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1
An inflection point or business as usual? Secessionism as state
contestation in Ukraine
Marc Sanjaume-Calvet, Universitat Pompeu Fabra
1
Lesley-Ann Daniels, University of Oslo
2
, Institut Barcelona d’Estudis Internacionals
Accepted at Global Studies Quarterly
Abstract
Does the Russian war in Ukraine presage a change in the rules of the game for
secessionisms around the globe? In this article we explore how the Russian war in
Ukraine and the contested international order from which it emerges can affect state
contestation and secessionist movements through changing opportunities in the
international order. International recognition plays a crucial role in state creation. The
Great Powers of a given historical moment have the capacity to raise sovereignty
expectations, since having “friends in high places” has been essential to obtaining
statehood, alongside de facto control of the territory. However, the liberal international
order in place since 1945 has given way to a more contested landscape that opens new
opportunities for different recognition patterns, which change how secessionists evaluate
their optimal strategy for state contestation. The effects have already been notable in
conflicts such as Transnistria, South Ossetia, Abkhazia or Kosovo, and many other
1
marc.sanjaume@upf.edu
2
l.a.daniels@stv.uio.no, corresponding author
2
territorial disputes, even “frozen conflicts” over the globe from Western Sahara to
Taiwan. We explore how Russia has created and exploited secessionist claims in eastern
Ukraine to justify military aims in the Russian war in Ukraine. Based on a detailed review
of the evolution of these claims, we draw different scenarios on the potential effects of a
changing world order on state contestation. Our research suggests that the theoretical
understanding of secession and secessionists’ optimal strategies need to be reviewed
taking into account the changing contested international order.
Keywords: state contestation, sovereignty; secessionism; world order; contested
international order; self-determination; recognition; ethnic conflict.
1. Introduction
Three days before launching a large-scale military operation into Ukrainian territory in
February 2022, the Russian President Vladimir Putin justified his planned military
attack in an address to the Russian nation: “I consider it necessary to take a long
overdue decision and to immediately recognise the independence and sovereignty of the
Donetsk People's Republic (DPR) and the Luhansk People's Republic (LPR).”
3
In a
copy of Putin’s strategy eight years earlier in Crimea, the military operation was
presented as a protective “remedial aggression” move over the ethnic Russian
population against Kyiv. However, this time Putin continued his assault, and the
military hostilities over the Donbass territories and other parts of eastern Ukraine turned
3
See: http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/67828
3
in a large-scale armed conflict that is still an ongoing war involving Russia and the
authorities of the two unrecognized republics (DPR and LPR), supported by Belarus,
against Ukraine.
Does Russia’s war in Ukraine presage a change in the rules of the game for
secessionisms around the globe? Could Russia’s exploitation of secessionist and
irredentist arguments change how secession can present itself within the contested
international order, and what effects might Russia’s actions have? The literature on
secessionism has consistently shown how international institutions – as “rules of the
sovereignty game” (Griffiths 2016) – shape secessionist movements’ strategies and
counter-secessionist policies in almost all conflicts (Griffiths 2016; Coggins 2014;
Cunningham 2014). International recognition plays a crucial role in state creation,
which hands a potentially decisive influence to the Great Powers of a given historical
moment (Coggins 2011). The 1945 rules regarding access to the UN gave a prominent
position to the five permanent members of the Security Council as gate-keepers of the
international states system. Moreover, the UN Charter and subsequent UN resolutions
allowed for state formation under certain conditions. The post-war world order shaped
the global map during the decolonization process and the dissolution of the USSR and
Yugoslavia. Achieving internationally recognized statehood equated to overcoming the
permanent members’ veto power (Griffiths and Muro 2020).
In its turn, statehood is extremely dependent on international norms and patterns
of behaviour vis-à-vis potential sovereignty challenges. The change from the liberal
international order in place since 1945 to a more contested landscape has changed the
opportunities for secession. In this context, we look at Russia’s use of secessionist
claims in the war in Ukraine. We explore whether the dynamics in Ukraine signal a shift
in the patterns of contestation around secessionism and the potential reverberations of
4
this conflict on other secessionist disputes, an impact mediated by its disruption of the
international patterns of recognition (Coggins 2011; 2014; Cunningham 2014; Ker-
Lindsay 2012).
The Russian war in Ukraine might be a watershed moment in a transforming
(post)liberal international order. The case analysis provided in this article not only gives
salience to the potential transformations within the field of state contestation, but also
on the ramifications of these events for the international order itself. We present the
dynamics described in the article as a potential confirmation of a historical shift in
recognition patterns among Great Powers, a shift first anticipated in Kosovo and later
confirmed in the cases of Ukrainian territories annexed by Putin’s government. Our
contribution is twofold since we simultaneously address the specific effects on
secessionism and state contestation of the Russian war in Ukraine, but at the same time
we analyse its implications in the wider context of the international order.
