Foreign and Diplomatic (Dis)Engagement

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DOI: 10.4324/9781003386063-8
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Myanmar’s foreign policy has undergone striking transformations since independ-
ence was won in 1948. In both contexts of the Cold War and post–Cold War inter-
national politics, the country has uctuated between phases of positive neutrality,
self-imposed isolationism, and passive alignment toward a powerful neighbouring
power, China. Yet, as this chapter shows, there have also been remarkable elements
of continuity in the shaping of Myanmar’s postcolonial relations and engagement
with Asia and the world. Regardless of the nature of its political regime, independ-
ent Myanmar has long had to – and continues to – cope with a series of commanding
geostrategic challenges. Sandwiched between two giant powers, India and China,
the country oers a geographical gateway to, and from, continental Southeast Asia
(Thant Myint-U 2012; Steinberg 2018). It also boasts a 2,000-km-long coastline
along the Indian Ocean, through which a large part of the world’s seaborne com-
merce has long transited. Whilst this geopolitical situation has presented consider-
able opportunities for trade and development, it has also contributed to persistent
concerns among Myanmar’s elites over the potential sway neighbouring states and
global powers may seek to gain in a country known for its abundance of underex-
ploited natural resources, such as gems, hydrocarbons, and timber (Haacke 2006;
Lintner 2015). A second aspect of continuity relates to Myanmar’s postcolonial
politics, epitomised by a failed process of nation building, a protracted civil war,
and, above all, continuing military intervention (Egreteau and Jagan 2013). The
persistent dominance of the armed forces over policymaking has had a dening
impact on the changing levels of Myanmar’s engagement with the world over the
decades (Passeri 2020; Shang 2022; Paribatra 2022). Yet this ability of the armed
forces to impose their strategic and diplomatic views has increasingly been chal-
lenged by Myanmar’s civilian leaderships, and society in general, as the battles for
international diplomatic recognition that have followed the February 2021 coup
clearly suggest.
Military Rule to 2011: From Hermit to Pariah
The rst post-independence decade brought prestige and international recognition
to Myanmar. Neutrality, non-alignment in the emerging context of the Cold War,
and a proactive international solidarity among recently decolonised nations of Asia
7 Foreign and Diplomatic
(Dis)Engagement
Military Priorities, Strategic
Realities, and Contested Legitimacies
Renaud Egreteau

92 Renaud Egreteau
and Africa were the cornerstones of the country’s early foreign policy (Johnstone
1963; Liang 1990). In particular, as Myanmar’s rst prime minister, U Nu (1907–
1995) guided the country on a socialist-inspired development path and ‘middle-
way’ diplomacy (Maung Maung 1956). The following three decades, however,
plunged the country into gradual diplomatic seclusion and economic autarchy.
Not long after independence, the gap had widened between civilian politicians –
partisans of active neutralism – and the army hierarchy, who were rather willing
to strengthen state defence capacity through increased security cooperation and
weapon deals negotiated with global military powers. Increasingly sophisticated
and better-equipped ethnic and communist insurgencies had indeed found growing
sympathies across the borders in Yunnan, India, Thailand, and even East Pakistan
(Lintner 1999). This made Myanmar more vulnerable to regional strategic tensions
and Cold War bipolarisation, while shaping the military’s early threat perceptions
and views of the world.
From 1962, Myanmar gradually disengaged from the world. Still, Ne Win’s
regime did not much depart from the ocial foreign policy orientation of its pre-
decessors. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the diplomatic language used by Ne
Win and his representatives abroad – many retired army ocers were appointed
ambassadors in Myanmar’s thirty-odd embassies across the globe – continued
to be grounded on a policy of neutralism and non-alignment. However, as his
socialist-inspired revolution progressively failed to bring about massive develop-
mental change in the 1970s, Ne Win opted for a steady withdrawal of Myanmar
from regional and world politics. This strategy was deemed the most appropriate
to respond to rising domestic and external threats to the socialist revolution and its
xenophobic undercurrents. Already, foreign businesses and educational institutions
had been nationalised in the early 1960s. This led to the disruptive departure of
Indian, Chinese, and Anglo-Burmese communities of merchants, bankers, lawyers,
and civil servants. Teaching of English and foreign languages came to be restricted.
