incorrect conclusions. I cover both nonlinear effects in the context of linear regression, and—most thoroughly—nonlinear effects in models for categorical outcomes (focusing on binary logit/probit). My goal in this article is to synthesize an evolving methodological literature and to provide straightforward advice and techniques to estimate,interpret, and present nonlinear interaction effects.
Previous research documents how stereotypes discourage young women from choosing and attaining technology jobs. We build off this research and ask whether (and how) stereotypes continue to affect men and women once they enter the technology workforce. Using a novel survey of technical employees from seven Silicon Valley firms and new measures of what we call "cultural" and "skill" alignment, we show that men are more likely than women to believe they possess the stereotypical traits and skills of a successful tech employee. We find that cultural alignment is especially important: because women are less likely than men to believe they match the cultural image of successful tech workers, they are less likely to identify with the tech profession, less likely to report positive supervisor treatment, and more likely to consider switching career fields. This paper is the first to use unique and independent measures of cultural and skill alignment comparing employees' perceptions of themselves to their perceptions of an ideal successful worker. By allowing cultural and skill alignment to operate separately, we are able to determine which work outcomes are most strongly related to each form of alignment. Our results imply that if we can broaden the cultural image of a successful tech worker, women may be more likely to feel like they belong in technology environments, ultimately increasing their retention in tech jobs.
We examine factors contributing to the gender gap in employment in science, technology, engineering, and math (STEM) among men and women with bachelor’s degrees in computer science and engineering, the two largest and most male-dominated STEM fields. Data come from the National Science Foundation’s (NSF) Scientists and Engineers Statistical Data System (SESTAT) from 1995 to 2008. Different factors are associated with persistence in STEM jobs among computer science and engineering degree holders. Conditional on receiving a degree in computer science, women are 14 percentage points less likely to work in STEM than their male counterparts. Controlling for demographic and family characteristics did little to change this gender gap. Women with degrees in engineering are approximately 8 percentage points less likely to work in STEM than men, although about half of this gap is explained by observed differences between men and women. We document a widening gender gap in STEM employment in computer science, but this gender gap narrows across college cohorts among those with degrees in engineering. Among recent computer science graduates, the gender gap in STEM employment for white, Hispanic, and black women relative to white men is even larger than for older graduates. Gender and race gaps in STEM employment for recent cohorts of engineering graduates are generally small, though younger Asian women and men no longer have an employment advantage relative to white men. Our results suggest that a one-size-fits-all approach to increasing women’s representation in the most male-dominated STEM fields may not work.
We follow female college graduates in the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 and compare the trajectories of women
in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM)-related occupations to other professional occupations. Results
show that women in STEM occupations are significantly more likely to leave their occupational field than professional women,
especially early in their career, while few women in either group leave jobs to exit the labor force. Family factors cannot
account for the differential loss of STEM workers compared to other professional workers. Few differences in job characteristics
emerge either, so these cannot account for the disproportionate loss of STEM workers. What does emerge is that investments
and job rewards that generally stimulate field commitment, such as advanced training and high job satisfaction, fail to build
commitment among women in STEM.
The climate of science is often described as "chilly" toward women and
is blamed for women's underrepresentation and slow advancement within
science fields. However, evidence of a chilly climate is often indirect.
In this study of male and female science faculty members at a major
research university, the authors found direct evidence for a chilly
climate: A smaller percentage of women than men described their
workplace environments in positive terms, and a larger percentage of
women than men described uncomfortable, tense, or hostile interactions.
Some men and many women said that gender bias might explain women's
negative experiences; at the same time, these men and women stated that
they could not say for certain that gender bias existed in their
departments. Reasons for interviewees' difficulties in identifying and
labeling gender bias are discussed.
Family Man illustrates the ways in which everyday practices help to construct masculine identities. Scott Coltrane's search for the origins of male dominance begins at home instead of the workplace, examining the ways in which patterns of domestic labour reflect and reinforce relations between men and women in society at large.
