Digital Empires: The Global Battle to Regulate Technology
Abstract
Digital Empires: The Global Battle to Regulate Technology examines the ideological origins, societal implications, and the relative global influence of three contrasting regulatory approaches toward the digital economy: the American market-driven regulatory model, the Chinese state-driven regulatory model, and the European rights-driven regulatory model. These three models reflect different theories about the relationship between markets, the state, and individual and collective rights. They also frequently collide in an international domain, leading to a contested battle over the present and future ethos of the digital economy. The book discusses how governments and tech companies navigate these inevitable conflicts that arise when these contrasting regulatory approaches collide in the international domain, ultimately asking which digital empire will prevail in their mutual contest for global influence. These regulatory conflicts take place at the moment of time when digital societies are at an inflection point. The cascade of digital regulation that is now being drafted around the world will be crucial in shaping the digital economy and digital society for years and decades to come. Governments, technology companies, and digital citizens are making important choices that will shape the future ethos of the digital society and define the soul of the digital economy. This book lays bare the choices we face as societies and individuals, explain the forces that shape those choices, and spell out the stakes involved in making those choices.
... This position raises, she notes, foundational questions about Big Tech's accountability to users, states, and populations across the world (993). In the same vein, other scholars have exposed how Big Tech has often managed to elude statutes and mechanisms that would otherwise regulate actors with such power (Atal 2021;Bradford 2023;Collier, Dubal, and Carter 2018;Thelen 2018). States and societies in the Majority World have often been particularly challenged in this regard, reflecting wider global inequalities, as we note later (Nothias 2020;Prasad 2018). ...
... Particular attention has been paid to the nature of corporate power, influence, and authority, especially in relation to that of the state. Recent work on Big Tech falls within this tradition, focusing on strategies deployed by companies such as Google and Uber to sidestep or renegotiate state regulatory regimes (Atal 2021;Bradford 2023;Srivastava 2023;Thelen 2018). What this set of literatures have paid less attention to are the organizational dynamics of firms themselves and how they come to calibrate the influence of SMFs in global politics. ...
... Shifts in content moderation policies have generally taken place in an ad hoc, reactive fashion in response to pressure from governments, the media, civil society, or users themselves around platforms' perceived failure to adequately tackle the sharing of misleading, harmful, hateful, or illegal material. Increasingly, these criticisms have developed into legislation in many polities, with which SMF compliance has varied considerably across jurisdictions (Bradford 2023). ...
Social media platforms have an increasingly central influence on global politics. Media of unprecedented reach, they have the power to sway elections, exacerbate societal polarization, promote or provoke conflict at all levels, and jeopardize relations between states. But what of the people who govern and oversee these platforms? For although algorithms and automation may underpin how social media content influences politics, the policies, approaches, and international relations of social media companies are directed or conducted by corporate executives and their representatives, actors who receive limited critical attention in International Relations (IR) scholarship. Combining multiple data sources, including field interviews with Meta and Twitter staff on three continents, this reflection suggests an approach to studying social media companies and their relationships to global politics that moves beyond abstraction and aggregation. Examining these actors and their internal dynamics through an organizational lens can shed fresh light on the contingent spatial, temporal, and normative drivers and enactments of their influence across the international system.
... Concerned with private companies' ability to skew public interests in favour of profit concerns (Bradford, 2023a;Golia, 2023a), this approach presents a call to action for state and regional governments, such as the EU, to develop a cohesive and demanding regulatory framework capable of constraining corporate power (De Gregorio, 2022). In tandem with Bradford's assessment of digital regulation's vertical war (i.e., a battle aiming to promote regulation of the digital economy through state and regional apparatus), this approach refutes the possibility of platforms themselves developing selfregulatory solutions that can benefit society in general and focus on the regulatory capacity of the state or the EU to commandeer the application of human rights within the digital environment, even if within a co-regulatory framework (Bradford, 2023a;De Gregorio, 2022). ...
... Concerned with private companies' ability to skew public interests in favour of profit concerns (Bradford, 2023a;Golia, 2023a), this approach presents a call to action for state and regional governments, such as the EU, to develop a cohesive and demanding regulatory framework capable of constraining corporate power (De Gregorio, 2022). In tandem with Bradford's assessment of digital regulation's vertical war (i.e., a battle aiming to promote regulation of the digital economy through state and regional apparatus), this approach refutes the possibility of platforms themselves developing selfregulatory solutions that can benefit society in general and focus on the regulatory capacity of the state or the EU to commandeer the application of human rights within the digital environment, even if within a co-regulatory framework (Bradford, 2023a;De Gregorio, 2022). ...
... The above description of the two first scenarios explains the situation previously discussed of X's users in India and the platform's decision-making during a sensitive political moment in which it first cooperated with the government's request for content blocking and user removal, favouring the interests of the state, and later backtracked and reinstated the account of protesters in favour of users human rights (Phartiyal, 2021;Poddar, 2023). The third scenario is easily related to the EU regulatory model for the digital economy, in which a baseline consensus among Europeans has allowed the exploration of the regulatory capacity of the bloc towards the definition of a particular distribution of power between digital companies and public-oriented values (Bradford, 2023b(Bradford, , 2023a. ...
