Content uploaded by Vlado Vivoda
Author content
All content in this area was uploaded by Vlado Vivoda on Sep 22, 2023
Content may be subject to copyright.
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=ccsd20
Conflict, Security & Development
ISSN: (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ccsd20
‘Water Wars’: strategic implications of the grand
Ethiopian Renaissance Dam
Ron Matthews & Vlado Vivoda
To cite this article: Ron Matthews & Vlado Vivoda (20 Sep 2023): ‘Water Wars’: strategic
implications of the grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, Conflict, Security & Development, DOI:
10.1080/14678802.2023.2257137
To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/14678802.2023.2257137
© 2023 Rabdan Academy. Published by
Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor &
Francis Group.
Published online: 20 Sep 2023.
Submit your article to this journal
View related articles
View Crossmark data
‘Water Wars’: strategic implications of the grand Ethiopian
Renaissance Dam
Ron Matthews and Vlado Vivoda
Research and Innovation Department, Rabdan Academy, Abu Dhabi, UAE
ABSTRACT
The construction of Ethiopia’s Renaissance Dam is a fait accompli.
By 2022, around 90 per cent of its construction had been com-
pleted, but only two of the 13 turbines were producing electricity,
and so uncertainty remains over the dam’s impact on the Nile’s
downstream countries. After protracted negotiations between
Ethiopia, where the waters originate, and Egypt and Sudan, the
two states most heavily dependent on Nile waters, the result is
diplomatic stalemate. The intractable problem is not so much the
dam but rather the 1902 and 1929 treaties between Great Britain
and its then Egyptian and Sudanese colonies over the utilisation of
the Nile waters. While Ethiopia was not a British colony, it was
a party to the 1902 Treaty, but has always interpreted the water-
sharing arrangements as inequitable. The problem’s resolution is
now endishly complex. Impoverished Ethiopia has unilaterally
proceeded with a hugely expensive dam, and the contemporary
danger is that with diplomatic eorts seemingly exhausted, the
military option becomes a distinct possibility. The question is
whether Egypt’s military posturing is real-politik or simply rhetoric.
KEYWORDS
Egypt; Ethiopia; Renaissance
Dam; water security; dam
diplomacy; Nile
Introduction
The Nile is the world’s longest river. Since biblical times, it has acted as the umbilical cord
connecting Africa’s upper riparian states. More than 300mn people rely on the Nile
waters, and the push for economic growth and development means the river has never
been so important as it is today.
1
According to the Nile Basin Initiative (2012):
‘the Nile is generally regarded as the longest river in the world. [. . .] The river has two main
tributaries: the White Nile and the Blue Nile (Abay). Both begin their journeys in relatively
humid areas, with annual rainfall ranging from 1,200 to 2,000 mm, and meet at Khartoum.
From this point onwards, the river flows northwards through the Sahara Desert, where
precipitation is less than 100 mm per year. [. . .] The Blue Nile (Abay) and the other rivers
coming from the Ethiopian Highlands contribute between 80 and 90% of the Nile’s flow . . . ’.
2
The Nile’s hydrology, en route, is characterised by Wheeler, Jeuland, Hall, Zagona and
Whittington (2020) as reflecting ‘high inter-annual rain variability, stark differences in
geography and climate, and flows modified by natural features and water infrastructure’.
3
CONTACT Ron Matthews rmatthews@ra.ac.ae
CONFLICT, SECURITY & DEVELOPMENT
https://doi.org/10.1080/14678802.2023.2257137
© 2023 Rabdan Academy. Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any med-
ium, provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way. The terms on which this article
has been published allow the posting of the Accepted Manuscript in a repository by the author(s) or with their consent.
The Nile fans out on reaching Cairo into a fertile delta that is suffering from climate-
induced water shortages and demand pressures from an Egyptian population that has
risen from 27mn in 1969 to around 100mn today.
4
Water availability is becoming
a critical issue for Egypt, not least because the river’s waters are essential for irrigating
the country’s crops. The United Nations (UN) has officially classified Egypt as a water
scarce country and by 2025 its position will worsen to become a country of ‘absolute
water scarcity’.
5
As the Nile is the source of 95 per cent of the country’s freshwater, it is
self-evident why the river is treated with such reverence.
6
The completion of Egypt’s High Dam in 1970 after two decades under construction,
stoked up Addis Ababa’s fears that Egypt was strengthening its ‘hydro-hegemony’ and
jeopardising Ethiopia’s access to the Nile waters.
7
This led to efforts by the US Bureau of
Reclamation to identify an optimal site for building the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance
Dam (also referred to as ‘the Renaissance Dam’ or ‘the dam’ throughout the paper) on the
Blue Nile. A suitable site was eventually found across the years 1956 and 1964, during the
reign of Emperor Haile Selassie, but the 1974 coup d’état and subsequent 17-year
Ethiopian civil war delayed work on the project.
8
Finally, in 2011, the plan for
Ethiopia’s new dam was launched, representing a source of enormous and enduring
controversy. The problems were compounded by Egypt’s decision to reactivate the
ambitious and expensive Toshka canal. The project was originally launched by
President Sadat in the 1970s, with the aim of irrigating the country’s western desert,
but in the process around 10 per cent of Lake Nasser’s Nile waters needed to be drained.
9
Numerous problems were encountered, including underground aquifers hindering irri-
gation, so the project was much delayed.
10
President el-Sisi revived Toshka planning in
2014, but again only gradual progress was made. However, there was renewed interest
following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 because the two countries supply
80 per cent of Egypt’s wheat needs and the war has seriously impacted shipments.
11
Accordingly, Cairo now views the Toshka dam as essential for facilitating self-sufficiency
in grain production, which, for Ethiopia, provides further evidence of Cairo’s hydro-
hegemonic instincts, strengthening Addis Ababa’s stance on building the Renaissance
Dam.
12
Water is the economic life-blood of the 11 riparian states (Burundi, Democratic
Republic of the Congo, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, Sudan,
Tanzania and Uganda). Among these nations, the principal opponents of Ethiopia’s new
dam are Egypt and Sudan (see Figure 1). Both countries are highly dependent on the Nile,
with Cairo fearful that the new dam will negatively impact the flow of Nile waters,
especially during prolonged periods of drought, while Khartoum’s concerns are driven
more by the dam’s safety.
13
Egypt is an industrialising state with a 2021 GDP of US
$404bn and a GDP per capita of US$3,876, but, by contrast, Ethiopia has a GDP of US
$111bn and a GDP per capita of just US$944; it is also the most populous landlocked
country in the world, and one of the poorest, ranked 173 out of 189 states in the 2020
UNDP Human Development Index.
14
Addis Ababa therefore views the Renaissance Dam
as a catalyst for kick-starting self-sustaining economic growth through relieving the
country’s acute energy shortage, affecting over 60 per cent of the population who are
without access to electricity.
15
The paradox is that while Ethiopia is a relatively poor developing state, where nearly
28 per cent of children are impoverished,
16
it is in the process of building a mega dam,
2R. MATTHEWS AND V. VIVODA
whose cost is estimated at around US$4.7bn, or some 7 per cent of GNP.
17
To finance the
dam’s construction, the government has resorted to ‘crowd-funding’ to sell bonds,
refusing financial aid from Cairo to ensure 100 per cent ownership,
18
but accepting
substantial funding from China to cover investment into associated electricity generation
equipment, such as power lines.
19
The Renaissance Dam’s construction is now
90 per cent complete, though when 100 per cent operational capacity will be attained
remains uncertain. The decision to proceed was taken unilaterally in the absence of any
agreement with Egypt and Sudan.
20
This has led to more than a decade of acrimonious
negotiations which have failed to conclude a water-sharing agreement, and as a result,
intra-African water security tensions have dramatically increased. Moreover, the dispute
is set against the back-drop of geopolitical interests, particularly those of China and the
US, but also Russia. Other stakeholders, such as the Gulf countries, are expressing
concern, arguing that Egypt and Sudan’s water security is integral to ‘Arab National
Security’.
21
Global datasets demonstrate that access to water has led to seven minor
skirmishes in the 20
th
century, but no wars.
22
Will the Renaissance Dam be different? The
Figure 1. Map of the Nile Basin. Source: Suter, 2016.
CONFLICT, SECURITY & DEVELOPMENT 3
issues are clearly complex, and resolving them at this very late stage represents one of the
most serious diplomatic conundrums facing Africa, if not the World.
23
The purpose of this paper, then, is to intellectually explore the Nile’s historical and
contemporary politico-economic landscape in order to assess the plausibility of the
world’s first water war at a time when Ethiopia is on the verge of pressing the switch
to operate the dam. This comes after years of Egyptian bellicose rhetoric and ominous
military posturing, but there is little evidence that military confrontation is a real
possibility. The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, the relevant literature
focusing on the concept of water security, transboundary water disputes and water wars
is briefly reviewed. This is followed by a discourse on Great Britain’s colonial heritage,
specifically focused on Egyptian and Sudanese sovereignty of the Nile waters and the
enforced exclusion of Ethiopia, providing the historical backdrop to the latter’s construc-
tion of the Grand Renaissance Dam. This is an enormously expensive undertaking for
one of Africa’s poorest nations, and introduces a more contemporary geopolitical
dimension into the debate through China’s financial contribution to the project. The
paper then compares the national economic upsides of the dam with its potential
environmental, engineering and regional economic costs. The dam has generated sig-
nificant diplomatic friction between the two principal antagonists, Egypt and Ethiopia,
leading to enduring rounds of negotiation and mediation. This process now appears
exhausted, but while there are signs of emerging cooperation and compromise, the
possibility of military confrontation remains. Egypt is a major military power in the
Middle East, possessing capability far exceeding that of Ethiopia. It is also officially
designated as a water-scarce country, with Cairo interpreting any diminution of its access
to Nile waters as an existential threat. Against this background, the paper assesses Egypt’s
military options, and concludes with an assessment of the strategic and political chal-
lenges that lie ahead.
Water Security, Transboundary Water disputes and Water Wars: a Brief
literature Review
Human societies rely on freshwater resources for drinking, household usage, and indus-
trial and agricultural production.
24
The concept of water security emerged in the 1990s,
in line with broadening of the scope of Security Studies beyond the traditional military
and defence focus.
25
Specifically, the Copenhagen School’s securitisation theory provided
the foundation for contemporary Security Studies, which considers energy, food, water
and the environment as (non-traditional) security issues.
26
The use of the term, water
security, has increased significantly over the past two decades, across multiple
disciplines.
27
It is beyond the scope of this paper to engage and explore its multiple
conceptual definitions, but UN-Water defines water security as ‘a capacity of populations
to safeguard sustainable access to adequate quantities of acceptable quality of water’ for
people, the economy and nature.
28
Conversely, water insecurity emerges in the absence of
any of these conditions.
Security challenges increasingly faced by societies cannot be understood in isolation
from one another.
29
There are often conflicting sectoral imperatives of large scale
development investments concerned with water, food and energy security, referred to
in the literature as the water-food-energy nexus.
30
Developments in one sector are often
4R. MATTHEWS AND V. VIVODA
associated with difficult trade-offs impacting on the other two sectors. For example,
globally, food production accounts for more than 80 per cent of water use.
31
In the
Middle East, water desalination accounts for 5 per cent of total energy consumption.
32
Indeed, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) is a region of international concern
and political unrest. It is also the most water-scarce region in the world. Home to
6.3 per cent of the world’s population, the region contains only 1.4 per cent of the world’s
renewable fresh water.
33
A significant share of the population in the MENA region
suffers from water and food insecurity, and is exposed to frequent droughts. With several
active transboundary water disputes, water is regarded as a security issue across the
MENA region.
34
Water security is critical to ‘the stability, continuity and sustainable
development of the states located in the arid realm’.
35
The scarcity of water in one of the
world’s driest regions is a major determinant of the domestic and foreign policies across
the region.
36
Countries are increasingly responding to connected water, food and energy security
challenges by building dams and reservoirs, and diverting water from one area to
another. When the water belongs to an international river system, these measures can
lead to an interstate riparian conflict. While water scarcity concerns can lead to interstate
conflict, they can also play an important part in building cooperation.
37
More than 3,600
treaties have been signed historically over different aspects of international waters.
38
The
decision to resolve water disputes through negotiation and/or cooperation or face them
escalating into violent conflict is based on complex calculations.
39
Indeed, the potential
for conflict or increased cooperation over transboundary waters is a hotly debated issue
in academic scholarship. Conflict and cooperation over water resources are not mutually
exclusive but coexist in most contexts. Consequently, the international water academic
and practitioner communities should consider conflict and cooperation as aspects of
transboundary water interaction. This interaction is inherently political and is influenced
by the broader political context. Examples of this complex interaction can be seen in the
relations between states on the Jordan, Nile, and Ganges rivers.
40
The concept of ‘water wars’ is a topic of linked significant interest. Competition for
access to adequate water resources can cause severe international political tensions and
outright conflict. Interstate conflict occurs between two or more neighbouring countries
that share a transboundary water source. The effects of climate change and growing
population on limited water resources exacerbates the potential for interstate conflict,
which has seen a resurgence in recent years.
41
A large and growing body of scholarly
literature considers water as a potential cause of interstate conflict.
42
Much of the
literature focuses on several prominent river basins, specifically the Indus, Jordan,
Mekong and Nile.
43
The concept of water wars is a complex issue that involves political,
socioeconomic, and environmental factors. The Nile River, as a crucial water source for
several countries, is a potential flashpoint for such conflicts. Being the longest river in the
world, the Nile has shaped the political and socioeconomic histories of the countries it
traverses, especially those in the Nile Basin. The river is vital for the survival of these
nations, providing water for agriculture and hydroelectric projects. In 1979, within days
of signing the historic peace treaty with Israel, the Egyptian President Anwar Sadat
declared that ‘The only matter that could take Egypt to war again is water’.
44
His threat
was not directed at Israel, but Ethiopia, the upstream neighbour that controls most of the
headwaters of Egypt’s lifeline, the Nile.
45
CONFLICT, SECURITY & DEVELOPMENT 5
As alluded to above, the Nile is one of the top studied international rivers that
dominate the academic literature on transboundary water disputes. Indeed, the Nile
has been described as ‘one of the most disputed international rivers in the world’.
46
Scholars have suggested that future conflicts may arise over water resources due to their
increasing scarcity and the effects of desertification in the Nile Basin countries.
47
The
Nile Basin transboundary dispute is as compelling as the level of water stress seems to be
insurmountable in the context of challenges presented by food and energy insecurity,
rapidly growing population, and climate change.
48
Most of the literature that examines
contemporary transboundary water disputes in the Nile Basin focuses on the impact of
the Renaissance Dam on riparian countries, the dynamics between them, and the various
compromise initiatives agreed since the 1990s.
49
While the Renaissance Dam has recently
been analysed from the novel nexus perspective of transboundary water management
and hydropower, assessing interlinkages between water, energy, and other resources,
50
there is a lacuna in the literature that explores the delicate balance between water-related
conflict and cooperation in the Nile Basin.
As this section demonstrates, the historical and contemporary scholarship suggests
that cooperation can exist even against the backdrop of potential conflict, as long as there
is a mutual nuanced understanding of the interactions necessary for sustainable water
management. Indeed, while the potential for Egyptian-led conflict over water resources
in the Nile Basin continues to be a subject of academic discourse and political concern, it
is important to note that a full-scale ‘water war’ has no historical precedent, at least not in
modern times.
51
It is also worth noting that while interstate water wars have not
occurred, there have been instances of intrastate conflicts and violence over water,
particularly in regions facing severe water scarcity. These conflicts often occur at the
local level, between different user groups, communities, or regions within a country. For
example, there have been tensions in the Middle East over the control and use of the
waters of the Jordan, Tigris and Euphrates rivers. However, these conflicts have not
escalated into full-scale wars solely over water. Instead, water issues are often one of
many factors contributing to broader political, territorial, or ethnic disputes.
