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Substitute to War: Questioning the Efficacy of Sanctions on Russia
Abstract
Western nations enacted harsh sanctions against Russia after its 2022 invasion of Ukraine. However, sanctions are rarely successful and policy makers should not expect sanctions to coerce Russia into a withdrawal. This article examines several concepts including the instrumental effectiveness of sanctions, the significance of state identity, the pitfall of mirror imaging, and aspects of prospect theory as they relate to the effectiveness of sanctions. Additionally, the weakness of sanctions used for moral signaling and the notion of sanctions as an act of war are considered. Recommendations are offered should policy makers continue to view economic sanctions as an attractive policy choice.
... 26 In conclusion, the Russian attempt to overturn the international constitutional principle of non-use of force has so far not been accepted by the international community. However, the primarily 'Western' sanctions are undermined by the continuation and even increase of trade and investment flows between Russia and important states with large markets, such as China, India, and many Central Asian states (Lawniczak, 2023;Schott, 2023). It is therefore far from certain that the sanctions will have any coercive effect (a sceptical assessment by van Bergeijk, 2022). ...
The Russian invasion of Ukraine was the first open and blatant aggression against a sovereign neighbour state in Europe since 1945. Does this war have systemic significance for the legal order as a whole? The contribution singles out legal trends that relate to three fundamental principles of the current international legal order: peace, people (humanity), and the planet. My thesis is that, although Russia has breached a fundamental, even constitutional, principle of international law, namely the prohibition of inter-state military force, this breach has productively – though unintentionally – boosted, firstly, a modest reform of the UN architecture and, secondly, a further humanization of international law. A third trend is the ‘greening’ of the law surrounding war and of the legal status of the individual. These are important positive developments that go to the very heart of international law. With some optimism, the ‘Ukraine moment’ can therefore be seen not only as an anti-constitutional, but at the same time also as a constitutional moment.
Ongoing geopolitical developments regarding Russia and Ukraine have resulted in discussions about the utility of sanctions. This article analyzes European Union (EU) sanctions on Russia following the annexation of Crimea by investigating whether EU-Russia oil and gas trade relations compromised the efficacy of restrictions. It thus argues that the EU did not sanction Russian oil and gas due to EU reliance on these resources. However, the absence of sanctions on these industries cannot be held responsible for Russia’s refusal to leave Crimea since restrictions that were put in place still notably impacted the Russian economy. Hence, other considerations, such as the general inefficacy of sanctions, unintended consequences of the EU restrictions, and deeper historical reasoning clarify why Russia’s occupation of Crimea persisted.
What determines the consequences of economic sanctions? Is there a common explanation for these consequences? This article provides a comprehensive review of the fragmented literature focusing on the consequences of sanctions. We critically discuss the complex relationships between types of sanctions and sanction senders and their targets, as well as the structural factors that account for the specific consequences of different sanction cases. A discussion on the thematic, methodological, and theoretical shortcomings of the existing literature on sanction consequences follows. We argue that a “common approach” to sanction consequences research should be framed within the framework of international interdependence. We also present several nascent trends and propose new directions for sanction researchers and other disciplines.
This paper offers a broader reflection on the current and historical discourse related to the analysis of the effectiveness of economic sanctions. Is it possible to reliably measure the effectiveness of economic sanctions ? In addition to summarizing the literature in this area, the article points out numerous problems in the interpretation and use of terminology. Confusion about different approaches in this discipline creates an environment in which it is difficult to orient oneself or segregate objective information. This confusion affects the behaviour of national governments. National governments frequently resort to economic sanctions, even though the measurement of their effectiveness is unclear. The article aims to introduce partial and valid arguments related to the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of the imposed sanctions. Moreover, its goal is to present the preferred approach how to measure the effectiveness. The paper concludes that universally valid metrics for measuring effectiveness are hardly achievable due to the inability to compare events across modern history, without taking into account the context. At the same time, there is neither a terminological nor a semantic consensus on the basic concepts, which makes the situation more complicated. One of the main issues is the inconsistent terminology, since many authors do not distinguish between effectiveness and efficiency. Thus, the author tends to interpret effectiveness as an ability to achieve the goals initially pre-set. Although this definition offers a rather loose view which does not allow too much comparison and generalization, it is, in the author’s view, the least “blurred” one. At the same time, the author encourages an individual approach to particular case reports and warns against attempting to econometrically and statistically capture something that is practically incommensurable or not measurable at all. Therefore, the author recommends, as a result of this literature overview, to stick to the perception of effectiveness (or its negation) as an ability (or a disability) to achieve predetermined goals . The value-added of this article is to contribute to the discussion about economic sanctions nowadays. It comes with conclusions about diverging approaches based on the unique, comprehensive literature review of respected authors. Also, the short list of case studies of what the author considers an example of effective and non-effective sanctions will be included.