The article proceeds as follows: first, we address the importance of the international
institutions and recognition to explain the behaviour of secessionists and counter
secessionists. Second, we add some contextual information on the Russian war in
Ukraine to trace the use of secessionist justifications. Third, we discuss the implications
of the impact of the war on international norms and, especially, on recognition and
examine possible impacts on secessionist conflicts in the future.
Our main findings are presented at three levels of analysis, that is norms, principles
and international order. We observe that a careful analysis of the events of the Russian
war in Ukraine in relation with state contestation, shows how international norms on
self-determination are more and more distanced from realpolitik. Moreover, the
principle of self-determination is paradoxically eroded by its own enunciation as a
remedial principle. Finally, we contend that the fragmentation trends and state
5
contestation dynamics might increase in the coming years, with destabilizing effects for
the contested international order. These findings are a useful guide for future analysis on
the prospects of secessionist conflicts around the world.
2. Literature & Theory
The literature on secessionism and state contestation has experienced a boom during the
last years (Sanjaume‐Calvet 2020; Requejo and Sanjaume-Calvet 2021; Vidmar,
McGibbon, and Raible 2022; Griffiths, Pavković, and Radan 2023; Ninet 2023). In this
section, we focus on three crucial aspects of secessionism and state contestation to
analyse the potential impact of the Russian war in Ukraine on these phenomena: the
strategic dimension of contestation, the role of recognition, and different types of
secessionism. Therefore, this section draws on secondary literature to sketch out the
common features of secessionism in the post 1945 order. In the next section we will
then assess how much the Russian war in Ukraine signals a potential sea change in the
dynamics of secessionism.
2.1. The strategic dimension of contestation
The creation of a new state, in absence of terra nullius, is only possible by the
fragmentation of an existing political entity.
4
The secession of a particular territory and
its population from an existing state has a number of particular implications when
compared with other potential non-exclusive causes of state emergence, such as
dissolution (USSR) or partition (Czechoslovakia).
4
The causes of state fragmentation are multiple and reach beyond the scope of this article but see Tilly
1975; Horowitz 2000; Jackson 2013; Coggins 2014; Griffiths 2016 for further discussion.
6
Pavkovic and Radan define secession as “the creation of a new state by the
withdrawal of a territory and its population where that territory was previously part of
an existing state” (2013, 5). This definition, although it contains the basic elements of a
secession, can be further qualified in at least three aspects. First, the seceding population
and territory are normally a smaller portion (a minority) vis-à-vis the host state and in a
geographically peripheral position. Cases such as Flanders, representing roughly half of
the Belgian territory and population, are a rarity and in case of success would rather
represent a case of partition of the country. Second, the withdrawal of territory is
normally (almost universally) opposed by the host state. In fact, some authors define
secession as a process against the will of the state authorities (Crawford 2006, 375).
Third, (part of) the population of the seceding territory normally shares a distinct
identity, either ethnic, linguistic, or religious, that fuels the secession movement;
nationalism and distinctiveness are the leading force behind secessionist movements
(Moore 1998; Sorens 2012; Sambanis, Germann, and Schädel 2018).
All these characteristics make secession, and state contestation in general, a very
complex process and dependent on more than one variable. For the moment, in this
subsection, we refer to secessionism and secessionist conflict as a form of state
contestation within an existing state. Nonetheless, things become more complex when
we introduce the role of a third actor into the equation. Rather than a domestic process,
or a two-player process (seceding unit and host state), almost universally any secession
dispute involves at least two intertwined arenas, domestic and international, with
multiple actors in each one. Horowitz affirms that “whether a secessionist movement
succeeds is determined by the balance of forces and interests that extend beyond the
state” (1985, 230). This observation is crucial to understand the importance of
recognition in state contestation and the choice of strategies by the seceding party.
7
Achieving statehood is the result of a combination of two complementary factors
that can occur at different points in time: effectiveness over the territory by the seceding
authorities and international recognition. In order to achieve independence, secessionist
movements often not only need to exercise de facto sovereignty over the territory but
also have “friends in high places” (Coggins 2011) assuring them of acceptance from the
international community.
5
In this context, a first strategy is the use of unilateral
referendums as a strategic device showing the legitimacy of the sovereignty demand
(Kelle and Sienknecht 2020; Sanjaume-Calvet 2021). In fact, during the break-up of
Yugoslavia from 1991-1993, the Arbitration Commission of the Peace Conference on
Yugoslavia (Badinter Commission) recommended the use of referendums, together with
the principle of uti possedetis juris, as a sine qua non condition to internationally
recognize the former Yugoslavian republics (Pellet 1992; Kohen 2006).
The interplay between effectiveness and recognition does not occur in a vacuum
but neither in a clear legal path. A second strategy is to convince the domestic and
international audience of the justification for their actions. As Crawford has stated,
under international law “secession is neither legal nor illegal in international law, but a
legally neutral act, the consequences of which are regulated internationally.” (2006,
390). The post-1945 international order is based on peoples’ right to self-determination
(article 2.1) and outlaws the use of force by one state against another (article 2.4).
