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Mediterranean Politics
ISSN: (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fmed20
Qatar’s evolving role in conflict mediation
Sansom Milton, Ghassan Elkahlout & Sana Tariq
To cite this article: Sansom Milton, Ghassan Elkahlout & Sana Tariq (16 Oct
2023): Qatar’s evolving role in conflict mediation, Mediterranean Politics, DOI:
10.1080/13629395.2023.2266665
To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/13629395.2023.2266665
Published online: 16 Oct 2023.
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Qatar’s evolving role in conict mediation
Sansom Milton , Ghassan Elkahlout and Sana Tariq
Center for Conflict and Humanitarian Studies, Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies,
Doha, Qatar
ABSTRACT
Qatar’s role in mediation diminished following the 2017 Gulf Crisis and the
regional backlash to its interventionist policy during the Arab Spring. After the
resolution of the Gulf Crisis in 2021, the Qatari role in conict mediation re-
emerged with a return to third-party mediation in the early 2020s, receiving
widespread attention following the U.S.-Taliban agreement. The post-crisis
return of Qatar to playing central mediator and facilitator roles in conict
management has, however, been subject to discontinuities as well as continu-
ities in its mediation style as a result of the crisis in its international relations.
This article analyses the evolution of mediation strategy, utilizing case studies of
Qatar’s mediation in Afghanistan, Chad, and Libya through a framework focus-
ing on results, modality, acceptability and reception. The analysis identies key
comparative ndings on Qatar’s post-2020 renewed role in conict mediation.
ARTICLE HISTORY Received March 2023; Accepted September 2023
KEYWORDS Qatar; conflict mediation; peacemaking; Gulf states; conflict resolution
1. Introduction
In the late 2000s, Qatar emerged as a leading peacemaker in the Middle East
and North Africa (MENA), playing multiple roles in conict mediation, huma-
nitarian assistance and post-conict reconstruction. The brokering of peace
agreements or ceaseres in Lebanon (2008), Yemen (2010), Darfur (2011), and
Gaza (2012) gained headlines worldwide and contributed signicantly to
Qatar’s rising reputation. The rapid transformation of Qatar from a quiet
country to a high-prole state within regional diplomacy led to
a concomitant increase in academic and policy analysis of the drivers and
dynamics of Qatari mediation and foreign policy (Kamrava, 2011; Roberts,
2012). However, Qatar’s role in mediation diminished following backlash
against its interventionist role in the Arab Spring (Ulrichsen, 2014). This
reached an apogee in 2017 when the blockade imposed on Qatar shifted
analytical attention away from Qatar’s role as a third-party mediator towards
attempts by regional and international powers to mediate the Gulf Crisis
CONTACT Sansom Milton Sansom.milton@chs-doha.org; Sansom.milton@gmail.com
MEDITERRANEAN POLITICS
https://doi.org/10.1080/13629395.2023.2266665
© 2023 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
between Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) (Fraihat,
2020; Miller, 2019; Milton-Edwards, 2020).
The facilitation of the U.S.-Taliban talks that culminated in the Doha
Agreement in February 2020 marked Qatar’s return as a third-party mediator
after the blockade. After the signing of the U.S.-Taliban agreement in 2020,
Qatar positioned itself as a go-to regional third-party capable of neutral and
trusted facilitation and mediation in a wide range of conict zones and
political crises (Alqashouti, 2021). In 2022, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al-
Thani, the Emir of Qatar, declared at the 77th UN General Assembly that
‘mediation in the peaceful settlement of disputes’ was at the centre of Qatar’s
foreign policy to ‘solidify [its] reputation as an internationally reliable partner’
(The Peninsula, 2022).
Whilst this new phase of Qatari conict mediation has been subject to
increased media and policy analysis, very little academic research empirically
analyses the continuities and discontinuities in Qatar’s mediation post-Gulf
Crisis. This paper contributes towards lling this gap in the comparative
knowledge base on the role of Qatar and the Gulf States more broadly in
conict mediation and theories of small states and emerging powers as
mediators. It then presents a brief contextualization of the rise of Qatar and
its role in conict mediation and other forms of conict response. The paper
then presents a comparative qualitative study of three novel cases of Qatari
mediation in the early 2020s that have not been widely researched in recent
literature: the U.S.-Taliban and intra-Afghan peace negotiations, the Chadian
agreement, and the Libyan political process. Finally, an analysis is then
oered that identies several key comparative ndings on the continuities
and discontinuities of Qatar’s renewed role in conict mediation. The analysis
is supported by primary eldwork research conducted through interviews
with Qatari ocials and with a range of policymakers, experts, and other
individuals close to the various processes mediated by Qatar.
2. Theoretical contribution
The paper makes a theoretical contribution in relation to several
research literatures. Firstly, the paper contributes towards research
examining the roles of small states in the ‘Global South’ in conict
mediation, a subeld that has largely focused on small states in the
‘Global North’ (Zartman, 2013), despite the increasing relevance of small
states to the contemporary mediation needs of complex and polarized
conicts. In contrast to the coercive methods accessed by great powers,
the mediation strategies of small states draw on their perceived neu-
trality, non-threatening nature, and ‘no legacies of foreign excess’,
(Jones 1999: 112), which lends itself to facilitative or procedural strate-
gies sometimes described as ‘pure’ mediation. These strategies have
2S. MILTON ET AL.
been found to produce more durable agreements with sustainable buy-
in (Beardsley et al., 2006, p. 82). Qatari mediation oers an important
hybrid case in that its sources of leverage in mediation, in particular its
strategic use of nance, entail that it does not t the classic typology of
a small state mediator.
Secondly, the major focus of extant scholarship in the eld has been on
how variation in mediation strategy aects the results of the mediation eort
(Beardsley et al., 2006; Eriksson, 2019). There has been relatively little atten-
tion given to the determinants inuencing the mediation strategy of single
actors and how these factors may change over time. Research into this issue
has argued that mediation approaches are based on explanations endogen-
ous to a given conict, such as the mediator’s epistemological understanding
of the conict, levels of conict intensity, or explanations regarding the
mediator’s background and style (Heemsbergen & Siniver, 2010; Lindgren,
2016). Neither of these approaches adequately considers the role of variation
over time or structural changes in the state’s foreign policy. Qatar’s renewed
third party role is a unique case that enables analysis of how a state’s media-
tion approach transforms in response to an international shock, such as the
2017 blockade that changed Qatar’s position in the international system, with
foreign policy a key tool utilized to overcome its eects (Al-Eshaq & Rasheed,
2022). Conceptually, a state’s mediation style expresses how it views itself as
an intermediary actor in international relations, choosing to depend, for
instance, more on facilitative versus coercive instruments for brokering
exchange. A crisis of regional exclusion amongst its neighbours oers analy-
tical insights into how a state reformulates its mediation approach to
enhance its comparative strengths and reduce the risks of third-party
engagement.
