The Pursuit of Japan and China's Rivalry and Soft Diplomatic Strategy towards South and Southeast Asia: Importance of Bangladesh

Abstract

After former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe paid a visit to ten ASEAN countries in 2013, Japan emphasized increasing its visibility in the Southeast Asian region. Considering China's steadily expanding influence in the region, a country like Bangladesh, which serves as a connecting link between South and Southeast Asia, will be considered sincerely for membership in the ASEAN. As the result of Sino-Japanese rivalry, Japan and other powerful nations introduced FOIP, AUKUS, CTPP, and QUAD as countermeasures to China's BRI and RCEP to establish its image as a liberal, the alternative partner of China and a credible security provider of this region. The Southeast Asian nations have significantly contributed to assisting Japan in this regard. In contrast, the Chinese loan-making initiatives are receiving rejection by the Southeast Asian community as they are considered a debt trap diplomacy aimed at influencing the least developed countries. In contrast, being a reliable partner for the Southeast Asian region throughout the years, Japan has advocated for its international trade relations to be reinforced by more substantial defense negotiations involving the USA with the ASEAN nations to prevail in maritime security in the Southeast Asian nations. Considering Bangladesh, a geopolitically important area, Japan and China have been trying to offer assistance in multiple sectors, such as infrastructure, projects, education, advanced transport, and technology. In this study, the researcher will conduct a comparative analysis highlighting Bangladesh's significance as a Southeast Asian nation following qualitative methodology resulting in some recommendations for Bangladesh to strategically balance its relationship with Japan and China while focusing on economic development.

Full text

The Pursuit of Japan and China’s Rivalry and Soft Diplomatic Strategy
towards South and Southeast Asia: Importance of Bangladesh
Dr. Md. Jahangir Alam
1
Abstract
After former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe paid a visit to ten
ASEAN countries in 2013, Japan emphasized increasing its visibility in
the Southeast Asian region. Considering China’s steadily expanding
influence in the region, a country like Bangladesh, which serves as a
connecting link between South and Southeast Asia, will be considered
sincerely for membership in the ASEAN. As the result of Sino-Japanese
rivalry, Japan and other powerful nations introduced FOIP, AUKUS,
CTPP, and QUAD as countermeasures to China’s BRI and RCEP to
establish its image as a liberal, the alternative partner of China and a
credible security provider of this region. The Southeast Asian nations
have significantly contributed to assisting Japan in this regard. In
contrast, the Chinese loan-making initiatives are receiving rejection by
the Southeast Asian community as they are considered a debt trap
diplomacy aimed at influencing the least developed countries. In
contrast, being a reliable partner for the Southeast Asian region
throughout the years, Japan has advocated for its international trade
relations to be reinforced by more substantial defense negotiations
involving the USA with the ASEAN nations to prevail in maritime
security in the Southeast Asian nations. Considering Bangladesh, a
geopolitically important area, Japan and China have been trying to
offer assistance in multiple sectors, such as infrastructure, projects,
education, advanced transport, and technology. In this study, the
researcher will conduct a comparative analysis highlighting
Bangladesh’s significance as a Southeast Asian nation following
qualitative methodology resulting in some recommendations for
Bangladesh to strategically balance its relationship with Japan and
China while focusing on economic development.
Keywords: Diplomatic Strategy, Japan, China, South and Southeast
Asia, Bangladesh.
1
Dr Md. Jahangir Alam is an Associate Professor at the Department of Japanese Studies, Faculty of
Social Sciences, University of Dhaka, Bangladesh.

Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 24, No. 2, December 2022
Introduction
Concerns regarding the possibility of great power competition in Asia have grown
over the past few years. The competition is most likely to emerge in the geo-
economic domain as regional governments attempt to utilize their expanding
economic strength to increase their regional and global influence. As a result, China
and Japan have become geographically solid economic opponents, as evidenced by
their competition regarding contracts for infrastructure in Asia, particularly in the
Southeast Asian region.
2
China has taken steps to increase its confidence as a rising
nation and has aimed to export infrastructural goods and associated technological
machines beyond Asia.
3
In contrast, Japan is determined to continue leading the area
in infrastructure development to hold its regional power.
4
The High-speed Rail System (HSR) has provided the most unambiguous indication
of this competition. China won a $5 billion deal from Japan in September 2015 to
construct Indonesia’s connecting Jakarta and Bandung through the first HSR.
56
Since
ties were strengthening between the two nations, Japan grabbed this opportunity to
benefit their national economy. In 2015, Japan consented to an arrangement with
India to develop an HSR that would connect Mumbai and Ahmedabad and cost
USD 15 billion.
7
Japan is also scheduled to build an HSR line that would link
Bangkok with Chiang Mai. The Chinese workers have started building a new train
line that will run from Nong Khai, located near the Laotian coastline, to Map Ta Phu,
situated on the eastern shore of the Gulf of Thailand.
8
Their recent endeavours, like
the creation of the AIIB, encouraged Japan to respond with pledges to Southeast
Asian Infrastructure Development Asia.
9
Japan’s strategy for preserving regional
2
Hong Zhao, “China–Japan Compete for Infrastructure Investment in Southeast Asia: Geopolitical
Rivalry or Healthy Competition?,” Journal of Contemporary China, vol. 28, no. 118 (2019): 558-574.
3
Md. Jahangir Alam, “Japan’s Foreign Policies in South and Southeast Asia Under Chinese Influence:
Significance of Bangladesh,” Journal of Japanese Studies: Exploring Multidisciplinarity, vol. 1, no. 2
(2022): 137-156.
4
Benny Cheng Guan Teh, “Japan–China Rivalry: What Role Does the East Asia Summit Play?,” Asia
Pacific Viewpoint, vol. 52, no. 3 (2011): 347-360.
5
Agatha Kratz and Dragan Pavlićević, “Norm-making, norm-taking or norm-shifting? A case study
of Sino–Japanese competition in the Jakarta–Bandung high-speed rail project,” Third World
Quarterly, vol. 40, no. 6 (2019): 1107-1126.
6
Jessica C. Liao and Saori N. Katada, “Geoeconomics, easy money, and political opportunism: the
perils under China and Japan’s high-speed rail competition,” Contemporary politics, vol. 27, no. 1
(2021): 1-22.
7
Hidetaka Yoshimatsu, “New dynamics in Sino-Japanese rivalry: Sustaining infrastructure
development in Asia,” Journal of Contemporary China, vol. 27, no. 113 (2018): 719-734.
8
Yang Jiang, “Competitive partners in development financing: China and Japan expanding overseas
infrastructure investment,” The Pacific Review, vol. 32, no. 5 (2019): 778-808.
9
Mike Callaghan and Paul Hubbard, “The Asian infrastructure investment bank: Multilateralism on
the silk road,” China Economic Journal, vol. 9, no. 2 (2016): 116-139.