Therefore, seceding authorities refer to justifications based on individual rights,
democracy and the concept of self-determination. In this, they are often stymied at the
domestic level. Beyond cases of decolonization, in international law secession is only
5
For this reason, contenders to the state often have active foreign diplomacy campaigns. See for example
Huang (2016).
8
permissible either with the host state’s consent. Political willingness is non-existent
from the part of the host state authorities in most of the cases. Seceding authorities also
face constitutional firewalls since most constitutions forbid, in one way or another, the
dismemberment of the national territory, and liberal democracies are not an exception
(Weill 2018; Sanjaume-Calvet 2022).
A further category of post-colonial successful secessions are those permitted in
international law due to extreme cases of human rights violations or military occupation
(Kohen 2006; Crawford 2006). A third strategy is therefore to appeal to both the
domestic and international audience, on one level, by trying to persuade their host state
to allow them to secede and on the other level, by circumventing the rejection from
central authorities through international pressure and legitimacy of their demands.
6
These demands are generally formulated from a remedialist perspective, claiming that
secession is existential to escape genocide or human rights violations. The
independence process of East Timor is a case in point and remedial secession was also
used to justify Kosovo’s separation from Serbia. In such a strategy, seceding authorities
denounce grievances to gain some traction from the international audience, despite its
doubtful practical effectiveness (Buchanan 1997, Kartsonaki 2020). The bar is high,
since the ultimate goal, an application for UN membership, has to be supported by 60%
of the Security Council before being approved by the General Assembly (by at least
two-thirds) but, most importantly, it can be vetoed by any of the Security Council five
permanent members (Griffiths 2020, 3).
6
This strategy has parallels with the transnational advocacy networks discussed by Keck and Sikkink
(1999).
9
As we discuss in subsection section 2.3, secessionism is generally distinguished
from a sibling concept, irredentism. The latter is normally described as a transfer of
sovereignty of a certain portion of territory to another state rather than a form of state
creation. As we will argue, secessionism can easily be transformed into a potential case
of irredentism. This transformation, which might present different characteristics
depending on the context, is crucial to understanding the involvement of third parties, as
neighbouring states, in a territorial conflict. The intervention of neighbouring states is
normally related to ethnic kinship, geopolitical interests related to state contestation and
imperialistic behaviours, as in the case of Russia in Ukraine. When this phenomenon is
fostered by a Great Power, as Russia, it has deep implications for the stability and
continuity of the international order.
The case addressed in this article reminds us that UN membership is not always the
goal in secessionist conflicts. The strategies mentioned in this section and the
interaction between effectiveness and recognition remain the defining element, even if
the final objective may not be exactly an internationally recognised state. Nonetheless,
the potential irredentist transformation of some conflicts make them more prone to
modify the international order and the patterns of state contestation. A key element is
recognition, as we will see in the following subsection. Recognition patterns have to be
analysed in order to understand how these conflicts work and potentially erode existing
international order patterns involving Great Powers.
2.2. How does recognition work?
All in all, in this “sovereignty game” (Griffiths 2020) that implies contesting the host
state at domestic and international arenas, recognition is a crucial factor for achieving
statehood and/or destabilizing neighbouring countries through irredentist claims
10
(Krasner 1999; Sterio 2015). But how does recognition work? What are the patterns
explaining recognition in secessionist and irredentist disputes? Coggins (2011; 2014)
has consistently argued in favour of abandoning domestic explanations of statehood in
institutionalist and international law perspectives, which “assert that states embody the
fundamental qualities prescribed by Montevideo. Because laws reflect shared sets of
norms and practices, governments generally obey them. Consequently, the Montevideo
criteria should accurately characterize new states” (2011, 447). Instead, she conceives
the international system of states as a “social organization” (Coggins 2011, 448).
7
Similarly, Griffiths refers to the states’ attitude to international system membership over
the aspirant regions as a “club-like” behaviour (2020, 3) and Siroky et al (2021) adopt a
similar approach by testing the role of competition among Great Powers in unilateral
secessions recognition. That is precisely the link between a domestic dispute and its
potentiality of changing international patterns by understanding the dynamics with a
focus on the big picture of states as a “social organization” rather than on the domestic
conflict.
The reasons and explanations of recognition patterns correspond to the
inherently social nature of the international community. States have several reasons to
control the proliferation of other states, since states are self-interested actors ultimately
protecting their own benefits (and survival) (Waltz 1979; Krasner 1999; Caspersen
7
By “Montevideo”, Coggins refers to the “Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States” an
international treaty that dates back 1933 in the context of the International Conference of American States.
The Montevideo Convention codified the declaratory theory of statehood setting the criteria of legitimate
statehood as customary international law. The first article of the treaty states that a state as a person in
international law should possess: (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and
(d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states.