Thirdly, the paper contributes towards the literature examining Qatar’s
mediation. In the early 2010s, a minor research agenda emerged that ana-
lysed the then-recent ascent of Qatar to the status of a new entrant to the fray
of conict mediation in the MENA region (Kamrava, 2011; Ulrichsen, 2013).
This strand of research was quickly eclipsed by real-world events as Doha’s
interventionist and controversial role in the Arab Spring led to its mediation
role being curtailed following the regional blockade imposed on Qatar in
2017 (Ulrichsen, 2014). Yet with renewed attention to Qatari mediation in the
early 2020s, there is a need for research examining the continuities and
discontinuities between the contemporary practice of Qatari mediation and
its hyper-active mediation phase from 2006–2010. Most studies on Qatari
mediation generalize from the empirical record focused on this 2006–
2010 period – particularly, the cases of the Lebanese political crisis of 2008,
the Houthi conict in Yemen during 2007–2008, the Darfur peace process
culminating in 2011, and, to a lesser extent, the 2012 Hamas-Fatah reconcilia-
tion agreement (Barakat, 2012; Barakat & Milton, 2011; Kamrava, 2011).
MEDITERRANEAN POLITICS 3
Lastly, the paper contributes to the broader literature on the Gulf states’
contemporary mediation and peacemaking roles (Freer, 2023). Mediation has
been a key tool within the repertoire of Gulf states peacemaking approaches,
although they play very little role in what is conventionally dened as ‘post-
conict peacebuilding’. For instance, Oman has been analysed as an ‘inter-
locutor state’ that aims to bridge ‘East’ and ‘West’, such as its role in facilitat-
ing the Iran nuclear deal in 2015 (Worrall, 2021). Moreover, the UAE has also
recorded notable mediation achievements, particularly the rapprochement
between Ethiopia and Eritrea (Ylönen, 2018). Furthermore, the transformation
of Saudi Arabia’s regional prole in the early 2020s also involves a major role
for mediation as a tool of foreign policy, notably in the Jeddah process aimed
to resolve the 2023 war in Sudan.
3. International relations of Qatar
Qatar experienced a major transformation over the past few decades from
a little-known Gulf state to a rapidly developing economy that occupies a key
role in international trade as one of the world’s largest natural gas producers
(Chapa, 2022). Qatar’s foreign policy ambitions in the region expanded at
a rate outsized to its diminutive geography as its economic status expanded
globally.
Qatar was incentivized to employ state branding and hedging strategies
due to the ‘structural constraints imposed by its small size and its unenviable
geographic location’ situated between powerful neighbours Saudi Arabia,
with which it shares its only land border, and Iran, with which Qatar shares its
largest gas eld, the North Dome gas eld (Kamrava, 2015, pp. 65–66). After
moving out from under the geo-political orbit of Saudi Arabia, Qatar pursued
a foreign policy centred around a hedging strategy and cultivating a range of
alliances to balance the Saudi-Iranian regional rivalry.
Qatar also employed an active soft power strategy involving several tools,
including establishing the Al-Jazeera media network, hosting mega-events
including the FIFA World Cup 2022, and investing in culture and education
through Qatar Foundation and other initiatives (Álvarez-Ossorio & Rodríguez
García, 2021). The projection of international power through its foreign policy
peaked in the early years of the Arab Spring when ‘a combination of wealth
and vision underpinned the success of Qatar’s strategy and enabled it to
eclipse the Arab world’s traditional superpower’ (Ulrichsen, 2014, p. 37).
Qatar’s return to the mediation centre stage in the early 2020s is also
connected to the rising power of the Gulf states. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine
necessitated a shift from Russia towards alternative sources of oil and gas,
which solidied the Gulf states’ power. Regarding this, Qatar and the Gulf
states have been viewed as critical to stabilizing global energy markets and
diversifying energy supplies to reduce Europe’s dependence on Russian gas,
4S. MILTON ET AL.
particularly due to sanctions on Iran (Jacobs, 2022; Motamedi, 2022). Within
this context, Qatar’s higher prole was evident in its facilitation of indirect
communication between American and Iranian negotiators on renewing the
Iran nuclear deal. The choice of Qatar, the world’s largest liqueed natural gas
(LNG) exporter, as the location for the talks underlined the G7’s focus on
strengthening relations with major hydrocarbon suppliers. Moreover, Qatar is
the only Arab state whose economy depends on a pragmatic working rela-
tionship with Iran for trade agreements regulating fuel production.
4. Qatar’s role in conict mediation
The 2003 Qatari Constitution enshrined Qatar’s commitment to mediation
through Article Seven, which states that ‘the foreign policy of the State is
based on the principle of strengthening international peace and security by
means of encouraging peaceful resolution of international disputes’. This
makes it one of the few states in the world with a constitutional commitment
to peaceful conict resolution rather than a loose foreign policy principle
(Gulbrandsen, 2010).
Qatar’s rst reported mediation role was in the Hanish Islands dispute
between Eritrea and Yemen in December 1995, shortly after Sheikh Hamad
Al-Thani’s succession as the Emir (Minich, 2015). Since then, Qatar’s mediation
portfolio expanded to include the 2008 Lebanese political crises, the 2007–
2010 Houthi ceaseres in Yemen, the 2010–2011 Darfur peace process, the
2012 Hamas-Fatah reconciliation agreement, and the 2020 U.S.-Taliban
agreement. Other notable mediation eorts include the 2010 Djibouti-
Eritrea ceasere, the 2015 Tebu-Tuareg reconciliation agreement in Libya,
the 2017 post-election crisis in the Gambia, the 2021 Somalia-Kenya border
agreement, the 2022 Chad dialogue agreement, and the 2022 Libyan political
proposal. Qatar has also been involved in specialized humanitarian accords
for safe passage, such as the deal with Iran in 2017 that enabled the evacua-
tion of four besieged towns in the Syrian civil war (Bellamy, 2022, p. 174;
Elkahlout & Milton, 2023).
