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POLAND
IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
SGH PUBLISHING HOUSE
SGH WARSAW SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS
www.wydawnictwo.sgh.waw.pl
EDITED BY ADAM A. AMBROZIAK
Report 2023
POLAND IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
Report 2023
POLAND
IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
Report 2023
POLAND
IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
Report 2023
EDITED BY ADAM A. AMBROZIAK
WARSAW 2023
Reviewers
Joanna Bednarz
Ida Musiałkowska
© Copyright by SGH Warsaw School of Economics, Warsaw 2023
All rights reserved. Any copying, reprinting or distribution of a part or the whole of this publication
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Order 67/IV/23
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction 7
Elżbieta Kawecka-Wyrzykowska
Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine vis-à-visProgress on Energy Transformation
inPoland 11
Introduction 11
1. Goals of energy policy inthe EU and within Poland 12
2. Structure of fuel consumption inPoland relative tothe EU average 14
3. Actions taken inPoland tomitigate the negative consequences ofthe war inUkraine
for energy suppliers and recipients 15
4. Costs of the transformation and sources of its financing 16
5. EU financial support 18
6. The pros and cons of expedited decarbonization (energytransformation) 20
Conclusions 23
Marzenna Błaszczuk-Zawiła
Poland’s CO2 Emission– Volume, Trends and Modalities. What It Means
forthe European Union? 29
Introduction 29
1. Total GHG emissions inPoland. Significance of CO2 30
2. Main sources of CO2 emissions inPoland 34
3. Main reasons for the high emission levels inthe Polish economy 41
Conclusions 48
Michał Schwabe
New Challenges inTurbulent Times– Immigration toPoland during
theYears 2020–2022 53
Introduction 53
1. Immigration toPoland during the COVID-19 pandemic 54
2. Crisis on the Poland-Belarus border 57
3. Forced migration from Ukraine toPoland as aresult of Russian aggression inUkraine 59
Conclusions 67
AdamA.Ambroziak
Evolution of Geographical Distribution of Regional State Aid inPoland
Following European Union Accession 73
Introduction 73
1. The evolution of area classification and the intensity ofadmissible regional state aid
inPoland 75
2. Distribution of domestic regional aid inPoland in2004–2021 83
3. Critical evaluation of the classification of areas covered by regionalaid 88
Conclusions 97
1
2
3
4
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Michał Kulpiński
European Union Trade inGoods withthe African Continent– Position
ofPoland 101
Introduction 101
1. Trade ingoods between Poland, the EU and the African continent 103
2. Significance of trade with Africa for EU member states 109
3. Poland’s comparative advantage inEuropean export toAfrica 113
4. Commodity structure of Polish and EU trade with Africa 117
Conclusions 120
Elżbieta Kawecka-Wyrzykowska
Poland’s Settlements with the European Union Budget from May 2004
tillthe Endof2022, and Funds Available from 2021 to2027 123
Introduction 123
1. Transfers toPoland from 1 May 2004 to31 December 2022 124
2. Poland’s payments tothe EU budget 129
3. Balance of accounts 131
4. Funds for Poland under the Multiannual Financial Framework 2021–2027 132
Conclusions 137
AdamA.Ambroziak
Evolution of State Aid inPoland Compared toOther European Union
Member States in2004–2020 143
Introduction 143
1. Value of state aid 144
2. Revealed state aid intensity 145
3. GBER 147
4. State aid similarity 147
5. Structure of state aid purposes 148
Conclusions 150
AdamA.Ambroziak
COVID-19 State Aid inPoland in2020–2022 151
Introduction 151
1. Change inthe European Commission’s approach toCOVID-19 state aid 151
2. EU member states’ budgets for state aid schemes 152
3. Distribution of COVID-19 state aid inEU member states 154
4. Distribution of COVID-19 state aid inPoland 156
Conclusions 159
5
6
7
8
INTRODUCTION
This monograph, entitled Poland in the European Union. Report 2023, is the third
edition of a cyclical report dealing with Poland’s membership in the EU, published by
the Warsaw School of Economics and prepared by the employees of the Department of
European Integration and Legal Studies. The report was funded by a grant received by
the Department as a subdivision of the Collegium of World Economy. As we do every
year, we strived to analyse the most important problems relating to the current stage of
Poland’s integration with the other EU member states, but also integration within the EU.
In the first chapter, titled Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine vis-à-vis Progress on Energy
Transformation in Poland, Elżbieta Kawecka-Wyrzykowska attempted to answer two
important questions. Firstly, has Poland’s progress in energy transformation been affected
by the Russian invasion in Ukraine and its aftermath, and in what way? Secondly, what
are the expected costs of decarbonization and possible sources of financing for them?
The main conclusions are as follows: Poland is the main brakesman of the ambitious
plan of decarbonization of the European Union’s economy under the Fit for 55 package.
There is no decarbonization plan providing for climate neutrality by 2050, which is
the overarching goal of the EU’s climate policy, and Poland is doing little to amplify
the significance of renewable energy sources (RES). On the contrary, Poland maintains
provisions forestalling any expansion of RES capacity. Decarbonization will be expensive
to implement, but the costs of not implementing it will be even higher, whether financial
or relating to energy sovereignty, health or climate change. There is a need for change
in the perception of the EU’s climate and energy policy in Poland. The decarbonization
policy is a chance for the development of new products and services, as well as job
creation, involving low-emission systems and based on novel technological solutions.
Equally important, the EU is offering significant financial support for the restructuring
of the energy sector.
In the next chapter, entitled Poland’s CO
2
Emission – Volume, Trends and Modalities.
What It Means for the European Union?, Marzenna Błaszczuk-Zawiła notes that Poland
was the only member state of the European Union to agree to the implementation of
the EU long-term goal of achieving climate neutrality by 2050 solely on the Union
level. It did not commit to realization of the goal on the national level, indicating the
8 Introduction
difficult starting point for the transformation, as well as very high socio-economic costs.
The chapter attempts to examine Poland’s specificity with regard to GHG emissions,
mainly CO2, and answer the question how it hinders the achievement of the climate
neutrality within the timeframe set by the European Council. The situation of Poland
was presented against the background of the other European Union member states.
The results of the study show that over thirty years (1990–2020) the reduction of GHG
emissions in Poland, especially of CO
2
, was below the EU average. The energy, transport
and residential-heating sectors had a decisive impact on emission levels. Emission
reduction requires the use (on a much greater scale than at present) of low- and zero-
emission sources, such as nuclear power and RES. Replacement of the car fleet and
accelerated thermo-modernization of buildings would be desirable. In all of these
areas, the relatively low wealth of Polish society and limited availability of funds for
investment remain a significant limitation.
The third chapter, entitled New Challenges in Turbulent Times – Immigration to
Poland during the Years 2020–2022, by Michał Schwabe, contains an analysis of the
challenges related to immigration to Poland during three consecutive years, during
which the COVID- 19 pandemic, the crisis on the Poland-Belarus border, as well as the
Russian aggression in the Ukraine affected the Polish economy. According to the author
of the chapter, the years 2020–2022 proved to be the most difficult period for Poland
since World War II in terms of immigration. Firstly, the COVID-19 pandemic triggered
concerns related to seasonal workforce shortages because of significantly reduced
international mobility. Secondly, the crisis on the Poland-Belarus border deepened the
division on Poland’s political stage, as the adopted legislation seemed to legitimize
the pushbacks of migrants, which was considered as violating numerous acts of Polish
as well as international law. Thirdly, the Russian invasion in the Ukraine in early 2022
forced millions of Ukrainians to flee their country, mostly to Poland, mobilizing the
Polish government and Polish society to provide organizational and financial assistance
of unprecedented scale. The purpose of the chapter is to evaluate the abovementioned
challenges in light of the available data and literature, with particular focus on the
Ukrainian crisis, as well as to cast a light on the Ukrainian forced migrants’ population
in Poland. Although the war did not end at the time when the chapter was prepared,
a significant volume of data was already available, including results of empirical studies
on the population of Ukrainian forced migrants living in Poland. The analysis conducted
with application of data gathered by international institutions as well as the available
results of empirical studies, allowed for drawing initial conclusions regarding Poland
as the immigration country as of 2022.
