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RUDN Journal of Philosophy. ISSN 2313-2302 (print), ISSN 2408-8900 (online) 2023 Vol. 27 No. 3 598—613
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598 «КРИТИКА ЧИСТОГО РАЗУМА» КАНТА…
https://doi.org/10.22363/2313-2302-2023-27-3-598-613
EDN: GUQRHL
Research Article / Научная статья
Felix Noeggerath on Kant: Transcendental Synthesis
as a Principle of System Formation
Hartwig Wiedebach
Independent scholar,
37 Georg-Boehringer-Weg, 73033, Goeppingen, Germany
wiedebach@posteo.de
Translated from German by D.I. Chistyakov
Abstract. Walter Benjamin called Felix Noeggerath (1885—1960) the “universal genius”
or simply “genius.” In his 1916 treatise “Synthesis and the Concept of System in Philosophy,”
Noeggerath offered a reading of Kant’s concept of synthesis in an original and radical manner.
He dares to confront thought with the incommensurability of atheoretical Being. The linkage
between logic and incommensurability is what he calls rationalism. In contradiction to this
claim, any attempt to exclude atheoretical Being from the realm of logic is anti-rationalism.
Noeggerath elaborates on this in a penetrating discussion and modification of epistemological
positions, especially those of the Marburg School and Hermann Cohen. Noeggerath constructs
a notion of the philosophical system with the help of Kant’s three tables of transcendental
judgements, categories, and principles in the Critique of Pure Reason. Each of these tables is
known to contain 12 individual elements in four groups of three each. For the systematic
division, the third group under the title “Relation” is decisive. Noeggerath assigns one systemic
part to each kind of relation: “For it is to be connected: the categorical relation with ethics, the
hypothetical with logic, and the disjunctive with aesthetics.” As a result the classical sequence,
beginning with logic, is changed. “The order of the limbs is: a) ethics, b) logic, c) aesthetics.”
In Noeggerath’s logical outline, specific mathematical concepts of meta-geometry play a
decisive role. According to him, philosophy can resemble their preciseness in building a viable
concept of the infinite. The prerequisite is that philosophy does not itself behave mathematically
but proceeds along its own path in critical distance to the “specialized, act-kindred thinking” of
the mathematician.
Keywords: atheoretical form, continuity vs. dialectics, Goethe, Hermann Cohen,
hypothesis, logic, mathematics, meta-geometry, neo-Kantianism, Plato, rationalism,
antirationalism, science, three-valued logic, Walter Benjamin
© Wiedebach H., 2023
© Chistyakov D.I., translator, 2023
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License
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Wiedebach H. RUDN Journal of Philosophy. 2023;27(3):598—613
KANT’S “CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON”… 599
Article history:
The article was submitted on 19.01.2023
The article was accepted on 07.06.2023
For citation: Wiedebach H. Felix Noeggerath on Kant: Transcendental Synthesis as a Principle
of System Formation. Chistyakov DI, translator. RUDN Journal of Philosophy.
2023;27(3):598—613. https://doi.org/10.22363/2313-2302-2023-27-3-598-613
I
The philosopher Felix Noeggerath (1885—1960) is almost unknown today. He
is significant for Kant studies because of his 1916 Erlangen dissertation “Synthesis
and the Concept of System in Philosophy. A Contribution to the Critique of
Anti-rationalism (With Two Excurses: ‘On the Judgmental Character of Meta-
Geometry’ and ‘On the Platonic Concept of μεταξυ’)” [1]1. The work interprets the
central concept of synthesis in an original and radical manner.
Noeggerath dares to confront thought with the incommensurability of
atheoretical Being [Sein]. The linkage between logic and incommensurability is
what he calls rationalism. In contradiction to this claim, any attempt to exclude
atheoretical being from the realm of logic is anti-rationalism. Noeggerath elaborates
this in a penetrating discussion and modification of epistemological positions,
especially those of the Marburg School. The treatise remained unprinted, first due
to World War I, and later due to certain publishing obstacles. Only now is it
available to the public in a critical edition [2].
First, a few things about the author. Noeggerath was an impressive personality
known by many people at the time. Nowadays, he appears only in connection with
Walter Benjamin; still, his appearance in this context is noteworthy. Their
acquaintance began around 1915—1916 in Munich while they attended university
lectures together. Among many other things, Noeggerath was working on his
dissertation. Benjamin calls him in his correspondence of the period the “universal
genius” or simply “genius”: “The first time I was almost stunned by his absolutely
universal education, since he is concerned — this is all at the same time—with the
foundation of a philosophical system in very significant way; with mythology from
Asia to early America, including all that is thereby related to it; with intensive
philological studies; and with the proof of Fermat’s [last] theorem, in addition”2.
There is indeed, in the words of Gershom Scholem, “no need to justify that a man
of whom Walter Benjamin thought so highly deserves attention” [3. P. 80]. And so
it was Scholem who meticulously developed his biography, although we know of
1I would like to thank Peter Fenves for his precise review of the translation. In addition he and
Pierfrancesco Fiorato offered extremely helpful support to systematic questions. The directors of the
Monacensia (municipal archives in Munich) and of the University Library of Groningen generously
allowed the use of their sources.
2 Benjamin’s letter to Fritz Radt of December 4, 1915 [3. P. 87—88]. Systematic interpretations
have so far only been given by Benjamin scholars [4—6], esp. cf. Fenves’s extensive afterword to
our current Noeggerath edition [2]: Felix Noeggerath and Walter Benjamin Redux.
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no place where Noeggerath so much as mentions Benjamin. Scholem went far
beyond the meeting of the two, which was limited to certain years. I mention here
only the most salient matters.