See: https://www.jus.uio.no/english/services/library/treaties/01/1-02/rights-duties-states.xml
11
2012). The UN mandates the territorial integrity of its members, and since 1945 UN
member states have consistently acted in cases of decolonization and consensual
secessions, recognizing all the states that have emerged under these two circumstances
(Pavković 2019, 162). However, UN member states have been less consistent in
recognizing states resulting from unilateral processes. The literature points to a number
of characteristics that govern the states’ behaviour towards recognition.
First, states prefer status quo and stability in the absence of agreement on
recognition in a particular case. There is a general presumption in favour of the status
quo that directly stems from the potential problems associated with border changes.
States are aware of the privileges of their status (being a state) and therefore do not aim
to unnecessarily increase the existent number of states, as this would reduce their share
of influence in the UN and other international organizations. Furthermore, precedents of
secession can encourage potential border changes that can give rise to new challenges
from other states or even from within their own state. Therefore, states are generally
very conservative. As the former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali stated in
the UN Agenda for Peace: “The United Nations has not closed its door. Yet if every
ethnic, religious or linguistic group claimed statehood, there would be no limit to
fragmentation, and peace, security and economic well-being for all would become ever
more difficult to achieve.” (Boutros-Ghali and Secretary-General 1992, 18).
Second, states do not act alone when it comes to recognition, they often
coordinate and follow the pattern of the Great Powers (Coggins 2011, 451). In fact, the
role of the Great Powers is crucial to understand the patterns of recognition among
states, even though this prerogative remains a sovereign decision of each state. The
common concern for stability often leads states to coordinate when it comes to
recognition, although this might not happen in a horizontal coordination scheme.
12
Contested states with numerous international recognitions but without UN membership,
such as Palestine (UN permanent observer), Western Sahara or Kosovo, share the
characteristic of being recognized by at least one Great Power. In fact, Kosovo is a
recent example of this coordination behaviour and a reminder that coordination can be
partial. Kosovo is a state that emerged from a non-consensual process, that has not been
recognized by its former parent state (Serbia), and is still not able to achieve UN
membership – Russia and China would vote against – but has been recognized by most
of the UN members (101) and notably was first recognized by the US, France and UK
(Caspersen 2015). By contrast, Taiwan has around 13 international recognitions but
without any Great Power among them - the US recognized the country until 1979, but
then switched its policy, disincentivizing potential further recognitions from other
states.
Finally, even though states have very strong reasons to refrain from recognizing
aspirant members of the international community – outside the colonial or consensual
secessions – they might have motivations for recognition under certain circumstances.
A glimpse into their actual behaviour shows that states often do recognize aspirants
based on their own interests. Security plays a crucial role in explaining recognitions.
From an external perspective, states might consider the recognition of other states to
destabilize their enemies, which reflects the argument that states delegate actors outside
their territory to undermine their rivals (Salehyan, Gleditsch and Cunningham 2011;
Byman 2013). In the same way, states with strong internal secessionist movements are
less sympathetic of creating precedents of unilateral secessions in order to not
encourage internal secessionisms, and may use stronger repression policies against
secessionists to protect their reputation (Walter 2006). It is not a surprise that, among
the EU member states, Spain, Slovakia, Cyprus, Romania, and Greece, which each face
13
domestic territorial challenges, are the only five states that do not recognize Kosovo.
Other factors that can influence states’ behaviour regarding their decision to recognize
are related to the hierarchy mentioned above and competition among Great Powers. In
their study on Kosovo, Siroky et al (2021) found that military and economic ties (arms
sales and investments) from the US and Russia were good predictors of recognition (or
non-recognition).
2.3. Unilateral secessionisms and irredentism
Recognition plays a crucial role in secessionisms as we have shown and irredentist
claims are frequently central to the dynamics of secessionism. The Russian war in
Ukraine has its point of departure in these dynamics in the Eastern part of the country
which started in the region of Crimea in 2014, as we argue in the next subsection.
Pavkovic (2019) makes sense of their relationship by defining a variety of unilateral
secessions, those without the consent of the parent state (as opposed to consensual
secessions) and relates them to external recognition as a tool to grant security or
promote division in third states borders, among which two broad types can be
summarized:
a) Unilateral secessions with external support: secessions created through military
intervention, such as the cases of Bangladesh (1971); Northern Cyprus (1974);
Kosovo (1999) and South Ossetia (2008). In all these four states, a process of
unilateral secession culminated with direct military help from a third actor
(India, Turkey, US, and Russia, respectively) although only Bangladesh
succeeded in entering the UN.
14
b) Unilateral secessions carried out by secessionists alone: unilateral secessions
without direct external military intervention, such as the cases of Biafra (1967);
Chechnya (1991); Nagorno-Karabakh /Artsakh (1992); and Tamil Eilam (1990).
In these cases, none of them has obtained relevant international recognitions.
However, in other cases such as Norway (1905), Ireland (1919) or Eritrea
(1961), unilateral secessions have later been transformed through peaceful or
violent means into consensual secessions. Unilateral secessions can also end in
state dissolution rather than a consensual process, as in the cases of Slovenia
(1991) and Croatia (1991).