The next, fourth chapter, titled Evolution of Geographical Distribution of Regional State
Aid in Poland Following European Union Accession and written by Adam A. Ambroziak,
Introduction 9
deals with the positioning of regional aid within Poland’s intervention mechanism.
Like any other market intervention, regional state aid threatens competition, and in the
European single market it does so on a European level. According to the European
Commission, the main purpose of admissible aid is regional development in EU member
states, provided that a level playing field is ensured for companies throughout the single
market. By contrast, recent years have seen the introduction of a solution allowing some
investments (e.g., research, development and innovation or environmental protection
and energy efficiency) in areas eligible for regional aid to source more support than
projects pursued in other fields. The purpose of this study was to pinpoint the changes
in the identification of regions, intensity and geographical distribution of regional aid
in Poland. The study found that a process of divergence in regional development levels
is progressing within individual regions and throughout Poland, and that this process,
observed on the EU level, should be significantly limited on the national level. Additionally,
new guidelines on regional aid for 2022–2027 leave much more room for intervention,
which, given the lack of rigid investment goals or categories, might do little to nothing
to assist with the achievement of the EU’s climate and digital goals.
The fifth chapter, by Michał Kulpiński, entitled European Union Trade in Goods with
the African Continent – Position of Poland discusses the main characteristics of trade
in goods between the EU and the African continent, with an emphasis on Poland’s
position in that trade. In recent years, Africa has become a geographical priority for
the European Union, and a theatre of competition between the EU and other global
powers as a result of its growing importance in the world economy. The analysis of
the commodity and geographical structure of trade relations is followed by an analysis
of Poland’s comparative advantages in trade in main commodity groups of Polish
exports. The study shows that Poland have a positive trade balance, and that its trade
is growing steadily despite economic disruptions during COVID-19 pandemic. Poland’s
share in the European Union’s trade with Africa is not large, and there is potential
for growth. Poland specializes mostly in exports of goods from the agri-food sector.
Furthermore, its trade in some products has a relatively more diverse geographic
structure than the EU average.
The sixth chapter, by Elżbieta Kawecka-Wyrzykowska, offers the overview of Poland’s
financial position vis-à-vis EU budget. It includes two elements. The first one is the
presentation of Poland’s payments to the EU budget since the EU accession (2004) to the
end of 2022, transfers from the EU budget and Poland’s net position in the same period.
The second element covers funds allocated to Poland within the Multiannual Financial
Framework 2021–2022 grouped by main categories of expenditures. Conclusions address
future challenges related to Poland’s settlements with the EU budget, starting in 2028,
after the current multiannual budget expires.
10 Introduction
At the end (chapters 7 and 8), there is a short discussion of the results of research on
a continuous basis on the evolution of state aid in Poland relative to other EU member
states and COVID-19 state aid in Poland in 2020–2022 by Adam A. Ambroziak.
The Authors
Elżbieta Kawecka-Wyrzykowska
Depar tment for Europ ean Integrati on and Legal Studies
SGH Warsaw School of Economics
ekawec@sgh.waw.pl
ORCID: 0000–0002-6655-874X
RUSSIA’S INVASION OF UKRAINE
VISÀVISPROGRESS ON ENERGY
TRANSFORMATION INPOLAND
Introduction
The energy crisis resulting from the war in Ukraine has threatened the implementation
of the European Union’s existing plan providing for a 55% reduction of greenhouse gas
(GHG) emissions by 2030 and achievement of climate neutrality by 2050. As a consequence
of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, in addition to the existing question of the cost and
viability of achieving the ambitious goal of climate neutrality, the issue has also arisen
of the methods and cost of ensuring the security of energy supply. The rapid surge
in energy prices in the global market and the physical shortage of raw materials have
evoked different reactions from EU member states. Some EU member states have decided
to embrace ‘recarbonization’ in order to guarantee the security of supplies needed for
electricity and heat production for their citizens and economies. This is accompanied by
a desire to decelerate the expensive energy transformation (decarbonization) progress.1
The European Commission and some of the EU member states, by contrast, are pushing
for the continuation of the European Green Deal (EGD) and its detailed development
in the form of the Fit for 55 scheme presented by the Commission in July 2021. Shortly
after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the Commission submitted action proposals such
as the REPowerEU package to accelerate the green transformation and thus facilitate
independence from Russian fuel imports [European Commission, 2022a]. The EU even
wants to leverage the necessity of abandonment of Russian imports so as to accelerate the
1 Here, we use the terms ‘energy transformation’ and ‘decarbonization’ interchangeably, even though the
latter is broader, as it includes departure from coal (carbon) and GHG emissions not only in the energy
sector.
12 Elżbieta Kawecka-Wyrzykowska
transition to renewable energy sources and introduce other pro-ecological solutions. The
decisions eventually taken by the EU as a whole and by the member states individually
in this regard will be key to the Union’s future, as they will not only determine the costs
of energy transformation in the next few years, but can also irreversibly affect the future
climate situation in Europe and worldwide.
The purpose of this paper is to answer the following research questions:
a)
Has Poland’s progress on energy transformation been affected by the Russian invasion
of Ukraine and its consequences, and in what way?
b) What are the estimated costs of decarbonization and how could they be financed?
c) Do the war and its consequences justify slowing down the energy transformation
in Poland?
The thesis is as follows: despite the high costs, halting or materially slowing down
the decarbonization progress in Poland as a consequence of Russian aggression against
Ukraine is not justified, whether for economic, ecological or social reasons, and neither
will it be conducive to strengthening Poland’s energy sovereignty. It will only serve
to postpone the costs of the energy transformation that will have to be borne eventually.
The structure of this paper is as follows. The starting point for the analysis is a concise
presentation of the goals and instruments of the European Green Deal, including Fit for 55,
and identification of the progress on the latter in Poland as regards decarbonization. Next,
energy policy measures taken by Poland in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine are
identified and assessed. Estimates of transformation costs and the scale of EU support
to facilitate this transformation are cited in this context. The penultimate part of this
paper brings together and evaluates the main arguments for and against accelerating
decarbonization. Last but not least, conclusions are drawn from the discussion.
The main method used is the literature review of EU documents, laws as well as of
different papers.
1. Goals of energy policy inthe EU and within Poland
A concise introduction to the EU’s climate plan will be beneficial from the perspective
of properly assessing the importance of the discussion about the EGD’s future and the
possible consequences of implementing it for the economic development of the EU’s
member states and the global climate situation. The main goal of the EGD is to reduce
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions at least by 55% by 2030 (compared to 1990), so that
all GHG can be eliminated and climate neutrality can be achieved by the EU by 2050,
i.e., a situation in which the pollution volume is entirely absorbed [Regulation (EU)
2021/1119]. Moreover, the renewable energy sources (RES) share in the EU’s energy
Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine vis-à-visProgress on Energy Transformation inPoland 13
mix is to reach 40% by 2030. There is a whole package of concrete actions to accelerate
energy transformation and improve climate quality. It contains thirteen detailed
legislative proposals complementing one another. In a situation in which the energy
sector generates approximately 75% of all GHG in the EU, the new proposals refer
mainly to areas involving energy production and consumption, such as the reduction
of emissions from industry, buildings, transport and agriculture, as well as limitations
on high-emission imports [European Commission, 2021b]. The Commission found it
would not suffice for the onus of the change of the structure of European economy
toward lower emission levels to be placed, as had previously been assumed, only on the
energy and industrial sectors.
Even before the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, Poland had opposed the fast
decarbonization provided for in the EGD and expressed in specific terms in Fit for 55.
Poland is the only EU member state not to have committed to achieving climate neutrality
by 2050 along with concrete actions necessary to that end.
