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The Effect of Interest on the Money Supply, Demand and Growth

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Abstract

This chapter explains why we are not only forced to grow from a microeconomic (supply side) point of view, as explained in the previous chapter, but why from a macroeconomic perspective (demand side) our monetary system makes economic growth possible. In this context we will explain why interest rates follow a downward trend in the long run and why central banks are really trend followers, not trend setters.
59
Chapter 5
The Effect ofInterest ontheMoney
Supply, Demand andGrowth
5.1 Interest Makes Growth Possible (Macroeconomic View)
On one hand, interest creates a requirement to grow, but on the other it also helps
make that growth possible. To understand this point, we need to examine the
effect that the interest rate has on the money supply and demand. Here a com-
pletely new view will be offered, contrary to conventional monetary theory. I
would even go so far as to say that—at least in the long run—it is the opposite of
what is normally taught. This misunderstanding could be an important contribut-
ing factor to the problems inherent in our monetary system being not yet broadly
recognized.
According to conventional wisdom lowering interest rates fosters economic
growth and vice versa. However, the following paragraphs will show that only in the
very rst moment lowering interest rates can foster economic growth while increas-
ing interest rates can slow it down. In the medium and long run the effect of the
interest rate on the money supply works the other way around and we see a clear
positive correlation between interest rates, ination, and GDP growth rate, when
looking at the history (Fig.5.1) of the US economy (for other economies see Lee &
Werner, 2018): the higher the interest rate, the higher ination and the GDP growth
rate. That the interest rate and the growth of the money supply are necessarily posi-
tively correlated can be understood from three perspectives, which will be dis-
cussed in the next paragraph.
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature
Switzerland AG 2023
F. Fuders, How to Full the UN Sustainability Goals,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-37768-6_5
60
Fig. 5.1 Interest rate, ination and GDP growth rate (US). Blue: market yield on 10-Year Treasury
Constant Maturity Rate; black: Consumer Price Index (% change from year ago); red: GDP growth
(% change from year ago). (Source: Own work. Data provided by Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, US Bureau of Economic Analysis and OECD (2023). Retrieved from
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (https://fred.stlouisfed.org))
5.2 Explanation oftheRelationship Between Interest, GDP
Growth andInation
5.2.1 First Perspective: Interest Makes Deposits Grow
As outlined above, interest makes deposits grow. The higher the interest rate, the
faster deposits grow and therefore the higher will be the total money supply (com-
posed of cash plus deposits). This effect might be called “interest money creation
(Fuders, 2011; Fuders etal., 2013). The role of the interest rate in the exponential
growth of the money supply can be seen in the US (Fig. 4.2) as well as virtually any
other country. A higher money supply means more monetary units circulating and,
as more money is spent, aggregate demand grows. In other words, the interest rate
not only pushes producers to maintain or increase prots, but it also makes eco-
nomic growth possible by increasing the money supply and aggregate demand.
Here, it is crucial to understand that (i) as long as bank accounts earn interest the
money supply will grow and (ii) once interest has led to the creating of monetary
units, those units cannot be destroyed unless there is a ‘reset’ of the whole nancial
system. Money supply thus always grows when there is a positive interest rate.
The higher the interest rate, the faster the money supply will grow. And as explained
above interest makes deposits grow exponentially. This is true even for a very low
interest rate since any positive interest rate will eventually lead to the amount of the
original deposit doubling. And everything that experiences periodic doubling grows
5 The Effect ofInterest ontheMoney Supply, Demand andGrowth
61
exponentially. The difference between higher and lower interest rates is simply that
the at part of the exponential growth curve is longer for lower interest rates. This
also means that, from the moment the interest rate falls, the money supply curve
ceteris paribus will show a disruption but will eventually start to again grow expo-
nentially from that point on (dashed line in Fig. 5.2). Only a zero-interest-
environment would create a stable money supply over the long term, as shown on
the right-hand graph of Fig.5.2, which depicts the growth of the money supply with
positive interest rate until the interest falls to zero % (dashed line).
One might wonder why then the US money supply in Fig. 4.2 does not show such
a disruption. Even though the interest rate has fallen sharply since 2009 the money
supply has kept growing exponentially. Well, this is why I used the term ceteris
paribus (“all other things being equal”). It is necessary to emphasize the ceteris-
paribus constraint here, since of course money supply (cash plus deposits) also
grows via central bank money printing. And this is precisely what the Fed and other
central banks in the industrialized world have done since interest rates fell sharply
in the aftermath of the 2008 nancial crisis. The Fed has increased the monetary
base since 2009. Figure5.3 contrasts the US money supply M3 (which was depicted
already in Fig. 4.2) with the US monetary base M0, i.e., the money directly pro-
duced by the central bank. As we can see, since 2009, the central bank has signi-
cantly expanded the monetary base in an environment of falling interest rates, thus
compensating for the decreased interest-money-creation effect.
Already at this time the former chairman of the Fed Ben Bernanke was referred
to as “helicopter Ben”, for his policy of metaphorically letting money rain on the
economy from a helicopter. In 2020 when interest rates had once again fallen to near
zero and thus almost no money creation effect was occurring via interest, the Fed
did what it never before had done in its history: it increased the monetary base from
3.2 to 6 trillion USD in just 1year. The reason why we did not observe the disrup-
tion in money creation as depicted in Fig. 5.2which would normally be caused by
Fig. 5.2 Scheme money supply growth. Left: effect of lowering interest rates (but maintaining
>0); right: effect of lowering interest rates to 0%. (Source: On work)
5.2 Explanation oftheRelationship Between Interest, GDP Growth andInation
Because the publishing house holds the copyright, it
cannot be shown more.