These categories could be complemented with the role of irredentism in fostering ethnic
kinship beyond state borders and even openly challenging existing borders for security
and identarian reasons. Irredentism is normally conceptualized as a different
phenomenon from secessionism, since it normally means a “claim to transfer” territory
from one state to another as, for example, when the territories that formerly belonged to
the Austro-Hungarian empire in Switzerland are called “Italia irredenta” (Pavkovic and
Radan 2013, 9). However, Woodwell (2022) highlights that irredentism can be closer to
secessionism than often thought. In some cases, irredentism implies simply a state
taking territory from another state, such as Hitler’s annexation of the Sudetenland, while
in other, more numerous, cases there is a procedure named “stealth-irredentism”, which
is “longer-term, dynamic efforts by homeland countries to support secession in a
territory with the (often vague) goal of annexing a region under more favorable
international circumstances if independence of the region can be achieved” (Woodwell
2022, 419). Irredentism introduces a third actor, the irredentist state, which may have its
own interests and motivations for promoting the transfer of territory.
15
3. The use of secessionism in the Russian war in Ukraine
Secession has an important role in the justification of the Russian war in Ukraine since
its recent origins in 2014 with the irredentism and annexation of Crimea by Russia,
presented as a secessionist claim by the Crimeans (Catala 2015; Suteu and Roznai
2015). To understand the nature of the dispute and the Russian opportunistic use (and
shaping) of these claims, it is necessary to trace back the recent development of the war
and the creation and exploitation of secessionist and irredentist movements in eastern
Ukraine.
8
Moreover, to grasp the potential consequences of the conflict, it is also
important to analyse the precise evolution of these territorial tensions, as well as how
Putin has been using them both in his discourse and realpolitik.
We argue that by understanding the conflict through the lens of secessionist and
irredentist dynamics, related to recognition patterns, we can reconstruct its implications
for state contestation and international order trends. Our analysis of the war focuses on
the events related to secessionist claims and the subsequent annexation of Ukrainian
territories by Russian military forces. By seeing these events through the literature
summarised in the previous sections, we can discuss later to what extent this war might
result in a more global change in the liberal interventionist order, Great Power
coordination and the international erosion of the self-determination principle.
3.1. Secessionism and irredentism from Crimea to Donbass
Besides historical explanations, the ongoing military conflict between Russia and
Ukraine began with an irredentist move by Russia in 2014 when, in the context of a
8
We highlight that the norms of self-determination is deep-rooted in Ukraine, since it was the Ukrainian
delegation at the 1918 Brest-Litovsk conference who were some of the first to formulate this principle to
justify the independence of their country facing the Bolshevik forces (Chernev 2011).
16
deep political turmoil after the Euromaidan protests (Shveda and Park 2016) that ousted
the pro-Russian government of the president Viktor Yanukovych, military forces from
Russian government – so-called “little green men” because of their lack of official
identification – took control of the Crimean peninsula (Suteu and Roznai 2015).
Following military occupation, the Russian forces installed a pro-Russian government
in the region that organized a unilateral referendum on 16 March 2014 on joining
Crimea to the Russian federation (Tierney 2015; Vidmar 2015), and claimed a large
majority of votes in agreement. The following day, the Parliament of Crimea asked the
Russian federation to be admitted as a republic. President Putin issued a decree that
recognized Crimea as an independent state and on 18 March the leaderships of Crimea
and Russia signed a treaty whereby Crimea was annexed into the Russian federation.
Putin justified the Russian actions in Crimea from a remedialist perspective, claiming
that the new regime in Ukraine were “nationalists, neo-Nazis, Russophobes and anti-
Semites” who had used “terror, murder [and] pogroms”, besides introducing “a
scandalous law on the revision of the language policy, which directly violated the rights
of the national minority”, though there was no evidence of threats against them (France
24 2014).
Irredentist claims are not only domestic but also international, but international
recognition for the change of borders was not forthcoming. The UN Security Council
condemned it by 13 votes to one, with China voting against, but the draft resolution,
sponsored by 42 countries, was vetoed by Russia. The General Assembly declared the
referendum illegal and reaffirmed Ukraine’s borders in Resolution 68/262 by 100 votes
to 11 against,
9
with 58 abstentions. In many cases, states referred to their domestic
9
Armenia, Belarus, Bolivia, Cuba, Nicaragua, North Korea, Russia, Sudan, Syria, Venezuela and
Zimbabwe voted against.
17
parallels with self-determination as justification for their vote. For example, Argentina
abstained and drew comparisons with the sovereignty dispute in the Malvinas Islands.
By contrast, the unrecognized states of Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia
and Transnistria drew on arguments relevant for themselves, referring to the right of a
territory to decide its fate, and all supported the referendum.
