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University of Michigan Press
Chapter Title: Delivering on Legitimation Claims: Creating Consultative Mechanisms for
CSOs in Authoritarian Regimes
Chapter Author(s): Angelo Vito Panaro
Book Title: Lobbying the Autocrat
Book Subtitle: The Dynamics of Policy Advocacy in Nondemocracies
Book Editor(s): Max Grömping, Jessica C. Teets
Published by: University of Michigan Press. (2023)
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.3998/mpub.12414985.17
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Lobbying the Autocrat
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266
12 | Delivering on Legitimation Claims
Creating Consultative Mechanisms for CSOs
in Authoritarian Regimes
Angelo Vito Panaro
e literature on authoritarian regimes argues that societal participation
is limited as the policy- making process is dominated by the ruler and
access is restricted to the members of the ruling coalition (Boix and Svolik
; Svolik ). But recent studies and other contributions to this vol-
ume demonstrate that autocratic leaders do not govern in isolation.
Instead, they also need to acquire political support from groups outside
the ruling coalition in order to strengthen their position in power (Geddes
; Gandhi and Przeworski ; Gandhi ). In doing so, rulers are
not immune from groups’ pressure and, under some circumstances, their
preferences may even inuence policy decisions in those contexts (Teets
; Steinberg and Shih ; Böhmelt ).
This chapter asks under which conditions nondemocratic regimes
develop routinized mechanisms for societal interest representation in
the policy- making process. By focusing on rulers’ need for informa-
tion, I analyze the conditions that facilitate interest groups’ access
under authoritarianism. I demonstrate that autocracies that legitimize
their position in power by using claims of socioeconomic performance
and democratic procedures need to collect more information about
citizens’ preferences. This in turn creates more opportunities for civil
society organizations (CSOs)1 to interact with public officials than in
autocracies that rely on other sources of legitimation. Unlike the previ-
ous chapters in this section that shed light on outcomes in one policy
area (land in Zimbabwe and social services in Russia and Belarus), I
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Delivering on Legitimation Claims | 267
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focus on the outcome of institutional changes creating consultative
mechanisms, and argue that they are catalyzed by specific regime
information needs and the ability of advocacy groups to provide this
information.
My theoretical argument builds on previous contributions according
to which, although repression and military force remain in the autocrat’s
toolbox (Kailitz ), regime survival does not primarily depend on the
use of force (Croissant and Wurster ). Dictators, in fact, need to
acquire support from both members of the ruling coalition and citizens in
order to secure their position in power (Gandhi and Przeworski ;
Geddes ; Wintrobe ). A ruler’s need for information about citi-
zens’ preferences creates varying interactions with actors outside the
political arena.
In addition to information needs, a recent body of research argues that
the strategies autocrats use to legitimize their position in power impinge
on a regime’s survival. ese contributions demonstrate that dierent
legitimation strategies aect the economic and social performance of
nondemocratic regimes (Dukalskis and Gerschewski ; von Soest and
Grauvogel ; Kailitz and Stockemer ; Kailitz ; Debre and Mor-
genbesser ; Cassani ). Following this logic, I argue that rulers
using performance- based and democratic- procedural legitimation strate-
gies need more information about citizens’ preferences compared to other
types of regimes if they intend to deliver on their legitimation claims.
More specically, in performance- based autocracies, rulers need to collect
information on how to allocate or to whom to distribute resources in
order to boost the economy and enhance citizens’ well- being. Similarly,
autocracies using democratic- procedural legitimation claims require
more frequent interactions between the ruler and other groups to uphold
the veneer of nominally democratic institutions. Built on this logic, I
hypothesize that both types of legitimation strategies are associated with
higher degrees of access for CSOs.
Following Binderkrantz and Pedersen, I dene access as “instances
where a group has entered a political arena passing a threshold controlled
by relevant gatekeepers” (Binderkrantz and Pedersen , ). In the
case of authoritarian regimes, the decision- making process is controlled
by the ruler who interacts with selected groups in order to “exchange
policy- relevant information” (Beyers , ). Overall, access allows
leaders to collect the necessary information in order to secure their posi-
tion in power while, at the same time, providing opportunities for external
actors such as CSOs to interact with public ocials. From the perspective
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268 | Lobbying the Autocrat
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of organized interests, access is a crucial intermediate objective facilitating
broader policy inuence.
e empirical analysis rests upon a time- series- cross- sectional (TSCS)
model with panel- corrected standard error estimates. e sample includes
all authoritarian regimes that have been autocratic for more than three
consecutive years from to . Data on CSOs consultations and
political regimes’ legitimation strategies are collected from V- Dem Data-
base (Coppedge et al. ).2 Importantly, those data yield new insights
into the internal logic and groups’ access in nondemocratic states, which
for many years have been made dicult by data scarcity.