Previous research has identied a range of features of Qatar as
a third-party mediator. Firstly, Qatar has an unusually large nancial
capacity in comparison to most small-state mediators. In various cases,
Qatar oered signicant funding as part of peace agreements or cease-
res that nancially incentivize conict parties to sign (Barakat & Milton,
2019). This led to criticism that Qatari mediation often leads to
unstable, short-term nancially-driven deals rather than resolving
underlying conict drivers (Ulrichsen, 2014). Secondly, Qatar’s accept-
ability as a mediator in the 2006–2010 pre-Arab Spring phase is largely
explained due to its then-widely perceived neutrality during a period in
which it had cultivated an unusually independent foreign policy
MEDITERRANEAN POLITICS 5
(Kamrava, 2015). However, Qatar’s intervention in the Arab Spring,
particularly in Libya and Syria (Ulrichsen, 2014), tarnished its neutrality,
restricting its acceptability as a third-party mediator in and beyond the
region.
Thirdly, there is a debate in the literature over Qatar’s motivations as
a mediator. Various explanations focused on Qatari mediation as a means
of pursuing economic or security interests or as a normative expression of the
state’s commitment to global peace and security (Alqashouti, 2021). Small
states aim to project an image as peacemakers to increase their ‘soft power’
given their limited hard power in terms of military or economic capacity (Nye,
2008, p. 104), and research has focused on the extent to which Qatar’s
mediation policy is driven by state branding (Barakat, 2012).
An alternative explanation relates to the realization that high-level media-
tion bestows third-party states close diplomatic channels to the U.S. and
other major international powers. Its re-emergence as the formal mediator
from 2018 to 2020 of the U.S.-Taliban negotiations, and its later role as
a facilitator in hosting the Afghan peace process, signalled that the U.S. and
other major powers involved in Afghanistan shared mutual interest in Qatar’s
evolution into a trusted and impartial regional partner. The foreign policy
interests of these powers became closely tied to the Afghan le, with Qatar’s
ability to broker peace through international diplomacy and supporting
broader international coalitions in support of negotiations. The American
security guarantee to Qatar, which involves hosting the Al-Udeid military
airbase, was emphasized because of the direct mediation channel with the
U.S. and the changed regional context of the 2017–2021 Gulf Crisis.
Qatari ocials reiterate the soft power rationale and argue that Qatar’s rise
as a global power was motivated by adopting a resilient policy based on soft
power, international law, positive neutrality, and international reputation (Al-
Qahtani & Al-Thani, 2021). These factors are identied, in addition to religious
and normative motivations, as the drivers behind Qatar’s diplomatic eorts
and its attempts to inuence peace and conict dynamics. This combination
of soft power, diplomacy, and mediation has enabled Qatar to become ‘an
innovative, dynamic actor with the capacity to mediate in the various con-
icts in the region, and to project itself onto the world stage’ (Álvarez-Ossorio
& Rodríguez García, 2021, p. 105).
Fourthly, another consistent nding in the research literature is that Qatar
has lower levels of state capacity for mediating and facilitating peace pro-
cesses in comparison to leading small-state mediators, such as Switzerland or
Sweden, which possess long-established mediation support structures.
Authority to lead mediation portfolios has been handled by a select few
individuals, such as the former Prime Minister and Foreign Minister and the
Special Envoy for Conict Resolution. Particularly, weak capacities have been
identied concerning post-agreement monitoring and implementation and
6S. MILTON ET AL.
knowledge of best practices in mediation process structure and design
(Barakat, 2014). Kamrava writes that Qatar’s successes in mediation:
Are often checked by limited capabilities to aect long-term changes to the
preferences of the disputants through power projection abilities, in-depth
administrative and on-the-ground resources, and apparent underestimations
of the complexities of the deep-rooted conicts at hand. (Kamrava, 2011, p. 539)
Finally, Qatar engages in multiple forms of conict resolution, including
preventative diplomacy, third-party mediation and support for multi-lateral
conict prevention and peacebuilding. Despite courting controversy in its
involvement in conict zones, Qatar has emerged as a major regional player
in conict mediation and peacemaking over the past few decades.
5. Analysis: Qatari mediation post-2020
This section provides insight into Qatar’s mediation of three conicts, ordered
chronologically, within its post-2020 phase as a third-party mediator: the U.S.-
Taliban and intra-Afghan peace negotiations, the Chadian agreement, and
Libya’s political process.
5.1. Methodological framework
Qatar’s changing strategy towards mediation post-Gulf Crisis is qualitatively
analysed through an analytical framework focused on four indicators for
mediation strategy and outcome (see Table 1 below).
The four indicators jointly analyse the interaction between Qatar’s refor-
mulated mediation strategy in response to the international diplomatic shock
of the Gulf Crisis and, subsequently, whether conict actors and other third-
party states have responded positively to Qatar’s repositioning. The analysis
of the results of the case studies links the state-specic analysis of Qatar’s
mediation style with the short-term and mid-term results in resolving or de-
escalating the conict.
The case selection criteria for the three case studies pick out those
instances of Qatari mediation and facilitation that led to an agreement or
Table 1. Indicators for assessing Qatar’s Mediation strategy.
Results Short-term outcomes of the agreement such as signing of an agreement and the
effects on conflict dynamics.
Modality The ‘how’ of mediation, including balance of persuasion or incentivization, the
individuals or organizations involved and use of mediation or facilitation.
Acceptability The factors influencing the acceptability of Qatar’s third-party role among the conflict
parties.
Reception How the mediation or facilitation was perceived by conflict parties, secondary actors
and the global public.
MEDITERRANEAN POLITICS 7
prevented the outbreak of national violence. This criterion excludes the
important yet inconclusive Qatari roles in facilitating the intra-Afghan talks
after the Doha Agreement and the hosting of talks to revive the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action with Iran to prevent nuclear armament that
took place in Doha in June 2022. Furthermore, the designation of 2020 as the
resurgence of Qatar’s role in mediation should be understood within the
geopolitical context of warming Saudi-Qatari relations and regional diplo-
macy throughout 2020 that culminated in the resolution of the Gulf Crisis on
5 January 2021.
5.2. U.S.-Taliban agreement
The Doha Agreement was signed between the Taliban and the United States
on 29 February 2020 by Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, the movement’s deputy
leader in political aairs, and Zalmay Khalilzad, the U.S. Special Representative
for Afghanistan Reconciliation, in the presence of high-level representatives
and foreign ministers of states and international organizations.