A few months later, in a copy-cat move, the self-proclaimed administrations of
the Donetsk and Luhansk Republics in eastern Ukraine carried out referendums on 11
May 2014 in many towns under their control. However, in this case the regional
authorities did not ask for annexation but for popular support for sovereignty. They
followed the strategy of unilateral referendums to indicate levels of support that would
justify their right to separation. The reported results in favour of independence were
followed by two simultaneous declarations of independence, while a counter-
referendum was held by Ukrainian-controlled forces in the province of Dnipropetrovsk
(west of Donetsk). As before, international support was not granted and these
referendums and the status of the regions were not recognized by the international
community. Interestingly, while the Russian government acknowledged the results of
the referendums, it did not recognize the regions, and only South Ossetia, the break-
away de facto state in Georgia, recognized the newly proclaimed republics. The
existence of the Donetsk and Luhansk Republics, initially aiming to confederate
between them, rapidly evolved into a low-intensity frozen conflict with separatist forces
supported covertly by Russian troops. For almost eight years, the Republics remained as
de facto entities, a situation that was certified by the 12 February 2015 Minsk II
agreements sponsored by France and Germany that meant a more durable ceasefire and
promised decentralisation to the secessionist leaders in exchange of the regions’
reintegration into Ukraine.
18
The situation totally changed in February 2022, when Russia decided to launch a
large-scale military operation to invade Ukraine. Again, it is not the aim of this article to
cover the whole development of the conflict in Ukraine, but rather to focus on its
relationship with secessionism and recognition. The Russian invasion had profound
implications for the territorial dispute that had been more or less “frozen” since the
independence proclamations in 2014. The fate of these territories evolved in different
phases. First, the Russian justification of its invasion in eastern Ukraine was based on
the territorial dispute and its historical meaning in the relationship between Ukraine and
Russia (since Lenin and the 1918 Brest-Litovsk conference). Putin justified the military
invasion in his 21 February 2022 speech as a special operation aiming to protect the
ethnic Russian population, attempting to validate the irredentist move with arguments
about rights. He referred to the Donbass in the following terms, to present the operation
as a just cause: “[these people] are fighting for their elementary right to live on their
own land, to speak their own language, and to preserve their culture and traditions.”
10
Second, in the same speech, Putin announced the recognition of the two de facto
republics of Donetsk and Luhansk, which he had not done after the unilateral
declarations of independence eight years previously. After the recognition by Russia,
Abkhazia, the de facto state in Georgia, gave recognition on the 25 February 2022, and
Syria and North Korea followed some months later. On 24 February 2022, Russia
invaded Ukraine.
The military campaign was not the rapid victory that Russia seems to have
anticipated. The initial target was to occupy Kyiv and take control of Ukraine. Instead,
Russian troops were pushed back and a militarized standoff was reached in the autumn
10
See: http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67828
19
of 2022. In the absence of military success, in September 2022, Putin turned to political
measures and the exploitation of secessionist referendums. Despite not having full
control over the territories of Donetsk and Luhansk, the Russian authorities organized
two annexation referendums in these regions, thus exploiting the justification of the
concept of self-determination and the strategy of using a referendum to indicate popular
levels of support. The questions were similar in both cases “Do you approve of the
Donetsk/Luhansk People's Republic being incorporated into the Russian Federation
with subject rights of the Russian Federation?” The referendums were criticized for
many procedural irregularities, including high levels of militarization. The reported
results of the vote showed a majority result for annexation and these referendums were
then replicated in the regions of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia. In the following days, Putin
annexed the four regions to the Russian federation.
As before, there was no international recognition. The UN Security Council declared
the referendums and the annexation illegal. Here, we see the importance of the Great
Powers, since Russia used its membership of the Security Council to veto this
resolution. The UN General Assembly condemned in the ES/11-04 Resolution both the
referendums and the annexation, stating “the unlawful actions of the Russian Federation
with regard to the illegal so-called referendums held from 23 to 27 September 2022 in
parts of the Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia regions of Ukraine that, in
part, are or have been under the temporary military control of the Russian Federation,
and the subsequent attempted illegal annexation of these regions, have no validity under
international law and do not form the basis for any alteration of the status of these
regions of Ukraine.”
11
The resolution was passed by 143 countries voting for, 5 against,
11
See: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3990673?ln=en
20
and 35 abstaining.
12
The current situation of war makes the fate of these territories
unpredictable, but Russian authorities have repeatedly referred to their plans to hold
other annexation referendums in occupied territories in Ukraine.
3.2. A change in the Russian strategy?
The role of secessionism in the Russian strategy has substantially evolved from the
Crimean conflict to the current situation. In fact, zooming out, an analysis of the use of
recognition and unilateral secessionism in the Russian “nearby territories” allows for a
better understanding of these changes.