This article explores the complex relationship between digital constitutionalism and democracy, focusing on how individuals navigate governance both as citizens of nation-states and as users of digital platforms. Drawing on the concept of quantum superposition, it argues that individuals exist simultaneously in multiple governance frameworks, influencing the legitimacy and democratic stability of both digital and national environments. It adopts a societal constitutional approach recognising digital platforms as transnational loci of power entangled with national constitutional systems. Within this scope, it investigates how digital constitutionalism intersects with the governance of and by platforms and advocates for a republican approach that better reflects the contingency and complexity of transnational governance environments. The argument is further corroborated by a quantitative analysis of the public comments submitted to Meta’s Oversight Board between 2020 and 2023, highlighting the asymmetries of users’ active engagement in content moderation practices and how this may impact the platform's attempt to enlarge internal and external legitimacy and democratic politics.
... We assume that the AI stakeholder environment greatly varies across the three countries. Whereas the strong position of industry actors in AI discourse and development is an international phenomenon [Brause et al., 2023], it is particularly evident in the U.S., being home to most major technology firms and a market-based regulatory framework [Bradford, 2023]. In Germany, we anticipate a more diverse stakeholder setup. ...
... In Germany, we anticipate a more diverse stakeholder setup. There are strong industry stakeholders in Germany, but also a substantive policy debate and public regulation at both national and EU level [Bradford, 2023]. This further allows for more effective interventions by NGOs and facilitates public debates. ...
... The portrayed imaginaries bear the distinct and different sociocultural and political contexts of the three case studies, yet when looking at the relation between countries, they share one similar dominant imaginary around an AI race. This imaginary reflects the ongoing global negotiation for political and economic power ascribed to AI technology [Bradford, 2023]. Externally, this imaginary plays on nationalistic ideals of being a global leader or superpower. ...
This paper examines how artificial intelligence (AI) imaginaries are negotiated by key stakeholders in the United States, China, and Germany, focusing on how public perceptions and discourses shape AI as a sociotechnical phenomenon. Drawing on the concept of sociotechnical imaginaries in public communication, the study explores how stakeholders from industry, government, academia, media and civil society actively co-construct and contest visions of the future of AI. The comparative analysis challenges the notion that national perceptions are monolithic, highlighting the complex and heterogeneous discursive processes surrounding AI. The paper utilises stakeholder interviews to analyse how different actors position themselves within these imaginaries. The analysis highlights overarching and sociopolitically diverse AI imaginaries as well as sectoral and stakeholder co-dependencies within and across the case study countries. It hence offers insights into the socio-political dynamics that influence AI’s evolving role in society, thus contributing to debates on science communication and the social construction of technology.
... The rapid advancement of digital technologies -especially artificial intelligence AI, digitization, automation, quantum computing, big data, and blockchain -is reshaping global politics (Allison, 2020;Bradford, 2023;Inkster, 2021;McCarthy, 2017). This transformation intensifies technological competition between the United States (U.S.) and China, altering geopolitical dynamics, complicating diplomatic relations, and raising concerns about international security. ...
... Recent analyses explore the geopolitical implications of this competition. Authors have investigated its geopolitical consequences, including concerns about a new Cold War-style contest for technological supremacy (Allison, 2020;Bryson & Malikova, 2021;Retzmann, 2024;Schmid et al., 2025;Wu, 2020), the potential effects of techno-logical decoupling (Inkster, 2021), the influence on military strategies and policy development (Johnson, 2021;Mori, 2019;Sun, 2019;Wong, 2021), and the conflict of regulatory standards and governance models in AI and cyberspace (Bradford, 2023;Hine & Floridi, 2022). Understanding how narratives shape geopolitical strategies is crucial, as discourse significantly influences world politics and affects how states justify their actions and strategic priorities (Deudney et al., 2023;Hagström & Gustafsson, 2019;Linklater, 2009;Prochniak & Nitoiu, 2023). ...
The intensifying technological competition between the United States and China is reshaping global power dynamics, deepening the digital divide, and complicating efforts to address shared global challenges. Adopting a neoclassical geopolitics approach-recognizing the interplay of material capabilities and ideational factors-, this article examines how geopolitical narratives regarding digital technologies, particularly artificial intelligence (AI), reflect and shape this competition. It proposes three heuristic "ge-opolitical narratives" grounded in international relations theories: a "closed world" narrative (realism), emphasizing security and sovereignty; an "open world" narrative (liberalism), focusing on cooperation and multilateral governance; and a "world of injustices" narrative (critical theories), highlighting global inequalities and digital divides. Through a qualitative content analysis of political speeches by Joe Biden and Xi Jinping (2018-2023), the study reveals how these leaders strategically deploy narratives to justify policies, promote interests, and influence global AI discourses. The findings underscore the bidirectional nature of narratives, which both reflect and shape strategic objectives and policy decisions. This article contributes to understanding how narratives influence global AI governance, highlighting their role in shaping international alliances and technological norms amid shifting geopolitical dynamics.
... Existing and emerging digital markets regulation often focus on the large technological companies such as Alphabet, Apple, Amazon, ByteDance, Facebook parent company Meta, and Microsoft (Bradford, 2023;Birch and Cochrane, 2022). This can be seen in the EU's Digital Markets Act which focuses solely on regulating these large technological companies, and the UK's Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act which focuses solely on regulating firms who are designated as having strategic market status (SMS), which is equivalent to the large technological companies. ...
... This can be seen in the EU's Digital Markets Act which focuses solely on regulating these large technological companies, and the UK's Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act which focuses solely on regulating firms who are designated as having strategic market status (SMS), which is equivalent to the large technological companies. The regulatory focus on large technological companies is because they control the world's digital transactional platforms (Bradford, 2023). While regulating the large technological companies is important to mitigate certain risks, the deliberate focus on only the large technological companies without focusing on the users of the digital transactional platforms may seem unfair to large technological companies. ...