Drawing upon work effort and gendered organizations perspectives and using data from the Current Population Survey, we examine how family structure types (i.e., combinations of marital and parental statuses) shape within- and between-gender variation in the earnings of highlyeducated men and women working in STEM and non-STEM occupations. We find that STEM and non-STEM women earn premia for marriage and for motherhood if they are married, with higher family-related premia for STEM women. Analysis of married men and women by specific STEM category reveals the largest parenthood premium is for women in engineering. Yet, STEM men and non-STEM men generally earn more than their counterpart women, with the largest between-gender wage difference for married parents in non-STEM occupations. Taken together, these findings provide a mixed picture of movement towards gender equality in work organizations.
Why are young women less likely than young men to persist in academic science and engineering? Drawing on 57 in-depth interviews with PhD students and postdoctoral scholars in the United States, we describe how, in academic science and engineering, motherhood is constructed in opposition to professional legitimacy, and as a subject of fear, repudiation, and public controversy. We call this the “specter of motherhood.” This specter disadvantages young women and amplifies anticipatory concerns about combining an academic career with motherhood. By specifying (1) the content of cultural discourses about motherhood in academic workplaces and (2) the processes by which these ideas circulate, produce disadvantage, and inform young, childless scientists and engineers’ career plans, our findings offer novel insight into mechanisms contributing to inequality in academic careers.
Nonmarital cohabitation and marriage are now fundamentally linked, a fact that is routinely reflected in current research on union formation. Unprecedented changes in the timing, duration, and sequencing of intimate co-residential relationships have made the study of traditional marriage far more complex today than in the past. It is now clear that a white, middle-class, American-centric research template has become increasingly anachronistic. In this review article , we begin by providing an overview of contemporary theory, empirical approaches, and demographic trends in cohabitation and marriage, focusing primarily on the United States, but also distinguishing the U.S. from patterns found in other high-income societies, including European countries, Canada, Aus-tralia, and in East Asia. We place the spotlight on the causes and consequences of union transitions. We identify the commonalities between cohabitation and marriage, but also key differences that are expressed unevenly across different populations and cultural groups. The rise in nonmarital cohabitation
Jobs have become increasingly insecure since the decline of the standard employment contract, a trend that is expected to continue in the future. Workers in all sectors of the economy, including scientists and engineers, face precarious working conditions today, as corporate downsizing and reorganisation result in routine layoffs. This paper investigates how job insecurity can contribute to gender inequality. Drawing on interviews with scientists and engineers conducted over a period of boom-and-bust at a multi-national oil company, I uncovered a discourse of ‘the deserving professional.’ This is a hegemonic discourse that identifies certain individuals—those who are under 50, native-born whites, and family breadwinners—as most deserving of keeping their jobs during periods of downsizing. I argue that the discourse of the deserving professional is used by workers to understand and in some cases justify what seem like arbitrary and biased decisions regarding layoffs. The discourse of the deserving professional also provides sociologists with insight into the future of white male domination of this industry.
Many studies have shown that women pay a wage penalty for motherhood, whereas men earn a wage premium for fatherhood. A few recent studies have used quantile regression to explore differences in the penalties across the wage distribution. The current study builds on this research and explores trends in the parenthood penalties and premiums from 1980 to 2014 for those at the bottom, middle, and top of the wage distribution. Analyses of data from the Current Population Survey show that the motherhood wage penalty decreased, whereas the fatherhood wage premium increased. Unconditional quantile regression models reveal that low-, middle-, and high-earning women paid similar motherhood wage penalties in the 1980s. The motherhood wage penalty began to decrease in the 1990s, but more so for high-earning women than for low-earning women. By the early 2010s, the motherhood wage penalty for high-earning women was eliminated, whereas low-earning women continued to pay a penalty. The fatherhood wage premium began to increase in the late 1990s, although again, more so for high-earning men than for low-earning men. By the early 2010s, high-earning men received a much larger fatherhood wage premium than low- or middle-earning men.
Given growing interest in computing fields, as well as a longstanding gender gap in computer science, this study used nationwide survey data on college students during 4 decades to: (a) document trends in aspirations to major in computer science among undergraduate women and men; (b) explore the characteristics of women and men who choose to major in computer science and how this population has evolved over time; and (c) identify the key determinants of the gender gap in the selection of computer science majors during the past 4 decades. The data included 8 million students attending 1,225 baccalaureate-granting institutions from 1971 to 2011, with selected-year multivariate analyses of 18,830 computer science majors (and 904,307 students from all other majors). The results revealed heavy fluctuations in students’ interest in computer science from 1971 to 2011, with trends highlighting a significant downturn between the late 1990s and 2011 as well as a persistent, sizeable underrepresentation of women across all years. The study also showed that while some of the traditional explanations for the gender gap in computer science held true, there have been distinctive shifts in who pursues computer science and why some students may be particularly interested in or dissuaded from the major.