The irredentist narrative has long-dominated Russian narratives, and references
to the “historical Russia” have been a commonplace since the fall of the USSR, even
though the real geographical boundaries remain unclear (Girvin 2023). Rotaru (2022)
argues that there is a common narrative used by Russian authorities in the Georgian war
(2008), the annexation of Crimea (2014) and the Donbass region (2022). When
compared to 1990s conflicts, the “new” discourse incorporates humanitarian and
historical “(in)justice” to ethnic Russians narratives to justify military operations to both
domestic and international audiences (Rotaru 2022, 94). Nonetheless, the modus
operandi has somehow evolved. What in Georgia (2008) and other contexts was a
military and logistic support to de facto secessionism, has evolved in Ukraine into a
more sophisticated approach. While in Crimea the territory was declared sovereign and
annexed, in the Donbass region de facto secessionism, sponsored from Moscow,
preceded the large-scale military operation of annexation. In some sense, the “new”
12
Belarus, Nicaragua, North Korea, Russia and Syria voted against.
21
strategy uses secessionism as a previous step of annexation and is closer to the 1956 and
1968 Soviet invasions (Rotaru 2022, 99).
In the legitimation discourse of Russian actions, the role of the responsibility to
protect (ethnic Russians) and the principle of self-determination appear more and more
frequently in the post-2008 scenario. In fact, the Kosovo secession precedent is
repeatedly cited by Putin. The Georgian invasion was already presented as a
“peacekeeping” operation aiming to protect ethnic Russian population from Tiblisi, and
the recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia independences were already supported
by the Kosovo precedent (Rotaru and Troncotă 2017, 4). In Crimea, Putin even pushed
further the comparison with Kosovo by stating that “while Prishtina declared its
independence by parliamentary decision alone, in Crimea, people held a referendum and
‘its results were simply stunning’” (Rotaru and Troncotă 2017, 8). Again, in the recent
large-scale invasion in Ukraine, while violating Ukrainian territorial integrity and
statehood, the former Russian president Medvedev justified the recognition of Donetsk
and Luhansk Republics: “Let’s put it mildly: our country doesn’t care about the G7’s
non-recognition of the new borders [of Ukraine]; what matters is the true will of the
people living there. Do not forget the Kosovo precedent, our Western friends, (…)”.
13
4. Discussion: Potential implications and scenarios
Is the Russian war in Ukraine an inflexion point or business as usual? How will these
events shape the role of recognition in self-determination conflicts? Since this is still an
ongoing conflict at the time of writing, our intuitions can only be preliminary and
13
See: https://tass.com/world/1451025
22
subject to revision as the conflict evolves. We focus on the external dimension of the
conflict, although the development of the war can also be framed as the latest chapter of
Russo-Ukrainian historical relations (Kordan 2022; Szpak 2022). From an international
relations perspective, the Russian invasion of Ukraine represents both a continuity and a
novelty. It is a continuity in the sense of the current situation being a new proof of the
expansionist-nationalist strategy of Russian authorities since the 2008 Georgian war,
and a novelty meaning an explicit challenge to the international liberal order (Özsu
2015; Mulligan 2022). Some global implications have already been discussed in the
literature section and relate to the different understandings of the liberal order to reflect
on its nature (Ikenberry 2012) and the war as a threat to the “collective West”.
14
We
speculate that the conflict might affect recognition patterns and self-determination
conflicts in several ways.
First, as has been observed since the Crimean case, the Russian invasion in
Ukraine exploits the evolution of the formal international liberal system rules into a
liberal interventionist order based on individual rights, humanitarianism, choice and
democracy justifications (Özsu 2015, 439) that popularizes the use of self-determination
and unilateral independence referendums, much more frequent in the last decades
(Sanjaume-Calvet 2021), as a sort of plebiscitarian means for controlling new territory.
Krisch already anticipated this possibility after the Crimean referendum in 2014: “The
more formal classical rules have come under pressure by arguments from democracy
(recognizing the continued relevance of a democratic government in exile), from rights
(of individuals threatened by a crisis, calling for protection and intervention) and from
liberal conceptions of political choice (the right to secede as an exercise of self-
14
See: https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2022/07/07/the-consequences-of-russias-invasion-of-
ukraine-for-international-security-nato-and-beyond/index.html
23
determination). As these rules become more elastic, they provide openings for abuse,
and they more easily provide cover for the interventionist practices of powerful
countries. Softening limitations on force, albeit for the sake of important values, always
risks putting us on a slippery slope, and it might make the constraining effect of
international law in this area – weak as it is in the first place – only weaker” (Krisch
2014).
Second, a long-term effect, first initiated by the intervention and partial
recognition of Kosovo, might be a more profound divide in the patterns of Great
Powers coordination when recognizing (or ignoring) de facto states. The trends
described in the first section of coordination dynamics when it comes to recognition
could exacerbate partial recognitions and the proliferation of de facto states without UN
membership. This could lead to a more fragmented and less structured “liberal
interventionist order” order in which non-recognized and partially recognized political
units gain control over territories with the protection of one Great Power.