The current goals of Poland’s
energy policy are specified in Poland’s Energy Policy 2040 (Polityka energetyczna Polski
do 2040 r.), adopted by the Polish government on 2 February 2021. These goals are as
follows [Ministry of Climate and Environment, 2021, p. 9]:
a) Reduction of GHG emissions by 30% relative to 1990 by 2030;
b)
Increased energy efficiency by 2030 due to a 23% reduction in primary energy
consumption relative to forecasts from 2007;
c) RES share in the target gross energy consumption of at least 23% and no less than
32% in the energy sector, at least 28% in heat generation, and 14% in transport.
The simple juxtaposition of energy policy goals of the EU as a whole (presented above)
and Poland shows that the Polish goals are more modest and are insufficient to reach
a 55% reduction in GHG emissions by 2030. Also, the Polish strategy does not make any
mention of climate neutrality by 2050. The outbreak of the war in Ukraine has modified
some of the goals of this strategy. The changes resulted from problems occasioned by
a drastic rise in energy source prices, limited energy-source availability, and the need
to guarantee Poland’s energy security. One month after Russia’s attack on Ukraine, the
Polish government adopted the assumptions for revision of Poland’s Energy Policy 2040
[Ministry of Climate and Environment, 2022]. The state’s energy strategy was expanded
to include a fourth pillar – energy sovereignty, a particular element of which is the expedited
independence of the national economy from fossil fuels (coal, oil and natural gas) and
derivative imports from Russia and other states covered by economic sanctions. Imports
from those directions were to cease as of the end of 2022 (de facto achieved before that
time). One of the elements of the strategy will be the continued diversification of fuel
supply, including an increased part to be played by RES. By 2030, coal is to account for
no more than 56% of energy generated, and in 2040 no more than 28%. Independence
14 Elżbieta Kawecka-Wyrzykowska
from Russian fuels, however, assumes periodic peaks in coal consumption. The nature
of the proposed modifications of the Energy Policy is general, not to be detailed until
mid-2023. This means that any serious concrete steps taken in support of the energy
transformation in Poland can only follow at an even later stage. That, of course, does
not bode well for the scale of decarbonization of Polish economy.
2. Structure of fuel consumption inPoland relative tothe EU average
The difficulty of decarbonization in Poland is materially exacerbated by the enormous
dependence of the economy on coal – one of the highest-emission fuels. Since the
beginning of Poland’s transformation into a market economy, GHG emissions have
decreased significantly, reflecting mainly the declining importance of heavy industry
and, in 2020, also the lockdowns and the economic downturn resulting from COVID- 19.
That decline was 21% in the years 1990–2020 (mainly in the energy sector), but the
decline in the EU-27 was even greater, being 31%. However, emissions increased on
a huge scale in inland transport and construction, more than threefold, whereas in the
EU as a whole this increase was only 20% on average [European Commission, 2021a,
p. 40; European Commission, 2020, p. 41]. Despite falling emissions, Poland continues
to retain one of the highest GHG emission rates in the EU. In 2020, its share in total EU
emissions was 11%. Higher levels were recorded only by Germany (22%), France and
Italy (12% each), while each of these three has an economy far larger than Poland’s. In
terms of the highest relative emissions per capita, Poland was placed fourth, behind
Czechia, Ireland and Luxembourg (Malta and Sweden were placed last). With regard to the
intensity of GHG emissions (as measured by the emission-GDP ratio), the situation was
even worse: in 2020, Poland was placed second in the EU (behind Bulgaria but ahead of
Czechia and Romania, with a share more than three times the EU average) [European
Commission, 2021a, pp. 40–42].
The main source of global warming is CO2 emissions, constituting 79% of all GHG
emissions in the EU in 2019. In Poland, the comparable index was even higher, at 81%
[EEA, 2021, p. 67]. In turn, the CO2 emissions from energy generation originate mainly
from coal, especially lignite (wood coal). In Poland, the share of fossil fuels in national
gross electricity generation in 2020 was the highest in the EU (more than 83%). The
analogous EU average was 37% in 2020 [Redl, Hein, Buck, Graichen, Dave, 2021, p. 15].
Hard coal also plays an important role in heat generation in Poland (76% in 2019, with
only 6–7% from RES). In effect, Poland contributes significantly to the high air pollution
indices in all of the EU.
Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine vis-à-visProgress on Energy Transformation inPoland 15
Poland’s situation vis-à-vis energy generation from RES is not favourable, either. In
the EU, renewable sources (mainly wind and solar energy) supplied 38% of all electricity
generated in the EU-27 in 2020. That was the first year in which green energy exceeded
the value of energy generated from fossil fuels (the latter with a 37% share). In Poland,
the RES share was as low as 17%, with even lower ratios being recorded in Czechia
and Hungary (12% and 15% respectively). At the same time, Poland and Czechia were
the only states to have a share of energy generation from fossil fuels more than four
times higher than that from RES [Redl et al., 2021, p. 15]. These ratios confirm that the
transition from coal to renewable energy sources in Poland is going to be a protracted
and costly path. The low share of green energy is partially the consequence of the fact
that energy generation from those sources was inhibited several years ago as a result
of the adoption of the so-called 10 H Act (fn 6, next section).
3. Actions taken inPoland tomitigate the negative consequences
ofthe war inUkraine for energy suppliers and recipients
On 8 April 2022, EU states agreed on a decision to ban coal imports from Russia,
among other measures [CIRE, 2022]. Those restrictions did not come into force until
10 August due to previous agreements. Several days later (13 April), the President of
the Republic of Poland signed an act of parliament banning the import or transit of
coal or coke originating from Russia or Belarus. The act came into force the day after.
The immediate halt to coal imports from Russia, previously mainly serving individual
recipients, with prospects of an EU-wide ban on such imports, resulted in serious
turbulence in the Polish market, in the form of massive price increases and fuel shortages
resulting from speculative purchases and from the limited flexibility of fuel supply.2
The Polish government began a chaotic search for alternative fuel suppliers, first and
foremost with regard to the deficit in coal. In early autumn 2022, when coal imports
began, a considerable portion of them were discovered to be of poor quality, even outright
unfit for combustion in some cases. Moreover, the coal failed to cover all of the demand
generated by households and was very expensive. In autumn, the government devised
a scheme of financial support for households reliant on coal, widely met with criticism
and subsequently modified on several occasions.
2 The prospect of limited supply caused many persons who had previously relied on Russian coal for the
heating of their homes (especially in rural areas) to desire to make provisions for the winter out of concerns
over the availability of coal at a later time. The effect was a colossal surge in prices and the practical
disappearance of the material from the market.
16 Elżbieta Kawecka-Wyrzykowska
There was no change to Poland’s situation in the market for renewable energy sources,
and this provided no opportunity to resolve a large portion of the energy problems, be
that in economic terms (prospects of cheaper energy free of allowances’ costs under the
ETS), climate terms (RES are emission-free) or energy independence (own sources). First
of all, the so-called Distance Act of 2016, almost completely halting the development
of wind energy, has not been amended.3 Although in 2022 Polish politicians recognised
the need to unblock the land-based wind-energy sector, they are in no haste to make
any concrete decision. The government adopted a proposal to amend the act on 5 July
2022, but as at December 2022 no parliamentary works had begun. There are also major
obstacles in administrative law to photovoltaics, which could otherwise be developing
at a much faster rate in Poland.4
4. Costs of the transformation and sources of its financing
There can be no doubt that the new situation arising in 2022 in the fuel market
in Poland and worldwide has increased the costs of the energy transformation due
to factors such as increased prices of sources and semi-products, labour, and other
items needed for RES expansion, including the replacement of ineffective heating
installations, temporary peak consumption of expensive coal, etc. Concerns about the
impossibility of meeting these costs made some EU member states oppose the continued
pursuit of the transformation at the rate agreed before the war.