52
The complexities of water management along the Nile coupled with interdependencies
of the riparian countries have led to a situation where cooperation and negotiation,
rather than outright conflict, have been the prevailing responses to water-related dis-
putes. Despite the challenges posed by factors such as climate change, population growth,
and large-scale projects like the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, the countries of the
Nile Basin have largely managed to navigate these issues without resorting to warfare.
This underscores the potential for peaceful resolution of water disputes, even in a context
of high stakes and significant geopolitical pressures.
Weighty Imperial Baggage
Egypt has historically been the ‘hydro-hegemon’ of the Nile.
53
It has the largest popula-
tion, wealthiest economy, strongest military forces, and closest ties with great powers like
the UK (until the 1950s), the Soviet Union (until the 1970s), and the US (from the
1990s).
54
Egypt’s dominance has been shaped by what are termed, the Nile Treaties,
which have proved instrumental in determining ‘ownership’ of the waters. The first of
these Treaties was signed in 1902, following negotiations between Great Britain and
6R. MATTHEWS AND V. VIVODA
Egypt. According to Tekuya,
55
the main purpose of the Treaty was to determine the
boundary between Ethiopia and Sudan, and citing Ullendorff, the author highlights that
Ethiopia undertook ‘not to construct or allow to be constructed, any work across the Blue
Nile, Lake Tana, or the Sobat, which would arrest the flow of their waters into the Nile
except in agreement with His Britannic Majesty’s Government of the Sudan’.
56
The second Nile Treaty was signed in 1929, and was again the result of British-
Egyptian negotiations, but this time Great Britain’s representation had expanded to
include its other East African colonies of Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika (present-day
Tanzania). Through the Treaty, Her Majesty’s Government recognised the ‘historical and
natural rights of Egypt and gave [it] veto power over any construction projects along the
Nile and its tributaries’.
57
The third Nile Treaty was signed in 1959, and confirmed the
specific apportioning of the Nile’s waters to Egypt. In precise detail, it was determined
that Egypt would be allocated 55.5bn cubic metres (BCM), or 66 per cent of the river’s
total flow of 84BCM, while Sudan would be allocated 18.5BCM, or 22 per cent, with the
remainder of the Nile waters, 10BCM, or 12 per cent, accounted for by seepage and
evaporation.
58
The reality of the 1959 Treaty was that Egypt and Sudan had exclusive
rights to the Nile waters.
59
The imperial baggage of the first two of the Nile Treaties has proved a major influence
on contemporary negotiations between the Tripartite antagonist states, Egypt, Sudan and
Ethiopia, with each consistently blocking any sustainable and equitable water-sharing
resolution to the dispute as an infringement of their sovereignty. Indeed, Egypt and
Sudan argue that the 1959 Treaty builds on what they call their historical ‘acquired rights’
of water use, leaving no water to the water source countries.
60
Ethiopia argues that it does
not recognise the earlier Treaties, principally because they fail to acknowledge that the
principal source of the Nile’s waters comes from within Ethiopia’s borders.
61
Protracted
negotiating efforts have failed to find a resolution. Yet, the Nile Treaties have not acted as
a deadweight on Egypt’s negotiating flexibility as Cairo has accepted the water rights of
upstream nations,
62
as evidenced by its signing of the 1999 Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) in
Tanzania. The NBI was signed by water ministers of nine riparian states, with observers
from the World Bank and the UN in attendance. The purpose of the Initiative was to
achieve a shared vision of ‘sustainable socio-economic development through equitable
utilisation of, and benefit from, the common Nile Basin water resources’.
63
Significantly,
the signatories included the Tripartite states, providing confidence that a framework for
future dialogue was in place to delineate the use and management of the Nile River.
In parallel, preparatory work began in 1997 on the next phase of East African water
diplomacy called the Nile River Basin Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA). Early
optimism inspired by the NBI success did not translate into speedy and positive CFA
outcomes, with negotiations lasting a decade.
64
Article 14 of the CFA proved to be the
major political and technical stumbling block on basin states achieving and sustaining
water security, with Egypt and Sudan not content with the wording, seeking instead an
additional clause that existing uses and rights would be fully protected under the CFA.
65
To the frustration of the other Nile riparian states, the intransigence of Cairo and
Khartoum led to the abandonment of discussions. Yet, notwithstanding this impasse,
four of the participant states, Ethiopia, Tanzania, Uganda and Rwanda, signed the CFA in
2010, Kenya’s signature quickly followed, and a year later, Burundi signed.
66
However,
given that six ratifications were required for the CPA to come into force, and only three
CONFLICT, SECURITY & DEVELOPMENT 7
had been secured, the CPA has never entered into force.
67
Addis Ababa’s ratification of
the CPA, was followed by its momentous 2011 decision to commence construction of the
Renaissance Dam.
68
Surprisingly, the decision did not elicit a major diplomatic rebuke
from Cairo, which was sorely distracted by the domestic turbulence of the Arab Spring
uprising. Moreover, Ethiopia’s hand was suddenly strengthened in May 2013, when
Khartoum made a diplomatic ‘flip-flop’, declaring that the ‘Grand Ethiopian
Renaissance Dam does not pose a threat to Sudan’.
69
This isolated Cairo, which felt
obliged to follow suit, preparing the way for the March 2015 signing of the Agreement on
Declaration of Principles on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam.
70
The Declaration
marked a pivotal moment in regional diplomatic history, with Egypt and Sudan acknowl-
edging that the Nile represented the source of livelihood and resource development for
riparian countries, including, significantly, Ethiopia,
71
with all three countries recognis-
ing the foundational principles of international water law.
72
The Declaration also for-
mally recognised that the purpose of Ethiopia’s dam is for ‘power generation to
contribute to economic development, promotion of transboundary cooperation and
regional integration . . . ’
73
Size does matter?
The site selected for the Renaissance Dam was on the Blue Nile in the state of
Benishangul-Gumuz. The final design was finalised and submitted to the Ethiopian
government by James Kelston in November 2010, under the planning label, Project X,
later changed to the Millennium Dam, and finally, in 2011, becoming the ‘Renaissance’
Dam; the term symbolising the ‘rebirth’ of Ethiopia as a future African power.
74
Given
the regional animosity that the project had engendered, it was perhaps unsurprising that
the Ethiopian government decided to keep the project’s design phase a secret until just
a month prior to laying of the dam’s foundation stone.
75
However, the extent of the
secrecy meant that even donor governments, such as Norway, were blindsided.
Separately, the Scandinavian country had been designing two Nile dams for the
Ethiopian government, and the announcement to proceed with the Renaissance Dam
immediately nullified this work , reportedly wasting about US$2-3mn in the process.
76
On completion, the Renaissance Dam will be the World’s fifth biggest dam, and the
largest on the African continent.
77
It is a 1.1 mile colossus, with 13 turbines planned that
will produce more than 5 gigawatts of electricity, 2.5 times more than the US Hoover
dam.
78
The Italian company, Salini Costruttori, possesses enormous dam-building
expertise, and was awarded the US$3bn construction contract.
79
Approximately half
the construction work was completed by December 2014, but then the Swiss company,
Alstom, signed a €250mn contract with Metals & Engineering Corporation (METEC),
which became the source of major delays in the supply of turbines, generators and all
electromechanical equipment for the dam’s hydropower plant.
80
The dam has a planned
generating capacity of 5,150 megawatts of electricity, with the main and saddle dams
creating a reservoir of 74BCM, equivalent to the Nile waters of Egypt and Sudan
combined, as determined by the 1959 Treaty.
81
The lake created will be larger than the
size of London, stretching back some 250 km (155 miles) upstream.
82
The total cost of the dam was estimated in 2014 at close to US$5bn, about
60 per cent of the Ethiopia’s annual budget.
83
In 2022, the reported budgeted cost
8R. MATTHEWS AND V. VIVODA
appears to have remained unaltered.
84
However, if this were the case, it would be
remarkable. Nearly all major public infrastructure projects experience budget
overruns, including large dams, which over the long-run, and on average, experi-
ence a 96 per cent cost overrun.
85
In fact, an unofficial 2019 investigative report
indicated that the Renaissance Dam project was three years behind schedule and
the cost had escalated to almost $6bn.
86
One Egyptian dam expert argues the cost
could rise even higher to US$7bn.
87
The fact is, there was no competitive bidding
for the initial major construction contract, and this omission is important,
because competition would have increased Ethiopia’s negotiating leverage to
secure a discounted price.
88
Also, the project’s controversial nature would likely
have stoked fears of a possible water conflict in the region and dampened
enthusiasm among bidders wary of protecting their international brands. As
a result, Ethiopia, one of the poorest countries in the world, decided to self-
finance this audacious near-US$5bn project.
The plan to sell ‘dam bonds’, especially targeting the Ethiopian overseas diaspora,
alongside the broader overseas investor community, proved more challenging than
expected. Investor ‘risk perception’ was high, and promotion efforts across the important
North American market were not helped by anti-dam protests (e.g. in San Diego and
Canada).
89
Marketing efforts in Ethiopia were more successful, however, with lowly paid
public sector workers exhorted to buy the bonds as an act of patriotism.
90
Reportedly,
there were also other buyers, including private sector firms, the state-owned Ethiopian
Electric Power Corporation, and even investors from other African states, such as
Djibouti.
91
The mass sale of bonds raised concerns that the associated high debt servicing
costs might retard Ethiopia’s future economic growth, but the government countered by
arguing that any increased costs would be offset by regional electricity sales.
92
Advocates
of the dam’s financing model tout it as innovative, enabling an initial US$450mn that was
raised through a mix of local taxes, donations and government bonds to contribute to the
ultimate aim of securing US$1bn.
93
This is a substantial sum, but some distance from the
dam’s approximate US$5bn overall cost. There is no evidence that China has played
a role in financing the dam’s construction, but Beijing has contributed loans to fund
related electricity generation investment.
94
China’s involvement in the Renaissance Dam is contentious, not least because major
infrastructural investment is a core component of China’s geoeconomic strategy aimed at
binding borrowing states into Beijing’s sphere of influence. The vehicle for this process is
the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). It commenced in 2013, and since then has spread its
investment tentacles across every continent.
95
In 2022, the BRI touched 147 countries,
96
50 per cent of the world’s population and a quarter of global GDP, via multiple invest-
ments financed through long-term loans.
97
Further, it is estimated that by 2027, BRI
spending will have reached US$1.3 trillion, with more than 2,600 projects worldwide
valued at US$3.7 trillion.
98
The BRI especially targets developing countries, where there is
an urgent need for infrastructural investment, but also where finances are tight.
99
Thus,
Beijing has resourced the building of roads, railways, ports and other strategic infra-
structure. In Africa, the scale of investment is staggering. It has been estimated that more
than 10,000 Chinese-owned companies are operating across the continent,
100
where,
reportedly, 46 African ports have Chinese financial, construction and operational
involvement.
101
CONFLICT, SECURITY & DEVELOPMENT 9
Dams, in particular, have attracted Chinese BRI funding. China has extensive exper-
tise in hydropower development. Since the 1950s nearly 22,000 large (15 metres or more)
dams have been constructed in China, including the world’s largest, the Three Gorges
Dam.
102
This domestic capability provided the generating force for ‘dam diplomacy’.
China’s entry into the global dam market occurred during the 1980s, when the World
Bank ceased funding major hydroelectric projects across the developing world. The
ensuing investment vacuum, vacated or neglected by US-dominated multilateral organi-
sations, was filled by China, especially as it possessed proven technical expertise to
undertake such ambitious ventures. By 2012, an international consultancy report high-
lighted that Chinese companies were engaged in 308 hydroelectric projects across 70
nations, with 28 per cent planned for Africa.
103
By 2016, Africa’s share of Chinese dam-
building had fallen to 26 per cent, but the number of Chinese-funded and -built overseas
hydropower projects had increased to almost 350, suggesting that China was building
around 90 African dams, listed as either completed, under construction, at the memor-
andum-of-understanding stage, or suspended.
104
China’s intensive economic and trading courtship of Ethiopia, as an important hub for
its activities in the East African region, represented the preamble for focused investment
into the Renaissance Dam. The two countries’ relations have rapidly grown since formal
diplomatic ties were established in 1970, and expanded still further in 2017 upon signing
of a comprehensive strategic partnership. A rising proportion of Ethiopia’s imports,
currently around 16 per cent of the total, are sourced from China.
105
China also invests
heavily in Ethiopia. By June 2020, Chinese companies had formulated plans to spend US
$2.7bn in the country via about 1,500 initiatives.
106
According to a 2020 UN Conference
on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) Report, China represented the largest source of
foreign direct investment in Ethiopia, accounting for almost 60 per cent of newly
approved projects.
107
There has also been substantial Chinese investment in projects
linked to the Renaissance Dam, such as the 2013 US$1.2bn loan, providing the invest-
ment means to build turbine electrical equipment and power transmission lines between
the dam and local towns and cities.
108
Additionally, in 2019, China promised US$1.8bn
to expand Ethiopia’s renewable energy sector.
109
These loans formed part of Ethiopia’s
substantial US$13.7bn debt to Beijing – the second biggest in Africa after Angola,
110
with
much of the funding targeting electricity supplies to Ethiopian cities and industrial parks.
Ethiopian plans to build a network of 9,000 km of distribution lines and 19,600 km of
power transmission lines, has become an urgent necessity as access to electricity is just
42.9 per cent.
111
In addition to Chinese loans, the Ethiopian government contracted two
Chinese companies in February 2019 to undertake the dam’s pre-commissioning activ-
ities as well as electrical, mechanical and civil/structural works to complete the generating
station and spillways.
112
Heavy economic dependence on China has come with a cost. Ethiopia, reportedly,
owes US$16bn to Chinese lenders, representing almost half of the East African country’s
foreign debts.
113
Such debt dependency is fraught with risk. Beijing willingly provides
billions of dollars in loans, with no strings attached, but at market rates of interest,
reflecting ruthless commercial exploitation rather than altruism. High value loans to
distressed states carry the danger of debt servicing failure, resulting in Chinese ownership
of the assets. These so-called debt-traps have become a troubling feature of China’s BRI.
For example, in 2017, China took a 70 per cent controlling stake in Myanmar’s Kyaukpyu
10 R. MATTHEWS AND V. VIVODA
Port after the host country defaulted on its loan repayments.
114
The result is that China
has potentially gained a naval base on the Indian Ocean side of the Malacca Strait
chokepoint, projecting power across the Bay of Bengal. Similarly, with Sri Lanka’s
Hambantota Port project. This attracted huge Chinese investment, but the toxic combi-
nation of weak revenue streams and high interest charges meant that Sri Lanka was
forced in 2017 to default on a loan repayment, obliging Beijing to call in its US$1.4bn
debt.
115
The Sri Lankan government had little choice but to sign a debt servicing
agreement that ceded 70 per cent control of the Port to China as well as a leasing
arrangement over a 99-year period.
116
The port has immense logistical and strategic
value, enabling Chinese warships to refuel and replenish stores, and project blue water
naval capability into the Indian Ocean.
‘Cracks’ in the Dam . . .
The construction of the Renaissance Dam is a monumental engineering feat, though in
terms of outcomes the ledger features both positives and negatives. The dam’s principal
driver is electricity generation. Ethiopia is one of the least economically developed
countries in Africa, with more than half of its roughly 117mn people lacking access to
electric power.
117
Even when there is access to power, the service dependability is
questionable, with frequent blackouts disrupting community life and economic activity,
including transportation, commerce and production.
118
The government argues that the
dam will enable 100 per cent electrification by 2025,
119
and generate exponential
increases in electric power that will act to spur self-sustaining industrial development.