This study explores digital markets, their formative components, regulation and regulatory challenges. It also presents a concise definition of “digital markets” and suggests a link between digital markets and digital financial inclusion. The study projects digital markets to be a game changer for society. It analyses the regulation of digital markets, particularly the recent EU Digital Markets Act, and show that regulation focus mostly on the large technological companies. The study also shows the benefits of digital market regulation for users of digital markets and the demerits for the large technological companies who own the world’s largest digital transactional platforms in digital markets. The criticisms of regulating large technological companies are also identified.
... Bradford, Anu. 2023. Digital Empires: The Global Battle to Regulate Technology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. E-book. 63 Boscheck, Ralf. 2024. "The EU's Digital Markets Act: Regulatory Reform, Relapse or Reversal." Intereconomics 59 (3): 154-59, 154. ...
O presente artigo tem como objetivo analisar as medidas que já existem no ordenamento jurídico brasileiro — ou que se encontram em debate legislativo — para prevenir práticas anticompetitivas das Big Tech e evitar seu monopólio sobre a inteligência artificial no Brasil. Para tanto, o trabalho divide-se em três partes: primeiramente, realiza-se uma análise das características da IA e de sua relação com as Big Tech. Em seguida, examinam-se os mecanismos atualmente previstos no direito antitruste brasileiro, com ênfase no papel do CADE e na análise das infrações à ordem econômica. Por fim, discutem-se os instrumentos previstos no Projeto de Lei 2338/2023, que visa instituir o Marco Legal da Inteligência Artificial no Brasil, bem como no Plano Brasileiro de Inteligência Artificial. O estudo demonstra que, caso o PL 2338/2023 e o Plano Brasileiro de IA sejam aprovados na forma em que se encontram, em conjunto com a legislação antitruste vigente, o Brasil disporá de mecanismos legislativos eficazes para coibir o abuso de posição dominante pelas Big Tech.
... This was not observed in the Netherlands or Hong Kong. We argue that this difference reflects broader concerns about privacy and data manipulation by powerful elites: the United States has been slower to implement regulatory frameworks for tech companies due to its focus on market-driven innovation compared to the Netherlands and Hong Kong, which may lead to greater skepticism about AI (Bradford, 2023). Finally, only in the United States do conspiracy beliefs shape the effectiveness of debunking messages, consistent with the cross-country difference that conspiracy beliefs are notably stronger in the United States. ...
This study investigates the effectiveness of public health institutions’ misinformation debunking on social media by examining the impact of message features—social media intermediaries, message framing, and social cues—alongside the moderating roles of political cynicism and conspiracy beliefs. We conducted preregistered survey experiments in Hong Kong, the Netherlands, and the United States (total N = 2,769). Results show that sponsored messages outperformed AI recommendations. Causal framing would backfire for the cynics (in both Hong Kong and the Netherlands). In the United States, peer-shared messages enhanced source and message evaluations among those with higher conspiracy beliefs.
... We pay whatever we can afford. It could be said that the digital world unfolded before our eyes, the states looked aside for years, and then, in the mid-2000s, they started a regulatory race (Bradford 2023) so that the digital immigrants would regulate digital natives (Prensky 2001). ...
Concepts of technofeudalism and neomedievalism offer valuable frameworks for understanding the complex and evolving challenges of internet governance and regulation in the contemporary digital era. Neomedievalism can provide an accessible explanation of internet sovereignty, the regulatory needs of states, and the relationship between users and giant platforms. The notion of technofeudalism is in line with the neomedievalist vision of a return to a more fragmented and hierarchical social order. Just as medieval society was characterised by a rigid hierarchy, where the position was primarily determined by birth or loyalty, the technofeudal order is characterised by digital serfdom. This paper develops the two concepts and shows the possibilities and also the limitations of their applicability for internet governance.
... Currently TikTok is involved in a US-centric but globally relevant debate about how its users and their data should be regulated. The main three regulatory models (i.e., U.S. American, Chinese, and European) each have differing perspectives on such things as privacy, security, and user rights (Bradford, 2023). Across the globe, technology companies are seeking to capture future markets of the next users; that is, users within cultures with emerging market economies and growing youth populations like Africa, the Middle East, and the Global South (Arora, 2019). ...
TikTok is a video-only social media platform with an estimated one billion global users. This study focuses on TikTok videos produced by and for Latine girls who employ the meme “no sabo,” a malapropism of “no sé” or “I don’t know.” More than a phrase to describe Latines with awkward Spanish fluency, the term indexes Latines struggling with the fluid and contingent standards of Latinidad. Latine girls occupy specific intersections of positionalities that offer both limitations and possibilities concerning Latinidad’s dominant constructs. Through inductive critical analysis, this study examines Latine girls’ no sabo TikTok videos as a form of transnational discourse. We identify three transnational mimetic suggestions across three transgressive themes: translating, transmuting, and transgenerating. These themes present agentic capacities of and for Latine girls in the twenty-first century. Our findings underscore the innovative and transformative strategies that can be located in these Latine girls’ videos for reimagining cultural belonging.
... In a more capitalist environment, successful IAs might be those that best attract, and especially monetize, flows from consumers for profit 4,85 . The two main models of this are subscription IAs, where individuals pay to receive and/or transmit information, and advertising IAs, where the information transmitted is incidental relative to the information that can be captured about users and sold to those who would pay for it. ...