Noeggerath came from a distinguished family. After a residency at a Swiss
boarding school, starting in in 1904, he studied a whole range of subjects at German
universities, primarily in Munich, where he took up permanent residence, but also
in Berlin, Bonn, Jena, Erlangen and — this is decisive for his philosophical
imprint—in Marburg. At Marburg he came into contact with Hermann Cohen and
Paul Natorp in 1907; and there again in the winter semester of 1912—1913 he
encountered Nicolai Hartmann. The latter wrote to Heinz Heimsoeth about his Kant
seminar: “Noeggerath also does not consider it beneath his dignity to speak; it is
touching how he descends from the pedestal of his difficult way of speaking and
makes an effort to speak in a completely childlike manner. He told me he expressly
learned how to speak in a philosophical manner through participation” [7. P. 132].
Noeggerath had already made a brief appearance the previous summer. On July
4, 1912, Cohen’s 70th birthday was celebrated in the university auditorium. “Two
of his students, Candidate Noeggerath and Dr. Schier, addressed him from the
tribune resplendent in the most beautiful floral decorations. The first presented a
Greek bust, ‘the Hypnos,’ as a token of gratitude. The second read out an address...
Moved by this, Cohen thanked them for the veneration and love, and he promised
to maintain the bond between him and his students”. Unfortunately, we know of no
personal remark by Cohen or Natorp about Noeggerath. This is striking, especially
since both of them would exchange letters that discussed many other students.
Noeggerath, however, studied elsewhere in the years between these Marburg
semesters, and even after his appearance in 1912—1913, he soon left the city again.
The next thing we hear about is the meeting with Benjamin in Munich in 1915,
but their exchange of ideas lasted only until “mid-March 1916” [3. P. 97]. This time
Noeggerath moved to Erlangen “to complete his studies with the philosopher Paul
Hensel (1860—1930), a friend of Wolfskehl’s [and Cohen’s], who was known for
his liberal stance, and to begin working on his dissertation, which he completed
through lively discussions with Hensel in the summer of 1916 and submitted in
October. On December 19, 1916, he was awarded the doctorate summa cum laude
in systematic philosophy, Indology, and comparative linguistics. During this time,
he met Helmuth Plessner, who also received his doctorate from Hensel (and on the
same day). Noeggerath’s dissertation Synthesis and the Concept of System in
Philosophy. A Contribution to the Critique of Antirationalism was never printed as
a result of the war circumstances and the inflation that occurred afterward.
However, Noeggerath had made several serious but failed attempts to get it printed,
especially in 1917 and 1922—1923… This is also the only work by Noeggerath
before 1945 that has survived with any certainty. Everything earlier, as far as it was
in his hands, he later destroyed, or it fell victim to the destruction of World War II”
[3. P. 97].
According to Scholem, Noeggerath came to Munich again in early 1917.
Benjamin had “the essential conversations with him about the mathematical theory
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KANT’S “CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON”… 601
of truth and how this discipline discovered itself for the first time in Europe with
the Pythagoreans”3. Because of the war, Noeggerath obtained permission to use the
title of doctor on March 23, 1918, even though his dissertation had yet to be
published4. At about the same time, he joined the Kant Society5, seeking with his
former teacher Moritz Geiger to establish a Munich chapter. The two published an
appeal as the Executive Committee, which, however, was unsuccessful at that time6.
It is Noeggerath’s last attachment to an academic body about which we know
anything for certain. To be sure, however, he remained academically active, for
instance, as a translator [8]. Nevertheless, we come across his name just as much in
the publishing business and even as an author of children’s books7.
After World War II, Noeggerath had many new plans. “At the beginning of
1946,” he had the intention, according to Scholem, “of publishing four books”: a
volume with about 25 poems, a compilation called Imaginäre Portraits (Imaginary
Portraits), a Denkfibel (Primer for Thinking) and a book titled Orpheus oder die
Spur des Vollendeten (Orpheus, or the Trace of One who Came to Completion).
Later, a book on the “Philosophy of the Symbol” was added to the list. Hardly
anything was prepared for printing. We can surmise the obstacles only in vague
manner. Health problems may have played a role. In the spring of 1949, for
instance, Noeggerath told Helmuth Plessner that he had “escaped from the Soviet
zone.” He came to Heidelberg at the end of 1948 and was then living in nearby
Ziegelhausen. He could sit at his desk only “for a few minutes at a time” because
of stomach problems, which lasted for months8. In general, illness is often
mentioned in the subsequent period; so, too, is oppressive poverty. Even as
Noeggerath “‘was in rags’—that’s how his second wife saw him in 1950 —
‘he remained a grand seigneur’”9.
There was, moreover, a deep resignation in the cultural Zeitgeist. A 1955
statement makes this clear. Although Noeggerath is only talking about poems here,
which he had apparently written in large numbers, it goes beyond this: “Why have
I never published any of them? For two reasons. First, not everything was as I
3 Benjamin’s correspondence to Scholem on May 25, 1917 [3. P. 99].
4 Noeggerath estate in the Monacensia archive in Munich: Biographische Dokumente I,
No. 2431/93.
5 Cf. their names on the list of admissions between January and May 1918: Kant-Studien 23
(1918—1919), 167.
6 Cf. ibid. P. 519. — Since the annual volume was not printed until 1919, the editors already note
that “the circumstances of the time” had so far prevented a foundation of the local group, in addition
to many other things (including a lecture by Max Weber) (ibid. P. 520).
7 According to Scholem [3. P. 105], he became co-owner of the newly founded Berlin children's
book publisher Herbert Stuffer in 1926 and anonymously wrote the text for its “Spielfibel” No. 4:
“Hurra, wir rechnen weiter!” (1932, illustrated by Tom Seidmann-Freud). By the way: Benjamin
published two very appreciative reviews of the first three Spielfibel [9. P. 267—272; 311—314],
but not on the fourth Spielfibel with Noeggerath's text.
