ArticlePublisher preview available

Stimulus Recognition and the Mere Exposure Effect

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology

October 1992
63(4):545-552

DOI:10.1037/0022-3514.63.4.545

Authors:

Gettysburg College

A meta-analysis of research on Zajonc's (1968) mere exposure effect indicated that stimuli perceived without awareness produce substantially larger exposure effects than do stimuli that are consciously perceived (Bornstein, 1989a). However, this finding has not been tested directly in the laboratory. Two experiments were conducted comparing the magnitude of the exposure effect produced by 5-ms (i.e., subliminal) stimuli and stimuli presented for longer durations (i.e., 500 ms). In both experiments, 5-ms stimuli produced significantly larger mere exposure effects than did 500-ms stimuli. These results were obtained for polygon (Experiment 1), Welsh figure (Experiment 2), and photograph stimuli (Experiments 1 and 2). Implications of these findings for theoretical models of the mere exposure effect are discussed.

A preview of this full-text is provided by American Psychological Association.

Learn more

Content available from Journal of Personality and Social Psychology

This content is subject to copyright. Terms and conditions apply.

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology

1992,

0022-3514/92/S3.00

Stimulus Recognition and the Mere Exposure Effect

Robert

Bornstein and Paul R. DAgostino

Gettysburg College

A meta-analysis of research on Zajonc's (1968) mere exposure effect indicated that stimuli per-

ceived without awareness produce substantially larger exposure effects than do stimuli that are

consciously perceived (Bornstein,

1989a).

However, this

finding

has not been tested directly in the

laboratory. Two experiments were conducted comparing the magnitude of the exposure effect

produced by S-ms

(i.e.,

subliminal) stimuli and stimuli presented for longer durations

(i.e.,

500 ms).

In both experiments, 5-ms stimuli produced significantly larger mere exposure effects than did

500-ms

stimuli.

These results were obtained for polygon (Experiment

1),

Welsh

figure

(Experiment

2),

and photograph stimuli (Experiments

and 2). Implications of these findings for theoretical

models of the mere exposure effect are discussed.

Since the publication of Zajonc's

(1968)

monograph describ-

ing the

mere exposure effect

(i.e.,

the observation that repeated,

unreinforced exposure is sufficient to enhance attitude toward

a stimulus), there have been more than 200 published experi-

ments investigating the exposure-affect relationship (Born-

stein, 1989a). The exposure effect has proven to be a robust,

reliable phenomenon, yielding strong results for a variety of

stimuli

(e.g.,

polygons, drawings, photographs, nonsense words,

and idiographs) and a variety of rating procedures

(e.g.,

liking

ratings, pleasantness ratings, and forced-choice preference

judgments). Furthermore, researchers have used paradigms

and procedures from exposure effects research to investigate a

wide variety of psychological phenomena, including advertis-

ing effects (Sawyer, 1981), social perceptions and behaviors

(Saegert, Swap, & Zajonc, 1973), stereotypes and prejudice

(Ball

Cantor, 1974), food preferences (Pliner, 1982), environ-

mental preferences (Herzog, Kaplan, & Kaplan, 1976), aes-

thetic

judgments

(Berlyne,

1974),

verbal learning (Zajonc, Mar-

kus,

& Wilson, 1974), implicit memory (Gordon & Holyoak,

1983),

and attitude formation (Grush, 1976).

A number of experiments have demonstrated that typical

mere exposure effects can be obtained by stimuli that are nei-

ther recalled nor recognized by subjects (Bonanno

Stillings,

1986;

Bornstein, Leone, & Galley, 1987; Kunst-Wilson & Za-

jonc,

1980; Mandler, Nakamura, & Van Zandt,

1987;

Seamon,

Brody, & KaufT, 1983a,

1983b;

Seamon, Marsh,

Brody,

1984).

These findings suggest that awareness of stimulus content is

not required for the production of mere exposure effects. Thus,

Portions of this article were presented at the 98th Annual Conven-

tion of the American Psychological Association, Boston, August 13,

1990.

This research

was

supported by an Institutional Self-Renewal grant

from Gettysburg College to Robert

Bornstein and Paul R. DAgos-

tino.

thank Larry

Jacoby,

Richard Moreland, and several anonymous

reviewers for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this article.

Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to

Rob-

ert

Bornstein, Department of Psychology, Gettysburg

College,

Get-

tysburg, Pennsylvania 17325.

although it

clear that some type of learning process underlies

the exposure effect (Gordon

Horyoak,

1983;

Harrison, 1977),

this learning process apparently can take place entirely outside

of conscious awareness, involving implicit rather than explicit

knowledge about a stimulus.

Not only do stimuli perceived without awareness produce

robust exposure effects, but a meta-analysis of research on the

exposure effect indicated that mere exposure effects produced

by stimuli that are not recognized at better-than-chance accu-

racy are substantially larger than mere exposure effects pro-

duced by clearly recognized stimuli. Bornstein (1989a) used

meta-analytic techniques to compare the magnitude of attitude

enhancement in mere exposure studies involving subliminal

stimuli and studies using stimuli presented for longer exposure

durations. A mean effect size

of .528 was found for subliminal

stimuli, whereas the mean effect size for stimuli presented for

longer exposure durations was .140. These data indicate that

subliminal mere exposure effects are considerably stronger

than typical mere exposure effects and suggest that awareness

of stimulus content may somehow inhibit the exposure effect.

subsequent meta-analysis of mere exposure effects research fur-

ther demonstrated that across all mere exposure experiments

there is an inverse relationship between stimulus recognition

accuracy and the magnitude of the exposure effect (Bornstein,

1989b).

Bornstein's (1989a, 1989b) meta-analytic findings regarding

the inverse relationship of stimulus recognition accuracy to the

magnitude of the mere exposure effect

have

not been replicated

in the laboratory. Further examination of this issue

important

for

two

reasons.

First, this

finding

has implications for theoreti-

cal models of the exposure effect. Extant models of the expo-

sure effect (i.e., the two-factor, opponent-process, and attitude

formation models) cannot easily accommodate this pattern of

results (see Harrison, 1977; Stang, 1974b). Thus, if laboratory

studies confirm that stimuli perceived without awareness pro-

duce significantly stronger mere exposure effects than do stim-

uli that are clearly recognized, extant models of the exposure

effect may need to be revised or replaced.

Second, this issue

has

important implications for

the

study

545

This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.

This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.

On the Relationship Between Recognition Judgments and Truth Judgments: Memory States Moderate the Recognition-Based Truth Effect

Article

Full-text available

Feb 2025

Repeatedly seen or heard statements are typically judged to be more likely true than statements not encountered before, a phenomenon referred to as truth effect. Similarly, statements judged to be old typically receive higher truth judgments than statements judged to be new. However, it is unclear whether and how this recognition-based truth effect depends on the latent memory states underlying observed recognition judgments. In order to investigate this question, we used a model-based approach to compare truth judgments as a function of recognition judgments (“old” vs. “new”) and their underlying memory states (state of memory certainty vs. state of uncertainty). In three experiments, we observed a recognition-based truth effect and found this effect to be larger in the state of memory certainty than in the state of uncertainty. This result also replicated for subjective instead of modeled memory states. Moreover, we found effects of recognition judgments on judged truth to be stronger than effects of factual repetition in all three experiments. Taken together, our research highlights the role of episodic memory processes in the truth effect and provides a methodological tool that takes underlying memory states into account.

The baby duck syndrome as cognitive bias in user-interface interaction

Article

Full-text available

Dec 2024
Cognit Process

As technological interfaces are relatively new cultural tools, regular interaction can lead to new psychological phenomena, like the baby duck syndrome, where users favor old interfaces over updates. This syndrome is seen as a cognitive bias in human–computer interaction. Two studies were conducted: Study 1 on an Airbnb app (old vs. new versions), and Study 2 on a self-developed website (blue vs. purple design). Subjects completed sequential five usability tasks in two blocks with the resting between. Experimental groups engaged with different interface versions, while control groups used the same one. After completing tasks, subjects filled questionnaires about interface interaction. Study 1 showed significantly higher preference for the old Airbnb version, though scores varied by group. Study 2 revealed a trend of reduced scores in experimental groups on second assessment, not seen in controls. Version-based rating differences were insignificant. Overall, Studies 1 and 2 indicated baby duck syndrome is challenging to study in labs, suggesting it emerges when users are genuinely engaged with the interface. This article has both theoretical and experimental significance for studying the emergence of psychological phenomena in human-digital interaction. As a practical application, the obtained results can be useful for correct development updates for interfaces.