Women earn better grades than men across levels of education—but to what end? This article assesses whether men and women receive equal returns to academic performance in hiring. I conducted an audit study by submitting 2,106 job applications that experimentally manipulated applicants’ GPA, gender, and college major. Although GPA matters little for men, women benefit from moderate achievement but not high achievement. As a result, high-achieving men are called back significantly more often than high-achieving women—at a rate of nearly 2-to-1. I further find that high-achieving women are most readily penalized when they major in math: high-achieving men math majors are called back three times as often as their women counterparts. A survey experiment conducted with 261 hiring decision-makers suggests that these patterns are due to employers’ gendered standards for applicants. Employers value competence and commitment among men applicants, but instead privilege women applicants who are perceived as likeable. This standard helps moderate-achieving women, who are often described as sociable and outgoing, but hurts high-achieving women, whose personalities are viewed with more skepticism. These findings suggest that achievement invokes gendered stereotypes that penalize women for having good grades, creating unequal returns to academic performance at labor market entry.
A ‘chilly’ environment limits women’s advancement through the educational pipeline leading to jobs in science and technology. However, we know relatively little about the environment women encounter after making it through the educational pipeline. Do technology companies create environments that may dampen women’s interest at the juncture when they are launching their careers? Using original observational data from 84 recruiting sessions hosted by technology companies at a prominent university on the US West Coast, we find that company representatives often engage in behaviors that are known to create a chilly environment for women. Through gender-imbalanced presenter roles, geek culture references, overt use of gender stereotypes, and other gendered speech and actions, representatives may puncture the pipeline, lessening the interest of women at the point of recruitment into technology careers.
Using the National Science Foundation's SESTAT data, we examine the gender wage gap by race among those working in computer science, life sciences, physical sciences, and engineering. We find that in fields with a greater representation of women (the life and physical sciences), the gender wage gap can largely be explained by differences in observed characteristics between men and women working in those fields. In the fields with the lowest concentration of women (computer science and engineering), gender wage gaps persist even after controlling for observed characteristics. In assessing how this gap changes over time, we find evidence of a narrowing for more recent cohorts of college graduates in the life sciences and engineering. The computer sciences and physical sciences, however, show no clear pattern in the gap across cohorts of graduates.
Women remain underrepresented in the STEM workforce. We assess explanations for women's underrepresentation in STEM jobs, focusing on a cohort that came of age in the 1980s and 1990s, when women dramatically increased their representation in the scientific labor force. Data are from the NLSY79, and our analysis focuses on members of this cohort who received a college degree, with an emphasis on those who completed a degree in a STEM field. Our analyses test the extent to which college major, expectations to work in STEM, and family expectations shaped transitions into STEM occupations within two years of degree completion. Among those majoring in STEM fields there were no gender differences in transitioning into STEM jobs, though there were sizable differences in transitions to STEM employment by field of study. Of note are gender differences in associations between family expectations and transitions into STEM employment. The most career oriented women, who expected to marry late and limit fertility, were no more likely to enter STEM jobs than were women who anticipated marrying young and having two or more children. The men most likely to enter STEM occupations, in contrast, adhered to significantly more conventional gender ideologies than their female counterparts, expecting to marry at younger ages but also to remain childless. Results of our regression decomposition indicated that marriage and family expectations and gender ideology worked in opposite directions for men and women. Nonetheless, the majority of the gender disparity in transitions into STEM jobs was related to women's underrepresentation in engineering and computer science fields of study.