The country even exited the Non-Aligned movement in 1979. As coined by some
observers of the time, a ‘bamboo curtain’ gradually shut the ‘hermit nation’ o
from the global stage (Steinberg 1981). The military leadership pursued the cul-
tivation of only a handful of key strategic concerns: deecting immediate threats
posed by an assertive Chinese neighbour, keeping a few channels open for military
equipment acquisition (with Israel and a few East European states in particular),
and maintaining the vital postwar economic assistance provided by Japan.
State-sponsored isolationism was nonetheless construed as a exible ideologi-
cal tool by Ne Win, who himself travelled relentlessly to satisfy his personal appe-
tites for foreign hobbies and medical check-ups in Europe, while maintaining a
tight grip on the freedom of movement of ordinary Myanmar citizens. More than
two decades of chauvinistic policies under the socialist rule also led to the fusion of
foreign, security, and state policymaking into military hands, a pattern that would
not evolve after the demise of Ne Win in 1988. Likewise, these years under Ne
Win’s inward-looking regime shaped the security perceptions and views of the
world of the next generation of military leaders that would succeed the socialist
administration.

Foreign and Diplomatic (Dis)Engagement 93
The crisis of 1988 proved a watershed in Myanmar’s interactions with the out-
side world. The new junta dropped Ne Win’s insular type of collectivist social-
ism. Opting for an economic model of state-led capitalism, Myanmar under the
State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) opened up to its neighbours
and sought to liberalise its domestic market and attract foreign investments. China
and several roaring economies of Southeast Asia such as Singapore, Malaysia, and
Thailand, were prompt to secure trade and investment opportunities in the early
1990s (Maung Aung Myoe 2011; Egreteau and Li 2018). After a brief suspension
of aid following the repression of the popular revolt of 1988, Japan resumed its
development cooperation with Myanmar through lavish investments into domes-
tic infrastructures and capacity-building programs. Relations with India also
improved soon after New Delhi ditched its pro-democracy stance in 1993 (Egre-
teau 2011; Bhatia 2015). After years of negotiations, Myanmar eventually joined
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1997. Diplomatic self-
condence in the region amidst an era of shared ‘Asian Values’ had encouraged the
organisation to overlook criticism from its Western partners, increasingly uneasy
with the ASEAN’s acceptance of a military-led regime lambasted on the global
stage for its poor human rights records (Roberts 2010). New narratives on emerg-
ing strategic and commercial rivalries between India, China, and other regional or
even global powers in and around Myanmar thrived (Thant Myint-U 2012; Lintner
2015; Chanda 2021).
While Myanmar’s neighbours and regional powers proved willing to engage
with the post–Ne Win military regime, the rest of the international community cast
a very dierent eye on the country after the crackdown of the 1988 uprising and
the refusal of the SLORC to honour the results of the elections held in May 1990.
A new charismatic gure had emerged in the midst of the popular revolt, an iconic
personality that, for the following three decades, would prove a formidable chal-
lenger to military rule: Aung San Suu Kyi. Soon portrayed as a world icon of
democracy, she was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1991. She captured the
fascination of world leaders and public opinion alike and had an enormous impact
on the way the international society viewed Myanmar under the junta in the 1990s
and 2000s. From a deliberately isolationist hermit nation under General Ne Win,
post-1988 Myanmar became a pariah state.
The ostracisation that Western powers and major international organisations
imposed on Myanmar was a direct response to the ruthless repression of dissent
and the treatment by the military of Aung San Suu Kyi herself (Aung-Thwin 2001).
It was a popular foreign policy tool for European and American governments and
global institutions, which deployed a wide range of complex political and trade
sanctions against the military regime from the late 1990s (Horsey 2011; Clymer
2015). Schematically, these sanction policies aimed to cut the junta o from inter-
national trade and nancial networks in order to implicitly force it to relinquish its
authoritarian grip, engage in democratic reforms, and eventually hand over power
to a democratically elected government – ideally led by Aung San Suu Kyi.
In response, while continuing to engage its neighbours and like-minded states,
Myanmar’s military elites modelled the country’s foreign policy on a siege

94 Renaud Egreteau
mentality already well entrenched among the ocer corps (Callahan 2003). The
transfer of the national capital from Yangon to Naypyitaw in 2005, the repres-
sion of the revolt led by Buddhist monks in September 2007, and the rejection of
international assistance after the passage of Cyclone Nargis in May 2008 further
illustrated the ‘us-versus-them’ siege mindset developed by the military top brass
(Egreteau and Jagan 2013). This strategy of isolationist retreat, reimagined in the
course of the 2000s, exacerbated the national security dimension in Myanmar’s
relations to the world. This allowed the ruling elite to diuse the eects of inter-
national sanctions and opprobrium, but it could not eectively leverage the ever-
waxing inuence of China (Maung Aung Myoe 2011; Steinberg and Fan 2012).