Just as important, hydropower is viewed as the key for expanding electricity exports to
the region, with Ethiopia planned to become the renewable energy ‘battery of East
Africa’.
120
As long ago as 2017–18, Ethiopian electricity sales to Sudan had reached US
$47.5mn and to Djibouti US$34.1mn.
121
It is expected that electricity export revenues
will increase with the commissioning of substantial additional distribution and power
transmission lines.
122
Electricity exports are expected to generate similar dynamic ben-
efits to the Nile Basin recipient economies as envisaged for Ethiopia. For example,
a recent independent report argued that the dam will contribute enormously to
Sudan’s prosperity. The results of econometric modelling suggest that Sudan’s GDP,
accumulated over the period 2020–2060, would benefit through increased crop output
and value added across the economy by between US$27.04bn and US$29.32bn, com-
pared to a baseline without the Renaissance Dam going live.
123
Moreover, as the dam
would be capable of handling 19,370 cubic metres of water per second, this would
generate several additional benefits for Sudan, including a reduction of alluvium by
100mn cubic metres, irrigation for around 500,000 ha of new agricultural lands and
reductions of approximately 40 km in flooding.
124
It is also held that the regulated flow of
water from the dam will improve agriculture, with minimal water evaporation from the
dam compared to that arising from the Aswan High Dam, helping water conservation.
125
For the Tripartite states, the building of the Renaissance Dam raises four major issues.
First, it is located where it can dam the Blue Nile just before it leaves Ethiopia, thereby
allowing the latter’s infrastructural capability to control most of the Nile River freshwater
that flows into Egypt and Sudan, with consequent political, economic and environmental
impacts.
126
Nevertheless, Sudan now supports the dam’s construction, indicating it
CONFLICT, SECURITY & DEVELOPMENT 11
would subscribe to a legally binding agreement on equitable and reasonable use of cross-
border resources if no harm is inflicted on downstream states.
127
Given this position,
Sudan’s principal concerns concentrate on the dam’s safety and the regulation of water
flows through its own dams and water stations.
128
Ethiopia has opted for a ‘hydropower’
expansion strategy on the Blue Nile, and not an ‘irrigation strategy’; this is good news for
Egypt and Sudan as hydropower means little actual water withdrawal, though it also
entails potential negative effects on Egypt, if not carefully managed.
129
Egypt harbours
anxieties concerning the dam’s impact during periods of filling and prolonged
drought.
130
Egypt has a land mass comprising 96 per cent desertic area, and the Nile
represents the only water source.
131
Water is critical for irrigating agricultural land,
which contributes 12 per cent of the country’s GDP and 20 per cent of its workforce.
132
Yet, Egypt is presently suffering water shortages, and in 2015, banned the cultivation of
water-intensive rice growing in Upper Egypt and the middle and south Delta regions.
133
For Cairo, then, water has become a critical element of national security, defined to
encompass not just the conventional military component but also a fundamental non-
conventional element of what the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe
(UNECE) describes as the ‘water-food-energy’ ecosystem security nexus.
134
When Ethiopia’s Renaissance Dam becomes fully operational, the Nile will have
two of the world’s biggest dams, if Egypt’s High Aswan Dam is taken into account.
The problem is that an agreement on how these dams will share the Nile’s scarce
water resources remains elusive. There are fears that the Renaissance Dam’s vast
capacity may act to reduce Egypt’s water share, which is additionally concerning,
because of the knock-on impact of reducing electricity production from the coun-
try’s High Dam reservoir. Moreover, Ethiopia’s objective of maximising energy
production will conflict with Egypt’s priority of water sufficiency, whose concerns
will intensify during periods of drought.
135
On present estimates, the water short-
fall caused by the Renaissance Dam will lead to a predicted loss to the Egyptian
economy of US$51bn along with the loss of 4.74mn jobs, such that by 2024, Egypt’s
GDP per capita would be 6 per cent lower.
136
A more upbeat assessment comes
from the 2013 International Panel Report, which argues that the Renaissance Dam
would create significant benefits for all three Basin countries, and the project will
have no significant adverse impact on the two downstream countries.
137
The diverse
benefits include:
●resolution of the problems of power reliability, availability and affordability in the
region;
●reduction in siltation in the dams in Sudan and Egypt, a problem costing millions of
dollars in rectification annually;
●more constant water flow, reducing frequent flooding to which Sudan has been
prone;
●reduction in evaporation loss, improvement in water management and enhance-
ment in rural development in Sudan;
●improvement in flood control and water flow to the Aswan Dam, reducing evapora-
tion losses in Egypt by as much as 12 per cent; and
●prolonging the Aswan Dam’s life by up to a hundred years through sharply cutting
the sediment reaching it.
138
12 R. MATTHEWS AND V. VIVODA
Moreover, although future Nile flows are uncertain, a 2017 study argued that adverse
impacts on Egypt will be diminished after the Renaissance Dam filling is completed.
139
A second concern has regard to the uncertainty over whether the Renaissance Dam
will play any role in mitigating the problems of drought. The inevitability of climate
change means that the dam will likely affect future water availability. Yet, this scenario
has not been factored into predictions on whether, and to what extent, water reductions
will impact on downstream users, affecting their ability to adapt to a changing climate.
Ethiopian droughts do happen, with the last major one occurring in the 1980s and lasting
eight years.
140
The Tripartite countries have agreed that ‘when the flow of Nile water to
the dam falls below 35-40BCM per year, then that would constitute a drought’,
141
and
Egypt and Sudan would expect Ethiopia to release water from the dam’s reservoir to deal
with the ensuing water scarcity. Ethiopia, however, prefers to have the flexibility to make
independent decisions on how to deal with droughts.
142
During the filling process, Egypt
would be able to compensate for water loss by releasing more water from the High Aswan
Dam. In years of normal, or above average, rainfall there is unlikely to be a problem, but
Egypt is nervous of a prolonged drought, lasting several years. Under that scenario, if
Ethiopia held back water then the levels in the High Aswan Dam would start to fall. In
theory, the Renaissance Dam could help regulate the flow of the Blue Nile and certainly
make Sudan less prone to floods. However, in Summer 2020, Ethiopia unilaterally
decided to execute the first stage of the dam’s filling (4.9BCM), shutting down three of
the four diversion outlets for the water.
143
This reduced water levels downstream,
disrupting Sudan’s pumping stations used for irrigation and municipal water supply.
144
In July 2021, it happened again, with the second phase of filling affecting Khartoum’s
water supply for three days. In May 2022, a project manager working on the Renaissance
Dam admitted for the first time that Egypt and Sudan may have been affected by the
filling of the dam.
145
A third criticism of the Renaissance Dam is that it is ‘over-engineered’; that is, its
excessive size will have a negative impact on efficiency and cost. One commentator
argues that the dam is 300 per cent over-sized:
More than half of the turbines will rarely be used. [The dam’s] available power output, based
on the average of river flow throughout the year and the dam’s height, is about 2,000
megawatts, not 6,000. There is little doubt that the system has been designed for a peak flow
rate that only happens during the 2–3 months of the rainy season. Targeting near peak or
peak flow rate makes no economic sense. [The] . . . issue is so highly politicized that it seems
to suppress legitimate engineering inputs and environmental discussions.
146
Fourth, the dam has been criticised on the basis of its diverse environmental impact. The
latter problem may prove severe, as evidenced by the construction of China’s Three
Gorges Dam, epitomising the worst of environmental degradation through biodiversity
destruction, ecosystem disturbance and reservoir-induced seismicity.
147
While the
Renaissance Dam’s short-term economic benefits have included the creation of 12,000
jobs, this is dwarfed by the approximately 120,000 people who have been displaced by the
dam’s construction.
148
Aside from displacement and resettlement of local people, the
local area may also suffer from the flooding of fertile land, leading to reductions in crop
yields, and an increase in health risks due to increased parasitic disease as a result of
ecological changes.
149
There are also concerns over the dam’s adverse effects on
CONFLICT, SECURITY & DEVELOPMENT 13
ecosystems through inducing earthquakes, changing water quality in the reservoir area,
blocking river fish channels, threatening fishery resources and interrupting downstream
flows.
150
As a counterbalance to such fears, an alternative agnostic judgement suggests
that while the expected flooded area, location at low latitude in the tropics, and deep
turbine intakes, could intensify greenhouse gas emissions, the dam’s high reservoir depth
would abate these emissions.
151
Moreover, based on precedents of the experiences of
other dams, when the Renaissance Dam is completed, and seriously promoted through
ecological restoration, it will have a positive impact on the surrounding vegetation, and
will positively affect water quality, especially the decrease of suspended solids.
152
Clearly,
the dam will offer both costs and benefits, though at this stage it is difficult to judge
eventual net impacts.
Negotiations exhausted, mediation stalls . . .
The ongoing friction between Egypt and Ethiopia over the filling and operation of the
Renaissance Dam is driven by the former’s claim for historical rights over the Nile and
the latter’s demand for equitable apportionment of its waters.
153
Although not intract-
able, compromise between these two polarised positions has proved elusive. The 2015
Declaration of Principles offered optimism that a solution could be found, and, in fact,
expert-level negotiations on the safety, filling and operation of the dam were undertaken
by the Tripartite nations, but internal political upheavals in Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan
have delayed progress.
154
These delays have led to a resurgence of tensions, prompting
Egypt’s President el-Sisi to call for greater international pressure on Ethiopia when
addressing the UN General Assembly in September 2019.
155
A month later, Egypt
declared that negotiations with Ethiopia had reached a dead-end and again requested
international intervention.
156
Russia quickly responded by facilitating meetings between
Egyptian and Ethiopian leaders in Sochi, on the margins of the October 2019 Russia-
Africa summit. The talks again failed, leading to rumours of a possible Egyptian military
intervention, and obliging the Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed to declare that
nothing would stop Ethiopia from building the dam, and millions would be mustered to
defend it.
157
Nevertheless, the leaders agreed to resume negotiations, and the two
countries settled this time on US and World Bank mediation. From November 2019,
five rounds of technical negotiations and over three rounds of ministerial-level meetings
were convened, and eventually in February 2020, there was a breakthrough and a deal
was agreed; however, at the 11
th
hour Ethiopia refused to sign and the impasse
continued.
158
President Trump was incandescent, and froze US$260mn of aid to
Ethiopia,
159
raging that ‘Egypt may blow up the dam’.
160
External mediation continued to be sought in an attempt to break the deadlock. In
2020, the UN recognised the African Union’s (AU) responsibility for resolving the Nile
waters dispute, and argued that ‘African problems call for African solutions’.
161
The call
for AU mediation was supported by China, which had consistently refused to take sides,
pursuing a delicate balancing act to protect its substantial investments in both Egypt and
Ethiopia. However, not even the AU, with China in tow, could get the two sides to
compromise and the Tripartite talks again ended in failure. Ethiopia then requested
South Africa’s President Cyril Ramaphosa, the AU Chair at the time, to mediate, but once
again the negotiations proved barren.
162
In the absence of any agreement, Addis Ababa
14 R. MATTHEWS AND V. VIVODA
signalled commencement of the first of the dam’s three fillings in July 2020. Further
complicating matters, Ethiopia announced in February 2021 partial operation leading to
limited electricity generation for the first time, in a move condemned by Egypt and
Sudan. The two countries heavily criticised Ethiopia’s unilateral filling and operation of
the dam, labelling the start of power generation a violation of the 2015 Declaration of
Principles.
163
Notwithstanding these protests, Ethiopia proceeded with the second filling, which was
completed in July 2021.
164
Egypt and Sudan again condemned the fillings, urging
Ethiopia to suspend the process until an agreement was reached. Egypt’s Ministry of
Irrigation voiced its ‘firm rejection of Ethiopia’s unilateral measure’, claiming that it
violated international laws regulating shared bodies of water and infringed Egypt’s
rights.
165
In parallel with the fillings, a further unproductive Tripartite meeting was
held under AU auspices in Kinshasa, the capital of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo. Egypt also sought mediation from Turkey in 2021, but that got nowhere. In the
summer of 2021, Cairo and Khartoum managed to include the Renaissance Dam issue on
the UN Security Council (UNSC) agenda, despite Ethiopian disapproval.
166
All these
rounds of mediation have proved fruitless despite, as earlier mentioned, Egypt and
Sudan’s recognition (through signing of the Declaration) of Ethiopia’s legal rights to
the equitable and reasonable use of the [Nile] Waters.
167
Although direct Tripartite negotiations have stalled, the UNSC continues to encou-
rage the three states to resolve the dispute.
168
For example, in an October 2021 summit in
Jeddah between the state leaders of Egypt, Jordan, Iraq and the US, the participants
expressed support for a diplomatic solution that achieves the interests of all parties
impacted by the Renaissance Dam.
169
The third dam filling occurred in July 2022, and
was completed a month later, enabling activation of its turbines.
170
The Renaissance Dam
will continue to be filled until it reaches 74BCM.
171
Thus, while completion of the filling
process has some way to go, its eventual achievement is now a fait accompli. Future
mediation efforts can only focus on operational and structural considerations, such as
Egypt’s August 2022 letter to the UNSC warning of fissures in the concrete façade of the
sub-dam linked to the main Renaissance Dam.
172
However, it appears that patience over
mediation efforts has begun to fray. For example, Qatar’s Autumn 2021 efforts to invoke
Arab League intervention prompted Ethiopian government officials to state that negotia-
tions are an ‘African’ issue, and any interference from external Arab states would be
unacceptable.
173
In response, an advisor to the President of the Sovereign Council in
Sudan pointedly warned that there could be a ‘water war’ in the region.
174
Thinking the unthinkable
Ethiopia’s near 150-year period of sovereign rule, save for Italian occupation during
World War II, has not led to high levels of economic growth and development. It is in
this context that the Ethiopian government views the Renaissance Dam, as a ‘weapon’ in
the country’s fight against poverty, alongside the unwritten agenda of undermining
Egypt’s hydro-hegemony.
175
Sabre rattling rhetoric has continuously punctuated
a decade of tortuous negotiations between the two principal protagonists, Egypt and
Ethiopia.
176
Indeed, the threat of military action has been a constant throughout the
dam’s life. Reports have surfaced indicating that Egyptian forces were implicated in the
CONFLICT, SECURITY & DEVELOPMENT 15
mid-1970s’ destruction of equipment destined for an Ethiopian dam.
177
Also, during the
latter stages of Egyptian President Mubarak’s Presidency (1981–2011), it was disclosed
that government officials had indicated in the event of a crisis between Egypt and
Ethiopia, ‘there will be no war – we [would] send a plane to bombard the dam and [it
would be] back in the same day, that simple’.
178
Then, in 2012 WikiLeaks acquired
documents from a US strategic intelligence company, Stratfor, revealing Egyptian and
Sudanese plans to build an airstrip for ‘bombing a dam [without naming it] on the Nile in
Ethiopia’.
179
The following year, a meeting of Egyptian politicians, chaired by the then
President Morsi, called the dam a ‘declaration of war’, and proposed military action to
thwart the project.
180
Notwithstanding these threats, the dam’s construction will inevi-
tably be completed in the coming years.
181
The end-game is thus imminent, but an
agreement to share the Nile’s waters remains as elusive as ever. Ethiopia has been
fortunate that the three filling phases have occurred during periods of abundant rains.
The future climate may not be so kind, leading to water shortfalls in the downstream
affected countries.
Egypt’s President el-Sisi owes his position to the military.
182
In a speech on
26 April 2020, to celebrate the anniversary of the return of Sinai to Egypt, he declared
‘The Supreme goal of the state is to preserve its survival . . . and maximising the state’s
comprehensive powers comes at the top of the Egyptian State’s priorities’. Such ideas
make a military build-up inevitable. The Armed Forces permeate every aspect of Egypt,
including the economy, which is described as a ‘military economy’.
