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Purity is still a problem
Abstract
Our recent review demonstrates that “purity” is a messy construct with at least nine popular scientific understandings. Cultural beliefs about self-control help unify some of these understandings, but much messiness remains. The harm-centric theory of dyadic morality suggests that purity violations can be comprehensively understood as abstract harms, acts perceived by some people (and not others) to indirectly cause suffering.
Why do many people morally condemn unrestrained indulgence in bodilypleasures—such as gluttony, masturbation, and drinking alcohol—even when these behaviorsdo not harm others? Leading theories of moral cognition claim that these puritanical moral judgments are independent of cognitive adaptations for reciprocal cooperation. In five pre-registered experiments (N > 3000), we test an alternative hypothesis: that puritanical moraljudgments emerge from perceptions that bodily pleasures indirectly facilitate free-riding by impairing self-control. In Studies 1 and 2a-b, participants judged that targets who increased (vs. decreased) their non-other-harming sex, food, alcohol, and inactivity would become more likely to cheat, an effect mediated by the perception that they would become less self-controlled. In Study 3, participants judged that relaxing regulations on sex, food, and alcohol in a village would decrease self-control and cooperation in the village, although they judged enforcing puritanical prohibitions even more negatively. In Study 4, participants expected that, in a scientific experiment, a treatment group made to increase their consumption of bodily pleasures would become less self-controlled and more likely to cheat than a psychologically similar control group. Across all studies, the perception that indulgence reduces self-control and cooperativeness was associated with the moral condemnation of harmless bodily pleasures. This provides support for the idea that some purity violations, although they do not directly harm other people, may be morally condemned because they activate cognitive systems designed for reciprocal cooperation.
The idea of “purity” transformed moral psychology. Here, we provide the first systematic review of this concept. Although often discussed as one construct, we reveal ~9 understandings of purity, ranging from respecting God to not eating gross things. This striking heterogeneity arises because purity—unlike other moral constructs—is not understood by what it is but what it isn’t: obvious interpersonal harm. This poses many problems for moral psychology and explains why purity lacks convergent and divergent validity and why purity is confounded with politics, religion, weirdness, and perceived harm. Because purity is not a coherent construct, it cannot be a distinct basis of moral judgment or specially tied to disgust. Rather than a specific moral domain, purity is best understood as a loose set of themes in moral rhetoric. These themes are scaffolded on cultural understandings of harm—the broad, pluralistic harm outlined by the Theory of Dyadic Morality.
Public Abstract
People are fascinated by morality—how do people make moral judgments and why do liberals and conservatives seem to frequently disagree? “Purity” is one moral concept often discussed when talking about morality—it has been suggested to capture moral differences across politics and to demonstrate the evolutionary roots of morality, especially the role of disgust in moral judgment. However, despite the many books and articles that mention purity, there is no systematic analysis of purity. Here, we review all existing academic articles focused on purity in morality. We find that purity is an especially messy concept that lacks scientific validity. Because it is so poorly defined and inconsistently measured, it should not be invoked to explain our moral minds or political differences.
Moral psychology has long debated whether moral judgment is rooted in harm vs. affect. We reconcile this debate with the Affective Harm Account (AHA) of moral judgment. The AHA understands harm as an intuitive perception (i.e., perceived harm), and divides "affect" into two: embodied visceral arousal (i.e., gut feelings) and stimulus-directed affective appraisals (e.g., ratings of disgustingness). The AHA was tested in a randomized, double-blind pharmacological experiment with healthy young adults judging the immorality, harmfulness, and disgustingness of everyday moral scenarios (e.g., lying) and unusual purity scenarios (e.g., sex with a corpse) after receiving either a placebo or the beta-blocker propranolol (a drug that dampens visceral arousal). Results confirmed the three key hypotheses of the AHA. First, perceived harm and affective appraisals are neither competing nor independent but intertwined. Second, although both perceived harm and affective appraisals predict moral judgment, perceived harm is consistently relevant across all scenarios (in line with the Theory of Dyadic Morality), whereas affective appraisals are especially relevant in unusual purity scenarios (in line with affect-as-information theory). Third, the "gut feelings" of visceral arousal are not as important to morality as often believed. Dampening visceral arousal (via propranolol) did not directly impact moral judgment, but instead changed the relative contribution of affective appraisals to moral judgment-and only in unusual purity scenarios. By embracing a constructionist view of the mind that blurs traditional dichotomies, the AHA reconciles historic harm-centric and current affect-centric theories, parsimoniously explaining judgment differences across various moral scenarios without requiring any "moral foundations."
