PreprintPDF Available


  • University of Alicante Spain
Preprints and early-stage research may not have been peer reviewed yet.
Raphael Neelamkavil, Ph.D. (Quantum Causality),
Dr. phil. (Gravitational Coalescence Cosmology)
Cosmologists and quantum cosmologists seem to be almost unanimous (but happily today, a bit
decreasingly unanimous) that, at the so-called level of the Planck era / quantum era of the
original state of the big bang (of our universe, or of an infinite number of such universes existent
in an infinite-eternal multiverse – whichever the case may be), where all forces are supposed to
be unified or quasi-unified (but always stated without any solid proof), (1) either there did not
exist and will never exist causality, (2) or any kind of causality is indistinguishable from the
normal course of physical existents.
Is this sort of cosmological theorizing acceptable, where (1) the unification is supposed but
is not necessarily physical-ontologically presupposable, and (2) causality and non-causality are
taken in the mood of dilemma? This sort of theorizing is, of course, based on some facts that
most physicists and other scientists agree on without much effort to search for causes of
approval or disapproval.
But the adequacy of such reasons for this conclusion is questionable. The manner of
concluding to non-causality or indistinguishability of causality and non-causality at spots in the
universe or multiverse, where all forces are supposed to be unified or quasi-unified, is
questionable too. The main reason is the lack of physical-ontological clarity regarding the status
of causality and the status of unification of the forces.
In my opinion, this is based on the inevitable fact that whatever the mathematics
automatically prescribes for such situations can be absolute only if all the parameters,
quantities, etc. that have entered the equations are absolute. The prescribed necessity condition
has not been the case in the physics that goes into the mathematical formulation of the said
Even concerning the measurement that humanity has so far made of the speed of light is not
exact and absolute. The reason for the fantastic cosmological conclusion regarding a volatile
decision for or against causality and regarding a supposed verity of the supposition that all
forces are unified therein, does not possess an adequate mathematical reason, and of course not
a sufficiently physical.
The reason I gave is not strictly and purely mathematical, physical, or just generally
philosophical. It is strictly physical-ontological and mathematical-philosophical. Things
physical-ontological are not “meta-”physical in the sense of being beyond the physical. Instead,
they treat of the preconditions for there being physics and mathematics. They being pre-
conditions, not respecting them leads to grave theoretical problems in mathematics, science,
and philosophy.
Hence, in my opinion, fundamentally mathematical-ontological and physical-ontological
presuppositions and reasons are more rationally to be acceptable for the foundations of
mathematics and physics than all that we have as strictly mathematical and physical in the name
of foundations. I give here the obvious in order to assure clarity: I presuppose that physical
ontology consists of the necessary presuppositions of anything dealt with in physics,
astrophysics, cosmology, and other purely physical sciences, and of course of the mathematics
and logic as applied to existent physical things / processes.
The main reason being considered for the so-called non-causality and indistinguishability
between causality and non-causality at certain cosmological or physical spots seems to be that
space and time could exist only with the big bang (or whatever could be imagined to be in place
of it), whether just less than 14 billion years ago or doubly or triply so much time ago or
First, my questions on this assumption are based on an antagonism that I have to
cosmologists lapping up the opinion expressed by St. Augustine centuries ago. That is, if space
and time “exist” only if and from the time when the universe exists, then the question of space
and time before the expansion of the universe is meaningless. These cosmologists presume that
the expansion of the universe was from a nullity state, and that hence it could not have existed
before the beginning of the expansion. What if it existed from eternity like a primeval stuff
without any change and then suddenly began to explode? This is the basic premise they seem
to hold, and then conclude that time, as an “existent” now, would not have existed before the
expansion! What a clarity about the concept of existence! Evidently, this is due to the gaping
absence of regard for the physical-ontological presuppositions behind physical existence.
Secondly, as is evident, some of them think that space and time are some things to exist
beyond or behind all the physical processes that exist. Thus, some identify space even with
ether. If we have so far only been able to measure physical processes, why to call them as
measures of space and time? Why not call them just as what it is, and accept that these are
termed as space and time merely for ease? After all, whatever names we give to anything does
not exist; and we have not seen space and time at all.