THE HARDER IT IS TO FIND, THE LESS WE LIKE IT; AT LEAST, WE SAY SO

Article

Full-text available

Apr 2025

In common buying frameworks of interest for consumer behavior, top-down and bottom-up attentional mechanisms interact, with the prevailing one changing frequently. The current study investigated the effects of increased effort to locate a stimulus on the self-reported valence and intensity associated with the respective stimulus. Two types of stimuli, of positive and negative valences, were evaluated. Both were placed in two visual fields with distractors of the same type; while the distractors were the same, their placement in one field facilitated the target location while in the other made it more difficult. Significant differences were found for the same stimulus in the two visual fields it was presented in concerning the valence, and more moderate regarding the intensity. Within each of the four resulting visual fields (positive stimulus easy to find, positive stimulus difficult to find, negative stimulus easy to find, and negative stimulus difficult to find, respectively), significant negative correlations were found between the time to first fixation (TFF) on target and the self-reported emotion valence; a significant positive correlation between TFF on target and self-reported intensity was found only for the negative stimulus presented in the difficult to find placement.

THE HARDER IT IS TO FIND, THE LESS WE LIKE IT; AT LEAST, WE SAY SO

Article

Full-text available

Apr 2025

In common buying frameworks of interest for consumer behavior, top-down and bottom-up attentional mechanisms interact, with the prevailing one changing frequently. The current study investigated the effects of increased effort to locate a stimulus on the self-reported valence and intensity associated with the respective stimulus. Two types of stimuli, of positive and negative valences, were evaluated. Both were placed in two visual fields with distractors of the same type; while the distractors were the same, their placement in one field facilitated the target location while in the other made it more difficult. Significant differences were found for the same stimulus in the two visual fields it was presented in concerning the valence, and more moderate regarding the intensity. Within each of the four resulting visual fields (positive stimulus easy to find, positive stimulus difficult to find, negative stimulus easy to find, and negative stimulus difficult to find, respectively), significant negative correlations were found between the time to first fixation (TFF) on target and the self-reported emotion valence; a significant positive correlation between TFF on target and self-reported Trifu Danut, Stan (Bizon) Claudia Cristina https://iaeme.com/Home/journal/IJMHRM 37 editor@iaeme.com intensity was found only for the negative stimulus presented in the difficult to find placement.

Article

Apr 2025
J Int Financ Market Inst Money

Differences in Recognition and Preference among Four- and Five-Year-Olds on a Tactile Learning and Visual Test

Article

Full-text available

Dec 1999
PERCEPT MOTOR SKILL

Izumi Uehara

Infants' preferential looking at novel objects and adults' preference for the familiar indicate that preference may be influenced by whether the objects have been experienced previously. Infants and adults may have opposite preferential tendencies; however, infants' preference for a familiar object which they have experienced orally casts doubt on this as a developmental process. To examine both the influences of experienced modalities and age on the relationship between preference and memory, tactile-visual preference and memory tests were employed in 4- and 5-yr.-olds. The results indicated the dissociation of preference by recognition only in 4-yr.-olds: those who recognized the objects preferred the familiar and the 4-yr.-olds who could not recognize them preferred the novel. The 5-yr.-olds tended to prefer the familiar objects regardless of recognition. The results may suggest an age effect on the relationship between preference and recognition.

Cultural Variation in Attitudes Toward Social Chatbots

Article

Full-text available

Feb 2025
J CROSS CULT PSYCHOL

Across two studies (Total N = 1,659), we found evidence for cultural differences in attitudes toward socially bonding with conversational AI. In Study 1 ( N = 675), university students with an East Asian cultural background expected to enjoy a hypothetical conversation with a chatbot (vs. human) more than students with European background. Moreover, they were less uncomfortable and more approving of a hypothetical situation where someone else socially connected with a chatbot (vs. human) than the students with a European background. In Study 2 (preregistered; N = 984), we found similar evidence for cultural differences comparing samples of Chinese and Japanese adults currently living in East Asia to adults currently living in the United States. Critically, these cultural differences were explained by East Asian participants increased propensity to anthropomorphize technology. Overall, our findings suggest there is cultural variability in attitudes toward chatbots and that these differences are mediated by differences in anthropomorphism.