Noting a phenomenon that might seem to recall a previous era, The New York Times Magazine recently portrayed women who leave their careers in order to become full-time mothers as "opting out." But, are high-achieving professional women really choosing to abandon their careers in order to return home? This provocative study is the first to tackle this issue from the perspective of the women themselves. Based on a series of candid, in-depth interviews with women who returned home after working as doctors, lawyers, bankers, scientists, and other professions, Pamela Stone explores the role that their husbands, children, and coworkers play in their decision; how womens efforts to construct new lives and new identities unfold once they are home; and where their aspirations and plans for the future lie. What we learncontrary to many media perceptionsis that these high-flying women are not opting out but are instead being pushed out of the workplace. Drawing on their experiences, Stone outlines concrete ideas for redesigning workplaces to make it easier for womenand mento attain their goal of living rewarding lives that combine both families and careers.
The current research examined differences between women engineers who persisted in an engineering career versus those who left engineering using a combination of two prominent theories of career change: social cognitive career theory (SCCT, Lent, Brown & Hackett, 1994; 2002) and integrated model of career change (Rhodes & Doering, 1983). The two groups of women did not differ in three domains of self-confidence or outcome expectations (engineering tasks, navigating organizational climate, or multiple roles), in vocational interests, or in workplace barriers. Women who continue in engineering do differ from those who leave in their experience of workplace supports and their levels of occupational commitment. Engineering turnover intentions and occupational commitment emerged as the two key variables that explained 33.4% of the variance in persistence in engineering careers. We discuss the implications of the results in terms of theoretical development and practical implications for organizations.
Using data from the IPUMS-USA, the present research focuses on trends in the gender earnings gap in the United States between 1970 and 2010. The major goal of this article is to understand the sources of the convergence in men's and women's earnings in the public and private sectors as well as the stagnation of this trend in the new millennium. For this purpose, we delineate temporal changes in the role played by major sources of the gap. Several components are identified: the portion of the gap attributed to gender differences in human-capital resources; labor supply; sociodemographic attributes; occupational segregation; and the unexplained portion of the gap. The findings reveal a substantial reduction in the gross gender earnings gap in both sectors of the economy. Most of the decline is attributed to the reduction in the unexplained portion of the gap, implying a significant decline in economic discrimination against women. In contrast to discrimination, the role played by human capital and personal attributes in explaining the gender pay gap is relatively small in both sectors. Differences between the two sectors are not only in the size and pace of the reduction but also in the significance of the two major sources of the gap. Working hours have become the most important factor with respect to gender pay inequality in both sectors, although much more dominantly in the private sector. The declining gender segregation may explain the decreased impact of occupations on the gender pay gap in the private sector. In the public sector, by contrast, gender segregation still accounts for a substantial portion of the gap. The findings are discussed in light of the theoretical literature on sources of gender economic inequality and in light of the recent stagnation of the trend.
Over the past 50 years, women's roles have changed dramatically - a reality captured by substantial increases in employment and reductions in fertility. Yet, the social organization of work and family life has not changed much, leading to pervasive work-family conflict. Observing these strains, some scholars wonder whether U.S. women's high employment levels are sustainable. Women's employment in professional and managerial occupations - the core of the analyses offered in this article - merits particular interest because of the material and symbolic implications for gender equality. In a cohort analysis of working-age women born between 1906 and 1975, I show that employment levels among college-educated women in professional and managerial occupations have increased across cohorts. Full-time, year-round employment rates continue to rise across cohorts, even among women in historically male professions and mothers of young children. Although labor force participation rates have stopped rising, they have stalled at a very high rate, with less than 8 percent of professional women born since 1956 out of the labor force for a year or more during their prime childbearing years. Moreover, the difference in employment rates between mothers and childless women - the "child penalty" - is shrinking across cohorts.
In this study, time diary data are used to assess trends in mothers' and fathers' child care time from the mid-1960s to the late 1990s. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the results indicate that both mothers and fathers report spending greater amounts of time in child care activities in the late 1990s than in the "family-oriented" 1960s. For mothers, there was a 1965-75 decline in routine child care time and then a 1975-98 rebound along with a steady increase in time doing more developmental activities. For 1998 fathers report increased participation in routine child care as well as in more "fun" activities. The ratio of married mothers' to married fathers' time in child care declined in all primary child care activities. These results suggest that parents have undergone a behavioral change that has more than countered family change that might otherwise have reduced time with children.