Overall, the chapter provides a twofold contribution to the literature of
interest groups. First, it supports the evidence that despite a hierarchical
and top- down decision- making process, social actors are not excluded
from the policy- making process in authoritarian regimes. Second, it dem-
onstrates that CSOs’ access is dependent on the claims and strategies used
by autocrats to legitimize their position in power. Building on previous
contributions on autocratic politics, this chapter sheds light on the inter-
link that exists between autocrats’ need for policy information and dier-
ent points of access for CSOs. e ndings in this chapter mirror those in
other chapters in this section in that advocacy groups are able to achieve
concrete policy outcomes, which is made possible by a regime’s need for
information, expertise, and support from certain advocacy groups.
Regime- legitimation claims create opportunities for land reform advo-
cacy groups in Zimbabwe, similar to social welfare groups in Russia and
Belarus (chapter ). ese ndings are supported more broadly by the
large- N analysis in this chapter.
e chapter is organized as follows. e rst section reviews previous
research on interest groups’ access in both democracies and autocracies.
e second part analyzes four legitimation strategies— indoctrination,
adulation, socioeconomic performance and democratic- procedural— and
how each creates dierent needs for political information on behalf of the
ruler. I then elaborate on the hypothesis regarding how information needs
and legitimation strategies aect the prevalence of CSO consultations. e
third section presents the data and research method linking legitimation
strategies to interest representation. e empirical analysis provides evi-
dence that performance- based and democratic- procedural legitimation
claims are associated with a higher degree of CSO consultations compared
to other types of autocracy. Finally, the chapter concludes with a discus-
sion of the results and potential pathways for future research.
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Delivering on Legitimation Claims | 269
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Political Regimes and Interest Representation
Studies in the eld of interest representation oer a cornucopia of neolo-
gisms for interest organizations. Among others, Berkhout () denes
interest organizations based on three constitutive elements: () organiza-
tional structure, () policy advocacy, and () collective action. In this view,
interest organizations include any organized forms of political behavior
engaging in lobbying tactics and intrainstitution relationships (Beyers,
Eising, and Maloney ; Jordan, Halpin, and Maloney ). Impor-
tantly, though, the literature demonstrates that those organizations are
most of the time passive as their primary concern is not to broadly inu-
ence the policy process but rather only those policies directly related to
the group survival or success (Lowery ).
Supply of and Demand for Access in Democracies
Established research on access of interest organizations in Western democ-
racies is mostly focused on the exchange of “access goods” (i.e., political
and technical information) between interest groups and policy makers
(Bouwen , ; Berkhout ). Based on those studies, access is
inuenced by the characteristics of the mobilized interests as well as by the
institutional context in which thos e interests operate. ese two approaches
are commonly referred to as “resource- based theory” and “institutionalist
perspective.”
e resource- based theory assumes that neither policy makers nor
interest groups alone can pursue their own political interests; therefore,
both actors have an incentive to interact with each other (Denzau and
Munger ). Scholars posit that the exchange of resources among inter-
est groups and gatekeepers depends on the characteristics of the group,
such as nancial resources (Lindblom ), ideological alignment (Bou-
wen ), level of expertise (Crombez ; Hall and Deardor ;
Beyers , ; Avant, Finnemore, and Sell ) and size of the mem-
bership (Eising b). According to this approach, policy makers inter-
act with interest groups because they need information to pursue their
own goals, while, at the same time, interest groups mobilize resources in
order to attract public ocials’ attention to “their” issue and to access the
political process.
A second approach to the study of interest groups looks at the struc-
ture of political regimes and emphasizes the role of institutional points of
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270 | Lobbying the Autocrat
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access (Weiler and Brändli ). is body of research argues that institu-
tional congurations play a pivotal role in either promoting or constrain-
ing access of interest groups in Western democracies (Grande ; Marks
and McAdam ), particularly at the EU institutional level (Beyers ;
Pollack ; Lowery ). Beyers (), for instance, nds evidence
that interest groups access public ocials more easily at the European
level than at the national level, since the European Union is made up of
dierent political arenas that oer multiple points of access. A more rigor-
ous version of the institutionalist approach argues that democracies pro-
vide more opportunities than autocracies for interest groups to organize
their resources and exercise pressures on public ocials (Kanol ).