Thirdly, is it such a difficult thing for scientists to accept the lack of evidence of any sort of
“existence” of space and time as background entities? Einstein spoke not of the curvature of
existent spacetime, but of the mathematical calculations within a theory of the
measurementally spatiotemporal aspect of existent physical processes as showing us that
the measurementally spatiotemporal aspect of the physical processes – including existent
energy-carrier gravitational wavicles – is curving within mathematical calculations.
Now, if the curvature is of existent processes (including existent energy-carrier gravitational
wavcles), then, at the so-called primeval spot in each existent universe (even within each
member of an infinite-eternal multiverse containing an infinite number of finite-content
universes like ours) where all forces are supposed to be unified or quasi-unified, there cannot
be a suspension of causation, because nothing existent can be compressed or rarefied into
absolute nullity and continue to exist.
This demonstrates that, even at the highly condensed or rarefied states, no existent is
nothing. It continues to exist in its Extended and Changing nature. If anything is in
Extension-Change-wise existence, it is nothing but causal existence, constantly causing
finite impacts.
Why, then, are some cosmologists and theoretical physicists insisting that gravitons do not
exist, space and time are entities, gravitation is mere spacetime curvature, causality disappears
at certain spots in the cosmos (and in quantum-physical contexts), etc? Why not, then, also say
that material bodies are merely spacetime curvature and cannot exist? Is this not due to undue
trust in the science-automation powers of mathematics, which can only describe processes
in a manner conducive to its foundations, and not tell us whether there is causation or not?
I believe that only slavishly mathematically automated minds can accept such claims.
Examples of situations where causality is supposed to disappear are plenty in physics. More
than century of non-causal interpretations within Uncertainty Principle, Double Slit
Experiment, EPR Paradox, Black Hole Singularity, Vacuum Creation of Universes, etc. are clear
examples of physicists and cosmologists becoming prey to the supposed omnipotence of
mathematics and their unquestioning faith in the powers of mathematics.
It is useless, in defence of mathematics and physics, to cite here the extreme clarity and
effectiveness of mathematical applications in instruments in space-scientific, technological,
medical, and other fields. Did I ever question these precisions and achievements? But do the
clarity and effectivity of mathematics mean that mathematics is absolute? If they can admit
that it is not absolute, then let them tell us where it will be relative and less than absolute.
Otherwise, they are mere believers in a product of the human mind, as if mathematics were
given by a miraculously active almighty space and time.
All physicists need to recognize that all languages including mathematics are constructions
by minds, but with foundations in reality out-there. Nothing can present the physical processes
to us absolutely well. Mathematics as applied in physics (or other sciences) is an exact science
of certain conceptually generalizable frames of physical processes. This awareness might help
physicists to de-absolutize mathematical applications in physics.
Fourthly, the above has another important dimension. Physics or for that matter any other
science cannot have at its foundations concepts that belong merely to the specific science. I
shall give an example as to how some physicists think that physics needs only physical concepts
at its foundations: To the question what motion is, one may define it in terms allegedly merely
of time as “the orientation of the wave function over time”. In fact, the person has already
presupposed quantum physics here, which is clear from his mention of the wave function, which
naturally presupposes also the previous physics that have given rise to quantum physics.
This sort of presupposing the specific science itself for defining its foundational concepts is
what happens when concepts from within the specific science, and not clearly physical-
ontological notions, come into play in the foundations of the science. Space and time are
measuremental, hence cognitive and epistemic. These are not physical-ontological notions.
Hence, these cannot be at the foundations of physics or of any other science. These are
derivative notions.
It is for this reason that I have posited Extension and Change as the primary foundational
notions. As I have already shown in many of my previous papers and books, these two are the
only two exhaustive implications of the concept of the To Be of Reality-in-total as the totality
of whatever exists.
ResearchGate has not been able to resolve any citations for this publication.
ResearchGate has not been able to resolve any references for this publication.