... Finally, social media platforms have been skilful in navigating the series of international crises, managing to reframe a public policy issue such as the regulation of Big Tech as a "geopolitical" issue (Bradford, 2023) that is mostly looked through the lens of "security" (Mügge, 2023; see also Proto et al., in press). ...
The emergence of social media companies, and the spread of disinformation as a result of their “surveillance capitalist” business model, has opened wide political and regulatory debates across the globe. The EU has often positioned itself as a normative leader and standard-setter, and has increasingly attempted to assert its sovereignty in relation to social media platforms. In the first part of this article, we argue that the EU has achieved neither sovereignty nor normative leadership: Existing regulations on disinformation in fact have missed the mark since they fail to challenge social media companies’ business models and address the underlying causes of disinformation. This has been the result of the EU increasingly “outsourcing” regulation of disinformation to corporate platforms. If disinformation is not simply a “bug” in the system, but a feature of profit-driven platforms, public–private cooperation emerges as part of the problem rather than a solution. In the second part, we outline a set of priorities to imagine alternatives to current social media monopolies and discuss what could be the EU’s role in fostering them. We argue that alternatives ought to be built decolonially and across the stack, and that the democratisation of technology cannot operate in isolation from a wider socialist political transformation of the EU and beyond.
... As a result, governments may have room to enact additional requirements related to risk mitigation without imposing additional compliance burdens on some companies. 3. Considering initiatives from a variety of different jurisdictions can significantly enhance analysis of AI safety [15,3]. By including both regulations and policies from the US, EU, and China, we were better able to assess the regulatory environment facing multinational companies and potential opportunities for global cooperation on AI safety. 2 We hope to analyze policies from a larger number of countries in future work. ...
We present a comprehensive AI risk taxonomy derived from eight government poli- cies from the European Union, United States, and China and 16 company policies worldwide, making a significant step towards establishing a unified language for generative AI safety evaluation. We identify 314 unique risk categories, organized into a four-tiered taxonomy. At the highest level, this taxonomy encompasses System & Operational Risks, Content Safety Risks, Societal Risks, and Legal & Rights Risks. The taxonomy establishes connections between various descriptions and approaches to risk, highlighting the overlaps and discrepancies between public and private sector conceptions of risk. By providing this unified framework, we aim to advance AI safety through information sharing across sectors and the promotion of best practices in risk mitigation for generative AI models and systems.
... Like "platform societies" elsewhere, Chinese society faces growing challenges related to market competition, information order, privacy, social inequality and stability, data security, and such. Given differences in political economies and positions within global techno-economic value chains, countries adopt varying approaches to platform governance (Bradford, 2023). However, as Gorwa (2019, p. 1) argues, "governance is less a set of practices than a capacity." ...
The “platform turn” across various disciplines has introduced a new framework for analyzing the global digital economy. This special issue critically engages with existing discussions by adopting a broad political-economic perspective on the platform economy in China. Aiming to deconstruct and contextualize the dominant concepts of “platformization” and “infrastructuralization,” we focus on three central themes under the overarching framework of Digital China : “Platform cum Infrastructure along a Techno-developmental Path,” “Platform Governance,” and “Platform Spatiality and Geopolitics.” These themes collectively deepen our understanding of the temporal and spatial dynamics of platforms, as well as their conceptual significance as evolving processes and outcomes. More importantly, we highlight how the development of Chinese platforms reflects not only the contours of China’s contested integration into global capitalism but also the state’s shifting socio-economic priorities and its broader aspiration to establish a distinct “Chinese model of modernization.”
... Additionally, it fostered international cooperation by establishing the "Chip 4" alliance-a semiconductor partnership among Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and the United States. The Biden administration has made technological competition a central element of its China policy, framing it within a binary context of "techno-democracies" versus "techno-autocracies" (Bradford, 2023). Furthermore, the Biden administration has successfully united traditional allies to counterbalance China, leading to a cohesive alliance of nations with shared values and objectives. ...
This study conducts a comparative analysis of two major trade conflicts-the U.S.-Japan trade friction of the 1980s and the current U.S.-China trade war- to explore the critical role of heterogeneity in shaping these conflicts. The study posits that heterogeneity cannot be assimilated or eliminated because countries, as countries like China and Japan inherently develop models different from that of the United States. Moreover, heterogeneity is closely related to state power; when power levels between states converge, heterogeneity is often seen as a potential threat.However, this study also points out that similarities in political institutions and ideologies can help mitigate the scope and intensity of conflicts. In the case of the U.S.-Japan dispute, most of the conflict has been contained between the two countries through targeted bilateral negotiations and industry-specific agreements. In contrast, the -China economic game poses a more far-reaching challenge to the existing international order. While China's economic rise has followed certain similar path to Japan's, its unique political system and ideological differences have made the impact of this conflict more pronounced.
... Hence, on a deeper level, these unilateral sanctions also reflect the legacies of colonialism, where Global South nations are viewed as incapable of possessing, developing, or handling advanced technologies or certain capabilities such as semiconductors, supercomputers, and AI, as exemplified by the FDPR. Instead, they are demoted to the role of consumer markets and are subordinated to the demands of data extraction (Bradford, 2023;Kwet, 2019). While the US exploited IPRs revenues during decades of offshoring and outsourcing, it has become increasingly dissatisfied with Chinese capitalisation over these investments and technologies within Chinese national development strategies, such as the MC25. ...