183
Weapons moder-
nisation is an obvious way of keeping the military content. Even though Egypt has no
obvious enemies, between 2015 and 2019, it became the third largest arms importer in the
world and the second in the MENA region after Saudi Arabia.
184
In terms of comparative
military capability between Egypt and Ethiopia, the former’s superiority is incontestable:
in 2021, Egypt spent US$5.2bn on defence in support of 836,000 Armed Forces compared
to Ethiopia’s US$448mn and 138,000 forces.
185
Yet, notwithstanding Egypt’s vastly
superior military capability, it would still need to carefully weigh the strategic implica-
tions of a pre-emptive military assault on Ethiopia’s dam. Such action would likely lead to
the imposition of international sanctions and negative politico-diplomatic consequences,
especially with respect to Western aid, relations with the Nile Basin countries, and more
generally across Africa. Egypt will also be aware that the dam has acted as a catalyst for
cultivating strategic allies. Since Israel’s rapprochement with Ethiopia during the reign of
Haile Selassie, it has had experts working in different capacities, including in the
country’s Ministry of Water and Electricity, directly on the dam’s construction and
also on the construction of three other dams on the Blue Nile.
186
There is speculation
that the award of contracts to Israel for the construction of these dams was a quid pro quo
for an Israeli military presence on the islands of Dahlk and Fatima.
187
Aside from ‘grey’ operations designed to influence Ethiopia’s political decision-
making, and special clandestine operations in Sudan to support the various nationalist
groups in Tigray and elsewhere in Ethiopia aimed at undermining the dam’s progress,
188
military action ‘might’ be feasible on three fronts. The first would be a precision air strike.
While Ethiopia’s government claims its air force, reputed to be the first in Africa,
189
is in
a position to defend the dam, the relative capability of Egyptian and Ethiopian military
inventories suggests otherwise.
190
Ethiopia’s air force comprises mostly Soviet-era air-
craft, supplemented with Russian and Ukrainian second-hand versions. By contrast,
16 R. MATTHEWS AND V. VIVODA
Egypt enjoys quantitative and qualitative combat aircraft superiority over Ethiopia,
possessing nine times as many military aircraft, including US F-16 fighters and the
recently procured advanced ‘deep strike’ French Rafale combat jets and US$2bn worth
of Russian SU-35 fighters, albeit none of these aircraft have flight capability from Egypt’s
airfields to reach Ethiopian air space.
191
An air strike would be exceedingly risky, with
uncertain outcomes, not least because Ethiopia has ring-fenced the dam with proven
Israeli and Russian Air Defence Systems. Additionally, if aerial bombing was successful,
there is the risk of massive flooding downstream in Sudan.
The second recourse to military action might be via a land-based assault. Egypt has an
army 2.5 times the size of Ethiopia’s, but Cairo would be challenged to deploy these
forces, including its nearly 16,000 main battle tanks (MBTs) and armoured vehicles as
forward bases are non-existent.
192
The third option would be deployment of the
Sudanese army, possibly incorporating Egyptian special forces. However, the Ethiopian
Army would undoubtedly have ‘war-gamed’ these military options, and would be
expected to have prepared for such an assault, given that the dam’s geographical
proximity to Sudan’s border is just 28 miles, easing its army’s operational and logistical
requirements. Moreover, the Ethiopian military is not inexperienced in border conflict.
In December 2020, it was obliged to respond to Sudan’s deployment of 6,000 forces using
heavy artillery in the disputed Al-Fasaga region.
193
Khartoum’s action was likely timed to
exploit Ethiopia’s preoccupation with fighting rebels in the enduring Tigray conflict to
the north, but Addis Ababa vowed that this ‘perfidious act [would] not pass’.
194
Of course, Egypt might consider undertaking a combined arms operation, both air
and land, in concert with its Sudanese allies. In fact, the two countries have recently been
collaborating to strengthen mutual military capability. In November 2020 and
April 2021, they conducted joint air exercises called ‘Nile Eagles’, followed up in
May 2021 by joint military ground and air exercises, dubbed ‘Homat El-Nile’
(Guardians of the Nile).
195
In parallel, in early 2021, a joint military agreement was
signed in Khartoum, covering mutual training activities. A senior Egyptian General
described the level of military cooperation between the two states as ‘unprecedented’,
arguing that they ‘faced common national security threats, and Cairo stood ready to meet
all of Sudan’s military-related requests’.
196
Military collaboration between states of the
wider Nile Basin also exists, reinforced by Cairo’s signing of an intelligence-sharing
agreement with Uganda in early 2021.
197
In the same year, Cairo additionally signed
a series of joint military, security, economic and intelligence agreements with Kenya,
Burundi, Rwanda and Djibouti.
198
Yet, there are several factors which militate against conflict. First, there is the self-
evident illogicality of breaching the dam that would cause massive flooding of Sudan’s
Blue Nile River and surrounding areas.
199
Second, there is no evidence to support the
argument that black Africa will act militarily or diplomatically to support an Egyptian
attack against the Renaissance Dam. Indeed, other Nile Basin countries such as Kenya,
Tanzania and Burundi are CFA signatories, suggesting an African-Arab divide in the
politics of the region.
200
Third, from a geopolitical perspective, the Autumn 2022 AU-led
Peace Accord signed in Pretoria to end the Tigray war in Ethiopia acted to end actual or
potential Egyptian military involvement in the region.
201
Finally, the Spring 2023 out-
break of major internal conflict in Sudan represents a major distraction to Khartoum
from any preoccupations with strategic issues surrounding the Renaissance Dam.
202
CONFLICT, SECURITY & DEVELOPMENT 17
Conclusion
The purpose of this paper has been to critically evaluate the historical antecedents and
contemporary developments influencing the politico-economic-strategic context behind
Ethiopia’s Renaissance Dam, including recent diplomatic initiatives. The dam’s comple-
tion is not in doubt, and in the absence of a Nile water-sharing agreement, there is great
uncertainty as to how downstream nations, and particularly Egypt, the principal prota-
gonist, will respond. Ethiopia appears to view itself as the injured party following
generations of diplomatic disagreement over the sovereignty of the waters. The Nile
Treaties ignored the fact that 90 per cent of the waters originate in Ethiopia. The Egyptian
perspective lies at the other end of the spectrum, where anything less than unrestricted
access to the Nile’s waters is viewed as an existential threat to national security. Through
international treaties, Cairo has been granted a high degree of sovereignty over the Nile
river, and this ‘ownership’ aspect has become increasingly important as, pari passu,
Egypt’s dependency on its waters have grown through population and economic pres-
sures. Yet, mature statecraft needs to balance historical diplomatic difficulties with the
reality of contemporary international relations. There is no doubt that international
mediation still has a role to play, but it might be easier if the diplomatic affiliations of
upstream and downstream countries did not fall on different sides of the geostrategic
divide: Egypt and Sudan are entwined with the Gulf states, which in turn are closely
aligned with the West, while Ethiopia is increasingly a client state of Russia, Israel and
China. The problem is that discourse between Egypt and Ethiopia appears to have ended,
and great power relations are also at an historical low, following the Russia-Ukraine
debacle and China-Taiwan frictions. Yet, if compromise is not achieved, and future rains
fail, or climate change irreparably reduces the water flow calculus, then the fear is that
military action will become Egypt’s only option.
Amid the West’s preoccupation with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the potential for
conflict between Egypt and Ethiopia remains a possibility. While the potential for
a ‘water war’ in the Nile Basin has not materialised into actual conflict, it is crucial to
distinguish between rhetoric and realpolitik in this context. The rhetoric from key
players, particularly Egypt and Sudan, has indeed become more bellicose in recent
years. For instance, Egypt’s media is ramping up the pressure on Cairo to act, with
headlines that ‘Ethiopia’s dam threatens the lives of 150mn Sudanese and Egyptian
citizens’.
203
Egyptian President el-Sisi’s 2020 statement that the water issue represents
an ‘existential threat’ and his subsequent warning in 2021 that the Nile waters represent
a ‘red line’ illustrate the escalating tensions.
204
In 2022, Egypt’s Foreign Minister further
escalated the rhetoric by stating that Egypt reserves the right, as guaranteed in the UN
Charter, to ‘take all necessary measures to protect its national security’.
205
These state-
ments, while not yet leading to physical conflict, are troubling and raise the spectre of
a potential attack on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. The situation is somewhat
reminiscent of the unexpected Russian invasion of Ukraine, where rhetoric and postur-
ing eventually led to actual conflict. It underscores the importance of careful diplomacy,
negotiation, and conflict resolution in managing transboundary water disputes.
However, it is also important to note that rhetoric, particularly in international politics,
can often serve other purposes. It can be a tool for rallying domestic support, signalling
intentions to other international actors, or exerting pressure in negotiations. While the
18 R. MATTHEWS AND V. VIVODA
rhetoric surrounding the Nile waters is undoubtedly concerning, it does not necessarily
mean that a physical conflict is inevitable. The practical considerations and potential
costs of such a conflict – may serve as a deterrent against escalation to actual warfare.
Nonetheless, the situation calls for continued vigilance, diplomatic engagement, and
efforts towards sustainable and equitable water management in the Nile Basin.
Notes
1. Paisley, ‘Why the 11 Countries’.
2. Nile Basin Initiative, State of the River Nile, 226.
3. Cited by Wheeler et al., ‘Understanding and Managing New Risks’. See also Abu‐Zeid and
Biswas, ‘Some Major Implications’.
4. Reguly, ‘Fear Along the Nile’.
5. Ezz and Arafat, ‘We Woke up in a Desert’.
6. Reguly, ‘Fear Along the Nile’.
7. Mbaku, ‘The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam’.
8. Aljazeera, ‘Ethiopia’s Blue Nile Mega-Dam Explained’.
9. Carlson, ‘Who Owns the Nile?’.
10. Fecteau, ‘On Toshka New Valley’s Mega-Failure’.
11. Egypt Today, ‘Toshka Agricultural Project Revived’.
12. Ibid.
13. Mohyeldeen, ‘The Dam that Broke Open’.
14. World Bank data; UNDP, ‘The Next Frontier’.
15. Mbaku, ‘Nile Basin at Turning Point’.
16. Dangeot, et al., Faces of Poverty.
17. Abtew and Dessu, The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam.
18. Maasho, ‘Ethiopia’s New Dam’.
19. Millar, ‘Selling Egypt Down the River?’.
20. Mbaku, ‘Nile Basin at Turning Point’; Holleis, ‘Ethiopia’s GERD Dam’.
21. Aldardari, ‘Water Politics and the Gulf States’.
22. Wolf, ‘Conflict and Cooperation along International Waterways’.
23. Kamat, ‘How US Retreat’.
24. D’Odorico et al., ‘The Global Food‐Energy‐Water Nexus’.
25. Kılıç, ‘Water Security Concept’.
26. Buzan et al., Security.
27. Cook and Bakker, ‘Water Security’; Bakker, ‘Water Security’; and Lankford et al., Water
Security.
28. UN-Water, ‘Water Security’.
29. Staupe-Delgado, ‘The Water – Energy–Food – Environmental Security Nexus’.
30. Smajgl et al., ‘The Water – Food–Energy Nexus’; and Allan et al., ‘The Water – Food–Energy
Nexus’.
31. Zeitoun, ‘The Global Web of National Water Security’; and D’Odorico et al., ‘The Global
Food‐Energy‐Water Nexus’.
32. Walton, ‘Desalinated Water Affects’.
33. Roudi-Fahimi et al., ‘Finding the Balance’.
34. Kehl, ‘Water Security in Transboundary Systems’.
35. Al-Otaibi and Abdel-Jawad, ‘Water Security for Kuwait’.
36. Naff, Water in the Middle East; Swain, Managing Water Conflict; and King, Water and
Conflict in the Middle East.
37. Wolf, ‘“Water Wars” and Water Reality’; Swain, ‘The Nile River Basin Initiative’; Peichert,
‘The Nile Basin Initiative’; Teshome, ‘Transboundary Water Cooperation in Africa’; and
Metawie, ‘History of Co-operation’.
CONFLICT, SECURITY & DEVELOPMENT 19
38. Wolf, ‘“Water Wars” and Water Reality’.
39. Kehl, ‘Water Security in Transboundary Systems’.
40. Zeitoun, Mark, and Naho Mirumachi, ‘Transboundary water interaction I: Reconsidering
conflict and cooperation’, 297–316.
41. Petersen-Perlman et al., ‘International Water Conflict and Cooperation’; Tir and Stinnett,
‘Weathering Climate Change’; and Hanjra and Qureshi, ‘Global Water Crisis’.
42. Gleick, ‘Water and Conflict’; Toset et al., ‘Shared Rivers and Interstate Conflict’; Klare,
‘Climate Change, Water Scarcity’; and Wolf, ‘“Water Wars” and Water Reality’.
43. Alam, ‘Questioning the Water Wars Rationale’; Kirmani, ’Water, Peace and Conflict
Management’. Mustafa, ‘Social Construction of Hydropolitics’; Burgess et al., ‘Human
Securitization of Water?’; Kalair et al., ‘Water, Energy and Food Nexus’; Wolf,
Hydropolitics Along the Jordan River; Haddadin, ‘Negotiated Resolution’; Weinthal et al.,
‘Securitizing Water’; Pearse‐Smith, ‘“Water War” in the Mekong Basin?’; Kittikhoun and
Staubli, ‘Water Diplomacy and Conflict Management’; Sneddon and Fox, ‘Rethinking
Transboundary Waters’; El‐Fadel et al., ‘The Nile River Basin’; Lawson, ‘Egypt versus
Ethiopia’; Milas, Sharing the Nile; Azarva, ‘Conflict on the Nile’; and Mbaku, ‘The Grand
Ethiopian Renaissance Dam’.
44. Anwar Sadat cited in Starr, ‘Water Wars’.
45. Starr, ‘Water Wars’.
46. Sutcliffe, ‘The Hydrology of the Nile Basin’.
47. Deng, ‘Cooperation between Egypt and Sudan’.
48. Kehl, ‘Water Security in Transboundary Systems’.
49. Yihdego et al., The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam; Abdelhady et al., ‘The Nile and the
Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam’; Nasr and Neef, ‘Ethiopia’s Challenge to Egyptian
Hegemony’; Pemunta et al., ‘The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam’; Negm and
Sommer, Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam; Abtew and Dessu, The Grand Ethiopian
Renaissance Dam; and Mbaku, ‘The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam’.
50. Bleischwitz et al., ‘Implications of the Resource Nexus on International Relations’.
51. Wolf, ‘Conflict and Cooperation’.
52. Gleditsch, ‘Armed Conflict and the Environment’.
53. Tekuya, ‘The Egyptian Hydro-Hegemony’.
54. Klaassen, ‘Everywhere and Nowhere to be Seen”.
55. Tekuya, ‘Colonial-era treaties’.
56. Ullendorff, ‘The Anglo-Ethiopian Treaty’.
57. Abdulrahman, ‘Agreements that Favour Egypt’s Rights’; and Tekuya, ‘Colonial-Era
Treaties’.
58. Kimenyi and Mbaku, ‘The Limits of the New “Nile Agreement”’.
59. Ibid.
60. Deribe, ‘The 1959 Agreement’; and Kimenyi and Mbaku, ‘The Limits of the “New Nile
Agreement’”.
61. Tekuya, ‘Colonial-Era Treaties’.
62. See International Waters Governance, ‘Nile River Basin Initiative’.
63. Tekuya, ‘Colonial-Era Treaties’; and Salman, “The Nile Basin Cooperative Framework
Agreement’.