Firstly, regarding results, Qatar achieved some success in opening up the
Afghan peace process. Doha was approached by the U.S. to facilitate negotia-
tions with the Taliban and host a political oce for the movement outside of
Afghanistan, following the acceptance in some U.S. government circles in
2007 for the need to seek a negotiated solution given the low likelihood of
absolute military defeat of the Taliban. Obstacles to Qatar’s early facilitation
ranged from the protracted process of establishing a political oce in 2013
and securing the release of high-level Taliban prisoners from Guantanamo
Bay detention camp in 2014.
During the ocial U.S.-Taliban talks, Qatari mediation was able to resolve
key issues of dispute regarding counterterrorism obligations, the details of
the ceasere between the U.S. and the Taliban, and the phasing of the
U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan. An agreement was eventually signed on
29 February 2020 that provided a roadmap for the safe withdrawal of US
troops from Afghanistan, a commitment from the Taliban to renounce Al-
Qaeda and other terrorist groups, and that the Taliban would enter intra-
Afghan negotiations.
However, the medium-term perception of the Doha Agreement changed
signicantly following the return of Taliban rule to Afghanistan on 15 August .
The Agreement was received negatively in U.S. media and policy-making
circles. David Petraeus, the former commander of U.S.-NATO forces in
Afghanistan, called it ‘among the worst diplomatic agreements to which
the U.S. has ever been a party’ (Petraeus, 2022). Rather than reecting
Qatar’s third-party role in the peace process, the shortcomings of the
Agreement on the intra-Afghan process stemmed from the alacrity of the
8S. MILTON ET AL.
U.S. to exit in the short-term, and without deploying greater military troops in
a bid to strengthen their negotiating position vis-à-vis Taliban.
Secondly, Qatar’s role in the U.S.-Taliban negotiations was that of
a mediator. Crucially, this third-party role was built over a long facilitation
period, beginning in 2013 with the hosting of the Taliban Political Oce in
Doha and acting as a location for condential dialogue between the
Taliban and the international community. Qatar’s third-party role in the
negotiations involved hosting various rounds of talks in Doha, including
technical and political support for Taliban leaders to travel to Doha for
talks. Third-party support also involved chairing negotiation sessions and
shuttle diplomacy between the two sides, particularly during sticking
points in the negotiations (EIU, 2019). For example, when President
Donald Trump cancelled the talks with the Taliban over the killing of an
American soldier, Qatar brokered the release of a US citizen and an
Australian citizen in exchange for three high-prole Taliban prisoners,
enabling talks to resume (France 24, 2019). This deal involved several key
actors within the government, including the Deputy Prime Minister and
Foreign Minister, Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al-Thani and the
Special Envoy, Mutlaq Al-Qahtani. Qatari mediation also addressed less-
reported disputes, such as the Taliban’s demand for a guarantor and the
U.S. unwillingness to grant a monitoring role to a foreign government,
which was eventually resolved by the U.S. arrangement for 11 Taliban
members to be temporarily removed from the UN Security Council travel
sanctions list.
Regarding its post-agreement role, Qatar continued to facilitate intra-
Afghan peace negotiations between the Taliban and the recognized govern-
ment in Kabul. The facilitation arrangement primarily involved hosting the
talks and convening a ‘group of friends’ of Asian and European states, namely
Germany, Indonesia, Norway, and Uzbekistan. The talks themselves were
Afghan-led without the presence of a formal third-party mediator, with no
external party present in the room during the negotiations. The exception
was a brief two-week period in mid-November 2020 when negotiating sides
requested mediation assistance from Special Envoy Al-Qahtani to resolve the
gridlock over the procedural rules. By the start of December 2020, the
procedural agreement was reached, marking the then-most signicant pro-
gress in the intra-Afghan peace process.
Following the Taliban’s military takeover of Afghanistan on 15 August ,
Qatar extended its post-agreement role by assuming the large responsibility
of facilitating the evacuation of thousands of international citizens and 60,000
Afghans via Doha over the next month, which involved complex on-the-
ground coordination with the Taliban. The assistance to the U.S. and its allies’
evacuation, in particular, led to international commendation for Qatar’s role
and the U.S. labelling Qatar as its ‘protecting power’ in Afghanistan.
MEDITERRANEAN POLITICS 9
Thirdly, regarding acceptability as a third party, as a rule, Qatar does
not enter as a formal mediator until requested to by negotiating
parties. The U.S. approached Qatar in 2012 to host the Taliban
Political Oce in agreement with the Taliban, who evaluated other
regional third-party contenders and selected Qatar based on their
acceptance of its pre-conditions and non-involvement in the Afghan
conict.
1
The importance of Qatar’s strategy premised on an invitation
is underscored by the UAE’s failed attempt to intervene as a formal
third party in the U.S.-Taliban negotiations and in the intra-Afghan
process, where former President Ghani agreed to rotate the Doha
process around the Gulf region.
2
In both attempts, the UAE was
rebued by the Taliban, who refused to engage. Throughout the two
tracks, the strong trust of the U.S. in Qatar’s role is evident from several
statements from the U.S. Department of State that thanked Qatar for its
‘indispensable role’ in the mediation and facilitation process (MOFA,
2020b). This trust was crystallized with the appointment of Qatar as
a ‘protecting power’ of U.S. interests in Taliban-led Afghanistan, which
included several consular duties in an established U.S.-focused section
in the Qatari embassy in Kabul (MEE, 2021).
Finally, regarding reception, the Agreement was broadly welcomed
by leading international actors in Afghanistan, including the U.S. and
the U.N., for providing a pathway to end the conict (U.S. Embassy in
Qatar, 2021). Despite the high degree of media freedom relative to
other Gulf states, the talks remained highly secretive and condential,
which enabled a productive exchange between both sides. The U.S.-
Taliban Agreement, despite its unpopularity in Washington circles, has
been vital to restoring Qatar’s reputation as a key regional mediator.
