Ideal Versus Ought Predilections for Approach and Avoidance: Distinct Self-Regulatory Systems

Abstract

Two studies using different paradigms activated either ideal self-guides (a person's hopes or wishes) or ought self-guides (a person's sense of duty and responsibility) and measured Ss' concern with different forms of self-regulation: approaching matches to desired end states or mismatches to undesired end states and avoiding mismatches to desired end states or matches to undesired end states. A 3rd study asked ideal versus ought discrepant Ss to select among alternative strategies for friendship. The results suggest that a concern with approach is greater for ideal than ought self-regulation, whereas a concern with avoidance is greater for ought than ideal self-regulation.

Full text

Journal
of
Personality
and
Social Psychology
1994.
Vol.
66. No.
2,276-286Copyright
!
994
by the
American Psychological Association,
Inc
0022-35I4/94/$3.00
Ideal Versus Ought Predilections
for
Approach and Avoidance:
Distinct Self-Regulatory Systems
E. Tory Higgins, Christopher
J.
R.
Roney, Ellen Crowe, and Charles Hymes
Two studies using different paradigms activated either ideal self-guides
(a
person's hopes
or
wishes)
or ought self-guides
(a
person's sense
of
duty
and
responsibility)
and
measured
Ss'
concern with
different forms of self-regulation: approaching matches
to
desired
end
states
or
mismatches
to
unde-
sired
end
states
and
avoiding mismatches
to
desired
end
states
or
matches
to
undesired
end
states.
A
3rd study asked ideal versus ought discrepant Ss
to
select among alternative strategies
for
friendship.
The results suggest that
a
concern with approach
is
greater
for
ideal than ought self-regulation,
whereas
a
concern with avoidance
is
greater
for
ought than ideal self-regulation.
Psychologists have long been interested
in the
principles
of
self-regulation, especially
the
nature
of
motivated movement
relative
to
represented
end
states
(for
recent discussions,
see
Bandura, 1986; Cantor & Kihlstrom, 1987; Carver & Scheier,
1990;
Kuhl, 1984). Two basic distinctions regarding self-regu-
lation have been made
in the
literature,
one
involving
the
va-
lence
of
the
end
state that functions
as the
reference value
for
the movement (positive vs. negative)
and
one involving
the
di-
rection
of
the motivated movement (approach
vs.
avoidance).
Our studies examined whether people's predilections
for dis-
tinct forms
of
self-regulation differ
for
regulation
in
relation
to
their ideal self-guides (i.e., their hopes
and
wishes) versus their
ought self-guides
(i.e.,
their sense of duty and obligations).
In regard
to
valence,
the
self-regulatory system
can
have
ei-
ther
a
desired
end
state (i.e.,
a
positive reference value)
or an
undesired end state
(i.e.,
a
negative reference value) functioning
as
the
standard. Both positive
and
negative reference values
have been described
in the
literature
(see
Carver
&
Scheier,
1990).
Various
self theories
have
described positive
selves as
ref-
erence values in self-regulation, such as the type of person indi-
viduals would like
to be
(e.g., Cooley, 1902/1964; Higgins,
1987;
James, 1890/1948; Markus
&
Nurius,
1986;
Rogers,
1961;
Schlenker & Weigold, 1989)
or the
type
of
person they
believe they should
be
(e.g., Freud, 1923/1961; Higgins,
1987;
James, 1890/1948; Schlenker & Weigold, 1989). Self theories
have also described negative selves
as
reference values
in self-
regulation, such
as
Erikson's (1963) "evil identity," Sullivan's
(1953)
"bad me," and
Markus
and
Nurius's (1986) "feared
self."
In regard
to the
direction
of
the motivated movement,
the
literature distinguishes between approaching
a
positive
self-
state
and
avoiding
a
negative self-state. Carver
and
Scheier
E. Tory Higgins, Christopher
J. R.
Roney, Ellen Crowe,
and
Charles
Hymes, Department of Psychology, Columbia University.
This research was supported
by
Grant MH39429 from
the
National
Institute of Mental Health
to E.
Tory Higgins.
Correspondence concerning this article should
be
addressed
to E.
Tory Higgins, Department
of
Psychology, Schermerhorn Hall, Colum-
bia University, New York, New York 10027.
(1990) proposed that when
a
self-regulatory system
has a de-
sired end state as a reference value, the system reduces discrep-
ancies
and
involves attempts
to
move
the
currently perceived
actual self-state
as
close
as
possible
to the
desired reference
point. When a self-regulatory system
has an
undesired state
as a
reference
value,
the system amplifies discrepancies and involves
attempts to move the currently perceived actual self-state as
far
away
as
possible from the undesired reference
point.
Carver and
Scheier (1990) referred
to the
former (discrepancy-reducing)
system
as an
approach
system
and the
latter (discrepancy-am-
plifying) system as
an
avoidance
system.
In
this
case,
approach
and avoidance concern
the
direction
of
the movement
in
rela-
tion
to
either
a
desired
end
state
or an
undesired
end
state,
re-
spectively. Alternative ways of accomplishing these movements
are unspecified. If specific means
for
accomplishing these over-
all movements
are
considered, additional modes
of
approach
and avoidance can be identified.
In
a
discrepancy-reducing system, people
are
motivated
to
move their actual self as close
as
possible
to the
desired
end
state.
There are
two
alternative
means to
reduce the discrepancy
between
the
actual self and
a
desired
end
state: approach
self-
states that match the desired
end
state
or
avoid self-states that
mismatch
the
desired
end
state.
For
example,
a
person
who
wants
to
get
a
good grade
on a
quiz
(a
desired
end
state) could
either study hard
at the
library
the day
before
the
quiz
(ap-
proaching
a
match
to the
desired
end
state)
or
turn down
an
invitation
to go out
drinking with friends
the
night before
the
quiz (avoiding
a
mismatch to the desired end state).
In
a
discrepancy-amplifying system, people are motivated
to
move their actual self as
far
away
as possible
from the undesired
end
state.
There
are,
again,
two
alternative means to amplify the
discrepancy between the actual self and an undesired end state:
approach self-states that mismatch
the
undesired
end
state
or
avoid self-states that match
the
undesired end state. For exam-
ple,
a
person
who
dislikes interpersonal conflict
(an
undesired
end state) could either arrange
a
meeting with his
or her
room-
mates
to
work
out a
schedule
for
cleaning their apartment (ap-
proaching
a
mismatch
to the
undesired
end
state)
or
leave
the
apartment when
the
roommates start
to
argue (avoiding
a
match
to
the undesired end state).
Thus,
by considering the alternative means
for
reducing dis-
276
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