The contemporary use of export controls by the US as a tool for compliance and enforcement has expanded a grey zone within global economic networks, where security and economic measures increasingly justify one another. These export controls, combined with industrial policies, reflect an emerging geoeconomic strategy. We examine the US growing use of export controls as a geoeconomic tool to curb China’s technological advancement, particularly in the semiconductor industry, focusing on the active role of the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS). We argue that the BIS has significantly expanded its influence under the Trump and Biden administrations, especially through policies targeting US-China technological rivalry, such as the Foreign Direct Product Rule (FDPR). This expansion is analysed through the lens of extraterritoriality, emphasising the usage of US structural power within the semiconductor industry and its supply chains. We illustrate how these policies reflect a new geoeconomic order, where economic interdependence is weaponised for strategic objectives, and global supply chains become arenas of geopolitical competition. By blocking China’s access to critical technologies, these policies reinforce US leadership but risk leading to long-term geoeconomic fragmentation in global trade and investment, raising relevant questions about international economic governance.
... 1. Comparing the regulatory efforts of a supranational bloc like the European Union (EU) with those of individual nation-states has become commonplace (e.g., Bradford, 2023), but this practice warrants criticism, particularly in discussions of sovereignty. Even if we accept the analytical distinctions, events like Brexit (Hobolt, 2016) and the rise of mainstream euroscepticism (Bijsmans, 2024) illustrate significant divisions in public opinion. ...
This study investigates the discriminatory impact of artificial intelligence (AI)-driven content moderation on social media platforms (SMPs), particularly in the Global South, where cultural and linguistic diversity often clash with the Western-centric AI frameworks. Platforms like Meta increasingly rely on AI algorithms to moderate vast amounts of content, but research shows that these algorithms disproportionately restrict free expression in the Global South (European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2023; De Gregorio & Stremlau, 2023). This results in “over removal” – censorship of lawful content – and “slow removal,” which fails to address harmful material, both of which perpetuate inequality and hinder free speech. Through a case study on Meta, this research examines how AI-based content moderation misunderstands local contexts and systematically marginalizes users. The contributing factors include limited financial investment, inadequate language training, and political and corporate biases. The imbalance reflects power asymmetries, as governments in the Global South lack influence over platform policies. This study uses a human rights perspective to explore solutions through multistakeholder engagement, advocating for collaboration among tech companies, governments, and civil society to reform AI governance. Ultimately, it aims to inform regulatory frameworks that ensure fairer, more inclusive content moderation and protect free expression for a globally equitable digital landscape.
This paper examines the relationship between democratization and the development of AI and information and communication technology (ICT). Our empirical evidence shows that in the past 10 y, the advancement of AI/ICT has hindered the development of democracy in many countries around the world. Given that both the state rulers and civil society groups can use AI/ICT, the key that determines which side would benefit more from the advancement of these technologies hinges upon “technology complementarity.” In general, AI/ICT would be more complementary to the government rulers because they are more likely than civil society groups to access various administrative big data. Empirically, we propose three hypotheses and use statistical tests to verify our argument. Theoretically, we prove a proposition, showing that when the above-mentioned complementarity assumption is true, the AI/ICT advancements would enable rulers in authoritarian and fragile democratic countries to achieve better control over civil society forces, which leads to the erosion of democracy. Our analysis explains the recent ominous development in some fragile-democracy countries.
The article is devoted to the development of legislation of Uzbekistan in the context of the transition to a digital economy. The article provides an overview of the norms introduced into the law taking into account the impact of digitalization on public relations. The author examines new provisions of the Constitution, codes, and other regulatory legal acts. Particular attention is paid to the review of concepts and strategies for the development of Uzbekistan until 2030 and their provisions regarding digital technologies. The author notes that the legislation of Uzbekistan is developing taking into account global trends, including such a factor as the intensive development of digital technologies. It is important to continue measures to improve legislation in the field of human rights taking into account the digitalization factor and to ensure reliable guarantees for the protection of human rights in the digital economy.
In the context of a globalised and interconnected world, there is a growing concern among policymakers regarding the protection of critical infrastructures, the safety and privacy of citizens, and the integrity of democratic institutions and processes. The concept of ‘digital sovereignty’ is becoming an increasingly prominent concern for governments across the globe. The advancement of digital technologies, along with the advent of AI, has intensified the global debate on technology governance and it has led to a growing consensus among stakeholders on the need for technology regulation. Concurrently, as the implications of disruptive technologies become more apparent, a notable shift in governance priorities has emerged in many jurisdictions and international fora. This paradigm shift advocates a human-centred approach with a focus on trust, the safety and security of citizens, and the alignment of technology with ethical standards. The ethical use of technology has become of paramount importance, coupled with equitable governance that seeks to establish a renewed social contract, ensuring a fair distribution of the benefits and costs associated with a digital transformation and in line with the UN Sustainable Development Goals.
The article addresses the interplay between narratives and competitive dynamics in the context of the United States–China “tech war.” It investigates the narrative shifts that have impacted the salience of technology as part of the relationship between the two states. Unpacking both US and Chinese storytelling, it contributes to the debate on the “tech war” by highlighting that it is through such narratives that objects of competition are being constituted and that actors position themselves. The findings demonstrate that the narratives of competition have changed gradually in the last two and a half decades. Technology has long played an important role in this context. But in the United States, it became even more central as part of the democracy-vs.-autocracy narrative. This narrative allowed the United States to reinvoke traditional identity narratives and assume the role of a global democratic leader while constituting China as a significant Other. The digital authoritarianism narrative emerged as a sub-narrative that has painted technology as an enabler of authoritarianism. For China, on the other hand, technological development is part of its national modernization and ultimately rejuvenation. America’s use of the democracy-vs.-autocracy narrative has been seen as an effort to safeguard its position as a global hegemon. Both states have thus increasingly perceived narrating as a distinct dimension of the competition. The United States and China compete with each other therefore not only in terms of technological performance, but they also engage in a contest of narratives—on their role in the world, the meaning of technology, and the international order.