It nevertheless helped the military leadership prepare, in a secluded Naypyitaw
immune to external interference, the long-awaited transition from military rule out-
lined in 2003 in a roadmap to a ‘disciplined-ourishing democracy’ and the new
Constitution ratied in 2008.
Thein Sein and the USDP: A ‘New Frontier’
The disbanding of the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) in March 2011
rekindled hopes for a prompt and durable reintegration of Myanmar into world
aairs and the lifting of the two-decades-long international opprobrium the coun-
try had been subjected to. Startlingly, a cohort of retired army ocers and former
members of the SPDC engaged the new Union Solidarity and Development Party
(USDP) administration into an across-the-board liberalisation. In particular, they
pledged a new phase of opening up diplomacy for the early 2010s. A global eupho-
ria emerged, not only among Yangon’s elites but also among diplomats and poten-
tial foreign investors. Puzzled and intrigued, the world rediscovered Myanmar on
the map.
The government headed by Thein Sein (2011–2016) abolished state censor-
ship; liberalised the banking, telecom, and petrol retail markets; and reached out to
remaining ethnic armed oppositions. It also allowed Aung San Suu Kyi to return
to the forefront of politics, and in doing so sparked a fundamental change in the
international community’s approach towards the country. Western governments,
starting with the United States under the Obama administration, Canada, Australia,
and the European Union, began to review – and suspend – their punitive policy of
sanctions and ostracisation (Steinberg 2015; Dosch and Sidhu 2015). Major inter-
national nancial institutions, including the Asian Development Bank, the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund, and the World Bank, re-entered Myanmar in an attempt to
reintegrate its economy into global trade and nancial circuits. In December 2013,
Myanmar took the annual rotating chair of the ASEAN – almost a decade after hav-
ing been denied that privilege by its peers.
The foreign policy objectives of the USDP in the early 2010s were threefold
(Haacke 2016; Maung Aung Myoe 2016). First, the new regime hoped to recover
a long-lost legitimacy and restore Myanmar’s international standing after decades
of diplomatic marginalisation. Second, it aimed to rebalance Myanmar’s strategic
partnerships with regional and global powers to fend o a Chinese inuence that

Foreign and Diplomatic (Dis)Engagement 95
had grown staggering from the early 1990s, while repairing its ties with the West
and all international institutions willing to assist the country in its renewed devel-
opmental eorts. Third, it desired to show that Myanmar was open to meaning-
ful business and ready to devise and implement the necessary reforms to attract
foreign investments and move on the path towards accelerated economic growth.
Early in his presidency, Thein Sein multiplied public speeches urging for a swift
reintegration of Myanmar into world politics. In his inaugural address pronounced
in front of the new parliament on 30 March 2011, he assured that Myanmar yearned
to recover its lost status of ‘respected member of the global community’ (New
Light of Myanmar 2011: 6). Many a policymaker and renowned foreign policy
expert inside the country have since shared this candid perspective (Chaw Chaw
Sein 2016). The rapid normalisation of foreign relations in the early 2010s also
purported to increase the new government’s legitimacy, which had originally been
undermined by the debatable organisation – and controversial outcomes – of the
constitutional referendum in May 2008 and the 2010 elections. Under President
Thein Sein, Myanmar increased the number of its bilateral relations and expanded
its own diplomatic network abroad as new foreign embassies opened in Yangon.
By the end of the USDP tenure, Myanmar had thirty-six ambassadors, three consul-
generals, and a permanent representative at the United Nations (UN) in New York;
it had established ocial relations with 114 independent states.
Observers have argued that the swift political mutations at work during Thein
Sein’s presidency were chiey driven by strategic calculations. In particular, the
rst generation of post-SPDC leaders proved eager to back away from China’s
commercial and political sway – shaped in the heyday of the previous junta in
the 1990s and 2000s – and rebalance Myanmar’s position vis-à-vis major powers
in the region (Pedersen 2014; Bünte and Dosch 2015). One of the earliest deci-
sions marking a fundamental foreign policy rethinking in Naypyitaw indeed related
to the asymmetrical Sino-Myanmar relationship. In September 2011, Thein Sein
announced the suspension of a major hydropower project funded in Myanmar’s
northern Kachin state by a Chinese state–owned company, the China Power Invest-
ment Corporation (CPIC). The multibillion-dollar Myitsone project had been inked
a decade earlier between the former military regime and the CPIC (Maung Aung
Myoe 2015). Located at the start of the Irrawaddy River that both economically
and symbolically nourishes Myanmar’s heartland, Myitsone has generated a strong
local resistance ever since construction was planned, and the surprising move by
Thein Sein was heartily welcomed by local and international activists (Chan 2017).