The first week of March 2019 was very exciting for Western experts on Russian military affairs. On March 2, the Russian Academy of Military Sciences held its annual defense conference with Chief of the General Staff, Army General Valery Gerasimov, giving the keynote address. Two days later, official Ministry of Defense newspaper Krasnaya Zvesda
published the main outlines of Gerasimov’s speech, igniting a new wave of discourse on Russian military affairs among Western experts. The
New York Times’ claim that “Russian General Pitches ‘Information’ Operations as a Form of War” was augmented by an interpretation claiming that Gerasimov had unveiled “Russia’s ‘strategy of limited actions,’” which was “a new version of the ‘Gerasimov Doctrine’” that was to be considered the “semi-official ‘doctrine’ of the Russian Armed Forces and its General Staff.”
Interestingly enough, this echo chamber–style interpretation of Gerasimov’s speech emphasized only the one small part of it that discussed information/propaganda/subversion/nonmilitary aspects of war. The main question, however, is whether this part deserves such attention—after all, this topic was discussed only in one short paragraph entitled “Struggle in Informational Environment.” Was there something in his speech that deserved greater attention? And if so, why was it missed?
Economic sanctions are frequently used as a tool of foreign policy, described by some as falling between diplomacy and military force. An important question regarding the use of sanctions is whether they can function as an alternative to military force by demonstrating the sender's resolve and making military force unnecessary, or if their use tends to result in an increased probability that military force will be used. Based on a theory of sanctions as costly signals, the authors develop and test hypotheses regarding the relationship between sanctions and military force. The results show that after a sanction occurs, there is a significantly increased probability of a use of military force. Democracies, because of their propensity to tie their hands with audience costs, while at the same time facing domestic pressure to devise sanctions to be costless to the sender, are highly likely to be involved in a militarized dispute after using sanctions.
The concept of soft power has caught the attention of policymakers, scholars, and political pundits for the last thirty years. Soft power studies most often focus on measures of public opinion toward a power-wielder and draw conclusions about a state’s level of soft power from that opinion. This research examines soft power influence by focusing on the elite discourse and the foreign policy decisions of states that are the target of soft power influence. Beginning with Joseph Nye’s conception that soft power is an attractive force that influences state policy decisions and its level of support for another state’s policies, Confronting the Myth of Soft Power in U.S. Foreign Policy examines whether U.S. soft power was part of key policymakers’ decision calculus. Soft power is tested against two plausible alternate explanations—balancing and state identity. Data from the discourse of key foreign policymakers in France and Germany indicate that U.S. soft power does not account for those states’ policy decisions to support U.S.-led policy interventions in Kosovo in 1999, or against ISIS in 2014. The results of this research are suggestive regarding the potential of soft power influence and its implications on scholarship and U.S. foreign policymaking.
There is growing policy consensus in Washington and other Western capitals that economic sanctions are powerful tools to cope with major foreign policy crises. Are sanctions, particularly targeted sanctions, really the potent instruments optimists suggest? Under what circumstances do punitive economic measures induce policy change in sanctioned countries? To probe these queries, in this article I outline the conditions that have been identified as more likely to lead to successful sanctions outcomes in the literature. I also discuss four major shortcomings of existing scholarship. First, the sender-biased interpretation of sanctions effectiveness renders the treatment of the ‘ineffective’ cases with negative outcomes the same as those cases that induce no discernable change in target behavior. Second, the prevalent use of static data from existing sanctions databases reduces the ability of researchers to study various time-specific factors affecting the probability of sanctions success. Third, the dominant state-centric bargaining model in the literature offers limited insight into contemporary coercive measures directed at non-state actors. Fourth, the study of sanctions in isolation of other instruments that frequently accompany them, such as incentives and diplomatic pressure, leads to a partial understanding of the specific role sanctions play in shaping the outcome of key foreign policy initiatives.
Although the structural constraints facing Germany shifted dramatically with the end of the Cold War and reunification, the direction of its European policy did not. The more powerful Federal Republic continued to press for deeper economic and political integration, eschewing a more independent or assertive foreign policy course. Neorealism, neoliberalism and liberalism cannot adequately explain this continuity in the face of structural change. This article sets out a constructivist account centered around the effects of German state identity. It develops a two-step analytical framework designed to pinpoint the content of state identity and establish its effects on state action, and then applies it to the German case. In the wake of reunification, German leaders across the political spectrum identified the Federal Republic as part of an emergent supranational community. This European identity, with roots in the postwar decades, drove Germany's unflagging support for deeper integration across the 1989-90 divide.