8 Two postcards from January 11 and March 28, 1949, in Plessner-Archiv der UB Groningen:
Brieven van Felix Noeggerath aan Helmuth Plessner (1892—1985) uklu Plessner 143, 010-011.
9 A statement by Marga Noeggerath, cf. [3. P. 115].
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wished. Second, I lack any literary ambition, a lack that is related to my thoroughly
negative assessment of today’s literary establishment. It is a mystery to me why
poems by Celan, for example, are printed, and I cannot believe that a man like Eliot
can be considered a great dramatist.” Noeggerath writes similarly about Nietzsche,
Ibsen, and Gerhart Hauptmann. Finally, he says, revealingly about Walter
Benjamin: “Part of the blame for this state of affairs lies in the fact that the critic is
an end in himself and that criticism itself has become literature”10. It will hardly be
overlooked that Benjamin, at least since the well-known January 1930 letter to
Scholem, claimed the “critique of German literature (critique de la littérature
allemande)” as a central task for himself11.
According to the title of Noeggerath’s four planned books, only Die Gedichte
(Poems) appeared, but this was not until 1961, a year after his death [13]. A slight
recollection, which he communicates, bathes his slightly dazzling personality in a
telling light. He laments being “labeled as a philosopher or epistemologist.” With
Rilke — Noeggerath had also known him since his student days in Munich — it
had been the other way round: “He only knew a few poems of mine and fell out of
all the clouds — he almost resented it — when he witnessed a conversation with
E[rwein] von Aretin about relativity (who was originally an astronomer): ‘I must
first slowly get used to you again,’ Rilke told me at that time”12.
Let's take another look at the planned “Primer for Thinking.” Its subtitle was
“Meditationen über ein Thema der Geometrie” (Meditations on a Topic of
Geometry). “Intended for interested laymen, and starting from a minimum of
presuppositions,” it was supposed to discuss “one of the last, quite central questions
of epistemology,” namely “that of the so-called axioms, i.e., of those propositions
which, though themselves neither capable of, nor in need of proof, nevertheless
underlie every proof”13. Later Noeggerath gave it a new title: Die
erkenntnistheoretischen Grundlagen der neueren Geometrie und Physik (The
Epistemological Foundations of Modern Geometry and Physics)14. Several
systematic sketches that have been preserved belong to the scope of this project15.
And one may also include the only essay printed during Noeggerath's lifetime,
“On the Untimeliness of Abstract Art” (Über das Unzeitgemässe der abstrakten
Kunst) [14]16. In it, Noeggerath builds a highly original bridge to the philosophical
10 Letter to the “Merkur” editor Joachim Moras, February 2, 1955, in [10. P. 29—33], here
[10. P. 32—33]. Scholem [3. P. 119] mentions that Noeggerath received the first edition of Benja-
min’s “Schriften” [11] from the Suhrkamp editor Friedrich Podszus in 1956. Nevertheless, also the
letter of Noeggerath to Podszus does not contain any statement about Benjamin.
11 Cf. the overview by Martin Opitz “Literaturkritik” [12].
12 Noeggerath’s letter to Joachim Moras [10. P. 32].
13 Noeggerath in his CV from 1950 [3. P. 116].
14 Noeggerath’s letter to Herbert Fritsche from May 1946 [3. P. 113].
15 Noeggerath estate, Monacensia, Box I, Mss. 1—20, e.g.: “A priori” (Ms. 2, 2439/93; 20 ss.);
“Über die Axiome” (Ms. 3, 2440/93; 26 ss.); “Erkenntnistheoretische Fragmente” (Ms. 9, 2446/93;
28 ss.); several parts on “Freiheit” (Mss. 10/11, 2447/93 und 2448/93; in total 17 ss.).
16 See our reprint [2].
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KANT’S “CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON”… 603
interpretation of modern physics. The connection to the 1916 Synthesis and the
Concept of System is also apparent. A “metaphysics of the finite,” which he
pronounces as the program of philosophy at the end of the art essay [14. P. 1019]17,
was Noeggerath’s endeavor from the beginning.
And so it remained, as he increasingly turned to a “symbol,” a
“transubstantiation” of “so-called inauthentic or ‘impossible’ concepts” into
sensually perceived objects, , as he put it18. In Synthesis and the Concept of System
he discusses something like this via the example of imaginary points of view in
projective geometry, to which I will return; in the essay he does so via the reality
of the work of art. This extends to the interpretation of spiritualist phenomena.
Noeggerath, almost 50 years later, reports about a “materialization” of human
figures, which he himself witnessed in 1906 or 1907 during a séance in his mother’s
apartment. He does not doubt the real appearance of the figures. However, he
contradicts the usual explanations by alleged liaisons into the beyond and the like.
Instead, he approaches the occult phenomenon with his concept of a “situational
reality.” The observer within the séance is to be considered — and here he quotes
his art essay of 1951 in detail — similar to modern quantum physics as a
constitutive moment of reality19.
In 1952 Noeggerath married Marga Bauer, with whom, as his health became
increasingly impaired, he lived again in Munich. On April 29, 1960, he died
“after an illness of about two months” and is “cremated according to his wishes”
[3. P. 120].
II
In 1916 Synthesis and the Concept of System Felix Noeggerath seeks a new
reading of Kant’s transcendental synthesis20. A first hint of its direction lies in the
fact that he initially designates the semantic horizon of the word “synthesis” not
primarily via Kant but as a citation from Goethe. This happens in the form of the
first of three mottoes that Noeggerath prefaces his treatise with. He quotes one of
Goethe’s reflections: “The main thing about which one does not seem to consider
in the exclusive application of analysis is that every analysis presupposes a
synthesis [...] A great danger into which the analyst falls is, therefore, that of
applying his method where there is at bottom no synthesis” [16]. We will see why
for this fundamental principle, it stems from Goethe rather than a citation from
Kant.