The Pursuit of Japan and China’s Rivalry and Soft Diplomatic Strategy
dominance in construction finance was widely seen as the Partnership for Quality
Infrastructure (PQI) as of May 2015.
10
This ongoing competition among the nations has benefitted Bangladesh’s recent ties
with the major powers, particularly Japan, China, and India.
11
Since 2020,
development funding has increased significantly, although Bangladesh
achieved lower middle-income status in 2015.
12
Net foreign aid increased to US$ 5.0
billion in 2017/18, representing the most considerable volume and year-over-year
rise. Additionally, China offered $4.35 billion while India committed $4.5 billion
in financial aid for $14.86 billion in fiscal 2017/18,
13
proving that the so-called ‘new
donors’ are now essential players in this field. Similarly, Japanese engagements have
increased during the previous decade, and the title ‘single largest donor’ remains
with Japan.
14
According to many experts and observers, China’s efforts to form ‘soft-balancing
alliances with smaller nations’ against India include Bangladesh.
15 16
Beijing’s
infrastructure initiatives in such countries have ‘questionable economic returns,’
17
where scholars criticize that the Chinese debt trap is prevailing in foreign aid
providing for the least developed countries for economic development.
181920
Dhaka is
10
Jyotishman Bhagawati, “Japan’s Grand Strategy to Counter China: An Analysis of the “Partnership
for Quality Infrastructure,” Institute of Chinese Studies Analysis, vol. 41, no. 8 (2016).
11
Lailufar Yasmin, “India and China in South Asia: Bangladesh’s Opportunities and Challenges,”
Millennial Asia, vol. 10, no. 3 (2019): 322–336.
12
Shams El Arifeen et al., “Maternal mortality in Bangladesh: a Countdown to 2015 country case
study,” The Lancet, vol. 384, no. 9951 (2014): 1366-1374.
13
Johannes Plagemann, “Small states and competing connectivity strategies: what explains
Bangladesh’s success in relations with Asia’s major powers?,” The Pacific Review, vol. 35, no. 4
(2022): 736-764.
14
Barbara Stallings and Eun Mee Kim, “Japan, Korea, and China: Styles of ODA in East Asia,” in
Japan’s Development Assistance: Foreign Aid and the Post-2015 Agenda, ed. Hiroshi Kato et al. (London:
Palgrave Macmillan, First Edition, 2016), 120-134.
15
Lai-Ha Chan, “Soft balancing against the US ‘pivot to Asia’: China’s geostrategic rationale for
establishing the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank,” Australian Journal of International
Affairs, vol. 71, no. 6 (2017): 568-590.
16
Thazha V. Paul, “When balance of power meets globalization: China, India and the small states of
South Asia,” Politics, vol. 39, no.1 (2019): 50-63.
17
Kevin G. Cai, “The one belt one road and the Asian infrastructure investment bank: Beijing’s new
strategy of geoeconomics and geopolitics,” Journal of Contemporary China, vol. 27, no. 114 (2018): 831-
847.
18
Gal Luft, “China’s infrastructure play: why Washington should accept the new Silk Road,” Foreign
Affairs, vol. 95, no. 5 (2016): 68-75.
19
Hong Yu, “Motivation behind China’s ‘One Belt, One Road’ initiatives and establishment of the
Asian infrastructure investment bank,” Journal of Contemporary China, vol. 26, no. 105 (2017): 353-
368.
20
Nadège Rolland, “China's “Belt and Road Initiative”: Underwhelming or game-changer?,” The
Washington Quarterly, vol. 40, no. 1 (2017): 127-142.

Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 24, No. 2, December 2022
becoming more autonomous, while Beijing, New Delhi, and Tokyo are still trying to
enhance their connections to the South and East, as seen by the history of
Bangladesh’s key construction developments. Recipient countries’ newfound
confidence might significantly affect their development paths to help equal global
power dynamics and inspire innovative approaches to building the world’s
infrastructure. By not pressing Dhaka to select a side, the large countries are
effectively recognizing Dhaka’s claim that its system is ineffectual, enabling it to
receive the advantages of having relations with all major nations at once.
Without a doubt, Bangladesh energetically embraces the idea of interconnection and
progression. Simultaneously, it is pushing for Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) regionalism, demanding multi-polarity and opposing talks that
demonstrate a Sinocentric worldwide request and selective participation with China,
all of which contradicts the Chinese-driven vision of a community of shared fate.
However, Japan and China’s emphasis on investments in construction as a foreign
policy tool in Southeast Asia in the twenty-first century is more symptomatic of the
increasing influence of non-major power nations than of a new era of significant
power domination. As a small state and a theatre of opposing connectivity plans,
Bangladesh has benefited from developing great power rivalries contrary to
theoretical projections.
The multilateral ties between Bangladesh, Japan, and China have been the research
subject for quite some time. Especially the growing interest of both these countries in
Bangladesh compelled us to monitor their advances and assess accordingly to gain
the best from both. From a geographic standpoint, Bangladesh is not considered a
Southeast Asian country, but it is crucial for connecting South and Southeast Asia.
21
Hence, Bangladesh has got potential to be considered to attain ASEAN membership.
Throughout this study, a comparative analysis will be made resulting in some
suggestions for Bangladesh to adopt amid this ongoing chaos of global politics.
Methodology
This study employs a literature and document review research methodology, and it
is strengthened by incorporating articles including empirical studies in relevant
disciplines. Among the subjects covered in this study is a variety of topics, including
comprehensive evaluations of Japan-China ties, the arrangement of credits for
infrastructural and transportation systems, as well as technological improvement in
South and Southeast Asia, with an emphasis on Bangladesh, and the development of
the worldwide economy and the recently introduced policies such as the Belt and
Road Initiative (BRI), Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific
Partnership (CPTPP), trilateral security pact between Australia, the United
21
Md Jahangir Alam, Bangladesh-Japan Diplomatic Relations (1972-2022): A New Paradigm of Strategic
Partnership (Dhaka: MuktoBuddhi Publishers, 2022).

The Pursuit of Japan and China’s Rivalry and Soft Diplomatic Strategy
Kingdom, and the United States (AUKUS), Regional Comprehensive Economic
Partnership (RCEP), and Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) plans. Due to the nature
and scope of this investigation, a qualitative approach has been taken in this study.
This research goal is ideal due to qualitative research’s unique objective of providing
a thorough understanding and interpretation of the social world phenomenon via a
study of its participants’ histories, experiences, and perspectives.
22
The data included
in the study come from a wide variety of credible and trustworthy sources that have
been checked for accuracy and quality by other governing authorities. This source
contains a variety of scholarly journals, books, and publications. To ensure that
research includes a high level of criticism, the analysis of empirical studies considers
relevant components and facilitates comprehension.
Theoretical Framework
The global movement of regionalism began in the years following World War II.
Since then, regionalism has gradually evolved over two separate eras: the Cold War
and the post-Cold War periods. Both politics and ideologies of the individual nations
have influenced regionalism to undergo periodic modifications. Establishing
territorial alliances and bipolar conflict were hallmarks of the Cold War era. The
post-Cold War era gave rise to an international system characterized by significant
changes in the distribution of power around the globe and the elimination of the
necessity to form regional blocs for political gain. The rise of new regional
organizations like the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and the West African Economic and
Monetary Union (UEMOA), as well as the re-emergence of respected regional
organizations like the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the
Southern African Development Community (SADC), are all hallmarks of post-Cold
War regionalism.
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is the subject of a sizable
amount of literature on Asian regionalism. This emphasis has been previously seen
primarily due to ASEAN being one of the few enduring regional organizations in the
greater Asian area. This reflects the field’s predisposition to prioritize state-led
regional organizations instead of more comprehensive regionalization processes.
The foundation of ASEAN cooperation during the Cold War was strengthening
member nations and promoting stability through promoting coordination. However,
22
Felicity Agwu Kalu and Jack Chola Bwalya, “What makes qualitative research good research? An
exploratory analysis of critical elements,” International Journal of Social Science Research, vol. 5, no. 2
(2017): 43-56.

Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 24, No. 2, December 2022
in a contemporary place, the weight is on attaining greater economic prosperity
and security in the regions involved.
23
Figure 1: Theoretical Framework of Regionalism
In recent phenomena, the discussion of informal, or ‘soft,’ regionalism and collective
identity development has played a significant role in East Asian regionalism
debates
24
. While there is a substantial network involving informal forums, work
teams, and advisory boards, notably within the ASEAN, the Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation forum (APEC), the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), and the ASEAN Plus
Three (China, Japan, and the Republic of Korea), scholars remain attracted to the
practice of non-legalistic decision-making that prevails in the area since there is no
transmission of state sovereignty. This unstructured decision-making method
is known as the ‘ASEAN Way’ or ‘soft institutionalism’.
25
23
Md Jahangir Alam, “Japan’s contribution to Bangladesh: Aspirations for inclusive development and
regional cooperation,” Cogent Social Sciences, vol. 8, no. 1 (2022): 2138150.
24
Md Jahangir Alam, “Role of Media and Governance for Bridging Socio-political Barriers: Japan-
Bangladesh Perspective,” Journal of International Affairs, vol. 18, no. 1 and 2 (2014): 85-102.
25
Fredrik Söderbaum, “Theories of regionalism,” in Routledge handbook of Asian regionalism,ed. Mark
Beeson and Richard Stubbs (London: Routledge, First Edition, 2012), 31-41.
Theory of Regionalism
Soft regionalism
Politics
Security
Strategical
Policies
Economy
Regional organisations such as ASEAN, APEC, ASEM, ASEAN
Plus Three, FOIP, CPTPP and others
Cultural

The Pursuit of Japan and China’s Rivalry and Soft Diplomatic Strategy
In contemporary times, the promotion of free regionalism and free trade has been a
goal shared by all regional initiatives, including NAFTA, MERCOSUR, ECOWAS,
and ASEAN. A significant concentration area of these programs is to reduce basic
tariffs. The notion of gradual lowering of trade barriers throughout the emerging
market was founded on the Bretton Woods system.
26
In the recent era, regional
dynamics have intensified, which has eventually caused power transfers inside the
international system to add complexity to the global system. Changes in global
power structures depend on the systemic change in new regionalism.
Japan in Southeast Asia: Smart Strategic Engagement to Ensure a Balanced Indo-
Pacific
After former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe visited ten ASEAN countries in 2013, Japan
emphasized increasing its visibility in the Southeast Asian region. During his visit,
Abe reminded the people of this region about the Fukuda Doctrine (1977) and asked
the ASEAN countries to work together to materialize this long-awaited vision.
Nevertheless, the question arose, why was there such a bold move by Abe within the
first year of his mandate? With China’s expanding power in Southeast Asia, the
solution seemed obvious: striking a balance. To cement its reputation as a competent
security provider and liberal option in South and Southeast Asia, Japan rolled out its
FOIP strategy.
The South China Sea is a vital region for the Asian economy’s seaborne shipping
lines and is under the complete control of China. Around 70 percent of Japan’s
commerce and 80 percent of its energy supplies go via this corridor.
27
That is why
the Japanese government is keeping a close eye on this waterway after escalating the
2013 Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands conflict to a new level.
28
Southeast Asia has been
playing a vital role in assisting Japan regarding its rising concerns about China. In
establishing its influence, Japan has promoted international economic cooperation
complemented by more active defense diplomacy.
In response to the ongoing competition between the two countries, the Partnership
for Quality Infrastructure (PQI) expanded in Japan in 2016 to compete with the BRI
of China. Its investment in connectivity projects in this region increased to US$200
(2016) billion from US$110 (2015) billion.
29
When Beijing prioritized North-South
26
Giovanni Barbieri, “Regionalism, globalism and complexity: a stimulus towards global IR?,” Third
World Thematics: A TWQ Journal, vol. 4, no. 6 (2019): 424-441.
27
S. Mahmud Ali, “Case Study 2: The Twenty-First Century Maritime Silk Road,” in China’s Belt and
Road Vision: Geoeconomics and Geopolitics (Switzerland: Springer, 2020), 231–289.
28
Marc Lanteigne, Chinese foreign policy: an introduction (London: Routledge, 2015, Third Edition).
29
Werner Pascha, “The quest for infrastructure development from a “market creation” perspective:
China’s “Belt and Road”, Japan’s “Quality Infrastructure” and the EU’s “Connecting Europe and
Asia”,” International Economics and Economic Policy, vol. 17, no. 3 (2020): 687-704.

Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 24, No. 2, December 2022
routes, Tokyo concentrated on developing the East-West one, resulting in a
wholesome incorporation of the entire region. Also, Japan’s China+1 strategy, the
corporate strategy of expanding its business outside of China, influenced 12,000
Japanese companies to expand their operations in the ASEAN countries,
30
diversifying their production bases and creating a new supply chain backed up by
new infrastructures.
Japan’s hunger for a more initiative-taking defense force is an open secret now. Abe
was often criticized for his ambitious goal to gain the highest rank in global soft
power while not implementing the necessary initiatives to achieve such a position.
However, Japan has strategically influenced the ASEAN countries to strengthen
maritime capacity-building activities and institutionalize strategic dialogues over the
years. Though formerly they were reluctant about a visible political or military
initiative in this region, their strategy has evolved. They have been practising the
‘grey security activities,’ disguising them as law enforcement issues regarding
antiterrorism and antipiracy. For example, the Japanese Coast Guard (JCG) has been
practiced countering piracy with funding from the Japanese Official Development
Assistance (ODA).
31
Even though ODA has been steadily decreasing for many years,
the ASEAN nations remain high on the list of priorities.
32
In 2009-2010, Indonesia
ranked first, Vietnam ranked third, and the Philippines ranked fifth.
Japan has been counted on as a reliable ally in Southeast Asia’s fight against security
concerns for a long time. Japan’s Self-Defense Forces (SDF) assisted Cambodia and
East Timor by teaching them how to respond to natural disasters and construct
infrastructure. The Indonesian and Vietnamese medical staff received special
training for their countries’ newly formed submarine teams. Though these might
sound like a lot, Japan’s government is cautious in adopting such approaches as
their constitution; specifically, Article 9 prevents them from owning conventional
security forces. That is why Japan’s highly ambitious security programs in the
ASEAN might enrage its neighbours. They emphasize strengthening human
resources and providing technical assistance to sectors outside of traditional
security. However, the Philippines, Indonesia (purchased radar systems and patrol
ships), Vietnam, and Malaysia (purchased second-hand P3-C maritime patrol
30
Chien-peng Chung, “What are the strategic and economic implications for South Asia of China’s
Maritime Silk Road initiative?,” The Pacific Review, vol. 31, no. 3 (2018): 315-332.
31
Yee-Kuang Heng, “Smart power and Japan’s self-defense forces,” Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 38,
no. 3 (2015): 282-308.
32
Md Jahangir Alam, “Significance of Japanese Studies to Achieve Sustainable Development Goals in
Bangladesh,” in Japanese Studies: Evaluation and Way Forward, ed. Abdullah-Al-Mamun (Department
of Japanese Studies, 2022), 121-147.