The Chinese reaction to the suspension was originally muted, and bilateral rela-
tions did not sour. Beijing even continued to oer its mediation in the ambitious
interethnic parleys that Thein Sein and his team of peace negotiators initiated in
2011. Under Chinese patronage, several rounds of peace talks were held in Yun-
nan, particularly with Kachin, Ta’ang, and Shan rebels still operating in the Sino-
Myanmar borderlands. Tensions resurfaced, however, in the bilateral relationship
towards the end of the USDP term. The formulation of more aggressive foreign
policy and infrastructure ambitions under Xi Jinping – who became China’s presi-
dent in March 2013 – exacerbated recurrent conicts between the army and rebel

96 Renaud Egreteau
organisations covertly supported by China (U Myint 2019). This was particularly
evident in the Kokang Special Region with the Myanmar National Democratic
Alliance Army (MNDAA) – a militia composed of ethnic Kokang, who are long-
term, Chinese-speaking residents of northern Shan State – which launched new
attacks against government troops in the run-up to Myanmar’s 2015 elections
(Han 2017).
The West and Japan were therefore certainly both construed as much sought-
after partners by the USDP leadership in its eorts to recalibrate Myanmar’s rela-
tions to the world. Patching up with the United States proved a decisive catalyst
in the lifting of diplomatic sanctions blocking Myanmar from international and
regional development-focused organisations. This also helped Thein Sein’s peace
initiatives, which received from 2012 key nancial support from Japan, the UN,
and the European Union (EU). But if the historical visit to Yangon of US Secre-
tary of State Hillary Clinton in December 2011 and then that of President Obama
a year later opened a new chapter in the US-Myanmar relationship, Washington
managed to secure little, if any, eective and readily available levers of pressure on
Myanmar under the USDP. In the eyes of the latter, the rebalancing of Myanmar’s
relations in the early 2010s indeed did not purport to insert Myanmar into the ris-
ing Sino-American rivalry in the region (Steinberg 2015). Instead, it was to – once
again, and as stated by Article 41 of the 2008 Constitution – reassert an “independ-
ent, active and non-aligned foreign policy”.
Lastly, Thein Sein and his entourage of voluble retired generals turned civilian
ministers kept on agging Myanmar’s readiness to reform its economy and adopt
international standards, ranging from environmental protection to anti- corruption
laws and labour rights. Among key transformations brought by the USDP admin-
istration, the central bank was provided with greater autonomy, the national cur-
rency (kyat) was nominally oated, foreign telecom operators and banks were
allowed, and a new investment law was adopted in 2012. Prominent tycoons who
made fortunes under the era of junta-led capitalism turned to philanthropy while
retooling their commercial empires into conglomerates in position to compete,
or partner, with international (potentially non-Asian) rms eager to invest in an
unfamiliar terrain. In the last stretch of the USDP government, Myanmar received
US$9.4 billion in Foreign Direct Investments (2015–2016 scal year) compared
with US$4.1 billion in 2013–2014 and only US$329 million in 2009–2010 (Aung
Hla Tun 2015, 2016).
Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD: Illusions and Delusions
Five years after the start of the post-SPDC transition, the government formed by
the National League for Democracy (NLD) could count on a tremendous reservoir
of international goodwill. Expectations that Aung San Suu Kyi would open a new
phase in the country’s hesitant democratic reforms and transformations, rein in
the military, and take a leadership role on the global stage ran high (Moe Thuzar
and Chachavalpongpun 2020). Constitutionally barred from the presidency, Aung
San Suu Kyi became foreign minister in March 2016, gaining a permanent seat

Foreign and Diplomatic (Dis)Engagement 97
at the powerful National Security and Defence Council (NSDC). To allow her to
further inuence policy, the newly formed NLD legislature adopted a law design-
ing for her an overarching cabinet post – that of state counsellor. However, Aung
San Suu Kyi soon delegated most of her diplomatic duties to trusted allies. Kyaw
Tint Swe, a former Myanmar representative at the UN during the junta heydays
(2001–2010), was appointed Union Minister in charge of foreign and political
aairs at the State Counsellor Oce. In January 2017, the NLD also created the
position of national security advisor (NSA), modelled on NSA oces operating in
South Asian states. Thaung Tun, another career diplomat and ex-ambassador to the
EU, took the post. A year later, Thaung Tun was promoted to Union Minister for
Investment and Foreign Economic Relations. Lastly, in November 2017, another
Union ministry was formed and tasked with international cooperation. Kyaw Tin
was appointed as its head.