Following widespread news coverage of its third-party role in
Afghanistan, international analysis of Qatar’s role in conict resolution
in policy outlets has increased concerning Qatar ‘carving out a leading
role for itself within international diplomacy [. . .] through its mediation-
oriented foreign policy’ (Ardemagni, 2021).
However, the return of Taliban rule and the breakdown of the
Agreement tarnished, to some extent, the reputational benets that
Qatar had accrued from the signing of the U.S.-Taliban agreement in
2020. Qatar’s role has led some experts and media outlets to question
its motivations and strategies, particularly the hosting of the Taliban
Political Oce in Doha. Nonetheless, the net eect of the facilitation
has been to signicantly enhance Qatar’s prole as a third-party actor
for conict mediation in the region, particularly involving Islamist
actors.
10 S. MILTON ET AL.
5.3. Chad: the 2022 Doha Agreement
On 8 August , over 40 Chadian signatories signed the Doha Agreement that
charted a pathway to the National Dialogue, constitutional reform, and
national elections to transfer power to a civilian government. The agreement,
mediated by Qatar, came during a political crisis that erupted when former
President Idris Déby was killed on the frontlines of a counterinsurgency
campaign in April 2021.
The announcement of President Déby’s death was immediately followed
by the formation of the Transitional Military Council (TMC), a military junta
comprised of 15 generals loyal to the former President and chaired by his son,
Mahamat Déby. The junta dismissed the government, dissolved parliament,
and abrogated the constitution, replacing it with a new transitional charter
contrary to the Chadian constitution (Mudge, 2022). Mahamat Déby, as the
self-appointed de facto head of state, announced an 18-month transition
ending in October 2022 to return power to a civilian government after an
Inclusive and Sovereign National Dialogue (National Dialogue), which would
be renewable if an agreement was not reached in that time.
As such, the Chadian government initiated negotiations with the rebel
factions in the country to reach an agreement before the National Dialogue,
in which the TMC would hold talks with the political opposition and civil
society for a pathway to a democratic transition. The government postponed
the talks from their initial agreed date of 27 February 2022 to 16 March in
Doha, with more than 40 rebel groups invited.
On 8 August , following ve months of negotiations mediated by Qatar,
the Chadian government signed a peace agreement with more than 30
opposition groups. In addition to committing parties to a permanent cease-
re, the Agreement outlined a pathway for the transitional process of trans-
ferring power from the TMC to a civilian government through the National
Dialogue, which committed to draft a new constitution and hold elections.
The Agreement also committed the TMC to provide safe passage for signa-
tories of the Agreement to return to Chad, not to conduct military operations
against the signatory parties on Chadian territory or in neighbouring coun-
tries, and provides for the consensus to disarm the rebel groups and integrate
them into the national army (The Africa Report, 2022).
Firstly, regarding results, the consensus on the agreement was a short-
term success that led to an immediate end to the hostilities in Chad between
the government and the rebel signatories, whilst the political opposition
accepted the legitimacy of the National Dialogue created by the agreement.
The phase of the peace process that the agreement sought to regulate, the
termination of hostilities and the opening of a political inclusion pathway
through an intra-Chadian political dialogue, largely remained in place in the
months following the signing of the agreement. The Front for Change and
MEDITERRANEAN POLITICS 11
Concord in Chad (FACT), however, rejected the agreement and stated that
the deal ‘follows the failure to take our demands into consideration’ (Diab &
Busari, 2022).
The National Dialogue was important for Chad’s transition as ‘its recom-
mendations will set in motion the drafting of a new constitution, a new
timetable for the transition and the upcoming elections’ (Betinbaye et al.,
2022). Concurrently, some of the outcomes of the National Dialogue, the key
elements of the Doha Agreement for Chad, were criticized by Chadian parties
and international observers. In early October 2022, the National Dialogue
agreed to extend the transition period for elections to 24 months and ruled
that Mahamat Déby is eligible to stand for presidential elections (Churm,
2022).
Secondly, Qatar played the leading formal mediator role and brokered the
agreement. Initially, the talks commenced with Qatar’s role limited to that of
a facilitator rather than a mediator. However, the conict parties formally
requested greater mediation support, which Qatar accepted. Qatar’s role was
further commended by France, which maintains strategic relations with Chad,
indicating that the mediation commenced without any reservations from
Paris (Qarjouli, 2022b). Qatar’s Special Envoy Al-Qahtani was even reported
to have stepped in as an ocial mediator to unlock the deadlock in the talks
(France 24, 2022). The Qatari mediator was afterwards switched to Qatar’s
Secretary of the Emir for Security Aairs (Al-Jazeera, 2022a).
The Doha Agreement for Chad is the most active and intensive mediation
role Qatar has played in recent years, in contrast to the facilitation role it has
mostly played since 2017. Many representatives from over 50 conict parties,
including the government, non-state military groups, and political factions,
were present in Doha for months (Qarjouli, 2022a). As the opposition parties
refused to negotiate directly with the government, Qatari mediation tactics
initially involved housing the delegates in separate accommodations for
weeks, whilst the mediator consulted them for a list of demands later struc-
tured into an agenda based on common ground. The extended timeline for
this consultation period required postponing the initiation of the National
Dialogue, on Qatar’s recommendation. The Qatari Envoy also brokered a key
demand for the rebel groups in exile to be granted a guarantee from the
government for amnesty when returning to Chad (The New Arab, 2022).
The scale of the talks and resources invested in the Chad mediation
process constitutes one of the largest peacemaking processes ever hosted
by Qatar. A media report noted ‘with more than 250 opposition and govern-
ment ocials staying in two luxury hotels, the Gulf state is picking up
a mounting bill for its mediation’ (Witcher, 2022). It is thus comparable to
the Darfur Track II negotiations for civil society in Doha in October 2009,
which involved hosting more than 200 tribal leaders and civil society repre-
sentatives (ReliefWeb, 2009).
12 S. MILTON ET AL.
Qatar’s post-agreement role switched back to facilitation for the
National Dialogue, which commenced on 20 August . The National
Dialogue convened with over 1,400 participants, including delegates
from the military, civil society, opposition parties, trade unions, and rebel
signatories of the Doha Agreement for a dialogue on state reform and
constitutional issues (Tantoh, 2022). Qatar’s National Security Adviser con-
tinued to be involved in post-agreement activities, including attending the
opening ceremony of the National Dialogue (MOFA, 2022). Yet Qatar
sought to work collaboratively and to promote third-party support from
other states and individuals in the post-agreement phase. Qatar appointed
the former Minister of Foreign Aairs of Burkina Faso, Djibril Bassolé, as
the facilitator for the National Dialogue process in N’Djamena. It is also
reported that Macky Sall, President of Senegal and the African Union, took
over the mediation dossier in terms of reaching out to FACT in the period
immediately after the Doha-based negotiations concluded in August 2022
(Africa Intelligence, 2022).