Supply of and Demand for Access in Autocracies
In applying these approaches outside of democratic contexts, scholars
contend that political power in nondemocratic regimes is strongly cen-
tralized in the hand of a leader, which consequently constrains interest
groups access (Fearon ; Lake ). Autocrats oen suppress groups’
mobilization in order to eliminate dissent and reduce the probability of
being overthrown. Based on this evidence, scholars argue that interest
groups in autocracies have only marginal roles in the policy process (Hre-
benar, McBeth, and Morgan ), as they are not independent and
mostly coopted by the ruler (Hasmath and Hsu ).
Despite institutional dierences between democracies and autocracies,
recent studies demonstrate that under certain circumstances, interest orga-
nizations manage to access and consequently inuence policy decisions in
authoritarian regimes as well. Following the logic of the resource- based
approach, Steinberg and Shih () provide evidence that interest groups
in China strategically inuenced policy decisions in the tradable industry
between and in order to keep the exchange rate undervalued. In
particular, they argue that capitalist groups used their connections with
high- level ocials to express their preferences and steer decisions on the
exchange rate. Similarly, other scholars contend that capitalist groups in
China nowadays constitute the party’s most important basis of support (Tsai
; Dickson ). In this account, group characteristics such as group
size, ideology, and scal resources matter much more than expertise.
In contrast to the resource- based theory, scholars utilizing an institu-
tionalist approach identify structural factors that enhance interest organi-
zations’ access in nondemocratic contexts. For example, Teets () dem-
onstrates that policy networks in China successfully inuenced elite
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Delivering on Legitimation Claims | 271
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conception of policy problems and consequently the range of policy solu-
tions. In this context, an institutional structure that requires NGOs and
other interest groups to register with a government agency as a supervisor
creates the access point for lobbying. Similarly, based on the work of
Bueno de Mesquita () and the selectorate theory, Böhmelt ()
demonstrates that the size of the selectorate and the winning coalition has
an impact on the likelihood that autocrats will ratify international envi-
ronmental agreements (IEAs). Using a large- N sample of environmental
nongovernmental organizations (ENGOs), he nds evidence that the
marginal eect of ENGOs’ lobbying on the likelihood of IEA ratication
is less pronounced in single- party regimes than in personalist types.
Overall, those studies demonstrate that autocrats are not immune to
interest organizations’ pressures. Both resource- based and institutionalist
arguments explain varying levels of access for interest groups, policy net-
works, and NGOs in nondemocratic regimes. Similar to democracies,
authoritarian regimes’ need for political support creates an incentive for
policy makers to interact with actors outside the political arena and gather
necessary information, while interest organizations mobilize their
resources to steer policy decisions. Despite these similarities, though, the
literature on authoritarian regimes argues that autocrats acquire and
maintain political power in dierent ways (Geddes ; Geddes, Wright,
and Frantz ; Kailitz and Stockemer ). Some govern with the
extensive use of military power and repression, while others establish
institutions and allow opposition groups to enter the political arena (Gan-
dhi and Przeworski ; Gandhi ; Magaloni ). According to the
strategies autocrats use to secure their position in power, interest organi-
zations’ access might vary substantially across authoritarian regimes. To
explore these relationships, I rst investigate the variation that exists
across authoritarian regimes and then develop a theory and elaborate the
resulting hypothesis about informational needs in authoritarian contexts.
The Information Gap: Legitimation Strategies
and Interest Groups’ Access
Autocratic leaders do not live in isolation but they use dierent claims to
legitimize their position in power and consolidate political support. Fol-
lowing Kailitz (, , ), “legitimization forms the theoretical founda-
tion of any governmental power” and “constitute the organization of any
political regimes.” e process of legitimation includes strategies and
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272 | Lobbying the Autocrat
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claims used by the leaders to gain support and justify their position in
power (Dukalskis and Gerschewski ). In the case of authoritarian
regimes, legitimation constitutes one of the three pillars that strengthen
autocratic rule (Gerschewski ).
Some scholars highlight the importance of indoctrination, based on
political ideologies and tradition, for consolidating nondemocratic regime
stability (Dukalskis and Gerschewski ). Ideology refers to a system of
belief aimed at creating a collective identity and a specic societal order
(Linz ), while tradition includes the historical values and national
heritage of the country. Both of them are used by the ruler to set the
boundaries of what is socially accepted, indoctrinate citizens, and make
them accept a hierarchical organization of power. In order to do so, rulers
use political narratives or symbols related to specic ideology or a coun-
try’s history. Nowadays, pure forms of this type of autocracy are extremely
rare (Dukalskis and Gerschewski ). ough an extensive mass control
on everyday activities, the disruption of boundaries between public and
private life and the presence of a strong ideology led some scholars to
arm that North Korea is an example of an indoctrination- based authori-
tarian regime (Armstrong ; Scobell ; Dukalskis and Hooker
).