64. Nile Basin Initiative, ‘Agreement on the Nile River Basin Cooperative Framework’.
65. Salman, ‘The Nile Basin Cooperative Framework Agreement’.
66. Ibid.
67. Ibid.
68. Al-Anani, ‘The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam’.
69. Sudan Tribune, ‘Sudan Downplays Negative Impact’.
70. Aman, ‘Egypt Warily Signs Preliminary Nile Agreement’.
71. Salman, ‘The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam’, 521.
72. MENA and Ahram Online, ‘Full Text of Declaration of Principles’.
73. Salman, The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam’, 521.
20 R. MATTHEWS AND V. VIVODA
74. Wuilbercq, ‘Ethiopia’s Nile Dam Project’.
75. The Sun, ‘Egypt, Ethiopia, Sudan and the Renaissance Dam’.
76. International Rivers, ‘The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam Fact Sheet’.
77. Wheeler et al., ‘Understanding and Managing New Risks’.
78. Bearak and Raghavan, ‘Africa’s Largest Dam Powers Dreams of Prosperity in Ethiopia’.
79. Mazel, ‘Looking for Compromise on Ethiopia’s Renaissance Dam’.
80. Water Technology, ‘Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam Project’.
81. Tekuya, ‘Sink or Swim’. Also see: Alarabiya News, ‘Ethiopia Starts Generating Power’; and
Saied, ‘Sisi Lauds Egyptian Water Conservation Programs’.
82. German Institute of Development and Sustainability, ‘Filling and Operation of the Grand
Ethiopian Renaissance Dam’.
83. International Rivers, ‘The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam Fact Sheet’.
84. Indeed, the 2022 cost appears to have declined, with one report published in February 2022
stating that in the absence of accurate accounting, experts have estimated the total cost of the
Dam to be US$4.4bn. See Afrique, ‘Ethiopia’.
85. Asiedu and Adaku, ‘Cost Overruns of Public Sector Construction Projects’; and Guerreiro,
‘What Chinese Dams in Laos Tell Us’.
86. Endale, ‘A Peek to Ethiopia’s Landmark Project’.
87. International Rivers, ‘The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam Fact Sheet’.
88. Endale, ‘A Peek to Ethiopia’s Landmark Project’.
89. International Rivers, ‘The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam Fact Sheet’.
90. Mbaku, ‘The Controversy Over the Ethiopian Grand Renaissance Dam’.
91. Ighobor, ‘Financing Africa’s Massive Projects’.
92. Maasho, ‘Paying for Giant Nile Dam Itself’.
93. Ighobor, ‘Financing Africa’s Massive Projects’.
94. Millar, ‘Selling Egypt Down the River?’.
95. Beeson, ‘Geoeconomics with Chinese Characteristics’.
96. Wang, ‘Brief ’.
97. Kuo and Kommenda, ‘What is China’s Belt and Road Initiative?’.
98. Umbach, ‘How China’s Belt and Road Initiative is Faring’.
99. Beeson and Crawford. ‘Putting the BRI in Perspective’.
100. Umbach, ‘How China’s Belt and Road Initiative is Faring’.
101. Devermont et al., Assessing the Risks of Chinese Investments’.
102. Guerreiro, ‘What Chinese Dams in Laos Tell Us’.
103. Hance, ‘China Plans over 300 Dam Projects Worldwide’.
104. Urban et al., ‘China’s Dam Builders’.
105. Kinfegabriel, ‘Ethiopia, China Trade Insight’.
106. Emam, ‘Egypt Hopes China can Break Deadlock’.
107. Ibid.
108. Millar, ‘Selling Egypt Down the River?’.
109. Economist Intelligence, ‘Ethiopia: China Invests in Power Grid’.
110. Sany and Sheehy, ‘Despite High Stakes in Ethiopia, China Sits on the Sidelines’.
111. Ngounou, ‘Ethiopia: State Will Invest $1.8 billion in Renewable Energy Transmission’.
112. Africanews, ‘Ethiopia Contracts Chinese Companies’.
113. Magistad, ‘As Ethiopia’s Civil Conflict Intensifies’.
114. Lee and Aung, ‘China to Take 70 per cent Stake in Strategic Port in Myanmar’.
115. Pasricha, ‘As Crisis-Hit Sri Lanka Counts Cost of Chinese Projects’.
116. Lu, ‘Sri Lanka Hands Over Port to China’.
117. Al-Anari, ‘The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam’.
118. Kiruga, ‘Growth Prospects Hurt as Ethiopia Struggles’.
119. Al-Anari, ‘The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam’.
120. Woldegebriel, ‘How Ethiopia Plans to Become a Clean Energy Exporter’.
121. Ngounou, ‘Ethiopia: State Will Invest $1.8 billion in Renewable Energy Transmission’.
122. Ibid.
CONFLICT, SECURITY & DEVELOPMENT 21
123. Siddig et al., ‘Long-Term Economy-Wide Impacts’.
124. Yihdego and Salem, ‘Nile River’s Basin Dispute’.
125. Ibid.
126. Kandeel, ‘Nile Basin’s GERD Dispute’. Acknowledgement is expressed to an anonymous
reviewer for insightful comments.
127. United Nations Security Council, ‘Egypt, Ethiopia, Sudan’.
128. Gobran, ‘Egypt Highlights Dangers’.
129. Climate Diplomacy, ‘Disputes Over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD)’.
130. Egypt Today, ‘Egypt Affirms Adherence to Rules’.
131. Mazel, ‘Looking for Compromise on Ethiopia’s Renaissance Dam’.
132. Ibid.
133. Rabie, ‘Egypt’.
134. UNECE, ‘Water-Food-Energy-Ecosystem Nexus’.
135. Abboud, ‘Impact of Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on Egypt’s National Security’.
136. Wheeler et al., ‘Comment on Egypt’s Water Budget Deficit’.
137. International Panel of Experts on Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam Project. ‘Final Report’.
138. Ibid.
139. Boehlert et al., ‘Analysing the Economy-Wide Impacts’.
140. Reguly, ‘Fear Along the Nile’.
141. Roussi, ‘Row Over Giant Nile Dam Could Escalate’.
142. Mbaku, ‘The Controversy Over the Ethiopian Grand Renaissance Dam’.
143. Wheeler et al., ‘Understanding and Managing New Risks’.
144. Egypt Independent, ‘Sudan Announces Sudden Decline of Nile Waters’.
145. Saied, ‘Sisi Lauds Egyptian Water Conversation Programs’.
146. International Rivers, ‘The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam Fact Sheet’.
147. Hvistendahl, ‘China’s Three Gorges Dam’.
148. Water Technology, ‘Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam Project’.
149. Dixon et al., ‘Dams and the Environment’.
150. Chen et al., ‘Impacts of Ethiopia Dam on Vegetation and Water and Ecological
Countermeasures’.
151. Elagib and Basheer, ‘Would Africa’s Largest Hydropower Dam’.
152. Chen et al., ‘Impacts of Ethiopia Dam on Vegetation and Water and Ecological
Countermeasures’.
153. Dahan, ‘Egypt Says Historic Nile Rights Not Negotiable’; see also: Mekonnen, ‘The Quest for
Equitable Resolution’.
154. International Crisis Group, ‘Bridging the Gap in the Nile Waters Dispute’.
155. State Information Service, ‘President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi’s Statement’.
156. Dessu et al., ‘Why Has the AU Been Silent on the Ethiopian Dam Dispute?’.
157. Mazel, ‘Looking for Compromise on Ethiopia’s Renaissance Dam’.
158. Widakuswara, ‘No Deal from US-Brokered Nile Talks’.
159. Caslin and Rabie, ‘Is a War between Egypt and Ethiopia Brewing on the Nile?’.
160. Malley and Davison, ‘GERD’.
161. United Nations, ‘Egypt, Ethiopia, Sudan Should Negotiate Mutually Beneficial Agreement’.
162. Louw-Vaudran, ‘As AU Chair, South Africa’s Leadership Fell Short in Key Areas’.
163. El Tawil, ‘Egypt Describes Ethiopia’s Unilateral Operation’.
164. Endeshaw, ‘Ethiopia Says Second Filling of Giant Dam on Blue Nile Complete’.
165. Aamari, ‘Tensions Rise as Ethiopia Keeps Filling its Nile Dam Reservoir’.
166. Saied, ‘Ethiopia Tries to Divide’.
167. Security Council Report, ‘Security Council Presidential Statement’.
168. Alarabiya News, ‘UN Encourages New Negotiations’.
169. Arab News, ‘Arab Leaders, President Biden’.
170. Magdi, ‘Third Filling of Nile Dam Heightens Ethiopia-Egypt Crisis’.
171. Daily Sabah, ‘Ethiopia to Initiate Generating Power’.
172. Gobran, ‘Egypt Warns of Cracks in Ethiopian Dam’.
22 R. MATTHEWS AND V. VIVODA
173. Maher, ‘Navigating the Ongoing Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam Negotiations’.
174. Ibid.
175. Floyd, ‘Power Trials Commence at Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam’.
176. Ibid.
177. Maher, ‘Navigating the Ongoing Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam Negotiations’.
178. Ibid.
179. Carlson, ‘Who Owns the Nile’.
180. Dunne, ‘The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam and Egypt’s Military Options’.
181. Kahsay, ‘Ethiopia: GERD to See Completion by 2023’.
182. Ottaway, ‘Egypt and the Allure of Military Power’.
183. Ibid.
184. Ibid.
185. SIPRI, ‘SIPRI Military Expenditure Database’; World Bank, ‘World Bank Open Data’.
186. Abboud, ‘Impact of Ethiopian Renaissance Dam’.
187. Ibid.
188. Tekle, ‘Ethiopia Vows to Defend its Airspace’.
189. Ibid.
190. Saied, ‘Egypt Deepens Military Ties with Sudan’.
191. Pangea-Risk, ‘Special Report: Egypt-Ethiopia War Scenarios’.
192. Ibid.
193. Ayeni, ‘Sudan Killings Risk Rekindling Border Conflict with Ethiopia’.
194. Africanews, ‘Sudan Recalls its Ambassador to Ethiopia’.
195. Saied, ‘Egypt Deepens Military Ties with Sudan’.
196. Egypt Independent, ‘Egypt, Sudan Sign Military Cooperation Agreement’.
197. Mikhail, ‘Egypt, Uganda Agree to Share Military Intelligence’.
198. Magdi, ‘Egypt Signs Military Deal with Kenya’.
199. Holleis, ‘Ethiopia’s GERD Dam’.
200. Kimenyi and Mbaku, ‘The Limits of the New “Nile Agreement’”.
201. Al Jazeera, ‘Ethiopia: Government, Tigrayan Forces’.
202. Gornall, ‘How the Sudan Crisis Complicates’. Moreover, Cairo’s efforts to achieve
a common approach to the GERD dispute is undermined by its sole focus on developing
relations with General Burhan, Commander of the Sudan Armed Forces. See Economist
Intelligence, ‘Sudan Crisis‘.
203. Al-Shamaa, ‘Ethiopia’s Plan to Fill Reservoir Opposed’.
204. Al-Monitor, ‘Egypt to Security Council’; and Floyd, ‘Power Trials Commence at Grand
Ethiopian Renaissance Dam’.
205. Hegasi, ‘Egypt Categorically Rejects Ethiopia’s Unilateral Filling’.
Acknowledgements
Appreciation is expressed to two anonymous reviewers for their invaluable and insightful com-
ments on an earlier draft of this paper.
Disclosure Statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes on contributors
Ron Matthews currently holds the Chair in Defence and Security Capability at Rabdan
Academy, Abu Dhabi. He is also a Visiting Professor in Defence Economics at Cranfield
University at the UK Defence Academy, and was formerly Professor of Defence Economics at
CONFLICT, SECURITY & DEVELOPMENT 23
the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University,
Singapore.
Vlado Vivoda is Associate Professor/Associate Researcher at Rabdan Academy, Abu Dhabi. He is
also an Honorary Fellow at the University of Queensland’s Sustainable Minerals Institute. He was
formerly Senior Lecturer in Strategic Studies at Deakin University, and Academic Advisor,
Defence and Strategic Studies Course, at the Australian War College, Canberra, Australia.
References
Aamari, Oussama, 2021. ‘Tensions Rise as Ethiopia Keeps Filling Its Nile Dam Reservoir’. Morocco
World News, 7 July. Available at: https://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2021/07/343280/ten
sions-rise-as-ethiopia-keeps-filling-its-nile-dam-reservoir [Accessed 2 November 2022].
Abboud, Tarek, 2021. ‘Impact of Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on Egypt’s National Security’.
Egyptian Institute for Studies (EIPSS-EG), 28 September. Available at: https://en.eipss-eg.org/
impact-of-ethiopian-renaissance-dam-on-egypts-national-security/ [Accessed 1 November
2022].
Abdelhady, Dalia, Karin Aggestam, Dan‐Erik Andersson, Olof Beckman, Ronny Berndtsson,
Karin Broberg Palmgren, Kaveh Madani, Umut Ozkirimli, Kenneth M. Persson and
Petter Pilesjö, 2015. ‘The Nile and the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam: Is There a Meeting
Point Between Nationalism and Hydrosolidarity?’ Journal of Contemporary Water Research &
Education 155(1), 73–82.
Abdulrahman, Salam Abdulqadir, 2018. ‘Agreements That Favour Egypt’s Rights to Nile Waters
are an Anachronism’. The Conversation, 4 November. Available at: https://theconversation.
com/agreements-that-favour-egypts-rights-to-nile-waters-are-an-anachronism-103353
[Accessed 2 November 2022].
Abtew, Wossenu and Shimelis Behailu Dessu, 2019. The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on the
Blue Nile. Springer International Publishing, Dordrecht, Netherlands.
Abu‐Zeid, Mahmoud A. and Asit K. Biswas, 1991. ‘Some Major Implications of Climatic
Fluctuations on Water Management’. International Journal of Water Resources Development 7
(2), 74–81.
Africanews, 2019. ‘Ethiopia Contracts Chinese Companies to Complete Nile Dam Construction’.
19 February. Available at: https://www.africanews.com/2019/02/19/ethiopia-contracts-chinese-
companies-to-complete-nile-dam-construction/ [Accessed 11 May 2023].
Africanews, 2022. ‘Sudan Recalls Its Ambassador to Ethiopia’. 27 June. Available at: https://www.
africanews.com/2022/06/27/sudan-recalls-its-ambassador-to-ethiopia/ [Accessed 3 November
2022].
Afrique, Jeune, 2022. ‘Ethiopia: The Nile Dam Launches Power Generation.’ The Africa Report, 23
February. Available at: https://www.theafricareport.com/179290/ethiopia-the-nile-dam-
launches-power-generation/ [Accessed 2 November 2022].
Alam, Undala Z, 2002. ‘Questioning the Water Wars Rationale: A Case Study of the Indus Waters
Treaty’. The Geographical Journal 168(4), 341–353.
Al-Anani, Khalil, 2022. ‘The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam: Limited Options for a
Resolution.’ Arab Center Washington DC, 16 September. Available at: https://arabcenterdc.
org/resource/the-grand-ethiopian-renaissance-dam-limited-options-for-a-resolution/
[Accessed 2 November 2022].
Alarabiya News, 2021. ‘UN Encourages New Negotiations in Dispute Over Ethiopia Dam’. 16
September. Available at: https://english.alarabiya.net/News/africa/2021/09/16/UN-encourages-
new-negotiations-in-dispute-over-Ethiopia-dam [Accessed 23 May 2023].