More than Aung San Suu Kyi herself, these three veteran diplomats took charge
of the foreign policy process under the NLD. The pyramidal and loyalty structure
of the ruling party meant that little foreign policy inputs could originate outside
Aung San Suu Kyi’s circle of trust (Maung Aung Myoe 2017). In any case, given
the amount of foreign goodwill the NLD enjoyed right after the 2015 polls, foreign
policy was not a priority for the new government. The latter only slightly expanded
the country’s diplomatic relations. As of late 2020, Myanmar had established o-
cial relations with 125 independent states, only up from 114 at the end of the USDP
term. A landmark addition was the Holy See in May 2017. The NLD adminis-
tration also cautiously pursued the ratication process of international treaties its
predecessors had initiated. In October 2017, the Union parliament ratied the Inter-
national Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESR), while the
government signed the UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW)
a year later. The NLD administration, however, postponed in 2019 the signature of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).
Three core elements have dominated the foreign policy agenda of the second
post-SPDC administration. First, the NLD acknowledged the need to work on
restoring ties with neighbouring China, wary at seeing its massive investment pro-
jects and strategic positioning in the country being challenged during Thein Sein’s
presidency. Second, the new government – and its advisors in charge of foreign
policymaking – had to negotiate backdoor power-sharing arrangements with a
fully autonomous military institution with its own strategic, security, and diplo-
matic goals. Third, soon after the NLD took power, fresh outbreaks of violence in
Rakhine State and the brutal crackdown led by Myanmar’s security forces on the
Rohingya minority triggered a global outcry whose impact was largely underesti-
mated, if not dismissed, by the NLD.
First, after ve years of tense relations under the USDP presidency, the NLD
administration sought to establish a more balanced relationship with China. The
Chinese leadership had already initiated a rapprochement with Aung San Suu Kyi
while she was an opposition parliamentarian. In June 2015, the top brass of the
communist party rolled out the red carpet for her rst ocial trip to Beijing (Aung
Zaw 2015). After she took the foreign aairs portfolio in 2016, her rst major

98 Renaud Egreteau
diplomatic trip abroad was to China. Only a month later, in September 2016, would
she travel to the United States. Despite Beijing’s accommodating approach toward
the NLD leader, several bilateral issues have remained unresolved. If Aung San
Suu Kyi made in August 2016 a conciliatory gesture, oering to form an investi-
gative commission on a China-funded project, progress on the Myitsone project
stalled. After 2016, China also increased its backdoor interactions with the Kachin,
Shan, and Ta’ang rebellions operating in the Sino-Myanmar borderlands. The pow-
erful ethnic Wa militia renewed its armed activism and anti-religious campaigns
targeting Christian minorities. An oshoot of the erstwhile Burmese Communist
Party (BCP) long supported by Beijing, the United Wa State Army (UWSA) still
counts powerful networks of sympathy and political backing in Yunnan. Protracted
armed conict and tracking in the borderlands continue to weigh heavily in the
ambitious peace process and interethnic dialogue initiated during the Thein Sein
presidency but faltering under its NLD successors.