Worldwide, authoritarian regimes frequently portray their leaders as
the ones who represents the nation’s unity and who can bring peace and
prosperity since they are chosen from above to fulll a certain mission
(von Soest and Grauvogel ). Charisma and leadership qualities of the
leader still constitute a fundamental source of legitimacy. Additionally,
rulers sometimes appeal to their personal and military achievements and
depict themselves as ordinary people who deserve to stay in power. Based
on this evidence, adulation, conceived as a deep form of respect and devo-
tion only to the leader, is a second legitimation strategy. Adulation diers
from indoctrination, as the leader claims to have a God- given natural
right to rule and, thus, he or she is the only one who is legitimized to gov-
ern. Claims based on the person of the leader are present in every type of
authoritarian rule, although they are particularly common in military
regimes and monarchies such as Chile under Pinochet (– ) or the
Republic of Congo under the Kabila family (– ).
Toward the end of the twentieth century, the toolbox of legitimation
claims that autocrats tap into has been enriched with the regime’s socio-
economic performance (Przeworski et al. ). Contemporary autocrats,
in fact, use economic successes rather than ideology or tradition to legiti-
mize their position in power. In particular, they emphasize economic
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Delivering on Legitimation Claims | 273
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growth, citizens’ well- being, equal redistribution and access to certain
public goods such as education and health, and present them as great
achievements of the regime under their rule (von Soest and Grauvogel
). Singapore is an example of such an autocratic regime type. From
until , Singapore experienced tremendous economic growth
during which business and nancial services in real GDP rose from
percent to percent in , the share of manufacturing in GDP
increased from percent to percent, and the level of employment tre-
bled (Bercuson ). Based on this period, the ruling party uses eco-
nomic results as a way to glorify their rule. Within performance- based
authoritarian regimes, rentier states deserve particular attention, as they
use rents coming from the export of natural resource to deliver public and
private goods to their citizens. By satisfying the basic needs of the popula-
tion, autocratic regimes in the Middle East and North Africa render the
population passive and, at the same time, reduce the probability of a
regime outbreak (Ross ).
Over the past decades, we have witnessed an increasing number of
autocrats establishing nominally democratic institutions.3 e emergence
of so- called “electoral autocracies” (Schedler ) or “competitive
authoritarianism” (Levitsky and Way ) have received greater atten-
tion in the literature on authoritarian regimes since democratic- procedural
legitimation strategy is nowadays quite common. As Wahman, Teorell,
and Hadenius () demonstrate, more than half of contemporary autoc-
racies hold elections or have established legislatures.
ose institutions give the ruler the pretense of having a democratic
legitimacy (Dukalskis and Gerschewski ). If the autocrat wins the
elections with more than percent of the votes, as has happened for
instance to the president of Turkmenistan, Gurbanguly Berdymukhame-
dov, in 4 or the president of Georgia, Mikheil Saakashvili, in ,5
then the leader claims to have the right to rule as the leader represents the
will of the majority. Institutions therefore give a semblance of democratic
legitimacy.
Table . summarizes those four legitimation strategies— indoctrina-
tion, adulation, performance, and democratic- procedural— and show
how each of them captures conceptual content of a variate of legitimation
claims and tools across dierent regime types.
In light of such discussion, authoritarian regimes that intend to deliver
on such legitimation claims () need dierent types of information to
secure their position in power and () have dierent incentives to collect
such information. Authoritarian regimes using indoctrination and adula-
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274 | Lobbying the Autocrat
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tion strategies rely on what I dene here as the “internal logic” of legitima-
tion. ose regimes use ideology, tradition, and the ruler’s personal and
military achievements to consolidate and enhance regime stability. ose
claims are omnipresent in the political and daily life of the regime (Fried-
rich and Brzezinski ) and create a feeling of belonging around the
person of the leader (Dukalskis and Gerschewski ). In this view,
authoritarian regimes using those claims have less incentives to acquire
any type of information as the process of legitimation is internal to the
regime itself. is logic is best captured by the famous phrase of Mussolini
“everything within the state, nothing outside the state and nothing against
the state.”