Alarabiya News, 2022. ‘Ethiopia Starts Generating Power from Second Turbine at Mega Dam on
Blue Nile’. 11 August. Available at: https://english.alarabiya.net/News/world/2022/08/11/
Ethiopia-starts-generating-power-from-second-turbine-at-mega-dam-on-Blue-Nile [Accessed
19 May 2023].
24 R. MATTHEWS AND V. VIVODA
Aldardari, Sima, 2021. ‘Water Politics and the Gulf States: The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance
Dam’. The Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, 19 August. Available at: https://agsiw.org/
water-politics-and-the-gulf-states-the-grand-ethiopian-renaissance-dam/ [Accessed 1
November 2022].
Al Jazeera, 2022. ‘Ethiopia: Government, Tigrayan Forces Agree to End Two-Year War’. 2
November. Available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/11/2/ethiopias-warring-sides-
agree-cessation-of-hostilities-au [Accessed 23 May 2023].
Al Jazeera, 2022 ‘Ethiopia’s Blue Nile Mega-Dam Explained’. 21 February. Available at: https://
www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/7/8/explainer-ethiopias-massive-nile-dam [Accessed 18 May
2023].
Allan, Tony, Martin Keulertz and Eckart Woertz, 2015. ‘The Water–Food–Energy Nexus: An
Introduction to Nexus Concepts and Some Conceptual and Operational Problems’.
International Journal of Water Resources Development 31(3), 301–311.
Al-Monitor, 2021. ‘Egypt to Security Council: Ethiopian Dam an Existential Threat’. Al-Monitor, 9
July. Available at: https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2021/07/egypt-security-council-
ethiopian-dam-existential-threat [Accessed 2 November 2022].
Al-Otaibi, Abdulhadi and Mahmoud Abdel-Jawad, 2007. ‘Water Security for Kuwait’. Desalination
214(1–3), 299–305.
Al-Shamaa, Mohammed, 2022. ‘Ethiopia’s Plan to Fill Reservoir Opposed by Egypt at UN.’ Arab
News, 31 July. Available at: https://www.arabnews.com/node/2132831/middle-east [Accessed 2
November 2022].
Aman, Ayah, 2015. ‘Egypt Warily Signs Preliminary Nile Agreement.’ Al-Monitor, 31 March.
Available at: https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2015/03/egypt-eastern-nile-water-
agreement-ethiopia-sudan.html [Accessed 19 May 2023].
Arab News, 2022. ‘Arab Leaders, President Biden Confirm Common Vision for Region at Jeddah
Summit’. 20 July. Available at: https://www.arabnews.com/node/2123541/saudi-arabia
[Accessed 23 May 2023].
Asiedu, Richard Ohene and Ebenezer Adaku, 2020. ‘Cost Overruns of Public Sector Construction
Projects: A Developing Country Perspective’. International Journal of Managing Projects in
Business 13(1), 66–84.
Ayeni, Tofe, 2022. ‘Sudan Killings Risk Rekindling Border Conflict with Ethiopia.’ The Africa
Report, 27 June. Available at: https://www.theafricareport.com/217791/sudan-killings-risk-
rekindling-border-conflict-with-ethiopia/ [Accessed 2 November 2022].
Azarva, Jeffrey D., 2011. ‘Conflict on the Nile: International Watercourse Law and the Elusive
Effort to Create a Transboundary Water Regime in the Nile Basin’. Temple International &
Comparative Law Journal 25(2), 457–498.
Bakker, Karen, 2012. ‘Water Security: Research Challenges and Opportunities’. Science 337(6097),
914–915.
Bearak, Max and Sudarsan Raghavan, 2020. ‘Africa’s Largest Dam Powers Dreams of Prosperity in
Ethiopia – and Fears of Hunger in Egypt’. The Washington Post, 15 October. Available at:
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/interactive/2020/grand-ethiopian-renaissance-dam-
egypt-nile/ [Accessed 2 November 2022].
Beeson, Mark, 2018. ‘Geoeconomics with Chinese Characteristics: The BRI and China’s Evolving
Grand Strategy’. Economic and Political Studies 6(3), 240–256.
Beeson, Mark and Corey Crawford, 2023. ‘Putting the BRI in Perspective: History, Hegemony and
Geoeconomics’. Chinese Political Science Review 8(1), 45–62.
Bleischwitz, Raimund, Sabrina Kirschke and Nora Adam, 2021. ‘Implications of the Resource
Nexus on International Relations: The Case of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam’.
Zeitschrift für Außen-und Sicherheitspolitik 14(4), 397–409.
Boehlert, Brent, Kenneth M. Strzepek and Sherman Robinson, 2017. ‘Analysing the Economy-
Wide Impacts on Egypt of Alternative GERD Filling Policies’. In The Grand Ethiopian
Renaissance Dam and the Nile Basin, eds. Zeray Yihdego, Alistair Rieu-Clarke and Ana
Elisa Cascão. Routledge, Milton Park, Abingdon, UK, 138–157.
CONFLICT, SECURITY & DEVELOPMENT 25
Burgess, J. Peter, Taylor Owen and Uttam Kumar Sinha, 2016. ‘Human Securitization of Water?
A Case Study of the Indus Waters Basin’. Cambridge Review of International Affairs 29(2),
382–407.
Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver and Jaap De Wilde, 1998. Security: A New Framework for Analysis.
Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, CO.
Carlson, Andrew, 2013. ‘Who Owns the Nile? Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia’s History-Changing
Dam’. Origins, March. Available at: https://origins.osu.edu/article/who-owns-nile-egypt-sudan-
and-ethiopia-s-history-changing-dam?language_content_entity=en [Accessed 3 November
2022].
Caslin, Olivier and Hossam Rabie, 2021. ‘Is a War Between Egypt and Ethiopia Brewing on the
Nile?’ The Africa Report, 6 May. Available at: https://www.theafricareport.com/85672/is-a-war-
between-egypt-and-ethiopia-brewing-on-the-nile/ [Accessed 1 November 2022].
Chen, Pengyu, Tengyuan Liang and Wu. Zibin, 2022. ‘Impacts of Ethiopia Dam on Vegetation and
Water and Ecological Countermeasures’. IOP Conference Series: Earth and Environmental
Science 1011(1), 012044.
Climate Diplomacy, Undated. ‘Disputes Over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD)’.
Available at: https://climate-diplomacy.org/case-studies/disputes-over-grand-ethiopian-
renaissance-dam-gerd [Accessed 23 May 2023].
Cook, Christina and Karen Bakker, 2012. ‘Water Security: Debating an Emerging Paradigm’.
Global Environmental Change 22(1), 94–102.
D’Odorico, Paolo, Kyle Frankel Davis, Lorenzo Rosa, Joel A. Carr, Davide Chiarelli,
Jampel Dell’angelo, Jessica Gephart, G. K. MacDonald, D. A. Seekell, S. Suweis and M. C. Rulli,
2018. ‘The Global Food‐Energy‐Water Nexus’. Reviews of Geophysics 56(3), 456–531.
Dahan, Maha El, 2009. ‘Egypt Says Historic Nile Rights Not Negotiable’. Reuters, 27 July. Available
at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-nile-framework-idUSTRE56Q3LZ20090727
[Accessed 18 May 2023].
Daily Sabah, 2022. ‘Ethiopia to Initiate Generating Power from Nile Dam’. 19 February. Available
at: https://www.dailysabah.com/business/energy/ethiopia-to-initiate-generating-power-from-
nile-dam [Accessed 23 May 2023].
Dangeot, Anaïs, Erëblina Elezaj, Julia Karpati and Chris de Neubourg, 2020. ‘Faces of Poverty:
Studying the Overlap Between Monetary and Multidimensional Child Poverty in Ethiopia’.
UNICEF and SPRI (Global), July. Available at: https://www.unicef.org/esa/media/10266/file/
UNICEF-Ethiopia-Faces-of-Poverty-Report-2020.pdf [Accessed 1 November 2022].
Deng, Biong Kuol, 2007. ‘Cooperation Between Egypt and Sudan Over the Nile River Waters: The
Challenges of Duality’. African Sociological Review/Revue Africaine de Sociologie 11(1), 38–62.
Deribe, Mekdelawit Messay, 2022. ‘The 1959 Agreement “For the Full Utilization of the Nile
Waters”: The Crux of the Problem in the Nile Basin Water Use’. We Aspire, 15 February.
Available at: https://www.weaspire.info/the-1959-agreement-for-the-full-utilization-of-the-nile
-waters-the-crux-of-the-problem-in-the-nile-basin-water-use/ [Accessed 18 May 2023].
Dessu, Meressa K., Dawit Yohannes and Roba D. Sharamo, 2020. ‘Why Has the AU Been Silent on
the Ethiopian Dam Dispute?’ Institute of Security Studies (ISS), 19 February. Available at:
https://issafrica.org/iss-today/why-has-the-au-been-silent-on-the-ethiopian-dam-dispute
[Accessed 3 November 2022].
Devermont, Judd, Catherine Chiang and Amelia Cheatham, 2019. ‘Assessing the Risks of Chinese
Investments in Sub-Saharan African Ports’. Center for Strategic and International Studies
(CSIS), 5 June. Available at: https://reconasia.csis.org/assessing-risks-chinese-investments-sub-
saharan-african-ports/ [Accessed 2 November 2022].
Dixon, John A., Lee M. Talbot and Guy J.-M. Le Moigne, 1989. ‘Dams and the Environment.’
World Bank Technical Paper No. 110. Available at: https://documents.worldbank.org/curated/
en/300561468782146320/pdf/multi-page.pdf [Accessed 3 November 2022].
Dunne, Charles W., 2020. ‘The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam and Egypt’s Military Options’.
Arab Center, Washington DC, 30 July. Available at: https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/the-grand
-ethiopian-renaissance-dam-and-egypts-military-options/ [Accessed 2 November 2022].
26 R. MATTHEWS AND V. VIVODA
Economist Intelligence, 2019. ‘Ethiopia: China Invests in Power Grid’. Economist Intelligence Unit,
3 May. Available at: http://country.eiu.com/article.aspx?articleid=177972001&Country=
Ethiopia&topic=Economy&subtopic=F_5 [Accessed 2 November 2022].
Economist Intelligence, 2023. ‘Sudan Crisis Brings Egypt’s Regional Diplomacy into Doubt’.
Economist Intelligence Unit, 9 May. Available at: https://www.eiu.com/n/sudan-crisis-brings-
egypts-regional-diplomacy-into-doubt/ [Accessed 23 May 2023].
Egypt Independent, 2020. ‘Sudan Announces Sudden Decline of Nile Waters Despite Ethiopia’s
Denial of Dam Filling’. Egypt Independent, 20 July. Available at: https://egyptindependent.com/
sudan-announces-sudden-decline-of-nile-waters-despite-ethiopias-denial-of-dam-filling/
[Accessed 3 November 2022].
Egypt Independent, 2021. ‘Egypt, Sudan Sign Military Cooperation Agreement’. Egypt Independent,
2 March. Available at: https://egyptindependent.com/egypt-sudan-sign-military-cooperation-
agreement/ [Accessed 3 November 2022].
Egypt Today, 2019. ‘Egypt Affirms Adherence to Rules of Filling Ethiopian Dam’. Egypt Today, 25
December. Available at: https://www.egypttoday.com/Article/1/79043/Egypt-affirms-adherence
-to-rules-of-filling-Ethiopian-Dam [Accessed 23 May 2023].
Egypt Today, 2022. ‘Toshka Agricultural Project Revived Amid Egypt’s Hope to Achieve Self-
Sufficiency in Wheat’. Egypt Today, 21 April. Available at: https://www.egypttoday.com/Article/
1/115145/Toshka-agricultural-project-revived-amid-Egypt%E2%80%99s-hope-to-achieve-self
[Accessed 1 November 2022].
El‐Fadel, M., Y. El‐Sayegh, K. El‐Fadl and D. Khorbotly, 2003. ‘The Nile River Basin: A Case Study
in Surface Water Conflict Resolution’. Journal of Natural Resources and Life Sciences Education
32(1), 107–117.
Elagib, Nadir Ahmed and Mohammed Basheer, 2021. ‘Would Africa’s Largest Hydropower Dam
Have Profound Environmental Impacts?’ Environmental Science and Pollution Research 28(7),
8936–8944.
El Tawil, Noha, 2022. ‘Egypt Describes Ethiopia’s Unilateral Operation of Renaissance Dam as
Violation of 2015 Declaration of Principles’. Egypt Today, 20 February. Available at: https://
www.egypttoday.com/Article/1/113060/Egypt-describes-Ethiopia%E2%80%99s-unilateral-
operation-of-Renaissance-Dam-as-violation [Accessed 26 May 2023].
Emam, Amr, 2021. ‘Egypt Hopes China Can Break Deadlock in Nile Dam Dispute’. Al-Monitor, 21
July. Available at: https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2021/07/egypt-hopes-china-can-break
-deadlock-nile-dam-dispute [Accessed 2 November 2022].
Endale, Ashenafi, 2019. ‘A Peek to Ethiopia’s Landmark Project’. Ethiopian Business Review 76.
Available at https://ethiopianbusinessreview.net/a-peek-to-ethiopias-landmark-project/.
Accessed 2 November 2022.
Endeshaw, Dawit, 2021. ‘Ethiopia Says Second Filling of Giant Dam on Blue Nile Complete’.
Reuters, 19 July. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/second-filling-ethiopias-
giant-dam-nearly-complete-state-run-media-2021-07-19/ [Accessed 2 November 2022].
Ezz, Mohamed and Nada Arafat, 2015. ‘“we Woke Up in a Desert” – the Water Crisis Taking Hold
Across Egypt’. The Guardian, 4 August. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/
2015/aug/04/egypt-water-crisis-intensifies-scarcity [Accessed 1 November 2022].
Fecteau, Andre, 2012. ‘On Toshka New Valley’s Mega-Failure’. Egypt Independent, 26 April.
Available at: https://egyptindependent.com/toshka-new-valleys-mega-failure-slideshow/
[Accessed 1 November 2022].
Floyd, Steve, 2022. ‘Power Trials Commence at Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam Despite Stalled
Negotiations and Regional Tensions.’ Lawfare, 19 May. Available at: https://www.lawfareblog.
com/power-trials-commence-grand-Ethiopian-renaissance-dam-despite-stalled-negotiations-
and-regional [Accessed 2 November 2022].
German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS), 2021. ‘Filling and Operation of the
Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam – a Way Out’. 4 May. Available at: https://www.idos-
research.de/en/events/details/filling-and-operation-of-the-grand-ethiopian-renaissance-dam
-a-way-out/ [Accessed 2 November 2022].
CONFLICT, SECURITY & DEVELOPMENT 27
Gleditsch, Nils Petter, 1998. ‘Armed Conflict and the Environment: A Critique of the Literature’.
Journal of Peace Research 35(3), 381–400.
Gleick, Peter H., 1993. ‘Water and Conflict: Fresh Water Resources and International Security’.
International Security 18(1), 79–112.
Gobran, Mohamed, 2022. ‘Egypt Warns of Cracks in Ethiopian Dam’. Arab News, 11 August.
Available at: https://www.arabnews.jp/en/middle-east/article_78092/ [Accessed 2 November
2022].
Gobran, Mohamed, 2023. ‘Egypt Highlights Dangers of Work on Grand Ethiopian Renaissance
Dam’. Arab News, 9 March. Available at: https://www.arabnews.com/node/2265536/middle-
east [Accessed 23 May 2023].
Gornall, Jonathan, 2023. ‘How the Sudan Crisis Complicates the Egypt-Ethiopia Dispute Over the
GERD Dam’. Arab News, 28 April. Available at: https://www.arabnews.com/node/2293531/
world [Accessed 23 May 2023].
Guerreiro, Phillip, 2021. ‘What Chinese Dams in Laos Tell Us About the Belt and Road Initiative’.
The Diplomat, 3 December. Available at: https://thediplomat.com/2021/12/what-chinese-dams-
in-laos-tell-us-about-the-belt-and-road-initiative/ [Accessed 2 November 2022].