Significance
Humans have several different ways to decide whether an action is wrong: We might ask whether it causes harm or whether it breaks a rule. Moral psychology attempts to understand the mechanisms that underlie moral judgments. Inspired by theories of “universalization” in moral philosophy, we describe a mechanism that is complementary to existing approaches, demonstrate it in both adults and children, and formalize a precise account of its cognitive mechanisms. Specifically, we show that, when making judgments in novel circumstances, people adopt moral rules that would lead to better consequences if (hypothetically) universalized. Universalization may play a key role in allowing people to construct new moral rules when confronting social dilemmas such as voting and environmental stewardship.
The nature of harm—and therefore moral judgment—may be misunderstood. Rather than an objective matter of reason, we argue that harm should be redefined as an intuitively perceived continuum. This redefinition provides a new understanding of moral content and mechanism—the constructionist Theory of Dyadic Morality (TDM). TDM suggests that acts are condemned proportional to three elements: norm violations, negative affect, and—importantly—perceived harm. This harm is dyadic, involving an intentional agent causing damage to a vulnerable patient (A→P). TDM predicts causal links both from harm to immorality (dyadic comparison) and from immorality to harm (dyadic completion). Together, these two processes make the “dyadic loop,” explaining moral acquisition and polarization. TDM argues against intuitive harmless wrongs and modular “foundations,” but embraces moral pluralism through varieties of values and the flexibility of perceived harm. Dyadic morality impacts understandings of moral character, moral emotion, and political/cultural differences, and provides research guidelines for moral psychology.
Are social conservatives the only ones who use concerns about sacred objects or practices when making moral judgments, such as when they defend the ''sanctity of marriage''? Or do liberals condemn sacrilege too? A third possibility is that all talk about sanctity and sacrilege is merely post hoc justification of moral judgments based solely on the perception of harm to sentient or anthropomorphized beings. We present evidence that liberals, like conservatives, morally condemn harmless violations of their own sacred objects. In most cases of liberal sacrilege (e.g., environmental destruction), sentient beings suffer. To deconflate desecration from harm, we examined a context in which someone altered an object that was lifeless yet sacred to a group of liberals—the mountain Cerro Torre. Three studies found that liberals condemned the alteration of the mountain as a harmless desecration. Defending sacred values may bind group members into a cohesive moral community.
Do moral disagreements regarding specific issues (e.g., patriotism, chastity) reflect deep cognitive differences (i.e., distinct cognitive mechanisms) between liberals and conservatives? Dyadic morality suggests that the answer is "no." Despite moral diversity, we reveal that moral cognition-in both liberals and conservatives-is rooted in a harm-based template. A dyadic template suggests that harm should be central within moral cognition, an idea tested-and confirmed-through six specific hypotheses. Studies suggest that moral judgment occurs via dyadic comparison, in which counter-normative acts are compared with a prototype of harm. Dyadic comparison explains why harm is the most accessible and important of moral content, why harm organizes-and overlaps with-diverse moral content, and why harm best translates across moral content. Dyadic morality suggests that various moral content (e.g., loyalty, purity) are varieties of perceived harm and that past research has substantially exaggerated moral differences between liberals and conservatives.
© 2015 by the Society for Personality and Social Psychology, Inc.
When something is wrong, someone is harmed. This hypothesis derives from the theory of dyadic morality, which suggests a moral cognitive template of wrongdoing agent and suffering patient (i.e., victim). This dyadic template means that victimless wrongs (e.g., masturbation) are psychologically incomplete, compelling the mind to perceive victims even when they are objectively absent. Five studies reveal that dyadic completion occurs automatically and implicitly: Ostensibly harmless wrongs are perceived to have victims (Study 1), activate concepts of harm (Studies 2 and 3), and increase perceptions of suffering (Studies 4 and 5). These results suggest that perceiving harm in immorality is intuitive and does not require effortful rationalization. This interpretation argues against both standard interpretations of moral dumbfounding and domain-specific theories of morality that assume the psychological existence of harmless wrongs. Dyadic completion also suggests that moral dilemmas in which wrongness (deontology) and harm (utilitarianism) conflict are unrepresentative of typical moral cognition. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2014 APA, all rights reserved).