The most recent available estimates of costs of energy transformation in Poland
precede the Russian invasion of Ukraine. More recent ones have not been forthcoming,
among other reasons due to the unstable conditions in the fuel market and lack of
basis for the making of any assumptions as to future fuel prices, prices of CO2 emission
permits, etc. Analyses completed before the war had already demonstrated that the
energy transformation would entail huge costs in Poland and the majority of EU member
states. Thus, for example, according to official estimates from one year before the Russian
invasion of Ukraine, cited in the Polish Energy Transformation Policy 2040, investments
in energy transformation in 2021–2040 (in the fuel and energy sectors alone) might
have been PLN 890 billion (EUR 193 billion, assuming a 4.6 PLN/EUR exchange rate). In
3 The Act specified a minimum distance between a residential home and a wind farm to be ten times the
installation’s height, i.e., the so-called 10H principles (viz. fans 100 m tall cannot be built at a distance of
more than 1 km from buildings). Projects entering the construction stage after 2016 were usually initiated
prior to the passing of the Act.
4
One of those are massive refusals of connection of new large investments to the energy grid [Globenergia,
2022].
Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine vis-à-visProgress on Energy Transformation inPoland 17
turn, the aggregate cost of decarbonization of the entire economy was estimated at PLN
1600 billion (EUR 348 billion). The estimate assumed socially acceptable management of
the transformation, based on three pillars: just transformation, a zero-emission energy
system, and good air quality [Ministry of Climate and Environment, 2021, p. 4].5 The
costs appear to be gargantuan. However, it has to be borne in mind that: 1) they are
going to be spread over time; 2) the costs of delaying the transformation could turn out
to be even higher. In 2021, the Polish Economic Institute (Polski Instytut Ekonomiczny,
PIE) prepared a cost estimate for an alternative scenario to the government one. The
Institute’s scenario assumed that the status quo in energy would be maintained until
2040 (i.e., no transformation). According to the Institute’s experts, this scenario would
generate costs at PLN 1 trillion 64 billion, i.e., 19.5% higher than in the decarbonization
scenario. The authors of that analysis emphasised that their estimates would have been
even higher, had they accounted for the social costs (mainly relating to health and the
environment). Thus, the aggregate costs of abandoning the energy transformation
would be significantly higher than in the transformation scenario [Gniazdowski et al.,
2021]. According to calculations by experts from the National Centre for Emissions
Management (KOBiZE), in turn, decarbonization outlays (in the energy sector alone,
without accounting for expenditure relating to the expansion and modernization of the
transmission and distribution networks and modernization of existing generation units)
would total approximately EUR 295 billion. In their opinion, the EU’s climate goals are
achievable in Poland in 2021–2050, assuming a fast development rate of innovative
low- and zero-emission technologies and access to financing [Pyrka et al., 2021, p. 11].
The estimates from the two analyst teams therefore vary quite significantly, and
comparability is limited due to diverging assumptions. Also, such costs are, objectively
speaking, extremely difficult to estimate. Their scale will largely depend on the
transformation path selected (speed of change, target energy mix, etc.), and this continues
to be unclear. It is also difficult to predict the fuel prices in the coming period and what
new technologies could appear in the short or slightly longer term to assist with the
cost mitigation.
The overall conclusion from the analyses appears to be that the decarbonization
of Poland as it has been planned is going to be less expensive than the maintenance
of the status quo, or at least not necessarily more expensive. The colossal increase
in the prices of energy sources and energy in the aftermath of Russia’s invasion of
Ukraine does not disprove this conclusion; on the contrary, it reinforces it. Firstly,
the very high prices for energy and heat generated from non-renewable sources have
5 The implication from the estimate is that investment outlays in other, non-energy sectors (industry,
households, services, transport and agriculture) could total approximately PLN 745 billion (EUR 162 billion)
[Engel et al., 2021, p. 10].
18 Elżbieta Kawecka-Wyrzykowska
caused the use of RES to become a relatively more profitable alternative (once suitable
infrastructure is established). This calculation is significantly affected by the fact that
energy generation from RES is not burdened with the costs of GHG emission allowances
(under the ETS), with the prices of emission permits having increased drastically
in mid-2022. Secondly, for all their limitations, RES are inexhaustible resources. Thirdly,
decarbonization increases the country’s chance of achieving energy sovereignty. In
addition, the EU is offering significant financial support for the reorganization of the
energy sector (see below).
5. EU financial support
In outlining its proposal for a highly ambitious plan of decarbonization of all of the
EU’s economy and improvement of its energy efficiency, the Commission at the same time
provided for significant financing to assist the member states with the implementation
of that plan. Some of the funds are intended mainly (or solely) for the less wealthy
members, for whom the burden of the transformation is going to be especially difficult
to bear. By contrast, some funds can be used by all EU member states. The author’s own
estimate accounting for these different ‘grounds’ indicates a minimum of EUR 40 billion
(in 2018 prices) to be claimed by Poland from EU funds (from the regular multiannual
budget for 2021–2027 and the Resilience Recovery Facility).6 Some of the funds (from
the multiannual budget) will require co-financing from beneficiaries. The size of those
funds has been estimated to be in the range of EUR 21–51 billion [Wróbel, 2020, p. 7],
resulting in a total of EUR 60–90 billion for investments in energy.
Another difficulty lies in the assessment of sums relating to the expansion of the
emission allowances market to include additional sectors of the Union’s economy, with
new EU funds being financed that way. This concerns especially the Social Climate Fund
intended to assist households facing difficulties due to the energy transformation,
expected to come into force in 2025, i.e., one year prior to the launch of the new pricing
system for carbon-dioxide emission allowances. The creation of the Fund, however, will
require the member states’ prior consent for the expansion of the emissions allowances
trade into new sectors. An innovative non-mandatory financing mechanism for RES
energy commenced operation in 2021 (with the relevant regulation adopted in 2020).
It can be financed from EU member states’ budgets, private sources, as well as other EU
programmes and funds. Certain sums are also available under programmes managed on
6 Its Polish equivalent is the National Recovery Plan (NRP) [cf. Kawecka-Wyrzykowska, 2022]. Similar sums
have been estimated by Buchholtz and Wróbel [2021, p. 9].
Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine vis-à-visProgress on Energy Transformation inPoland 19
the Union level, e.g., LIFE or Horizon Europe (an ambitious programme of research and
innovation for 2021–2027). Although these are far more modest in scale, they too can be
of assistance to certain recipients. The prospects of benefiting from National Recovery
Plan’s funds are becoming increasingly doubtful due to EU institutions’ reservations
concerning the rule of law in Poland, as well as the very high penalties that Poland
has refused to pay.7 Some funds are financed by proceeds from emission allowances
under the ETS, and Poland has already taken advantage of that source.
8
Moreover,
taking into consideration the prospects of expansion of the ETS into more sectors, the
proceeds should increase (at present, the system only covers slightly above 40% of all
GHG emissions). With that, funds available in the future to Poland (and other member
states) for the energy transformation would increase. Some experts claim that by 2030
the ETS will be the largest stable source of financing for energy transformation in Poland
[Buchholtz, Wróbel, 2021, p. 12].9 Also, the aforementioned estimate of funds available
for the financing of the transformation in Poland did not include a considerable loans
on favourable terms, the Union has offered to its members in support of climate action.
Lastly, the above estimates account only to an insignificant degree for the national funds
for energy transformation, whether coming from public sources or from private budgets.
An entirely new form of assistance is the REPowerEU plan submitted by the Commission
in May 2022 in response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine [European Commission,
2022a]. The plan aims for the expedited achievement of the EU’s independence from
gas, coal and oil and the creation of a more resilient energy system. It is based on four
pillars: energy saving, diversification of supply, accelerated transition to clean energy,
and an intelligent linking of investments to reforms.10
The above means that considerable funds are available in support of the transformation
of the energy sector. Their availability is conditional on meeting a variety of requirements,
especially where EU funds are concerned. The hard line taken by the Polish government,
refusing to meet the requirements advanced by EU institutions, is making the materialization
7 Due to the refusal to pay the penalty imposed by the CJEU for failing to comply with its judgment
requiring the liquidation of the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court, in January 2022 the European
Commission began to deduct the outstanding balance from the funds intended for Poland. The sum total
of penalties deducted for not complying with the CJEU’s judgment had exceeded EUR 200 million by mid-
October 2022, with the sum total of penalties charged reaching around EUR 430 million in the end of 2022
(growing by EUR 1 million per day!) [Sobczak, 2022; Ile kosztuje Izba Dyscyplinarna].