Emerging technologies pose many new challenges for regulation and governance on a global scale. With the advent of distributed communication networks like the Internet and decentralized ledger technologies like blockchain, new platforms emerged, disrupting existing power dynamics and bringing about new claims of sovereignty from the private sector. This special issue addresses a gap in the literature by focusing the discourse on the issue of trust and confidence in the digital realm. In particular, looking at the evolution of the web (from Web 1.0, to Web 2.0, and then Web 3), this article analyses how every iteration reflects a different way of dealing with the problem of trust online, resulting in a different regulation and governance landscape. Technology is often regarded as a new lever of regulation, attempting to resolve the problem of “trust” online, either through the introduction of a new trusted authority (Web 2.0) or through the introduction of technological guarantees that provide more assurance—or “confidence”—in the way interactions can be operationalized (Web 3). Yet, each of these technologies also introduce new risks and governance costs, ultimately shifting the problem of trust in a new direction rather than resolving it or removing the need for trust altogether. The main contribution of the articles in this special issue is providing a better understanding of the trust challenges faced and posed by emerging technologies and demonstrating how they affect institutional governance—in both theory and practice—with a view to help policymakers find appropriate answers to these challenges.
In order to mitigate concerns over potential disruptive impacts of the integration of artificial intelligence in the criminal justice system on criminal justice, the article explores the European Union's human-centric approach towards that integration, emphasising the balance to be struck between technological advancement and fundamental values and rights on the basis of legal and ethical principles. While existing literature explores AI's role in the criminal justice systems, devoid of sufficient in-depth analysis on the application of EU’s human-centric strategy in the criminal justice systems, there is a gap in examining how the EU’s human-centric strategy directly shapes legal, ethical and regulatory frameworks. Based on the EU AI strategy with the aim of moderately filling this gap it discusses how the framework addresses ethical concerns in order to keep human’s place centric with safeguarded fundamental rights and values in the application of the AI system within the criminal justice system. To attain that objective the analysis highlights the mitigation of bias and enhancement of fairness, the protection of privacy and data, the significance of human oversight, encouraging multi-stakeholder engagement, the non-substitution of human judges by automated decision-making within the framework of the EU's commitment to developing AI technologies that all serve the public good while respecting fundamental rights and values. The article contributes to the ongoing discourse on responsible AI integration into criminal justice by synthesising insights from legal, ethical and AI governance frameworks.
The Brussels effect has become a major tool for analysing the global exemplary impact of the European Union (EU) rules in academia and policy‐making. It is entering uncharted territory. Heightened corporate lobbying and third‐country influence test the EU's regulatory capacity and the stringency of its standards while shifting political tides challenge the EU's aspirations as a global rule‐maker. Threats from Donald Trump and tech firm executives abound. To capture such dynamics, the article outlays a pioneering reconceptualisation of this effect, drawing from the political economy concepts of instrumental and structural/hybrid power. This reconceptualisation equips the Brussels effect framework with analytical tools needed to tackle contemporary governance challenges while encompassing advocacy efforts that undermine the background conditions of this effect. Reconceptualising the Brussels effect also helps us to address the shifting world political dynamics while adjoining it with broader debates on power and polycentric governance.
The paper considers the question of location in the development and governance of artificial intelligence in Africa. The discussion draws from ideas on locational advantage and the mix of factors that affect inequalities in AI development and how this influences the ability that countries have to shape AI norms, cultures and governance. It analyses policy documents and internet databases to highlight Africa’s place in AI development, the continent’s governance approach and the symbiotic relationship that explains the influence of advanced countries and tech corporations in the AI landscape. Based on this, it proposes the concept of the ‘politics of locationality’ to extend our understanding of how the power resident in AI systems is associated with their primary situatedness and how this reality, in turn, (re)produces imbalances and unequal opportunities for Africa in AI development and governance. It concludes with implications for Africa’s contribution to global AI cultures, design and governance at this time of pressing need for well-balanced AI policies.
Este artigo analisa a relação entre o uso de dados pessoais e as tecnologias de inteligência artificial (IA) em certos países relevantes para o estudo, destacando seus desenvolvimentos históricos e desafios regulatórios. O uso de dados pessoais inicialmente focou na privacidade e evoluiu para a proteção de dados, enquanto a IA, surgida no século XX, ganhou relevância comercial de forma mais abrangente a partir da década de 1990, exigindo amplo processamento de dados e gerando tanto benefícios quanto riscos. No Brasil, a Lei Geral de Proteção de Dados Pessoais (LGPD) estabeleceu um marco jurídico, mas a regulamentação da IA ainda está em discussão, buscando equilibrar inovação com direitos fundamentais e segurança jurídica.