Third, the erosion of the concept of self-determination, used in a cynical way and
as a strategic and offensive device rather than as a solution to territorial disputes, can
have implications in the future. On the one hand, in the lines advanced by Krisch (2014)
in the Crimean context, this can mean a proliferation of the use of democratic principle
and a more “liberal” understanding of self-determination demands with all the potential
destabilization of these uses. On the other hand, the constant invocation of the “Kosovo
precedent” might reinforce the “strategic game” described in the first section. Both third
states and secessionists can take advantage of the precedents of unilateral secession and
disrespect for the territorial integrity of Ukraine as potential de facto or militarized
solutions to their conflicts. The “de facto playbook” defined by the latest Russian moves
could be replicated in the post-Soviet space to reinforce the Russian influence in ethnic
24
Russian territories such as Transnistria (Moldova) or even in the Baltic Republics.
15
These potential actions have motivated demands for a more coherent approach to de
facto authorities by the UN and a monitoring of these cases instead of the current case-
by-case treatment.
16
Fourth, the inconsistent and/or cynical use of remedialism to justify secession
has also meant a confirmation of the weakness and political nature of remedial self-
determination in practice (Vidmar 2010; Kartsonaki 2020; Sanjaume‐Calvet 2020; Azizi
and Karami 2022). For example, the comparison between the repeated Russian support
to Syrian repression of the Kurdish minority and its policies of Arabisation contrasts
with the justification of the Ukrainian invasion as supporting a remedial secession of the
Russian ethnic minority on the grounds of their repression from Kyiv.
17
In fact,
determining remedial secessionism cannot be done from a position of complete
objectivity; because of geopolitical rivalry, we’re likely to see less consensus around
what counts as an illegitimate case of remedial secession.
Finally, we can reflect on the actors’ perspective of the consequences of the current
geopolitical situation. What might the consequences of Russian war in Ukraine be for
different actors? For aspiring secessionists, the path to independence is likely rockier as
secessionist claims have been debased. Unilateral referendums are more likely to be
seen as a political tool and results are more likely to be questioned. In this context,
processes will become more important, and it may be that secessionists put more effort
into building support for recognition prior to taking any steps toward secession, with the
15
See: https://www.ponarseurasia.org/the-changing-de-facto-state-playbook-from-opportunism-to-
strategic-calculation/
16
See: https://theglobalobservatory.org/2023/01/does-the-un-need-a-more-coherent-approach-toward-de-
facto-authorities/
17
See: https://opiniojuris.org/2022/04/25/the-violations-of-sovereignty-and-the-right-to-self-
determination-in-rojava-and-ukraine/
25
prime goal a consensual referendum from the parent state. The recent developments in
some Western secessionisms, as in Scotland and Catalonia, suggest that the current
international norm is a reinforcement of host-state consent to secession as a requirement
for any application of the self-determination principle and a stronger constitutional-
legalistic approach to the right to hold an independence referendum.
18
Regarding the
Great Powers, the post-liberal order gives rise to an opportunity space for contested
states, making recognition more important. It is likely that alliances of recognition will
fluctuate and fracture. State entities are likely to be seen as more rigid and non-
negotiable, to prevent cascading copy-cat attempts to redraw borders.
5. Conclusions
The cynical use by Russia of secessionism within regions in Ukraine to move forward
with its plans for annexation has changed the context for secessionism. Existing
secessionist movements and de facto states will likely have a harder time asserting
credibility, while for future claims there will be an increased assumption that Great
Power patrons are a proactive and not simply reactive force and are driven by their own
interests, with the result that internal justifications will be attributed less weight.
This is a potential confirmation of a historical shift in state contestation and in
recognition patterns among Great Powers in a (post)liberal international order. The first
instances of this novel trend were signalled by the Kosovo case more than a decade ago.
Since then, the distance between the principles contained in international norms (UN
18
While Spain took a very restrictive approach to Catalan demands of self-determination since the
beginning of the movement (López and Sanjaume-Calvet 2020), the UK Supreme Court recently judged
unconstitutional any attempt to hold a non-consensual referendum in Scotland. See:
https://www.supremecourt.uk/cases/uksc-2022-0098.html
26
Charter, Resolution 1514, Resolution 2625) and states’ recognition practices have been
evolving into a more diverse set of constituencies of legitimacy (see Megan Price’s
article in this special issue) from which alternative normativity is constructed.
In a nutshell, the gap between norms and the realpolitik of recognition and the
tensions between different interpretations of the principle of self-determination had
always been observable in contested cases such as East Pakistan (now Bangladesh)
(1971), Biafra (1967) or Katanga (1960). However, in the current international scenario
the gap is now widened and reinforced by a proactive production of narratives that
legitimate actions out of the scope of international law. The erosion of the self-
determination principle is paradoxically fuelled by remedial, liberal, democratic and
humanitarian arguments simultaneously, hand-in-hand with violations of the principles
of territorial integrity and non-intervention often defined by ethnic territorial
demarcations. The “age of secession” (Griffiths 2016) might be accelerated in the
future, but instead of creating new UN member states could foster the emergence of
more contested entities, borders and contested international norms.
Acknowledgements:
We thank Lucas Knotter and Megan Price for helpful comments.
27
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