8
In 2021 alone, Poland obtained EUR 5.6 billion from allowances sales under the ETS [European Commission,
2022b, p. 15].
9
However, the ETS generates not only revenues for the budget but also costs for the economy. The high prices
of pollution emission permits under the ETS increase the costs for the companies purchasing them and they
are ultimately passed on to the end recipients of the products (especially of energy-intensive products).
10
In June 2022, the Council adopted a regulation whereby the member states ought to top up their gas storage
before the winter season (by 1 November 2022) at least to 80% capacity and 90% as from 2023 [Regulation
(EU) 2022/1032].
20 Elżbieta Kawecka-Wyrzykowska
of the NRP an increasingly improbably prospect as at the end of 2022, while the costs
resulting from the government’s actions in the form of penalties charged for each day
of non-compliance with the CJEU’s ruling are mounting up.
6. The pros and cons of expedited decarbonization
(energytransformation)
Alongside the measurable costs of the transformation (although the calculations
are difficult), the general balance of all pros and cons of expedited transformation must
consider other aspects materially affecting the holistic view.11 The majority of those
factors are universal and applicable to all member states. Some are specific to Poland due
to its different starting point. On the basis of a literature review and especially analyses
by experts dealing with the future of energy and consequences of climate change, one
can identify at least the following factors that favour transitioning to low-emission or
zero-emission energy sources as soon as possible.
§Decarbonization, following a period of transient increase in costs relating to the
energy transformation, promises a lasting improvement in the form of lower pollution
emissions, with advantages for the climate, human health, healthcare expenditure, etc.
§Even more importantly, in the light of the experience of the war in Ukraine, the
country’s energy security has to be strengthened by reducing its dependence on
fuel and electricity imports [Kucharczyk, 2021].
§Decarbonization also means the use of free wind, solar and hydro-energy, notably
without depleting the resources left to future generations.
§Another important benefit will be the decreased costs of energy generation due for
instance to increased production of devices necessary for eco-energy generation
(fans, photovoltaics) with a probability of new technological solutions and the fact
that the energy-generation costs will not be compounded by the increasing prices
of pollution-emission rights (under the ETS).
§At the same time, until the permanent effects of decarbonization can be achieved,
the high prices of and revenues of the state budget from the sale of pollution-
emission allowances should be utilised in the most rational way possible, which
is the financing of clean energy. In accordance with EU law, at least 50% of that
income should be spent on investments furthering climate transformation. How
those funds are in fact allocated in Poland is difficult to ascertain, with specialists
11
Decarbonization is an effective method of reduction or elimination of GHG, but of course not the only one.
Activities intended to reduce energy consumption are also of significant importance
Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine vis-à-visProgress on Energy Transformation inPoland 21
claiming that the funds are mainly spent on other expenses of the state than ecology
[Popkiewicz, 2019].
§The carbon-based energy infrastructure in Poland is ageing, making it necessary
to invest in replacements anyway [Czerniak, 2022].
§
Furthermore, coping with the expected rise in electricity consumption (for example
due to the planned switching of car production exclusively to electric models in the
EU by 2035), will necessitate investment in new energy infrastructure. In view of this,
the increased role of coal would require additional investments (exploitation of new
deposits, protection from methane explosions, etc.). The expenditure necessitated by
such activities, however, would be more sensibly spent on future-oriented solutions
rather than the perpetuation of high-emission carbon.
§
Another important factor in the shaping of an energy strategy for Poland (goals and
expected progress rates), usually disregarded in discussions, is the risk that in the
coming several years some Polish products might become impossible to offer on
the Single European Market due to non-compliance with emission standards and
a less competitive position because of the increasing carbon footprint [Chojnicki,
Harenda, Poczta, 2020]. The above entails the risk that without decarbonization
Polish companies will be left without access to EU funds due to not meeting the
environmental standards based on clean energy. The first step in that direction
has already been taken, with the enactment of taxonomy rules on the Union level
[Regulation (EU) 2020/852]. Among other things, these provisions narrow the types
of economic activities consistent with the requirements of sustainable development,
with the effect of making manufacturers eligible for EU funds.12
§Decarbonization is vital for reasons of protection of the environment, with more
and more disasters and weather anomalies caused by continuing global warming.
Enormous heat waves, droughts and the fast melting of ice covers and Arctic ice
are only some examples of ecological disasters in 2022 confirming the need for
intensified climate actions. To ensure their success, such actions should of course
include as many regions of the world as possible.
§Decarbonization also has a beneficial impact on human health and helps to reduce
the costs of treatment of multiple diseases resulting from the pollution of the
environment.
§Analysts propose that decarbonization should be viewed not only in terms of cost,
but also as a development impulse for the economy. This aspect of decarbonization
has been analysed by analysts from the largest strategic consultants in Poland,
12
That may be followed in time by more provisions restricting the access to the EU market for ‘unecological’
goods, such as those causing GHG emissions during the manufacturing process.
22 Elżbieta Kawecka-Wyrzykowska
McKinsey & Company Poland, in the report Carbon-Neutral Poland 2050 [Engel, Purta,
Speelman, Szarek, Pluijm, 2021]. In their opinion, decarbonization is going to have
a very positive impact on the country’s economy, contributing to the development of
new devices needed for the generation and transmission of new types of energy and
related products and services (wind energy, heat pumps, electric car components,
digital monitoring of new devices, etc.) and creating as many as 300 thousand new
jobs. According to McKinsey’s calculations, that would translate into 1–2% economic
growth [Engel et al., 2021, p. 12].
§
Continuation of the existing carbon-based system is also opposed by social
considerations. Continued or especially expanded coal mining in Poland would
necessitate the exploitation of deposits with a high level of firedamp hazard, thus
posing a significant threat to the life and health of the miners working there. This
risk was amply demonstrated by methane explosions in the Pniówek and Zofiówka
mines in April 2022, in which 26 persons died. Moreover, in Polish circumstances, RES
provide the best guarantee of the security of energy supply. The use of coal should
be transient at the most – used only for one heating season, so as to mitigate the
adverse impact of turbulence in the heating system and to ensure that electricity
remains available.
§
The majority of EU member states have already adopted (prior to the invasion
in Ukraine) and been implementing decarbonization strategies (the trend has lost
impetus due to the war). In Poland there is still no decarbonization strategy, because
the Energy Policy of 2021 or the assumptions for its revision of March 2022 could
hardly be regarded as such a strategy.
§
In the context of the arguments in support of an expedited modification of the
existing energy policy, as discussed here, it is noteworthy that even the most
advantageous scenario cannot be implemented without public support [Lipiński,
Maj, Miniszewski, 2022]. The decarbonization scenario for the country’s economy
does not command high levels of public support. It appears that the war in Ukraine
and its consequences have strengthened the objections, with predominant concerns
for the continuity of supply of any sort of fuel, mainly for heat generation but also
electricity. Simultaneously, the high level of emissions from coal or other fuel has
now begun to be less important in the eyes of the average Pole, mainly preoccupied
with obtaining any sort of fuel with which to heat the home. The relaxation of the
provisions banning the use of high-emission sources of energy is not conducive to
the decarbonization policy, either. One of the examples is the enactment, in October
2022, of an act permitting the purchase of lignite for heating needs on a temporary basis
by individual recipients, even though household stoves are not suited for capturing
the very noxious gasses emitted during its combustion [Grzelak-Michałowska, 2022].
Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine vis-à-visProgress on Energy Transformation inPoland 23
In turn, critics of accelerated decarbonization argue that implementing the Fit for 55
concept would dramatically increase the energy costs for the least wealthy citizens
[European Commission, 2021b; Wilkins, 2021]. They also claim that such costs will rise
with the contemplated expansion of the ETS system to include the construction and
transport sectors. Voices opposing accelerated decarbonization are also heard from
regions with a high concentration of coal mining. Miners and their families fear for their
jobs, especially where alternative employment opportunities are scarce. The critics also
note the enormous cost of decarbonization for the Polish budget. They argue that the
country cannot afford expense of that magnitude, especially given a general increase
in prices throughout the economy and the reliance of many citizens on state support, as
they cannot afford electricity and heat bills in the winter. An indisputable limitation of
RES as an alternative to fossil energy is that they are not a stable form of energy, with
a generation volume that is difficult to predict because there can be no guarantee of
many sunny or windy days. This factor can make renewable energy unprofitable in some
regions of the country. The payback period on RES investments is long, as well. To some,
RES in general and wind farms in particular are a barely acceptable type of interference
with the landscape and the natural environment.
The above-cited quantitative estimates of decarbonization costs along with the
arguments discussed prompt the conclusion that the war and its consequences cannot
justify decelerating the transformation in Poland and all of the EU. On the contrary, the
consideration of many different factors leads to the conclusion that the transformation
should accelerate, as otherwise it will be impossible to ensure the country’s energy
security, recipients will be unable to count on any radical mitigation of electricity and
heat bills, and at the same time manufacturers, especially of energy-intense products,
will quickly become uncompetitive in the national market and the EU market as a whole,
as well as the global market.
Conclusions
The European Green Deal was originally presented by the European Commission
near the end of 2019 as a climate protection programme. However, in the new situation
following the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, it became an instrument for ensuring energy
security and economic security for EU member states. In circumstances of limited supply
flexibility of fossil fuels (substitutability of Russian imports), their harmful effects on human
health and on the climate (they are a source of fast warming of the climate and a source
of diseases), as well as the enormous surge in fossil fuel prices, decarbonization (or, more
precisely, the entire Fit for 55 package of mutually complementary and strengthening
24 Elżbieta Kawecka-Wyrzykowska
measures, of July 2021) is the most successful method of achieving independence from
Russian fuels and ensuring the energy security of the entire EU, including Poland. At
the same time, the abandonment of coal is the best instrument for achievement of the
goals of the EU’s climate policy and mitigation of risks arising from climate change.
The costs of decarbonization will be very high, but the costs of not implementing it will
be even higher, whether in financial terms or in terms of energy sovereignty, health,
or climate change. Although it presents a challenge for the member states, the EU’s
climate and energy policy also marks a unique historical opportunity to accelerate the
energy transformation of the Union’s economy. Due to the combination of many harmful
developments in the energy market in 2022, a temporary increase in the role of carbon
is inevitable (substitution of Russian coal with fuel originating from different foreign
suppliers). Such a solution, however, should be used for as short a time as possible and
closely interlinked with investments in renewable energy sources (such as the fastest
possible elimination of developmental barriers to RES). At the same time, the energy
transformation should be implemented in such a way as to provide support for the social
groups the most vulnerable to its costs, e.g., by introducing additional mechanisms
to stimulate the development of the employment market and creating favourable
conditions for the conduct and development of economic activity, including investment
in the creation of products and services linked to low- and zero-emission energy sources.
Specific conclusions from the above analysis in reference to the Polish situation are
as follows. Poland is the brakesman of the ambitious decarbonization plan for the EU
economy. So far, it has an energy strategy only for the timeframe up to 2040, even though
the other member states have committed to achieving energy neutrality by 2050. More
importantly, the existing strategy provides for more modest goals and actions than the
all-EU strategy. Furthermore, little has been done to increase the significance of RES,
even though the country is one of the largest in the EU in terms of GHG emissions and
RES share in the generation mix and is the most dependent on carbon in the whole of
the EU. Poland has taken some action to accelerate its independence from Russian fuel
imports (such as being the first EU member state to cease coal imports from Russia). The
actions taken, however, do not envisage a move towards permanent solutions to protect
the climate and strengthen energy independence, mainly coming down to decisions
relating to the replacement of Poland’s foreign suppliers of coal and gas with those who
are not subject to sanctions. Moreover, there continues to be a decline in the effective
measures taken to eliminate the existing regulatory barriers to RES development, where
such a change would have the most quickly visible and very desirable effects in the form
of increased energy generation from renewable sources.
The slowness of the process of reducing greenhouse gas emissions from the economy
and the lack of an action programme for climate neutrality by 2050 is not reducing the
Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine vis-à-visProgress on Energy Transformation inPoland 25
costs of transformation but in fact increasing and postponing them. Despite the EU’s
offer of considerable financial support for the reorganization of the energy sector,
Poland is not taking the actions necessary to claim that support. The analysis of the
above-presented arguments for and against the elimination of GHG emissions leads
to the conclusion that the declining pace of the energy transformation in Poland and
of the whole of the EU cannot be justified in economic, ecological, social or energy-
security terms, even though the war in Ukraine and its consequences can temporarily
slow down the progress.
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Marzenna Błaszczuk-Zawiła
Depar tment for Europ ean Integrati on and Legal Studies
SGH Warsaw School of Economics
mblaszcz@sgh.waw.pl
ORCID: 0000-0002-6612-8205
POLAND’S CO2 EMISSION VOLUME,
TRENDS AND MODALITIES. WHAT IT MEANS
FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION?
Introduction
In December 2019, the European Council approved the goal of climate neutrality
by 2050 in accordance with the Paris Agreement as a long-term goal for the European
Union. The transformation leading to that goal is to be cost-effective, just and inclusive
for all, and to take into account the different starting points of individual member states.
The actions to be taken must in particular respect the need to guarantee energy security
and the right of the individual member states to decide on their energy mix and the
technology to be used [European Council, 2019b, p. 1]. In line with the European Green
Deal – the EU’s climate transition strategy – the achievement of neutrality means a net
zero level of GHG emissions by 2050 [European Commission, 2019, p. 2].
Poland has acceded to the implementation of the aforementioned Union goal but
without committing to implementing it on the national level (as the only EU member
state to do so), justifying its decision by pointing out the difficult starting point for
transformation and very high socio-economic costs [Ministry of Climate and Environment,
2021, p. 3]. The purpose of this paper is to determine Poland’s specificity with regard
to carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions, as the main GHG in Poland, hindering the country’s
capacity for the achievement of climate neutrality within the time-limit approved by
the European Council. The descriptive and statistical methods were used in the study.
This paper is subdivided into three sections and conclusions. The first section discusses
the level of GHG emissions with emphasis on CO2 across the entire Polish economy.
The second section outlines the main emission sources and how they have changed
in significance over the thirty years of the transformation. In both parts, comparisons
30 Marzenna Błaszczuk-Zawiła
are made with other EU member states (including the United Kingdom). The third
part describes the causes behind the relatively slow progress on the reduction of emissions
in the energy and housing sectors, as well as the significant increase in emissions in the
transport sector. The study covers the years 1990–2020. Unless stipulated otherwise,
the analysis refers to the EU-28 (EU-27 + UK), due to the data reporting method for the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The statistical
data originate primarily from the EU report 2022 National Inventory Report – European
Union [EEA, 2022] and the Polish report National Inventory Report – Poland [KOBiZE,
2022], submitted to the UNFCCC in May 2022.
1. Total GHG emissions inPoland. Significance of CO2
In 2020 (most recent available data), the level of GHG emissions in Poland exceeded
376 million tonnes CO
2
equivalent, thus 100 million tonnes (21%) less compared to 1990
(the reference year for emission reduction for the purposes of the implementation of the
Paris Agreement in the majority of countries of the world). The above data do not include
GHG emissions and absorptions from the so-called LULUCF category, i.e., land use, land
use change and forestry, which, in general, translate into emission reduction (in that
category gas absorption is usually lower than gas emissions). By 2020, Polish emissions,
including LULUCF, had reached 355 million tonnes CO2 equivalent (90.6 million tonnes,
i.e., 20%, less than in 1990). Thus, GHG emissions in Poland continued to increase at
a faster pace than absorption. For the period under review, LULUCF had the least impact
on Poland’s GHG emission balance in 1992–1995 and 2019–2020 (Figure 1).