How and why do moral judgments vary across the political spectrum? To test moral foundations theory (J. Haidt & J. Graham, 2007; J. Haidt & C. Joseph, 2004), the authors developed several ways to measure people's use of 5 sets of moral intuitions: Harm/care, Fairness/reciprocity, Ingroup/loyalty, Authority/respect, and Purity/sanctity. Across 4 studies using multiple methods, liberals consistently showed greater endorsement and use of the Harm/care and Fairness/reciprocity foundations compared to the other 3 foundations, whereas conservatives endorsed and used the 5 foundations more equally. This difference was observed in abstract assessments of the moral relevance of foundation-related concerns such as violence or loyalty (Study 1), moral judgments of statements and scenarios (Study 2), "sacredness" reactions to taboo trade-offs (Study 3), and use of foundation-related words in the moral texts of religious sermons (Study 4). These findings help to illuminate the nature and intractability of moral disagreements in the American "culture war."
The sociology of culture provides tools to weigh in on key interdisciplinary debates that hinge around categorization and its underlying processes. For example, at present, there is widespread debate about how individuals come to perceive events as immoral. In this paper, I use sociological approaches to cultural meaning to test one of the leading theories of moral cognition: the idea that individuals attribute immorality through template matching. I use spatial measures of cultural meaning to define and locate a prototypical moral wrong. I then test the theory of template matching and find evidence that distance from the typical moral transgression -in semantic space - is related to the time it takes to categorize an event as immoral or harmful. I then test these results on a corpus of naturally occurring text to assess their external validity. These studies provide empirical evidence supporting the notion that the attribution of immorality occurs through template matching. Furthermore, they also serve to illustrate that productive conversations can emerge when we take the insights that sociologists of culture and cognition have reached in the past few decades out of our disciplinary boundaries.
As the moral philosopher David Wong has noted (2006: xi): "The standard characterizations of [moral] relativism make it an easy target and seldom reveal what really motivates people who are attracted to it. Introductory textbooks in ethics frequently portray the view as an extreme variety of subjectivism (or conventionalism) in which anything goes – a person"s (or group"s) accepting that something is right makes it right for that person (or group)." This variety of moral relativism pictures human subjectivity in terms of human reactions of both acceptance (feelings of approbation) and rejection (feelings of opprobrium). Its central principle states that approving of some act or customary practice makes it right (good, virtuous, moral) and disapproving of the very same act or customary practice makes it wrong (bad, vicious, immoral); and this is so for any conceivable act or customary practice whether it is eating pork, terminating a pregnancy, drinking alcohol, spanking a child, banning a book, marrying a member of your own sex, marrying more than one member of the opposite sex, walking bare breasted on a public beach, covering yourself with a burqa 1 in the public square, conducting a Bris, 2 surgically reshaping the genitals of all the children in ones family regardless of their gender, assisting someone in committing a suicide or immolating yourself on the funeral pyre of your husband. Writing more or less in this vein the anthropologist Ruth Benedict once defined morality as "a convenient term for socially approved habits" (1934). It is not too surprising that this variety of moral relativism is viewed as extreme by many moral philosophers. If for no other reason than the fact that moral relativism of this variety rejects the most basic principle of moral reasoning presupposed by each of the parties to any genuine moral dispute; namely the presupposition that if I am right in judging a particular course of action to be wrong, bad, vicious or immoral then you cannot be equally right in thinking it right, good, virtuous or moral (see for example Rashdall 1914, also Cook 1999). One implication of moral relativism so portrayed is that the very same act or customary practice becomes right and wrong, good and bad, virtuous and vicious, moral and immoral to the very extent that two people (or groups) disagree about whether it is right or wrong, good or bad, virtuous or vicious, moral or immoral. This is because the extreme variety of moral relativism (as subjectivism or conventionalism) asserts that in fact there is nothing objective 1 The enveloping outer garment and face cover worn by women in public spaces in some Islamic traditions. 2 The Jewish ritual in which there is the surgical removal of the foreskin of a male infant eight days after his birth.
People are selfish, yet morally motivated. Morality is universal, yet culturally variable. Such apparent contradictions are
dissolving as research from many disciplines converges on a few shared principles, including the importance of moral intuitions,
the socially functional (rather than truth-seeking) nature of moral thinking, and the coevolution of moral minds with cultural
practices and institutions that create diverse moral communities. I propose a fourth principle to guide future research: Morality
is about more than harm and fairness. More research is needed on the collective and religious parts of the moral domain, such
as loyalty, authority, and spiritual purity.
Operationalizations of purity are more heterogeneous and less coherent than either harm or loyalty
- N Dimaggio
- F Kachanoff
- K Gray
The “Big Three” of morality (autonomy, community, divinity) and the “Big Three” explanations of suffering
- R A Shweder
- N C Much
- M Mahapatra
- L Park