Haddadin, Munther J., 2000. ‘Negotiated Resolution of the Jordan-Israel Water Conflict’.
International Negotiation 5(2), 263–288.
Hance, Jeremy. 2012. ‘China Plans Over 300 Dam Projects Worldwide’. Climate Diplomacy, 9
December. Available at: https://climate-diplomacy.org/magazine/cooperation/china-plans-over
-300-dam-projects-worldwide [Accessed 2 November 2022].
Hanjra, Munir A. and M. Ejaz Qureshi, 2010. ‘Global Water Crisis and Future Food Security in an
Era of Climate Change’. Food Policy 35(5), 365–377.
Hegazi, Sami, 2022. ‘Egypt Categorically Rejects Ethiopia’s Unilateral Filling of GERD in Letter to
UN Security Council’. Zawya, 30 July. Available at: https://www.zawya.com/en/economy/
north-africa/egypt-categorically-rejects-ethiopias-unilateral-filling-of-gerd-in-letter-to-un-
security-council-kvu64nzf [Accessed 2 November 2022].
Holleis, Jennifer, 2023. ‘Ethiopia’s GERD Dam, a Potential Boon for All, Experts Say’. Deutsche
Welle, 8 April. Available at: https://www.dw.com/en/ethiopias-gerd-dam-a-potential-boon-for-
all-experts-say/a-65254058 [Accessed 18 May 2023].
Hvistendahl, Mara, 2008. ‘China’s Three Gorges Dam: An Environmental Catastrophe?’ Scientific
American, 25 March. Available at: https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/chinas-three-
gorges-dam-disaster/ [Accessed 2 November 2022].
Ighobor, Kingsley and Busani Bafana, 2014. ‘Financing Africa’s Massive Projects’. Africa Renewal,
December. Available at: https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/december-2014/finan
cing-africa%E2%80%99s-massive-projects [Accessed 2 November 2022].
International Crisis Group, 2019. ‘Bridging the Gap in the Nile Waters Dispute’. International
Crisis Group, Report No. 271/Africa, 20 March. Available at: https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/
horn-africa/ethiopia/271-bridging-gap-nile-waters-dispute [Accessed 4 November 2022].
International Panel of Experts on Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam Project, 2013. ‘Final Report’.
31 May. Available at: https://www.scidev.net/wp-content/uploads/site_assets/docs/interna
tional_panel_of_experts_for_ethiopian_renaissance_dam-_final_report.pdf. [Accessed 23 May
2023].
International Rivers, 2014. ‘The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam Fact Sheet’. 24 January.
Available at: https://archive.internationalrivers.org/resources/the-grand-ethiopian-renaissance-
dam-fact-sheet-8213 [Accessed 2 November 2022].
International Waters Governance, Undated. ‘Nile River Basin Initiative’. Available at: http://www.
internationalwatersgovernance.com/nile-river-basin-initiative.html [Accessed 23 May 2023].
Kahsay, Dargie, 2021. ‘Ethiopia: GERD to See Completion by 2023 – Minister’. The Ethiopian
Herald, 16 February. Available at: https://allafrica.com/stories/202102170241.html [Accessed 2
November 2022].
Kalair, Ali Raza, Naeem Abas, Qadeer Ul Hasan, Esmat Kalair, Anam Kalair and Nasrullah Khan,
2019. ‘Water, Energy and Food Nexus of Indus Water Treaty: Water Governance’. Water-
Energy Nexus 2(1), 10–24.
28 R. MATTHEWS AND V. VIVODA
Kamat, Dnyanesh, 2022. ‘How US Retreat Will Define the Nile Dam Dispute’. Asia Times, 25
April. Available at: https://asiatimes.com/2022/04/how-us-retreat-will-define-the-nile-dam-
dispute/ [Accessed 1 November 2022].
Kandeel, Amal, 2020. ‘Nile Basin’s GERD Dispute Creates Risks for Egypt, Sudan and Beyond’.
Atlantic Council, 10 July. Available at: https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/nile-
basins-gerd-dispute-creates-risks-for-egypt-sudan-and-beyond/ [Accessed 23 May 2023].
Kehl, Jenny R., 2017. ‘Water Security in Transboundary Systems: Cooperation in Intractable
Conflicts and the Nile System’. In Water Security in the Middle East: Essays in Scientific and
Social Cooperation, ed. Jean Axelrad Cahan, Anthem Press, London, 39–66.
Kılıç, Seyfi, 2014. ‘Water Security Concept and Its Perception in the Egypt’. International Journal
of Arts & Commerce 3(8), 69–80.
Kimenyi, Mwangi S. and John Mukum Mbaku. 2015. ‘The Limits of the New “Nile Agreement”’.
Brookings, 28 April. Available at: https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2015/04/28/
the-limits-of-the-new-nile-agreement/ [Accessed 2 November 2022].
Kinfegabriel, Melaku, 2022. ‘Ethiopia, China Trade Insight’. Behak, 22 February. Available at:
https://newbusinessethiopia.com/trade/ethiopia-china-trade-insight/ [Accessed 2 November
2022].
King, Marcus Dubois, 2021. Water and Conflict in the Middle East. Oxford University Press,
Oxford, UK.
Kirmani, Syed S., 1990. ‘Water, Peace and Conflict Management: The Experience of the Indus and
Mekong River Basins’. Water International 15(4), 200–205.
Kiruga, Morris, 2019. ‘Growth Prospects Hurt as Ethiopia Struggles to Keep the Lights on.’ The
Africa Report, 30 May. Available at: https://www.theafricareport.com/13533/growth-prospects-
hurt-as-ethiopia-struggles-to-keep-the-lights-on/ [Accessed 2 November 2022].
Kittikhoun, Anoulak and Denise Michèle Staubli, 2018. ‘Water Diplomacy and Conflict
Management in the Mekong: From Rivalries to Cooperation’. Journal of Hydrology 567,
654–667.
Klaassen, Lisa, 2021. ‘Everywhere and Nowhere to Be Seen’: How China’s Role in the GERD
Dispute Challenges Beijing’s Non-Interference Principle’. London School of Economics, 27
October. Available at: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/cff/2021/10/27/everywhere-and-nowhere-to-be-
seen-how-chinas-role-in-the-gerd-dispute-challenges-beijings-non-interference-principle/
[Accessed 4 November 2022].
Klare, Michael T., 2020. ‘Climate Change, Water Scarcity, and the Potential for Interstate Conflict
in South Asia’. Journal of Strategic Security 13(4), 109–122.
Kuo, Lily and Niko Kommenda, 2018. ‘What is China’s Belt and Road Initiative?’ The Guardian, 30
July. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/cities/ng-interactive/2018/jul/30/what-china-
belt-road-initiative-silk-road-explainer [Accessed 2 November 2022].
Lankford, Bruce, Karen Bakker, Mark Zeitoun, Declan Conway, B. Lankford, K. Bakker,
M. Zeitoun and D. Conway, 2013. Water Security: Principles, Perspectives and Practices.
Routledge, Milton Park, Abingdon, UK.
Lawson, Fred H., 2017. ‘Egypt versus Ethiopia: The Conflict Over the Nile Metastasizes’. The
International Spectator 52(4), 129–144.
Lee, Yimou and Thu Thu Aung, 2017. ‘China to Take 70% Stake in Strategic Port in Myanmar –
Official’. Reuters, 17 October. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/china-silkroad-
myanmar-port-idUSL4N1MS3UB [Accessed 2 November 2022].
Louw-Vaudran, Liesl, 2020. ‘As AU Chair, South Africa’s Leadership Fell Short in Key Areas’.
Institute for Security Studies, 19 November. Available at: https://issafrica.org/iss-today/as-au-
chair-south-africas-leadership-fell-short-in-key-areas [Accessed 2 November 2022].
Lu, Hai Liang, 2018. ‘Sri Lanka Hands Over Port to China to Pay off Debt’. The National, 11
September. Available at: https://www.thenationalnews.com/world/asia/sri-lanka-hands-over-
port-to-china-to-pay-off-debt-1.684606 [Accessed 2 November 2022].
Maasho, Aaron, 2014a. ‘Ethiopia’s New Dam is Thwarting Egypt’s Long-Held Control Over the
Nile’. Business Insider, 23 April. Available at: https://www.businessinsider.com/r-paying-for-
giant-nile-dam-itself-ethiopia-thwarts-egypt-but-takes-risks-2014-23 [Accessed 18 May 2023].
CONFLICT, SECURITY & DEVELOPMENT 29
Maasho, Aaron, 2014b. ‘Paying for Giant Nile Dam Itself, Ethiopia Thwarts Egypt but Takes Risks’.
Reuters, 23 April. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-ethiopia-energy-insight-
idUKBREA3M0BB20140423 [Accessed 2 November 2022].
Magdi, Muhammed, 2021. ‘Egypt Signs Military Deal with Kenya Amid Escalating Tensions with
Ethiopia’. Al-Monitor, 1 June. Available at: https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2021/06/
egypt-signs-military-deal-kenya-amid-escalating-tensions-ethiopia#ixzz7ddETVUfH
[Accessed 2 November 2022].
Magdi, Muhammed, 2022. ‘Third Filling of Nile Dam Heightens Ethiopia-Egypt Crisis’. Al-
Monitor, 17 August. Available at: https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2022/08/third-filling-
nile-dam-heightens-ethiopia-egypt-crisis [Accessed 2 November 2022].
Magistad, Mary Kay, 2020. ‘As Ethiopia’s Civil Conflict Intensifies, the Future of Chinese
Investment is Uncertain’. The World, 27 November. Available at: https://theworld.org/stories/
2020-11-27/ethiopia-s-civil-conflict-intensifies-future-chinese-investment-uncertain [Accessed
2 November 2022].
Maher, Mohamed, 2021. ‘Navigating the Ongoing Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam
Negotiations’. Fikra Forum, 29 September. Available at: https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/
policy-analysis/navigating-ongoing-grand-ethiopian-renaissance-dam-negotiations [Accessed
2 November 2022].
Mazel, Zvi 2019. ‘Looking for Compromise on Ethiopia’s Renaissance Dam’. Geopolitical
Intelligence Services (GIS), 10 December. Available at: https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/
ethiopian-dam/ [Accessed 2 November 2022].
Mbaku, John Mukum, 2020. ‘The Controversy Over the Ethiopian Grand Renaissance Dam’.
Brookings, 5 August. Available at: https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2020/08/05/
the-controversy-over-the-grand-ethiopian-renaissance-dam/ [Accessed 2 November 2022].
Mbaku, John Mukum, 2022a. ‘The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam and the Nile Basin
Conflict’. Georgetown Journal of International Affairs 23(1), 84–91.
Mbaku, John Mukum, 2022b. ‘Nile Basin at Turning Point as Ethiopian Dam Starts Operations’.
The Conversation, 6 March. Available at: https://theconversation.com/nile-basin-at-a-turning-
point-as-ethiopian-dam-starts-operations-178267 [Accessed 1 November 2022].
Mekonnen, Dereje Zeleke, 2013. ‘The Quest for Equitable Resolution of the Nile Waters Dispute:
Wandering in the Wilderness?’ International Journal of Ethiopian Studies 7(1&2), 77–100.
MENA and Ahram Online, 2015. ‘Full Text of Declaration of Principles’ Signed by Egypt, Sudan
and Ethiopia’. Ahramonline, 23 March. Available at: https://english.ahram.org.eg/
NewsContent/1/64/125941/Egypt/Politics-/Full-text-of-Declaration-of-Principles-signed-by-E.
aspx [Accessed 19 May 2023].
Metawie, AbdelFattah, 2004. ‘History of Co-Operation in the Nile Basin’. International Journal of
Water Resources Development 20(1), 47–63.
Mikhail, George, 2021. ‘Egypt, Uganda Agree to Share Military Intelligence’. Al-Monitor, 12 April.
Available at: https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2021/04/egypt-uganda-agree-share-
military-intelligence [Accessed 2 November 2022].
Milas, Seifulaziz, 2013. Sharing the Nile: Egypt, Ethiopia and the Geo-Politics of Water. Pluto Press,
London.
Millar, Iain, 2020. ‘Selling Egypt Down the River? China Supercharges Ethiopia’s Grand
Renaissance Dam’. U.S.-China Perception Monitor, the Carter Center, 12 March. Available at:
https://uscnpm.org/2020/03/12/selling-egypt-down-the-river-china-supercharges-ethiopias-
grand-renaissance-dam/ [Accessed 18 May 2023].
Mohyeldeen, Sherif, 2021. ‘The Dam That Broke Open an Ethiopia-Egypt Dispute’. Malcolm
H. Herr Carnegie Middle East Center, 12 February. Available at: https://carnegie-mec.org/
2021/02/12/dam-that-broke-open-ethiopia-egypt-dispute-pub-83867 [Accessed 18 May 2023].
Mustafa, Daanish, 2007. ‘Social Construction of Hydropolitics: The Geographical Scales of Water
and Security in the Indus Basin’. Geographical Review 97(4), 484–501.
Naff, Thomas, 2020. Water in the Middle East: Conflict or Cooperation? Routledge, Milton Park,
Abingdon, UK.
30 R. MATTHEWS AND V. VIVODA
Nasr, Hala and Andreas Neef, 2016. ‘Ethiopia’s Challenge to Egyptian Hegemony in the Nile River
Basin: The Case of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam’. Geopolitics 21(4), 969–989.
Negm, Abdelazim M., Sommer Abdel-Fattah, A. M. Negm and S. Abdel-Fattah, 2019. Grand
Ethiopian Renaissance Dam versus Aswan High Dam: A View from Egypt. Springer International
Publishing, Dordrecht, Netherlands.
Ngounou, Boris, 2019. ‘Ethiopia: State Will Invest $1.8 Billion in Renewable Energy Transmission.’
Afrik21, 4 May. Available at: https://www.afrik21.africa/en/ethiopia-state-will-invest-1-8-bil
lion-in-renewable-energy-transmission/ [Accessed 2 November 2022].
Nile Basin Initiative, 2010. ‘Agreement on the Nile River Basin Cooperative Framework’. May.
Available at: https://www.nilebasin.org/images/docs/CFA%20-%20English%20%
20FrenchVersion.pdf [Accessed 18 May 2023].
Nile Basin Initiative, 2012. State of the River Nile Basin 2012. Nile Basin Initiative, Entebbe,
Uganda.
Nyabiage, Jevans, 2020. ‘China’s Allies at Loggerheads Over Ethiopia Dam – Will Beijing
Intervene?’ South China Morning Post, 26 July. Available at: https://www.scmp.com/news/
china/diplomacy/article/3094650/chinas-allies-loggerheads-over-ethiopia-dam-will-beijing
[Accessed 2 November 2022].
Ottaway, Marina, 2022. ‘Egypt and the Allure of Military Power’. Wilson Center, 21 June. Available
at: https://www.wilsoncenter.org/microsite/8/node/110929 [Accessed 3 November 2022].
Paisley, Richard Kyle, 2017. ‘Why the 11 Countries That Rely on the Nile Need to Reach a River
Deal Soon’. The Conversation, 27 August. Available at: https://theconversation.com/why-the
-11-countries-that-rely-on-the-nile-need-to-reach-a-river-deal-soon-75868 [Accessed 1
November 2022].
Pangea-Risk, 2021. ‘Special Report: Egypt-Ethiopia War Scenarios Over Disputed Blue Nile Dam’.
Pangea-Risk, 10 June. Available at: https://www.pangea-risk.com/special-report-egypt-ethiopia-
war-scenarios-over-disputed-blue-nile-dam/ [Accessed 3 November 2022].