In contrast, performance- based and democratic- procedural autocra-
cies rely on an “external logic” of legitimation. In autocracies delivering on
socioeconomic performance, rulers need to acquire information on how
to allocate and distribute resources in order to boost the economy as well
as acquire citizens’ preferences to enhance their well- being. e need for
technical information and citizens’ preferences require policy makers in
performance- led autocracies to engage in more interactions with interest
organizations (Flöthe ; De Bruycker ). Similarly, rulers that
intend to deliver on electoral competition and political participation to
justify their position in power need to collect political information. As
other contributions to this volume demonstrate (e.g., Hanegraa and De
Bruycker in chapter ), political information indicates the amount of
political support for the regime, which, in the case of authoritarian regimes
delivering on democratic- procedural legitimation strategies, is pivotal to
creating a pretense of democratic legitimacy and strengthen regime stabil-
ity (Schedler ).
TABLE 12.1. Legitimation Strategies, Claims, and Tools
Legitimation Strategies Legitimation Claims Legitimation Tools
Indoctrination Ideology, Tradition, Political narratives, symbols
Adulation Person of the Leader Charisma, personal and mil-
itary achievements,
Performance Socioeconomic conditions Economic growth, citizens
well- being, equal redistribu-
tion, access to public goods
Democratic- Procedural Democratic procedures
and norms Elections, legislatures, and
party competition
Source: Author’s elaboration from Dukalskis and Gerschewski (2017).
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Delivering on Legitimation Claims | 275
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In short, the need for technical and political information as well as citi-
zens’ preferences exposes some rulers to pressure from interest organiza-
tions. In performance- based regimes, interest organizations reect the
preferences of those groups working in the sectors that are strategic for the
economic performance of the regime, while interest organizations in
democratic- procedural authoritarian regimes have more opportunities to
communicate their preferences to members of the winning coalition. is
is because, on one hand, the need for political support creates more incen-
tives for the ruler to collect political information, while on the other hand
the presence of institutions such as elections and legislatures provide more
points of access. Conversely, interest organizations in authoritarian
regimes that rely on indoctrination and adulation strategies have only a
marginal role as both the need for technical and political information and
institutional opportunities are limited. Following this logic, I formulate
the resulting hypothesis:
H: Performance- based and democratic- procedural legitimation
strategies are associated with higher access of interest organizations in
authoritarian regimes compared to indoctrination and adulation
strategies.
Empirical Analysis
Data
I conducted a longitudinal analysis of ninety- three authoritarian regimes
from to . is time span makes it possible to control for variation
in the legitimation strategies across authoritarian regimes. Before , in
fact, the number of nondemocratic regimes relying on democratic-
procedural legitimation claims was quite limited (Levitsky and Way ,
). Countries are classied as autocracies according to the Regime of
the World (RoW) indicator collected from the Varieties of Democracy (V-
DEM) Database (). Data for the dependent variable and the covari-
ates are also collected from V- DEM. e complete dataset includes coun-
tries that have more than a million inhabitants and have been autocratic
for more than three consecutive years.6
e main dependent variable access is measured by the degree to
which CSOs are consulted by policy makers on policies relevant to their
members (vcscnsult).7 According to V- DEM, CSOs include interest
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276 | Lobbying the Autocrat
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groups, labor unions, professional associations, and nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs), thus tting well within the denition of interest
organizations used here. Consultations with policy makers have already
been used in other studies as a proxy for the level of interest organizations’
access to the political arena (Bouwen , ; Crombez ; Chalm-
ers ).
To account for legitimation strategies, I use four V- DEM indicators
that point to governments’ claims to legitimacy: ideology, person of the
leader, social- economic performance, and rational- legal procedures.
Importantly, legitimation claims are not mutually exclusive and, therefore,
those indicators reect the propensity of the regime to rely on dierent
types of claims. e indicators are elaborated in an expert survey based on
ve questions that reect the most important legitimation claims used by
the rulers. Experts’ scores for each claim are converted into interval latent
variables with values that represent country- year point estimates on the
bases of the expert coding. As expected, the report “Regime Legiti-
mation Strategies” demonstrates that authoritarian regimes dier among
themselves in terms of legitimation claims. Closed autocracies rely more
on ideological and personalistic claims, while electoral regimes tend to
legitimate their rule on performance and rational- legal claims (Tannen-
berg et al. ).
In addition, other potential confounders might aect groups’ access.