The Pursuit of Japan and China’s Rivalry and Soft Diplomatic Strategy
aircraft) are increasingly demanding Japanese military hardware.
33
Hence, it is
planning to expand its operations in the future.
Japan could not establish a political and military presence in Southeast Asia for a
long time because of its history of aggression in the region. Nevertheless, with time
and strategic proceedings, Japan has successfully gained support for its defense
agenda from Indonesia, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. As the scenario changed for
good through the economic, political, educational, and cultural strategic
diplomacies, finally, with a recent survey, it is known that Japan is the most reliable
country in the eyes of the ASEAN. But allegations were raised some pointed out that
the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) is a counter policy of China. That is why the
FOIP strategy is now presented as a vision with progressive economic, political, and
security relations emphasizing the ASEAN centrality. As the relations between the
ASEAN and Japan grow in various ways with economic integration and security
cooperation, we can sense a more remarkable shift in the power dynamics of world
politics.
China’s Development Assistance in Southeast Asia
Japan and China, arch-rivals of each other, share plenty of similarities. Just like
Japan, the Bandung Conference 1955 highly influenced China’s philosophy behind
diplomatic assistance. In a 1964 visit to Africa, Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai
outlined eight guidelines for China’s economic and technical support of other
nations.
34
33
William T. Tow and Satu Limaye, “What’s China Got to Do With It? US Alliances, Partnerships in
the Asia‐Pacific,” Asian Politics & Policy, vol. 8, no. 1 (2016): 7-26.
34
Victor Carneiro Corrêa Vieira, “From Third World Theory to Belt and Road Initiative: International
Aid as a Chinese Foreign Policy Tool,” Contexto Internacional, vol. 41 (2019): 529-551.

Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 24, No. 2, December 2022
Figure 2: China’s Philosophy behind Assistance
The inspiration behind such high morale was Japan’s experience as a victim of
colonialism and imperialism. These ideological principles had remarkable
similarities with Japanese ODA, received by China in return for natural resources,
primarily coal, and oil. Japan contributed to the modernization of its four sectors,
agriculture, industry, defense, and science & technology, ultimately strengthening
the backbone of the Chinese economy.
After introducing the BRI to a greater audience worldwide in 2013, China described
it as an initiative to connect the Chinese market to the international economy by
building a global organization of rail routes, streets, and waterways. Furthermore,
45% of the Chinese BRI projects were expected to be assigned to Southeast Asia in
2017.
35
But with growing concerns over the Chinese debt trap, the BRI was on the verge of
receiving mass rejection by the Southeast Asian community. The Hambantota in Sri
Lanka and Gwadar in Pakistan are being taken away upon failing to repay debts on
time, creating excellent opposition among individuals to adopt the BRI, primarily
35
Xunpeng Shi and Lixia Yao, “Prospect of China’s energy investment in Southeast Asia under the
belt and road initiative: A sense of ownership perspective,” Energy Strategy Reviews, vol. 25 (2019):
56-64.
Ensuring equality
and mutual benefit
above all
Respect for the
sovereignty of the
recipient countries
Fair and affordable
loans
Support for self-
reliance and
independent
economic
development
Fast and affordable
projects
High-quality
equipment and
materials
Know-how and
technology transfer
No special treatment
for Chinese experts

The Pursuit of Japan and China’s Rivalry and Soft Diplomatic Strategy
because people from this region are not very hospitable to foreign
collaborators.
36 37
But some examples of resilience by the Chinese government
defended their intensions behind preaching the BRI. A few of them are mentioned
below:
First, Vietnam’s countermeasures after the Chinese transfer of the HD-981 oil rig in
2014 did not provoke any threats from the Chinese government when a single snap
to such a small economy as Vietnam could severely break down its entire system.
Second, in 2012, when the Philippines seized 8 Chinese fishing vessels, it did not lead
to severe economic repercussions, contrary to popular belief.
Third, in 2011, the Myitsone Dam in Myanmar was stopped by their domestic
authority, despite being the most significant project financed by China and the
existing close relations between the countries. This is an important example to
remember, as it proves that the recipient countries, no matter what, hold the right to
oppose initiatives that might not benefit the local communities across Southeast
Asia.
Fourth, in 2018, Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammad halted the East
Coast Rail Link project (under BRI), as it could take their economy to a vulnerable
state, with massive debt unreturnable due to a lack of available capital.
Finally, Laos declined the high-speed rail project of US$ 6 billion, as it was unclear
how a GDP of roughly US$ 17 billion could benefit from this development.
Though such examples are available, the belief that China is becoming a revisionist
power (that effort to use force, if necessary, to impose a new order in society that
favours the current quo) is gaining popularity over time. It is disturbing that in a
poll by the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute in 2018, 51% of senior policymakers in
Southeast Asia distrusted China as a significant power.
38
Moreover, 47℅ strongly
opposed the concept of the BRI. On the other hand, only 17% of the population
(Southeast Asia) was mistrusted by Japan, and 66% believed that Tokyo was taking
the correct measures. Hence, China must check its upcoming moves cautiously to
raise its position in power politics among the ASEAN countries.
36
Adhe Nuansa Wibisono, “China’s “Belt and Road Initiative” in Sri Lanka: Debt Diplomacy in
Hambantota Port Investment,” Mandala: Jurnal Ilmu Hubungan Internasional, vol. 2, no. 2 (2019): 222-
245.
37
Jeremy Garlick, “Deconstructing the China–Pakistan economic corridor: Pipe dreams versus
geopolitical realities,” Journal of Contemporary China, vol. 27, no.112 (2018): 519-533.
38
David Shambaugh, US Relations with Southeast Asia in 2018: More Continuity Than Change, no.
18 (ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, 2018).

Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 24, No. 2, December 2022
BRI, RCEP VS QUAD, FOIP, AUKUS, CPTPP: Can a Fragmented Approach
Counter China?
Figure 3: BRI, RCEP VS QUAD, FOIP, AUKUS, CPTPP nations
On the question of the RCEP, China will get the upper hand. With 30% of global
GDP coverage, this partnership exceeds UNMCA (28%) and the EU market (18%) in
world trade.
39
Tariff-free access to Japan and South Korea will result in massive
export growth. Also, importing manufacturing supply chains from ASEAN
countries will undoubtedly increase their production capability. But on the other
hand, the least developed countries in this pact will lose their export opportunities
as Japan and South Korea will be on opposing teams. Services and agriculture not
included in this deal will significantly affect the least-developed and developing
countries. However, to contain China, Washington planned to join TPP but later
withdrew it. Afterward, it was modified and introduced as CPTPP. Meanwhile,
39
Kazushi Shimizu, “The ASEAN Economic Community and the RCEP in the world
economy,” Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies, vol. 10, no. 1 (2021): 1-23.
•147 countries joined BRI; among them, 6 are in Southeast Asia
(Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Thailand, and
Vietnam).
BRI: Belt & Road Initiative by
China
•The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, a trade
deal between 10 ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian
Nations) countries and China, Japan, South Korea, Australia,
and New Zealand.
RCEP
•Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, a strategic security dialogue
between India, Australia, Japan, the United States, and member
countries.
QUAD
•Free and Open Indo-Pacific, Japanese foreign policy, which
will combine two continents, Asia (including Southeast Asia)
& Africa, and two oceans (the Indian Ocean & Pacific Ocean).
FOIP
•A security pact in the Asia-Pacific by the UK, USA, and
Australia to counter China.
AUKUS
•The Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-
Pacific Partnership. This is a trade agreement between Canada
and 10 other countries (Australia, Brunei, Chile, Japan,
Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and
Vietnam)
CPTPP

The Pursuit of Japan and China’s Rivalry and Soft Diplomatic Strategy
China has been attempting to join CPTPP, which is still uncertain.
40
However, a
healthy Chinese hegemony will be formed over this region if it succeeds.
When the West has been trying to counter China’s rising influence, it must be
addressed that without a perfect blueprint, uneven approaches of AUKUS, QUAD,
FOIP, or CPTPP will result in nothing. Security facilities and increased economic
interaction under these deals have been slower, unlike the BRI or RCEP. Moreover,
as a silent shadow following China and the US in various agreements, Japan might
prevent itself from uniting with the UK, US, and Australia (AUKUS) against China.
It makes sense as AUKUS has proposed nuclear submarines for patrolling the South
China Sea. But Japan possessing such machines and using them within its military
vessels might cause considerable controversy as its constitution does not permit
them to use or maintain land, air, or sea weapons.
However, the EU’s Indo-Pacific approach can serve as a model in the contest to defy
China. It helps to understand that priorities must be fixed to ensure sustainable
development. Inclusion in prosperity, transition to a green economy, ocean
governance, human rights, security, and defense are some key points to making a
comprehensive plan, keeping the current environment in mind. In addition, working
towards attaining these goals will not succeed with such fragmented approaches.
That is why, despite multiple attempts, the West has not been able to seal off a more
solid agreement than the BRI by China or the RCEP, which will most likely benefit
the Chinese more than any other participating nations.
The Rivalry between Japan and China
Since in the process of striving for the support of little nations, significant powers
would attempt to give numerous advantages and opportunities to the latter, this
competition between the two countries may present Southeast Asia with additional
options for constructing infrastructure. According to the findings of Tomotaka
Shoji’s study, Japan is building its ties with the ASEAN like that of China because of
apprehension of China’s growing power in the Asian countries. Regardless of John
Ciorciari’s cases that fortifying binds with Southeast Asia is not a reaction to China’s
rising power, contests from different countries that believe they should carry on with
work in Southeast Asia have heated up because of China’s growing economic effect.
Indeed, Japan’s infrastructure assistance greatly influences China’s expanding
strategic importance throughout Southeast Asia. For example, in May 2015, a few
months afterward, China sent off the China-driven Asian Infrastructure Investment
Bank (AIIB), and Japan laid out the PQI to improve Asia’s framework quality.
40
Takashi Terada, “RCEP Negotiations and the Implications for the United States,” The National
Bureau of Asian Research, vol. 20 (2018).

Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 24, No. 2, December 2022
Japan’s foreign affairs fundamental weakness is its failure to dream large.
41
The elites
of several Southeast Asian countries are hoping that Japan will step up its game and
play a more significant part in the Asian development strategy if the regional
competition between China and Japan stimulates it. However, Japan’s attempts to
construct regional institutions in Asia have not yet proven successful. On the other
hand, China promoted a more targeted strategy across the region via initiatives like
the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the AIIB, and the Community of Human Destiny.
Different individuals have different perspectives on how much China and Japan
compete for regional public services. Some experts have argued that China and
Japan’s competition for investment in Southeast Asian infrastructure goes beyond
the projects themselves and will instead be motivated by geopolitical considerations,
which could lead to geopolitical problems within the territory. Japan, as well as the
United States, have always been treaty allies, therefore, apart from the demands for
strengthening their very own economy, Japan has been placing a premium on
the export competition for the High-speed Rail System (HSR) to align with
America’s Asia-Pacific rebalance approach as well as limit China.
42
Since 2010, many
Southeast Asian nations have experienced changes due to competition between
major powers. Mainland ASEAN states like Laos and Cambodia are less involved in
the Sino-Japanese struggle for economic capacity development than their maritime
counterparts, such as the Philippines and Indonesia, in the war. If tensions between
China and Japan or other major powers escalate, it might test the ASEAN’s
commitment to unity and neutrality. Concerns have been raised that the rivalry
between China and Japan could derail or even undermine the ASEAN’s efforts at
unification since the ASEAN is perceived as lacking the ability to control the
negative implications of the rivalry due to its small size and disparities among the
participating countries. It is not location, according to Chinese academics; instead, it
is the difference in China’s policy that has caused a strategic divide among the
ASEAN members. Since 2010, attitudes toward China in Southeast Asia have varied
per country, and investment competition between China and Japan has
heated present-day policy variation across Southeast Asian nations.
Japan and Bangladesh: A Story of 50 Years of Solid Friendship
Since 1974, a growing economic interaction has occurred between Japan and
Bangladesh. Over the years, a large amount of Japanese Overseas Development
Assistance (ODA) has been allocated to Bangladesh. Multiple Japanese brands like
Sony, Hitachi, Panasonic, Nikon, Honda, and Nissan have integrated themselves
into Bangladesh’s domestic market in such a way that today the demand for
41
Asta Maskalionaite, “Learning to think big: The Lithuanian experience of the ISAF,” Pol. Q. Int'l
Aff., vol. 23, no. 2 (2014): 43-60.
42
Fei Xu et al., “Research on the impact of China’s high-speed rail opening on enterprise market
power: Based on the perspective of market segmentation,” Transport Policy, vol.128 (2022): 121-137.