Thirdly, Qatar’s acceptability as a mediator by the Chadian conict parties
was demonstrated by their demand for Qatar to play a more active interven-
ing role in the National Dialogue after the Doha Agreement, despite Qatar
initially only oering to facilitate the talks. Trust in Qatar’s neutrality devel-
oped over the years through its third-party support for conict resolution in
the region. In 2009, the Qatar-negotiated Doha Accord improved the rela-
tions between Sudan and Chad. This limited Chad’s potential role as a spoiler
in Qatar’s ongoing mediation eorts in Darfur, in which former President
Déby has been accused of permitting the recruitment of mercenaries for
Darfuri movements in refugee camps in Chad (Marchal, 2006). In
August 2017, Chad severed diplomatic relations with Qatar, which it accused
of playing a destabilizing role in Chad. Whilst most media sources explained
this as Chad supporting Qatar’s blockade, there are claims relating it to Qatar
hosting the exiled Timane Erdimi, nephew of former President Deby and the
head of the Union of Resistance Forces – a rebel alliance formed in 2009 (ICG,
2021). However, Qatar-Chad diplomatic ties were restored eight months later
in February 2018 and Erdimi was later granted political asylum to return to
Chad for the National Dialogue (Al-Jazeera, 2018).
Equally important to domestic acceptability, Qatar’s role as a mediator in Chad
was enabled by Qatar’s warm relations with Egypt. Relations between Qatar and
Egypt strengthened greatly following the Al-Ula Summit in January 2021.
Following that, Qatar supported the Egyptian Central Bank with $1bn in depos-
its. Both countries also entered talks on a wide range of trade, diplomatic and
other portfolios, including Qatari investment worth up to $5 billion (Al-Jazeera,
2022b). Qatar’s role in mediation factored into this renegotiation of bilateral
ties. According to uncorroborated Egyptian security sources, it is reported that
Qatar agreed to increase its presence in Ethiopia to counter-balance UAE
MEDITERRANEAN POLITICS 13
inuence and support to Tigray and also to come to a unied position on Libya,
- and that - in return for support in Libya and Ethiopia, ocials in Egypt agreed
to support Qatar’s eorts to sponsor the Chadian national dialogue between
the transitional military council led by Mahamat Déby and armed opposition
forces. (Kassab et al., 2022)
Qatar’s acceptance as a mediator by Egypt was thus a bargaining chip in
a transactional relationship between the two countries – with Cairo aware of
the strategic importance placed by Doha on bolstering its role as a regional
mediator.
There is further evidence of the positive reception of Qatar’s mediation in
Chad. The key international actors in Chad, such as France, the African Union
(AU), the U.S., and the EU, commended Qatar’s role in mediating the deal
between the parties, and the UN Secretary-General thanked Qatar for mediat-
ing the National Dialogue (UN, 2022). Some representatives of rebel groups
welcomed the Agreement for its stronger obligations for international guar-
antees and third-party monitoring of its implementation against agreed-
upon timelines and benchmarks.
5.4. De-escalation in Libya
Following clashes in Tripoli in August 2022 that led to over 30 deaths and
threatened to tip the country back into outright civil war, a period of pre-
ventative diplomacy ensued in which Qatar played the leading role as a third-
party mediator. In September 2022, Doha welcomed Parliamentary President
Aguila Saleh alongside Belqasim Haftar, son of Khalifa Haftar – the rst
representatives from the eastern Tobruk-based Libyan government to visit
Qatar since at least 2014, due to Qatar’s general alignment with the Tripoli-
based government. Just two days previously, Prime Minister Abdul Hamid al-
Dbeibah of the Tripoli government also paid a visit to Qatar (Qarjouli, 2022c).
After weeks of shuttle diplomacy, Saleh presented a political proposal to the
Libyan parliament in a closed session in September based on the agreements
that emerged primarily from the meetings in Doha (LNA, 2022).
The proposal outlined a new political framework in which parliamentary
elections would be held before presidential elections to resolve the dilemma
of rival administrations of Dbeibah and Bashhaga by tabling it for parliamen-
tary approval. Saleh stated that the proposal was conditional upon creating
a new three-member Presidential Council led by himself and including Khaled
al-Mishri, the head of the High Council of State in the western government,
and an unnamed representative from southern Libya (TLO, 2022). The pro-
posal removed many of the prior restrictions on presidential candidates, such
as the disqualication of dual nationals, which had been viewed as removing
restrictions against General Khalifa Haftar to contesting the presidency in
elections.
14 S. MILTON ET AL.
Firstly, regarding results, the third-party intervention averted large-scale
violence and led to a relatively calm period. The proposal continued to hold
the backing of Saleh and al-Mishri amid growing international support for the
electoral arrangement, despite tensions between the two regarding compli-
ance with the existing electoral law (Reuters, 2021).
Secondly, regarding modality, the mediation process was a brief case of
shuttle diplomacy between the Tobruk and Tripoli-based governments,
which featured the highest level of Qatari political involvement with meet-
ings hosted personally by the Emir of Qatar himself. The distinctive element
of Qatari support is the spoiler management of the process by achieving the
buy-in of Mishri, with whom Qatar has maintained good relations. As the
head of the High Council, Mishri was needed to appease Council members
opposed to the return of a Haftar presidential bid, as Haftar’s inclusion in the
track one political process was necessary, given his past spoiler behaviour in
triggering the Battle of Tripoli to block the national dialogue in 2019
(Wintour, 2019).
Thirdly, regarding acceptability, the Libyan mediation marks the re-
emergence of the perception of Qatar as a neutral and trusted mediator in
one of the key post-Arab Spring contexts in which this very same reputation
was tarnished after 2011, when Qatar supported the Security Council resolu-
tion 1973 to impose a no-y zone on Libya and contributed in the operation
and provided humanitarian aid and logistical support to anti-Gadda forces.