Democratization studies contend that the extent to which autocrats use
military force and respect civil rights and liberties inuence access of civil
society or opposition groups to policy makers. ose studies demonstrate
that access of opposition leaders and groups to the political arena is nega-
tively associated with the level of state control on group’s activities (Lev-
itsky and Way ; Haggard and Kaufman ). erefore, we should
expect to see access of CSOs in autocracies with higher level of repression
to be more constrained compared to regimes with lower levels of repres-
sion. To account for this relationship, I use two CSO indicators collected
from the V- DEM database: . CSOs repression (vcsreprss), which reports
the extent to which government attempts to repress CSOs. . CSOs entry
and exit (vcseeorgs), which describes to what extent the government
achieves control over the entry and exit of CSOs in public life. Impor-
tantly, higher values for CSOs’ repression (vcsreprss) reect more free-
dom in CSOs’ organization, while lower values signal higher levels of gov-
ernment repression. Similarly, higher values for CSOs’ entry and exit
(vcseeorgs) indicate a limited control of the government over entry and
exit of CSOs into public life, while lower values signal an explicit monop-
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Delivering on Legitimation Claims | 277
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oly of the government over CSOs’ political activity. Overall, these two
variables measure the competitiveness of each regime, with more closed
regimes having higher levels of repression and less entry.
Finally, scholars argue that democracies allow more groups to partici-
pate in the policy process compared to nondemocratic regimes (Kanol
). erefore, I control for the number of years a country has been
democratic; a longer democratic experience should reect a legacy of
more group consultations.
Table . presents the descriptive statistics for each of these variables.
ose statistics show that there is variation in CSOs’ consultation across
authoritarian regimes. On average, the top ve countries with the highest
degree of CSOs consultations are Tunisia, Indonesia, Niger, Peru, and
Venezuela, while the ve countries with the lowest degree are Azerbaijan,
Uzbekistan, Libya, North Korea, and Eritrea.
At a rst look this suggests that CSOs are more frequently consulted in
countries using performance and democratic- procedural legitimation
strategies (Indonesia, Venezuela, Peru, and Tunisia) compared to coun-
tries using ideology and the person of the leader to legitimize their rule
(Uzbekistan, Libya, North Korea, and Eritrea).
e scatter diagrams in Figure . show this relationship in more
details as they plot the distribution of vcscnsult_osp over the four legiti-
mation strategies. Each diagram also illustrates predicted values for a lin-
ear regression between CSOs and each legitimation strategy. e correla-
tion coecients are, respectively: Indoctrination −., Adulation −.,
TABLE 12.2. Descriptive Statistics for All Variables (1990– 2014)
Variables Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Dependent Variable
CSOs consultations 2325 –0.76 0.51 0.02 1.973
Independent Variables
Indoctrination 2309 2.22 0.96 0.37 3.95
Adulation 2315 2.50 0.99 0.35 3.97
Performance 2325 2.59 0.71 0.12 3.75
Democratic- procedural 2315 2.38 0.72 0.16 3.78
Control Variables
CSOs entry & exit 2325 2.11 1.04 0.06 3.95
CSOs repression 2325 2.33 0.95 0.04 3.91
Democratic Experience 2325 1.88 4.28 0 22
Source: Coppedge et al. (2019) and Ross- Mahdavi Dataset (2015).
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278 | Lobbying the Autocrat
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Performance ., Democratic- procedural .. ese patterns of associa-
tion signal that () CSOs consultations vary across authoritarian regimes
that use distinctive legitimation claims to justify their position in power
and () indoctrination and adulation strategies are negatively associated
with CSOs consultations, while performance- based and democratic-
procedural- based regimes interact more frequently with CSOs.
Estimation Technique
To test the hypotheses, I employ pooled Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)
regressions. As Beck and Katz () argue, OLS is optimal for time- series-
cross- sectional (TSCS) data if () the error processes have the same variance
(panel homoscedasticity) and () all error processes are independent of each
other both across time (no serial correlation) and units (no contemporane-
ous correlation). e authors also advise researchers to rst examine the
temporal properties of the data and eliminate serial correlation by either
adding a lag dependent variable as a regressor or transforming the data
Figure .. Autocratic Legitimation Strategies and CSOs Consultations
Note: Linear prediction of v2cscnsult_osp by legitimation strategies, with a condence
intervals.
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Delivering on Legitimation Claims | 279
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(Beck and Katz , ). Following this logic, Cumby- Huizinga tests sug-
gest that serial correlation is not eliminated by adding a dependent variable
on the right side of the equation, while the serially correlated (SC) error
model with a panel- specic autocorrelation structure (AR) best accounts
for the temporal dynamics in the error processes.
Once the temporal dimension has been examined, I combine OLS with
“panel- corrected standard errors” (PCSEs) to correct for contemporane-
ous correlation and panel heteroscedasticity. e combination of OLS
with PCSEs in fact allows me to correctly estimate panel variability and
structure of the error terms (Beck and Katz , ).