The second motto comes from Kant. He warns against neglecting analytical
precision: “It is not an increase, but a disfigurement of the sciences, if one lets their
borders run into each other” (KrV B VIII). Then, after these two references to
17 For the connection with earlier work [3. P. 117].
18 The letter to Joachim Moras [10. P. 31].
19 Citation from Noeggerath’s report [15. P. 225].
20 Page references in the following according to Noeggerath’s typescript [1] (also given in our new
edition [2]).
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fundamental unification and punctual separation, the reconciling whole must now
be indicated in a third motto. It finds its symbol in Plato’s Eros, the hermeneutic
demon “in the middle” (εν μεσω) between the two, through which — Noeggerath’s
third motto — “the whole is combined in one”: “ωστε το παν αυτο αυτω
ξυνδεδεσθαι” (Plato, Symp. 202e).
As indicated above: Noeggerath’s guideline is indeed Kant’s critique of reason.
Nevertheless, he considers it deficient precisely at its center, i.e., in the thought of
transcendental synthesis. On the one hand, Kant unmistakably strives for the idea
of a philosophical system in the Critique of the Power of Judgement. On the other
hand, in the Critique of Pure Reason, he had determined the concept on which the
unity of the system hangs, namely “synthesis,” only in one partial aspect, namely
in relation to theory. This may have corresponded to his original intention in the
drafting of the first Critique, but more is needed for the later project of a
philosophical system. For it is no longer only a matter of theoretical philosophy.
The principle of “synthesis” in a system, according to Noeggerath, must also
include “atheoretical” objects: areas in which synthesis does not establish relations
of thought but relations of will or feeling, i.e., actions (ethics) and works of art
(aesthetics). In these a-theoretical directions, Kant did not sufficiently discuss
transcendental synthesis. Therefore, the relationship between synthesis and the
concept of system must be reformulated.
Taking his point of departure from this task, Noeggerath determines
rationalism and thus the critique of anti-rationalism to which the subtitle refers.
Rationalism is the search for a synthesis which, on the one hand, creates systematic
unity and, on the other, gives each individual part, including a-theoretical ones, its
specific form. Anti-rationalism devalues the a-theoretical part; more precisely, it
consists in an overvaluing of the theoretical part, i.e., of thinking. One may be of
the opinion that it is rational to dissolve all kinds of objects “indiscriminately into
relations of thought...” [1. P. 3]. What is theoretically not graspable is regarded as
a “possible remainder,” as indeterminately “irrational” [1. P. 3]. Such a “pseudo-
rationalism” is Noeggerath’s primary opponent — an “intellectualism” incapable
of differentiation [1. P. 3]. Even Kant bears traces of it. For this reason, it needs
Goethe: “Compare... the motto from Goethe, which precedes our work, with Kant’s
demand that the intellect cannot dissolve anything, which it has not itself connected
before! [In Goethe] a synthesis in general is presupposed, here [in Kant] one of
thinking” [1. P. 7].
Nevertheless, thinking remains central. Rationalism sets boundaries [Grenzen]
to it, but it is precisely rationalism that establishes its own foundation in thinking
and, therefore, as a theory. It rests on an investigation into thinking that is in itself
conducted by thinking, i.e., it rests on logic. And here Noeggerath proceeds in a
strictly Kantian manner. Theory is a cognition [Erkenntnis], and cognition is a kind
of knowing [Wissen] that is projected toward and examined for its validity, i.e.,
science [Wissenschaft]. Consequently, theory is science. This is also true the other
way around. Science is cognition. Cognition is theoretical. Consequently, science
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KANT’S “CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON”… 605
is theoretical. Logic thus takes shape as a question of knowledge and is, to this
extent, scientific. What it lets us know is valid. This is the acid test for Noeggerath’s
rationalism. For: How should the logical (i.e., scientific) foundation of rationalism
substantiate a possibility of objects that are not scientific, i.e., atheoretical?
The first step is as follows. Logic gets a special role through the question that
is at stake here. In other words, it fathoms the ground, its own preconditions. It
remains science, but in contrast to other sciences it seeks to formulate the conditions
of the possibility of cognition, of theory itself. The cognition of logic, therefore,
applies to something that is original [ursprünglich] to itself and to the fact of
cognition in general. This original element, however, must, in turn, be a scientific
cognition. Otherwise, it would not be verifiably valid. Such a paradox, when made
into a concept of its own, is the transcendental synthesis sought by Kant and
Noeggerath.
If it succeeds in naming its form, it is the precise indication of something that
can be designated only by a double location. On the one hand, the synthesis is,
figuratively speaking, in front of the one whose possibility it produces. Moreover,
on the other hand, it should be at work in the very thing it precedes. Only in this
way, it comes to evidence. It must be validly cognized in itself. Then it can
recursively be understood as justifying knowledge. This double place inevitably
leads to the boundary [Grenze] of science. This is where Noeggerath starts. More
clearly than Kant, he emphasizes that logic, when it reflects on the boundary of its
scientificity, lays germs in itself for non-logical, non-scientific, atheoretical
objectivities [Gegenständlichkeiten].
Here Noeggerath first follows Marburg’s footsteps. The “boundary” [Grenze]
received philosophical significance, especially with Cohen’s second Kant book
Kant’s Foundations of Ethics (1877). The work begins with a review of Kant’s
theoretical philosophy, more precisely: with a consideration of the “thing-in-itself
as a boundary concept.” In Cohen’s work, this retrospective is conspicuously not at
the center of his reconstruction of Kant’s epistemology, presented in Kant’s Theory
of Experience (1871). Instead, it is already on the way to ethics21. It is only from
this second systematic viewpoint that the “Transcendental Dialectics” from the
Critique of Pure Reason comes up, and with it the unique boundary logic of the
knowledge of ideas, Kant’s so-called regulative principles. In Kant’s Foundations
of Ethics, the boundary knowledge, although belonging to logic, is developed from
a point of view external to the theory.