Prospect theory is the most influential behavioral theory of choice in the social sciences. Its creators won a Nobel Prize in economics, and it is largely responsible for the booming field of behavioral economics. Although international relations theorists who study security have used prospect theory extensively, Ameri-canists, comparativists, and political economists have shown little interest in it. The dominant explanation for political scientists' tepid response focuses on the theoretical problems with extending a theory devised in the lab to explain political decisions in the field. This essay focuses on these problems and reviews suggested solutions. It sug-gests that prospect theory's failure to ignite the imagination of more political scientists probably results from their aversion to behavioral assumptions and not from problems unique to prospect theory.
The succession of mostly nonviolent revolutions that replaced Eastern European communist governments in 1989 and the lack of any action by the Soviet Union to stop these changes transformed the international political system. Since these changes were not driven by changes in relative capabilities, they did not follow the postulates of neorealist theory. Rather, the revolutions of 1989 changed the rules governing superpower conflict and, thereby, the norms underpinning the international system. This constructivist perspective systematically links domestic and international structures with political practice and shows that international systems consist of ensembles of social institutions. These institutions change in response not only to shifting distributions of capabilities but also to redefinition of actors' identities as well as changes in state-society relations. Transformations of the international system occur when political practices change and therefore fail to reproduce the familiar international
The author's experience with economic sanctions as a tool of international politics is ambivalent. Since opinions pro and contra the effectiveness of sanctions are based on biased selections of case studies, the debate lacks both clarity about how sanctions work and a solid empirical foundation. To alleviate these deficiencies, this paper presents a review of literature and some empirical findings. A reduced-form equation fitted to the data of a recent study by G. C. Hufbauer and J. J. Schott (1985) correctly predicts failure and success in 83 percent out of eighty sanctions in the years 1946-83. Copyright 1989 by WWZ and Helbing & Lichtenhahn Verlag AG
Economic Sanctions: Too Much of a Bad Thing
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Richard N. Haass, "Economic Sanctions: Too Much of a Bad Thing," Brookings, 1
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Chris Hayes on the Cost of Sanctions on Iraq
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Christopher Hayes, "Chris Hayes on the Cost of Sanctions on Iraq," In These Times,
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The Sanctions Weapon
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Mulder, "The Sanctions Weapon," 22.
Four Decades of Failure: The U.S. Embargo against Cuba" (speech, James A. Baker III Institute Program, Cuba and the United States in the 21st Century
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Daniel Griswold, "Four Decades of Failure: The U.S. Embargo against Cuba" (speech,
James A. Baker III Institute Program, Cuba and the United States in the 21st Century,
Rice University, Houston, TX, 12 October 2005); and Sarah Marsh, "U.S. Trade Embargo Has Cost Cuba $130 Billion, U.N. Says," Reuters, 8 May 2018.
Billionaire Russian Gas Trader Says U.S. Sanctions a Badge of Honor
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Christian Lowe, "Billionaire Russian Gas Trader Says U.S. Sanctions a Badge of Honor," Reuters, 12 April 2014.
Russia Sanctions against 287 MPs Should Be Seen as 'Badge of Honour
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- Diana Bradley
John-Paul Ford Rojas, "Russia Sanctions against 287 MPs Should Be Seen as 'Badge of
Honour,' Says Boris Johnson," Sky News, 27 April 2022; and Diana Bradley, "Russia
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Sanctions after Crimea: Have They Worked?
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Edward Hunter Christie, "Sanctions after Crimea: Have They Worked?," NATO Review, 13 July 2015.
The Impact of Western Sanctions on Russia and How They Can Be Made Even More Effective
- Anders Åslund
- Maria Snegovaya
Anders Åslund and Maria Snegovaya, The Impact of Western Sanctions on Russia and
How They Can Be Made Even More Effective (Washington, DC: Atlantic Council,
2021).
Russia Sanctions at One Year: Learning from the Cases of South Africa and Iran
- Maria Snegovaya
Maria Snegovaya et al., Russia Sanctions at One Year: Learning from the Cases of South
Africa and Iran (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies,
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One Year of War in Ukraine: Are Sanctions Against Russia Making a Difference?