Pasricha, Anjana, 2022. ‘As Crisis-Hit Sri Lanka Counts Cost of Chinese Projects, India Moves to
Recover Influence’. VOA News, 10 June. Available at: https://www.voanews.com/a/as-crisis-hit-
sri-lanka-counts-cost-of-chinese-projects-india-moves-to-recover-influence/6611703.html
[Accessed 2 November 2022].
Pearse‐Smith, Scott W.D., 2012. ‘“Water War” in the Mekong Basin?’. Asia Pacific Viewpoint 53
(2), 147–162.
Peichert, Henrike, 2003. ‘The Nile Basin Initiative: A Catalyst for Cooperation’. In Security and
Environment in the Mediterranean, eds. Hans Günter Brauch, Peter H. Liotta,
Antonio Marquina, Paul F. Rogers and Mohammad El-Sayed Selim, Springer, Berlin,
Germany, 761–774.
Pemunta, Ngambouk Vitalis, Ngo Valery Ngo, Choumbou Raoul Fani Djomo, Sianga Mutola,
Judith Achin Seember, Grace Annih Mbong and Enjeckayang Asomanei Forkim, 2021. ‘The
Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, Egyptian National Security, and Human and Food Security
in the Nile River Basin’. Cogent Social Sciences 7(1), 1875598.
Petersen-Perlman, Jacob, D. Jennifer, C. Veilleux and Aaron T. Wolf, 2017. ‘International Water
Conflict and Cooperation: Challenges and Opportunities’. Water International 42(2), 105–120.
Rabie, Hossam, 2022. ‘Egypt: State Policies Usher in Big Fiefdoms and Debilitate Small Farmers’.
Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung, 22 August. Available at: https://assafirarabi.com/en/47042/2022/08/
22/egypt-state-policies-usher-in-big-fiefdoms-and-debilitate-small-farmers/ [Accessed 2
November 2022].
Reguly, Eric, 2021. ‘Fear Along the Nile: Why Egypt Sees a Massive Dam in Ethiopia as a Matter of
Life and Death’. The Globe and Mail, 3 December. Available at: https://www.theglobeandmail.
com/world/article-why-egypt-sees-a-massive-nile-river-dam-in-ethiopia-as-a-matter-of/
[Accessed 1 November 2022].
Roudi-Fahimi, Farzaneh, Liz Creel and Roger-Mark De Souza, 2000. ‘Finding the Balance:
Population and Water Scarcity in the Middle East and North Africa’. Population Reference
Bureau (PRB), 17 July. Available at: https://www.prb.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/
FindingTheBalance_Eng.pdf [Accessed 2 November 2022].
CONFLICT, SECURITY & DEVELOPMENT 31
Roussi, Antoaneta, 2020. ‘Row Over Giant Nile Dam Could Escalate, Experts Warn’. Nature, 583.
Available at: https://media.nature.com/original/magazine-assets/d41586-020-02124-8/d41586-
020-02124-8.pdf [Accessed 4 November 2022].
Saied, Mohamed, 2022a. ‘Egypt Deepens Military Ties with Sudan as Ethiopia Moves Forward with
Nile Dam’ Al-Monitor, 22 March. Available at: https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2022/03/
egypt-deepens-military-ties-sudan-ethiopia-moves-forward-nile-dam#ixzz7dcvFKkGW
[Accessed 2 November 2022].
Saied, Mohamed, 2022b. ‘Ethiopia Tries to Divide Sudan, Egypt in Talks Over Nile Dam.’ Al-
Monitor, 11 March. Available at: https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2022/03/ethiopia-tries-
divide-sudan-egypt-talks-over-nile-dam [Accessed 23 May 2023].
Saied, Mohamed, 2022c. ‘Sisi Lauds Egyptian Water Conservation Programs as Nile Dam
Progresses’. Al-Monitor, 14 June. Available at: https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2022/06/
sisi-lauds-egyptian-water-conservation-programs-nile-dam-progresses [Accessed 2 November
2022].
Salman, Salman M.A., 2013. ‘The Nile Basin Cooperative Framework Agreement: A Peacefully
Unfolding African Spring?’ Water International 38(1), 17–29.
Salman, Salman M.A., 2016. ‘The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam: The Road to the Declaration
of Principles and the Khartoum Document’. Water International 41(4), 512–527.
Salman, Salman M.A., 2017. ‘The Nile Basin Cooperative Framework Agreement: The Impasse is
Breakable’. Sudan Tribune, 22 June. Available at: https://sudantribune.com/article60989/
[Accessed 18 May 2023].
Sany, Joseph and Thomas P. Sheehy, 2022. ‘Despite High Stakes in Ethiopia, China Sits on the
Sidelines of Peace Efforts’. United States Institute of Peace, 19 January. Available at: https://www.
usip.org/publications/2022/01/despite-high-stakes-ethiopia-china-sits-sidelines-peace-efforts
[Accessed 2 November 2022].
Security Council Report, 2021. ‘Security Council Presidential Statement on the Grand Ethiopian
Renaissance Dam (GERD).’ Security Council Report, 15 September. Available at: https://www.
securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2021/09/security-council-presidential-statement-on-the
-grand-ethiopian-renaissance-dam-gerd.php [Accessed 23 May 2023].
Siddig, Khalid, Mohammed Basheer and Jonas Luckmann, 2020. ‘Long-Term Economy-Wide
Impacts of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on Sudan.’ Economic Research Forum,
Working Paper 1427, November. Available at: https://erf.org.eg/publications/long-term-
economy-wide-impacts-of-the-grand-ethiopian-renaissance-dam-on-sudan-2/ [Accessed 2
November 2022].
SIPRI, Undated. ‘SIPRI Military Expenditure Database’. Available at: https://milex.sipri.org/sipri
[Accessed 4 November 2022].
Smajgl, Alex, John Ward and Lucie Pluschke, 2016. ‘The Water–Food–Energy Nexus–Realising
a New Paradigm’. Journal of Hydrology 533, 533–540.
Sneddon, Chris and Coleen Fox, 2006. ‘Rethinking Transboundary Waters: A Critical
Hydropolitics of the Mekong Basin’. Political Geography 25(2), 181–202.
Starr, Joyce R., 1991. ‘Water Wars’. Foreign Policy 82(1), 17–36.
State Information Service (SIS), 2019. ‘President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi’s Statement at UN General
Assembly 74th Session’. SIS, 25 September. Available at: https://www.sis.gov.eg/Story/141734/
President-Abdel-Fattah-El-Sisi%E2%80%99s-Statement-at-UN-General-Assembly-74th-
Session?lang=en-us [Accessed 3 November 2022].
Staupe-Delgado, Reidar, 2020. ‘The Water–Energy–Food–Environmental Security Nexus: Moving
the Debate Forward’. Environment Development and Sustainability 22(7), 6131–6147.
Sudan Tribune, 2013. ‘Sudan Downplays Negative Impact of Ethiopian Dam Project’. 30 May.
Available at: https://sudantribune.com/article45878/ [Accessed 19 May 2023].
The Sun, 2021. ‘Egypt, Ethiopia, Sudan and the Renaissance Dam’. 9 December. Available at:
https://sunnewsonline.com/egypt-ethiopia-sudan-and-the-renaissance-dam/ [Accessed 19 May
2023].
Sutcliffe, John V., 2009. ‘The Hydrology of the Nile Basin’. In The Nile, ed. Henri J. Dumont,
Springer, Dordrecht, Netherlands, 335–364.
32 R. MATTHEWS AND V. VIVODA
Suter, Margaret, 2016. ‘The Politics of Water: What We Know About the Grand Ethiopian
Renaissance Dam.’ Atlantic Council, 9 February. Available at: https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/
blogs/menasource/the-politics-of-water-what-we-know-about-the-grand-ethiopian-
renaissance-dam/ [Accessed 3 November 2022].
Swain, Ashok, 2002. ‘The Nile River Basin Initiative’. SAIS Review 22(2), 293–308.
Swain, Ashok., 2004. Managing Water Conflict: Asia, Africa and the Middle East. Routledge,
Milton Park, Abingdon, UK.
Tekle, Tesfa-Alem, 2022. ‘Ethiopia Vows to Defend Its Airspace from Any Foreign Attack’. Sudan
Tribune, 15 August. Available at: https://sudantribune.com/article262822/ [Accessed 2
November 2022].
Tekuya, Mahemud, 2020a. ‘Colonial-Era Treaties are to Blame for the Unresolved Dispute Over
Ethiopia’s Dam’. The Conversation, 25 March. Available at: https://theconversation.com/colo
nial-era-treaties-are-to-blame-for-the-unresolved-dispute-over-ethiopias-dam-133538
[Accessed 2 November 2022].
Tekuya, Mahemud, 2020b. ‘The Egyptian Hydro-Hegemony in the Nile Basin: The Quest for
Changing the Status Quo’. The Journal of Water Law 26(1), 10.
Tekuya, Mahemud, 2021. ‘Sink or Swim: Alternatives for Unlocking the Grand Ethiopian
Renaissance Dam Dispute’. Columbia Journal of Transatlantic Law, 5 February. Available at
https://www.jtl.columbia.edu/volume-59/sink-or-swim-alternatives-for-unlocking-the-grand-
ethiopian-renaissance-dam-dispute [Accessed 19 May 2023].
Teshome, B. Wondwosen, 2008. ‘Transboundary Water Cooperation in Africa: The Case of the
Nile Basin Initiative (NBI)’. Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations 7(4), 34–43.
Tir, Jaroslav and Douglas M. Stinnett, 2012. ‘Weathering Climate Change: Can Institutions
Mitigate International Water Conflict?’ Journal of Peace Research 49(1), 211–225.
Toset, Hans, Petter Wollebæk, Nils Petter Gleditsch and Håvard Hegre, 2000. ‘Shared Rivers and
Interstate Conflict’. Political Geography 19(8), 971–996.
Ullendorff, Edward., 1967. ‘The Anglo-Ethiopian Treaty of 1902’. Bulletin of the School of Oriental
& African Studies 30(3), 641–654.
Umbach, Frank, 2022. ‘How China’s Belt and Road Initiative is Faring.’ GIS Report, 8 April.
Available at: https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/belt-road-initiative/ [Accessed 2 November
2022].
United Nations, 2021. ‘Egypt, Ethiopia, Sudan Should Negotiate Mutually Beneficial Agreement
Over Management of Nile Waters, Top Official Tells Security Council’. United Nations Press
Release, 8 July. Available at: https://press.un.org/en/2021/sc14576.doc.htm [Accessed 2
November 2022].
United Nations Development Program (UNDP), 2018. ‘The Next Frontier: Human Development
and the Anthropocene’. UNDP, 2 October. Available at: https://www.undp.org/belarus/publica
tions/next-frontier-human-development-and-anthropocene [Accessed 3 November 2022].
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE), 2022. ‘Water-Food-Energy-
Ecosystem Nexus’. UNECE, 19 October. Available at: https://unece.org/environment-policy
/water/areas-work-convention/water-food-energy-ecosystem-nexus [Accessed 2 November
2022].
United Nations Security Council (UNSC), 2021. ‘Egypt, Ethiopia, Sudan Should Negotiate
Mutually Beneficial Agreement Over Management of Nile Waters, Top Official Tells Security
Council,’ UNSC, 8816th Meeting, 8 July.
United Nations Water (UN-Water), 2013. ‘Water Security and the Global Water Agenda’. United
Nations University, UN-Water Analytical Brief. Available at: https://www.unwater.org/sites/
default/files/app/uploads/2017/05/analytical_brief_oct2013_web.pdf [Accessed 1 November
2022].
Urban, Frauke, Giuseppina Siciliano and Johan Nordensvard, 2018. ‘China’s Dam-Builders: Their
Role in Transboundary River Management in South East Asia’. International Journal of Water
Resources Development 34(5), 747–770.
CONFLICT, SECURITY & DEVELOPMENT 33
Walton, Molly, 2019. ‘Desalinated Water Affects the Energy Equation in the Middle East’.
International Energy Agency, 21 January. Available at: https://www.iea.org/commentaries/desa
linated-water-affects-the-energy-equation-in-the-middle-east [Accessed 3 November 2022].
Wang, Christoph Nedopil, 2022. ‘Brief: China Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) Investment Report
H1 2022.’ Green Finance and Development Center, 24 July. Available at: https://greenfdc.org/
china-belt-and-road-initiative-bri-investment-report-h1-2022/ [Accessed 2 November 2022].
Water Technology, Undated. ‘Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam Project, Benishangul-Gumuz.’
Available at: https://www.water-technology.net/projects/grand-ethiopian-renaissance-dam-
africa/ [Accessed 2 November 2022].
Weinthal, Erika, Neda Zawahri and Jeannie Sowers, 2015. ‘Securitizing Water, Climate, and
Migration in Israel, Jordan, and Syria’. International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law
and Economics 15(3), 293–307.
Wheeler, Kevin G., Marc Jeuland, Jim W. Hall, Edith Zagona and Dale Whittington, 2020.
‘Understanding and Managing New Risks on the Nile with the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance
Dam’. Nature Communications 11(1), 1–9.
Wheeler, Kevin G., Marc Jeuland, Kenneth Strzepek, Jim Hall, Edith Zagona, Gamal Abdo,
Thinus Basson, Don Blackmore, Paul Block and Dale Whittington, 2022. ‘Comment on
‘Egypt’s Water Budget Deficit and Suggested Mitigation Policies for the Grand Ethiopian
Renaissance Dam Filling Scenarios’. Environmental Research Letters 17(8), 0880003.
Widakuswara, Patsy, 2020. ‘No Deal from US-Brokered Nile Talks’. VOA News, 29 February.
Available at: https://www.voanews.com/a/africa_no-deal-us-brokered-nile-dam-talks/6185024.
html [Accessed 2 November 2022].
Woldegebriel, E. G., 2015. ‘How Ethiopia Plans to Become a Clean Energy Exporter’. World
Economic Forum, 20 May. Available at: https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2015/05/how-
ethiopia-plans-to-become-a-clean-energy-exporter/ [Accessed 4 November 2022].
Wolf, Aaron T., 1995. Hydropolitics Along the Jordan River: Scarce Water and Its Impact on the
Arab-Israeli Conflict. United Nations University Press, New York.
Wolf, Aaron T., 1998. ‘Conflict and Cooperation Along International Waterways’. Water Policy 1
(2), 251–265.
Wolf, Aaron T., 1999. ‘“Water Wars” and Water Reality: Conflict and Cooperation Along
International Waterways’. In Environmental Change, Adaptation, and Security, ed.
Steve Lonergan, Springer, Dordrecht, Netherlands, 251–265.
World Bank, Undated. ‘World Bank Open Data’. Available at: https://data.worldbank.org
[Accessed 4 November 2022].
Wuilbercq, Emilie, 2014. ‘Ethiopia’s Nile Dam Project Signals Its Intention to Become an African
Power’. The Guardian, 14 January. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/global-
development/2014/jul/14/ethiopia-grand-renaissance-dam-egypt [Accessed 19 May 2023].
Yihdego, Zeray, Alistair Rieu-Clarke and Ana Elisa Cascão, 2017. The Grand Ethiopian
Renaissance Dam and the Nile Basin: Implications for Transboundary Water Cooperation.
Routledge, Milton Park, Abingdon, UK.
Yohannes, Yihdego, Alamgir Khalil and Hilmi S. Salem, 2017. ‘Nile River’s Basin Dispute:
Perspectives of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD’. Global Journal of Human
Social Sciences 17(2), 1–21.
Zeitoun, Mark., 2011. ‘The Global Web of National Water Security’. Global Policy 2(3), 286–296.
Zeitoun, Mark and Naho Mirumachi, 2008. ‘Transboundary Water Interaction I: Reconsidering
Conflict and Cooperation’. International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and
Economics 8(4), 297–316.
34 R. MATTHEWS AND V. VIVODA