Following the second Libyan civil war in 2014 and the emergence of two rival
governments in Libya, Qatar became associated with support for the western
Tripoli-based, internationally-recognized government, which it had been the
rst Arab country to recognize (Nuruzzaman, 2015, p. 228). Consequently, the
eastern Tobruk government and the parliament led by Aguila Saleh in the
east cut diplomatic relations with Doha due to Qatar’s political and nancial
support to the Shoura Council forces in Benghazi, who fought against the
forces commanded by the Egypt- and UAE-backed General Khalifa Haftar
(Reuters, 2017). Haftar and the Egyptian media subsequently promulgated
the narrative that Qatar supported the Muslim Brotherhood , which aected
Qatar’s reputation amongst sections of the Libyan public. This perception
that Qatar supported one side in the Libyan political scene entailed that it did
not have the neutrality and acceptability by conict parties to serve as a third-
party mediator in Libya’s national-level peace process. At the regional level,
Qatar also stood in a conicting position with Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Egypt, in
particular during their 2017-2021 blockade of Qatar (El-Gamaty, 2017). After
January 2021, the regional détente with the lifting of the blockade led to
a new mode of communication between the conict parties and external
actors in their reception of Qatar’s role in Libya.
Qatar was however not completely out of the Libyan political scene
despite not having a major role since 2014. One instance of Qatari mediation
MEDITERRANEAN POLITICS 15
came in 2015 with the brokering of a local peace agreement, signed in Doha,
between the Tebu and Tuareg groups in southern Libya for the reopening of
the second largest oileld in the country (the Sharara Oileld), which involved
agreement on a ceasere, the withdrawal of combatants, and the return of
thousands of displaced civilians (EIU, 2015; MOFA, 2015). Furthermore, Qatar
was involved in a supporting capacity to several multi-party mediation initia-
tives, including the Deputy PM’s statement for German mediation eorts in
Libya (MOFA, 2020a).
Qatar’s entry as a major third-party mediator in the Libyan political crisis
was also enabled by the geopolitical context of warming of ties between
Qatar and Turkey on one hand and Egypt on the other. In President Sisi’s rst
visit to Doha on 13 September 2022, Libya was presumed to be high on the
agenda (The Arab Weekly, 2022). This produced a broad agreement amongst
these key regional parties on a vision for the future of Libya. Whilst Russia and
the UAE both backed the spoiler eorts of General Khalifa Haftar in 2019,
Russia, in mid-2022, scaled down the presence of the mercenary Wagner
Group in Libya due to the Ukraine crisis, whilst the UAE maintained a low
prole in the Libyan le. Qatar’s acceptability as a mediator also appears to be
related to the strengthening ties between Doha and Washington in co-
operation over peace and security issues (U.S. Embassy in Qatar, 2020).
Since the Libyan uprising of 2011, the U.S. has followed a policy of ‘leading
from behind’ in the conict, with other actors playing the key public-facing
roles in the Libya post-intervention and subsequent attempts at diplomacy
and mediation (Gros, 2012).
Fourthly, the reception of the Qatari role was largely positive. The Qatari
proposal received strong backing amongst international actors, with state-
ments released in January 2023 from the U.S., who urged that there is ‘no
reason to delay’, and the U.N., who ‘strongly encourage[d]’ the nalization of
the agreement (TLU, 2023; U.S. Embassy in Libya, 2023). Support for the
Qatari-mediated proposal continued to strengthen in early 2023 through
Egyptian mediation (MEM, 2023).
In sum, whilst the Libyan case is a minor episode within Qatar’s historical
record in third party mediation, and ultimately did not lead to a wider
settlement of the political crisis, the case highlights the analytical point that
Qatar in the new phase of its mediation was able to enter the fray once more
as a mediator in the very same contexts in which its activist role in the Arab
Spring led to the decrease in Qatari mediation.
6. Analysis
This section analyses several signicant trends that emerged from comparing
the three cases presented in the paper: Qatar’s renewed reputation as
a skilled third-party mediator; the restoration of Qatar’s widely perceived
16 S. MILTON ET AL.
neutrality as a third-party mediator; Qatar’s shifting modalities of mediation
that no longer primarily rely on nancial inducements; and role diversication
within Qatari mediation practice.
Firstly, Qatar post-2020 regained its reputation as a skilled third-party
mediator capable of facilitating challenging peace processes and political
agreements. The mediation role in the U.S.-Taliban negotiations is a key
example of skilled mediation that involved developing trust and knowledge
of the conict parties over a long period of facilitation from the opening of
the Taliban Political Oce in Doha in 2013. Despite various obstacles repeat-
edly marring the process, such as President Trump cancelling talks in 2019,
Qatar was able to eectively step in to broker a prisoner release and
a ceasere to bring the parties back to the negotiating table. Though its
role in the intra-Afghan negotiations was facilitative, the brief period of
mediation in November that swiftly resulted in overcoming the procedural
rules deadlock suggests that a more active mediator role would have led to
greater progress in the negotiations. Similarly, a new level of mediation skill is
demonstrated by the Emir’s rapid intervention to de-escalate the risk of civil
war resurgence in Libya.
Secondly, Qatar’s latest mediation phase has repaired its reputation for
neutrality as a third-party mediator. Qatar’s diplomacy in the Libyan political
crisis was the case in which a perception of its neutrality can be observed.
Some analysts allege that Qatar was partisan in the case of Afghanistan, but
this is out of a misunderstanding of why the U.S. agreed to the major
compromises of its deal with the Taliban, whose causes lie in two successive
presidents’ desire for a total military withdrawal in the short-term, rather than
in Qatar’s mediation approach. The U.S.-Taliban agreement was another
major turning point in the general reception of Qatar’s non-interventionist
role in facilitation and mediation, and resulted in the Qatar’s status being
upgraded to ‘major non-NATO ally’ with the U.S. in 2022. Qatar’s regained
neutral stance as a mediator should be understood within the political con-
text following the January 2021 al-Ula summit and rapprochement with Saudi
Arabia following the Gulf Crisis.
Qatar’s role in helping bring the Taliban to the table with the U.S. has been
positively received by various conict parties themselves, particularly in con-
ict contexts where non-state armed movements labelled as ‘extremist’ or
‘terrorist’ seek to negotiate, such as in Mali and Syria. Due to their unique
position of trust with the Tuareg separatists and the Al-Qaeda-linked Ansar
Dine, Qatari non-governmental organizations (NGOs) were often the only
humanitarian organizations granted access to north Mali under rebel control
(Allemandou, 2013).