Furthermore, China under President Xi Jinping has been pressing ahead with a
massive infrastructure programme – the Belt and Road Initiative. Aimed at enhanc-
ing China’s participation in regional and global economic and trade relations, the
initiative has included Myanmar as a key partner. The NLD government has been
sympathetic to the Chinese-funded proposal and agreed to pursue the development
of a China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC). The latter comprises twenty-
odd infrastructure projects on Myanmar soil – including a special economic zone
and the expansion of a deep-sea port in Kyaukphyu, a city along the Rakhine coast
at the termination of an already operating Chinese oil and gas pipeline. The CMEC
has an estimated total budget of US$2 billion (Amara Thiha 2018). But fears of a
potential debt trap have encouraged the NLD administration to keep on negotiating
with Beijing the scaling down of its ambitions in Myanmar (U Myint 2019). The
NLD knew it had to walk on a tightrope. Social activism in the country has often
targeted Chinese projects for their lack of transparency, weak accountability mech-
anisms, and disregard for local conicts – particularly on land – thus highlighting
a whi of neo-colonialism (Tang-Lee 2017). Public opinion in Myanmar has long
tended to hold negative attitudes towards an overreliance on Chinese political and
economic support. At the same time, international pressure has mounted again on
Myanmar following the resurgence of violence in the country in late 2016. The
renewed pressure from the West and the international society have responded to the
lack of empathy showed by the NLD for the plight of ethnic and religious minori-
ties that have been victims of the brutality – and impunity – of Myanmar’s security
forces. That context has encouraged the new government to avoid alienating such
a powerful diplomatic and commercial partner as China.
A second key challenge the NLD had to cope with during the early days of
its mandate was the persistent inuence of the military over foreign, regional,
and border policymaking. The 2008 Constitution bestowed upon the armed forces
crucial foreign policy prerogatives, through in particular the military-run Minis-
try of Defence and Ministry of Border Aairs (Egreteau 2018). The number of
foreign trips made by the commander-in-chief of the Tatmadaw has surged since
2011. Under both the USDP and NLD governments, Senior-General Min Aung

Foreign and Diplomatic (Dis)Engagement 99
Hlaing travelled to attend high-ranking diplomatic meetings in such capitals as
Vienna, Singapore, Tel Aviv, Tokyo, and Moscow, among others. A study commis-
sioned by the Yangon-based Tagaung Institute of Political Science recorded forty-
six trips between April 2011 and July 2018 (The Irrawaddy 2018). These visits
aimed not only at restoring an image of respectability for the chief of an institution
long despised for its poor accountability records. It also opened new doors for
the acquisition of military equipment and the establishment of military-to-military
exchange programmes in Central Europe, Russia, Israel, and Japan (Maung Aung
Myoe 2017). National security concerns still linger high among Myanmar’s mili-
tary elites. The release by the Ministry of Defence of a white paper in early 2016 –
the rst in twenty years – attested to an obvious continuity in the wary perceptions
that the army leadership had developed of the outside world, despite the post-2011
opening up. The army top brass still insist on the multifaceted threats to the ‘state
security’ and ‘national security’ of the country, a stance that often comes in con-
trast with the views of civilian policymakers, including with the NLD (Callahan
2015: 47–48).
Lastly, the resurgence of violence in the Rakhine State in 2016 not only threat-
ened the transition at work by taking the NLD focus away from socioeconomic and
democratic reforms. It also severely undermined international condence about
Myanmar’s future and its handling of enduring ethnic and sectarian conicts. The
(mis)management by the NLD administration of the Rakhine crisis and the tragedy
of the latest Rohingya exodus have, for many international observers, dashed hopes
that Aung San Suu Kyi could live up to the sky-high expectations her electoral vic-
tory in 2015 had generated (Robinson 2016). Already disenfranchised by the USDP
government in 2015, the million-strong community of Rohingya residing in the
northern parts of Rakhine State have faced increased persecution since an armed
group pretending to represent its cause started o a rebellion in 2016. The army-led
repression turned even more brutal after renewed attacks by the Arakan Rohingya
Solidarity Association (ARSA) in August 2017. Much to the chagrin of her admir-
ers, Aung San Suu Kyi refused to condemn the military’s brutality and widespread
human rights violations the Muslim minority has been subjected to (Barany 2018).
Her decision to appoint an advisory commission headed by the late Ko Annan – a
former UN secretary-general – and thereafter start implementing the eighty-odd
recommendations made by this commission did not thwart international criticism
(Jollie 2017). Neither did her decision to counter in person allegations of geno-
cide to the UN International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague, where Myanmar
faced a genocide case in December 2019.