From 1990 to 2020, GHG levels in Poland did not uniformly decrease but changed
in different directions on multiple occasions (fluctuated), and thus there is no clearly
discernible trend. Initially, a strong decrease in GHG emissions was recorded, which was the
consequence of having embarked on path of systemic transformation, decline of energy-
ineffective heavy industry, and beginning of the restructuring of the economy. From 1995
onward, emissions increased gradually, which can be linked to the reconstruction of the
economy following the crisis of the transition period. By 1997, however, emissions had
begun to fall, which was facilitated by the implementation of programmes and actions
with a view to increasing energy efficiency [KOBiZE, 2022, p. 6]. Changes in emissions
observed in the years that followed went in different directions – increasing during
periods of economic recovery or growth (2003–2006; 2015–2017) and decreasing during
global downturns (2009). The most recent years (2018–2020) were a period of decline
in GHG emissions in Poland.
Poland’s CO2 Emission– Volume, Trends and Modalities. What It Means for the European Union? 31
Figure 1. GHG emissions (including CO2) inPoland in1990–2020 (inmillions of tonnes
of CO2/CO2 equivalent)
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
500
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
GHG with LULUCF GHG without LULUCF CO
2
with LULUCF CO
2
without LULUCF
Source: Own elaboration based on KOBiZE [2022, p. 8].
In general, the first decade of the analysed period witnessed a clear decrease in GHG
emission levels by 16.6% (Table 1). In the decade that followed, emissions rose by more
than 4%. By contrast, in the last analysed decade, they fell by more than 9%.
As can be observed in Figure 1 and Table 1, GHG emissions in Poland largely
correspond to the trend for carbon-dioxide emissions. That is because the latter is the
predominant GHG in Poland, having been responsible for approximately 80% of all of the
country’s GHG emissions in 2020 (Table 1). Methane accounted for 12% of all emissions,
and nitrous oxide 6%. The share of fluorinated industrial gases (so-called F-gasses) was
insignificant, totalling approximately 1.4% of all GHG emissions in 2020.
Table 1. Emissions of main GHGs inPoland inthe years 1990, 2000, 2010 and 2020,
excludingLULUCF
Specification 1990 2000 2010 2020
GHG total
Emission level (ktCO2 equiv.) 475 873 396 680 412 902 375 038
Change insubsequent decades (%) – −16.6 +4.1 −9.2
Share inEU-27 + UK emissions (%) 8.4 7.7 8.6 10.1
CO2
Emission level (kt) 376 814 317 719 334 917 303 523
Change insubsequent decades (%) – −15.7 +5.4 −9.4
Share inEU-27 + UK emissions (%) 8.4 7.6 8.5 10.2
Share inPoland’s GHG emissions (%) 79.2 80.1 81.1 80.9
32 Marzenna Błaszczuk-Zawiła
Specification 1990 2000 2010 2020
CH4
Emission level (ktCO2 equiv.) 67 612 52 352 50 262 44 356
Change insubsequent decades (%) – −22.6 −4.0 −11.8
Share inEU-27 + UK emissions (%) 9.5 8.8 10.5 10.6
Share inPoland’s GHG emissions (%) 14.2 13.2 12.2 11.8
N2O
Emission level (ktCO2 equiv.) 31 305 25 232 22 068 22 839
Change insubsequent decades (%) – −19.4 −12.5 +3.5
Share inEU-27 + UK emissions (%) 8.2 8.3 9.3 10.1
Share inPoland’s GHG emissions (%) 6.6 7.9 5.3 6.1
Source: Own elaboration based on KOBiZE [2022, p. 8] and EEA [2022, p. IX].
The CO2 emission level in 2020 exceeded 303 million tonnes excluding LULUCF. This
means that it was lower by 73.3 million tonnes or 19.5% compared to 1990. Including this
category, the respective values were 280.6 million tonnes, 64 million tonnes and 18.6%.
With emissions of 376 million tonnes CO2 equivalent in 2020, Poland was one of
the five largest GHG emitters among all member states of the European Union. A share
exceeding 10% of all EU emissions placed it below Germany (19.7% of all emissions),
the United Kingdom (10.9%), France (10.6%) and Italy (10.3%). The next largest emitter
was Spain, with 7.4% of all EU-28 emissions (Figure 2).
Figure 2. Share of individual EU-28 states inthe EU’s total GHG emissions in2020,
excludingLULUCF (in%)
Germany;
19.7
United Kingdom;
10.9
France;
10.6
Italy;
10.3
Poland;
10.2
Spain;
7.4
Netherlands;
4.4
Czechia;
3.1
Romania;
3.0
Belgium;
2.9
Rest of the EU-27 + UK;
17. 6
Source: Own elaboration based on EEA [2022, p. VIII].
cont. Table 1
Poland’s CO2 Emission– Volume, Trends and Modalities. What It Means for the European Union? 33
Despite the rapid decline in GHG emissions during the initial period of the
transformation, Poland played a relatively insignificant role in the EU’s emission
reductions of 1990–2020. Over the thirty years, the EU-27 + UK reduced its total emissions
by almost 2 billion tonnes CO2 equivalent, i.e., 34.4%. Poland’s reduction (100 million
tonnes) represented only 5.2% of that value. Poland’s results were thus significantly worse
than those of Germany (decrease by 513 million tonnes CO2 equivalent, corresponding
to 26.4%) and the United Kingdom (391 million tonnes and 20.2% respectively), but also
France (151 million tonnes; 7.8%), Italy (139 million tonnes; 7.2%) and even Romania
(140 million tonnes; 7.2%). The results presented here were considerably affected by
emission reductions linked to the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic and the restrictions
on population mobility and business activities (lockdowns). In Germany, the emission
reduction in 2019–2020 represented almost 14% of reduction achieved over thirty years.
For France, this was 27.5%, Italy – 26.7%, and the UK – 10.8%. Poland’s corresponding
ratio was 15%.1
Figure 3. Change toGHG emission levels inthe EU member states in2020/1990,
excludingLULUCF (in%)
–80
–60
–40
–20
0
20
40
60
80
Estonia
Latvia
Lithuania
Romania
Bulgaria
Slovakia
United Kingdom
Czechia
Denmark
Germany
Sweden
Hungary
Finland
Luxemburg
France
Greece
Belgium
Italy
Netherlands
Croatia
Poland
Malta
Slovenia
Austria
Spain
Portugal
Ireland
Cyprus
Source: Own elaboration based on EEA [2022, p. VIII].
1
This was primarily the result of lower consumption of fuels combusted in stationary sources (hard coal and
lignite) and in transport (petrol and diesel oil). Emissions from industrial processes (as a result of decreased
steelmaking activities and lime production) and from the waste sector also decreased [KOBiZE, 2022, p. 6].
34 Marzenna Błaszczuk-Zawiła
In the years 1990–2020, the majority of EU member states recorded higher emission
reductions than Poland (Figure 3). Those were primarily member states that joined the
EU at the same time as Poland or later, and also underwent a deep restructuring of their
economies. Poland also recorded the lowest levels of change compared to other main
GHG emitters.
2. Main sources of CO2 emissions inPoland
The largest source of CO2 emissions in Poland, similarly to the European Union as
a whole, are the sources classified in category 1: Energy (Figure 4). In 2020 its share
in Poland’s emission structure (excluding LULUCF) was 93% (in 1990 it had been
insignificantly higher, at 94.2%). For the EU-28, that share was lower (approximately
91.5%) and did not undergo any significant changes in the analysed period.