Additionally, it is reasonable to assume that the parameter estimates
are inuenced by country- level covariates. As seen above, a country’s geo-
graphical location or historical legacy seems to play an important role in
the extent of CSOs’ consultations in authoritarian regimes. ose unob-
served factors, however, are not associated with dierent legitimations
strategies as, for instance, countries in the MENA region use both ideol-
ogy and leader’s achievement to legitimize their position. us, according
to Beck and Katz ( ) and Hsiao (), when unit- specic hetero-
geneity is uncorrelated with the explanatory variables, the most appropri-
ate approach is to use random- coecient models (or multilevel model) in
which the observations (i.e., country- years) are nested in the unit of anal-
ysis (i.e., country). Similarly, the Hausman’s specication test does not
reject the null hypothesis that unit- level eects are adequately modeled by
a random- eects model. In light of such discussion, I employ OLS regres-
sions with PCSEs to control for contemporaneous correlation and panel
heteroscedasticity, and random eects to account for unit- specic hetero-
geneity. Finally, I also add time dummies to the regression model in order
to control for time- specic eects.
Results
Table . presents a summary of various regression models. Model
reports coecient estimates for a static pooled- OLS baseline model with
random eects and all three control variables. Model presents the coef-
cient estimates for OLS regressions with PCSEs estimates and a rst-
order autoregressive process (AR), while model reports coecients for
the same model but also includes time dummies.
As we can see, dierent legitimation strategies are correlated with dif-
ferent frequencies of consultations between CSOs and policy makers.
Performance- based and democratic- procedural legitimation strategies
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280 | Lobbying the Autocrat
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are positively correlated with the degree of CSO consultations across all
models, while autocrats using legitimation strategies that rely on the per-
son of the leader tend to have lower numbers of consultations with CSOs,
as the coecients for adulation claims are negative and statically signi-
cant across all models. Instead, although the coecient estimates for
indoctrination- based regimes are negative, they are not statistically sig-
nicant in any model suggesting that ideology is not correlated with CSO
consultations. is result is in line with a strand in authoritarian literature
that highlights the importance of grassroots monitoring groups and grid-
based digital surveillance in autocracies that legitimize their power using
ideological claims, such as China and North Korea (Lee ; Creemers
; Qiang ; Stockmann and Gallagher ).
TABLE 12.3. Pooled OLS Regressions of CSO Consultations
Variables Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)
Indoctrination –0.01 –0.01 –0.01
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Adulation –0.12*** –0.06*** –0.06***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Performance 0.08*** 0.07*** 0.05**
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Democratic- procedural 0.20*** 0.18*** 0.18***
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
CSO entry & exit 0.39*** 0.35*** 0.34***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
CSO repression 0.48*** 0.42*** 0.43***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Democratic experience 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant –0.33*** –0.17*** –0.19***
(0.06) (0.05) (0.05)
Time- dummies No No Yes
Panel- specific (AR1) No Yes Yes
Observations 2,309 2,309 2,217
R- squared 0.47 0.48
Time- period 1990– 2014 1990– 2014 1990– 2014
Number of countries 93 93 93
Note: Panel- corrected standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p <
0.01. Coefficients are presented with standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients for
time- dummies variables are measured, but not reported.
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Delivering on Legitimation Claims | 281
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Coecients for both CSO repression and organization are positive
and statistically signicant, as hypothesized. is means that when the
use of repressive measures and government’s control over entry and exit
of CSOs in public life is lower, CSOs tend to have more opportunities to
interact with policy ocials. Additionally, as expected, democratic leg-
acy creates an environment that allows CSOs to have access to policy
makers more frequently. Authoritarian regimes that are exposed to
democratic institutions, in fact, allow more frequent interactions
between CSOs and policy ocials.
Figure . shows the average marginal eect of each legitimation
strategies on CSO consultations. As we can see, adulation- based regimes
have a negative marginal eect on CSO consultations while autocratic
regimes where the ruler legitimizes his or her position in power based on
performance and democratic- procedural claims have more frequent
interactions with CSOs. Interestingly instead, indoctrination- based
regimes have almost no eect on CSOs consultations.
Figure .. Marginal Eects of Legitimation Strategies on CSOs Consultations
Note: Marginal eects with a condence intervals.
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282 | Lobbying the Autocrat
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Conclusion
Over the past two decades, a growing amount of theoretical and empirical
research on access of interest organizations has been produced (Eising
b, a; Beyers , ; Bouwen ; Binderkrantz, Christian-
sen, and Pedersen ; Binderkrantz ; Chalmers ; Weiler and
Brändli ). Yet most of the attention has been devoted to interest group
mobilization in Western democracies. Some scholars in fact posit that
there is a symbiotic relationship between democracy and interest groups,
as the one cannot exist without the other (Klimovich and omas ;
Kanol ). As authoritarian regimes curtail political participation and
oen use repression to suppress the voice of those that do not support the
regime, groups’ access is believed to be more limited (Boix and Svolik
).