Aesthetic Influence on Consumer Behavior

Chapter

Feb 2025

Carmela Donato

This chapter defines the concept of aesthetics and its influence on consumer behavior, emphasizing its impact on visual appeal and the evaluation of visual stimuli. It discusses aesthetic psychology and the dimensions of aesthetic experience, highlighting the roles of psychographic and collative variables in appreciating visual stimuli. The chapter delves into the fluency process as a key mechanism that explains the relationships between visual dimensions and aesthetic appreciation. Additionally, it examines how aesthetic dimensions and fluency affect consumer perceptions across various marketing domains, including eco-labels, showcasing their importance in shaping consumer attitudes and decision-making processes.

Natural color composition induces oddball P3 asymmetry associated with processing fluency

Article

Full-text available

Feb 2025

Color composition is a crucial factor in the aesthetic evaluation of paintings. Several studies have reported a prototype preference for art paintings, where altering the original painting results in a poorer aesthetic evaluation. If the original painting has familiar features, the phenomenon of original preference may be due to the fluency of processing color composition in paintings. However, there are few investigations into the neurocognitive mechanisms underlying the preference for original paintings. This study aimed to clarify whether the original preference is due to the fluency of processing color composition using P3 asymmetry to reflect perceptual fluency for stimuli. Oddball tasks with a combination of the original and 180°, or 90° and 270° as control, were performed by swapping the repetitive and deviant stimuli for each task. The results revealed that P3 asymmetry was found only with a combination of 0° and 180°, indicating that the color composition of original paintings can be fluently processed compared with other color compositions in hue-rotated paintings. This explanation may lead to the elucidation of universal color preferences or physiological mechanisms that favor certain color compositions.

The uncanny valley phenomenon can be explained by categorization failure rather than categorization difficulty

Article

Jan 2025
VIS COGN

Affective discrimination of stimuli that are not recognized: II. Effect of delay between study and test

Article

Full-text available

May 1983
Bull Psychonomic Soc

Results of a study of 64 right-handed undergraduates indicate that repeated exposure to briefly presented stimuli increased positive affect through familiarity without enhancing recognition of the stimuli. Following exposure, Ss selected previously shown target stimuli on the basis of affect in the absence of stimulus recognition. Interpreted in terms of the manner in which information can be accessed in long-term storage, the present study extends earlier research by showing that the ability to select target stimuli by affect can occur undiminished over a delay of 1 wk between study and test. Repeated processing during study can produce a form of perceptual learning, called perceptual fluency, that can serve as the basis for stimulus discrimination in the absence of recognition at the time of test. The present results of familiar but unrecognized stimuli are analogous to the memory phenomenon of déjà vu. (14 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)

Cognitive Responses in Persuasion

Article

Jan 1981

A.G. Sawyer

Perception without Awareness: Cognitive, Clinical and Social Perspectives

Book

Jan 1992

This landmark volume brings together the work of the world's leading researchers in subliminal perception. This compilation marks a fundamental shift in the current study of subliminal effects: No longer in question is the notion that perception without awareness occurs. Now, the emphasis is on elucidating the parameters of subliminal effects and understanding the conditions under which stimuli perceived without awareness significantly influence affect, cognition, and behavior. "Perception Without Awareness" firmly establishes subliminal perception within the mainstream of psychological science. Well represented here are the two main research branches that have emerged: One directly investigates the nature of subliminal effects; the other uses subliminal techniques as tools for investigating psychological phenomena such as hypnosis, dreaming, repression, social judgment and inference, psychopathology, and symptom formation. Timely and thought-provoking, "Perception Without Awareness" is sure to be of enormous interest to all psychoanalytic clinicians and scholars, as well as cognitive, clinical, and social psychologists whose work touches upon issues relating to psychopathology, perception, cognition, and memory. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)