This also relates to a key discontinuity, which is Qatar’s high aversion
to risk after the regional blowback to its interventionist foreign policy.
Qatar is strongly committed to the principle that conict parties should
MEDITERRANEAN POLITICS 17
request its intervention as a formal third-party rather than unilaterally
enter the conict resolution process. This risk aversion extends as far as
a noticeable reluctance to accept the role of a formal mediator in peace
processes, often preferring to merely facilitate, marked by low probabil-
ities of durable success, where a failed peace outcome would reect
poorly on Qatar. This was the case with the intra-Afghan negotiations
in Doha (2020–21), where Qatar did not push to play the formal mediator
role because the parties did not request it, despite the clear need for
one. Also, in Chad (2022), Qatar initially preferred to only facilitate and
reluctantly accepted the role of mediator after receiving the request from
the Chadian government and opposition groups. The hesitance to pro-
vide more substantive involvement is likely to be associated with a lower
likelihood of successful outcomes in conict cases if this policy is
extended over the long term.
Thirdly, in the three analysed cases, Qatar did not oer major nancial
inducements to conict parties as a ‘carrot’ to incentivize reaching an agree-
ment. This demonstrates that one signicant discontinuity in Qatar’s evolving
role is no longer engaging in ‘chequebook diplomacy’. This charge was
consistently applied to Qatar’s highly active mediation phase during the
2006–2010 period, including oering $300–500 million for development in
the Sa’ada governorate in Yemen in 2007 (ICG, 2016), oering $250 million for
humanitarian and reconstruction eorts in Gaza in an unsuccessful attempt
to reach a multi-year ceasere deal between Israel and Hamas (Rabi, 2009,
p. 459), and most notably the substantial development funding package of
$2 billion to establish a development bank for Darfur, linked to the Doha
Document for Peace in Darfur signed in 2010 (ReliefWeb, 2010). The return to
quieter diplomacy and expert facilitation has eclipsed this modality of indu-
cement. Yet whilst not oering large-scale funding as a ‘deal sweetener’,
Qatar expended vast sums on facilitation. The 400-strong Chadian delegation
staying at the JW Marriott Marquis hotel were largely present in Doha for
months. Qatar also paid sizable bills for hosting Afghan delegations during
the intra-Afghan negotiations.
Fourthly, Qatar’s practice of mediation is not pursued by one single actor
or institution but is rather becoming a more diverse eld. Of the three cases:
Afghanistan was mediated or facilitated by the Special Envoy, the National
Security Advisor, the Deputy Foreign Minister, and the Foreign Minister; Libya
was mediated by the Emir; and Chad jointly by the Special Envoy and the
Secretary of the Emir for Security Aairs. This contrasts with the highly active
mediation period during 2006–2010 when nearly all third-party roles were
handled by the then-Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, Hamad bin Jassim
Al-Thani. This diversication of roles is likely related to a recognition that
much of the specialist expertise of mediation is conned to a small team of
individuals that imposes capacity constraints on Qatari mediation. The lack of
18 S. MILTON ET AL.
broader capacity had forced Qatar to turn down mediation oers between
2006 and 2010, for example in 2008 Qatar declined the invitation to mediate
in Mauritania’s post-coup crisis as its key personnel were occupied in Darfur
(LeBaron 2008). On some mediation les, the lead Qatari mediators rotate
every six months, as further evidence of eorts to deepen capacity given the
concomitant need for multiple senior and experienced Qatari mediators to be
capable of engaging in a wide range of conict zones.
Finally, one emergent theme from this study is that Qatar, in its recent
mediation or facilitation eorts, has supported agreements that do not
include some of the major conict parties. This charge is observed most
clearly in the case of Chad and the non-signatory party of the FACT rebel
group. A parallel to this type of criticism could also be made in the case of the
U.S.-Taliban agreement in that it excluded the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
led by former President Ashraf Ghani. The Libyan political mediation was
more inclusive by contrast, with key actors travelling to Doha. However, due
to General Haftar’s unclear role in the 2022 agreement, concerns have been
raised about the comprehensiveness and inclusivity of the Qatari facilitation
and mediation that laid the groundwork for the proposal’s acceptance by
various conict parties.
7. Conclusion
Qatar’s engagement in high-level conict mediation after the 2017–2021 Gulf
Crisis marked a signicant re-entry into the mediation eld of a distinctive
third-party actor. Analysis of Qatari third-party engagement in the early 2020s
revealed several continuities and discontinuities in the state’s practice of
international mediation in comparison with its earlier phase of mediation
activity. The case studies of Afghanistan, Chad, and Libya provided evidence
in support of Qatar regaining its reputation as a skilled third-party mediator
capable of facilitating challenging negotiations and restoring its reputation
for neutrality between conict parties, particularly concerning the Emir’s
mediation in Libya.
The Qatari approach has departed from elements of its earlier practices by
delinking mediation support to large nancial incentives and distributing
mediator roles across several ocials in government, which are likely to be
associated with more successful and durable future mediation outcomes.
Two elements of its current approach that warrant further investigation to
identify potential negative eects on the success of mediation consist of (1)
the theme of supporting agreements that do not include major conict
parties, as observed in the Chadian process, and (2) the principle of oering
third-party support only when the negotiating parties request it without
inducement, as seen in the Afghan and Chadian cases, which verges on risk
aversion to adopting more active mediator roles.
MEDITERRANEAN POLITICS 19
Over the coming period, the mediation politics of the Gulf region will
continue to be a fruitful and rich eld of inquiry for analysing the relationships
between patterns of international relations and the determinants of how
states develop mediation styles. The Gulf Crisis appears to have come full
circle with reports that Egypt requested Qatar’s support in September 2022
concerning imprisoned Muslim Brotherhood leaders. This suggests that
Qatar, which facilitates humanitarian dialogue with Islamist groups in the
region, may play an active role in emerging global norms of inclusiveness in
peace processes.
Notes
1. Interview. Former member of the Taliban Political Oce. March 2022.
2. Interview. Technical sta, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan’s negotiating team.
November 2021.
Disclosure statement
No potential conict of interest was reported by the author(s).
ORCID
Sansom Milton http://orcid.org/0000-0002-8126-1231
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