In line with other contributions in this volume, this chapter demon-
strates that, despite a centralized and hierarchical organization of power
that characterizes authoritarian regimes, autocrats are not immune to
interest- group pressures. Based on the seminal work of Wintrobe (), I
argue that the need for technical, political, and policy information encour-
ages autocratic leaders to interact more frequently with CSOs; thus the
ruler’s demand for policy information depends on how they legitimize
their position in power. Authoritarian regimes using socioeconomic suc-
cesses and citizens’ well- being to legitimize their position in power require
more technical information and information on citizens’ policy prefer-
ences to strengthen support from external actors. Similarly, autocrats who
legitimize their rule by appealing to nominally democratic institutions
such as elections and legislatures provide more points of access for CSOs
groups to public ocials and require more political information in order
to make these institutions appear to be functioning.
e empirical analysis nds that legitimation strategies create dierent
incentives for autocrats to consult with CSOs, with performance and
democratic- procedural- based regimes providing more opportunities for
CSOs to interact with public ocials (as also found by Guriev and Treis-
man ). Legitimation claims based on ideology and tradition do not
have any eect on CSO consultations with policy makers. us, specic
legitimation claims create more consultative channels, as also seen with
land policies in Zimbabwe and social services in Russia and Belarus.
Overall, these ndings have several implications for the debate on
interest representation in a nondemocratic context. First, the chapter sup-
ports the evidence that autocrats do not live in isolation and authoritarian
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Delivering on Legitimation Claims | 283
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regimes dier among themselves not only in terms of formal and informal
institutions (Gandhi ; Geddes ; Hadenius and Teorell ), but
also in the extent to which autocrats create mechanisms through which to
interact with CSOs. us the chapter provides evidence that not all
authoritarian regimes have a closed policy- making system that only mem-
bers of the ruling coalition can access.
Second, the results show that when autocrats face more incentives to
open the policy- making process to collect the necessary technical and
political information, interest organizations adapt and navigate the politi-
cal context to provide such information and consequently access the polit-
ical arena, as also seen in the two preceding chapters. Overall, this specic
resource- exchange relation produces a situation in which both autocrats
and CSOs mutually benet from such consultations. Yet further investiga-
tion on whether more frequent CSO consultations are conducive to better
representation of citizens’ preferences and what kind of interest organiza-
tions get access to the policy- making process is still needed.
Finally, all three chapters in this section nd that groups’ policy varies
depending on the legitimation claims autocrats deploy. As the concluding
chapter discusses, in this volume we theorize that three overarching con-
ditions shape all stages of inuence production under authoritarianism:
access to policy making, the regime’s information demands, and its need
for social control. In my examination of consultative mechanisms, I nd
that regime- legitimation claims based on performance and/or procedure
create the need for societal information and expertise provided by CSOs,
which then encourage greater access to policy making.
NOTES
. I dene civil society organizations (CSOs) as nongovernmental and nonprot
organizations that have a legal personality and whose purpose is clearly stated. is de-
nition includes interest groups, labor unions, professional associations, and classic non-
governmental organizations (NGOs).
. I refer to consultations as informal channels used by policy makers to consult
with CSOs in formulating policies (e.g., CSOs are invited to comment on new policy
initiatives). e frequency of consultations may vary according to the degree of insula-
tion of the government from CSOs’ input.
. Studies on authoritarian regimes demonstrate that the number of electoral
regimes or competitive authoritarianism (Levitsky and Way ) has increased since
the beginning of the s.
. Berdymukhamedov won with percent of the votes.
. Saakashvili won with percent of the votes.
. Countries that have been autocratic for less than three consecutive years are con-
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284 | Lobbying the Autocrat
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siders hybrid regimes (Diamond ) or awed democracies (the Economist Intelli-
gent Unit ). us those countries are excluded from the dataset because the scope
of this paper is to investigate CSOs’ access in stable and fully autocratic regimes rather
than in awed democracies or hybrid regimes.
. e original variable vcscnsult_ord is on an ordinal scale that takes the value
if the government does not oen consult CSOs in formulating policies, if CSOs are
sometimes consulted but not on a regular basis, and if CSOs are recognized as impor-
tant stakeholders in some policy arena and there are corporatist arrangements between
the government and the CSOs. e variable used in the analysis here (vcscnsult) is the
continuous version of this variable, based on V- Dem’s measurement model.
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