AI in Society provides an interdisciplinary corpus for understanding artificial intelligence (AI) as a global phenomenon that transcends geographical and disciplinary boundaries. Edited by a consortium of experts hailing from diverse academic traditions and regions, the 11 edited and curated sections provide a holistic view of AI’s societal impact. Critically, the work goes beyond the often Eurocentric or U.S.-centric perspectives that dominate the discourse, offering nuanced analyses that encompass the implications of AI for a range of regions of the world. Taken together, the sections of this work seek to move beyond the state of the art in three specific respects. First, they venture decisively beyond existing research efforts to develop a comprehensive account and framework for the rapidly growing importance of AI in virtually all sectors of society. Going beyond a mere mapping exercise, the curated sections assess opportunities, critically discuss risks, and offer solutions to the manifold challenges AI harbors in various societal contexts, from individual labor to global business, law and governance, and interpersonal relationships. Second, the work tackles specific societal and regulatory challenges triggered by the advent of AI and, more specifically, large generative AI models and foundation models, such as ChatGPT or GPT-4, which have so far received limited attention in the literature, particularly in monographs or edited volumes. Third, the novelty of the project is underscored by its decidedly interdisciplinary perspective: each section, whether covering Conflict; Culture, Art, and Knowledge Work; Relationships; or Personhood—among others—will draw on various strands of knowledge and research, crossing disciplinary boundaries and uniting perspectives most appropriate for the context at hand.
The regulatory state is under severe stress. The rise of populism, at times with authoritarian tendencies, is challenging the very fundamentals of the regulatory state and regulatory governance. Populist leaders do not simply politicize and undermine regulatory governance, but they tend to transform the regulatory state. Despite the rich and ever-expanding debate about the impact of the populist ascent and democratic backsliding on public administration, bureaucracy, and public policy, research on the effect of populist rule on regulatory governance and the regulatory state is still scant. In this paper, we show how to address this gap and present two major contributions to guide future research agenda. First, we revisit the populist ascent and map out the current state of our (limited) knowledge. Second, we discuss five avenues scholars could follow in order to develop empirical and/or conceptual insights in order to better understand the transforming regulatory state: populist strategies for controlling regulatory agencies, the politics of regulatory design, market responses to regulatory instability, the role of transgovernmental networks and international constraints, and regulatory agency responses and adaptation to the populist ascent.
Current global AI governance frameworks struggle with fragmented disciplinary collaboration, ineffective multilateral coordination, and disconnects between policy design and grassroots implementation. This study, guided by Integration and Implementation Science (IIS) initiated a structured interdisciplinary dialogue at the UN Science Summit, convening legal, NGO, and HCI experts to tackle those challenges. Drawing on the common ground of the experts: dynamism, experimentation, inclusivity, and paradoxical governance, this study, through thematic analysis and interdisciplinary comparison analysis, identifies four core principles of global AI governance. Furthermore, we translate these abstract principles into concrete action plans leveraging the distinct yet complementary perspectives of each discipline. These principles and action plans are then integrated into a five-phase, time-sequential framework including foundation building, experimental verification, collaborative optimization, global adaptation, and continuous evolution phases. This multilevel framework offers a novel and concrete pathway toward establishing interdisciplinary, multilateral, and vertically coordinated AI governance, transforming global AI governance challenges into opportunities for political actions.
This paper examines the extent to which there is regulatory competition in the area of EU data protection law and whether this analytical perspective can explain the dynamics of legislative developments. It finds that due to the broad territorial scope of application of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and its spillover effects, the so-called Brussels effect, companies do not have the possibility to influence the applicable law. Thus, there is no regulatory competition between the EU and third countries. However, if the focus is shifted to the relationship between Member States, some regulatory competition can be observed in terms of the level of public enforcement. While companies cannot opt out of the application of the GDPR as such, they may be able to influence the competent lead supervisory authority by choosing the location of their establishment within the EU. Finally, it is discussed and answered in the negative whether the theory of regulatory competition can be applied to contractual relationships between a data controller and a data subject, such as the operator of a social network and a consumer.
The digital single market is the site of major social and technological upheavals. Big data, artificial intelligence (AI), and platforms pose fundamental challenges for legislators and global businesses alike. This chapter provides an overview of the salient features, challenges, and research gaps in the analysis and regulation of the digital single market, setting the stage for the in-depth contributions in this volume.
Regulatory competition in the digital realm stands out due to the intersection of traditional legal frameworks and the emergence of regulatory technologies. As regulation of digital technologies and markets proliferates in the European Union, but also in the United States and China, the evolving global governance of the digital economy raises a critical question: How will competition between private and public regulators, as well as between different jurisdictions, affect firms’ strategic decisions, the development and diffusion of innovative technologies, and, ultimately, the welfare of societies? This contribution explores the peculiarities of regulatory competition in the digital realm, highlighting how technology itself—through algorithms, platforms, and protocols—functions as a regulatory force alongside formal legal systems. Drawing parallels to Lawrence Lessig’s seminal work on code as law, the paper explores how code, driven by private actors and technological innovation, competes with state-imposed legal norms to influence digital governance and market behavior. By considering issues such as online platform terms, smart contracts, and AI governance, the paper illustrates how regulatory competition in the digital realm is reshaping the relationship between law and technology, raising new questions about sovereignty, enforcement, and the role of law in a digitally driven world.