Global pressure has mounted on the NLD government to rein in the security
forces and address grievances and aspirations of the country’s ethnic and religious
minorities. In August 2018, a UN fact-nding mission produced a damning report
highlighting massive violations of human rights by the armed forces not only in
Rakhine State against the Rohingyas but also in war-torn northern Myanmar. It
urged for the prosecution of army leaders for war crimes, crimes against humanity,
and genocide. In a highly commented decision, the online social networking com-
pany Facebook deleted the personal account of Senior-General Min Aung Hlaing,

100 Renaud Egreteau
the army chief, for spreading hatred and relying on unveried, if not forged, pieces
of news. The United States terminated the military-to-military cooperation they
had reactivated under the USDP and imposed in July 2019 new sanctions on Min
Aung Hlaing. Departing from its traditional non-interference stance, the ASEAN
has similarly proved to be at odds with the NLD government on the Rakhine issue,
particularly Indonesia and Malaysia (Moe Thuzar and Rieel 2018). Lastly, as she
defended Myanmar (and its security forces) against genocide charges at the ICJ in
December 2019, Aung San Suu Kyi seemed to respond to the global outcry over
genocide denial with a lack of concern, if not a lack of empathy (Passeri 2021a;
Shang 2022). Combined with the failures of the NLD to uphold long-promised eco-
nomic and bureaucratic reforms necessary to attract foreign investors – most wary
at the image of volatility Myanmar has projected since Aung San Suu Kyi took
power – the NLD government may have squandered the enthusiastic opportunities
the outside world oered to provide after the euphoria of the 2015 polls. In that
context, the unwavering diplomatic and commercial support provided by China –
and to a lesser extent that of Russia and India – proved at the turn of the 2020s a
quite-needed patronage for the NLD government.
After the 2021 Coup: Battles for Diplomatic Recognition
The coup of 1 February 2021, had destabilising eects on Myanmar’s foreign poli-
tics and relations with the world. It generated a profound disorganisation of the
state, its political institutions, and the everyday functioning of the bureaucracy –
including the diplomatic corps. The takeover also had two major foreign policy
implications for the country. First, the State Administrative Council (SAC) soon
confronted a large-scale civil disobedience movement, backed by strong, nation-
wide popular support and a well-organised opposition of ousted legislators and
political dissidents that forced the military establishment to engage in an unex-
pected battle for international diplomatic recognition. Second, the coup ushered in
a new era of international sanctions against Myanmar. As a result, the generals fell
back on their old strategic playbook to weather punitive measures and diplomatic
ostracism. They indeed reverted to a foreign policy approach grounded on a limited
number of bilateral relations with like-minded regimes, shunning multilateralism
and increasingly rejecting regional cooperation.
The military takeover rst triggered a major legalistic – and practical – dis-
pute about which political authority should legitimately represent Myanmar at
the international level (Renshaw 2021). To justify and explain its latest seizure of
power, the army leadership relied on the country’s existing networks of embas-
sies, consulates-general, and permanent representations to international organisa-
tions. However, divisions within its diplomatic corps soon surfaced. Two of its
highest-ranking diplomats in London and New York at the UN even defected. In
April 2021, Ambassador Kyaw Moe Tun and Ambassador Kyaw Zwar Minn, both
appointed by Aung San Suu Kyi’s ousted administration, pledged their support to
the emerging, and increasingly popular, National Unity Government (NUG). Since
then, the NUG and the SAC have been at loggerheads; each has claimed that they

Foreign and Diplomatic (Dis)Engagement 101
were the rightful representative of Myanmar internationally. The question has been
of particular signicance, especially at the UN. Indeed, Ambassador Kyaw Moe
Tun’s public stances and votes as incumbent representative of Myanmar have rou-
tinely run counter to the SAC’s own interests, for instance, when he condemned the
junta’s staunch Russian ally for its invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
The SAC and the NUG have also engaged in a struggle to garner diplomatic rec-
ognition beyond the UN. Despite its lack of control over Myanmar’s foreign policy
administration, the NUG has stepped up its own lobbying eorts with the outside
world, focusing in particular on the ASEAN, South Korea, and the West. On its
side, the SAC sought support from Russia, China, and India and accepted cre-
dentials from the newly appointed Saudi Arabian ambassador. In November 2021,
Min Aung Hlaing’s envoys attended the 89th Interpol Meeting in Istanbul. They
also represented Myanmar at the ICJ in The Hague, where the country still stands
accused of genocide against its minority Rohingya population. At the same time,
some Western and Southeast Asian governments have withheld ambassadorial
appointments to Myanmar, downgrading embassy representatives in Yangon to the
rank of chargé d’aaires, while openly meeting with members of the opposition
to the SAC, such as Dr Sa Sa (international envoy for the Committee Representing
the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw [CRPH]) and Daw Zin Mar Aung, a twice-elected NLD
legislator appointed NUG foreign minister. In October 2021, the Czech Republic
allowed the NUG to open its rst liaison oce in Europe. The French Senate and
the EU Parliament also passed motions supporting the NUG. Yet only a handful
of foreign governments and institutions have formally recognised either source of
legitimate authority. Often, the Myanmar seat is left vacant during international
meetings, as observed in conferences held by the UN Human Rights Council or the
World Health Organization. In November 2021, the UN-backed COP26 climate
conference held in Glasgow disinvited the SAC representatives. Such a conun-
drum has generated similar regional divisions, particularly with the ASEAN (Moe
Thuzar 2021). At a summit held in April 2021 at the ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta,
regional leaders agreed to a ve-point consensus on how to tackle Myanmar’s
political stalemate. However, no concrete outcomes were seen more than two years
into the agreement. Worse, the mediation assistance oered by Hun Sen, Cambo-
dia’s verbose prime minister who visited Naypyitaw in January 2022, did not yield
any political or diplomatic results.