Noeggerath's interpretation of Kant’s system concept germinates in this
decision, even though he does not mention Cohen’s interpretations. He chooses
instead Cohen’s Logic of Pure Knowledge (Logik der reinen Erkenntnis, 1st edition
published in 1902) as his philosophically most crucial contemporary source. In it,
Cohen integrated meditation on boundaries [Grenzen] into his new conception of a
logic of knowledge. This does not mean that he drags ethics into logic. The Kantian
separation between nature-being and ethical entitlement remains untouched.
21 The subsequent editions of the book published in 1885 and 1918 brought no change in this point.
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Nevertheless, symptomatically enough, Cohen outlines the ethical analogy for
almost every form of judgement discussed in his Logic at the end of the respective
chapter.
Noeggerath was fascinated by this conception, which combines constitutive
and regulative logic. Especially in the first two main parts of Cohen’s Logic, “The
Judgements of the Laws of Thought” and “The Judgements of Mathematics,”
he found — in affirmation and criticism, including a remarkable modification —
his starting points22.
III
The inner outline of Noeggerath’s Synthesis and the Concept of System is the
following. A boundary is characterized by the laws of the objects whose area it
circumscribes. The lawfulness by which this circumscription is determined
correlates to those laws within the area. However, only in the territory-inside are
there objects: its border is not an object. Boundary cognition seeks instead the
principles according to which objects are formed, and special rules apply to
principles. Now, transcendental synthesis is the name for such a boundary complex
of principles, first of all in cognition.
Consequently, the new rules apply as principles of science. And still more:
they must themselves preserve the form of science, for they too are to be known in
valid knowledge. Since science is essentially a mode of determination for objects,
the boundary knowledge also follows valid guidelines within the field. However,
something has to change. To preserve the form of science requires cognizing the
original synthesis, with Kant’s expression, as if one cognized it.
What does “as if” mean? Doesn’t one thereby violate the classical prohibition
of contradiction from the outset? According to this prohibition in its simplest
version, an X is either cognizable or not — tertium non datur. To be cognizable
would mean that the X constitutes a specific identity (A is A). To be non-cognizable
would mean that the X does not constitute a particular identity. Its inquiry tends
toward a non-A. Non-A is denied the step to the object (non-A is not A). With
synthesis as a boundary, however, an X is in question, which — because it is not
within the domain — is not constituted as a determinate A but which nevertheless
is to be cognized as if it were an A. Here, a demand for cognition is obviously held
against the prohibition on contradiction.
22 Natorp’ s “Die Grundlagen der exakten Wissenschaften” is also repeatedly called upon by Noeg-
gerath. The book treats much more comprehensively than Cohen the details of the mathematical-
scientific sources (among others, Josef Wellstein), which also became necessary for Noeggerath.
But, and this is the crucial caveat, Noeggerath considered Natorp’s essential epistemological act of
“fieri” [17. P. 10—14] to be flawed. The “fieri” seemed to be subject to temporality, instead of
conversely helping to ground it. Therefore, Noeggerath sees Natorp on the way to his “Allgemeine
Psychologie nach kritischer Methode” [18]. The “reconstructive method” of this book has, according
to Noeggerath, a certain correspondence with Kant. For the logic of cognition, however, it must be
rejected [1. P. 71].
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KANT’S “CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON”… 607
Is it possible to read the “Non” in the “Non-A” in a way that this “Non-A” is
no longer a contradiction? Can this “Non-A” also designate a novelty, an otherness
transforming the whole cognitive situation? An adventurous thought! For it
demands a revolution of questioning, the venture of a new hypothesis in relation to
the material of the traditional knowledge. Noeggerath sees the methodological
model for this venture in Kant’s regulative principles of Transcendental Dialectics.
His most consistent exposition, however, he finds in Cohen’s Logic of Pure
Knowledge.
This is, using Cohen’s phrase, the “adventurous detour” [19. P. 84]: In the
negation of the pseudo-identity, as it were, in the middle of the annihilation of the
tendency of the X towards something false, a stop is set, an fictitious stopping point.
This fictitious point becomes the hypothesis, the hinge of the reversal into a new
positive, into a negation of the negation. And so that this does not come to nothing
in a thoroughly moving scenery, one must dare everything completely. One boldly
asserts that the setting of the fictitious point is the foundation of determinability par
excellence. It is the condition of the possibility of cognitive principles in general.
The fictitious point achieves this precisely because it is — necessarily
imaginary — not existent. Without blatant violation of the prohibition of
contradiction, such a thing is only possible if the method that gives an
X determination is a pure consummation, a self-discovery. This is thinking in Cohen
and Noeggerath — completion per se, without a carrier or subject.
The hypothesis runs as follows. The border-X that is subject to inquiry, the
transcendental synthesis, cannot, to be sure, constitute itself as A; but it is the way
to find an A. Constituting and finding [Finden] are different, and only the latter is
concerned here. But as indicated earlier, this cannot be a special path outside of
science. So, with transcendental synthesis, science must be newly invented
[erfunden]. Also, the objects within the circumscribed area are now different. It is
a paradigm shift. If it succeeds, it brings the cognition of the boundary and the
cognition of the bounded objects to unity under newly discovered rules. This is done
at the following price: it needs a reduction to pure form, a form not already
articulated into contents. In question is a cognition as a form without content. This
is what Noeggerath in fact intends: that the binary prohibition on contradiction be
therefore replaced by a three-valued logic23. It makes a new mode of identity
possible. This is to be noted: the circumscribed objects also become new with
border cognition. Their contents are dissolved, analyzed. The purification toward
form is, as indicated above, decisive. If no new nexus [Zusammenhang] is found,
binary contradiction remains. The smallest nuances decide. The questioning driven
by the risky curiosity concerning border-knowledge must grope its way between
the Scylla of complete annihilation by contradiction and the Charybdis of a
delusional system on loan.