This paper analyses regulatory competition in the digital economy through three interconnected lenses: theoretical foundations, EU framework conditions and practical applications in recent EU digital regulations. It demonstrates how the interplay between centralised and decentralised rule-making, including private ordering, shapes regulatory outcomes in digital markets. The paper finds that whilst the EU has opted for centralised regulation through the GDPR, DSA and AI Act internally, it maintains pockets of decentralised rule-making through private ordering mechanisms. Beyond the EU’s borders, the paper shows how these regulations affect global regulatory competition through two key mechanisms: the ‘effects doctrine’ and the ‘Brussels effect’. The analysis reveals that the EU has emerged as a central global rule-maker in digital regulation, capable of inducing a ‘race to the top’ through its European rights-driven regulatory model, whilst still preserving space for regulatory experimentation. This dual approach of centralised standard-setting with retained flexibility for innovation exemplifies how regulatory competition can be productively channelled in rapidly evolving digital markets.
This informative Handbook provides a comprehensive overview of the legal, ethical, and policy implications of AI and algorithmic systems. As these technologies continue to impact various aspects of our lives, it is crucial to understand and assess the challenges and opportunities they present. Drawing on contributions from experts in various disciplines, the book covers theoretical insights and practical examples of how AI systems are used in society today. It also explores the legal and policy instruments governing AI, with a focus on Europe. The interdisciplinary approach of this book makes it an invaluable resource for anyone seeking to gain a deeper understanding of AI's impact on society and how it should be regulated. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.
An increasing number of data policies and legislative models are being developed globally. These complex data laws and circulation models are often competing and have extra-territorial implications, thereby complicating global data management for multinational enterprises. Adopting an institutional logic perspective, this study focuses on the European Union, the United States, and China as key representative economies. It aims to outline the three prevailing regulatory patterns in cross-border data transfer, their evolutionary trajectories, and the institutional logic behind them. Furthermore, the research investigates the conflicts in data circulation across borders among these major economies, examining their effects on the global data governance of multinational enterprises (MNEs) and identifying the universal challenges in current global data transfers. In response, we propose a future research agenda, grounded in theoretical insights, for international business research to address these challenges through the efforts of MNEs and public policy.
Concerns over the amount of corporation tax paid by firms in digitally intensive industries have led to efforts to reform corporate tax codes at national and international levels. Despite this, there is little evidence to suggest firms in digitally intensive industries pay less corporate tax. The paper examines the interplay of digitalisation, firm size and MNE status to investigate if large, digitally intensive and multinational firms do indeed pay less tax, as measured by the cash effective tax rate (Cash ETR). It finds no significant relationship between industry digitalisation and Cash ETRs using a primary measure of industry digitalisation. However, the interactions of digitalisation, firm size and MNE status exhibit statistically significant impacts on Cash ETRs, though the magnitudes are modest. Larger firms in digital intensive industries tend to have Cash ETRs that are 1% lower than their less digital intensive equivalents. MNEs in more digital intensive industries tend to have Cash ETRs that are approximately 0.5% lower than firms in less digital intensive industries. Notably, the very largest tech firms display considerably lower Cash ETRs, thus, it would appear they provide much of the impetus for corporate tax reform.
In this paper, we provide a systematic review of existing artificial intelligence (AI) regulations in Europe, the United States, and Canada. We build on the qualitative analysis of 129 AI regulations (enacted and not enacted) to identify patterns in regulatory strategies and in AI transparency requirements. Based on the analysis of this sample, we suggest that there are three main regulatory strategies for AI: AI-focused overhauls of existing regulation, the introduction of novel AI regulation, and the omnibus approach. We argue that although these types emerge as distinct strategies, their boundaries are porous as the AI regulation landscape is rapidly evolving. We find that across our sample, AI transparency is effectively treated as a central mechanism for meaningful mitigation of potential AI harms. We therefore focus on AI transparency mandates in our analysis and identify six AI transparency patterns: human in the loop, assessments, audits, disclosures, inventories, and red teaming. We contend that this qualitative analysis of AI regulations and AI transparency patterns provides a much needed bridge between the policy discourse on AI, which is all too often bound up in very detailed legal discussions and applied sociotechnical research on AI fairness, accountability, and transparency.
China's approach to Internet governance is increasingly perceived as a Party‐centric model, aligning the state under the Chinese Communist Party's (the Party) leadership. The division of labor between the Party and the state in the context of political centralization and Party centrality remains unclear. This study aims to address this knowledge gap by examining the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC), a central player in Internet governance, which also functions as a Party organ under the name of the Office of the Central Cyberspace Affairs Commission (OCCAC). Utilizing a novel data set of policy documents, this study explores how CAC's dual Party‐state status plays out in China's Internet governance. The findings indicate that policies on Internet development are predominantly issued under the Party's name (OCCAC), while regulatory policies concerning the Internet industry are primarily issued under the state's name (CAC). Nevertheless, the Party's nameplate (OCCAC) is increasingly utilized for social regulations related to the Internet sector. These findings present nuanced insights into the practices of China's Internet governance, suggesting a conceptual need to differentiate the roles played by the Party and the state in shaping Internet governance under authoritarianism.
The paper aims to highlight the conflict between the idea of state control over the Internet and the impact on freedom of expression and access to information and to challenge the state-driven regulatory model. The doctrine of cyber sovereignty, as advocated by China and Russia, is an example of such control in the absence of international legally binding regulation. First, the special features of cyberspace as a sui generis phenomenon are presented, as well as the attempts of the United Nations to create a legal framework for this special environment. Second, the digital perspective of the right to access information is analysed, followed by the meaning of the principle of state sovereignty and the impact on the digital space, especially its fragmentation. Addressing this conflict is crucial to safeguarding fundamental rights in the digital empire, divided between the doctrine of human rights, the idea of open space and the control of information supported by authoritative regimes.
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