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Journal
of
Comparative Psychology
1994,
Vol. 108,
No. 4,
307-317
Copyright
1994
by the
American
Psychological
Association,
Inc.
0735-7036/94/S3.00
Production
and
Comprehension
of
Referential Pointing
by
Orangutans
(Pongo
pygmaeus)
Josep Call
and
Michael Tomasello
We
report
3
studies
of the
referential pointing
of 2
orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus). Chantek
was
raised
in an
enculturated environment; Puti, raised
in a
nursery,
had a
more typical
captive life.
In
Experiment
1,
flexibility
of
pointing behavior
was
investigated
by
requiring
subjects
to
point
in
novel circumstances (for
an
out-of-sight tool,
not
food).
In
Experiment
2,
we
investigated
the
orangutans' comprehension
of the
significance
of a
human point
in
helping
them
to
locate food.
In
Experiment
3, we
investigated whether these pointing subjects
comprehended that
a
human recipient must
be
looking
for the
point
to
achieve
its
attention-
directing
goal.
In all
experiments
the
enculturated orangutan showed better understanding
of
pointing than
the
captive orangutan. This finding
is
consistent
with recent studies that have
found
differences
in the
cognitive
and
social-cognitive
abilities
of
apes
that
have
had
different
types
of
experience with humans.
A
central question
in the
study
of
primate communication
is how the
different
primate
species
understand their com-
municative signals. Almost
all of the
research
to
date
has
been concerned with
the
vocal
signals
of a few
monkey
species.
For
example,
in
order
to
determine
how
monkeys
(especially
vervets
and
rhesus) comprehend their vocal sig-
nals, researchers have asked such questions
as: Do
they
produce their vocal signals rigidly,
in a
single communica-
tive
context,
or
more
flexibly—including
deceptively
(e.g.,
Byrne
&
Whiten, 1988,
1990)?
Do
they comprehend accu-
rately
the
vocal
signals
of
other members
of the
group
without
specific perceptual support
in the
immediate con-
text
(e.g.,
Gouzoules, Gouzoules,
&
Marler, 1984;
Seyfarth,
Cheney,
&
Marler,
1980)?
and Do
they produce vocal
signals
when
and
only when there
is an
appropriate audi-
ence
(e.g.,
Cheney
&
Seyfarth,
1985)?
Researchers have
used these questions
as
diagnostics
in
helping
to
determine
whether
particular
vocal
signals
are
simple conditioned
re-
sponses
and
involuntary expressions
of
emotion
or
whether,
on
the
other hand, they
are
referential
signals
in
which
the
signaller attempts
to
direct
a
conspecific's attention
to
some
entity
in the
environment (see Cheney
&
Seyfarth, 1990,
for
a
review).
Josep Call
and
Michael Tomasello, Department
of
Psychology
and
Yerkes Regional Primate Research Center, Emory University.
This investigation
was
supported
in
part
by
Grant
RR-00165
from
the
National Center
for
Research Resources
to the
Yerkes
Regional Primate Research Center.
The
Yerkes Center
is
fully
accredited
by the
American
Association
of
Laboratory Animal
Care.
We
gratefully
acknowledge
the
support
of
Josep
Call
by
Fundacio
"La
Caixa"
(Barcelona, Spain).
We
thank Lark Varley
for her
assistance during
the
study.
Lyn
Miles, Daniel Povinelli,
and
Anne Russon were reviewers
who
provided helpful comments
on an
earlier version
of the
article.
Correspondence concerning this article should
be
addressed
to
Michael Tomasello, Department
of
Psychology, Emory Univer-
sity,
Atlanta, Georgia
30322.
The
gestural communication
of
nonhuman primates
has
not
received this same research attention.
This
is
particu-
larly
unfortunate
in the
case
of the
great apes,
for
whom
gestural communication
is an
important part
of
their
close-
range
social
interaction with conspecifics
(e.g.,
Bard, 1992;
Goodall, 1986; McGrew
&
Tutin, 1978;
van
Hooff,
1973;
van
Lawick-Goodall,
1968).
One
gesture
that
is
very inter-
esting
in
this regard
is
referential pointing. Pointing
to
more
distal entities
in the
environment
in
order
to
draw
the
attention
of
conspecifics
to
them
is a
communicative gesture
of
central importance
in the
social life
of
humans, especially
in
the
socialization
of
offspring early
in
life
(Butterworth,
1991;
Hoffmeister
&
Moores,
1973).
Although distal point-
ing of
this type
has not
been observed
in
apes
in
their natural
habitats (Goodall, 1986; Menzel,
1973),1
many apes
that
have
had
extensive contact with humans
do
learn
to use
referential
pointing
to
direct
the
attention
of
humans
to
distal entities
and
locations. This
has
been well-documented
for
all
four
great
ape
species
(chimpanzees, Fouts, Hirsch,
&
Fouts, 1982; Savage-Rumbaugh, 1986; bonobos, Savage-
Rumbaugh,
McDonald, Sevcik, Hopkins,
&
Rubert, 1986;
gorillas, Patterson, 1978; orangutans, Miles,
1990).
In
most
cases
the ape was
first
trained
in
some kind
of
communi-
1
The
most closely related behaviors that apes engage
in are
such
actions
as
these: Chimpanzees extend their arms toward conspe-
cifics when approaching them
affiliatively
(Goodall,
1986)
or
when
vocalizing toward them
in an
effort
to
recruit
assistance
in
bouts
of
aggression
(de
Waal
& van
Hoof,
1981);
chimpanzees
place their hand, sometimes with
an
extended index finger,
on
parts
of
their
own
bodies when soliciting grooming
from
others
(Goodall, 1986;
Tomasello,
George,
Kruger,
Farrar,
&
Evans,
1985);
and
both chimpanzees
and
orangutans have been observed
to beg for
food
from
conspecifics
by
holding their hands under
the
mouth
of
conspecifics
that
are in the act of
eating (Goodall, 1986;
Bard,
1992).
None
of
these observations constitutes referential
pointing
if
what
is
meant
by
this term
is the
attempt
to
draw
the
attention
of
conspecifics
to
relatively distal entities
by
means
of an
extended
arm, hand,
or
finger.
307
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