Up to this point, Noeggerath follows Cohen. Nevertheless, Noeggerath
emphasizes much more strongly that not only scientific reflections discover new
23 Cf. the letter to Joachim Moras [10. P. 31].
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608 «КРИТИКА ЧИСТОГО РАЗУМА» КАНТА…
things with the help of three-valued logic. Yes, as indicated, he limits science in
general to problems of theorizing. He rejects, for example, Cohen’s view that
“jurisprudence” may be “called the mathematics of the humanities, and primarily
for ethics its mathematics” [20. P. 66]24. In return, Noeggerath expands the capacity
of logic beyond the confines of science. With him, a logic that has become suitable
for comprehending the original synthesis eliminates the obligation toward science,
cognition, and theory for everything that comes into view outward from the newly
considered boundary.
The demarcation of boundaries has axiomatic force both inwardly and
outwardly. The science of logic brings a freedom to science inward and a freedom
from science outward. And indeed both in the form of a realizing justification:
science as well as non-science are now possible in a valid form. For logic, this has
a remarkable consequence. Logic — which must remain a science — relativizes
itself. It strips off all totalitarian behavior. It will no longer grow into a panlogism.
Noeggerath’s three-valued logic is a look beyond one’s own horizon. His claim is:
Nothing now speaks against synthesis assuming an atheoretical form.
IV
A primordial scenery of the synthetic opens up, a kind of logical substructure.
The transcendental theory of finding can identify only germinal points of pure
quality. Developing these germs toward real appearance and giving them, per
Noeggerath, articulation, quantity, and measure, is no longer its business. With
atheoretical objects, this was not to be expected. Yet, in theory, this logic does not
supply real objects but only rules to prepare the appearance of possible objects.
Therefore, when it is now a matter of systematically presenting these principles of
the possible, a new boundary becomes noticeable, this time in language. To give
expression to the motility of reflection, it is true that philosophizing must remain
close to natural language with its attachment to dynamic objects and things. But its
most important problem, synthetic lawfulness, will then be to grasp only
metaphorically. Philosophizing risks missing precisely what it wants to say by
object- and thing-relevant designations.
Therefore, mathematics serves as a guide. Its symbolism can give an exact
form to the imaginary element of that border. According to Noeggerath, philosophy
can resemble this preciseness in the non-actual. The prerequisite is that it does not
behave mathematically but proceeds along its own path in critical distance to the
“specialized, act-kindred thinking” [1. P. 90] of the mathematician. This is the
purpose of the two digressions at the end of Synthesis and the Concept of System,
one on meta-geometry, the other on Platonic μεταχυ (“between”).
I provide two examples from the Theory of Conic Sections. This theory had —
here lies Noeggerath’s approach — united the Euclidean conception of space (under
24 Noeggerath does not mention that Cohen rejects the fact of an (art) science for his Aesthetics of
Pure Feeling (1912) and establishes a “kind of new logic” on the paradigm of poetry [21. P. 367].
Wiedebach H. RUDN Journal of Philosophy. 2023;27(3):598—613
KANT’S “CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON”… 609
the title of the parabolic projection) with two basic forms of non-Euclidean
conception of space (under the titles of the elliptic and the hyperbolic projection) to
a unified geometry. He is interested in this because “the problem of non-Euclidean
space... has become the formulaic expression of a new view of the nature of science
and thus of knowledge in general” [1. P. 87]. But in the end, Noeggerath is not
concerned with the question of Euclidean and non-Euclidean. He is interested in the
new interpretation of the Infinite.
To show this, the first example leads us away from the naïve assumption that
space extends into an indefinite endlessness. For this purpose, Noeggerath uses the
theory of the so-called “spherical bush” [Kugelgebüsch]25 [1. P. 78—83]. Intuition
is not a criterion in this meta-geometry. Instead, space is defined, against the idea
of endless extension, as bent back in itself “spherically” towards a center. This
center marks a point with only one determination; it does not belong to the defined
space. No construction can positively represent this point. In this sense the point
does not exist. But, its positing is the condition of the possibility of constructions.
And furthermore: if it is posited, then in the spherical bush — Noeggerath restricts
himself to the (parabolic) variant — all basic and doctrinal theorems of Euclidean
geometry remain in force.
Thus, the positing of the non existing point becomes the hypothesis of a
(Platonic) μὴ ὄν, giving precise determination to the infinite. It frees spatial thinking
from the insoluble aporias of an indeterminate endlessness. As a result of the
spherical bending, the endlessness becomes the locally determined infinite of a
single central point. It is true that the new infinity, as with the (previous) endless,
means the non-being of a positive determination. But as punctual “not” it has an
exact place. The hypothesis of the spherical bush enables, as Noeggerath puts it,
the “apprehension of the infinite as something limited [Auffassung des Unendlichen
als eines Begrenzten]” [1. P. 103]. Thus, the limit or boundary [Grenze] is put into
effect as a principle of a continuously determined geometry.
The second example shows above all the producing moment of an imaginary
point of view (focus imaginarius [1. P. 94—97]). One puts a plane through a cone
in such a way that it intersects its central height axis at right angles. The line of
intersection with the cone then describes a circle. Now the plane is rotated around
a straight line lying in it but outside the cone as around an axis in continuous angular
motion. Ellipses, parabolas, hyperbolas are created as intersecting surfaces. The
demand is then to determine all conic sections as if they were created purely as
projections of the initial sectional figure circle into a changed geometrical
environment, despite their differences.