In this article, we analyze gender differences in college major selection for respondents to the Education Longitudinal Study (2002-2006), focusing on educational pathways through college that lead to science, engineering, or doctoral-track medicine occupations and to non-doctoral track clinical and health sciences occupations. We show that gender differences in college major selection remain substantial, even for a cohort in which rates of enrollment in postsecondary education are more than ten percent higher for young women than for young men. Consistent with other recent research, we demonstrate that neither gender differences in work-family goals nor in academic preparation explain a substantial portion of these differences. However, the occupational plans of high school seniors are strong predictors of initial college major selection, a finding that is revealed only when occupational plans are measured with sufficient detail, here by using the verbatim responses of students. We also find that the association between occupational plans and college major selection is not attributable to work-family orientation or academic preparation. Finally, we find gender differences in the associations between occupational plans and college major selection that are consistent with prior research on STEM attrition, as well as with the claim that attrition also affects the selection of majors that are gateways into doctoral-track medicine. We discuss the implications of the predictive power of occupational plans formed in adolescence for understanding sex segregation and for policies intended to create a gender-balanced STEM and doctoral-level medical workforce.
Between 1994 and 2006, the ratio of foreign-born scientists and engineers (FSE) to native scientists and engineers (NSE) doubled. I decompose this change into a migration effect (which accounts for migration in general), a proportional college effect (which accounts for the relative proportions of college graduates among migrant and native workers), and a proportional science and engineering (S&E) effect (which accounts for the relative proportions of S&Es among migrant and native college-educated workers). Results show that the migration effect explains about three-quarters of the increase in FSE/NSE during the entire period under study. The proportional S&E effect, which captures changes in the ratio as a result of immigration of S&Es in excess of what would be expected from general migration alone, was largest in 1995-1998, which were years of sustained economic growth. Conversely, a slower economy coincided with a declining proportional S&E effect after 2000. Increases in the annual cap on H-lB visas, an important avenue of entryforforeign-born S&Es, had little effect on the ratio. In short, during 1994-2006, the association between economic swings and the specific, more than proportional migration of S&Es was much stronger than the association between the latter and changes in the H-1B cap.
Using the 2003 National Survey of College Graduates, I examine how immigrants perform relative to natives in activities likely to increase U.S. productivity, according to the type of visa on which they first entered the United States. Immigrants who first entered on a student/trainee visa or a temporary work visa have a large advantage over natives in wages, patenting, commercializing or licensing patents, and publishing. In general, this advantage is explained by immigrants' higher education and field of study, but this is not the case for publishing, and immigrants are more likely to start companies than natives with similar education. Immigrants without U.S. education and who arrived at older ages suffer a wage handicap, which offsets savings to the United States from their having completed more education abroad. Immigrants who entered with legal permanent residence do not outperform natives for any of the outcomes considered.
The low prevalence of women in the information technology (IT) workforce has received considerable attention in recent years. The focus of much of this discussion concerns how women can be recruited into careers in IT by making careers more attractive and accessible to women. The size of the IT workforce depends on retention as well as recruitment. The focus of this study is on retention, examining factors related to retention and how retention varies by gender. Data for the study come from the Scientists and Engineers Statistical Data System (SESTAT) compiled by Science Resources Statistics (SRS), National Science Foundation (NSF). We find that retention varies by gender and that a sizeable proportion of IT-trained women who are not working in IT jobs leave the labor force rather than take positions in other occupations. We also find that marriage and family play different roles for women and men in affecting retention. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, Inc. 2005
The Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition technique is widely used to identify and quantify the separate contributions of group differences in measurable characteristics, such as education, experience, marital status, and geographical differences to racial and gender gaps in outcomes. The technique cannot be used directly, however, if the outcome is binary and the coefficients are from a logit or probit model. I describe a relatively simple method of performing a decomposition that uses estimates from a logit or probit model. Expanding on the original application of the technique in Fairlie (1999), I provide a more thorough discussion of how to apply the technique, an analysis of the sensitivity of the decomposition estimates to different parameters, and the calculation of standard errors. I also compare the estimates to Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition estimates and discuss an example of when the Blinder-Oaxaca technique may be problematic.
Why So Few? Women in Science
- C Hill
- C Corbett
- A Rose
The Age That Women Have Babies: How a Gap Divides America
- Q Bui
- C C Miller