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Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
2000.
Vol. 78, No.
1,81-91
Copyrighl 2000 by the American Psychological Association, Inc.
0022-3514/O0/$5.O0 DOI: 10.1037//0022-3514.78.1.81
Error Management Theory:
A New Perspective on Biases in Cross-Sex Mind Reading
Martie G. Haselton and David M. Buss
University of Texas at Austin
A new theory of cognitive biases, called error management theory (EMT), proposes that psychological
mechanisms are designed to be predictably biased when the costs of false-positive and false-negative
errors were asymmetrical over evolutionary history. This theory explains known phenomena such as
men's overperception of women's sexual intent, and it predicts new biases in social inference such as
women's underestimation of men's commitment. In Study \ (N = 217), the authors documented the
commitment underperception effect predicted by EMT. In Study 2 (N = 289), the authors replicated the
commitment bias and documented a condition in which men's sexual overperception bias is corrected.
Discussion contrasts EMT with the heuristics and biases approach and suggests additional testable
hypotheses based on EMT.
Several independent traditions of research have documented
systematic errors in human judgment and decision making. The
most famous of these was established by Tversky and Kahneman,
1974) and is influential in cognitive and social psychology as well
as in business and economics (Lopes, 1991). Social cognition
researchers in this tradition have documented cognitive errors such
as base-rate neglect, confirmation bias, and illusory correlation
(Nisbett & Ross, 1980). Typically the goal in these studies was to
identify biased heuristics—"rules of thumb" or "shortcuts"—that
are the hypothesized source of errors (Tversky & Kahneman,
1974).
A second line of research concerns a particular domain of
judgment: inferences about the thoughts and intentions of mem-
bers of the opposite sex. A potentially harmful error is that men
appear to over-infer sexual intent in women in response to cues
such as a smile or friendliness (see, e.g., Abbey, 1982, 1991).
These errors have typically been attributed to sex-role socialization
rather than to the operation of simplifying heuristics.
These two lines of research are related in that they concern
judgment under uncertainty. Judging the likelihood of probabilistic
events, such as in tasks used in heuristics and biases research,
requires judgment under uncertainty. Similarly, inferences about
the sexual intentions of others, which are not directly observable,
are based on probabilistic cues and hence also uncertain.
Martie G. Haselton and David M. Buss, Department of Psychology,
University of Texas at Austin.
We are greatly indebted to W. Todd DeKay, whose initial insights led
to the formulation of error management theory. For discussions and com-
mentary on the ideas contained in this article we thank April Bleske, Ryan
Brown, Randy Diehl, and Lee Kirkpatrick. We thank Amy Isaia, Lisa
Moliski, Jennifer Semmelroth, Todd Shackelford, and Lars Strother for
help collecting and preparing portions of the data for analysis. We thank
Pat Randall and Tor Neilands for helpful suggestions on statistical analysis
and presentation.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Martie G.
Haselton, Department of Psychology, University of Texas, Mezes Hall
330,
Austin, Texas 78712. Electronic mail may be sent to haselton@
psy.uiexas.edu.
This article describes two hypotheses about cross-sex mind-
reading biases, one that explains men's overperception of women's
sexual intent and one that predicts a new error. These hypotheses
are derived from a theory of errors that challenges the position that
errors reflect shortcomings or limitations of psychological design
(see,
e.g., Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982; Nisbett & Ross,
1980) or susceptibility to erroneous social messages caused by
socialization. This new theory proposes that cognitive errors result
from adaptive biases that exist in the present because they led to
survival and reproductive advantages for humans in the past.
Error Management Theory
When judgments are made under uncertainty, two general types
of errors are possible—false positives (Type I errors) and false
negatives (Type II errors). A decision maker cannot simulta-
neously minimize both errors because decreasing the likelihood of
one error necessarily increases the likelihood of the other (Green &
Swets, 1966).
The costs of these two types of errors are rarely symmetrical. In
scientific hypothesis testing, Type I errors are usually considered
more costly than Type II errors. Scientists, therefore, typically bias
their decision-making systems (e.g., inferential statistics) toward
making Type II errors. Errors are also asymmetrical in warning
devices like fire alarms, which are biased in the opposite direction.
Missed detections (Type II errors) are more costly; therefore, the
bias is toward making false alarms (Type I errors). Whenever the
costs of errors are asymmetrical, humanly engineered systems
should be built to be biased toward making less costly errors
(Green & Swets, 1966). This bias might increase overall error
rates,
but it minimizes overall cost.
According to error management theory (EMT; Haselton, Buss,
& DeKay, 1998), decision-making adaptations have evolved
through natural or sexual selection to commit predictable errors.
Whenever there exists a recurrent cost asymmetry between two
types of errors over the period of time in which selection fashions
adaptations, they should be biased toward committing errors that
are less costly. Because it is exceedingly unlikely that the two
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