Crucially, the circle must also be dissolved, analyzed as a figure. Its appearance
is traced back to elements of construction that generate a circle under the initial
constellation but generate other projection shapes when the plane is rotated.
Thus, one does not allow descriptive attributes of finished circles, ellipses, etc. but
only genetic predicates of their becoming. The “predicative definition”
25 His most important source is Josef Wellstein’s “Grundlagen der Geometrie” [22].
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610 «КРИТИКА ЧИСТОГО РАЗУМА» КАНТА…
[1. P. 92] of the conic section distilled out under this projective consideration
exemplifies what we brought up above with respect to the boundary meditation: the
tracing back of content determinations to pure form. Continuity (as a form of
motility) is paired with discontinuity (of the appearing projections).
This law of continuity governs everything that under the title of transcendental
synthesis unfolds into a germinal form, first, of qualitative and, then, of quantitative
diversity. Neither a leap nor a dialectical change leads from one content to another.
This applies to single regions of the systems and for every transition between
different regions, e.g., from theory to practice and aesthetics or vice versa. Thus,
one postulates a continuous motility — precisely such synthesis — which generates
the parts of the philosophical system in a manner similar to geometrical projection.
If this succeeds, the validity of the cultural phenomena correlating the system
parts — knowledge, action, and art — is demonstrated.
The continuity of the synthetic motility remains fictitious from the point of
view of the products, but it is indispensable for their validity. However, these very
phenomena provide the basis for asking about this validity. They appeared at first
separately from each other or only uncertainly connected. So what unites them? For
the sake of the answer a hypothesis of continuity must be ventured. It claims that
this separation arises from a unified, purely legal synthesis. This becomes true in
the Platonian sense of “hypothesis,” i.e., as a foundation of stable insight if the
synthesis can be formalized and a strictly ordered series of actual forms can be
developed.
Under this guideline Noeggerath brings together his titular concepts: synthesis
and system concept. He obtains the continuity hypothesis with the help of Kant’s
three tables of transcendental judgements, categories, and principles in the Critique
of Pure Reason [23. A 70, 80, 161/B 95, 106, 200]. Each of these tables is known
to contain twelve individual elements in four groups of three each. For the
systematic division, the third group under the title “relation” is decisive. In it —
Noeggerath takes his key terms only from the tables of judgements and
principles— the three principles of substance, causality and interaction correspond
to the categorical, hypothetical, and disjunctive judgements [23. A 182—218/B
224—265]. Here, too, Noeggerath makes use of mathematical analogies. At the
center, in interpreting the hypothetical relation, this is the theory of the arithmetic
series [1. P. 51—54]. As a result, he assigns a systemic part to each of the
three pairs of judgement and principle. “For it is to be connected: the categorical
relation with ethics, the hypothetical with logic, and the disjunctive with
aesthetics” [1. P. 10].
It is immediately noticeable that Noeggerath changes the classical sequence
beginning with logic. Indeed: “The order of the limbs is: a) ethics, b) logic,
c) aesthetics” [1. P. 10]. However, despite this change, Noeggerath, as shown
above, also begins with thinking, hence, with logic. This concerns his interest in the
regulative potential of the third antinomy (freedom versus natural law) from Kant's
transcendental dialectics.
Wiedebach H. RUDN Journal of Philosophy. 2023;27(3):598—613
KANT’S “CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON”… 611
However, we come up against a limit in the text before us. Noeggerath needs
to unfold his reflection of the third antinomy in detail. The reason is that the second
part of Synthesis and the Concept of System, which is supposed to present it, is —
because the work had to be finished as a qualifying dissertation for the
doctorate degree — only available in the manner of a protocol of attained results
[1. P. 62—76]. A similar case can be found, for example, in a series of details,
where Noeggerath intervenes in Cohen’s “Judgements of Mathematics” [1. P. 47].
What he hints at here, however, demonstrates a profound familiarity with
his subject-matter. The potential of this unusual writing for research is beyond
doubt.
References
[1] Noeggerath F. Synthesis und Systembegriff in der Philosophie. Ein Beitrag zur Kritik des
Antirationalismus (Mit zwei Excursen: ‘Über den Urteilscharakter der Metageometrie’
und ‘Über den Platonischen Begriff des μεταξυ’) [dissertation]. Erlangen; 1916.
[2] Noeggerath F. Synthesis und Systembegriff in der Philosophie. Wiedebach H, Fenves P,
editors. New York: Peter Lang; 2023.
[3] Scholem G. Walter Benjamin und Felix Noeggerath. In: Walter Benjamin und sein Engel.
Vierzehn Aufsätze und kleine Beiträge. Tiedemann R, editor. Frankfurt am Main:
Suhrkamp; 1983. P. 78—127.
[4] Deuber-Mankowsky A. Der frühe Walter Benjamin und Hermann Cohen. Jüdische Werte,
kritische Philosophie und vergängliche Erfahrung. Berlin: Vorwerk; 2000. P. 38—48.
[5] Tagliacozzo T. Esperienza e compito infinito nella filosofia del primo Benjamin.
Macerata: Qodlibet; 2003. P. 253—295.
[6] Fenves P. Über das Programm der kommenden Philosophie. In: Benjamin-Handbuch.
Leben—Werk—Wirkung. Lindner B et al., editors. Sonderausgabe, Stuttgart/Weimar:
Metzler; 2011. P. 134—150.
[7] Hartmann F, Heimsoeth R, editors. Nicolai Hartmann und Heinz Heimsoeth im
Briefwechsel. Bonn: Bouvier; 1978.
[8] Croce B. Logik als Wissenschaft vom reinen Begriff. Noeggerath F, transl. In: Gesammelte
philosophische Schriften in deutscher Übertragung. Reihe 1. Philosophie des Geistes. Bd.
2. Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr; 1930.
[9] Benjamin W. Gesammelte Schriften. Vol. 3. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp; 1972.
[10] Noeggerath F. Das Fenster: eigener Bericht des ehemaligen Korvettenkapitäns von
Silhouet über seinen Aufenthalt in einer fremden Stadt. Fischer JM, editor. In:
Vergessene Autoren der Moderne 23. Siegen: Univ. Siegen; 1986.
[11] Benjamin W. Schriften. In 2 vols. Adorno ThW, Adorno G, editors. Frankfurt am Main:
Suhrkamp; 1955.
[12] Opitz M. Literaturkritik. In: Benjamin-Handbuch. Leben—Werk—Wirkung. Lindner B
et al., editors. Sonderausgabe, Stuttgart/Weimar: Metzler; 2011. P. 311—332.
[13] Noeggerath F. Die Gedichte. Nürnberg: Hans Carl; 1961.
[14] Noeggerath F. Über das Unzeitgemässe der abstrakten Kunst. Merkur.
1951;5(45):1005—1019.
[15] Moufang W. Magier, Mächte und Mysterien. Handbuch übersinnlicher Vorgänge und
deren Deutung. Heidelberg: Keyser; 1954.
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[16] Goethe JW. Analyse und Synthese. In: Goethes Werke, hrsg. im Auftrage der
Großherzogin Sophie von Sachsen. Section II. Vol. 11. Pt. 1. Weimar: Böhlau; 1893.
P. 71—72.
[17] Natorp P. Die Grundlagen der exakten Wissenschaften. Leipzig/Berlin: B. G. Teubner;
1910.
[18] Natorp P. Allgemeine Psychologie nach kritischer Methode. Tübingen: Mohr; 1912.
[19] Cohen H. Logik der reinen Erkenntnis. In: Werke. Vol. 6. Hildesheim: Olms; 1977.
[20] Cohen H. Ethik des reinen Willens. In: Werke. Vol. 7. Hildesheim: Olms; 1981.
[21] Cohen H. Ästhetik des reinen Gefühls I. In: Werke. Vol. 8. Hildesheim: Olms; 1982.
[22] Wellstein J. Grundlagen der Geometrie. In: Wellstein J, Weber H. Enzyklopädie der
Elementar-Mathematik. Vol. 2: Elemente der Geometrie. Leipzig/Berlin: B. G. Teubner;
1915. P. 33—54.
[23] Kant I. Critique of Pure Reason. United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press; 1998.
About the author:
Wiedebach Hartwig — Dr. phil. habil., Independent scholar, Goppingen, Germany (e-mail:
wiedebach@posteo.de).
Феликс Нёггерат о Канте:
трансцендентальный синтез
как принцип системообразования
Хартвиг Видебах
Независимый исследователь,
Germany, 73033, Goeppingen, Georg-Boehringer-Weg, 37
wiedebach@posteo.de
Перевод с немецкого Д.И. Чистякова
Аннотация. Вальтер Беньямин называл Феликса Нёггерата (1885—1960) «универ-
сальным гением» или просто «гением». В своем трактате 1916 года «Синтез и концепция
системы в философии» Нёггерат предложил оригинальное и радикальное прочтение кан-
товской концепции синтеза. Он осмеливается противопоставить мысль несоизмеримости
атеоретического бытия. Связь между логикой и несоизмеримостью — это то, что он
называет рационализмом. В противоречие с этим утверждением любая попытка исклю-
чить атеоретическое бытие из сферы логики является антирационализмом. Нёггерат
развивает это в глубоком обсуждении и модификации эпистемологических позиций,
особенно позиций Марбургской школы и Германа Когена. Нёггерат конструирует поня-
тие философской системы с помощью трех таблиц трансцендентальных суждений,
категорий и принципов Канта в «Критике чистого разума». Известно, что каждая из этих
таблиц содержит 12 отдельных элементов в четырех группах по три в каждой. Для с
истематического деления определяющей является третья группа под названием «Отно-
шение». Каждому виду отношений Нёггерат отводит одну системную часть. По его
убеждению, категориальное отношение должно быть связано с этикой, гипотетиче-
ское — с логикой, а дизъюнктивное — с эстетикой. В результате меняется классическая
последовательность, начиная с логики. И получается такой порядок членов: а) этика,
Wiedebach H. RUDN Journal of Philosophy. 2023;27(3):598—613
KANT’S “CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON”… 613
б) логика, в) эстетика. В логической схеме Нёггерата решающую роль играют конкрет-
ные математические понятия метагеометрии. По его мнению, философия может
напоминать их точность в построении жизнеспособной концепции бесконечного.
Предпосылкой является то, что философия сама не ведет себя математически, а идет
своим собственным путем, на критическом расстоянии от «специализированного,
деятельного мышления» математики.
Ключевые слова: атеоретическая форма, непрерывность vs. диалектика, Иоганн
Вольфганг фон Гёте, Герман Коген, гипотеза, логика, математика, метагеометрия,
неокантианство, Платон, рационализм, антирационализм, наука, трехзначная логика,
Вальтер Беньямин
История статьи:
Статья поступила 19.01.2023
Статья принята к публикации 07.06.2023
Для цитирования: Wiedebach H. Felix Noeggerath on Kant: Transcendental Synthesis as a
Principle of System Formation / D.I. Chistyakov, translator // Вестник Российского
университета дружбы народов. Серия: Философия. 2023. Т. 27. № 3. С. 598—613.
https://doi.org/10.22363/2313-2302-2023-27-3-598-613
Сведения об авторе:
Видебах Хартвиг — доктор философских наук, независимый исследователь, Геппинген,
Германия (e-mail: wiedebach@posteo.de).