- Noah Berman
- Anshu Siripurapu
Noah Berman and Anshu Siripurapu, "One Year of War in Ukraine: Are Sanctions
Against Russia Making a Difference?," Council on Foreign Relations, 21 February
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The Price Cap on Russian Oil: A Progress Report
- Elizabeth Rosenberg
- Eric Van Nostrand
Elizabeth Rosenberg and Eric Van Nostrand, "The Price Cap on Russian Oil: A Progress Report," U.S. Department of the Treasury, 9 June 2023.
Buys Russian Oil at Prices Above Cap
- Peter Landers
Peter Landers, "Japan Breaks with U.S. Allies, Buys Russian Oil at Prices Above Cap,"
New York Times, 2 April 2023.
What Are the Sanctions on Russia and Are They Hurting Its Economy?
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Dan Murtaugh and Debjit Chakraborty, "Russia Pockets $24bn from Selling Energy
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Will Russia Ever Leave Fossil Fuels Behind?
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Biden Says Sanctions Weren't Meant to Deter Putin from Invading Ukraine
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Katherine Fung, "Biden Says Sanctions Weren't Meant to Deter Putin from Invading
Ukraine," Newsweek, 24 March 2022.
Biden Says Any Russian Movement into Ukraine Will Be Considered Invasion
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Steve Holland, "Biden Says Any Russian Movement into Ukraine Will Be Considered
Invasion," Reuters, 20 January 2022.
War, Power, and the Willingness to Suffer
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Steven Rosen, "War, Power, and the Willingness to Suffer," in Peace, War, and Numbers,
ed. Bruce M. Russett (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1972), 169.
Remarks by President Biden Announcing U.S. Ban on Imports of Russian Oil, Liquefied Natural Gas, and Coal
- Joseph R See
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Ban on Imports of Russian Oil, Liquefied Natural Gas, and Coal," U.S. Embassy in El
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West's Sanctions on Russia," AP News, 22 February 2023.
Impact of Sanctions on the Russian Economy
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The Effectiveness of Economic Sanctions
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Pala, "The Effectiveness of Economic Sanctions," 249.
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Not-So-Smart Sanctions: The Failure of Western Restrictions Against Russia
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Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics
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3-4. Mercer (4) also notes regarding prospect theory that "the temptation to reason backwards, from choice to domain to frame, is strong
- Mercer
Mercer, "Prospect Theory and Political Science," 3-4. Mercer (4) also notes regarding
prospect theory that "the temptation to reason backwards, from choice to domain to
frame, is strong." In the interpretation of Russian or Western perceptions of gain or
loss, this form of backward reasoning is likely the case.
The Abilene Paradox: The Management of Agreement
- Jerry B Harvey
Jerry B. Harvey, "The Abilene Paradox: The Management of Agreement," Organizational Dynamics 3, no. 1 (Summer 1974): 17-18, https://doi.org/10.1016/0090-2616
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These authors also note that which states adopt a norm matters in terms of a norms increased acceptance and relevance
- Martha See
- Kathryn Finnemore
- Sikkink
See, for example, Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," International Organization 52, no. 4 (1998): 901. These
authors also note that which states adopt a norm matters in terms of a norms increased
acceptance and relevance.
Russia Can't Replace Western Chips-So It Gets Them Illegally
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Landers, "Japan Breaks with U.S. Allies, Buys Russian Oil at Prices Above Cap"; Alena
Popova, "Russia Can't Replace Western Chips-So It Gets Them Illegally," Hill, 27
January 2023; and "Special Report: How U.S.-Made Chips Are Flowing into Russia,"
Nikkei Asia, 12 April 2023.
For a comprehensive discussion of privileged, latent, and intermediate group typologies, the effects of group size on collective action, and the provision of common goods, see Mancur Olson
For a comprehensive discussion of privileged, latent, and intermediate group typologies, the effects of group size on collective action, and the provision of common goods,
see Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965); and Russell Hardin, Collective Action (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982).
Unrestricted Warfare (Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House Arts
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- Wang Xiangsui
Liang Qiao and Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare (Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts
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Putin Says Western Sanctions Are Akin to Declaration of War
"Putin Says Western Sanctions Are Akin to Declaration of War," Reuters, 5 March
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No Economic 'Knockout' Yet from West's Sanctions on Russia
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Hussein, "No Economic 'Knockout' Yet from West's Sanctions on Russia."
72.
Peksen, "When Do Imposed Economic Sanctions Work?," 641.
When Do Imposed Economic Sanctions Work?
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Russia and China Are Being Driven Together as the Chasm with the West Deepens
- Simone Mccarthy
Simone McCarthy, "China and Russia Are as Close as Ever, and That's a Problem for
the US," CNN, 3 February 2023; and Holly Ellyatt, "Russia and China Are Being
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81.
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82.
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83.
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