Figure 4. CO2 emission structures inPoland and the EU-28 in1990 compared to2020 (in%)
–20
0 20 40 60 80
100
1990
2020
1990
2020
European Union Poland
Energy Industrial processes and use of products Agriculture
Land use, land use change and forestry (LULUCF) Waste
Source: Own elaboration based on EEA [2022] and KOBiZE [2022].
The next category of sources, i.e., industrial processes and use of products (Category 2),
accounted for 5% of all of Poland’s CO2 emissions in 1990 and 6.3% in 2020. Here, too,
differences in the percentage in the case of the EU as a whole were smaller (8% and 8.2%
respectively). Emissions from the remaining two categories: Agriculture (Category 3)
and Waste (Category 5) did not exceed 1% cumulatively for Poland and 0.5% for the EU.
Regarding LULUCF (Category 4), attention is drawn to how, unlike in the case of the
EU-28, its significance for GHG absorption in Poland decreased over the thirty years.
Across the Union, the size of this category increased by more than 11%, whereas in
Poland it decreased by almost 29%. The proposed main causes behind the decrease in this
Poland’s CO2 Emission– Volume, Trends and Modalities. What It Means for the European Union? 35
category include natural disasters (such as protracted draughts since 2014), hurricane
winds (2017), significant changes to the decomposition dynamics of dead wood, and
ageing of tree stands [KOBiZE, 2022, p. 13].
Due to the primary importance of Category 1 (Energy) in domestic CO2 emissions,
it will be analysed in detail later in this paper.
Between 1990 and 2020, the level of CO2 emissions in the Energy category decreased
from nearly 355 million tonnes to a level only slightly exceeding 282 million tonnes.
This translates into a decline by just above 20% (at the same time the EU-28 countries
decreased their emissions by almost 34%). Of key importance for emission levels were
emissions from fuel combustion, accounting for an overwhelming majority, at 98.5% of
CO2 emissions in the Energy category (Figure 5). In the analysed period, emission levels
in the discussed subcategory fell from 350.6 million tonnes to 278.1 million tonnes, i.e.,
by 20.7% (more than 34% in the EU as a whole). The situation in this category, however,
varied significantly from one sector to another.2
Half of all CO
2
emissions from fuel combustion (139 million tonnes) was attributable
to the energy industry (Table 2). In the years 1990–2020, emissions from this sector fell
by almost 41%, but it was still less than the decrease in the aggregate EU level (reduction
by 49%). Poland’s share in EU emissions from the energy industry in 2020 was remarkably
higher than in the case of total CO2 emissions (16.4% compared to 10.2%), decreasing
in the analysed period (in 1990 it had been 14%). Poland became the second largest CO2
emitter in this sector, after Germany. In the energy industry, the decisive role in terms
of CO
2
emission levels was played by the public generation of electricity and heat
(i.e., emissions from main electricity producers, combined heat-and-power plants and
heating plants). This represented 94.4% of emissions from the Energy Industry sector.
In the years 1990–2020, the decline in CO2 emissions in this area in Poland exceeded
96 million tonnes, i.e., 42%. From the perspective of the entire EU, the relative decline
was larger (51%), with eleven member states achieving a worse result than Poland (in two
of them emissions increased – Cyprus and Luxembourg) and one (Hungary) the result
was comparable. Poland’s share in EU CO2 emissions in this sector (at 18.8%) was also
higher than thirty years ago (15.9% in 1990).
The impact of emissions from refineries (i.e., combustion supporting the refining
of petroleum products, including on-site combustion for electricity and heat for own
needs)
3
on total CO
2
emissions in Poland was insignificant (respectively 3.3% and 2.3% of
2 This category covers a broad spectrum of CO2 emission sources with highly diverse emission levels and
trends.
3 In this area, CO2 emissions in Poland decreased by 1.6 million tonnes, i.e., 34%, over the thirty years.
Thirteen countries recorded greater decreases, although there were also some in which emissions increased,
even considerably, such as Estonia, Romania and Lithuania.
36 Marzenna Błaszczuk-Zawiła
emissions from fuel combustion). It is, however, noteworthy that Poland was the country
with the largest increase in refinery emission levels, both in absolute and relative terms.
Between 1990 and 2020, the CO2 emissions in this area increased by 2.4 million tonnes
and thus 112% (the EU as a whole recorded a 14% decrease).4
Transport, as the second largest sector in terms of CO
2
emissions in the Fuel
Combustion subcategory (62.4 million tonnes) was responsible for 22.5% of all emissions.
Its emissions in 2020 were three times higher than at the beginning of the analysed
period (in the EU-28, an CO2 emission increase in this sector was also recorded, but
it was relatively small, of 3.7%). In 2020, emissions from transport decreased by 4.2%
(due to lower fuel consumption during the COVID-19 pandemic) [KOBiZE, 2022, p. 19].
As a result of these changes, Poland’s share in EU emissions of carbon dioxide from
the transport sector increased from 2.6% in 1990 to 7.7% in 2020. In terms of the CO2
emission level, Poland ranked sixth in the entire EU-27 + UK, after Germany, France, the
United Kingdom, Italy and Spain.
In the transport sector, emissions from road transport predominated (61.4 million
tonnes in 2020, corresponding to more than 98% of total CO
2
emissions from transport).
5
The share of these emissions increased considerably over the thirty years under review.
In 2020, Poland emitted almost 43 million tonnes (232%) more CO2 in this sector than
in 1990, which placed it among the EU countries with the largest increase in road
transport CO
2
emissions, whether in absolute terms (ahead of Spain, Austria and Czechia)
or in relative terms (also first place, before Ireland, among others).
The EU-27 + UK recorded a 7% increase in CO
2
emissions in 1990–2020. Eight
countries noted a decline in emission levels from 1990 to 2020; the largest was in Sweden
(thanks to the increasing reliance on liquid biofuels – ethanol and FAME) and in the
United Kingdom. The largest emitters – Germany, France, Italy, Spain and the United
Kingdom – were responsible for more than 62% of all emissions from this source in the
entire EU-28 (2020).
Other types of transport did not affect emission levels in this sector to a significant
degree. The second largest subcategory, ‘Other Transport’ (pipelines and ground-
based activities in airports and ports) accounted for only 1.2% of CO2 emissions from
transport. Poland, with its CO2 emissions at 765 million tonnes, similar to those of
Germany and slightly higher than Italy, was one of the three largest emitters. Its
share amounted to 14.8% of all EU emissions, having increased during the 1990–2020
period. Attention is drawn to the strong decline in emissions from rail transport (nearly
4 Increased emissions were recorded in eight EU member states; they were relatively large in Greece (87%)
and Ireland (79%).
5 This includes all types of light vehicles (passenger vehicles and light commercial vehicles), heavy trucks
(tractors, trailers and busses), as well as one-wheel and three-wheeled vehicles.
Poland’s CO2 Emission– Volume, Trends and Modalities. What It Means for the European Union? 37
1.4 million tonnes, thus 84%, over the thirty years)
6
and inland navigation (135 kt and
90%, respectively).7
Table 2. Characteristics of CO2 emission insubcategory 1. A.Fuel combustion inPoland
in2020
Sector Indicator GHG total
(CO2 equiv.) CO2
1.A.1. Energy sector
Emission level (kt) 139 757 138 996
Change 2020/1990 inPoland (%) −40.6 −40.7
Share inEU-27 + UK emissions (%) 16.3 16.4
Change 2020/1990 inEU-27 + UK (%) −48.9 −49.2
Largest emitters inthe EU:
Germany, Poland, Italy, the United Kingdom
1.A.2. Manufacturing
and construction
industries
Emission level (kt) 29 196 28 878
Change 2020/1990 inPoland (%) −31.8 −16.0
Share inEU-27 + UK emissions (%) 6.6 6.6
Change 2020/1990 inEU-27 + UK (%) −44.7 −55.0
Largest emitters inthe EU:
Germany, Italy, France, Spain, the United Kingdom and Poland
1.A.3. Transport
Emission level (kt) 63 238 62 474
Change 2020/1990 inPoland (%) +204.7 +20