Comparing Direct (Explicit) and Indirect (Implicit) Measures to Study Unconscious Memory

Article

Mar 1991

Comparisons of the relative sensitivity of direct and indirect tasks can provide definitive evidence for unconscious memory when the direct and indirect tasks are matched on all characteristics except instructions. To demonstrate unconscious memory in normal adults, subjects first viewed pairs of words and named one cued word in each pair. During the subsequent assessment of memory, new words and either previously cued words (Experiment 1) or previously uncued words (Experiments 2A and 2B) were presented against a background mask. The subjects judged whether a word was old or new (direct task) or whether the contrast between a word and the mask was high or low (indirect task). For cued words, the direct task was more sensitive than the indirect task. However, for uncued words, the indirect task was initially more sensitive than the direct task, even though the direct task exhibited hypermnesia so that it became more sensitive than the indirect task across trial blocks. The greater initial sensitivity of the indirect task implicates unconscious processes underlying memory for the uncued words. These results indicate that unconscious processes in normal adults can be revealed through comparisons of comparable direct and indirect measures.

Novelty, complexity, and interestingness

Chapter

Jan 1974

D E Berlyne

Unconscious Influences of Memory for a Prior Event

Article

Sep 1987
Pers Soc Psychol Bull

We interpret the difference between aware and unaware forms of memory in terms of Polanyi's distinction between tool and object. Aware memory, such as recognition and recall, occurs when memory serves as an object of attention. Unaware memory occurs when memory serves as a tool to accomplish a present task. Both memory-as-tool and memory-as-object can rely on memory for specific prior experiences. Memory used as a tool is a pervasive form of unconscious influence. We present experiments in which memory used as a tool enhances perception, lowers the subjective experience of background noise, increases the fame of nonfamous names, and lowers estimates of the difficulty of anagrams. To escape the pervasive effects of unconscious memory, one must consciously remember the past experience, understand its influence in the present task, and possess a good theory to serve as an alternative basis for behavior. These three criteria may seldom be met.

Exposure effects and associative learning*1

Article

May 1974

The contributions of initial stimulus affect and of associative learning to the effects of repeated stimulus exposures were examined in two experiments. Stimuli that were initially positive and stimuli that were initially negative were presented for different number of times, and subjects rated these stimuli afterward on a number of affective dimensions. In all cases, except when negative affect was associatively paired with every stimulus exposure, affective responses became increasingly more positive with increasing exposures. The results were taken to indicate that the exposure effect can overcome an initially negative stimulus affect when the conditions of the mere exposure hypothesis are satisfied. Initial stimulus affect and associative learning of affect were shown to be independent factors, the first influencing the intercept of the exposure function, the second its slope.

Thinking lightly about others: Automatic compo-nents of the social inference process

Article

Jan 1989

D. T. Gilbert

Exposure and Affect: Overview and Meta-Analysis of Research, 1968-1987

Article

Sep 1989

Robert F. Bornstein

A review and meta-analysis of methodological and subject variables influencing the exposure-affect relationship was performed on studies of the mere exposure effect published in the 20 years following Zajonc's (1968) seminal monograph. Stimulus type, stimulus complexity, presentation sequence, exposure duration, stimulus recognition, age of subject, delay between exposure and ratings, and maximum number of stimulus presentations all influence the magnitude of the exposure effect. Implications of these findings are discussed in the context of previous reviews of the literature on exposure effects and with respect to prevailing theoretical models of the exposure-affect relationship. Modifications of the 2-factor model of exposure effects that increase the heuristic value of the model are described. A possible evolutionary basis of the exposure effect is discussed.

Psychoanalysis: Freud's cognitive psychology.

Book

Jan 1985

Matthew H. Erdelyi

Stimulus Recognition and the Mere Exposure Effect

Abstract

Recommended publications

Stimulus Recognition and the Mere Exposure Effect

Exposure and Affect: Overview and Meta-Analysis of Research, 1968–1987

Exposure and Affect: Overview and Meta-Analysis of Research, 1968-1987

The Attribution and Discounting of Perceptual Fluency: Preliminary Tests of a Perceptual Fluency/Att...