93
mathematical logic of interest. This dynamic exerts a constant pressure on the econ-
omy to grow at least at the same rate. In other words, regardless of whether or not
natural resources are freely accessible goods, they will be overexploited in the long
term because of this logic of growth.The next Chap. 6 discusses the connection
between economic growth and the degradation of our natural environmentin greater
detail.
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5 The Effect ofInterest ontheMoney Supply, Demand andGrowth
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This chapter describes the latest phase of a participatory action research project initiated in 1990 by the Federal University of Santa Catarina and local farmers in Santa Rosa de Lima, Santa Catarina, Brazil. The Project involved university students and professors, extension agents, agricultural cooperatives and local and state governments. The current phase, initiated in 2008, is implementing agroecological systems that synergically restore rural landscapes, strengthen food sovereignty and improve farmer livelihoods in Brazil’s Atlantic Forest. Ecologists estimate that there is an ecological threshold at 30% forest cover in the biome below which there will be a precipitous decline in biodiversity and an associated loss of ecological functions, including many that are essential to agriculture. Forest cover is currently below this level, but there is an extinction lag, which offers a narrow window of opportunity to reforest before the system collapses. Farmers are also required by the New Forest Code (NFC) to restore ecologically critical areas. However, mandated restoration under the NFC may be inadequate to prevent ecological collapse. Furthermore, the small family farmers have so little land that if they restore enough forest to prevent system collapse, they may cross an economic threshold below which they cannot sustain their families. Given these conditions, the project is seeking to implement silvopastoral systems on open pasture with agroforestry nuclei and multifunctional riparian forests with native trees that exceed compliance with the NFC, while generating sufficient revenue from non-timber forest products to recover restoration costs and enhance farmer livelihoods. Markets fail to reward land-owners for the numerous ecosystem services provided by ecological restoration, and if left solely to farmer initiative and resources, restoration will likely be underprovided from a social and ecological perspective. We are therefore working with the state to help farmers adopt these systems in compensation for the ecosystem services they provide. We describe both the project and its theoretical justifications.
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Modern economies must "grow" because money borrowed for investment can be repaid only by expanding production and consumption to meet the burden of usurious rates of interest. The roots of this dynamic between debt and growth lay in the financial revolution of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries in Britain which established a new usurious monetary system. For the first time in history credit was made widely available, but only on condition of an exponentially increasing debt burden. To pay back debts production had to increase correspondingly, leading to the industrial revolution, economic "growth", and modernity itself. Though private creditors gained a monopoly over the creation of credit, and were disproportionately enriched, the resulting economic growth for a time was great enough to benefit most debtors as well as creditors, ensuring widespread prosperity. That is no longer the case. With today's eco-crisis we have reached the limits of growth. We no longer have the natural resources to grow fast enough to pay our debts. This is the real root of our current financial crisis. If we are to live sustainably, our system of money and credit must be transformed. We need a non-usurious monetary system appropriate to a steady-state economy, with capital broadly distributed at non-usurious rates of interest. Such a system was developed by an early nineteenth century American thinker, Edward Kellogg, and is explored here in depth. His work inspired the populist movement and remains more relevant than ever as a viable alternative to the a financial system we can no longer afford.
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This chapter analyzes the process that led to the design of Acre’s System of Incentives for Environmental Services (Sistema de Incentivos a Serviços Ambientais – SISA), the first attempt at constructing a jurisdiction-level REDD+ system in the world. We discuss the state’s move from attempting to build a state-wide Payments for Environmental Services project to the design of an institutional structure that intends to serve as an umbrella for all forest conservation initiatives in the state. We analyze the political and historical developments behind SISA’s construction, focusing on the state’s institutional structures, and the most important actors. Our findings point to the importance of the environment in the state government’s political discourse over the past decade, to Acre’s experience in implementing environmental and territorial policies, and to the closeness between government actors and the grassroots movement as important factors shaping the design of SISA.
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Studying land use change as a socio-ecological system provides a holistic framework from which to integrate social, political, historic, economic, and environmental observations regarding human-nature interactions. However, integrating the insights of multiple disciplines poses methodological challenges. This chapter focuses on the expansion of commercial forestry in south-central Chile, to the detriment of smallholder agriculture and native forest conservation, due to specific political and economic transformations since 1974, including the enactment of the Native Forest Act (NFA). This chapter provides a global overview of the economic and political drivers of land use change, as well as the environmental outcomes of such change in a historical perspective. Then, this chapter presents two methodological tools that complement the socio-ecological perspective. One tool is the use of land use modeling. The second tool is ethnography of peasant’s households living at the fringes of tree farm expansion. This chapter foregrounds the ways in which environmental change has profoundly altered lifeways and livelihoods for rural people within just one generation. Finally, this work provides a discussion of the necessary theoretical and methodological intervention, thinking with and through land use change from an explicitly socio-ecological and transdisciplinary perspective.
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Economic growth remains a prominent political goal, despite its conflicts with ecological sustainability. Are growth policies only a question of political or individual will, or do ‘growth imperatives’ make them inescapable? We structure the debate along two dimensions: (a) degree of coerciveness between free will and coercion, and (b) agents affected. With carefully derived micro level definitions of ‘social coercion’ and ‘growth imperative’, we discuss several mechanisms suspected to make growth necessary for firms, households, and nation states. We identify technological innovations as a systematic necessity to net invest, trapping firms and households in a positive feedback loop to increase efficiency. Resource-intensive technology is economically attractive because of a subtle violation of the meritocratic principle of justice. The resulting dilemma between ‘technological unemployment’ and the social necessity of high employment explains why states ‘must’ foster economic growth. Politically, we suggest to institutionally limit resource consumption and redistribute economic rents.