Increasingly sceptical of multilateral engagement, and targeted by a new round
of extremely damaging sanctions, the SAC has thus reverted to a well-worn
path of selective isolationism. The military’s unrelenting hostility and suspicion
towards the outside world, fuelled by a siege mentality historically developed by
its higher-ranking ocers, have driven the SAC towards the development of a
limited number of bilateral interactions with like-minded states ready to cooperate
(Passeri 2021b). Russia has stood out for its ability to expand its strategic foothold
in Myanmar since the coup. A crucial supplier of military hardware for a decade,
Russia has oered its staunch support to the junta chief, Min Aung Hlaing. It
rolled out the red carpet when he visited Moscow in June 2021. China remains
another essential diplomatic and economic patron for the new junta, despite

102 Renaud Egreteau
decades of distrust between the two neighbours. Even if Beijing has maintained
some contacts with NLD ocials after the coup, the Chinese government has
not recognised the NUG. Instead, it has continued its engagement with the mili-
tary establishment, welcoming the SAC foreign minister, Munna Maung Lwin,
in March 2022. In 2021, the sole major foreign investment secured by the SAC
was a Chinese one, for a liquied natural gas power plant in the Irrawaddy delta.
However, China has also showed its willingness to continue its direct dialogue
with some ethnic organisations operating in areas where Chinese investors and
traders have long been actively involved. Beijing has voiced its concern regard-
ing the capacity of both the SAC and various ethnic organisations and emerging
People’s Defence Forces (PDFs) to protect factories, pipelines, and other infra-
structure projects it has developed over the past decade (Myers 2021). The coup
may have indeed thrown into jeopardy a range of Chinese strategic interests and
economic projects.
Conclusion
Three aspects of Myanmar’s foreign relations and engagement with the world
have remained quite unchanged since independence and continued to signicantly
determine the formulation and implementation of the country’s foreign policy
even after the coup of 1 February 2021. First is the peculiar geography with which
an independent Myanmar must cope with. While oering outstanding opportuni-
ties for growth and commerce, the country’s geostrategic situation at the cross-
roads of competing Asian giants and a still volatile Southeast Asian region is a
commanding obstacle to more openness and proactive diplomacy. Second, the
unrelenting dominance of the armed forces over Myanmar’s state apparatus has
translated into a pervasive military control over foreign policymaking. Whether
under civilian, semi-civilian, or direct military rule, Myanmar’s foreign policy
has been decisively inuenced by the vision the ocer corps has developed of the
world. The general mistrust of foreign powers and its xenophobic undercurrents
shared by many among Myanmar’s contemporary military establishment endure.
Global outcry and persistent international criticism over the recurrent brutality
with which Myanmar’s security forces tend to conduct their counterinsurgency
and cleansing operations, but also crackdown of dissent, will continue to hinder
any tentative process of reconciliation between the armed forces and the world.
Lastly indeed, Myanmar’s long-standing domestic problems, from ethnic and sec-
tarian conicts to forced migration and unhealthy civil-military relations, continue
to aect its relations with its immediate neighbours and the global powers and
international society alike. Worse, from the 2021 military takeover emerged an
ever more polarised landscape, reminiscent of the deep divisions than run through
Myanmar’s society and politics (at home and abroad) after the 1988 coup but also
more recently following the 2017 Rohingya crisis. The question of who will ulti-
mately prevail in this renewed struggle for political legitimacy and international
recognition will have an enormous impact on how Myanmar situates itself in the
world of nations in the coming decade.

Foreign and Diplomatic (Dis)Engagement 103
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