The Pursuit of Japan and China’s Rivalry and Soft Diplomatic Strategy
electronic appliances and automobiles has been highly dependent on Japan for the
past five generations. Over the last five years, Japanese companies increased their
investment in Bangladesh to around 40%,
43
resulting in a considerable rise in the
number of Japanese operating companies in the country within a decade (from 82 to
315).
India is also strategically significant because of its enormous population and position
between the Bay of Bengal to the South, the Indian Ocean to the West, and the
Arabian Sea to the East. Japan has invested in India’s infrastructure and assisted in
India’s capacity to produce electricity because of the long history of friendship and
solidarity between India and Bangladesh. Furthermore, Japan’s assistance in job
creation for India’s massive population contributed to developing a highly trained
labour force in that country.
Besides Bangladesh, the ASEAN countries, including Vietnam, Indonesia, Thailand,
Cambodia, Malaysia, and the Philippines, have been the most excellent receiver of
Japanese Foreign Direct Investment (FDI),
44
which brought a beneficial change in
their industrial structure and policies, improved their productivity, and technology-
based development. When the Prime Minister of Bangladesh visited Japan in 2014,
‘Japan-Bangladesh Comprehensive Partnership Treaty was signed. The Bay of
Bengal Industrial Growth Belt (Big-B) is a megaproject on Matarbari Island. It was
included in a 600 billion yen offer to start additional infrastructure projects.
454647
As a strategic intersection between South Asia and Southeast Asia, Bangladesh is a
magnet for countries that want to improve their international position. Particularly,
the Indian Ocean controlling 80% of Japan’s maritime trade with the Middle East to
import raw materials has been their most significant concern. Moreover, with its
growing control over this route under the BRI by building many deep-sea ports,
China can put Japan in a vulnerable position at any moment. China providing 97%
43
Mohammad Sujauddin et al., “Ship breaking and the steel industry in Bangladesh: a material flow
perspective,” Journal of Industrial Ecology, vol. 21, no. 1 (2017): 191-203.
44
Lurong Chen and Ponciano S. Intal, “ASEAN foreign trade, investment, and integration in
comparative perspective,” ASEAN and Member States: Transformation and Integration (Economic
Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia, 2017, vol. 3): 13-33.
45
Hossain Ahmed Taufiq and Shakira Mahzabeen, “Japan-Bangladesh Relations: Focus on Free and
Open Indo Pacific,” Journal of International Relations, vol. 15, no. 1-2 (2022): 205-241.
46
JICA, “The Initiative of BIG-B (The Bay of Bengal Industrial Growth Belt) | Bangladesh | Countries
& Regions | JICA,” available at:
<https://www.jica.go.jp/bangladesh/english/office/topics/141105.html> (accessed on November 5,
2014).
47
Gaurav Dutta, “Japan and the BIG-B Plan for Bangladesh: An Assessment,” National Maritime
Foundation, available at: <https://maritimeindia.org/japan-and-the-big-b-plan-for-bangladesh-an-
assessment/> (accessed on October 21, 2016).

Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 24, No. 2, December 2022
duty-free facility to 5,161 Bangladeshi products (till 2024) motivated Japan to bring a
subtle shift in their concentration from India to Bangladesh.
48
In addition, due to their persistence, they have been greeted highly in Bangladesh’s
domestic market. In Araihazar, Narayanganj, a G2G-based ‘Japanese economic zone’
on 1,010 acres, and in Gazaria, Munshiganj, a factory for Honda Motor Corporation,
has been approved by the government of Bangladesh as a sign of rising Japanese
influence. Dhaka Mass Rapid Transit (MRT) metro rail is one of the recent examples
of successful collaboration between these two countries. Furthermore, many more
activities are ongoing under the Big-B initiative. However, along with offering cheap
labour, the government of Bangladesh must ensure a safe environment free of
political instability to attract more Japanese ODAs. In terms of the agricultural
sector, as 40% of farming products get damaged due to poor management, Japan has
also shown interest in implementing a cold chain and ensuring a better supply chain
to modernize Bangladesh’s agriculture industry.
China and Bangladesh: A Delicate Relationship under Major Third-Party
Influences
Although some of the powerful neighbours may not have been pleased with the
beginning of the connection, Bangladesh cannot avoid becoming economically and
geopolitically dependent on China. In 2002, Bangladesh signed a Defense
Cooperation Agreement, leading China to become the former’s biggest arms
exporter in the upcoming years. Today, around 70% of Bangladesh’s weapons are
purchased from them.
49
After that, President Xi Jinping’s visit in 2016 gave birth to a
new bilateral relationship called the ‘Strategic Partnership of Cooperation.’ After
Bangladesh agreed to be a part of China’s BRI, facing sharp rejection for Padma
Bridge’s funding by the World Bank, the Chinese government promised a total of
$40 billion as an investment for infrastructure development, joint ventures, and loan
agreements. Bangladesh boasts nine significant infrastructure projects attributable to
the BRI, including the Dasher Kandi Sewage Treatment Plant, the Bangabandhu
Tunnel under the Karnaphuli River, and the Padma Bridge Rail Link.
It might seem that China has a growing positive image in South Asia, but this is not
entirely true. The possibility of falling under the Chinese ‘debt trap’ endangered
future collaboration possibilities between China and other South Asian countries.
50
48
Uma Kabe, “String of Pearls: Still Attached or Detached?,” Forum for Integrated National Security
(FINS), May 19, 2021, available at: <https://finsindia.org/string-of-pearls-still-attached-or-
detached.html> (accessed on November 15, 2021).
49
Ling Li and Ron Matthews, “Made in China”: an emerging brand in the global arms
market,” Defense & Security Analysis, vol. 33, no. 2 (2017): 174-189.
50
Md Jahangir Alam, “Japan’s Foreign Policies in South and Southeast Asia under Chinese Influence:
Significance of Bangladesh,” Journal of Japanese Studies: Exploring Multidisciplinarity, vol. 1, no. 2
(2022): 137-156.

The Pursuit of Japan and China’s Rivalry and Soft Diplomatic Strategy
The discussion over Gwadar Port of Pakistan and Hambantota of Sri Lanka enraged
the mass people of Bangladesh, and the government felt it might face harsh criticism
if negotiations of the currently operational Chinese projects were not made
wisely. As a result, China’s long attempt to establish a naval base through the project
of the Sonadia deep seaport was rejected bythe government of Bangladesh due to
environmental concerns and to resist coal-based projects.
51
But this does not indicate
the main reason. India’s strong dissatisfaction with the existence of a Chinese naval
base near the Indian Ocean played a key role here. Also, its mere distance from
Japan’s proposed deep-sea port in Matarbari made it entirely redundant. Later, they
were given the Payra marine port project, connected only through a 75 km long
canal, which does not qualify Payra as the most suitable candidate for a naval base.
52
Also, Bangladesh has been dealing with the Rohingya issue for quite a long time.
5354
It has more reasons to decline any significant advances from China due to its
investment in Myanmar’s Kyaukpyu Deep Sea Port, which is located in a sensitive
geopolitical area in the Rakhine state, the homeland of Rohingya refugees. The
reason behind the strategic investment is not very hard to realize, as this port is in
Vishakhapatnam (East Coast of India), close to an expanding Indian submarine base
on the Bay of Bengal coast.
5556
Recently tension between these two countries grew further as China warned
Bangladesh from joining QUAD, a US-led venture to contain Chinese hegemony in
51
Rejaul Karim Byron, “Plans for a Deep Seaport at Sonadia Nixed,” The Daily Star, September 1, 2020,
available at: <https://www.thedailystar.net/business/news/plans-deep-seaport-sonadia-nixed-
1953857> (accessed on November 15, 2021).
52
Wade Shepard, “Bangladesh’s Deep Sea Port Problem: China, Japan, and India Are All Competing
to Build Dhaka’s First Deep Sea Port,” The Diplomat, June 7, 2016, available at:
<https://thediplomat.com/2016/06/bangladeshs-deep-sea-port-problem/> (accessed on December 12,
2021).
53
Dhaka Tribune, “Rohingya Repatriation: Efforts Underway to Resume Tripartite Talks,” May 22,
2021, available at: <https://archive.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/rohingya-
crisis/2021/05/22/rohingya-repatriation-efforts-underway-to-resume-tripartite-talks> (accessed on
December 12, 2021).
54
Parvej Siddique Bhuiyan, “Japan’s Silence on Rohingya Hinders Asia’s Peace and Stability,” Union
of Catholic Asian (UCAnews), September 14, 2021, available at:
<https://www.ucanews.com/news/japans-silence-on-rohingya-hinders-asias-peace-and-
stability/94123> (accessed on January 02, 2022).
55
Eleanor Albert, “Competition in the Indian Ocean,” Council on Foreign Relations, May 19, 2016,
available at: <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/competition-indian-ocean> (accessed on January
02, 2022).
56
Linda Calabrese and Yue Cao, “Managing the Belt and Road: Agency and Development in
Cambodia and Myanmar,” World Development, vol. 141 (2021): 105297.

Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 24, No. 2, December 2022
the South China Sea.
57
Bangladesh strategically balanced the situation by replying to
remind them about the rights of an independent, sovereign government.
58
The foreign policy study on the bilateral ties between Bangladesh and China is
unparalleled. Bangladesh and China have built an unlikely pattern of amicable
relations that has survived government changes in Bangladesh. It has also endured
the context alterations of the Cold War and its aftermath. Both countries have had
friendly relations for decades. Analysts often use the phrases all-climate and time-
tested to characterize bilateral interactions. However, China and Bangladesh may
have a somewhat different relationship.
A variety of intellectual currents have theoretically influenced Bangladesh’s foreign
policy. Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the father of the nation, highlighted
the importance of the phrase ‘Friendship to all and malice to none’ in a profitable
way. Although it reflects an idealistic notion of foreign policy, it has a lasting impact
on Bangladesh due to its importance in maintaining bilateral and multilateral
partnerships worldwide. Bangladesh has increasingly accepted several international
norms that define its position in the global community. Examples include
multilateralism, Third-Worldism, anti-colonialism, non-interference, and Asianism.
Bangladesh has often expressed certain policy positions using pragmatic reasoning.
It has helped Bangladesh avoid partnerships with international superpowers.
Bangladesh is now at a crossroads as the influence of China and Japan continues to
expand, and it must determine which direction to go. In recent years, China has
effectively exerted a substantial influence over South Asian nations, and Bangladesh
is one of the essential geopolitical players in this area. However, Tokyo did not
ignore its significance. Tokyo had maintained a charitable connection with
Bangladesh since the country’s inception post-war and has assisted Bangladesh in
times when even Beijing was unable to do so. As Bangladesh’s foreign policy lacks a
clear preference, it is transitioning towards strategic planning that can be understood
via ‘Game Theory,’ where geographically and economically, smaller states balance
their actions to get the most from their larger counterpart. With the assistance of its
favourable foreign policy, Bangladesh has embraced this idea to maximize
productivity and has attempted to strike a balance between Beijing and Tokyo.
57
Nilotpal Bhattacharjee, “China’s Warning to Bangladesh on the Quad,” The Diplomat, May 18, 2021,
available at: <https://thediplomat.com/2021/05/chinas-warning-to-bangladesh-on-the-quad/>
(accessed on January 04, 2022).
58
Abul Quasem Haider, “Bangladesh and the Issue of Quad,” The Financial Express, June 26, 2021,
available at: <https://thefinancialexpress.com.bd/views/bangladesh-and-the-issue-of-quad-
1624645330> (accessed on January 04, 2022).

The Pursuit of Japan and China’s Rivalry and Soft Diplomatic Strategy
With its growing interaction with the US and Japan and India being Bangladesh’s
oldest friends, the nation is cautiously taking steps to strategically balance itself
against overpowering China. Sensing this distance, Beijing had recently tried to
enhance bilateral ties with Bangladesh, led by the Chinese foreign minister, to
discuss the economic fallout of the post-Russian-Ukraine war and third parties’
provocations regarding the China-Taiwan issue. Supporting the ‘One China’ slogan,
Bangladesh stated that it welcomes China’s advances to contribute to Bangladesh’s
economy, but the government of Bangladesh will make the final decision regarding
such proposals.
Bangladesh, like some other Southeast Asian countries (Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia,
Myanmar), can be chosen as the new location for labour-intensive Chinese factories.
Several sunset industries will be relocated amidst their unique approach to
increasing high-end manufacturing. Bangladesh could be the perfect destination to
possess a considerable population with a cheap labour force.
Nevertheless, to maximize profit from their interactions, Bangladesh must
emphasize collaboration between the countries on the digital economy, cloud
computing, internet finance, artificial intelligence, big data, quantum computers,
internet infrastructure, smart cities, nanotechnology, and e-commerce. Otherwise, if
these sectors remain unexplored, Bangladesh’s gain from Beijing’s strategic move
out to avert the effects of rising environmental pollution will be minimal but with a
substantial negative impact.
Map 1: Regional map of South Asia (dark blue) and Southeast Asia (light blue)
Bangladesh’s Pursuit of Being a Part of ASEAN
With around zero diversification in export, where the garment sector contributes
only 85%, the future of Bangladesh’s economy does not seem very bright. Finally, in
2026, Bangladesh will be crowned as a developing country, and many prior facilities

Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 24, No. 2, December 2022
will be stripped down from the country.
59
However, the question is, is Bangladesh
ready to take the shocks of a developing nation? The answer is, sadly, no.
Bangladesh’s rival in the garments sector, Vietnam, is receiving ample Foreign Direct
Investment (FDI), a sector where Bangladesh is lagging far behind. Bangladesh is
currently concentrating on signing as plentiful FTA as possible to minimize the
shock after 2026.
60
The government has already identified around seven to eight
sectors where export diversification is possible. In the meantime, Bangladesh needs
to keep signing FTAs with more prominent countries to understand better how this
works and with the smaller ones with little trade deficit to ensure duty-free imports
and tariff-free exports.
61
During these times, one option is to apply to join the ASEAN, which will provide
and increase significant possibilities. The ASEAN countries have produced an
enormous market by interconnecting and contributing to raising each other’s income
levels. Bangladesh can serve as both a consumer market and a manufacturing facility
due to the country’s vast population, ninth biggest labour force, thirty-first (thirty-
third) largest economy, and enormous consumer demand per capita (rising).
62
Quickly, the country can be titled one of the fastest-growing middle classes.
Therefore, to the ASEAN, Bangladesh is a golden land of opportunities. Nonetheless,
before joining the ASEAN, Bangladesh must ensure many factors: tax and product
compliance and a certain level of production quality to maintain the membership.
Unfortunately, Bangladesh is not ready to uphold such responsibilities. But it is high
time to reform the corrupted and reckless system and consider the bigger picture.
Like the rest of the ASEAN, the Philippines has significantly benefited from the
intra-ASEAN investment from other member states like Singapore and Malaysia. We
might find inspiration by modelling ourselves after them. The government of
Bangladesh has already applied to become the ASEAN’s Secretarial Dialogue
Partner. Now is the time to use Bangladesh’s connection with Japan and China to
convince the ASEAN countries of our capability and how both sides could benefit
59
Debapriyo Bhattacharya and Sarah Sabin Khan, “Bangladesh Moving out of the LDC Group:
Looking through the Issues,” in Bangladesh’s Graduation from the Least Developed Countries Group:
Pitfalls and Promises, ed. Debapriya Bhattacharya (London: Routledge, First Edition, 2019).
60
Mohammad A. Razzaque, “Geo-Economics, Globalization, Geo-Economics in the Aftermath of the
COVID19 Pandemic: Trade and Development Perspectives from Bangladesh,” in Globalisation
Impacts: Countires, Institutions and COVID 19, ed. Amitendu Palit (Singapore: Springer, 2022), 105-
125.
61
Prabir De, “Why Is Trade at Borders a Costly Affair in South Asia? An Empirical Investigation,”
Contemporary South Asia, vol. 19, no. 4 (2011): 441–64.
62
Vitalina Antoshchenkova et al., “Enhancing competitiveness as a key factor in improving living
standards,” in Vectors of competitive development of socio-economic systems, ed. Oleksandra Mandych
and Tadeusz Posuka (Opole: The Academy of management and admimistration in Opole, 2020), 4-
10.

The Pursuit of Japan and China’s Rivalry and Soft Diplomatic Strategy
from this integration. But why and how would Japan or China influence these
Southeast Asian countries? To know the answer, it is a must to dig deeper and learn
more about the RCEP.
RCEP: Confederating Bangladesh, Japan, and China with the Southeast Asian
Countries
When India pulled out of the RCEP, many opposed the initiative of Bangladesh to
join the RCEP as prudent. However, Bangladesh has taken a bold step to boost its
development process, making it up to the mark of a middle-income country. It has
associations with a few multilateral economic alliances (D8, APTA, SAFTA). Since
1976, a constant trade deficit has occurred due to the low export volume.
6364
Once
Bangladesh graduates as a developing country, maintaining export to the RCEP
region will face tariff issues, worsening the scenario.
The idea of establishing such a partnership derived from facing the current
difficulties of cross-border trade in Asia under multiple FTAs. Instead of advantages,
Bangladesh is facing significant losses due to increased transaction costs, existing
trade protectionism, and declining operational efficiency. The RCEP aims to boost
the intra-ASEAN exports and imports, eliminating trade barriers. Undoubtedly, such
principles establish the RCEP as a sustainable remedy to the noodle-bowl effect.
65
It is not hard to predict that entering the RCEP will also increase Bangladesh’s
credibility in joining the ASEAN. Through the RCEP, Bangladesh will be able to
explore unexplored opportunities to transform itself into a manufacturing hub,
offering the developed RCEP countries a reasonable option to relocate their sunset
industries. Bangladesh will also gain other assistance, including trade facilitation
and logistics support. More FDA proposals will keep coming once the nation gains
the confidence of foreign investors.
Bangladesh’s economy will face a sharp turn in the upcoming years when its
garments industry will face hurdles among other tough competitors. Without a
cheap labour force, there is nothing else that Bangladesh’s garments sector can
63
Bushra Humaira Sadaf and Sakib B. Amin, “Causal relationship between current account deficit
and foreign direct investment: An empirical analysis of Bangladesh,” World Review of Business
Research, vol. 8, no. 3 (2018): 52-60.
64
Mohammad Kabir Hosen et al., “Economic growth of Bangladesh and external sector
behavior,” International Journal of Natural and Social Sciences, vol. 3, no. 3 (2016): 48-63.
65
Asif Muztaba Hassan, “Will Bangladesh Benefit by Joining RCEP?,” The Diplomat, November 5,
2021, available at: <https://thediplomat.com/2021/11/will-bangladesh-benefit-by-joining-rcep/>
(accessed on January 10, 2022).

Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 24, No. 2, December 2022
provide to foreign business people.
66
Moreover, this growing competitive world
cannot be counted as precious capital. Amid such a situation, there are two options:
Joining the RCEP with a bundle of several FTAs, or signing them separately, which
will only exhaust the process, and of course, there will be all the complications of the
‘noodle-bowl effect.’
Both considering Bangladesh as a geopolitically vital region, Japan and China have
been attempting to offer aid to Bangladesh in multiple sectors. With their help,
Bangladesh can join the RCEP by completing the necessary homework and
designing an economic plan with short, mid, and long-term strategies. This
integration will ultimately result in gaining membership in the ASEAN, which will
designate Bangladesh with further advantages.
Conclusion
Bangladesh’s core principle regarding foreign policy has been ‘Friendship to all,
malice to none.’ But in 2022, when the world is divided into political or religious
views, this slogan puts Bangladesh in a good position. Bangladesh has maintained a
peaceful, friendly relationship with its neighbouring country, India, since 1971. But
as globalization took Bangladesh forward in the more significant international
market space, the government has been approached by some major powers, China,
Japan, and the US. However, Bangladesh has avoided significant confrontations with
any of them so far. Does it mean Bangladesh gained the highest possible advantages
through implementing the pacifist foreign policy? The answer will be negative.
Because, despite having multiple assistance from foreign investors regarding
infrastructure development and logistics support, the country has not been able to
expand its export system to the necessary height. On top of that, Bangladesh has not
even explored the options suitable for exporting so far. This raises the question of the
growing corruption and internal political instability that has restricted Bangladesh’s
economy from choosing options for the country’s best interest. That is why
Bangladesh needs to find new sources to earn dollars. In addition, both Japan and
China can assist in broadening their horizons, thus helping to enter the era of
sustainable development. Strategic measures must be taken to gain the best from
both these providers. Moreover, freeing itself from the age-old foreign policy,
Bangladesh might need to take bold stands to ensure its interest is served duly.
Standing at the confluence of South and Southeast Asia, it must be kept in mind that
Bangladesh holds a crucial geopolitical position, and it is time to use the perks
gained from this inherited asset. So, Bangladesh getting into the ASEAN with the
help of China and Japan can ensure a win-win position for all parties involved.
Bangladesh can offer more skilled human resources with integrated technology and
feasible space for their sunset industries. In this way, the country will be able to
66
Christian Wagner, “The Role of India and China in South Asia,” Strategic Analysis, vol. 40, no. 4
(2016): 307-320.

The Pursuit of Japan and China’s Rivalry and Soft Diplomatic Strategy
maximize its output and, with the help of the developed countries as the
development partner, can achieve a lot to sustain itself economically and politically.